

## South Asia After the Cold War: International Perspectives

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Edited by Kanti P. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen

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*Reviewed by Sean P. Killen*

South Asia is comprised of seven states, over one billion people, and myriad linguistic, religious, caste, and ethnic groups. The region is both one of the fastest growing and least understood areas of our world. Because it has been the site of four major wars and several war scares, has suffered religious and ethnic violence that transcends the boundaries of states, and has been recently nuclearized, the implications of ignoring this region should be of concern to the entire international community. In this era of economic diplomacy, India and (to a lesser extent) Pakistan promise to become important players on the international scene. International economic efficacy and the stability of the region are threatened, however, by the rapidly increasing social, political, and economic disparities between the wealthy and the poverty-stricken. This widening chasm between those people who have and those who do not have access to resources such as education, basic health care, housing or employment—some of the components of human security—has become the issue of ultimate concern. This fundamental human insecurity endured by the population of the region both exerts itself within and pressurizes relations between the states of South Asia, subsuming but enhancing the nuclear threat most important to Western countries.

*South Asia After the Cold War: International Perspectives*, edited by Kanti P. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen, is an attempt to analyze the future domestic, regional, and international security issues of major concern in South Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the purported end of the Cold War. The book is divided into five parts: an overview in which Bajpai and Cohen discuss South Asia, and a chapter considering the future of security studies after the Cold War; two chapters discussing the region broadly with two others focusing on India and Pakistan; two chapters considering the specific relationship between India and Pakistan; three chapters on the various aspects of

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nuclearization and proliferation in the region; and two concluding chapters looking at the role of Afghanistan in South Asia, the future roles of the littoral areas of Central Asia and the Indian Ocean.

This volume achieves its desired end with moderate success, the shortcomings mainly due to a lack of integration between individual essays and the somewhat dated time of publication. Despite the laudatory tone of the preface, which declares that one of the strengths of this volume is the contributions of not only many subjects, but many nationalities, most of the authors are Indian or U.S. scholars who studied in India. The other main shortcoming lies in the exaggerated focus on India. Although Bajpai and Cohen assert that "Indo-centricity" is one of the main attributes of South Asian relations, this volume does nothing to explore the effects of this attribute on states other than India and Pakistan, which are the major focus of the volume to the exclusion of other regional states. The foremost strength of the volume emerges if the contributions are understood not so much as works on South Asia but as an exploration of security issues in the developing world.

The introduction, written by Bajpai and Cohen, explores the range of possibilities between the danger of war and the opportunities for stability and peace. They accept Pakistani and Indian possession of nuclear weapons, despite the international debate and the denials of those countries, and they note that in addition to Indo-centricity, ideological differences between the South Asian states, ethnic conflict, and territorial or border disputes characterize regional politics. Bajpai and Cohen also describe the five possible types of relations between India and Pakistan: war, cold war, *détente*, *entente*, and integration. They opt for *détente*, characterized by an absence of political subversion, economic warfare, or vying for alliances, and by the existence of attempts to lower tensions and codify the "military, political, and diplomatic game."

Although first presented three years ago, time has borne out their forecast. The collapse of the USSR and the concomitant decrease of U.S. interest in the region created a situation in which India and Pakistan, no longer mouthpieces or Cold War proxies, have been forced to speak with and about one another, knowing that their words might require military action. This new freedom led to the increased use of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) and conflict management strategies as the preferred approaches to the difficulties that mar communication between the states of South Asia. In this atmosphere, the 1992 destruction of the Babri Mosque at Ayodhya by Hindus was a major setback to relations between India and both Pakistan and Bangladesh—one that emphasizes the accuracy of the call for a focus on basic social welfare, or human security. Despite the massive civil unrest following the destruction of the mosque, the three governments did act to forestall violence among their states, albeit this involved levying undue force on the population. Still, Bajpai and Cohen, like almost every other contributor, locate the seemingly intractable Kashmir dispute, a contentious issue outlasting the Cold War, as the pivot of South Asian relations.

Edward Kolodziej, in his chapter on the future of security studies, identifies the explosion of intra-state violence along lines of linguistic, religious, ethnic,

or economic demarcation as the subject matter for future studies of security. The failure of Cold War security studies resulted from a narrow focus on inter-state conflict, and eventually deterrence, disregarding differences between developed and developing states. As Baladas Ghoshal later notes, the developed world possesses a sense of political community that created an environment in which nations—religious, ethnic, linguistic or other non-political groupings of people—have become enmeshed to form the state. He also asserts that citizens of the developing world do not enjoy the same economic or political freedoms as do inhabitants of the “more advanced Western world.” As a result, security issues in the developing world cannot be perceived solely in terms of the balance of power or defense against external threats.

Kolodziej implicitly supports the distinction between the developed and the developing worlds. He also indicates that security studies must be approached as a multi-tiered issue and notes that domestic security should be viewed as an international issue. Encouragingly, the United Nations has increasingly moved in this direction as well. The United Nations’ active integration of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), regional bodies, and international conferences into its *modus operandi* is an attempt to deal with the primary failure of Cold War security studies, the unforeseen end of that discipline’s own narrow existence. The global community continues to reel from the violent upheaval following the collapse of the Soviet Union, in no small part because so-called “experts” were unprepared for their own obsolescence. Generally, Kolodziej’s chapter is a major weak point—turgid, too long, and overly focused on the disintegration of the USSR—providing little that could not be obtained elsewhere in the book, but he does argue convincingly for both a multi-tiered approach and consideration of the social components necessary in future studies of security.

What type of world will the post-Cold War bring: unipolar, bipolar, multipolar? Shelton U. Kodikara and Ghoshal offer only possible scenarios, but Partha S. Ghosh’s assertion that the world has become unipolar with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the preeminence of capitalism rings hollow in today’s global climate. The past two to three years have witnessed a multipolar world evolving. Certainly, the Soviet Union did collapse, and capitalism appears to be the calling card of the most adamant communist states. However, China, Germany, Japan, the European Union (EU), and the United States are sharing preeminence in the global market. China is too large to be manipulated economically, the Gulf “war” and the horror in Bosnia-Herzegovina passed with the United States foregoing unilateral action, and regional economic organizations are flourishing. In South Asia, this presages an era of possible prosperity.

Ghosh’s comments that the economic future of India lies with the West and the political-diplomatic future of India rests in the United Nations have some truth to them, but this idea seems relevant throughout South Asia. Making this image a reality will require both India and Pakistan moving to end their reliance on foreign aid, primarily received from the West, because international relations during the next decade or longer will be determined by economic power. Because of the existing aid links with Western states and the history of capitalism in the West, the United States and Europe are logical places to look for foreign

investment as the South Asian states begin privatizing state-owned industries and opening up heavily protected markets. China and the former Soviet Central Asian republics, however, will also provide attractive economic forums in the near future.

Serious obstacles, however, impede the path to South Asian economic self-sufficiency and social welfare. Ghoshal notes, too much in passing, that by the year 2000, India alone in South Asia will have a population of over one billion people, more than 50 percent of whom could be living below the poverty line. He cites Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) data that show the 1985 literacy rate in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh as 43 percent, 40 percent, and 33 percent, respectively. South Asian states have among the lowest per capita incomes in the world. Foregoing social investment in the region is a recipe for calamity. Also, as the end of Cold War alliances left the states of South Asia more isolated than in the past, they will be required to alleviate many of these problems internally, making the domestic and regional levels of security more important for the South Asian states at this time.

Considering the region's need for self-reliant initiative, Lieutenant General M.L. Chibber delves into the region's most fundamental problem—the problem of poverty. In Kashmir, many of the difficulties derive from the lack of local autonomy and from the dire socio-economic straits of the mostly Muslim inhabitants of this area. Pakistan has exacerbated the unrest by providing military and social support to the population of Kashmir. Adding military fuel to the presently hot fire, however, does little but escalate the cycle of Kashmiri unrest and Indian paramilitary repression, consequently increasing tensions between India and Pakistan. Chibber rightly notes that both India and Pakistan—and any other state—exist for the welfare of the people. In the case of Kashmir, the social welfare of all Kashmiris should be of ultimate importance, yet Indian Muslims, while accorded some special freedoms under law, are generally poorer and less educated than Indian Hindus. Still, all the people of South Asia need rapid socio-economic development and progress, and both countries must realize that having the other strong and stable will contribute both to their own well-being and that of the region.

Kodikara notes that the shifting alliance of the United States left Pakistan insecure. The United States has opened up to India since the end of the Cold War, hoping to benefit from the immense size of India's potential market. During the same time period, the United States has become less willing to work with Pakistan to the same degree as during the Cold War. Simultaneously, the United States has more strictly enforced the Pressler Amendment, refusing to deliver military aircraft for which Pakistan has paid. This may be changing, though. As Pakistan has started to privatize many state-controlled industries, the United States has encouraged investment in oil, natural gas, and other areas of the energy sector. Increased foreign investment in India has aided that economy as well, but the region suffers horribly from underdevelopment.

Pakistan believes its situation in the subcontinent to be worsening. Maqsoodul Hasan Nuri observes that the rise of separatism, the perception of Islam as the next target of the Western world, and the situation in which Pakistan is no longer

a geostrategic prize have cumulatively accentuated Pakistan's perceived vulnerabilities. Its new strategic isolation has left the state temporarily bereft of direction. Still, without the United States forcing Pakistan to focus on India, Pakistan has developed relationships with Iran, China, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. Its membership with some of these states in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) promises to aid the development of Pakistan's economic strength and its political stability while reducing its focus on India. A major oversight of the volume is the omission of a serious discussion of Pakistan's internal problems: clashes between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, unrest in the Sindh and Balochistan provinces, and drug proliferation in northern Pakistan.

Indian involvement in the United Nations could alleviate tensions with China and Pakistan and could enhance national integration within the Indian state, especially in areas such as Kashmir, Punjab, and the northeast Indian states of Assam, Nagaland, and Manipur. In the United Nations, India and China have found themselves on the same side of the argument against linking human rights and economics, and they will likely find themselves on similar sides in the future. As developing economies, however, both states will find themselves competing for investment money, and India will be at a disadvantage. India's internal instability, borne of intra-state conflict, diverts both human and material resources away from the development of the state, and all of the individuals within the state, toward either the forceful maintenance of stability or the often costly appeasement of parties on both sides of the religious, ethnic or linguistic divide. India and the other states of South Asia must work on three levels—domestic, regional, and international—to alleviate internal fractiousness, to reduce tensions with adjacent states, and to become integrated into the international community. India, in particular, must avoid political and diplomatic tension with China while learning to work with Pakistan and showing care with the Central Asian republics.

The tenor of the relationship between Pakistan and India will be the most important indicator of South Asia's future, and both Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Chibber deftly describe the intricacies of this relationship. Cheema notes that the roots of a desire for peace in the region existed prior to independence and are observable in the thought and action of M.A. Jinnah, Nehru, and Gandhi, among others. This peace has never materialized, and the hate-pedaling of the British lives on in the religious communal strife both regionally and domestically. The Indian-Pakistan relationship is marked by mistrust and marred by a past that includes violent reactions to dispute.

India views Pakistan with suspicion because of Pakistani involvement in Kashmir, a dispute India regards as internal, because of Pakistan's history of non-democratic and military rule, and because of what India perceives as the Pakistani need to achieve nuclear parity with India. Pakistan, on the other hand, often finds itself reacting to events originating outside its borders, in Afghanistan or in India, appearing to believe that India has designs on the creation of a "United India." Essentially, as Cheema notes, different security perceptions have driven Indian and Pakistani policy pursuits. He also believes that this drove Pakistan to adopt the Western alliance system, enlisting the help of the

United States, after which the Indian government allied with the USSR. Although implied by Cheema, it is doubtful that one enlistment caused the other. If the region is ever to move beyond Bajpai's and Cohen's détente, through entente and into integration, however, peace is required. Sadly and perhaps partially as a result of their misperceptions, both India and Pakistan have developed and almost used nuclear weapons.

Nuclear proliferation and the threat of nuclear weapons use is one of the major concerns of Western analysts of South Asia as well as of South Asian scholars and citizens. India was severely drubbed at the hands of the Chinese in the 1962 war, shortly before the detonation of the first Chinese nuclear weapon. China voiced a "no first use" policy following this detonation, but the Indian government stepped up its nuclear program, with the Pakistanis following suit, and detonated its first nuclear explosion in 1974. Now, China possesses tactical or "first strike" nuclear weapons, stationed on the Tibetan plateau, and, as K. Subrahmanyam recalls, conducted one of their most recent tests, a one megaton detonation, during the visit of the Indian president in May 1992. The major difference between these states is that China is a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory with "permission" to possess nuclear weapons, and India has not signed the NPT because doing so would mean renouncing all rights to possess these weapons. This situation appears to underlie India's refusal to discuss the proliferation issue regionally, believing that nuclear weapons must be discussed in a global forum.

Any discussion must be an informed one, though. Clifford E. Singer notes that many states who signed the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states have or are close to developing the technology needed to construct nuclear weapons, often under the guise of developing this technology for peaceful purposes. He further mentions that few people understand the differences between commercial nuclear power possibilities and the requirements for weapons programs. Singer fails to explore these differences himself, but he does explore the environmental, health, social, and human costs of nuclear weapons programs. For the nations of South Asia, the concept of deterrence held by India—the ability to inflict merely unacceptable damage on a transgressor—is the only "sane" path available. This path does not require the monetary or human investments of a high-tech nuclear program. These states need all of the resources they can accumulate to remedy the horrific social, political, and economic situation of so many of their citizens.

Since the time these essays were written, India and Pakistan have moved closer regarding the possibility of discussing the issue of nuclear proliferation. Hasan-Askari Rizvi notes, however, that Pakistan proposed a summit on regional nonproliferation as far back as 1985, so the process is slow. Perhaps the 1995 NPT Review conference will eventuate in new goals or directions that would ease both the bilateral and regional discussions that need to occur worldwide. Perhaps, too, the era of economic diplomacy will result in states such as the United States accepting the global importance of India and all of South Asia, a step that would achieve much with regard to the Indian and Pakistani desires to be considered global forces.

In the final analysis, the opportunity exists for the states of South Asia to pursue the welfare of the over one billion inhabitants of this region. Marvin Weinbaum and Vice Admiral Mihir Roy, in the final section, discuss the possibility that relationships with Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics and the development of the Indian Ocean, both as a resource base and as a trade route, could smooth this process. Although the fighting in Afghanistan continues, Pakistan has developed economic relationships with the Central Asian republics, and South Africa's President, Nelson Mandela, recently indicated his desire to establish economic ties between India and South Africa via the Indian Ocean. While interesting, these final two chapters would be better considered separately from the volume because they do not provide a cohesive conclusion.

*South Asia After the Cold War: International Perspectives* can be read as a volume on one of the world's most active, populous, quickly developing, and troubled regions or as an exploration of security issues in the developing world. Either approach requires some knowledge and understanding of events in South Asia since 1947, enough so that the volume would not serve well the general reader or the reader seeking an introduction to South Asia. In addition, many of the questions raised have been answered by events during the past two years since the essays were edited for this volume. Many of the suggestions offered for confronting issues of social, economic, or political welfare are historical footnotes, other paths having been chosen. Many of the forecasts or suggestions provided, however, have been borne out by time. The ideal way to read this book is as a book on security in the developing world. The issues raised of economic, social, political, and cultural security, and of human security, are of ultimate concern, not only in South Asia, but in most of Africa, much of Central and South America, and in Southwest and Southeast Asia.

## German Unification: Process and Outcomes

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Edited by M. Donald Hancock and Helga A. Welsh

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*Reviewed by Annika S. Hansen*

The German Question has been on the European agenda since Bismarck first joined the German states into a single country in 1871. In an attempt to evaluate whether the German Question has finally found its solution, M. Donald Hancock and Helga A. Welsh invited a number of scholars to contribute to a collection of twelve essays on *German Unification: Process and Outcomes*. The book is structured in two ways. First, it follows the evolution of unification which is reflected in the work's sub-division into three sets of essays addressing the *Background and Impetus*, the *Process and Outcomes*, and the *Consequences and Problematics* respectively. Second, the underlying structure groups the forces at play in unification into internal, intra-German, and external actors with an emphasis on the European dimension. In covering these sets of issues, *German Unification* offers a comprehensive picture of German post-war history that goes into particular detail when discussing the immediate pre-unification years and reaches back further where necessary to understand the events of 1989 to 1990. By viewing the development from diverse angles and allowing authors to deal with a broad spectrum of aspects concerning the unification of Germany, it provides a remarkable collection of detailed information. Accordingly, although the volume provides no new insights into the events surrounding unification, its value lies in the manner in which the information is offered.

Hancock and Welsh make an unsuccessful attempt to establish a theoretical framework around the events. Although there is an inherent value in theoretical constructs that facilitate the assessment of future events, the analysis is not followed through and the structure not empirically "tested." Similarly, the introductory chapter develops a complex theoretical approach that links political theories of integration and of democratization, but is never explicitly examined against the actual events of German unification. On the contrary, when we return to the editors' concluding remarks, they make but few references to their initial framework and instead introduce entirely new aspects that should have been included in the discussion at an earlier stage. Thus, Hancock and Welsh write in the conclusion "[t]oday, cultural and not material differences are widely perceived as the major stumbling block in the formation of a unified German society with a shared political culture" (p. 317). If this is the case, why does the

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book spend so much time discussing political and economic decisions while merely alluding to the human element involved?

In accordance with the two-fold structure of the book, this essay reviews the two approaches in turn, beginning with the forces at play in Germany and proceeding to the evolutionary assessment of German unification. One of the most valuable characteristics of the book is that it identifies and explains the entire spectrum of forces at play in the fall of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the process of unification, and the future of the united Germany. As indicated above, a line should be drawn between internal, and here mostly East German, intra-German, and external actors.

Among the internal actors there are three predominant groups. The first group consists of the political elite, i.e. the communist state party, which was unable to prevent the erosion of its power and the ensuing demise of the GDR. This was in part due to the pressure arising from popular demands and in part to a number of unwise and ill-timed decisions. However, the East German government's gravest shortcoming was a general unresponsiveness to change in the political culture of the GDR. In particular, as Henry Krisch puts it, "[i]t was this shift in legitimacy in the realm of thought that prepared and accompanied a shift in political legitimacy that ultimately doomed the GDR regime" (p. 66). The fundamental change in the political culture consisted of an altered sense of legitimacy and enhanced self-confidence on the part of the opposition. The origin of this shift was in the 1980s when a new set of issues was placed on the agenda, which addressed day-to-day needs, such as the provision of day care centers and local environmental issues.

These issues were adopted by the second group of internal actors, the intellectual elite. The intellectual elite was mainly composed of prominent writers and religious leaders, who were becoming increasingly critical of the government. The withdrawal of their support hastened the downfall of the East German government, which had relied on that group for ideological support over the years. Despite their criticism and relentless calls for reform, the intellectuals did not go so far as to insist upon the discontinuation of the system and of a separate East German state. Instead, the demands gave rise to the formation of the civic movements whose objectives initially remained limited to the daily concerns mentioned above. Due to their limited scope which did not include larger political goals, such as unification or reform of the socialist system, the transition to full-fledged political parties in the March 1990 election was made more difficult. In her discussion of the development of East German parties and civic movements, Michaela W. Richter describes the formation of popular movements and their integration into the political party system as a "democratization" process. As the first free elections approached, the movements were subjected to a "westernization" process that reflects how West German parties moved in and assisted their East German counterparts in the election campaign.

The third group are the people themselves. Although they are featured in the discussions, they do not receive the credit they deserve. As the people took over the initiative from the intellectual elites and the civic movements, they became the most important force at work. They not only greatly increased the pressure

on all the other actors involved, but most importantly, the people took over the formulation of the revolution's aims. Whereas the objective pronounced by the intellectual sphere had been to fundamentally reform the socialist system without discarding it, the people called for a clearer solution. Their demands can be summarized as: no more experiments—unification, fast. In that sense, the call *Wir sind das Volk* ("we are the people") may have been directed as much against the intellectuals in favor of maintaining a new and reformed GDR as against the political leadership. Michael G. Huelshoff and Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr. point to the Alexanderplatz demonstration of 4 November 1989, as the last rally to call for the so-called "third path" between capitalism and socialism, emphasizing "reform rather than unification" (p. 81). From then on, the pace of unification was set entirely by the people and the move toward unification became unstoppable. In fact, the intellectual sphere and the political parties that arose from it suffered from their ambiguous stance towards unifying the two Germanies in the March 18th elections. The parties that gained the most support were those that went all out in favor of speedy unification.

Although the book clearly focuses on the East German perspective, the role of West German actors is also outlined, concentrating on the two major elements their influence on the events. First, throughout the post-war period, the government of the Federal Republic defined its relationship with the GDR through its *Ostpolitik*. Johannes L. Kuppe provides a concise overview of the development of intra-German relations before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Willy Brandt's concept of "two states, one nation" played a central part, as it offered partial recognition without surrendering the option of unification. The main goal of the *Ostpolitik* was to improve the living conditions in East Germany by normalizing intra-German relations as far as was compatible with the requirements of the West German constitution. A key example of normalization was the albeit limited facilitation of travel between the two German states, providing Germans on either side of the border with the opportunity to visit relatives. In that way, successive German governments were able to comply with the quest for German unity while adjusting to the realities of continued division.

Second, as indicated above, West German parties were heavily involved in the East German elections of March 1990. The way in which newly established political parties were promoted is indicative of the leading role the West German government played in the unification process. A number of authors in the volume alluded to the West German political leadership's abuse of its dominant position. In an attempt to counteract those accusations, Gert-Joachim Glaeßner underlines the positive side of the GDR's link to West Germany. In East Germany, as "compared with its neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, . . . a system of democratic institutions is already in place and is not seriously questioned" (p. 159). Moreover, the evaluation of the political decisions made by either side should take the inevitability of the development into account. Once the outcome of German unity was clear, it was merely a matter of determining the specific steps toward that end and the terms of the union. And again, given the steadily deteriorating bargaining position of the East German government, the West German government seemed to naturally assume the place at the helm.

The German question was always an issue that reached beyond Germany's borders and even those of its immediate neighbors. Similarly, the external actors discussed in this volume range from the wider Eastern European setting, to the occupying powers of the post-war period, and to other EC members. Finally, the book reviews the prospects for unified Germany's future role in international politics. The most important external influence emanates from the reform processes in the Soviet Union and in other satellite states, notably Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, which had a catalyst effect on the events in the GDR. In their respective articles, Welsh and Huelshoff and Hanhardt call attention to how a major impetus for the popular movements and the development that led to the fall of the GDR regime arose from similar reform tendencies in other Central and Eastern European countries. Furthermore, when the regime was threatened by the ongoing events, the absence of support from Moscow accelerated the collapse of the East German government. Similar to Krisch's statements on the GDR regime, Welsh identifies the inability of the communist regimes to adjust to shifts in the political culture as the factor that eventually led to their downfall.

Welsh also points to another set of international actors that arrive on the scene at a later stage. When the question of unification had become inescapable, the approval of the four post-war occupying powers, the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and the United States, was both technically necessary and desirable for the establishment of the unified German state. The technical necessity arose from the fact that no final peace settlement had been reached after World War II. As a result, neither of the German states had the sovereign power to enter into the unification process. In addition, keeping in mind Germany's historical legacy, it would have been unwise to go against the wishes of the four powers. The reluctance on the part of the British and the French was counteracted by immediate and strong support from the United States. The Soviet Union had little leverage which was clearly demonstrated when they "lost" the one concern they had with regard to unification, namely unified Germany's membership in NATO.

In his discussion of the GDR's integration into the European Community, Andreas Falke addresses the reactions of Great Britain, France, and other EC member states. The issue here is how to merge two states with widely diverging trade policies into one. Regardless of the fascinating elements of this issue, the primary conclusion Falke draws is stating the obvious, namely that "integration of the GDR into the EC was a unique process and cannot serve as a model for integration of other Eastern European countries" (p. 188). In addition, Falke engages in a fruitless discussion of why the EC might have blocked the integration of the GDR, but did not. Falke elaborates on objections that were never actually raised by other EC members. Speculations about what is in the back of an actor's mind are certainly relevant to the assessment of upcoming events. They lose their value when they have had obviously no bearing on past events. Looking toward the future, various authors raise more valid questions about how unification and the economic recession that Germany has suffered will affect European integration. Although German unification has certainly affected

popular and political support for accelerated integration, the brakes have not only been put on in Germany. The Danes and the British have shown far less enthusiasm for the full implementation of the Maastricht Treaty and have subsequently been granted special rights. In the German case, the political agenda quite suddenly includes very different issues that need to be dealt with. Therefore, it is not surprising that the focus on European integration has been shifted toward the integration of seventeen million East Germans into the enlarged Federal Republic.

Another aspect pertaining to the international dimensions of German unification is Germany's future role in international politics examined in James Sperling's chapter. He emphasizes that Germany considers the concept of security to be far wider in these post-Cold War days, encompassing economic and environmental aspects in addition to traditional military elements. Underlining Germany's desire to maintain a variety of security structures, such as NATO, WEU, and OSCE, Sperling summarizes as follows: "Germany has offered to entrap itself in integrative and constraining political and military structures, despite a legitimate claim to European leadership by virtue of geography, demography, economic capacity, and latent military power" (p. 276).

It is crucial to realize how the different forces interacted to arrive at the specific outcome of unification. Similarly, although there is no singular cause of the 1989-1990 movement, the people might be considered the driving force behind the events. The key role of the "masses" is not emphasized enough in this volume. They voted both with their feet by leaving the country in large numbers and with the ballot, setting records for German electoral participation. Either "exiting" or withdrawing from an unsatisfactory political system or expressing discontent through participation in that system, are the two options of protest in A. O. Hirshman's theory of "exit and voice," that he himself applied to the reform process in the GDR. Making use of both options, the East German people exercised pressure on all levels of actors, pushing the occupying powers to give their blessing, on the one hand, and the German governments to strive towards rapid unification, on the other.

Apart from a discussion of various sets of actors, *German Unification: Process and Outcomes* exposes a wide range of fascinating factors involved in the move towards German unity. A valuable element is the identification of opportunities arising from the fusion of two states and how they were used. Two chapters explicitly recognize the potential inherent in the fundamental changes taking place in the two Germanies. Peter H. Merkl begins his essay on privatization by saying that "[a]dvocates of the free market both inside Eastern European countries and in the West have dreamed for decades of a shift of power from states to private firms in the wake of the collapse of communist regimes" (p. 199). This approach enables Merkl to expose the difficulties of putting a dream into action in the form of the Trust Agency, the *Treuhand*.

Gunnar Winkler chooses a similar perspective in his analysis of potential changes in social policy emerging from the unique fusion of a capitalist and a socialist system. He claims that "[t]he unification process offered a historical

opportunity to realize a comprehensive social reform, at the end of which an improved system of social security could have emerged in the unified German state" (p. 224). Although he is dealing with the political decisions on social policy, Winkler's approach finally takes the popular dimension into account. More specifically, he refers to some of the psychological challenges arising among East Germans as a result of the radical changes resulting from unification. The gravity of the changes cannot be stressed enough. It is important to place oneself in the shoes of seventeen million East Germans who have been told that the basis on which they built and organized their lives is worthless. In addition to the loss of direction, they have been thrown out into the rough waters of market economy enhanced by the recession that has hit Germany and the world in recent years. The relationship and the differences between East and West Germans is also undeniably relevant. Petra Bauer-Kaase approaches the issues scientifically in an attempt to systematize the divergences in political culture and, in that manner, also contributes one of the few discussions to this volume that is oriented towards the human factor involved.

When outlining his perception of the unified Germany's future, Hancock paints a bleak picture of the developments between 1990 and 1993. In his view, "Germany has embarked on disquieting patterns of economic and political performance which raise fundamental questions about the future of the unified nation." (p. 245). Based on the rise of right-wing violence which is indeed shocking, he draws conclusions about the German population's capacity to deal with political unrest. The conclusions are ill-founded to say the least. It is quite true that this is the most difficult test for the German people and their democratic values since the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1949. And yet, it is a sign of a healthy political system that the population can resort to supporting a variety of political groupings. Hancock himself mentions the increased support for the Greens on the left extreme of the political scale, but fails to draw the conclusion that this is indicative of a balanced political system that would not be a cause for concern in most other countries. Due to its historical legacy, unified Germany is not "most other countries," but political scientists and scholars of German history should be able to distinguish between a real regime crisis and threat to democracy and the voicing of dissatisfaction with the current government. There is an enormous difference between the call for system change and the call for government change. An example, of which Hancock was admittedly unaware of at the time of writing, are the elections in 1994, in particular the *Bundestagswahl*, which have shown that the right-wing *Republikaner* have lost whatever basis of support they had held for a short period of time. Sadly, onlookers are often incapable of distancing themselves from Germany's past, which should not be forgotten, but should also be overcome half a century later.

Although I have disagreed with assessments and have criticized approaches, the value of the book as a whole remains intact. It is a useful, concise, if not entirely complete collection of essays that discusses issues relating to German unification. Particularly given the emphasis placed on the developments in the

former GDR, the book would have gained immensely from an additional chapter on the human factors involved in the process and the outcome of unification, and most importantly, in the prospects for the future. After all, it is the relationship between the people in the eastern and western parts of the country that will determine the pace and success of integration among Germans.

## Central Asia and the Caucasus After the Soviet Union: Domestic and International Dynamics

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Edited by Mohiaddin Mesbahi

Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1994, 363 pp., with notes and index, \$49.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

*Reviewed by Zia Daniell*

The end of the Soviet empire came as a great surprise not only to the West, but also to the former republics of the USSR. In 1991, Soviet citizens in Moscow dismantled the great motherland as those in the USSR's non-Russian republics looked on in disbelief. Though the newly independent states appeared euphoric, rarely were the former republics, Russia's "near abroad," consulted during the process or asked for an opinion on the breakup of the country these states had been part of and depended on for decades.

No region faced greater uncertainty after independence than Central Asia. With little industry and an abundance of only a few isolated raw materials, Central Asia had grown economically as well as politically dependent upon Moscow. Independence forced the former republics of Central Asia to come to terms with a number of issues which in the past had been controlled almost entirely by central planners in Moscow.

It is in the wake of these recent changes in Central Asia that books analyzing the trends and developments in the region have begun to appear. Mohiaddin Mesbahi's *Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union* is one of the most up-to-date texts addressing these issues. Mesbahi, an associate professor at Florida International University and a specialist in Soviet-Iranian relations, takes on a tremendous task in his book, attempting to cover the history and geopolitics of six independent states and several autonomous republics in 300 pages. Although the breadth of Mesbahi's subject limits the depth in which any single topic may be covered, he succeeds in assembling a series of interesting, though somewhat inconsistent in both viewpoint and quality, essays on the region.

*Central Asia and the Caucasus* begins with an introduction by the editor himself and an overview of the contents of the book. Part One focuses on the issues of demography and ethnicity in the region while Parts Two and Three address the history and contemporary issues facing the individual states of Central Asia and the Muslim areas of the Caucasus. Part Four concludes with a series of essays on the geopolitics and foreign relations of these former Soviet republics.

To cover such a vast array of topics, Mesbahi brings together the works of

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fourteen scholars from the United States and the former Soviet Union. Approximately half of these scholars hold positions at the Russian Academy of Sciences; the other half hail from American universities or institutes. This unique collection of authors provides the reader with an interesting series of essays and variety of different viewpoints. As a result of this diversity, however, the writing style in *Central Asia and the Caucasus* varies greatly from one chapter to the next. The slightly awkward Russian translations contrast starkly with the more fluid writing style of the native English speakers. The spelling of certain words also varies from time to time within the text. The reader cannot help but notice these distinct shifts in style which occur throughout Mesbahi's book.

Mesbahi also faces a difficult task in synthesizing the works of such different authors. While he has attempted to assemble the chapters in logical order, a few of the works seem out of place. For instance, a discussion of "Future Challenges and Prospects" falls at the very beginning of the book while the chapter addressing such questions as, "Is Kazakhstan Central Asia?" and "Where Does Europe Begin, Where Does Asia End, and What is Eurasia?" follows a discussion of the individual Central Asian states. Such questions would seem more appropriate if included towards the beginning rather than the end of the book. The final part of the book also contains a discussion of the changes which took place in the region from 1917 to 1922, another topic which might logically precede the essays on contemporary Central Asia.

If read as a series of independent essays, however, *Central Asia and the Caucasus* provides the reader with rich accounts of the issues facing the southernmost regions of the former USSR. The initial three chapters give a good overview of the region as a whole: Sergei Panarin's work outlines the religious, linguistic, ethnic and settlement structures existing in Central Asia today, while Eden Naby's chapter describes religion and ethnicity in more detail. M. Nazif Shahrani sets the stage for further essays by giving a quick synopsis of the Soviet legacy in Central Asia.

The majority of Mesbahi's book is devoted to essays dealing with individual states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, beginning with Marie Bennigsen Brozup's discussion of Tartarstan and the northern Caucasus. Ms. Brozup's account gives a brief history of the region as well as a shrewd foreshadowing of coming events; much of her chapter looks at the independence movement and increasing instability in Chechnya since 1990. The following chapter on Azerbaijan examines the conflict with Armenia in addition to dealing with the geopolitics of the only Muslim state in the Caucasus.

Mesbahi then shifts the focus to the states of Central Asia. Unlike most of the pieces in *Central Asia and the Caucasus* which tend to be quite objective, some of the essays dealing with the individual states of Central Asia strongly reflect the opinions of the contributors. The author of the chapter on Uzbekistan, Zahid Munavvarov, contends that, "[t]he most significant event in the cultural and spiritual life of Uzbekistan since the mid-1980s was the return of Islam to its proper place in society" (p. 140). He further argues that Islam "is capable of becoming one of the main stabilizing forces in the social and political life of each republic and of the region as a whole" (p. 145). While many would certainly

support Munavvarov's arguments, others might view the role of Islam in the region with more skepticism.

To the other extreme is the author of the chapter on Kyrgyzstan, Alexander Filonyk. He states casually that the Kyrgyz who migrated to the urban centers from rural areas of the country "have lost their traditional values and principles. They are devoid of their roots but cannot adjust to the new conditions of urban life. They are easily roused, prone to primitive nationalistic slogans, and always ready to place blame on other ethnic groups for their problems" (p. 150). He later states that, "Kyrgyz adherence to Islam, and especially their knowledge of the Koran and Muslim rites, have remained very superficial" (p. 156). Although it is true that Islam arrived in Kyrgyzstan later than in the other Central Asian states, Filonyk makes no qualifications to his statements, nor does he suggest that there may be exceptions to his proposed paradigm.

The other chapters on Central Asian states tend to be less biased. Each author covers different topics within his or her assigned country according to the domestic situation. Aziz Niyazi's chapter on Tajikistan contains a significant section on the civil war while Martha Brill Olcott's essay on Kazakhstan focuses largely on Turko-Slavic relations. Andrei Nedvetsky's review of Turkmenistan emphasizes the role of natural gas in its economy. Through these different chapters, the reader begins to get a sense of the major issues confronting each of the independent states.

The final part of Mesbahi's collection focuses on the geopolitics of the region. Milan Hauner provides an interesting discussion and comparative look at the dissolution of the Soviet empire and creation of the independent states of Central Asia. Anthony Hyman describes Central Asia's relations with the countries of the Middle East while both Arthur Sagadeev and Mesbahi himself look at Russia's policies toward the region. The book ends rather abruptly, however, without any formal conclusion or summary of the fourteen chapters.

The one issue that none of the authors covers in any depth, however, is the environmental degradation in Central Asia. Given the extent to which environmental problems have affected the entire region and caused a severe decline in levels of public health, most books on Central Asia have devoted significant coverage to environmental issues. The absence of any discussion of these issues in *Central Asia and the Caucasus* is surprising in a book which generally presents a good overall view of the issues and problems facing the newly independent states of the region.

To his credit, Mesbahi succeeds in assembling a book which covers a number of the most important issues facing Central Asia today. He sets lofty goals with *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, as he attempts to pull together theoretical essays alongside factual accounts of events in Central Asia. Although the content of his book may appear a bit erratic at times, Mesbahi's *Central Asia and the Caucasus* provides the reader with a comprehensive, in-depth look at the changes taking place in one of the most dynamic regions of the world.

# Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation

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By Kathleen C. Bailey

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, 132 pp., with appendices, notes, and index, \$15.95 paper.

*Reviewed by Mi Ae Geoum*

How can we repair the damage to the only existing international regime in order to stem the spread of nuclear weapons by rogue states and the political inheritors of the Soviet nuclear arsenal? Kathleen Bailey attempts to answer this question through an explication of that damage and policy recommendations designed to repair it. *Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation* succinctly describes both the informal and formal measures of export controls, and bilateral and multilateral treaties. These constitute the international regime to stem the further acquisition of nuclear weapons. This book will prove especially valuable for those who wish to understand the on-going negotiations at the multilateral forum Conference on Disarmament, based in Geneva, which has been engaged in an effort to establish a universal comprehensive test ban. More importantly still, Bailey presents the key arguments which governments are using to support the indefinite extension of the 1968 Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This April, parties to the NPT will convene at the U.N. headquarters in New York to review the implementation of the treaty and negotiate the terms of the NPT's continuance.

Chapter One of *Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation* begins with an analysis of the NPT's functions. Bailey continues by providing a brief negotiating history of the NPT in Chapter Two. In Chapter Three, she explains its failure to address the underlying demand for nuclear weapons. According to Bailey, the NPT is a "supply-side" regime which encourages potential and actual suppliers of nuclear weapons and energy technology to restrain technology or weapons transfers. Bailey considers the NPT weak because it fails to introduce measures which address the motivations of states to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. In her view, states seek to develop a nuclear weapons capability in order to enhance their security, to elevate their political stature and to satisfy their "wish to engage in aggression" (p. 24). This is a key point in her critique of the regime. In subsequent chapters of her book, Bailey appeals to her readers to consider how one could focus on the "demand-side." To do this, the options should encompass everything from military action, such as air strikes, to eco-

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conomic sanctions (limited or general), or the extension of positive security assurances to threshold nuclear states.

In Chapter Four, Bailey describes the failure of the non-proliferation regime to detect and deter the development of a nuclear weapons program by Iraq, a state party to the NPT. After the Gulf War, allies spearheaded the development of an international inspectorate (the United Nations Special Commission) to eliminate or destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Despite the determined and concerted efforts that the Special Commission and U.N. member states made, Bailey remains pessimistic about the legacy of Iraqi special inspections. She concludes from this episode that other "rogue" states could use the NPT as a "smoke screen" to hide its acquisitions. Moreover, the traditional measures of export controls and routine inspections of declared nuclear facilities were inadequate. Bailey warns that while the Special Commission may succeed in its mission in the short term, Iraq could still reconstitute its nuclear weapons program unless NPT parties make a concerted effort to maintain strict export controls and the present verification system.

The force of Bailey's argument relies on the assumption that states like Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus, Iran, and North Korea are themselves politically unstable and unlikely to have complete control over their nuclear arsenals. In Chapter Five, Bailey contends that as the circle of nuclear weapons-capable states grows, so too does the threat of an intentional or an inadvertent nuclear weapons attack on the United States and its allies. It follows that the defense of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is an integral element in the maintenance of U.S. national security. Bailey, a senior fellow in the Center for Security and Technology at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, is keenly aware of the policy implications of this new international security environment. While these post-Cold War threats might initially appear less dangerous than the original Soviet arsenal which once targeted Western Europe and the United States, the level of security amongst and within states has declined.

After issuing this warning, Bailey considers other elements of the non-proliferation regime that remain deeply controversial. In Chapter Six, Bailey addresses arguments for general and complete disarmament. In Chapter Seven, she considers arguments for and against a treaty banning all nuclear tests, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In Chapters Eight, Nine, and Ten, she examines three conventional enforcement tools of the non-proliferation regime: the use of on-site inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency; the use of economic sanctions; and finally, pledges by declared nuclear-weapon states to defend non-nuclear-weapon states in case of a nuclear weapons attack.

Bailey considers disarmament a political "pipe-dream." She warns: "Nations which have already decided that their security interests are better served by nuclear weapons possession are unlikely to reverse that position unless they can be persuaded that nuclear weapons actually decrease rather than increase their security" (p. 54). In contrast, the NPT offers states a rational quid pro quo. Indeed, George Bunn, one of the principal U.S. negotiators to the 1968 multilateral conference which established the NPT, considers the treaty to be an important political bargain consisting of three key elements: 1) non-nuclear weapon

states promised to forgo nuclear weapons capability and accept IAEA safeguards on their civilian energy programs; 2) states which had acquired nuclear weapons capability before 1967 agreed under Article VI to "negotiate in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament . . ."; and 3) all parties to the treaty agreed to cooperate on civilian nuclear energy programs provided that no nuclear-weapon state supplied nuclear weapons material or technologies to non-nuclear-weapon state parties unless they were under IAEA safeguards.<sup>1</sup>

This bargain provides the legal basis for a norm to assure non-nuclear-weapon states that the circle of nuclear-weapon states will not and should not widen. The states parties will meet this April to decide whether to extend the treaty in force indefinitely or for an additional fixed period or periods (Article X). For the reasons just outlined, the Clinton Administration has publicly associated itself with the indefinite extension of the NPT. Since January 1994, members of the Conference on Disarmament have tried to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. At the same time, the Clinton Administration has tried to harmonize the positions of the other declared weapon states and to avoid the possibility that failure to establish a comprehensive test ban might undermine any opportunity to extend the NPT indefinitely. Some critics, including Kathleen Bailey, would reproach the Clinton Administration for linking the future of a comprehensive test ban to the indefinite extension of the NPT.

Bailey is no knee-jerk non-proliferationist, however. While the core of the non-proliferation regime remains the NPT and its political bargain, she is critical of the regime's failure to head off the problem of demand for nuclear weapons. In her opinion, the NPT has only partially achieved its goals: 1) to prevent nuclear weapons transfers; 2) to safeguard the development of nuclear materials and facilities for peaceful research and energy production; 3) to ensure access to nuclear energy use; and 4) to promote measures working towards general and complete disarmament.

Bailey concludes that the NPT is the only multilateral nuclear non-proliferation instrument that can obstruct the flow of nuclear weapons technology. While heralding the development of Security Council resolution 687 and the establishment of the United Nations Special Commission, she is quick to point out that Iraq, still a party to the NPT, eluded detection for several years. This observation is not novel, but her candor about the regime is important.

In her conclusion, Bailey suggests that amending the NPT could result in far worse alternatives, i.e., an incoherent and less effective set of proposals to replace it. A good example of this "worst-case alternative" is the failure of governments to reach agreement on an arrangement to replace the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom). Until its demise in March 1994, members of CoCom agreed to a system of licensing to restrict the export of sensitive defense and civilian technologies to Eastern Bloc countries. With the absence of the Soviet threat, international interest has focused on increasing

<sup>1</sup> George Bunn, "The NPT and Options for Its Extension in 1995," *The Nonproliferation Review* (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1994): 52.

economic competitiveness. Like the issue of amending the NPT, the inability of governments to replace CoCom undermines efforts to strengthen non-proliferation. Bailey's analysis may be cold comfort for non-proliferation fans but it is clear-headed. In sum, Bailey manages to make a convincing case for continuing and bolstering the present international regime in an effort to uphold the norm of nuclear non-proliferation.

## Unifying Germany, 1989-1990

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By Manfred Goertemaker

New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, 352 pp., with notes, selected bibliography, and index, \$49.95 cloth.

*Reviewed by Vera Eccarius-Kelly*

The mass exodus of East Germans through the Hungarian loophole lifted the spirits of Western anti-communists who had anticipated a fierce conflict with the Soviet Union before any dramatic changes would occur in Eastern Europe. As the exodus, demonstrations, and public protests continued and increased in intensity in Leipzig, Dresden, and Berlin, the key cities of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the German Question became a reality again in the minds of European political leaders. In particular, the leaderships of neighboring countries spoke of the German national conscience and the country's recent history. Many European nations feared an intensified German nationalism and renewed hegemony in the region. The Cold War division of Germany had placated these concerns. With the imminent reunification of Germany, however, these long-standing fears reemerged, particularly in France, Poland, and the Soviet Union. World opinion was largely dominated by a discussion about the possible ascendance of a Fourth Reich in the face of German unification.

Manfred Goertemaker dismisses that fear as unjustified hysteria in his recent book, *Unifying Germany, 1989-1990*. He argues convincingly that a united Germany has chosen a path of economic strength and cooperation, social responsibility, and international burden-sharing. He believes that Germany offers a unique opportunity to bridge the artificial divide between East and West. The newly unified country's geographic positioning in "Mitteleuropa" offers both a high level of assistance, strength, and confidence to the Eastern neighbors and reassurance to the West. The Eastern states of the former GDR are functioning as a gateway to the markets of the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic States. On the Western border, France and the Benelux countries will continue to remain in close economic and political cooperation, enabling Germany to connect the European Union (EU), NATO, and the Western European Union (WEU) with central Europeans such as the Czech and Slovak Republics.

Goertemaker considers the historical development of the political forces within Germany that led to eventual reunification. In quick and powerful strokes, the author draws a picture of the German revolution of 1989 that rejects close parallels or even comparisons to other European revolutions of historical

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importance such as the 1789, 1848, and 1917 revolutions. He makes a strong argument that the 1989 mass uprisings in East Germany as well as in other former Soviet satellite states were driven by East Germans' deep desire to improve their personal lives. Thus while they sought more political and social freedoms, the primary factor motivating the revolution was a demand for a higher standard of living.

The majority of protesters were young people who took their frustrations to the streets. They were not looking for another socialist experiment as Egon Krenz was to find out in his quick and unsuccessful attempt to halt the imminent collapse of the SED (Social Unity Party) regime. The people of East Germany rejected ideology and demanded realistic improvements in their everyday lives. They fiercely rejected a political and social regime that they had given forty years to prove itself and chose another system that had provided economic wealth and freedoms to many in the West.

The 1989 revolution should, therefore, not be compared to prior revolutions that swept away populations in waves of ideology with the specific intent to create a new system. There was little illusion in Eastern European countries that a rejection of communism would be much more than swapping one system for another. The final outcome would clearly be a capitalist system.

In East Germany, a number of the leaders of the original anti-government protesters tried to preserve an East German identity and combine the positive elements of the socialist state with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). But the changes came too rapidly and forcefully. The majority of the East Germans were not concerned about their own identity. They rejected forty years of socialist experiments, embracing everything Western with a vengeance unknown to those who tried to keep a distinction between East and West alive. The fruits of economic freedom seemed too close to grant socialists one more opportunity to turn around the country's economy.

The hard-line SED government of Erich Honecker had, in fact, unsuspectingly contributed to its own demise. While Mikhail Gorbachev introduced reforms in the Soviet Union, and democratic changes became more apparent in Poland and Hungary, Honecker and his East Berlin Politburo rejected reforms categorically. As East Germans vacationing in Hungary realized that their chance of escape was becoming more realistic, Honecker refused to adjust his internal policies to prevent a mass exodus. When he was finally removed by Central Committee Secretary for Security Egon Krenz and Politburo members Willi Stoph and Guenter Schabowski, among others, East Germans were holding their breath, anxiously awaiting the first official speech by the new SED government. Krenz, seemingly overwhelmed by the burden of preventing an imminent economic collapse of the country, failed to give East Germans a vision of a better future. He sounded too much like the old government and missed his opportunity to present himself as a strong, visionary leader for the nation.

Meanwhile, the Western powers were weighing the neutrality issue against a unified Germany's membership in NATO. It was clear that all Western countries rejected the idea of Germany as an enormous neutral giant in the middle of Europe. The Bush administration strongly supported Chancellor Helmut

Kohl's position of making the unified country a full member in NATO. The British were reluctant to support a united Germany, not trusting the recent changes quite yet, while the French and the Poles preferred a Western controlled German nation over a neutral one. Only the Soviet Union remained seriously opposed to Germany being so strongly aligned with the West. Understandably, the Soviets argued that their national security would be seriously endangered were the NATO alliance to be enlarged to the East.

Chancellor Kohl took advantage of the extreme Soviet need for hard currency to convince them not only to allow the unification process to continue but also to agree to a united Germany's alliance with NATO. He knew of the desperate financial situation the Soviets were in and offered a deal that was impossible to reject. Kohl and Hans Dietrich Genscher, West Germany's foreign minister, also offered a number of promises besides the hard currency that eventually convinced the Soviets to agree to the deal. Germany's armed forces would be reduced, Soviet troops were given permission to remain in East Germany for a transition period, paid for by the German government, and the CSCE would be expanded to a pan-European organization, guaranteeing the inviolability of borders and territory of the Soviet Union.

Goertemaker's book is a fascinating look at the day-to-day events that lead up to the unification of East and West Germany. His account of the Two-Plus-Four negotiations and the economic costs and benefits of unification are exhaustive. The author's strong opinions are well argued and convincingly presented. *Unifying Germany, 1989-1990* provides an intelligent, detailed account of how the collapse of East Germany came about. Goertemaker examines the difficulties that were encountered in the negotiations among the former occupying nations before consensus was finally reached. He also investigates how the East German voice disappeared in the process of "acquisition" and "integration" of five new states by the West German government under the leadership of Kohl and Genscher.

Unfortunately, the book lacks an East German perspective. Although Goertemaker attempts to represent the opinions of a select few leaders, the reader learns little about the distinctiveness of East German thought and identity. The events are clearly described from a West German perspective, particularly in the second half of the book, which describes the international negotiations that lead to the unification agreement.

Though somewhat lacking in its presentation of Eastern European and Soviet perspectives, Goertemaker's book does offer a fairly comprehensive overview of the events leading to the German reunification. I would highly recommend *Unifying Germany, 1989-1990* to readers with a passion for western European affairs and an interest in recent German history.

# The Global Spread of Arms: Political Economy of International Security

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By Frederic S. Pearson

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, 161 pp., with index, notes, suggested readings, glossary, and discussion questions, \$49.95 cloth, \$13.95 paper.

*Reviewed by Howard Madnick*

Perhaps the best description of this book can be found at the end of "About the Book and the Author": "Students of international relations and international political economy . . . will join industry and government professionals as well as general readers in finding this primer indispensable to understanding the past and future global arsenal" (p. 144). My own dictionary defines a *primer* as "a small introductory book on a subject" (*Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*, 1976, p. 914), and Pearson's very readable 161 pages would certainly qualify.

Pearson, professor of political science at Wayne State University and director of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, assumes his reader knows very little about arms proliferation, international security issues, or even general current international events. This is not to say that he belittles the reader's prior knowledge, but that he is thorough and comprehensive in his illustrations and examples. For the newcomer to the study of weapons proliferation, his clarity and fluid style is most welcome. He posits no bold new theories and discloses no previously undiscovered data, and precious little of any controversy can be found.

This volume is part of a series entitled *Dilemmas in World Politics*. There can be no doubt that Pearson takes that designation seriously. His introduction, entitled "Persistent Arms Dilemmas," lists seven quandaries which his book is meant to address as he contemplates one central question, "Can the proliferation, or spread, of weapons around the globe be stopped?" (p. 4). The set of dilemmas he enumerates is as follows:

1. The *security* dilemma—How can one state increase its level of security without causing its neighbors or rivals to follow suit, thus decreasing security overall?
2. The dilemma of *causation*—Does an increase in the number or sophistication of weapons in the international system cause increased violence, or do weapons merely act as tools in the hands of political leaders?
3. The dilemma of *access*—" . . . [T]hose interested in peace ostensibly

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- have to fight for it on occasion and . . . entitlement to be armed must be determined”(p. 2). Who exactly must be disarmed, to what extent, and how?
4. The dilemma of *alternatives*—How can any state maintain an adequate level of security without arms? Are there other options?
  5. The *adequacy* dilemma—How many arms, and of what level of sophistication, are enough?
  6. The *political* dilemma—“. . . [T]he question of armament in international relations is not related simply to security or economic objectives. Politics becomes part of the debate as well since arms are a means to political power”(p. 4).
  7. The *equity* dilemma—Should all states be permitted access to all types of weapons (i.e., should the “nuclear club” remain exclusive)?

Pearson begins by recounting the history of arms competition and proliferation from clubs and axes through the nuclear age. Why do states seek parity with or superiority over other states in weapons technology? “The motives for improving arms often have less to do with warfare itself than with technical, political and economic factors. Leaders desire new weapons for political purposes, such as conquest or influence with friends or foes, while firms manufacture them for profit. Both come to agree that power depends on new military technology. Arms, then, are treated as symbols of power and glory in addition to being valued for use in battle”(p. 9). He also recounts the moral and legal efforts which have been used to try to curtail the spread of weapons technology, citing the examples of crossbows, balloon-borne explosives, and expanding bullets. He notes, however, the failure of those arms control efforts as states and firms have worked, in concert or at cross-purposes, to proliferate state-of-the-art weapons technology to allies or to customers. Here the reader first gets the sense that the subject of the book is not meant to be merely nuclear weapons, but “modern” weapons of all types and scales. The term “modern” as used here refers to any weapon substantially better than that used by the average soldier of a particular state at the time it is introduced by a state, its allies, or its adversaries.

Chapter Two documents “The Impetus to Manufacture and Acquire Arms” by cataloguing the history of what eventually came to be called the “military-industrial complex”, which the author defines as “the coincidence of interests between industrialists and military officials” (p. 141). His litany begins with the role of Krupp as a primary military supplier to Prussia before and after 1870 as well as to both sides during World War I, and continues through the current problems faced by defense contractors fighting for larger parts of a shrinking global defense budget. His attention to detail can be seen in Table 2.2 (pp. 34-35), in which he provides the reader with approximate employment levels in the defense firms of over fifty states through three periods (early 1980’s, mid-1980’s, and 1990 to 1992). He also notes an unusual modern paradox: “. . . [D]efense strategies relying on high-technology become very costly very quickly. . . . [I]n recent wars some leaders—such as Iraq’s Hussein facing U.S. forces in 1991 or

Argentina's generals facing Britain in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in 1982—chose not to employ their best, most advanced arms, at least partly for fear of heavy losses" (pp. 49-50). Pearson ends the second chapter by stating that "Clearly, however, the defense economy is the driving force behind the global arms trade" (p. 51).

In the third chapter Pearson examines the relationship between politics and arms transfers, focusing on military-political relationships, such as in the United States and Israel, and on those which are better labeled as commercial-defense relations (arms exports by British, French, and German firms), though even here the issue is clouded. He quotes then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as explaining why the United States sent replacement arms to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur war: ". . . [T]he United States could not—either today or tomorrow—allow Soviet arms to win a big victory, even if it was not decisive, against U.S. arms. This has nothing to do with Israel or with you" (p. 53, reviewer's emphasis). He considers topical issues such as black market arms deals, the effects of arms sales and embargoes during or immediately preceding conflict (as in the 1973 Middle East case above), and the limits inherent in using arms to ensure domestic stability (witness the revolution in Iran and the collapse of the USSR).

Pearson's final substantive chapter concerns past and present efforts to arrest the spread of arms, listing and illustrating traditional arms control measures (formal treaties and export controls). Again he displays a penchant for detail and clear examples as he recounts negotiations between fifth-century B.C. Athens and Sparta concerning limitations on fortifications around their cities (even as the Athenians used the talks to take advantage of Sparta and rush improvements to their own walls, keeping the Spartans at bay for over twenty-five years). Pearson classifies types of arms control agreements as those between relative equals (the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817, nuclear-free zones, and many of the U.S.-USSR accords), as well as those imposed by the victors over the vanquished after a war (restrictions placed on Germany by the League of Nations and U.N.-sponsored sanctions on Iraq). The future of arms control measures is seen as two-dimensional, involving the political leadership of states trying to resolve their individual dilemmas and the future direction of arms manufacturers and salespeople struggling to balance increased competition for fewer defense dollars with prospects of conversion to related civilian industries (tank manufacturers building farm and shipping vehicles, etc.). His outlook could be characterized as generally optimistic in the long-term though slightly grim for the immediate future. The pressure to arm comes from recipient states and supplying companies while restraint is embodied in the acts of certain states (which nevertheless may have sizable arms industries at home) and political movements. This dichotomy is sure to last well into the millennium.

The format which Pearson uses to present his findings makes *The Global Spread of Arms* an excellent textbook for readers new to the subject of weapons proliferation. Over sixty key terms are identified in bold print, described in the context in which they first appear, and are defined again in the Glossary appendix. He also provides discussion questions which range from "fill in the

blank" format (such as "What factors stand in the way of effective restrictions on the export of arms?" [p. 120]), to those which could keep a seminar class busy for over an hour ("Cite elements of change, continuity, and new challenges for arms control in the developing weapons picture in world politics" [p. 121]).

Pearson also puts two other stylistic devices to good use for a book written as an introduction to an admittedly complex set of issues. Along with easy-to-understand charts and tables, Pearson presents eleven "boxed" mini-cases to help illustrate issues he addresses in the book. For example, in Chapter Two the author devotes about four paragraphs to each of three sample cases ("Inside the Paris Air Show, 1991," "The Internationalization of Euro-arms Industries," and "The History of Brazil's EMBRAER Aircraft Industry"). Other mini-cases include "Resolving an Arms Transfer Dispute," "The Riddle of Drug Traffickers on the Arms Market," "Mounting Indian-Pakistani Weapons and Tension," and "The Defense Industry Conversion Debate."

The other device Pearson uses, no doubt to help convince readers unfamiliar with his topic that his book *is* meant as an introductory volume, are five topically-relevant illustrations by syndicated cartoonists, casting humor on the subjects of arms control verification, the "guns-or-butter" dilemma, the difficulties of defense conversion, and the relationship between peace and the "bottom line" for defense contractors.

A serious scholar of the history and dynamics of weapons proliferation would be unlikely to find much new in Frederic Pearson's book, aside perhaps from the emphasis he gives to the purchase and sale of arms (i.e., the defense *industry*) over their acquisition and transfer (possession and movement by *states*). Manufacturers and merchants are given parity with generals and presidents, and the economic motivations found in the arms trade are presented as thoroughly as, though not to the detriment of, the political motivations. In short, this would be a good start for a reader wishing to understand the background and motivations behind weapons proliferation.