## SOSAS RESEARCH IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING SIX

ISSUE AREAS AS BEING THE MAJOR DETERMINENTS

OF PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS THE SOCIAL ACCEPT-ABILITY OF SMOKING:

- 1. PASSIVE SMOKING ISSUE
- 2. ANNOYANCE/COURTESY ISSUE
- 3. SOCIAL COST ISSUE
- 4. GOVERNMENT INTRUSION/COST ISSUE
- 5. INDUSTRY CREDIBILITY
- 6. IMAGE OF SMOKER/SMOKING

### PASSIVE SMOKING ISSUE

### I. FINDINGS

- A. A majority of both smokers and nonsmokers believe that passive smoking is harmful to the nonsmoker (51% smokers, 71% nonsmokers).
- B. A sizable minority believe passive smoking will actually <u>cause</u> lung cancer or heart disease (20% smokers, 43% nonsmokers).
- C. Belief in the negative aspects of passive smoking is as high among government legislators/regulators as among the general population (62% legislators/regulators, 67% general population).
- D. A decreasing number of federal legislators believe passive smoking is harmful; the opposite trend exists among state and local legislators.
- E. In laboratory tests, copy was effective in changing negative attitudes about passive smoking.
- F. The passive smoking issue has brought the nonsmoker into the fray -- heretofore it was the smoker versus the anti-smoker.

### II. CONCLUSIONS

- A. The continued growth of the negative passive smoking belief among the general population and the legislative/regulatory segments could lead eventually to the suppression and possible banning of smoking.
- B. The passive smoking issue remains the single most important factor concerning the social acceptability of smoking because it invites suppressive legislation.
- C. Passive smoking beliefs are susceptible to change. It is not clear that behavior (such as voting) can be changed.
- D. The anti-smoker now feels totally comfortable in speaking out against smoking -- supported by the misconceptions regarding passive smoking.
- E. Passive smoking beliefs often act as "rationale" to oppose smoking, masking an underlying factor of annoyance and irritation.
- F. "Passive Smoking" is clearly an arena in which the Tobacco Industry can compete, and perhaps prevail.
- G. Public Relations and Public Affairs programs, rather than advertising, may be the most effective vehicles for waging the campaign on passive smoking.
- H. "Issue" advertising works best when there is a threat, i.e., a loss of choice.
- I. The "Tobacco Family," smokers, and nonsmokers (not anti-smokers) will be the most productive constituencies for all passive smoking efforts.

#### PASSIVE SMOKING ISSUE

### III. RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. Continue documentation of passive smoking medical findings, updating and expanding the number of endorsers. Nineteen endorsers have been included in the Jones Hearings findings reported in the Federal Register.
- B. Integrate the passive smoking documentation into all TAN programs addressing smoking restrictions.
- C. Develop and implement a public relations program responding to responsible reports that allege passive smoking is harmful.
- D. Work aggressively with the Council of State Governments to prevent adoption of Mode. State restrictive smoking laws.
- E. Gain wide exposure of expert medical and scientific testimony before local and state government forums such as the Council of Mayors and Governors Conferences.
- F. Conduct a worldwide symposium on passive smoking in conjunction with ICOSI to develop an international posture on this issue.
- G. Develop communication programs (public relations and advertising) that will serve to dispel the passive smoking myth among smokers, nonsmokers, and opinion leaders.

### PASSIVE SMOKING ISSUE

## III. Recommendations (cont'd.)

- H. Develop a program for disseminating passive smoking medical findings to the medical community, targeting to such opinion leaders as the AMA and the New England School of Medicine Journal.
  - The Tobacco Institute and Companies
- I. Conduct special Capitol Hill staff briefings on public smoking across a broad spectrum of legislators, with emphasis on those representing tobacco, agriculture, and those on key committees involved with tobacco issues.
- J. Integrate the Jones Hearings findings as a major plank of other programs, such as Pride In Tobacco and The Tobacco Institute Spokesperson.

the following the control

- K. Organize and implement passive smoking presentations before national and regional meetings of NAM, Chambers of Commerce and similar business trade groups with the objective of developing influential, informed allies.
- L. Develop the same type of program (K above) targeted to Labor Unions.

## Companies

M. Initiate an In-Company communications program on passive smoking issues for all employees.

### ANNOYANCE/COURTESY ISSUE

# I. FINDINGS

A. Both the public opinion surveys and the qualitative group research indicate that an increased public sensitivity to annoyance and irritation underlie the decline in the social acceptability of smoking.

The analysis to the second

The Control of the Co

- B. A majority of nonsmokers and a sizable number of smokers find smoke to be extremely annoying (51% nonsmoker, 20% smoker).
- C. Evidence from the public opinion surveys indicates that public tolerance of any environmental annoyance is declining. Pollution is harmful.
- D. A copy test indicated that the Courtesy Ad tested had no measurable effect on consumer attitudes or voting intention.

# ANNOYANCE/COURTESY ISSUE

## II. CONCLUSIONS

- A. Evidence from the Passive Smoking copy tests and the California Proposition 5 research suggests that annoyance is a major driving force behind anti-smoking activity.
- B. The "Age of Me" has led to increased one-on-one confrontation over smoking annoyance in public places.
- C. When Passive Smoking is defused as an issue, annoyance becomes the underlying reason to oppose smoking.
- D. Courtesy has universal appeal; however, nonsmokers perceive smokers as non-courteous. They attack the courtesy concept as utopian and thus support restrictive smoking legislation.
- E. Smokers are confused as to where they should and should not smoke. They are on the defensive.

### III. RECOMMENDATIONS

In these recommendations major emphasis is placed on programs directed to the smoker since his conduct will influence directly the attitudes and behavior of the nonsmoker.

- A. Continue to develop and test advertising concepts addressing Annoyance/Courtesy.
- B. Develop and implement a Courtesy
  Communications program directed to smokers.
  Place courtesy in its role versus rights,
  freedom of choice and restrictive legislation.
- C. Make Courtesy a permanent part of all TAN efforts opposing restrictive smoking legislation.
- D. Develop a courtesy program to which Labor can subscribe. Labor is opposed innately to restrictive smoking legislation since it adds to employers' costs, takes away employees' rights, and requires constant arbitration in connection with enforcement. "Courtesy" can provide Labor with an alternative to legislation.
- E. Develop a business program that promotes courtesy as a solution to employee comfort, recognizing that restrictive smoking legislation is costly to business. It breaks up functional pattern of the office and creates an antagonistic atmosphere.

# III. Recommendations (cont'd.)

- F. Gain "Courtesy" credibility by the creation and implementation of programs such as a "No Litter" program as a part of the Courtesy campaign.
  - The Tobacco Institute and Companies
- G. Utilize all appropriate programs such as Pride In Tobacco and The Tobacco Institute Spokesperson to carry on a dialogue with smokers.
- H. Fully inform the Tobacco Community of the Courtesy programs being implemented.
- I. Test the use of a carton insert as a media vehicle for conveying the courtesy message.

### SOCIAL COST ISSUE

## I. FINDINGS

- A. While no specific research addressing this issue has been conducted, a commonly cited social cost estimate is 18 to 25 billion dollars. Broad assumptions are applied in arriving at this and other estimates.
- B. Media coverage of this issue is increasing dramatically.
- C. The Secretary of HEW uses the Social Cost argument frequently and has been widely quoted by other government and private agencies.
- D. Social cost is a relevant issue to "leaders" but not to the general population.

the second secon

- E. Some businesses are providing employee incentives to quit smoking in the interest of reducing medical benefit premiums.
- F. Insurance companies (a few) provide a reduced premium to nonsmokers in recognition of reduced social cost.
- G. "Social costs" is a worldwide issue.

# SOCIAL COST ISSUE

# II. CONCLUSIONS

- A. The Social Cost of Smoking appears to be one of the next major anti-smoking efforts that will be leveled against the Tobacco Industry.
- B. There is broad opinion that the social cost of smoking outweighs any benefits accruing to smoking.
- C. The opinion leaders are beginning to use this issue, with its economic thrust, to support anti-smoking campaigns.
- D. Industry is beginning to support programs to restrict employee smoking, thus avoiding the alleged costs.
- E. Qualitative research suggests that nonsmokers, once exposed to the social cost
  argument, readily incorporate this
  argument as it provides the "rationale"
  for opposing smoking.

### III. RECOMMENDATIONS

NOTE: While the SOSAS project identified Social Cost as an emerging issue, the project did not undertake studies/research that would identify action programs. The recommendations that follow, therefore, are suggestive only of avenues that might be pursued.

- A. Initiate research that will identify and evaluate those reports (domestic and international) that purport to quantify the social cost of smoking.
- B. Work closely with ICOSI in the development of research projects, position papers and strategies.
- C. Develop and arm the Tobacco Community with a strong position against the alleged social cost of smoking. This position could be one that:
  - 1. Destroys the credibility of currently circulated "costs." For example, the studies assume that the only difference between smokers and nonsmokers is that the former use cigarettes.
  - Builds on the concept that everything "costs society." This could be related to diet, sports participation, drinking.
  - 3. Builds on the fact that the cause of cancer is unknown. Further, there is growing evidence that cancer is multifactional -- thus making a cost analysis covering a single factor almost impossible.

# I. FINDINGS

- A. The majority of the population (75%) approves of some government control over the cigarette industry.
- B. A majority agrees that government product safety testing and information dissemination is a legitimate government role.
  - C. But only a bare majority supports government arti-smoking campaigns (51% for, 43% against).
  - D. And only one-third supports the use of government taxing power to discourage cigarette smoking.

· 论的。在2000年,1000年的1000年的1000年的1000年的1000年的1000年的1000年的1000年的1000年的1000年的1000年的1000年的1000年的1000年的1000年的1000年的100

E. The California Proposition 5 Research indicated that Government Interference and Government Cost arguments had and Government Cost arguments to powerful effects on changing voters to powerful effects on changing voters to a "No on 5" position.

# GOVERNMENT INTRUSION/COST ISSUE

## II. CONCLUSIONS

- A. Social Opinion surveys indicate a national "conservative" movement that is explicitly opposed to further Government Irtrusion with its attendant costs.
- B. Public opposition to government interference in private life and the attendant cost of government programs can have a favorable impact on the public's evaluation of the social acceptability of smoking, and the role of government and law in settling smoking issues.
- C. There is a widespread mistrust and disbelief in the effectiveness/ enforceability of restrictive smoking laws.

# III. RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. Thoroughly evaluate the California

  Proposition 5 Campaign. Develop a model

  attack plan, incorporating "Government

  Intrusion/Cost" for use in opposing

  future legislation at all levels.
  - B. Conduct an exhaustive study of restrictive smoking experiences, such as that done among restaurants in Seattle, to establish the impracticality of segregation.
  - C. Develop a "cost of enforcement" position paper that could be endorsed by Labor and Business and given wide circulation. In support of this effort, initiate research to determine the cost of enforcement. Consider the development of models using "real world" situations such as Arizona "real world" situations such as Arizona and Berkeley. Review the Proposition 5 and Berkeley. Review the Proposition 5
    - The Tobacco Institute and Companies
    - D. Combat all federal efforts to enact an increase in the excise tax or a uniform tax, incorporating the public's distaste for this use of tax power and the fact that this is a regressive tax.
      - E. Establish as an arm of this issue the "right of the proprietor" to determine the degree or extent of smoking the degree or extent of smoking restrictions in his place of business. Take cognizance of suits that support this strategy.

### INDUSTRY CREDIBILITY

### I. FINDINGS

- A. SOSAS research, Yankelovich and the Roper study all indicate that the Tobacco Industry ranks low on the list of socially responsible industries.
- B. In spite of Industry's long-standing claim that "the case has not been established," over 90% of the public believes that smoking is harmful.
- C. Unlike the general population, the RJR family displays great pride in the Tobacco Industry and especially in RJR.
- D. The instantaneous success of "Pride In Tobacco" demonstrated the latent support of the Tobacco Family and its hunger for proactive programs that will enhance the Industry's credibility.

### INDUSTRY CREDIBILITY

### II. CONCLUSIONS

- A. During the course of the SOSAS research, several strategies were explored as possible methods to counter the credibility gap. For one reason or another, the basic SOSAS research suggested that each would be ineffective. These rejected strategies were:
  - 1. Primary smoking-and-health studies are inconclusive.

Over 90% of the population believe smoking is harmful. There is no prospect of reversing this opinion at the present time.

2. Tobacco Industry Essential to Economy,
Taxes.

This strategy's effectiveness is limited to the "Tobacco Family" and does not have national appeal.

3. Right to Market a Legal Product.

The public is perfectly willing to change the status of a product contributing to serious disease (especially if it occurs among non-users).

4. History and Heritage of Tobacco.

The general population simply is unconcerned with this issue and finds it irrelevant.

- B. The very stringent legal restrictions placed on this Industry makes it unlikely that any shift in public opinion will come quickly or easily.
- C. The spokespeople of the Tobacco Industry are considered significantly less reliable sources of data than lobbyists of other major industrial areas.

Industry Credibility

-2-

# II. Conclusions (cont'd.)

- D. Industry's lack of credibility is synergistic when coupled with negative public and key leader opinions on cigarette advertising, especially "image" advertising which is seen "to glamorize smoking."
- E. The credibility of a given Tobacco Industry position can be achieved if voiced by objective, outside authorities speaking in unison and in force.

and the second s

- Language and the control of the co

#### INDUSTRY CREDIBILITY

# III. Recommendations (cont'd.)

- E. Because of the Tobacco Industry's credibility deficiency, a base from which to speak must be developed. The medical profession is one such base and has been functional vis-a-vis the Jones Hearings findings. Continued basic medical research support might provide an additional opportunity. The American Civil Liberties Union offers another possibility.
- Paper" by RJRI Public Relations will be supportive of all programs designed to enhance the Industry's image. A related document prepared by The Tobacco Institute, The Smoking Controversy: A Perspective, will be functional here also.

## • Companies

G. Capitalize on employees' willingness to engage in activities supportive of a socially responsible RJRT image. Such programs might include greater activity in civic affairs, active support of philanthropic programs, support of the "Arts," etc.

### INDUSTRY CREDIBILITY

### III. RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. DISCUS has served the beverage industry well in maintaining credibility. The Tobacco Industry must develop its own "moderation," "don't drink and drive" campaign. One strategic thrust might le an educational program at the pre-adult level.
  - The Tobacco Institute and Companies
- B. SOSAS has confirmed the need for TAN as an essential force in developing an improved industry image. With California as a "pilot," the expansion of TAN to key states must be expedited.
- C. The Pride In Tobacco program has been successful in supporting one segment of the tobacco community -- the Grower/ Warehouse. Programs of this type must be developed that will provide support, education and credibility for other segments of the tobacco community.
- D. The Pride In Tobacco concept must be broadened and expanded. In North Carolina a program is being developed that will tie the Pride In Tobacco concept to colleges and universities. Expansion of The Tobacco Institute advertising relating tobacco to its agricultural brethren should be considered.

# IMAGE OF SMOKER/SMOKING

## I. FINDINGS

- A. The image of smoking is declining.
- B. Smokers have negative self-images concerning their smoking behavior.
- C. Roughly two-thirds of the smoking population say they would like to quit smoking (approximately one-third are trying to quit).
- D. Within the Tobacco Family, there is positive support for smoking.

# IMAGE OF SMOKER/SMOKING

# II. CONCLUSIONS

- A. Smoking is becoming a socially unacceptable habit and is considered harmful to the smoker and nonsmoker alike.
- B. "Moderation" does not appear to be a viable solution since there are no standards for "moderation" or "excess."
- C. Civil rights poses the question of whose rights -- and the higher civil right of nonsmokers.
- D. Smokers are becoming less aggressive about their right to smoke -- and more defensive and uncomfortable.
- E. A Smokers Alliance, supported by the Industry, was considered and rejected because:
  - Smokers are not easily allied. They are defensive, and many would like to quit.
  - Industry support of the alliance would destroy its credibility.

# III. RECOMMENDATIONS

The most viable base from which to launch a program to enhance the image of the smoker and smoking is the Tobacco Family. And the core of the Tobacco Family is RJR (and other tobacco manufacturer) employees.

# • The Tobacco Institute and Companies

- A. The self image of the smoker must be enhanced. This can be accomplished through programs described under "Passive Smoking" and "Courtesy."
- B. In all appropriate communications and programs, smoking must be positioned as the pleasurable adult activity it is.
- C. Develop programs that will promote positive dialogue between family and the general population -- smokers and nonsmokers.

# • Companies

# D. Capitalize on Family Strengths.

- Conduct an in-depth employee education program on all phases of smoking and health, courtesy, economic impact, and heritage.
- Expand Pride In Tobacco type programs to all segments of the family.
- 3. Develop and mobilize an RJRT Support System.
- 4. Assure that TAN and allied organizations receive the same comprehensive educational program provided the immediate family.

### NEXT STEPS -

- TRANSFER SOSAS TO T.I.
  - PRESENT FINDINGS TO COMPANY CEO'S.
  - PRESENT TO T.I. STAFF.
  - PRESENT TO T.I. EXECUTIVE

COMMITTEE WITH RECOMMENDATION

FOR TRANSFER.

• FEED INFORMATION/FINDINGS TO TOBACCO

INTERNATIONAL AT DIRECTION OF

TY WILSON/ED HORRIGAN.

• PRESENT FINDINGS TO ICOSI.

# ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

YANKELOVICH -- DATA BASE IS ESTABLISHED.

WILL SERVE TO MEASURE PROGRAM'S

PROGRESS.

PAHILY

-- EXPAND BEYOND LIMITED RESEARCH

DONE AMONG WINSTON-SALEM

EMPLOYEES.

SECHENTATION

- -- NON-SHOKERS
- A WHAT CHOIDS ATTRACT
- · HOW REACHED
- ISSUES BEYOND PASSIVE SMOKING/

COURTESY/SOCIAL COST, ETC.