
IN THE ABSENCE OF WAR: EMPLOYING AMERICA'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE 1990s

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Absence of war is not peace.

— John F. Kennedy

In the 1990s, the challenges and dangers of a world system experiencing multiple imbalances place new demands on the United States. America's ability to match increasingly diverse commitments and strained resources in this environment seems at times an impossible responsibility, calling into question established beliefs and traditional approaches toward security.

The task is made more difficult by the uniqueness of the post-Cold War period. At this point in history, there is but one center of power — the United States. The United States stands alone in both global reach and influence, dominant and seemingly more able to impose its will than at any period in its history. But at the same time, the security environment is filled with uncertainty. Past security paradigms for viewing the world are no longer relevant. Today, the calculation of America's national security must take into account unknown variables from at least three simultaneous revolutions: one political, one social, and one military.

The political revolution is *transnationalism* — an emerging political framework that is changing the basic understanding of nationhood and sovereignty. In its place, the basic outlines have emerged of a world where geographic borders are becoming transparent to the flow of ideas, commerce, people, and turmoil; where state and non-state actors are on an almost equal footing; and where global institutions have an international constituency and are less responsive to the authority of a single national government.

The social revolution is *technocentrism* — the impact on society of advances in science, mass communication, and information exchange. This revolution affects how business is conducted, how information is received, and how the world is perceived.

The military revolution is *defense multilateralism* — the radical transformation of the threat and response sides of the national security equation. Rather than an easily identified, singular threat that could be contained by a Western-based security alliance, the world now faces a vast dispersal of dangers requiring a

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wider — but constantly varying — coalition of nations to deter aggression and resolve conflicts.

In reviewing the ongoing debate over a post-Cold War security strategy, it has become clear that some do not recognize these revolutions in the making. Others acknowledge the revolutions, but see no need to adapt to their consequences.

Characterizing the various factions in this debate is difficult, as they cross party lines and ideologies. Distinguishing at least two distinct groups is the issue of national interest. One camp holds a restrictive view based on vital core interests, believing that the danger of communism has been replaced with the danger of multilateralism. The other group adopts a more expansive interpretation, viewing multilateralism as the *modus operandi* for the employment of America's military power; this camp would permit force to become a more usable, versatile instrument of statecraft. The tension between these competing views of the national interest and the role of force are unlikely to be resolved soon.

Since maintaining America's national security is at the heart of any argument regarding the national interest and force employment, defining the elements of this security is essential. An important source for definitions of this strategy is the 1993 *Joint Military Net Assessment*. It lays out the following elements of a new national military strategy:

- Deterring would-be aggressors and decisively defeating them when necessary;
- Preventing or helping resolve foreign internal conflicts;
- Continuing U.S. participation in security partnerships; and
- Maintaining long-term preparedness.

While consensus in national security matters is always difficult to achieve, real controversy arises both within and outside the military services when basic elements of security are expanded to include protecting human rights and fulfilling rudimentary needs in other nations. Where to draw the line is neither neat nor precise, as witnessed in Somalia. Solutions to international crises must be made on a case-by-case assessment and carried out in consultation with allies and multinational organizations. Protracted debates over participation and involvement in each multilateral effort will likely be the norm.

Because the international environment remains uncertain, the United States continues to face security challenges. The 1993 *Joint Military Net Assessment* identifies the predominant challenges and dangers facing the United States, including:

- Dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, biological, or chemical — in the hands of a hostile regional power or terrorist group;
- Regional aggression and conflict;
- Dangers to democracy and reform, particularly in those areas that have experienced democracy and liberal reform only since the end of the Cold War; and

- Economic problems within the U.S. economy, its performance within a global economic system, and America's continued need for access to key resources and markets.

The immediate task for civilian and military decision makers is to develop both *national* and *international* mechanisms for handling these dangers. This duality is important. The security environment today — involving multiple challenges, limited resources, and domestic economic and political constraints — increasingly presumes a reliance on multilateral responses. Multilateralism, however, requires an appreciation of diverse perspectives and a reassessment of traditional approaches to national security. It allows for a reconciliation with, rather than abandonment of, U.S. national interests.

The Military's Core Value

America's collective military capability is an appropriate cornerstone upon which to build the framework of international security in this turbulent decade. For while the calculation of security has changed with the collapse of the Berlin Wall, America's inventory of military capabilities retains its unique utility in this era of uncertainty. The United States did not acquire weapons for a cold war solely to contain an ideological opponent, but rather invested broadly for deterrence and defense. Because the security equation has changed, the challenge for U.S. leaders is to identify the type and quantity of capabilities applicable for future operations that stress flexibility and mobility, and include coalition participation. In this way, the United States can tailor its preeminent capabilities to maximize both its military advantage and its ability to contain disorder, and meet the unpredictable challenges of this decade.

The challenges today are similar to the political, economic, and military upheaval that followed the conclusion of the two global conflicts of the twentieth century. Then as now, established organizations and traditional beliefs were severely tested; correct assessments and appropriate actions required exceptional leadership. It was the lack of focused leadership in the interwar years that led to a second global conflagration. On the other hand, the clarity of vision and sureness of purpose demonstrated by U.S. leaders after World War II ensured the peace in Europe for more than four decades.

For handling post-war reconstruction, U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall advised his planning staff: "Don't fight the problem." This philosophy called for avoiding immersion in the wrong issues. From Marshall's perspective, the real objective of any effort required dealing with the consequences of problems — areas that could be influenced by decision makers and policy planners. Accordingly, to mitigate the economic destruction of World War II, the Marshall Plan and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation were launched to facilitate European reconstruction and recovery. To defend a devastated Western Europe against the threat of aggression, collective security mechanisms were established through the Brussels Treaty, the Western Union Defense Organization, and ultimately the NATO Alliance. The post-war leader-

ship concluded quickly that economic and political reconstruction, if implemented in stages, would not succeed when people did not feel secure. U.S. leaders learned that political, economic, and security issues could not be treated as isolated elements, but rather they had to form a seamless framework.

Five decades later, with the Cold War, Warsaw Pact, and Soviet Union relegated to the history books, the problem America confronts now is systemic change — prompted by the revolutions in politics, society, and defense. Fighting this change is futile, just as reverting to isolationism is impossible, for these transformations are too pervasive. Accordingly, to be in a position to mitigate and correct the political, economic, and military imbalances in the international system, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has established a new strategic direction, as articulated in the *Bottom-Up Review*. This review establishes the parameters for defining legitimate force and posture levels for the U.S. armed forces, while taking account of political and strategic necessity.

Establishing Security Requirements

In the new security environment, the United States has discarded the Cold War planning assumption of a short-notice, intense conflict against forces as large and capable as those of the Warsaw Pact. The old planning assumptions required a large network of garrison forces committed to the defense of Europe.

Now, to address the competing forces of integration and fragmentation, the United States is prepared to rely on highly mobile forces at lower states of readiness. These will be called on for near-term challenges or for reconstituting forces if a major threat reemerges. Additionally, the post-Cold War security equation has permitted a number of selected force-level reductions.

Reduction in force levels is only part of the overall picture, however. The decreased tensions inherent in the current regional and global security environments allow for increased warning time, which permits the United States to reduce its response time. The greater reaction time for likely contingencies compensates for reduced materiel and manpower resources. Notwithstanding dramatic reversals in the security environment, these adjusted force structure and readiness levels remain valid for addressing U.S. security for the mid-1990s and beyond.

“We Have What We Have”

Regardless of whether considering national or international resources, the strategic environment and economic realities dictate that force levels and defense budgets be reduced. In this context, defense planners must use their existing capabilities more efficiently and effectively, rather than expect new, large-scale capital investments. This approach need not raise fears about lost capabilities. In the short term, innovative employment strategies will allow for a continued, credible response to support U.S. commitments. Paying the bills for these forces will be the only hurdle. For the long term, the United States should be identifying priorities for research and development (R&D) and pro-

curement of next-generation technologies and platforms that will ensure force and capability enhancements for the military of the future.

In spite of the near-term assessment of continued military effectiveness, already alarms are being sounded. Some are concerned about the potential for creating hollow forces similar to the military's experience in the 1970s. Then, the United States failed to maintain the needed balance among R&D, procurement, operation and maintenance (O&M), and personnel programs. The U.S. military cut its forces without preserving its strength. Today, the situation is different; there is a road map to avoid repeating that journey. By exploring various force employment options, promoting joint operations, and investing in next-generation technologies, the United States is undertaking a number of initiatives for "right-sizing" the American armed forces even as it reduces the size of the military.

The demands the United States faces today are unlike those of the previous four decades. During the Cold War, the United States, in its global and theater roles, responded to security requirements with fairly rigid combinations of permanently assigned forces and standard deployment packages. Traditional force employment concepts sometimes provided more capability than was necessary, or, conversely, required more than was available to command authorities. Just as significant, traditional security approaches excluded non-military assets for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and peacekeeping, which are now becoming essential for resolving the current range of global crises. For the past two decades, each Unified Commander had substantial forces in-theater and on-call as "umbrella insurance coverage" for crisis response.

Today, technology permits — and declining force levels and fiscal constraints mandate — that the United States find new ways to provide needed coverage at reduced cost. The United States cannot afford, and the American people should not have to pay for, duplicate capability. The United States should be careful to avoid the temptation of allowing "the best" to become the enemy of "good enough."

The United States should avert this pitfall by breaking with the momentum of past deployment patterns. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Joint Staff, and the Unified Commanders have begun exploring ways to position needed capabilities forward without over-committing tomorrow's necessarily smaller force. The changed security equation has prompted the United States to play a global role that requires flexible, mobile, and adaptable forces.

The new focus is on Adaptive Joint Force Packages, capabilities-centered groupings of forces and headquarters that are trained and organized to meet specific requirements of the supported combatant commander in times of peace, crisis, or war. The concept involves two distinct elements: "packaging" forces, and then tailoring those forces to meet specific theater requirements (Figure 1).

Rather than the omnibus approach of the past, Adaptive Joint Force Packages are tailored to execute specific missions, contingencies, and tasks. Tailored elements of the full Joint Force Package can be positioned forward as needed, with designated backup units remaining stateside. As the concept matures, the

Unified Commanders will be able to write a more accurate prescription based on the anticipated situation in their area of responsibility, and call forward only the precise capabilities needed. Because the full Joint Force Package will have trained together, the tailored aspect — once deployed — will become the forward element of a trained and ready joint force available in the United States.

The concept of Adaptive Joint Force Packages was first validated in the spring of 1993, when a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) embarked on the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt for deployment to the Mediterranean. Naval aircraft whose basic mission was anti-submarine warfare — a threat virtually non-existent in 1993 — were left in the United States, and replaced by a Marine Air Element with selected capabilities for contingency response. Two-hundred and fifty Marines moved aboard the carrier. The traditional carrier air wing was modified to emphasize the strike mission in a possible littoral conflict, and anti-air warfare, a top concern during the Brezhnev era of naval confrontation in the Mediterranean, was deemphasized. The end result of this exercise was additive capability: strike and air-to-air capability were found to be equivalent to what had been deployed traditionally, and the focused capability of the SPMAGTF was oriented more closely toward the Unified Commander's requirements for the specific area and time of deployment.

The Roosevelt deployment was just a start. In the late summer of 1993, the USS America Joint Task Group deployed to the Mediterranean. Moving beyond the Roosevelt experience, the typical eleven-ship carrier battle group and five-ship Marine amphibious ready group were "blended" into a nine-ship Adaptive Joint Force Package, a prototype for the application of joint service capabilities in the 1990s. To enhance its capabilities, the package was rounded out by

Figure 1 Adaptive Joint Force Packages





Figure 2 Blending Capabilities



including Special Operations Forces, land-based Air Force and Navy aircraft, and tailored Army elements.

In the future, this concept will be developed further in order to blend the capabilities of disparate groups and forces into one jointly trained and employed force. Figure 2 represents a "nominal" Joint Task Force for the 1990s, employing both Special Forces and Space Command assets to ensure that all capabilities available in the U.S. inventory are brought to the table.

Adaptive Joint Force Packages need not be predominantly maritime in their orientation. The resident core capability could be land- or air-based as required. Packages positioned forward on a rotational or periodic basis to support a Unified Commander's specific contingency requirements could be composed mainly of Army units or Air Force squadrons, with just a supporting maritime component. By developing and integrating Adaptive Joint Force Packages, and promoting joint training, the Unified Commanders can meet the security requirements for continuous and periodic presence, as desired by the national command authority. By using the full potential of U.S. forces and calibrating capabilities that are positioned forward in accordance with the requirements of each Unified Commander, the United States can maintain the needed forward presence without over-committing its military forces.

Non-Traditional Missions

In this period of uncertainty and revolutionary developments in the geopolitical arena, America's armed forces must continue to be a sword for deterrence, crisis response, and war fighting. At the same time, however, they must be a

plowshare for peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief. The U.S. military is more than a force for deterrence; it can and should be a force for constructive change at home and abroad.

This duality is more than just an arcane academic debate on "traditional" versus "non-traditional" roles and missions. The American people have always expected a solid return on their taxpayer investment. Today's military can perform its basic missions, but it also has the technology, skill, and training — the "core competencies" in engineering, medicine, logistics, planning, intelligence, and communications — to do much more. The *modus operandi* is not "to do more with less," but instead, to get the most from investments *already* made.

From humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to peacekeeping, peace-promoting and peace enforcement missions, these non-traditional missions will continue. The question of "to do or not to do" is irrelevant. The need is there, the armed services have performed these types of missions since the early days of the republic, and they alone have the resources to complete the job effectively. In fact, since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, U.S. armed forces have participated in 28 significant operations. These have included a variety of diverse operations, from Operation Desert Storm to disaster relief in Florida; from peacekeeping in the streets of Mogadishu to flood relief in the Missouri River flood plains.

In several cases, the armed forces were simply responding to Americans in need of assistance. But this country cannot wait until an international crisis occurs before deciding to fashion a joint capability to accomplish the mission. Humanitarian assistance, nation building and disaster relief employments require communications linkages and logistics trains. Further, during a national or international crisis, genuine joint interoperability must already be in effect.

Rather than diminish operational capabilities, engagement in non-traditional missions enhances military effectiveness. While the battlefield may be absent, a capability used in a non-traditional setting will be honed and strengthened for future employment. Whether flying a photo reconnaissance mission above St. Louis to support flood relief, or conducting battle damage assessment on a training range in the Nevada desert, combat skills are reinforced.

Some argue that using U.S. armed forces for these "plowshare" missions tends to dull the warrior's sword. But these missions are not only a proper use of U.S. forces; they also provide valuable experience and training that are applicable to a broad spectrum of other essential operations. America's armed forces can no longer just "show up" when the tocsin is sounded. When U.S. forces arrive "on station," they have to be trained as a team and able to accomplish the mission with the help of joint doctrine and compatible equipment.

Concerns about employing American forces in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and nation-building roles overseas are understandable. Such concerns are well founded, given that during a 12-month period, 62 regional conflicts, guerrilla insurgencies, or terrorist group campaigns have been identified.

Nevertheless, if dangers to the United States are defined too broadly, the

country will always feel threatened and in a state of perpetual crisis. Even skeptical U.S. leaders must realize that activities which promote peace — especially those focused on humanitarian concerns — may help preempt future crises and forestall the employment of additional capabilities and accrual of additional costs. To resolve this dichotomy, prior to embarking on peace-promoting, peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peace enforcing missions, U.S. national leadership must achieve interagency consensus on six basic questions:

- What is the U.S. national interest?
- What challenges does America face in supporting or defending its national interest?
- What resources is America willing to commit in support and defense of its national interest?
- What is the proper role for American leadership?
- What are the criteria for success?
- When these criteria are met, when and how does the United States leave?

After achieving consensus, an interagency group must be organized. Membership will be comprised of individuals and groups essential to the process of determining:

- What is the U.S. objective?
- Who should lead (and, just as importantly, who should follow) in establishing a strategy to implement policy?
- What capabilities, functions, and tasks are required to implement policy on a cost-effective basis?
- What organizations possess these capabilities?
- How will implementation be monitored and lessons from past missions applied to future efforts?

The interagency group must be an organization capable of establishing central and component relationships. Accountability must be determined early, and planning, decision making, and implementation processes agreed to by all parties. Proper funding and staffing must also be resolved. Central to the ultimate success of the mission is that the United States not rush headlong into a commitment without adequate mechanisms and procedures in place which specifically delineate each interagency group components' responsibilities. Not to do so will result in "mission creep" of the kind in Somalia, with the United States incrementally taking on greater and greater responsibilities.

Equally important, those who formulate policy must realize that America is not just another country; it is the center of power in a world looking for moral, political and military leadership. When the United States makes a commitment, even at a base-force entry level — such as sending a single destroyer to conduct coastal maritime interception operations — it is but an initial check written on an account whose balance represents the entire spectrum of U.S. military capacity. This capability, from Marines to Special Forces, B-1 bombers to carrier battle groups, is always there, and capable of being called upon in a moment's notice.

U.S. political and military leadership must always be aware of this salient

fact. A decision to commit military force at any order of magnitude is a draw on this account, and one that is ultimately paid for by the American people. They have a right to expect the national leadership to be just stewards of their tax dollars, willing to invest if the occasion warrants, but aware of the prospects for profit as well as for potential loss.

Lessons gleaned from previous humanitarian assistance missions indicate that the hard issues upon which consensus is obtained must be addressed, not ignored. Additionally, operating procedures must be standardized among all participants. Finally, the peacemakers must focus on the roots of the problems, rather than flail away at distended branches not central to the issue.

A new perspective is needed to rethink and restructure the U.S. armed forces for such missions in this uncertain era. The diffuse nature of dangers facing the global community requires the United States to look at capital defense items differently. These items are more than just aircraft, ships, tracked vehicles or an information structure, including an entire command, control, communications, computer and intelligence (C⁴I) network. They are performance platforms that provide a range of capabilities to accomplish national or multinational objectives. Figure 3 illustrates this point with selected American capital defense items, which are capable of performing multiple missions because of their intrinsic multiple capabilities.

From the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) perspective, the wealth of capabilities available within the United States is easily demonstrated. Consider the Air Force's B-1B bomber. On the low-altitude part of its flight, the high-speed penetration ability of this bomber is more than 500 knots ground

Figure 3 Capital Investments and Capabilities

	Strategic Deterrence	Conventional Deterrence	Conventional Combat	Command & Control	Reconnaissance	Presence	Peace Enforcement	Peace-Keeping	Humanitarian Assistance	Counter-Drug	Disaster Relief
Aircraft Carrier	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Advanced Tactical Fighter		X	X		X	X	X			X	
Aegis Cruiser	X	X	X	X		X	X			X	
Amphibious Assault Ship		X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X
Army Brigade		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
B-1	X	X	X		X	X	X				
C-17			X			X	X	X	X		X
Helicopter		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Submarine	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	

speed, without afterburners. Capable of in-flight refueling, which expands its flying range, it provides the U.S. national command authority with an unparalleled global reach. As a nuclear deterrent, the B-1B can carry in its weapons bays various combinations of short-range nuclear air-to-ground missiles, nuclear free-fall bombs, and auxiliary fuel. With its variable geometry wing, the B-1B has a rapid take-off capability which enhances its survivability. In a conventional role, the B-1B can fit into a composite strike package or can conduct a dispersed operation for deep interdiction targets; accordingly, it provides a variety of tasks for a Joint Task Force Commander and Joint Force Air Component Commander.

The WASP Class multi-purpose amphibious assault ship provides another example of a capital defense item that is flexible and capable. Specifically designed to accommodate air-cushion landing craft and Harrier vertical/short takeoff and landing jets, this class of ship can accommodate the full range of Navy and Marine Corps helicopters, conventional landing craft, and amphibious vehicles. It can transport, deploy, command, and support all elements of a Marine Landing Force. When assigned by a Unified Commander, this ship is capable of operating with a joint task group as a command center for all phases of an amphibious operation. Where military force is required, it can carry an embarked landing force squadron and a mix of Harriers and assault helicopters from any service, provided that crews are trained for carrier operations. Where humanitarian assistance is needed, the WASP Class LHD has six fully-equipped medical operating rooms, four dental operating rooms, and hospital facilities for 600 patients. Additionally, it has 100,000 cubic feet of cargo space.

Another example of a flexible defense capability is the Army's Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Current joint exercises conducted by the Army include a brigade supported by Marine Corps air and naval gunfire controllers, Air Force close air support A-10s, and Navy Seals. NATO military units also frequently participate. Scenarios often involve a non-combatant emergency evacuation and employment of forces to defend a friendly nation from invasion by a neighboring state. The tactical operational centers, staff planning process, and live-fire range represent an impressive capability of an Army brigade and its three battalions. The Army's equivalent of the aircraft and ship performance platforms of the Air Force and Navy is the brigade and battalion, armor, light/heavy infantry, airborne or ranger. Whether for combat operations, peacekeeping, or aid to civilian authorities, the Army has capabilities uniquely suited to the most likely force employments in the 1990s and beyond.

Employment of the three systems cited above — a long-range bomber, an amphibious assault ship, and an army brigade — requires the Unified Commander to possess a sophisticated C⁴I network. Sophisticated does not necessarily mean complicated or large, however. From a simple desk in Norfolk, VA, the Unified Commander can communicate directly by voice and visual display with a Joint Task Force commander, whether in the field or at sea. With this computer system and a secure communication link, operational direction is provided, rules of engagement discussed, and field requests answered in real time. The Joint Task Force Commander, in turn, can communicate with all

component commanders, providing positive tactical control commonly required for today's highly fluid and sensitive operations.

A focus on capabilities is one way to break away from traditional threat-oriented thinking geared towards the Soviet bloc. Another method calls for changing the fundamental paradigm that is used to train the armed forces for future missions. In October 1993, the mission of USACOM expanded to reflect this new perspective. In addition to its traditional geographic responsibilities, USACOM was made responsible for the combatant command of nearly all deployable combat forces in the United States. Working closely with the component commanders and with the supported U.S. commanders-in-chief, USACOM is now responsible for the joint training of these forces: They must be capable of satisfying a continuum of requirements, from presence and humanitarian and peace operations, to contingency response and regional conflict. The intent of the change is to ensure that forces from the continental United States are fully prepared to complement forces overseas from the moment of their arrival in theater. Communications procedures, operating doctrines, and employment concepts will be known and understood by all forces, regardless of service.

Training is essential for effective joint force employment. Participating personnel, regardless of mission, need to train and exercise together to realize their full potential. Regardless of skills, service, or country, all participants need to become familiar with one another; forging a team begins only when participants are no longer a mystery to one another. Understanding capabilities on paper is one thing; seeing them employed in the field is quite another.

To provide realistic training for anticipated missions, USACOM has modified traditional maritime exercises in the Caribbean to include peacekeeping training. Involving both ground and sea-going forces, peacekeeping training focuses on necessary skills and realistic missions identified by Caribbean political leaders. Participants include forces from various island nations.


Exercises have focused on disaster recovery activities, counterdrug operations, small unit tactics, and engineering and medical force deployments. Planned future training scenarios will include crisis mediation, cease-fire arrangements and maintenance, election monitoring, and establishment of a multinational Joint Command Element.

The goal of all these initiatives is to realize the full potential of American forces. This can be done only by establishing a command structure and a joint operations focus that reflects the way the United States needs to be organized for both peace and war.

The Total Force Integrator

The multiple capabilities within each military performance platform are only part of the different strategic approach. A second consideration is how these platforms and capabilities are integrated into a unified, ready force that could also include non-military and international agencies. A Rubik's cube serves as a perfect conceptual model.

Figure 4 Capability Cube



The cube tests one's ability to align the six colors of the cube correctly. For these purposes, the six sides of the cube are modified to represent a range of capabilities that exist in the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, non-military agencies, and international agencies. Thus, a capability cube is created, as depicted in Figure 4.

By rotating the capability cube, various patterns emerge. The rules of this game allow for the construct of different force packages. A *correct* answer is a pattern whose combined and integrated capabilities can successfully accomplish an assigned mission. There is not just one correct configuration, as real world dynamics preclude a set prescription.

A planned joint task-force deployment to Europe could serve as one example. Based on requirements established by the U.S. European Command, the aircraft carrier USS George Washington is configured with capabilities from all four services. As depicted in Figure 5, such a configuration could respond to a Deny Flight operation (Iraq); a Sharp Guard maritime mission (Adriatic Sea); a non-combatant evacuation mission (Monrovia); or a national or international presence in a regional confrontation. The George Washington Joint Task Force could be reinforced rapidly with additional capabilities or reconfigured with substitute capabilities if the requirement arose.

Two other possible configurations, based on specific mission requirements, are depicted in Figure 6. For a 1994 deployment, USACOM and the theater commands requiring support are planning a joint task force that would include a Theater Missile Defense capability and Special Operation Forces (Army Rangers and Navy Seals) embarked on the aircraft carrier USS Eisenhower.

This joint task force would also include a cooperative engagement capability permitting one ship to engage a target held by another ship's sensors. Current plans envision this concept expanding to include land-based Army Patriot missile batteries which would be tied into the tactical picture generated by shipborne AEGIS air defense radars and AWACS aircraft.

From the advanced technology of the Washington Joint Task Force, consider a potential operation in support of a United Nations/Organization of American

Figure 5 Joint Task Force 94-1 George Washington





Figure 6 Variable Force Packages



States negotiated settlement of the Haitian political crisis. This task force might include armed forces and non-military agencies from both the United States and the international community. The package of capabilities would include military engineering units, as well as training units to modernize and professionalize the Haitian military and police forces. Required support personnel from other nations' militaries, coast guards, and police organizations also would be included. The goal would be to ensure that the full range of U.S. military activities were closely integrated with diplomatic and economic efforts.

The examples of both the Washington and Haitian Joint Task Forces illustrate the variety, flexibility, and scope of capabilities that can be employed by national and international decision makers. Only the limits of one's professional imagination will set the boundaries for the range of capabilities that can be assembled to address any crisis, peacekeeping effort, or humanitarian assistance endeavor. Accordingly, selecting the right capability mix for the mission is that which requires the most thought.

The Inner Workings and Hidden Mechanisms

For a Rubik's cube to work, three pivot arms hold the separate blocks together and allow for multi-dimensional rotation. A capability cube also requires three specific pivot mechanisms. In this case, they ensure that a force package maintains its cohesiveness and flexibility. As depicted in Figure 7, the pivot mechanisms for a capability cube are:


- a common command concept;
- interoperability of equipment and systems; and
- functional connectivity of equipment and systems.

A common command concept, the first pivot mechanism for the cube, is an accepted approach governing the entire command and control environment for combined joint operations. While it employs a C⁴I infrastructure, a command concept is not the information structure itself. A common command concept answers the basic question: How do forces operate, consistent with doctrine, force levels, and force competence, to achieve the assigned mission?

The battlefields and operating areas of the 1990s do not respect geographic or coalition boundaries, areas of responsibility, or service operating environments. Thus, command and control of national or multinational forces must be seamless, regardless of physical or political boundaries.

There are three essential and complementary elements of a common command concept. First, there must be unity of authority, from civilian leadership to an intermediate command headquarters to a field commander. It is this chain of authority that provides strategic direction, operational control, and public accountability for the mission. Second, military operations require unity of command — with all components and component activities answerable to the field commander. The designated joint force commander has the required authority to direct all forces. Third, field operations require unity of purpose

Figure 7 Cube Pivot Points



with all deployed capabilities integrated to accomplish the assigned tasks. Increasingly, field operations will include military and civilian personnel as nations, alliances, and transnational organizations undertake disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping operations. These specific operations, in particular, require coordination and cooperation among all forces to achieve the recognized objective — even though these forces may not necessarily be part of the same command arrangements.

The second pivot mechanism, interoperability of equipment and systems, is required for joint and combined operations. For a commander to be effective, he or she must be able to communicate directly with all mission components. For orders to be implemented by geographically separated forces, electronic networks must be compatible. Ground support missions can be more responsive if the air crew can communicate directly with the troops. Army helicopters can operate off a carrier or amphibious assault vessel if specifications for maritime operations are met and the crews are properly trained.

Functional connectivity of equipment and systems, the third pivot point of the cube, can enhance field operations. With the computer revolution, equipment and systems allow for “clip-on” capabilities — the ability to introduce new features into an existing structure. A C⁴I system in a Unified Commander’s office allows a Joint Force Commander access to intelligence briefings and imagery data. A data package that permits full access — or a data package with mission-specific intelligence — can be loaded into a compatible computer system, providing a technological edge for joint or coalition forces. From friend or foe identification programs, to counter-electronic jamming devices, to transportable command work center modules, the potential is limitless.


Adaptive Joint Force Packages and the concept of a capability cube that crosses organizational boundaries to include non-military participants provides the United States the ability to operate effectively in the world system it faces today. Because of the unsettled nature of this security environment, decision making requires keen situational awareness (Figure 8). A clear advantage resides with those who can properly access and use global information, intelligence, and communications networks. As a composite, these networks form an information sphere. America’s preeminent position has been built, in good measure, on its success in accessing and using this network. As others gain entry, the United States cannot remain complacent without forfeiting its advantage, and perhaps its security.

Into the Future

Currently, the United States has a wealth of capabilities even as it reduces force levels and defense budgets. A capabilities-centered approach to “right-sizing” forces provides a valid blueprint for defining, maintaining, and developing a force structure. Such a blueprint is necessary to meet America’s requirements for deterrence, defense, and other likely missions.

To maintain security capabilities into the future and to avoid the potential for hollow forces, the United States needs to invest wisely. America’s competitive

Figure 8 Situational Awareness Envelope



advantage resides in force enhancements achieved through technology, logistics, airlift, and C⁴I infrastructure. U.S. acquisition programs should be measured against their ability to maintain this competitive advantage, and to exploit the global information and technology network.

As American leaders structure U.S. forces for the security challenges ahead, they need to focus continually on operational effectiveness and resource efficiency. The international system is not self-policing; history has not ended. Unfortunately, in many areas of the world, "history" has resumed with a vengeance. Now that the yoke of global, ideological totalitarianism has been lifted, the long-suppressed memories of past conflicts are resurfacing.

History continues to surprise, and the world is considerably more hostile than many had hoped for in the euphoric proclamation of a New World Order. Strategies and force structures based primarily on threats have gone the way of the Berlin Wall. Only through combined command, joint operations, and Adaptive Joint Force Packaging — focused on capabilities instead of threats — can the U.S. military adjust to the dynamics of change as it approaches a new century.



