

**Gender Difference and the Liberal-Realist Divide:
Citizen Opinions of Power, Institutions, and War in Global Comparison**

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Abstract

Recent scholarship has raised the hypothesis that gender difference in attitudes toward global issues may be rooted in a broader gender difference in world views, perhaps along the familiar liberal-realist divide. However, evidence for this hypothesis is limited. Most research examines gender difference in the US, and there is an almost exclusive focus on gender difference in attitudes toward military force and war. This paper offers a broader perspective and more cross-national evidence. Specifically, I examine gender difference in opinion surveys from more than forty countries across three categories of global issues: military power and balance of power, global institutions and their legitimacy, and military force and war. Taking the evidence as a whole, my major finding is that gender difference is greatest on issues of violence, force, and war. Second, it is only in the US that gender polarization characterizes general views of international institutions, but there is evidence in global opinion that multilateral military interventions lower gender difference, and women demonstrate less support for expending resources in the pursuit of power.

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Introduction

There is a growing research consensus that gender is among the strongest correlates of citizen attitudes toward international issues. For example, scholars have found that women in the US are more supportive of international institutions (Wolford and Johnston 2000) and also more supportive of military interventions that receive UN approval (Brooks and Valentino 2011). Brandes (1994) has shown that women in both the US and the UK were less supportive of militant policies on such issues as nuclear weapons, arms control, and the wars in Korea and Vietnam (1994), a finding that Togeby confirmed for citizens in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and New Zealand. In studies of US opinion, research shows that women were more critical of the Gulf War of 1990-1991 (Conover and Sapiro 1993) and indeed that they have been consistently less likely to support the use of military force since at least the Second World War (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Berinsky 2009; Eichenberg 2016a). Several studies have also shown that British and Canadian women were significantly less likely than men to support the military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya (Clements 2013; Reifler et. al. 2014; Fitzsimmons et. al. 2014).

Despite this growing body of evidence, there are two important limitations on our ability to generalize about the importance of gender polarization in international attitudes. The first is that, despite the availability of several cross-national studies, most of the evidence is confined to studies of US opinion, and the few cross-national studies that do exist rarely include data from countries outside of Europe. This is unfortunate, because survey evidence from a wider global

sample of countries is now available, and this larger pool of data represents an opportunity to pursue a more robust evaluation of competing hypotheses about gender difference. The second limitation is that most scholarship focuses on gender difference in attitudes toward war or the use of military force short of war. Of course, studying public reactions to war is important, and gendered reactions to war and violence are central to many hypotheses that seek to explain gender difference, but the focus on war also limits our ability to assess broader theoretical arguments which suggest that gendered reactions to war are part of a more general difference in worldview. Evaluating these arguments requires examination of gender difference on a wider variety of international issues. In summary, to make theoretical progress, we need studies of gender difference in more countries on a larger number of global issues.

In this paper, I extend the empirical reach of scholarship on gender difference in citizen opinions of global issues. The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, I briefly review four theoretical frameworks that yield specific predictions about the likely magnitude and distribution of gender difference. In a subsequent section, I assess the existence, magnitude, and variation in gender difference across three dimensions on which the liberal and realist worldviews differ. I analyze gender difference in attitudes toward power and power balance, international institutions and their legitimizing functions, and war and the use of force. My major finding is that gender difference is greatest and most consistent on issues of violence, force, and war, although there is some evidence that multilateralism reduces gender difference. In a concluding section, I discuss the political implications of the results and suggest avenues for further investigation of gender difference.

Hypotheses on Gender Difference

Although scholars of international relations neglected gender issues for most of the first one hundred years of the discipline's existence, during the 1980s gender polarization forced its way onto the intellectual agenda as a result of the large gender divide that emerged in the US during the Reagan administration. The ensuing forty years have produced a substantial body of scholarship, much of it devoted to the question of *why* women were less inclined to support militant policies in general and the use of military force in particular. In this section, I review four sets of hypotheses that scholars have offered to explain gender difference and summarize the hypotheses associated with each theoretical framework.

The Essentialist View

One body of scholarship on gender difference evaluates the putative effect of biological sex or socialization to emotions, norms and roles that are based on biological sex (especially the fact that women bear children and have the largest responsibility for their nurture and survival). Hypotheses that emphasize biological sex are often derived from evolutionary biology, particularly the fact that natural selection favored larger, physically stronger males who could successfully compete --fight-- for territory, mates, and food. Women, in contrast, bore children and provided the nurture that ensured survival of the group (Goldstein 2001, 128-183; Hudson et. al. 2008/09). Related hypotheses based on motherhood carry this argument further, arguing that "women's unique role as nurturers and primary caregivers endows mothers with a greater respect for life and makes them more empathetic and caring toward others" (Brooks and Valentino 2011, 272). Goldstein observes more directly that motherhood "best suits [women] to give life, not take it. Women are more likely to oppose war, and more likely to find alternatives to violence in

resolving conflicts" (2001, 43).

Hypotheses such as these are highly contested (see Goldstein 2001, 128-182 for a review). A tentative assessment of the scholarship that evaluates this hypothesis would be that it is now discounted, for an important reason: hypotheses based on biological difference imply large and invariant gender differences across time, issues, and cultures, but existing scholarship demonstrates that gender difference varies across all of these dimensions. For example, the evidence that mothers (or fathers) have distinct views has been largely disconfirmed in research, although gender remains an important factor (Conover and Sapiro 1993; Wohlford and Johnston 2000; Elder and Greene 2007). In addition, in studies of US opinion, scholars find large gender differences on some global issues and conflicts, but small differences on others, and gender difference varies over time (Conover and Sapiro 1993, 1086-1095; Burriss 2008; Eichenberg 2016b). As noted above, there is less cross-national research, but the limited evidence suggests variation rather than uniformity. As noted above, evidence from the wealthier Western democracies show gender difference, but in other countries they are modest. For example, gender differences on security issues and the Middle East peace process are quite small –and in some cases nonexistent--in Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Kuwait, Jordan, and Lebanon (Tessler and Warriner 1997; Tessler, Nachtwey, and Grant 1999 see also Wilcox, Hewitt, and Allsop 1996). In summary, the variation in gender difference over time and across societies with differing cultures and strategic concerns suggests that gender difference is determined (or mediated) by factors other than biological sex. Nonetheless, a final assessment of the degree of constancy or variation in gender difference must remain tentative, because the number of cross-national studies is small. In addition, to my knowledge there is no cross-national study that evaluates a range of identical issues across an identical time span.

Economic Development and the Political Mobilization of Women

A second set of hypotheses about gender difference in attitudes towards global issues emphasizes the attitudinal and behavioral changes that result from the cultural, economic, and political transformations associated with the transition to industrial and postindustrial societies. The most comprehensive statement of these hypotheses appears in the work of Inglehart and Norris, who argue that the emergence of "psychological autonomy" and shifting policy preferences among women are the result of an interrelated set of economic, social, political, and cultural changes that accompany the transition of societies from rural and agricultural to urban and industrial and postindustrial (2003, 19-26). For example, as societies shift from rural, agricultural production to urban, industrial production, fertility rates decline and the primacy of extended families is replaced by the nuclear family, both of which reduces the care giving burdens of women. Reinforcing this shift is an increase in the public provision of services previously provided by women in the home, especially child and elder care and health care. As these changes take place, women take advantage of the expanded availability of public education and access to the paid labor force. Finally, industrial and postindustrial production are accompanied by a shift in values, the most important of which is the decline of "traditional" forms of authority, including religious authority and patriarchy, and their replacement by secular, rationalist authority and increasing support for gender equality. Together, these changes reduce the burdens of women in the home, relax the traditional values that marginalized women's political voice, and provide educational opportunities and increased access to work.

These changes have substantial political consequences. For example, the increase in the labor force participation of women has led some scholars to argue that gender difference arises

from the distinct material needs of men and women rather than innate characteristics or differing conceptions of national security. As women enter the workforce in growing numbers, their need for social services grows as well. For example, in an early study, Shapiro and Mahajan found significant gender differences on public spending issues in the US: "women were more supportive of a guaranteed annual income, wage-price controls, equalizing wealth, guaranteeing jobs, government-provided health care, student loans, and rationing to deal with scarcer goods" (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986, 51). This finding was reinforced in a study of the role of policy preferences in explaining gender difference in President Reagan's job approval ratings (Gilens 1988). Strikingly, Gilens found that it was divided gender preferences on the issues of defense spending and social spending that produced the strongest correlate of Reagan's approval ratings. Moreover, these effects were stronger than partisanship in explaining Reagan approval. As a result, Gilens asserts that "gender differences in the evaluation of politicians will extend beyond President Reagan and are likely to appear whenever military or social welfare issues figure prominently in the public's assessment..." (1988, 45).

These findings for the 1980s have been replicated in more recent scholarship. For example, studying a myriad of policy items from US election studies over the period 2000 to 2004, Crowder-Meyer found large, consistent gender differences on defense issues (including defense spending) and social welfare issues. Furthermore, Crowder-Meyer shows that men and women differ both in their prioritization of these issues and in their propensity to condition their voting behavior on these issues. Men are more likely to give defense a higher priority and to base their evaluation of candidates on the issue. Women, in contrast, rank social welfare higher and are more likely to condition candidate evaluations on the issue (Crowder-Meyer 2007). Similarly, Kaufman and Petrocik studied the impact of gender difference in policy attitudes on

both party identification and the vote in the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections. The results are clear: social spending and defense-related attitudes are strong correlates of party identification and voting in 1992 and 1996 (along with other policy attitudes).

There is less research on gender differences in policy preferences outside the US, but the evidence that does exist suggests that women's higher relative preference for social service programs is widespread in industrial and postindustrial societies. For example, analyzing a question from the World Values Survey that asks if "government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for," Inglehart and Norris find that "women are overwhelmingly more favorable to an active role for the state"(Inglehart and Norris 2003, 83). Similarly, studying a sample of ten OECD democracies, Iversen and Rosenbluth find that "Women everywhere want the government to take a more active role in public employment creation," in part to support the "partial socialization of family work," but also to increase women's employment prospects outside the home (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006, 18).

Change in labor markets also helps to explain an important pattern in industrial and postindustrial societies: women have shifted their partisan loyalties to the left, and there is some evidence that they have become more pacifist in orientation. For example, Inglehart and Norris show that women born in the early years of the twentieth century showed a slight preference for parties of the right. Over time, however, there has been a leftward shift, with younger women in many European countries now slightly more likely to prefer parties of the left (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 83-88.) The same pattern is evident in the United States and other Western societies (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006).

Finally, the significance of gender difference in policy preferences that accompanies industrialization is amplified by the increased political mobilization and independence of

women. For example, one of the most consistent findings of political behavior research in the US is that engagement and participation increase with income and education (Burns, Scholzman, and Verba 2001), and Inglehart and Norris demonstrate that is true in global comparison as well (2003, 102-104). Moreover, increasing education and labor force participation increase the "psychological autonomy" of women, a change that should also increase policy difference on defense and other issues. Put differently, traditional societies and patriarchal family models are rooted in the assumption of "unified [household] preferences" (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006). As societies undergo the social, economic, and cultural changes of economic development, however, the preferences of women are differentiated from men, especially in their preference for social service spending that socializes family work. This shift in preferences is reinforced -- perhaps accelerated-- by increasing divorce rates because women must reckon with the prospect of independent work and the correlative need for supportive family services (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006, 12-13).

There are three implications of these changes for the study of gendered perspectives on global issues. First, gender difference should be rooted above all in pragmatic concerns, especially the preference for social programs over national defense. Second, gender difference on all issues should vary cross-nationally with the level of economic development --or more specifically with the increase in access to education and labor force participation that leads to an increase in the "psychological autonomy" of women and a differentiation of household preferences.

Threat, Risk, and Violence

Conover and Sapiro report an interesting finding in their study of gender differences during the

Gulf crisis and war of 1990-1991: women in the US were more likely to exhibit a "fear of war" and to express what the authors call "isolationist" sentiments, that is, they were more likely to agree that "this country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world" (Conover and Sapiro 1993, 1088-1091). Berinsky finds a similar gender difference in the US in support for proposals to assist Britain and France prior to US entry into World War II, versus the option of "staying out" (Berinsky 2009, 53-54.) While puzzling perhaps for students of international relations or political behavior, these results are in keeping with scholarship that investigates the relationship among gender, threat perceptions, anxiety, and aversion to risk. Specifically, there is substantial evidence that women perceive higher threat from their environment than do men in the same environments. For example, women are more likely to express vulnerability to violence (Hollander 2001), to fear victimization, and to perceive external threats (Hurwitz and Smithey 1998; Huddy et. al., 2002; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2009). However, women are *less* likely to favor a forceful or violent reaction to threats. For example, women in the US felt more threatened than men by terrorism after September 11, 2001, but they were less likely than men to endorse retaliatory measures, such as the initiation of the war in Afghanistan (Huddy et al., 2005; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2009) The reason is that women are also more likely to experience anxiety at the prospect of forceful retaliation, and anxiety increases the perception of risk, uncertainty, and loss of control: "Women express higher levels of anxiety and perceive greater risks associated with war and terrorism" (Huddy et. al. 2005, 594-595). Furthermore, "anxious individuals are motivated to reduce anxiety, leading to a preference for less risky options" (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2009, 4.)

All of this suggests that violence and the risk of violence are most likely to produce

gender differences on issues of international security. Specifically, we would expect the threat or use of violent military force to produce the largest gender differences in public opinion.

However, we might also expect to find that women are more supportive of military interventions that are designed to mitigate the effects of violence, as is the case in some studies of citizen support for humanitarian intervention (Brooks and Valentino 2011; Eichenberg 2016b).

Socialization and the Liberal-Realist Divide

Each of the three theoretical perspectives reviewed above yields discrete hypotheses about gender difference on global issues. The *essentialist* perspective, rooted as it is in biological sex and socialization based on sex, would predict large and invariant difference across cultures, time, issues, and strategic situation. Hypotheses based on *economic development and the political mobilization of women* are more narrowly focused on pragmatic concerns, especially the preference of women for social over national security priorities. In addition, economic development is accompanied by increased labor force participation and educational attainment among women, and these two changes contribute to changes in the political preferences and political autonomy of women. The implication is that gender difference should also be correlated cross nationally with the level of economic development. Finally, a focus on *risk and violence* predicts that gender difference will be evident primarily on the question of employing violent military force and perhaps also on military actions that are designed to mitigate the human suffering caused by violence.

A fourth, broader perspective argues that gender difference is the result of the differential socialization of boys and girls into competing world views that resemble the realist and liberal frameworks of international relations theory (Wohlford and Johnston 2000). Indeed, the

argument of scholars who articulate this view is that boys are socialized to norms that resemble the tenets of realism --an individualist, competitive, power-oriented worldview-- while girls are socialized to liberal norms that emphasize connection, community, cooperation, and an aversion to violence. The implication of this argument is that gender difference should align on the core arguments of realist and liberal thought.

The clearest articulation of this argument appears in the scholarship of Tickner (1988; 1992; 1997) and Goldstein (2001). Tickner, for example, argues that:

Masculinity and politics have a long and close association. Characteristics associated with "manliness," such as toughness, courage, power, independence, and even physical strength, have, throughout history, been most valued in the conduct of politics, particularly international politics. Frequently, manliness has also been associated with violence and the use of force, a type of behavior that, when conducted in the international arena, has been valorized and applauded in the name of defending one's country (1992, 6).

Given the dominance of men in both political practice and intellectual discourse, Tickner argues that it is not surprising that the analytical and prescriptive paradigms of international relations theory would also be masculinized. Focusing in particular on the tenets of realist theory, Tickner sees parallels between the hierarchical distinctions in power, emotion, and reason that characterize social constructions of gender and the realist discourse of international relations: "The construction of this discourse and the way in which we are taught to think about international politics closely parallel the way in which we are socialized into understanding gender differences"(1992, 9). In her feminist critique and reformulation of Hans Morgenthau's classic statement of realist theory, Tickner focuses in particular on what she considers the

masculinized conception of power (Tickner 1997; Morgenthau 1948). In Tickner's view, Morgenthau's core concept and prescription of the national interest defined in terms of power reflects a masculine conception rooted in dominance or efforts to prevent dominance. Drawing on the works of Nancy Hartsock (1983) Hannah Arendt (1969), and Jane Jaquette (1984), Tickner asserts that women's conceptions of power emphasize energy, capacity and potential (Hartsock), "the human ability to act in concert," or "action which is taken in connection with others who share similar concerns" (Arendt). She also cites Jane Jaquette's argument that "since women have had less access to the instruments of coercion, women have been more apt to rely on power as persuasion" and coalition-building (Tickner 1997, 434). In other words, Tickner is arguing that men are socialized to an understanding of power that resembles a realist understanding, while women are socialized to a more cooperative world view that resembles liberalism.

Thus, Tickner argues that intellectual paradigms reflect broader societal norms and expectations that are socialized, but this raises a question: What is the specific content of this socialization that is relevant to gendered views of global issues? Goldstein (2001) provides an answer in his encyclopedic synthesis of social science research on war and gender roles. Goldstein reverses the common theoretical argument that domestic injustice --including gender inequality-- causes war. He argues in contrast that gender roles are the *result* of what he calls the "war system," which he defines as "the interrelated ways that societies organize themselves to participate in potential and actual wars .. [including] military spending and attitudes toward war, in addition to standing military forces and actual fighting" (2001, 3). Because nation states are aware of a latent, persistent "shadow" of war --"like a patient with cancer in remission"-- they must make preparations for self-defense (2001, 3).

In Goldstein's view, this task presents nation states with a dilemma. Human beings do not take naturally to fighting and killing.¹ Indeed, the violence, chaos, and brutality of war are frightening and repulsive to most. As a result, "cultures mold males into warriors by attaching to 'manhood' or 'masculinity' those qualities that make good warriors...gender identity becomes a tool with which societies induce men to fight." Further, there is a striking cross-cultural consistency in the existence of "manhood rituals" in which boys are required to display warrior-like qualities to achieve the status of "men," including the qualities of bravery, endurance, strength and skill, and honor. Further, boys and men are taught to suppress emotions (fear, sadness) that might interfere with the warrior's obligations.² The result is a set of socialization norms in which maleness is equated with physical strength, willingness to fight, and an emotional stoicism, while women are socialized to provide the contrast of the feminine "other." To be a warrior (male) is to be strong, assertive, courageous, and willing to engage in violence. To be feminine is to be the opposite -- weak, compliant, and unwilling to fight.

Finally, drawing on difference feminists such as Gilligan (1982), Goldstein observes that "men and women think differently about their separateness or connection with other people...Boys construct social relationships in terms of autonomous individuals, interacting according to formal rules, whereas girls construct social relationships as networks of connection." Further, men compete "to be alone" at the top of a hierarchy, whereas women seek to be at the center of a web (Goldstein 2001, 46). The preference for hierarchy and individualism is reinforced by socialization to the model of the masculine, individualist warrior

¹ Material in this paragraph follows Goldstein (2001, 252-268).

² One striking finding in the study by Conover and Sapiro is the very large gender difference that emerged in emotional reactions to the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Women were more likely by twenty to thirty percentage points to express disgust at the killing or fear for the safety of troops (1993, 1092).

(2001, 280).

Wohlford and Johnston applied precisely this reasoning in their study of support for international institutions in the US (2000). Controlling for partisanship, education, race, and income, they found that gender was among the strongest correlates of support for institutions. Similarly, Brooks and Valentino articulate a hypothesis that relates the "consensus orientation" of women to gender difference on the question of military intervention: "A large body of psychological research shows that women place greater value on group relationships than men do and that women are more likely to favor cooperation and compromise over aggression as a means for settling disagreement" (Brooks and Valentino 2011, 273, citing Bystydzienski 1993 and Beutel and Marini 1995). Brooks and Valentino do not hypothesize that this makes women more likely to oppose all war, but rather that they are more likely to support it when "consensus-driven organizations like the U.N. have approved the war," and their experimental survey confirms that this is the case in a sample of U.S. citizens (2011, 273, 278-280).

These observations on connection and cooperation are reminiscent of both normative and empirical versions of liberal theories of international relations, in particular the argument of liberal theorists that international institutions can mitigate the pathologies of an international system composed of autonomous sovereign states in a competitive balance of power. For example, in a 1917 peroration against the balance of power, President Woodrow Wilson argued that "There must be not a balance of power but a community of power...When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection" (cited in Craig and George 1983, 52). Compare this to the feminist, cosmopolitan themes of Virginia Woolf's *Three Guineas*, in which she observed that "As a woman, I have no country. As a woman, I want no country. As a woman, my country

is the whole world" (as cited in Goldstein 2001, 44).

Finally, two additional considerations might underlie greater support among women for international institutions and their support for multilateral decisions and actions. First, multilateral actions collectivize both the human and financial cost of war. Thus, if women are sensitive to potential casualties in war, the pooling of effort with others reduces the risk to the lives of a single country's soldiers. Similarly, to the extent that women are wary of the financial costs of war on pragmatic grounds (it threatens social and other programs of higher value to women), military actions in which the costs are shared should be more acceptable. Second, as I noted above, women are more sensitive to the risk of violence, and multilateral actions usually delay the onset of violence because they require a substantial period of consensus building. For that reason, multilateral actions may appeal disproportionately to women who have been socialized to use violence only as a last resort. Conover and Sapiro, for example, argue that "The point is not that women learn early in life never to engage in conflict nor use violence, but rather that they learn to put off the use of violence until later in the course of a conflict than do men, to escalate its use more slowly, and to be more emotionally upset by it" (Conover and Sapiro 1993, 1096). The same reasoning might explain the higher level of support among women for international institutions more generally (Wolford and Johnston 2000).

Taken together, these ideas provide the most theoretically coherent argument both for the existence of gender difference on global issues and the specification of which issues should evoke the largest difference. If boys and girls are indeed socialized into competing understandings of power, competition, the prospects for institutional cooperation, and the inevitability of war and violence, we would expect to find that gender difference characterizes attitudes in all of these domains. Specifically, we would expect to find gender differences on

three sets of issues: the virtue of national power and power balancing; the role of international institutions in managing international conflict; and the acceptance of war and violence as means for resolving conflicts.

Data and Method

Each of the theoretical frameworks described in the previous section point to specific issues on which gender difference should be highest. Unfortunately, there is no single opinion survey that would allow an integrated, comprehensive evaluation of these hypotheses. The arguments reviewed above cover a large number of global issues, from fundamental beliefs about power and war to specific questions about international institutions and the objectives of military actions. However, with the exception of the United States and to some extent Western Europe, there are few surveys with items that query respondents on all of these global issues. Indeed, surveys that include countries other than the US and Europe often ask only one or two questions about global issues. Moreover, some hypotheses about gender difference are inherently historical, but few surveys exist that would allow us to trace the evolution of gender difference over time. This is a particular problem for global opinion surveys, which exist only for the recent past.

Because of the absence of a single, comparative survey covering a variety of issues, I take a different approach in this paper. First, I organize my analysis according to the arguments of scholars who see the liberal-realist divide as the underlying organizing principle of gendered views of global issues. Employing a variety of available surveys, I compare gender differences for as many countries and years that are available for the following three sets of issues: the nature of power and the desirability of balancing power; international institutions and their legitimizing function; and war and the use of military force. If it is true that socialization yields

a divide that is similar to the arguments of liberals and realists, we would expect to find a significant gender difference on all of these issues.³ If gender difference characterizes only certain issues, it may provide evidence for the other hypotheses described in the previous section. For example, if gender difference is evident only in economically developed societies in which women demonstrate a higher level of political engagement, it would suggest that variation in gender difference is associated with the increasing cognitive and political autonomy that women experience in economically developed societies.

The data that I employ in the analysis are drawn from a number of sources. Among the more valuable sources are the *Transatlantic Trends* surveys conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States in as many as fourteen countries from 2002-2014; the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys; and the World Values Surveys. The German Marshall Fund surveys and the World Values Surveys are available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, and the Pew Global surveys are available from their website as well as from the Roper Center at Cornell University.⁴ In several cases, I also draw on my own data collection of global survey results on support for the use of military force during ten historical episodes since 1990. The source for each question that I analyze is listed in the tables and graphics in the sections below.

³ When possible in analyzes at the individual level, I control for other variables that influence opinions, including ideology, age, and other factors specific to each dependent variable.

⁴ The ICPSR website provides some online data analysis for the German Marshall Fund surveys. The same is true of the website for the World Values Surveys.

Power in International Relations

Liberal theorists criticize balance of power as the path to an insoluble security dilemma or the cause of conflict itself. Liberal and feminist theorists also criticize military power and balance of power for the same reason: peace or stability based on national military power impedes the creation of community. Finally, military power is expensive. If gender difference on security issues is due to pragmatic considerations, we would expect military power to raise the specter of a guns/butter trade off and thus increase gender difference.

The utility of military power is raised bluntly in the survey question displayed in Table 1. The question asks respondents to agree or disagree with the statement that "The best way to ensure peace is through military strength." Several things in Table 1 stand out. First, there is a chasm in the responses between the US and Turkey on the one hand, and Western and Eastern Europe on the other. In the former, a majority of the population agrees that military strength ensures peace, but in the latter this view is a distinct minority. Second, these views are strongly correlated with ideological self-placement among both men and women –the right is more supportive of military strength than the left. Nonetheless, given the overwhelming skepticism of Europeans toward military strength, this polarization may not be politically meaningful, as it is a view shared on all sides of the political spectrum. Finally, it is only in the United States that there is a gender difference in the population as a whole, and it is significant both statistically and politically. In the US, a majority of men agrees that military strength ensures peace, but a majority of women disagrees. In the US and Western Europe (less strongly), gender is a significant influence in a simple regression test (ordered probit) including ideological self-placement, educational attainment, and a variable representing the acceptability of war as an instrument of policy (described later in this paper). Ideological self-placement is the strongest

influence in all four groups of countries shown in the table. Gender is insignificant in Eastern Europe and Turkey. Further, as the bottom of Table 1 shows, this gender difference is complicated but not removed by considering party identification in the US. Military strength is most highly valued by both men and women in the Republican Party, but there is a gender division within the latter as well. The overall result in the US is a society that is doubly divided on the issue of military power: both by party and gender.

A second evaluation of power occurs in a question about "superpowers." Over the last twenty years, there has been a great deal of discussion in Europe about the US becoming a "hyper power" and the need to balance US power by enhancing European military capabilities. Transatlantic Trends pursued this question during 2002-2005 by asking the following: "In thinking about international affairs, which statement comes closer to your position about the United States and the European Union:

- The US should remain the only superpower
- The European Union should become a superpower, like the United States
- No country should be a superpower [volunteered]"

The review of prior research presented above would lead us to expect one of two gender patterns in the response to this question. First, because of the hypothesized relative antipathy of women to power and hierarchy, we would expect women to favor the "no country should be a superpower" response. Secondarily, we might also expect women to favor the "Europe as a superpower" response, for it at least suggests that dominant power (hierarchy) should be balanced by European efforts. Indeed, the reference to the European Union might be attractive to

women because it refers to a supranational entity, which suggests community rather than competition.

The responses in Table 2 indicate that neither of these patterns is present. In fact, gender differences are close to nonexistent in all countries but the US. American opinions on this issue are indeed divided, but gender plays a relatively minor role in that division. It is true that American women are slightly less favorable toward the idea of the US as a single superpower, and the gender divide does occur at a closely divided level of opinion that could be politically relevant. Nonetheless, the gender difference is dwarfed by the polarization by party and ideology. For example, on the left of the political spectrum in the US, only 26 percent of respondents believe in "unipolarity." On the right, in contrast, it is 60 percent! These ideological divisions do not exist in other countries.

In contrast, in Europe there is a strong consensus in favor of the European Union becoming a superpower, while in Turkey there is a division between this point of view and the view that no country should be a superpower. What is important for my purpose here is the finding that there are virtually no gender differences of consequence on this issue in Europe or Turkey. Thus, although hypotheses rooted in the socialization of women to a liberal worldview would point to opinions of power as a likely fulcrum of gender cleavage, I find evidence for the hypothesis only in the US, and even there the gender difference is dwarfed by ideological polarization. In summary, I find no evidence that questions of power and balance of power are central to gender difference. Put differently, there is no evidence for a gendered, liberal-realist divide when the question focuses on the utility of power itself.

However, a different story emerges when the focus turns to the *cost* of military power. Table 3 displays a follow-up to the question on the US and European Union as superpowers. The

follow-up question asked respondents who had favored the European Union becoming a superpower if they would hold to this belief "even if this implies greater military expenditures." The table reveals that Europeans' aspiration to achieve superpower status is not matched by a desire to spend more in its pursuit. Only about half of Europeans who favored pursuing superpower status are willing to spend more on defense. Further, opinions on the issue are closely divided, and gender difference on this question is very high, statistically significant, and politically relevant. The gender polarization is present in all countries, although the absolute level of support for increased spending does vary. In seven of the ten countries shown, a majority of men are willing to spend more, but among women there is not a majority in any country. Further, these differences are politically as well as statistically significant, as there are essentially competing majorities by gender. In further analysis not shown for reasons of space, I found that gender remains a significant influence in all countries but Turkey and Slovakia after controlling for left-right ideological placement, a measure representing the acceptability of war, support for US global leadership, and level of education. In summary, the very high gender polarization on the question of the cost of military power suggests that gender difference arises more from pragmatic differences in spending priorities than from a broader liberal world view.

International Institutions and Legitimacy

I noted earlier in this paper that one hypothesis supporting the hypothesis of "gender as world view" is that women prefer the cooperative "consensus orientation" represented by international institutions, while men are socialized to an individualist, competitive orientation. If this hypothesis is correct, there should be evidence for gender difference in attitudes toward international institutions and their community legitimizing functions.

The United Nations has been the focus of a substantial number of global polls. Beginning in 2002, the Pew Global Attitudes Survey asked the following question in as many as thirty-nine countries: "Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of ...the United Nations" (Pew Global Attitudes 2013). From 2003 through 2006, *Transatlantic Trends* asked "Would you say your overall opinion of the United Nations (UN) is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?" These questions allow a rare cross-national evaluation of the hypothesis that women have more positive opinions of international institutions.

A list of the gender difference on these questions for all thirty-nine countries would require a lengthy table, but it can be easily summarized: globally, 64 percent of men and 65 percent of women express a favorable view of the UN in the Pew Global survey, so the average gender difference is very small indeed. Further, there are fifteen countries in which men are slightly *more favorable* toward the UN than women. Gender difference on the UN question is also very small in the *Transatlantic Trends* surveys. The notable exception is the US, where women are more favorable to the UN than men by 9 to 17 percentage points --a significant difference. In fact, although opinions of the UN in the US are favorable in the aggregate, they are polarized both by partisanship and gender. For example, about 80 percent of democrats (men and women) are favorable to the UN, but among republicans there is a gender split. Among republican women, 53 percent express favorable views of the UN, compared to only 31 percent of republican men.⁵ In summary, while opinions from around the globe yield largely favorable attitudes toward the UN and show no evidence of gender difference, in the US opinions are divided by both party and gender. Nonetheless, there is little comparative evidence for the

⁵ The same is true in the study by Wohlford and Johnston (2000).

hypothesis that women are more supportive of international institutions.

Of course, a generally favorable attitude toward the UN is one thing, but perhaps the more important question is whether favorable attitudes translate into a willingness to accept the UN's injunctions or whether it is justifiable to ignore the UN altogether. In 2003-2005, *Transatlantic Trends* asked precisely this question: "Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following: When vital interests of our country are involved, it is justified to bypass the UN." From the literature reviewed above, the hypothesis would be that women are more likely to reject this statement because it contradicts the presumed consensus building function of the United Nations, and it ignores the cost and risk sharing that UN actions or mandates can offer.

However convincing the hypothesis, Table 4 shows little supporting evidence. The table shows that overall agreement with this sentiment is surprisingly strong in Western and Eastern Europe, which had shown very high UN favorability ratings in the surveys discussed above. Nonetheless, more than a majority of Eastern Europeans and a sizable percentage of Western Europeans are prepared to bypass the UN. Citizens in the US and Turkey are less favorable to the UN to begin with, so they are understandably more prepared to bypass the institution.

There are significant gender differences in only five countries: the US, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, but they are not all in the same direction. In the US and UK, women conform to the hypothesis: they are *less* willing to bypass the UN, especially those on the left of the political spectrum (shown at the bottom of Table 4). In France, Germany and the Netherlands, in contrast, women are *more* likely to favor bypassing the UN, a pattern also most pronounced on the political left. Why should women in these three countries display attitudes that are opposite to those of women in the other two? The answer likely lies in the

context in which citizens appraised possible UN action in the debate that led to the Iraq War in 2003. In the US and the UK, governments were pushing hard for a UN resolution that would authorize a coalition to use force in Iraq, but the US government in particular made clear that it would go to war in any case (thus bypassing the UN). This was an action that women on the left in the US and UK rejected. In France and Germany, by contrast, the governments had made clear in 2002 that they would not participate in a war against Iraq under any circumstances, including the eventuality of a UN resolution. In this case women on the left in France, Germany, and the Netherlands also gravitated toward the "anti war" position by endorsing the view that their country should bypass the UN should it pass a resolution endorsing intervention in Iraq.

In short, in these five countries, one can interpret the attitudes of women (in particular) as more opposed to the use of force relative to men, but this opposition found expression in different ways depending on the different political context in each country. The important point is that the gender difference appears to be governed by opposition to the use of force. Attitudes toward the UN appear secondary.

A similar result occurred in responses to a *Transatlantic Trends* question in the 2005. Respondents were asked simply to agree or disagree with the following statement: "The use of military force is more legitimate when the United Nations (UN) approves it." The hypothesis would be that women are more likely to agree with this statement, but with the exception of the United States, the opposite is actually true: men are slightly more likely to agree. In Germany and Italy, the difference is very large; about 70 percent of men agree with the statement, but among women the figure is 55 percent (German Marshall Fund of the United States 2005). As was true with the question on bypassing the United Nations, in these two countries approval by the United Nations is not enough to overcome skepticism among women about the use of

military force. War —not international institutions--is the issue.

War and the Use of Military Force

A core hypothesis of theorists such as Tickner and Goldstein is that men are socialized to a masculinized view of international relations that emphasizes a dispassionate acceptance of war and violence. Women, in contrast, are portrayed and socialized as the "softer," cooperative gender, in part to provide a contrast to men's warrior role. If this view is correct, we would expect to find particularly large gender differences on questions concerning the employment of violence to resolve international disputes. In this section, I evaluate this hypothesis by presenting two sets of data: opinions of the acceptability of war in twenty nine countries, and a global comparison of support for using military force in as many as fifty countries during ten historical episodes since 1990.

The Acceptability of War

Much of the evidence for gender difference in previous scholarship occurs in studies of attitudes towards war in the US. It is therefore difficult to tell if the gender difference is a uniquely American phenomenon, reflecting the US global role and perhaps the uniquely polarized nature of gender politics in the US. It is therefore useful to compare the views of men and women on attitudes toward war in as many countries as possible.

The Halifax International Security Forum and the German Marshall Fund recently fielded a question that attempts to measure support for the fundamental proposition that war is sometimes necessary as an instrument of policy. The question asks: "Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following--Under some conditions war is necessary to obtain justice."

The question is not without some weaknesses. The mention of "justice" is of particular concern, especially in the environment after September 11, 2001, when respondents might interpret the question as specifically inspired by the attacks on the US. Yet research by Hurwitz and Peffley (in the US) has shown that a basic measure of the "morality of war" is one of the "core values" that has a strong influence on a variety of other security attitudes (1987). Moreover, this "war is necessary" question was not formulated in reaction to recent events. Its origins date to the 1930s as part of the research program of L.L. Thurstone, a social psychologist who was a pioneer in the development of attitude scales on a variety of topics (1929, 1931, 1959). During the 1930s, Thurstone and his students invested considerable effort to develop a "pacifism" scale, and the "war is sometimes necessary" question was one of twenty-three items from which the scale was constructed (Droba 1930; Peterson 1931). In fact, the item is still in use by psychologists who study attitudes toward war (Kuterovac 2000; Jones-Wiley, Restori, and Lee 2007), and it resembles similar attitudinal questions on the use of military force that are strongly correlated with attitudes toward national security in other studies (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Bartels 1994; Reifler et. al. 2014). In short, the question is attractive because it seeks to measure a basic attitude toward war that is independent of time and circumstance.

The question has other virtues as well. The first is the blunt invocation of "war," a welcome contrast to survey questions that often employ abstractions, such as "military action." Second, the measure from the two organizations mentioned above is available in identical form in twenty nine countries, and the GMF questions is available for more than ten years in as many as sixteen countries. As a result, many research findings that exist only for the US can now be explored comparatively. Third, the question subtly invokes the ambivalence that most citizens have about policy choice (Zaller and Feldman 1992). War may be necessary, but only "under

some conditions." The research question is whether women and men resolve this ambivalence in different ways. A fourth virtue of the question is that it has proven to be a very robust predictor of opinions on other security issues, which increases confidence that it measures fundamental attitudes toward military force (Everts and Isernia 2015). In summary, whatever doubts one might have about the wording of the question, it seems to measure a fundamental toleration or rejection of war as an instrument of policy.

Figure 1 summarizes the size of the gender difference on the "war is necessary" question. There are several striking features of the results. First, the gender differences are very large. The average difference is 13 percentage points across all the countries shown, and the difference exceeds the threshold of statistical significance in twenty one of the twenty nine countries shown in the graphic. This is far larger than any gender difference reviewed in earlier sections of this paper, and it is the only question for which the gender difference is consistent across a large number of countries. Clearly, gender difference on the question of whether war is a necessary instrument of policy is not confined to citizens of the US superpower. It is one that divides the genders in most countries.

The *Transatlantic Trends* data for this question are available for the period 2003 through 2013, and they demonstrate that gender difference on the necessity of war question is large and stable over time in Western and Eastern Europe (not shown). In Western Europe, the difference averages 14 percentage points and is never less than 12 percentage points. In Eastern Europe, it averages 10 percentage points and is never less than 7 percentage points. There is more variation in the US and Turkish figures, but even here there are occasionally very large differences and the overall average is a substantial gender difference. In summary, on the fundamental question of whether war is "sometimes necessary," there is a substantial gender difference in almost all

countries for which data are available, and evidence from Europe, Turkey, and the US show that the difference is stable over time.

Nonetheless, a notable finding in Figure 1 is that there is some cross-national variation in the magnitude of gender difference, from a low of 4 percentage points in Romania, Turkey and China to over twenty percentage points in Belgium, Sweden, and Australia. The gender difference also varies somewhat over time in the US. This variation casts doubt on the essentialist, biological hypothesis. As I observed above, evidence in support of the essentialist hypothesis would consist of large and unvarying gender difference across different political, cultural, and strategic contexts. Moreover, if we focus on the level of acceptance of war rather than on gender difference, as shown in Table 5, we see that majorities of men state that war is necessary in only nine of the twenty nine countries, and in five countries a majority of women find that war is sometimes necessary. Clearly, the views of both men and women on the necessity of war varies considerably, suggesting that factors other than gender *per se* underlie the differences that result. Put differently, while there is certainly a tendency for women to express less agreement with the argument that war is necessary, the magnitude of this difference is affected by factors other than --or in addition to-- gender alone.

I explored what these factors might be in a regression analysis with the magnitude of gender difference as the dependent variable. Figure 2 displays the variable that emerged as the most strongly correlated with gender difference: an index of the political empowerment of women that is part of the World Economic Forum's annual "gender gap" report (World Economic Forum 2014). This measure combines the ratio of women to men in three categories: parliamentary office holders, minister-level positions, and total years in the office of chief executive (president or prime minister). Thus, the scatter gram in Figure 2 shows that gender

differences on war are most strongly correlated with a variable that measures the extent of actual progress in achieving political gender equality. A second variable --the level of women's educational attainment relative to men, is also strongly correlated with gender difference on war. What the regression analysis therefore shows is that the differentiation of women's views of war from those of men increases as the cognitive skills of women and the political representation of women increase.

There are two possible interpretations of this correlation. The first is that the policy preferences of women change as society changes, as Inglehart and Norris argue in their theory of economic development and attitudes toward gender equality (2003). As I noted above, Inglehart and Norris argue that the increasing educational attainments of women and their increasing participation in the labor force contribute to an increase in the "psychological autonomy" of women and therefore to an increasing differentiation of their policy preferences from those of men. The second possibility is that the policy views of women had long been different from men, but the expression of those views awaited the political opportunity to do so --or perhaps awaited the presence of female candidates and officer holders whose views serve to mobilize those of women in general (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001).

Support for Using Force in Ten Historical Episodes

In this section, I examine support for using military force in ten historical episodes using surveys from as many as fifty countries. Specifically, I analyze 1098 individual survey questions from ten historical episodes involving the threatened or actual use of force from 1990 through 2015 (a list of the historical episodes, the number of countries, and the number of questions for each are listed in Appendix 1). The unit of analysis is an individual survey question in a specific

country other than the US. For example, in the case of the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, I collected the gender breakdown in responses to 94 individual survey questions from 23 countries concerning support for using force against Iraq. I define "support for using military force" as any survey item that seeks a positive or negative opinion on "the potential or actual use of military force [past, present, or future]... including questions that actively (if sometimes hypothetically) query approval or disapproval of an action involving military force as a means of policy and also including questions that ask if the action is justified, appropriate, or the right thing to do."⁶

Figure 3 displays the average percentage of women and men who supported the use of military force in the ten historical episodes. Both the levels of support and the magnitude of gender difference vary. The Gulf War of 1990-1991, the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the War against Terror were more popular among both genders than in other episodes, but the magnitude of gender difference varies widely. The largest gender difference occurs during the confrontation with Iraq during the 1990s, the intervention by NATO in Kosovo in 1999, and NATO's attack against Libya in 2011 --the gender difference in these episodes averages 15 percentage points versus 8 points overall. What sets these episodes apart is that all consisted of air or missile strikes conducted by US and other NATO forces. No intervention by ground forces occurred. Pending controls for other variables, this suggests that one source of gender difference is an aversion to air strikes that risk inadvertent casualties among civilians, a pattern

⁶ The survey questions were retrieved from ninety-four sources. Additional details on data collection procedures will appear in Eichenberg (2016a). An earlier discussion appears in Eichenberg (2007).

that has been explicitly documented in US and global opinion of air strikes and drone strikes (Eichenberg 2015).

A second feature of the data in Figure 3 is the substantial variation in the magnitude of gender difference across the historical episodes, ranging from 3-4 percentage points in the case of potential interventions against Syria or Iran to 19 percentage points in reaction to NATO's air campaign in Kosovo. This adds additional evidence that gender difference is not large and unvarying across different contexts, an additional reason to discount essentialist theories.

Third, the gender differences shown in Figure 3 are clearly a factor of potential political importance in global opinion. Across all episodes, a majority of exactly 50 percent of men supported the use of force, compared to 43 percent of women. In three episodes, a majority of men supported using force, while a majority of women favored it in only one (the Gulf War of 1990-1991). In two additional episodes, a strong plurality of men favored military force, but among women, this is true of only one episode (Kosovo). Thus, the gender divide on using military force has the potential to exert real political influence, depending on political institutions in particular states and the influence of other variables.

My data on support for using military force in these ten historical episodes also provide additional insight into the argument that women's consensus orientation will lead to higher support for military actions that are carried out with the sanction of international institutions. Table 6 demonstrates that the thrust of these arguments is correct. The table shows support for using force and the resulting gender difference according to which multilateral actor (if any) is mentioned in the question --regardless of whether that actor is named as the one whose military forces who will actually carry out the action. For example, the mention of the UN might occur because the question asks if the respondent would favor using military force "to enforce UN

weapons inspections" or if the respondent would favor "international action." Such questions contrast with others that imply unilateral action ("favor or oppose sending French troops to Afghanistan"). Most strikingly, the smallest gender difference (4 percentage points) occurs with mention of general multilateralism (international action), the UN, or the EU. Indeed, support for military action when the UN is mentioned is *the only one* for which women express majority support. In contrast, the gender difference is twice as large when no multilateral organization is mentioned and four times as large when NATO or "allies" are mentioned.

Similar results occur with a more specific set of codes that I created to specify exactly which military actor or forces would be carrying out the action. These codes are closely related to those described immediately above, but they provide slightly more detail about "whose military force" is mentioned in the question. As Figure 4 shows, the pattern is very much the same as that for the simple mention of multilateral organizations: the smallest gender difference occurs when the military actor is specified as "UN [or international] forces," compared to much larger differences for other combinations of military actors. In summary, there is clear evidence that multilateral military actions reduce gender polarization, primarily because women increase their support for military action when the primary actor will be an international organization and even when those organizations are simply mentioned in the question. Contrary to the more general data on the United Nations presented above, these data lend support to at least one strand of the argument that the liberal-realist divide underlies gender difference.

Summary and Conclusions

I framed this paper as an attempt to assess four sets of alternative hypotheses on gendered views of global issues: an essentialist perspective; a perspective based on economic development and

the political mobilization of women; a perspective that emphasizes women's perception of risk and the risks associated with violence; and a broader perspective rooted in the liberal-realist divide.

One clear conclusion emerges from the data: there is little evidence for the essentialist perspective. If gender difference were rooted in biological sex, we would expect to find large and unvarying gender difference across issues, cultures, and time. The opposite is the case. Gender difference varies substantially across time and issues, and there is considerable cross-national variation as well.

Second, gender difference is largest and most cross-nationally consistent on questions that raise the *prospect of violence*. Gender difference is particularly evident on the fundamental question of war's acceptability, and the difference appears in a large number of countries. My cross national study of historical episodes since 1990 also revealed large gender differences in overall support for using force and in support for specific actions (such as air strikes or troop deployments). Taking this evidence together with the findings of previous research, it is fair to say that gendered reactions to the prospect of violence and the consequences of violence are the most consistent over time and across cultures.

Third, there is at best partial evidence that gendered reactions to war and violence are part of a broader divide in which women adhere to a more liberal world view and men to a more realist one. Attitudes toward military power, balance of power, and the UN are not divided by gender, and men are *more* likely to support the UN's legitimizing role when using force. On questions involving the UN and war, it is the issue of war that attracts the opposition of women even if the war is legitimized by UN endorsement. However, one finding might suggest that abstract, hypothetical questions may miss gendered reactions that occur in real-world conflicts:

in my study of ten conflicts since 1990, women in many countries are more supportive of using force if the action is multilateral. This latter finding suggests that additional research might uncover gendered attitudes toward community and consensus decision making that more abstract questions do not.

Fourth, there is evidence that gendered attitudes are *mediated by economic development*, the empowerment and mobilization of women, and the resulting differentiation of women's policy preferences. The pragmatic concerns of women were revealed in two questions. One question demonstrated that women's views of power and power balance are little different from men. However, a second question showed a substantial reluctance on the part of women to expend resources in the pursuit of power. In addition, gender difference in attitudes toward war is correlated with the level of political empowerment of women, which suggests that the expression of gender difference increases as women experience the higher level of political and psychological autonomy that accompany entry into the labor force, access to education, and political representation.

Fifth, the results make clear that national *political and strategic contexts* make a difference. This is particularly clear for the US, which is the only country in which gender divides views of power and the United Nations. This suggests one of two interpretations. The first is that the power position of the US and its history of frequent use of military force are the source of substantial gender (and partisan) polarization. The second interpretation is that national security is just one of many issues that are polarized by gender in the US, where gender differences in issue preferences and issue voting have been prominent for many years (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999). Whatever the cases, it seems clear that, in their search for general patterns in the views of women and men, scholars must be attentive to the possibility that

national or regional contexts may be a mediating factor.

Finally, the data make clear that gender difference may exert real political influence in national debates, especially debates about using military force. Women are consistently more skeptical of using military force, and in many countries a majority of women opposes the use of force while a majority of men are in favor. Given the increasing mobilization of women and their increased representation in political institutions, the prospect for gendered polarization on issues of national security is very real. Ironically, this is a subject that has been largely neglected by scholars of international security, but there is a large literature on women and international conflict that can help guide the future research agenda (Hudson et. al. 2013).

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Table 1. Percent who agree that "The best way to ensure peace is through military strength" by ideology and gender, 2004-2005

<i>ideology</i>	Left		Center		Right		Total		N
	<i>gender</i> Men (%)	Women (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	
United States	34	25	60	43	72	61	55	44	2172
Western Europe	20	18	29	23	41	33	30	25	14221
Eastern Europe	22	19	26	15	32	27	27	21	4049
Turkey	44	49	51	57	64	59	57	54	2309

<i>party identification</i>	Democrat		Independent		Republican		Total		N
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	
United States	40	32	50	43	77	64	55	44	2174

Note: Western Europe includes France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Eastern Europe includes Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Ideological self-placement is a seven point scale (1-extreme left through 7-extreme right), here collapsed into a three-point scale (1-3=Left 4=Center 5-7= Right). Party identification in the United States does not include "leaned" independents. All responses here add in subsequent tables and figures are weighted to yield a nationally representative sample.

Source: German Marshall Fund, *Transatlantic Trends*, 2004-2005.

Table 2. Views of superpowers by gender, 2002 - 2005


	Men (%)	Women (%)	Gender Difference (women - men) (%)	N
United States				
US should be the only superpower	51	46	-5	1343
European Union should become a superpower	43	46	3	1235
no country should be a superpower	6	8	2	202
Western Europe				
US should be the only superpower	11	9	-2	1917
European Union should become a superpower	75	76	1	14685
no country should be a superpower	14	16	-2	2863
Eastern Europe				
US should be the only superpower	8	7	-1	368
European Union should become a superpower	61	61	0	2875
no country should be a superpower	30	32	2	1471
Turkey				
US should be the only superpower	8	7	-1	146
European Union should become a superpower	46	46	0	914
no country should be a superpower	47	47	0	919

Note: See text for full question wording. See Table 1 for countries included in Western and Eastern Europe.

Source: German Marshall Fund, *Transatlantic Trends 2002-2005*.

Table 3. Gender difference in percent who favor the European Union becoming a superpower —even if this implies greater military expenditures,” 2003-2005

	Men		Women		Gender Difference (women - men)	N
	Yes	No	Yes	No		
Germany	49	50	31	67	-18	2118
Italy	62	35	47	45	-15	2284
Portugal	61	35	47	41	-14	2328
Turkey	62	32	49	33	-13	914
United Kingdom	60	37	48	45	-13	1617
Slovakia	45	44	33	50	-12	848
France	59	40	48	48	-11	2628
Spain	53	43	42	46	-11	1662
Poland	50	45	41	47	-9	2026
Netherlands	42	56	33	62	-9	2047
Overall	57	43	47	55	-10	17679



Note: With the exception of Slovakia, the cross tabulations are significant at the .001 level; the relationship for Slovakia is significant at $p=.003$.

Source: *Transatlantic Trends*, 2003-2005.

Table 4. Percent who agree: "When vital interests of our country are involved, it is justified to bypass the UN," 2003-2005

	Men (%)	Women (%)	Total (%)	Gender Difference (women - men) (%)	N
USA	67	56	61	-11	3085
Western Europe	47	49	48	2	19200
Eastern Europe	58	55	57	-3	4233
Turkey	78	76	77	-2	1814
USA	67	56	61	-11	3085
United Kingdom	58	50	54	-8	2857
Spain	49	44	44	-5	1993
Poland	54	50	52	-4	2451
Turkey	78	76	77	-2	2026
Slovakia	64	63	63	-1	1781
Portugal	46	49	47	3	2716
Italy	40	44	42	4	2929
Netherlands	52	58	55	6	2846
France	44	51	46	7	2943
Germany	39	49	44	10	2917


<i>ideology</i> <i>gender</i>	Left		Center		Right		N
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	
United Kingdom	47	39	60	53	63	58	2565
USA	50	37	69	53	85	68	2657
Germany	29	41	38	47	50	51	2800
Netherlands	38	50	53	56	57	58	2845

Note: See text for full wording of question and Table 1 for definition of ideology and the list of countries included in Western and Eastern Europe.

Source: German Marshall Fund, *Transatlantic Trends*, 2003-2005.

Figure 1. Gender difference in views of war, June/October 2013

"Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following—Under some conditions war is necessary to obtain justice." (gender difference in percent agree)




Source: German Marshall Fund *Transatlantic Trends 2013* and Halifax International Security Forum, *Global World Affairs Survey 2013* (survey by IPSOS).

Table 5. Responses to the statement: "Under some conditions war is necessary to obtain justice," June/October 2013

	Men		Women		Gender
	Agree (%)	Disagree (%)	Agree (%)	Disagree (%)	Difference (%)
China	82	18	78	22	-4
USA	76	24	70	30	-5
United Kingdom	68	32	57	43	-10
India	66	34	55	45	-12
Saudi Arabia	63	37	58	42	-5
Australia	63	37	42	58	-21
Canada	58	42	39	61	-18
Netherlands	51	49	35	65	-16
Indonesia	50	50	45	55	-5
Sweden	49	51	27	73	-21
South Africa	49	51	33	67	-16
Mexico	47	53	28	72	-19
Poland	46	54	35	65	-12
Belgium	43	57	20	80	-24
South Korea	42	58	28	72	-14
France	40	60	23	77	-17
Turkey	40	60	36	64	-4
Brazil	38	62	22	78	-16
Russia	37	63	31	69	-6
Germany	37	63	18	82	-19
Hungary	36	64	18	82	-17
Bulgaria	35	66	27	73	-8
Portugal	31	69	18	82	-13
Japan	31	69	16	84	-15
Romania	30	70	26	74	-4
Slovakia	29	71	17	83	-13
Argentina	28	72	12	88	-16
Italy	27	73	15	85	-11
Spain	23	77	10	90	-13

Source: German Marshall Fund *Transatlantic Trends 2013* and Halifax International Security Forum, *Global World Affairs Survey 2013* (survey by IPSOS).


Figure 2. The relationship between the political empowerment of women and the size of the gender difference on “war is necessary”



Note: The horizontal axis displays an index of the political empowerment of women that is part of the annual World Economic Forum’s annual “gender gap” report. The measure combines the ratio of women to men in three categories: parliamentary office holders, minister-level positions, and total years in the office of chief executive (president or prime minister). The vertical axis displays the gender difference in agreement with the statement that “war is sometimes necessary to obtain justice” (absolute value)

Sources: German Marshall Fund *Transatlantic Trends 2013* and Halifax International Security Forum, *Global World Affairs Survey 2013* (survey by IPSOS).

Figure 3. Support of men and women for using military force in ten historical episodes



Note: See text for definition of support for using military force. The bars represent the average over all survey questions and all countries within each historical episode.

Source: Author's data collection.


Table 6. Support for using military force according to multilateral organizations mentioned in survey questions (%)

	Men (%)	Women (%)	Gender Difference (women - men) (%)	Number of Questions
no multilateral mention	44	36	-8	624
NATO/allies	54	38	-16	53
EU, NATO & UN allies or friends	49	41	-8	243
multilateral general	43	38	-5	5
UN specifically mentioned	51	46	-4	60
EU mentioned	55	51	-4	61
all multilateral mentions combined	45	43	-2	50
Total	50	43	-7	(474)
Total	47	39	-8	1098

Note: The figures represent the average level of support for using military force across all historical episodes and all countries. See text for definition of support for using military force.

Source: Author's data collection.

Figure 4. Gender difference in support for using military force according to whose military force is mentioned in survey question (% women - % men)



Note: The bars represent the average gender difference in support for using military force across all historical episodes and all countries. See text for definition of support for using military force.

Source: Author's data collection.

Appendix 1. Support for Using Military Force List in Ten Historical Episodes

Historical episode	Time period	Number of Survey Questions	Number of States Surveyed
Gulf Crisis and War	1990-1991	94	23
Bosnia	1992-1995	280	17
Iraq confrontation	1992-2003	36	4
Kosovo	1998-1999	32	16
War Against Terror	2001-2013	360	51
Iraq War	2003-2012	97	16
Iran	2003-2013	96	28
Syria	2003-2013	41	18
Libya	2011-2012	29	14
Ukraine	2014-2015	33	11
Total		1098	

Source: Author's data collection