

INTER-AGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR SOUTHERN SUDAN

INTRODUCTION

1. Comprehensive contingency plans have been put in place in Southern Sudan by the UN, Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and other partners to respond to emergencies that may arise from the referendum and related CPA and Sudan activities. Four briefings by the UN and the World Bank in a recent Inter-Donor Coordination Forum [IDCF] meeting outlined the humanitarian emergency preparations, efforts to strengthen the governance capacities of GoSS, and options to resolve the external debt of the Sudan. The briefings took place at the Juba office of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD] on Wednesday 10 November 2010.
2. The humanitarian contingency plan and repatriation arrangements were put together under the guidance of the Office of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator [ORHC] in Sudan and the International Organization for Migration [IOM]. The UNDP also monitors the governance capacity building agenda of GoSS as outlined at the September 2010 Brussels High Level Meeting on Capacity Development in Southern Sudan, and partner commitments to the program. The World Bank Sudan team's current focus is on Sudan's indebtedness.
3. As the November meeting of the IDCF was the last before the referendum, members were keen to be present. Juba-based UN agencies, the EU, the Joint Donor Team, USAID, GTZ, IGAD, the Arab League, consulates of Canada, China, Egypt, Germany, Japan, Norway, South Africa, UK, and Uganda, among others, attended. The AU was represented by Senior Political Officer, AUHIP-Juba on behalf of the Head of Office, AU Liaison Office in the Sudan-Juba.
4. This report details the discussion for the AUHIP as the issues are relevant to the Panel's ongoing facilitations on Sudan.

UN INTER-AGENCY HUMANITARIAN CONTINGENCY PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS

Office of the UN Deputy Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator's emergency response plan, 2010/2011:

1. **A Worst-Case Scenario approach was used as the basis for the humanitarian plan**, which extends to the end of the CPA in July 2011. Among the scenarios were: 1) unwillingness by a CPA party to accept the referendum results; 2) unresolved CPA milestones on, e.g. wealth-sharing or border demarcation, ignite renewed fighting; 3) conflict breaks out in contested border areas and near oil fields; 4) clashes in Abyei, aggravated by opposition by Misseriya leaders to PCA award of borders to Abyei; 5) renewed inter-tribal conflict erupts within the south when SPLA is, say, engaged with the LRA in Western Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal states; and 6) local level government structures fail to deliver services as the conflict drags out.
2. **Triggers being monitored:** 1) disputes over CPA benchmarks including Abyei; 2) postponement of the Abyei and southern referenda; 3) escalation of localized conflicts in border areas; 4) increasing polarization between the CPA parties; 5) problems and disputes during the registration process; 6) increased presence of armed groups in disputed areas; 7) increased interference with humanitarian actors; 8) killing of key tribal figures; 9) increased arbitrary arrest and detentions; 10) massive rearming of local populations in flashpoint areas; 11) mass migration of southerners living in the north; and 12) active recruitment into the armed forces.

3. **High risk potential flashpoints:** Juba; Torit; Kapoeta; Yambio; Pibor; Wao; Bentiu; Abyei; Malakal. Areas described as critical are the entire borderlines from Upper Nile, through, Jonglei, Unity, Warrap, and Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal States. Eastern and Western Equatoria are described as medium critical risk.
4. **Number of people to be affected in Worst Case Scenario:** close to 4m, with assistance to be required for 800k IDPs around the border states, 700k fleeing inter-tribal conflicts, 2m affected by social service delivery breakdown, 75k pastoralists unable to migrate, 800k southern IDPs returning en masse from the north around the referendum if violence erupts, and 250k fleeing to neighboring countries.
5. **Emergency coordination structure** to be activated in worst case scenario: UN Disaster Management Team [national]; Emergency Operations Team, Public Information and Emergency Operations Rooms in Khartoum and Juba; and State Emergency Operations Teams.
6. **Contingency exercises underway:** UN agencies' exercises with business community; UN Dept for Safety and Security planning; UNMIS contingency planning; OCHA independent humanitarian planning, and with UNMIS in Operation Swift Shield in case of mass migration.
7. **State level preparedness** is underway and comprises ten state and eight cluster plans. Six pipelines for food, emergency shelter, medical, water and sanitation supplies are being readied. Emergency infrastructure repairs and warehousing are underway. Broader Northern and Southern Sudan chapters of the contingency plan have been finalized.
8. **The amount needed to boost readiness capacity is \$25m**, and before the referendum. Japan announced at the meeting that it has dedicated \$67m [or 22%] of its 2010 support to Africa, but it did not make it clear if this was at the bilateral level or part of a partners' basket.
9. **The 2011 humanitarian plan budget is \$2b**, described by the UN as the largest in the world. It is based on possible displacement of large numbers of people due to insecurity. For instance, continued LRA marauding in western Southern Sudan could uproot more civilians. LRA activities in Western Equatoria in 2010 displaced 42k people and paralyzed food productivity. Nine hundred more people were killed between Jan and October 2010 in other tribal fighting, which also displaced over 215k people.

REPATRIATION TO SOUTHERN SUDAN

IOM and GoSS' return plan:

1. **As expected, returnee numbers have spiked** in recent months as southerners feared violence and political pressure around the referendum activities. Spontaneous UN tracking between January 2007 and September 2010 showed that 2m people returned to Southern Sudan and Southern Kordofan. But the annual figures were declining until September 2009 when they started to rise again.
2. **GoSS' ongoing Accelerated Return and Early Reintegration Initiative [ARERI]** will require more assistance both for returnees and hosts considering the poor state of existing social amenities in the receiving communities. In Unity State for example, where humanitarian agencies are currently providing assistance to 700k recent returnees, 46% of the villages have no access to drinking water,

81% have no schools and where there are any schools, 90% are at the primary level. Furthermore, 82% of the villages lack primary healthcare facilities.

3. **The departure points for returnees** to the South are Khartoum, Gedaref, White and Blue Nile States through two eastern and western corridors. Luggage trucks are arriving daily in Unity and other states. ARERI anticipates to return 150k in Phase I [Nov 2010 to March 2011] and 1.4m in Phase II [April to Dec 2011]. GoSS' request to donors for the program is \$62m for transportation, provision of basic needs, mobilization, registration and verification, and staff allowances.

CAPACITY BUILDING OF GOSS' CORE FUNCTION

UNDP on GoSS' governance functions:

1. **The GoSS governance capacity building agenda** has gained momentum among partners. The agenda was outlined at the Brussels High Level Meeting on Capacity Development in Southern Sudan in September 2010. The framework identifies 19 core governance functions, of which seven key priorities need to be in place by July 2011. The functions are clustered under six priority areas: 1) executive leadership; 2) security sector; 3) rule of law; 4) fiduciary management; 5) public administration; and 6) natural resource management. Irrespective of the outcome of the referendum an improvement in these functions is still essential for effective state management and to mitigate the risk of fragility in post-CPA Southern Sudan.
2. **There is a need for a coherent partner program in Southern Sudan.** Though partners are willing to realign their support against the priorities so as to avoid the risk of pushing GoSS in different directions, the enthusiasm has to be focused and consistent with Southern Sudan's development agenda. So far however, the pattern of involvement appears to be disparate with countries and institutions compete to carve out niches.¹

RESOLVING SUDAN'S DEBT

The World Bank and options to mitigate Sudan's debt:

1. **Sudan total debt in nominal terms stood at \$35.7b** [60% of GDP] at the end of 2009 with over \$30b [or 85%] in arrears. This is in addition to the country's domestic debt. Most of the external debt is bilateral, \$24.5b. The multilateral debt is \$5.3b and the commercial debt is \$5.9b.
2. Debt to The World Bank is entirely owed to the International Development Agency [IDA], and comprises 4% of the country's total external obligations.
3. Three possible avenues of relief are:
 - i. **A Highly Indebted Poor Country [HIPC] facility from the IMF:** This is not a 100% debt forgiveness but is intended to bring debts to sustainable levels. Given its inclusion in the IMF HIPC list of potential beneficiaries, a unified Sudan will remain eligible for the facility. However, since the list

1 According to an African Development Bank (AfDB) source, the Bank plans to concentrate on heavy infrastructure development, such as roads, bridges, highways, and electrification. Japan is focusing on the health sector and plans to build a hospital in each of the ten states. The African Capacity Building Foundation is developing a program on government ministries capacity building; and UK's DFID will insert itself in security sector reform, particularly the reform of the police service.

of eligible states was closed in 2006, a secession vote will change the scenario as, potentially, there will be two new states. In that event the HIPC option will have to be renegotiated.

- ii. **Debt apportionment:** Examples of apportionment of IDA debts can be found in the only one case of Pakistan-Bangladesh split of 1971. The IBRD has however carried it out twice: in the Bangladesh-Pakistan case and the 1993 split of former Yugoslavia. There have also been cases of secession where debt was not apportioned, for instance the IDA retained claims on Ethiopia while apportioning none to Eritrea when both split in 1993.
- iii. **Arrears Clearance:** irrespective of the referendum's outcome, Sudan will have to clear its arrears to The World Bank before it is eligible for regular financial support. The country's arrears to IFIs at the end of 2009 included \$600m to IDA, \$1.6b to the IMF, and \$300m to the AfDB, which are significant stumbling blocks to debt relief and will require coordinated action among IFIs and possibly the generous support of international donors. With respect the debt owed to the IDA, the country could qualify for an exceptional arrears clearance grant, as used in recent years by Ivory Coast, Liberia and Togo.

Two activities being considered by the IMF and the World Bank are a debt reconciliation exercise and an in-country workshop focused on partners, the GoNU and GoSS. Technical staff from the two institutions will join the workshop, which is planned for 12 Dec in Khartoum.

Report:

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