

BOOK REVIEWS

Psychology and Deterrence. By Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, 270 pp., \$27.50.

Reviewed by TIMOTHY H. HIEBERT

Underlying many examinations of deterrence theory are implicit assumptions that deterring and deterred decision makers are rational, and fully able to understand each other's motivations and capabilities. Such assumptions are useful for analytical purposes, for they permit speculation and planning to proceed to advanced stages. Like economists, military planners must often assume the constancy of certain factors in order to explore the likely consequences of policy choices.

But because the success of deterrence rests fundamentally on the accuracy and efficiency of mental processes, psychological factors ought to receive closer scrutiny than most past studies have offered. *Psychology and Deterrence* provides such a focus on the nexus between politics and psychology, and is a refreshing contribution to the literature for that reason. The book is especially notable for its attention not only to the behavior of states seeking to deter, but also to that of states seeking to challenge deterrence. Indeed, the book's main value may lie in the insights it offers into the minds of leaders struggling to change the status quo. As Robert Jervis points out, defenders rarely understand the pressures leading their opponents to launch an attack even when the chances of success may be small: "the pessimism, the fear, the sense of being driven into a corner are hard for outsiders to grasp."¹

In his introductory chapter, Jervis presents the reader with two basic causes of "irrational" thinking, factors which he views as crucial to an appreciation of the real workings of deterrence. "Unmotivated biases" constitute the mechanism by which humans "avoid being overwhelmed by complexity and ambiguity": we simplify, at the cost of erroneous understanding. More specifically, our perceptions are colored and distorted by our beliefs about the patterns the world is likely to present us

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1. *Psychology and Deterrence*, p. 3.

with, the ease with which we recall specific patterns, and the degree to which new phenomena resemble old ones.²

"Motivated biases," by contrast, result from the need to minimize discomfort which would be created by "a full appreciation of the negative attributes" of objects we value, such as our country or our favored policy: when faced with threats, we deceive ourselves about them in order to avoid painful perceptions. In effect, Jervis is reminding us that our vision is often distorted by our psychological predispositions. With this diagnostic background, we are equipped to examine the manifestations of the ailment, as set forth in the following chapters by Janice Gross Stein, Richard Ned Lebow, Patrick Morgan, and Jack Snyder. Stein's two chapters provide an insightful and intriguing look at the military calculations and miscalculations of Egyptian and Israeli leaders in five episodes from 1969 to 1973. In the wars or near-wars which Stein examines, a whole catalog of distorted perceptions is seen to influence policy on both sides. In 1969, for instance, Israel's deterrent strategy failed not because it was badly designed but because Egyptian calculations were so flawed that they defeated deterrence. But Israeli leaders erred too: they failed to recognize "the costs to Egypt of a perpetuation of the status quo, costs that were so heavy that they were likely to promote motivated errors like wishful thinking and denial in an effort to escape an intolerable dilemma."³ Thus, Stein concludes, theories founded on the premise of rationality do not adequately explain the success or failure of deterrence. Rather, only by considering the element of distorted perception will we fully understand the process. And, although Stein declines to offer prescriptive advice, we are led to conclude that only by considering empirical psychological evidence will we be able to use deterrence to our own full advantage. By acknowledging and understanding our own biases, we may be able to mitigate against them. By understanding our opponents' we may be able to adjust our communications of threat so as to avoid misperceptions, or perhaps selectively encourage them.

Richard Ned Lebow's chapter on the origins of the Falklands/Malvinas War also examines the conduct of more than one state in a deterrence relationship, this time focusing on a single episode of deterrence failure. On the British side of the conflict, Lebow seeks to identify the reasons for Britain's insensitivity to the possibility of Argentine military action. Essentially, Britain failed to examine the situation from an Argentine perspective, and was therefore blind to the fact that Argentine leaders

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-24.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

had finally lost faith in negotiation as a means to sovereignty over the islands. The British leaders' error resulted from their reliance on their experience in 1977, the last time Argentina seemed ready to invade. An extremely cautious attitude then had apparently helped forestall war; there seemed no reason why the same approach would not work in 1982. As Lebow argues, the psychological phenomenon of "defensive avoidance" may have interfered with rational responses to Argentine signals: British policy makers were attempting to "shield themselves from threatening realities which they were unprepared for and unable to face."⁴ In Jervis' terms, unmotivated biases were interfering with clear perception and rational thought.

But the Argentine leaders, too, were selectively attentive to information: from their perspective, it seemed unlikely that in 1982 Britain would try to recapture a "liberated colony" militarily. They seemingly ignored ample evidence that Britain saw the islands not as a colony, but as the home of British descendants whose right to self-determination should be protected by all necessary means.

Lebow's essay fits within the theme of the book not so much as an examination of deterrence as an analysis of the impact on foreign policy of the same sorts of distorted perceptions which Jervis and Stein identify. Or put differently, Lebow explains how those distorted perceptions prevented Britain from recognizing a *need* for deterrence.

The following chapter by Patrick Morgan, by contrast, examines the influence of a policy of deterrence on the cognitive processes of the leaders pursuing it. Specifically, Morgan discusses what some see as a U.S. tendency in various situations to be concerned with the country's reputation to a degree beyond that which a cold calculation of interests would require. Thus even where U.S. interests might otherwise be fairly remote, as in Vietnam, U.S. leaders have devoted vast resources to avoid a reputation for not keeping commitments.

A main reason for the United States' disproportionate emphasis on reputation in comparison with interests at stake, Morgan suggests, is that reliance on nuclear deterrence inevitably produces a sense of insecurity. For the United States, the fear of the consequences of deterrence failure works against the credibility of the deterrent threat: "where nuclear weapons might have to be involved in upholding a commitment, there are no intrinsic interests of sufficient value to make that commitment inherently credible."⁵ The response of U.S. policy makers to this problem

4. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 131 (emphasis omitted).

has been to try, in compensation, to bolster American credibility in other contexts.

Morgan recognizes that Britain, France, and the Soviet Union do not fully share the United States' concern with "saving face for the sake of deterrence," but attributes this fact to a difference in political cultures. In the end, he suggests, the American style of deterrence may be a result predominantly of domestic psychological factors not directly related to a felt need to shape an opponent's perceptions. Morgan's essay, then, contributes to the larger theme that behavior undertaken in the name of deterrence is often the product of self-deception and irrational thought.

Although the book is a collection of essays by five different authors with different writing styles and approaches to the topic, it is thus notable for the degree of cohesiveness it achieves. The general thematic consistency is reinforced by the fact that the three main authors refer frequently to each other's ideas in support of their own.

Nevertheless, the collection might have been more carefully integrated than it was. It would have been helpful, for example, if Jervis' categories of bias had been put to more productive use in later chapters. Stein makes use of the phrase "unmotivated and motivated biases" occasionally but does not take the opportunity to explore and test the notions. Lebow writes that the British sought to "shield themselves from threatening realities," but chooses not to present this idea in terms with which the reader is familiar from earlier chapters. Nor does Jack Snyder make fruitful use of the ideas in his essay on the security dilemma in 1914. His discussion of the "perceptual security dilemma," for example, would have benefitted from a closer analysis of the miscalculations and misperceptions he mentions.

The book marks no great departure from earlier works by Jervis and Lebow. Readers familiar with Jervis' *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, for example, will recognize familiar themes.⁶ But they will also find useful the condensation and reorganization of those themes which his current work represents. Lebow's *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* likewise constitutes an earlier, comprehensive discussion of misperception and crisis management with which readers may be familiar.⁷ But his case study of the Falkland/Malvinas episode provides a useful confirmation of the ideas he presented in 1981. Both authors' presentations benefit from their current compactness, and may serve as useful points of departure for readers desiring a quick introduction to ideas presented in greater detail elsewhere.

6. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

7. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.

Ultimately, the book's value may lie in the thought it provokes about the role of oversimplification, self-deception, and miscommunication in areas other than deterrence. The relations between the United States and its NATO allies, for example, seem appropriate for study in light of the arguments presented in the book. Likewise, President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative might usefully be examined for its tendency to exacerbate or alleviate the perceptual problems associated with current U.S. policy.

Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures. By Elisabeth Zoller. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1984, 228 pp., \$35.00.

Enforcing International Law Through U.S. Legislation. By Elisabeth Zoller. Ardsley-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1985, 224 pp., \$35.00.

Reviewed by ALFRED P. RUBIN

On December 9, 1978 an arbitral tribunal decided that French actions attempting to enforce the French interpretation of U.S.-French air traffic agreement, by making it economically impossible for Pan Am to maintain its London to Paris service, justified American suspension of more or less equivalent but legally indisputable French rights. The tribunal spoke of "counter-measures" and said that they were justifiable if they had "some degree of equivalence with the alleged breach." Using the word "equivalence" in place of "proportionality" and "counter-measures" in place of the more usual "reprisal," the tribunal upheld the legality of the United States action. Responding to an arguable breach of treaty with an undoubtable breach of treaty, it held, was the "right" of the United States as a matter of international law.

Based on this decision, which is reproduced in full in *Peacetime Unilateral Remedies*, the first book under review, Professor Elisabeth Zoller of the University of Angers, France, has analyzed with considerable breadth the current conception of "counter-measures" and the legal framework now established in the United States for applying them. Her two slim volumes are an important beginning to research in an area of public international law that has been seriously neglected by scholars in the past and is of vital importance in a world of increasing mutual vulnerability to economic disruption by governments acting in pique against each other's attempts to maximize the respective national interests.

The first half of the first volume is devoted almost entirely to categorization, fitting labels to categories of action and distinguishing between such well-known categories as "reprisal," "retorsion," reciprocal counter-action and suspension of related treaty terms. The second part fits "counter-measures" into a comprehensive legal framework more sophisticated than traditional "response to a prior illegality" generalizations. There seem to be some technical slips in the first part, such as what

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seems a minor confusion between a "Bernstein letter"¹ and the "Tate letter"² (p. 11); and a deeper confusion between a "right" which would mean that the international legal order could be brought into play to vindicate the "right," and a legal "power" (pp. 11-12, 116). There is a similar confusion between "rescission" of a contract as a legal option of the party injured by another's breach, resulting in restitution as the measure of damages instead of "reliance" or "expectancy" damages, and "rescission" as an automatic result of breach (pp. 16, 19), which, as far as I know, nobody argues.³

But the most significant problem is not that of technical detail: the technical slips seem easy to spot and accommodate intellectually (although it does make for difficult reading in places). The most significant problem is what seems a degree of superficiality. Specifically, it is odd to see no mention of "rectification" as a theory to support "counter-measures" of precisely the sort Zoller is addressing. She obviously was not familiar with the concept.⁴

More serious than overlooking a major, relatively novel, argument is the general lack of jurisprudential depth. For example, a sharp distinction between the law of war and the law of peace is adopted (pp. 60-61), and the phrase "cold war" relegated to political rhetoric. But, whether or not there are legal relationships intermediate between war and peace,⁵ there have been incidents involving that relationship in a way central to her "counter-measures" rationale that Zoller simply ignores.⁶ The result is a book that is rather less rigorous in analysis than it should be.

1. This was a letter issued by the State Department's Acting Legal Adviser in 1949 advising a plaintiff's attorney and submitted to an American court, saying that there were no foreign policy reasons for a refusal to pass on the validity under international law of an act of the German state under its Nazi Government during the closing days of the Second World War.
2. This was a circular letter issued in 1952 by the State Department's Acting Legal Adviser advising foreign governments that the United States would not support in American tribunals their claims to sovereign immunity from private suit in cases in which the acts complained of had been acts that, by the United States' "restrictive view" under the international law regarding sovereign immunity, seem "commercial" rather than "sovereign" acts.
3. The comparable Anglo-American contract rules are explained in F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, *CONTRACTS* 1059 n.1 (2d ed. 1970).
4. See Sheehan, *The Entebbe Raid: The Principle of Self-Help in International Law as Justification for State Use of Armed Force*, 1 *FLETCHER FORUM* 135 (1977); Discussion, 71 *PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L.* 30-31 (1977). The earliest instance known of the notion being applied by one state to justify its doing for another what that other was bound by law to do and was failing to do, to the injury of the acting state, involved a British action to hunt down "pirates" in Turkish territorial waters. 1 A. MCNAIR, *INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS* 75 (1956).
5. Grotius's famous aphorism to this effect, taken from Cicero's 8th Philippic against Antony, has been misconstrued. Grotius himself indicated that the laws of war apply locally as a matter of "natural law" even when the legal requirement of a "declaration" is lacking and there is no general war between the parties. See Rubin, *Terrorism and the Laws of War*, 12 *DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y* 219 n. 1 (1983).
6. She cites (at 60 n.41) Jessup's noteworthy article suggesting that the "cold war" involves aspects

Zoller slips into reasoning that must strike many American lawyers as strange when adopting the European "naturalist" view of a "structured international community" (p. 114, quoting Willem Riphagen) that overcomes by mere assertion any inhibitions with regard to officious intermeddling, thus, ultimately, the entire body of law relating to *jus standi*. The assertion that "the neighbor is the typical helper" and that therefore "neighborhood is brotherhood and friendship" assumes that the ancient maxim *res inter alios acta* is no longer applicable. There is no justification given for that assumption outside of citations to the speculative writings of some publicists. As long as reasons for her "naturalist" model of international society are not given, the book must remain persuasive only to scholars accepting *a priori* her naturalist framework of analysis. That is a great pity, because there is much more to the conception of "counter-measures" than that, and her book could be the beginning of a major new area of investigation and legal analysis if lifted out of the particularities of a single jurisprudential school.

The second book is an attempt to fit United States municipal law into the framework of public international law as an example of the way one very important state applies its own legal order to help persuade (coerce is too strong a word) other states to abide by the rules of the international legal order. The first part deals with direct suits in United States courts under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. It analyses executive action in settling foreign disputes, particularly the one with Iran over the hostage crisis of 1979-80, as coordinated with a pattern of permissible private suits in United States courts. Because the leading case, *Dames & Moore v. Regan*,⁷ upheld the constitutional authority of the President without express congressional action to bargain away private claims regardless of the 1976 Act, there are conceptual difficulties with which Zoller struggles but, to my mind, does not fully resolve. Her analysis probably would have been helped by a careful reading of what is probably the leading scholarly article in disagreement with the case.⁸

Far more interesting is her discussion of American legislation purporting to provide a sort of legal remedy for violations of treaties which result in "collective injuries," such as treaties limiting whale fishing or

of the laws of war. Jessup, *Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status between Peace and War?*, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 98 (1954). One incident illustrating the point, not mentioned by Zoller, was the 1975 dredging up by the United States of a Soviet submarine without regard for the normal maritime law under which Soviet property rights would have been maintained. See Rubin, *Sunken Soviet Submarines and Central Intelligence: Laws of Property and the Agency*, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 855 (1975).

7. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).

8. Trimble, *Foreign Policy Frustrated — Dames & Moore, Claims Court Jurisdiction and a New Raid on the Treasury*, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 317 (1984). The article is not cited by Zoller.

providing agreed national trading practices among the parties, such as the GATT. As a party to such treaties, the United States can be concerned about their breach by other parties, but in the absence of a legal injury there is no standing in the United States actually to engage in counter-measures. Or is there? The United States certainly does restrict the importation of furs skinned from endangered species; is this not a form of counter-measure? Zoller seems to argue that it is. I would suggest that it is not, but rather is an attempt to observe American obligations regardless of the violations of others. But the conceptual structures put forth by Zoller are worth considering and perhaps are more compelling to others than to me.

Turning to even more generalized injuries, "universal" injuries resting on states' violations of general international law, such as the asserted law prohibiting gross violations of "human rights," Zoller adopts the International Law Commission's conception of "crimes" by states under public international law as a corollary of the reference to "obligations *erga omnes*" (owed to the community as a whole) by the International Court of Justice.⁹ This leads into very deep waters indeed, and poses a model of the international legal order that seems so removed from the way statesmen really behave and the sensitivities that people maintain with regard to what they regard as disputes within the family not properly the subject of outside comment, that the utility of the analysis can be questioned. For example, it is asserted (p. 120) that because there is "no doubt that the slave trade . . . is illegal [presumably under public international law] . . . any state is still entitled to visit, search and seize foreign vessels engaging [in it]." That was indeed the British position in the early nineteenth century, but Zoller seems not to know that it was rejected by France and Portugal in 1818.¹⁰ Three of the four U.S.-British 1850s arbitrations cited in the book held against this British position, and the fourth favored the substantive British anti-slavery position but not any doctrine of universal enforcement jurisdiction. The logic supporting that book's substantive conclusion was that the municipal laws of all "civilized nations" having prohibited the African slave trade, that prohibition had become part of the "law of nations." This has nothing to do with universal enforcement, and rests on conceptions of "natural law" that not all jurists accepted then or have accepted today, despite the codification of that

9. *Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain)*, 1970 I.C.J. 32. The court did not apply this phrase to give "standing" to Belgium in the case, even though in fact Belgian nationals had been injured incidentally by the Spanish action against a Canadian corporation.

10. 6 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 77 *et seq.* (1818-1819); *The Le Louis*, 2 Dods. 210 (1817). Those two states did in fact accept British naval activities against their slave traders later, but by treaty, not by accepting the British natural-law argument.

view of natural-law-legislation-by-analogy in article 38.1.c of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The decision did not uphold any principle of universal enforcement, but turned away the American claimants, owners of the slave-trading vessel, on the ground that because their action was "prohibited by the laws of the United States" they "could not claim the protection of their own government, and therefore, . . . can have no claim before this commission."¹¹

It seems that the universal standing position accepted by Zoller and many other publicists, possibly including, by Zoller's interpretation of their work, the International Law Commission, rests not on what tribunals have actually decided or any close analysis of the legal order, but on an ideal conception of the legal order aimed at easy enforcement of humanitarian and some other rules. This, despite the ample and tragic evidence of the centuries that political leaders and mankind's organized bodies politic consider humanitarian and general community values among the less significant values protected by the law, if protected by public international law at all.

All these matters are fit for further discussion. But a discussion cannot begin with a model whose relationship to reality is to be demonstrated; it can end with such a model, but only if that relationship is in fact demonstrated.¹² The elaboration of American practice in isolated human rights cases, praising those that fit the author's ideal model and not analyzing the reasons why those that do not fit the model came out as they did, is not enlightening.

In sum, these two books together constitute a study of great breadth, but seem more an elaboration of a thesis conceived *a priori* than the new and challenging work it should have been.

11. Compare Zoller, at 120, with the actual language of the decisions cited at note 81 on that page. The quotation here is from *The Lawrence* (U.S. v. U.K.), 3 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 2824-25 (1899). The logic of the commission seems weak unless interpreted as a construction of the commission's charter rather than of the law of the United States.

12. I do not underestimate the difficulty of writing a legal analysis satisfactory to both "positivist" and "naturalist" jurists, but difficulty is no excuse to scholars. An example of the sort of effort possible and useful is the translation of the International Law Commission's "naturalist" category of "international crimes" (18 *Int'l Legal Materials* 1568 (1979) Draft Report on State Responsibility, article 19) into positivist terms, Starace, *La Responsabilité Resultant de la Violation des Obligations à l'Égard de la Communauté Internationale*, RECUEIL DES COURS, vol. 153, no. 5 (1976), at 267.

The Pacific Century: Economic and Political Consequences of Asian-Pacific Dynamism. By Staffan Burenstam Linder. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986, 154 pp., \$18.95, \$7.95.

Reviewed by DAVID LUBIN

In the West, we have tended to look upon the postwar dynamism of East Asia with a kind of suspicious awe. A simple glance at the numbers is enough to explain our amazement: the Pacific Basin's share of world GDP has catapulted from 16 percent in 1960 to 25 percent today,¹ yet in the same period, the United States' share of output has shrunk from 50% to 25%.² The suspicions that such growth has aroused in the West are often uncharitable. There's an intuitive feeling that, because many of these countries have developed under an umbrella of Western beneficence, it is somehow ungracious of them to have enjoyed so much success: rather like a house guest who eats a little too much cake. The suspicion of ungraciousness is often taken further. Hofheinz and Calder,³ for example, have questioned our ability to enjoy economic prosperity unless we come to terms with the East Asian "threat." This supposed threat is usually shrouded in mystery by the notion that there is something peculiar to the East Asian psyche, whether its Confucianism or some obscure sociological traits, that fosters their growth. It is almost as if their "Asian-ness" is a weapon against which the West is temporarily powerless.

The Pacific Century is a clear, brief contribution to the attempt to unravel what lies behind East Asian dynamism, and to examine what its implications might be. The author, a distinguished economist and member of the Swedish Parliament, is mainly concerned in the early chapters with demystifying the source of Asian-Pacific dynamism. He correctly dismisses simple, single-factor explanations of their performance, such as "work ethic" or "family structure" or "industrial policy." Disappointingly however, he merely substitutes these simple explanations with one of his own:

There is nothing miraculous about the success of the Asian Pacific countries. They are all unique, but they have a unifying characteristic. Basically, they have all pursued similar economic policies within the same economic system.⁴

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1. Staffan Burenstam Linder, *The Pacific Century: Economic and Political Consequences of Asian-Pacific Dynamism* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986), p. 10.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
3. Roy Hofheinz and Kent E. Calder, *The Eastasia Edge* (New York: Basic Books, 1982).
4. Linder, p. 36.

Linder's belief, in other words, is that the source of East Asian success can be boiled down to a devotion to free market liberalism. The bureaucratic authoritarianism which typifies many of these countries, he claims, seeks to avert market failure rather than perpetuate it. Indeed, the book often reads like a rather conventional exposition of the joys of free trade, which is assumed to promote an efficient allocation of resources through an international division of labour. The general problem with a purely economic explanation such as Linder's is that it begs the question: *WHY* is it that East Asia has espoused such liberalism, while others, Africa in particular, have not? An answer to this kind of question seems to require analytical tools which are not part of an economist's kit. Yet it is precisely this sort of question which needs to be answered if we are fully to understand East Asian growth.

Linder foresees three consequences of Asian Pacific dynamism. The first is what he calls the "demonstration effect," by which other countries, in observing the East Asian example, will learn the lessons of the market. According to Linder, for instance,

the reform movement in China is a manifestation of the power of the demonstration effect, and of the political challenge it represents to adherents of a socialist economic system.⁵

Despite this rather bold statement, Linder offers nothing substantive to suggest that the motivation for the Chinese modernizations was a result of the demonstration effect. To that extent, his treatment of China's readjustment is incomplete.

The second consequence of Asian Pacific growth that Linder considers is the "stimulating effect." The old industrial economies will, he suggests, be given new opportunities for investment and access to technology, as well as the advantages of a buoyant market for Western goods. In a less direct way, the West will be able to benefit from the competitive pressures which Asian Pacific growth brings to bear. The West will benefit from the stimulating effect only if it can adjust to the emerging now international political economy. This adjustment — his third consequence — will be painful, because for many in the West, it would amount to giving in to the East Asian threat. It doesn't matter, thinks Linder. Obedience to the market is a medicine which, despite its sour taste, will prove to be the best cure for an ailing industrial West.

Linder's hope, in conclusion, is for a free trade utopia governed by Pareto and Ricardo. It is this utopian outlook, and the purely economic analysis on which it is based, which makes the book ultimately unsatis-

5. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

fyng. East Asian growth needs to be explained with the tools of all the social sciences, and not just those of the “dismal” one. Moreover, the policy we should adopt towards such growth needs to take account of more interests than those of economic theory.

Southern Africa in the 1980s. Edited by Olajide Aluko and Timothy M. Shaw. Winchester, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1985, 327 pp.

Reviewed by MERI A. MCCOY

The Portuguese coup of 1974 rocked Southern Africa, catching most states by surprise. The implications of the coup — more specifically the end of the Portuguese empire in Africa and the resulting shift to black-majority independent states in Angola and Mozambique — sent reverberations throughout the region. The seemingly indestructible last bastion of white supremacy on the African continent had started to crumble. It was only a matter of time before the rest of the *cordon sanitaire* protecting South Africa would be broken, and the entire region governed by black-majority governments. This vision was reinforced by the disintegration of Ian Smith's government in Rhodesia in 1980 and the corresponding rise of the black Zimbabwe state. Now the black liberation movement has marshalled its forces for the struggle in Namibia and South Africa.

Southern Africa in the 1980s, edited by Olajide Aluko and Timothy M. Shaw, examines the conflicts in the region from an African perspective. Historically, ideology and emotions have distorted any examination of the political and economic tensions of the region, but the book does a remarkably good job of disaggregating the problems. Of course, any book has a hidden agenda and the perspective of this book is definitely antiapartheid. Its underlying purpose seems to be to provide a blueprint for how to dismantle the South African regime: it identifies pressures which weaken the regime and the pressures which strengthen it, as well as possible steps towards eradicating apartheid.

The book is a collection of 14 essays, divided into four sections: "Black Africa and Southern Africa," "Great Powers and Southern Africa," "Change and Continuity in Southern Africa," and "The Future of Southern Africa." Part one is the weakest, for the authors are so intent in describing what the black African states plan to do for the liberation struggles in Southern Africa that they fail to analyze the actual success of the plan; the essays concentrate on rhetoric instead of action. Adekunle Ajala, in his essay "The OAU [Organization of African Unity] and Southern Africa," is almost apologetic for the OAU. He details the efforts of the OAU in eradicating colonialism and minority governments in Africa, but he does not analyze the difference between the ideology the OAU has adopted and the actions it has taken.

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The roles of the front-line states are examined by Amadu Sesay, who aptly points out the contradictions between the domestic and regional desires of these states. To a large extent they are economically dependent on South Africa, so they cannot afford to isolate themselves completely from it. This dependence upon South Africa creates tension with their desire to pressure South Africa into abandoning apartheid. Still, they have a significant ability to legitimize and unify the liberation movements in South Africa. Sesay's African bias becomes obvious when he makes such statements as "the intensification of . . . guerrilla war was acceptable by the rest of the world."¹ Such a statement underestimates the West's interest in stability and order in the region.

The book becomes less a propaganda piece for the African viewpoint and more analytical when it moves to Olajide Aluko's article on Nigeria, Namibia and South Africa. Nigeria's objective is to eliminate white supremacy in Southern Africa, and Aluko analyzes its capability to change the current status quo. The country has declared economic sanctions against South Africa and supports the liberation forces both directly and indirectly. Nigeria however, refrains from taking direct military action itself. Aluko surmises that Lagos will have to recognize that the only way to topple South Africa will be through military action, and therefore must intensify its support of the guerrillas.

In a change of pace Thomas Callaghy, in his essay on Zaire and Southern Africa, adopts an anti-governmental stance, castigating President Mobutu. He charges Mobutu and the regime in South Africa with using one another to protect race, class, and state interests. Mobutu has followed a consistent pattern of public vilification but quiet cooperation with the regime. This type of "flexibility" in foreign policy breeds suspicion among other black African states, and the front-line states are attempting to use political and economic pressure to keep Mobutu in line and away from South Africa. Callaghy demonstrates the diversity of opinion in Africa, for even though all denounce apartheid, some states are more willing than others to work with the regime.

Part two examines the roles of the great powers in the region. James Mayall gives an excellent analysis of the policy of the Soviet Union in his essay, "The Soviet Union, Zimbabwe and Southern Africa." Since 1963, the Soviets have linked themselves with those who are oppressed by the colonial state, equating anti-capitalism with anti-imperialism. This approach, however, has not been a successful policy for the Soviets. Power shifts within states often involved ideological changes, as in So-

1. Olajide Aluko and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., *Southern Africa in the 1980s* (Winchester, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 33.

malia, and consequently the Soviets frequently lost what influence they had gained during more sympathetic administrations. Also, they competed with the Chinese for patronage status. Thus by the 1970s, the Soviets were attempting to maintain relations with all states, regardless of ideology.

The emergence of a Marxist state in Angola, which appeared to be a victory for the Soviets, actually complicated their policy because confrontation with the Western powers in Africa became more likely. Mayall points out quite correctly that the Soviets will never be able to supplant Western influence in the region completely because the whole economy of Southern Africa depends on its ties with the West. The most ambitious Soviet policy is therefore limited to being the major military supplier, and thus an active counterpoint to Western influence.

Larry Bowman then dismantles the rationale behind American policy in the region. He admits that South Africa may be important to the United States for strategic reasons, but argues that strategic needs do not require continued support of the present regime. Also, supporting South Africa as a regional power has an extremely high price; in any conflict in the region, it is likely to turn many states against American interests.

Finally, the argument to which Bowman gives the most credibility is the importance of South Africa's mineral wealth to the West. But any scenario that envisions South Africa cutting off mineral supplies to the U.S. must also take into account the fact that South Africa is dependent on Western markets. It would be disastrous for South Africa to join the Soviet Union in the mineral cabal against the West largely because the Soviets cannot afford to buy the South African surplus.² Also, the West would only encounter problems if stoppages were longer than five years, which could be overcome with foresight and planning. Though any changes in American policy are hard to predict, Bowman believes that eventually the United States will be forced into a policy that agrees with the majority African position on the problem.

Next, Geoffrey Berridges launches an all-out attack on the policy of the Conservative government in Britain to reestablish friendly links with South Africa. The British government has decided to encourage investment in South Africa, and has turned its back on British violations of the EEC code of conduct. Official justification of the policy is that only diplomacy will move the National Party to abolish apartheid and its domination of Namibia, and successful diplomacy requires extensive contacts. Berridges believes that the underlying reasons are that the

2. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

Conservatives fear Soviet expansion in the area, and they want to expand Britain's share of the South African market.

Humphrey Asobie expands on Berridge's focus on markets in his essay describing relations between the EEC and South Africa. The present political and economic structure is very conducive for the exploitation of raw materials by the European multinational firms, who desire exclusive control over these materials. An added benefit is that the investments provide abnormally high returns. Asobie concludes that the EEC will not, of its own accord, compel firms to curtail investment and economic transactions with South Africa. Instead, the African states must coordinate pressure on the EEC and its multinationals so that their policies become no longer economically beneficial.

Part three describes some of the other problems in Southern Africa. In "Continuity and Change in Zimbabwe" Boniface Obichere discusses the problems Zimbabwe will face in the 1980s, typical of the concerns of the other African states. Zimbabwe's immediate need is to develop its human resources, especially in education for its black citizens. Product diversification and agricultural land reform and investment are also pressing needs, and the country will be vulnerable to regional political upheaval because of its land-locked transport system.

One aspect of the political stress in Southern Africa often forgotten by Westerners is the social impact of war on the region. This impact is outlined very adeptly by Kenneth W. Grundy, who maintains that the continuous warfare dominates the lives of even the most apolitical citizens. Under the white regimes, compulsory military training for white males may affect everyone from 18-60 and many Asians, coloreds, and blacks are forced into the armed services. The governmentally-enforced military training, combined with the intense mobilization by the liberation forces, creates many problems for the society. The problems include a high proportion of casualties, necessary demobilization of the large armed population, reductions in food and health services, a large number of refugees, and "protected villages" created by the government. The entire society is disrupted and suffers under psychological strain as a result of this war mentality.

The last part of the book reiterates some of the major issues concerning South Africa. The most interesting discussion in the section, an essay by Timothy Shaw and Edward Leppan, examines the *Verkrampte-Verligte* dispute in South African politics. The *Verligte* advocate closer links with other states and eventually coming to terms with African nationalism. The *Verkrampte* is the rightwing backlash to this more moderate view. It emphasizes retreating into the laager to protect South African interests, using military means when necessary. Its primary justification other than

Afrikaner nationalism is anti-communism.³ The Verligte, who control the present government, risk losing their political power to the Verkamp if they accommodate too many of the black concerns. This internal political struggle in turn complicates *any* attempt to ameliorate the current situation of blacks in South Africa.

Though it contains many excellent essays, the book is so tightly organized that the organization almost interferes with the arguments the authors are trying to present. Every point is numbered and highlighted, so that the reader is sometimes overwhelmed more by form than content. Another weakness in the book is that no information is given on any authors except for the editors; the reader has no way of either identifying possible biases of the authors or judging their credentials. Nevertheless, the sequence of articles is appropriate, and the diversity of subjects analyzed provides the reader with insights into most of the arguments surrounding a very complex situation.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 258.

