

endemic to the whole of the international nuclear regime in the post-Baghdad world. Clearly, the policies of one nuclear supplier mean little if they are not shared by all. And the looming prospect of a new class of supplier in the years to come which does not share in the rules of the present regime makes the necessity of forging common agreement all the more urgent. But perhaps the strongest argument for increased efforts to revamp the international nuclear regime, in which the United States remains the key player, is the lesson and warning of Baghdad: The current state of affairs is not adequate if a nation can bring on the symptoms of proliferation without breaking the rules. As the testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of a former IAEA inspector indicated, stronger safeguards are needed.²¹ But regardless of how good the IAEA's safeguards may become, the spread of facilities to countries with questionable motivations must be stemmed. That goal will require much better cooperation and agreement on non-proliferation objectives from all nations involved in nuclear affairs.

NATO and the Persian Gulf: A New Concept of Burden Sharing

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The notion of burden sharing in NATO defense has undergone a transformation in recent years, in part because of the relative decline in America's status within the Western Alliance and the fact that the Persian Gulf has taken on "vital importance" for the West. Although the members of the Alliance are not equally dependent on Persian Gulf oil, they all share a common interest in ensuring the security of the oil supply. Maintaining a steady flow of oil from the Gulf is not exclusively a European or Japanese concern, despite the fact that their imports from the region are six times greater than those of the United States. The US would suffer equally the calamitous effects of a loss of this oil, not merely in the direct impact on the American economy, but because the blow inflicted on the entire Western economic structure by such a cutoff would strike at the

21. Testimony of Roger Richter before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 19 June 1981. See also testimony of Emanuel Morgan and Thomas Shea, 2 December 1981.

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heart of America's security. It is not simply "European oil" that the United States is being asked to defend in the Middle East; if this were really the case, the Europeans could no longer argue that the United States as leader of the West is solely responsible for Western interests in the Middle East. The crisis in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan reduced the different American and European perceptions of security policy in the Middle East to a common denominator; that is, the important relationship between the vulnerability of the West, because of its dependency on Persian Gulf oil, and the continued relative decline of its political-military power vis-à-vis that of the Soviet Union.

US-European discussions are being held about the nature of the threat of oil flow interruption. The Americans stress the danger of a direct Soviet intervention, whereas the Europeans perceive regional instability as a more imminent danger. The different evaluations of possible sources of conflict underlie a trans-Atlantic debate about the means which should be used in a Middle East security approach. The American perception of the Soviet threat implies that the response will be primarily military in nature, whereas the European view considers diplomatic and economic measures more suitable. The choice of the policy instruments also depends, however, on the respective national capacities and politico-historical restrictions of each NATO member (for example, the restriction put on German military action as a result of its militaristic past). It is therefore difficult to envision the Atlantic Alliance acting unanimously within the North Atlantic Council to make a decision involving the use of force to secure Persian Gulf oil.

It is currently impossible to extend NATO borders into the Persian Gulf region, due to the nature of the Atlantic Treaty, which does not allow for NATO geostrategic involvement beyond the Atlantic. In addition, the different conclusions on opposite sides of the Atlantic regarding the December 1979 decision on theater nuclear force modernization revealed cracks in the fundamental pillars of the traditional NATO mission on the "central front." NATO could, however, serve as a useful forum for consultation and coordination between members who pursue an independent military approach to the Gulf region.

In reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States initiated the speediest military build-up since Vietnam. Based on the so-called Carter Doctrine, the United States shifted massive military power to the Indian Ocean. American military involvement in the Middle East has been made more visible with the creation of a potential for mobile intervention (Rapid Deployment Force), surveillance systems (AWACs and satellite) and ambitious plans for a network of naval facilities, bases and strategic logistical airlift capabilities (CX and C-5A planes).

Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf Region

Assuming a minimum European concern and willingness to take on greater responsibility for oil supply security, the key question in the Alliance context would be how particular NATO members could coordinate their policies with and complement the US presence in the Persian Gulf region. Furthermore, what kind of policy approach would optimize a combined allied political-military effort with the aim of maintaining secure access to the region?

No matter how efficiently Western Europe combines its direct and indirect contributions to the goal of Gulf stability, it is still the US power projection capacity in the region which is the determining factor of Alliance efforts in the Middle East. Nevertheless, each Western European nation could play an important role in Alliance burden sharing by a "division of labor," or a "mixed policy" combination. Through an appropriate contribution based on economic, military and/or logistical resources, they would be effecting a cohesive Alliance policy in the Gulf that would assure a certain minimum of regional stability and security.

The basis of this burden sharing concept was set by a joint report of four well known international research institutes, which concluded that, given the relative decline of the United States in world affairs, the principle nations of the West should act on a basis of equal partnership. The term "West" here means more than merely NATO or Western Europe; it encompasses the advanced industrialized nations around the globe which are part of what is customarily labeled the "free world." The "principle nations" would be that small number of concerned states — Germany, France, Great Britain, Japan and the US — which have the capacity and are prepared to assume certain responsibility for the West's extended security interests. Under the "mixed policy" concept of burden sharing, each of these nations would pursue an approach which emphasizes its relative strengths and capabilities in international relations.¹

This burden-sharing concept can be considered new compared to the "classic" concept which emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The original notion of burden-sharing was based on offset agreements and "Mansfieldism" — American pressure for an increased European contribution to NATO defense, backed up by the threat to withdraw US forces. The main difference between the two concepts is found in the change in the relative power status of the United States. During the classic era, the US was "Superpower Number One"; US-European relations were determined by American military, economic and financial dominance. In the environment of the new burden sharing concept, the United States is in

1. K. Kaiser, W. Lord, T. deMontbrial and D. Watt, *Western Security: What has changed? What should be done?* (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1981).

the somewhat more limited position of *primus inter pares*. Economically, the protégé has become as strong as the protector, and politically, the Europeans perceive themselves as equal partners in world politics. Militarily, the US has lost ground in relation to the Soviet Union as evidenced by Moscow's recent achievement of global power projection capabilities and strategic parity.

One way in which the new approach to burden sharing could be manifested is in an *increased Western naval presence* in the Gulf region. Generally speaking, Western presence in the area itself is limited by local refusal or hesitation to provide bases. The Gulf countries tend to be wary of any Western military presence because of its "colonialist" overtones, and hope to avoid becoming targets of anti-American (anti-Western) sentiment in the region. By looking at the geostrategic position of the Arabian Peninsula as well, one can see why naval-based operations constitute the main pillar in a Western military approach toward the Gulf region.

France maintains a *force d'intervention exterieure*, which is employed for missions primarily in former French colonies.² France also maintains a large fleet in the Indian Ocean which operates from bases in Mayotte and Djibouti.³ There is limited French-US military cooperation although France is not integrated into the NATO military command structure. For instance, in the second Shaba operation in Zaire, American C-5s and C-141s carried equipment that was either too large or bulky for the French Transall transports.⁴ However, despite the current Franco-American rapprochement and reports of growing French staff-level cooperation with the NATO countries in the Mediterranean and other areas, it is unlikely that such cooperation will become a part of official French policy in the foreseeable future.

British, French and Belgian actions in Africa and the Middle East are examples of the extent to which individual Western European states will take military steps to preserve their own interests outside the NATO area. French deployments have already been mentioned; Britain annually deploys a surface group to the Indian Ocean. In 1978, the British deployed a helicopter cruiser (Tiger), five frigates and four support ships to the Indian Ocean. Then, early in 1980, Britain deployed four destroyers in the Mediterranean as the United States transferred units from the Sixth Fleet to the Indian Ocean.⁵

2. For more details see General M. du Peyrat, "Nos capacites militaires d'actions exterieure," *Defense nationale*, May 1979, pp. 11-6.

3. For more details see Robert J. Hanks, *The Cape Route: Imperiled Western Lifeline* (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1981), pp. 62-64.

4. Dov S. Zakheim, "Towards a Western Approach to the Indian Ocean," *Survival*, vol. 22, no. 1 (January/February 1980), p. 11.

5. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Energy Issues and Alliance Relationships: The United States, Western Europe and Japan* (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980), p. 3.

While the West European naval presence in the Gulf area is not as potent a fighting force as the American, these European contingents combined are almost as large as that of the United States. An efficient Western deterrent in the Gulf region could only be maintained through coordinated and multilateral operations. Western Europe could therefore create, together with the United States and Australia, a multinational naval force in the Indian Ocean. Australia, Britain, and even the Netherlands could replace parts of the US task forces during the year.

Another European contribution could be resupply activities for support ships. Western states might accept this means of supporting US activities as one less likely to convey an image of imperialism to local regimes. France could more readily undertake this task than a joint force deployment.

Logistics is another area in which the new burden-sharing concept could be reflected. It is widely conceded that present US strategic airlift capabilities, centered in the US Military Airlift Command's 77 C-5A and 276 C-141 aircraft, are insufficient to meet the demands of a NATO contingency alone, to say nothing of a simultaneous contingency in the Persian Gulf. In other words, the United States lacks sufficient logistical support to respond quickly to crises at great distances. If present US rapid deployment capabilities are too heavy to lift, what contribution can Western Europe possibly make?

Western Europe is in a position to assist any US military effort in the Persian Gulf, if only through making bases available for en route support for airlift operations. This is critical for the rapid transit of US troops to the Gulf, for the absence of such bases could force the US Air Force to load its cargo aircraft at levels far below their capacity.⁶ American planning currently relies on the airfield at Lajes in the Azores, the availability of which is not guaranteed. Portugal reportedly did not make Lajes available to the United States to support the transit of F-4 aircraft to Egypt for the Proud Phantom exercise of Cairo West in July 1980.⁷ This recalls the 1973 European refusal during the Yom Kippur War to allow those American aircraft participating in the Israel support mission a stopover on European air facilities.

Western Europe could also provide US naval units with home ports. This would simplify current deployment schedules, which have stretched to the limit the capacity of the US fleet and of the carrier force in particular. Home-porting reduces transit times and permits most major maintenance and training activities to be conducted while forward deployed.

6. The maximum load carried by a C-5 varies by 30 tons, between 3000 mile and 5000 mile transits. See Dov S. Zakheim, "Of Allies and Access," *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 4, no. 1 (Winter 1981), p. 91.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

Western Europe military contributions of a combatant or logistical nature are not the only ones on which a security policy in the Middle East must rely. Western Europe could share the *financial burden of military programs* such as port and airfield construction at Diego Garcia; Thumrait, Seeb, Salalah, and Mashirah in Oman; Berbera and Mogadishu in Somalia; Nanyuki, Embakasi, and Mombasa in Kenya; and possibly Ras Banas in Egypt.

Several European states currently pursue direct or indirect stabilization policies in the Gulf region or along its periphery. Britain has a long-standing relationship with Oman, which holds a pivotal position in the Gulf region. The memory of British support in quashing the Dhofar rebellion is sufficiently recent to foster much Omani goodwill toward the UK. Germany heavily supports two key peripheral nations: Turkey and Pakistan. The economic support of Turkey cost the German government a total of DM 1.1 billion in 1979 and 1980. Germany currently provides even greater aid to Pakistan than does the United States.⁸ Finally, France is pursuing its own policy of stabilization in Central Africa — currently over 14,000 military personnel are stationed there. Continuing and expanding such bilateral stabilization policies would further reflect the “mixed policy” approach to burden sharing. These bilateral relationships between European and Gulf states are not necessarily inconsistent with a unified Western approach to the region; indeed, the essence of the “mixed policy” is to permit each state greater latitude in its security policy.

Conclusion

Western Europe has the opportunity to assume a variety of responsibilities in the effort toward assuring greater security in the Persian Gulf region. This is possible through an increased naval presence, contributions in the form of logistics, and/or financial and political support of key nations. Further low profile contributions could include West European intelligence sources, as well as knowledge of the Persian Gulf (including its terrain, history, and peoples) resulting from the active European presence in the region until just recently.

It is vital that West European nations be willing to participate in the “mixed policy” of burden-sharing. This approach is designed to overcome possible sources of friction between the United States and Europe because under such a system, each state maintains the option of contributing in its own way to the security of the Gulf region. The “mixed policy” minimizes the problems which might ordinarily hinder successful cooperation — a possible renaissance of French Gaullism, British reluctance

8. “Fragen and Reagan,” *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), 29 May 1981, p. 1.