Engaging the Middle East: After the Cairo Speech

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A report on the conference:

Engaging the Middle East: After the Cairo Speech
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Rapporteur and Writer: **Amelia Cook**
Amelia Cook received a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from The Fletcher School in 2008, where she studied international development, human rights, and environmental policy. Her thesis analyzed the status of human rights in the Republic of Botswana with specific regard to the San of the Kalahari. She recently published, with Jeremy Sarkin, “Who is Indigenous? Indigenous Rights Globally, in Africa, and among the San in Botswana,” in the *Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law* (Fall, 2009) and “Is Botswana the Miracle of Africa? Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Human Rights versus Economic Development,” in *Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems* (Spring, 2010). In 2010, she completed a Master of Science in Resource Economics and Policy at the University of Maine, where she worked as a graduate assistant in the School of Economics. Amelia received her B.A. in Africana Studies from Vassar College in 2001. She was a research assistant at the Fares Center while at The Fletcher School, and continues to work as an editor for the Center from her new home in Boise, Idaho. Amelia can be reached at amelia.cook@tufts.edu.

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Preface

When President Barack Obama stood before a vast crowd at Cairo University on June 4, 2009 and gave a speech entitled "A New Beginning," his words signaled just that for many Muslim communities around the world. For the most part, these communities responded to President Obama's extended hand with optimism and respect. More than a year and a half later, however, many would argue that U.S.-Muslim relations have begun to regress in the wake of the limited concrete changes that have actually taken place in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East following the President's promising speech.

During the second year of Barack Obama's presidency, the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies hosted a conference entitled "Engaging the Middle East: After the Cairo Speech," one of the Center's many events that provide a forum at Tufts University for the discussion of topics affecting the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean region. An exceptionally talented group of scholars, journalists, policymakers, and members of the U.S. military and the U.S. Foreign Service gathered at Tufts University on October 14-15, 2010 to review the status of American-Muslim relations and other regional issues more than a year after the speech at Cairo University.

Among the many topics analyzed by the conference participants were the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the lack of progress in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the tense relationship between the U.S. and Iran, and the dangers presented by increasing turmoil in Pakistan. Participants offered analysis of these major issues in addition to policy prescriptions for the U.S. government intended to facilitate progress in their resolution. Many lamented the perceived deterioration in American-Muslim relations following what appeared to be a moment of hope in June 2009. As in years past, speakers noted the caliber of their fellow panelists and the high regard with which this annual conference has come to be recognized. Audience members, from within the Tufts community and beyond, enriched the debate further with their insights and questions.

This publication, the Fares Center's seventh occasional paper, contains a series of summaries of the panelists' lectures. Preceding these summaries is a brief introduction to the common themes of the conference and a selection of the policy prescriptions recommended by the speakers.

I would like to recognize the extraordinary group of people whose contributions, support, and advice made the conference and this publication possible. They include: H.E. Issam M. Fares, founder of the Fares Center and former Deputy Prime Minister of Lebanon; Mr. Fares I. Fares, trustee and member of the Fares Center executive committee; Tufts University President Lawrence S. Bacow and the Office of the President; Provost Jamshed Bharucha and the Office of the Provost; Dean Robert M. Hollister and the Jonathan M. Tisch College of Citizenship and Public Service; Dean Stephen W. Bosworth and The Fletcher School; Dr. Malik Mufti and Dr. Drusilla Brown and the International Relations Program at Tufts University; Dr. Richard H. Shultz and the International Security Studies Program at The Fletcher School; Dr. John L. Esposito and the Fares Center Academic Committee; the members of the Fares Center Executive Committee, including Dr. Jamshed Bharucha, Mr. Richard E. Blohm, Mr. Fares I. Fares, Dr. Laurent Jacque, and Mr. Jeswald Salacuse; the Fares Center Advisory Board, with special recognition for the support of Dr. M. Lee Pearce; the Honorable William A. Rugh, Edward R. Murrow Visiting Professor of Public Diplomacy at The Fletcher School and former Visiting Scholar at the Fares Center; Dr. Vali Nasr, Professor of International Politics at The Fletcher School, and Dr. Ibrahim Warde, Adjunct Professor of International Business at The Fletcher School, both Fares Center Associate Directors, as well as the rest of the Fares Center staff; and finally, a special thank you to Mr. Anastassis G. David for his contribution.

Dr. Leila Fawaz
Founding Director
The Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies
Tufts University

Introduction

By the time former U.S. President George W. Bush left office in January 2009, U.S. relations with the Muslim world, especially throughout the Middle East, appeared to be at an all-time low. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continued to undermine America's reputation in the region, and despite efforts to curb Islamic extremist activities, extremist groups continued to present dangers throughout the region. A new president's taking office offered the opportunity for a fresh start in Muslim-American relations and the U.S. could potentially begin to regain the trust and friendship of Muslim communities across the Middle East.

There is little doubt that the hand extended by President Obama during the Cairo speech of June 2009 signaled a promise of a new phase in American relations with Muslims, especially those in the Middle East and South Asia. In several speeches to the Muslim world that took place during his first year in office, most would agree that the President said "the right things" to mend soured relations. Additionally, the appointments of Richard Holbrooke as Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and George Mitchell as Special Envoy for Middle East Peace during President Obama's first days in office indicated to the world that he prioritized American foreign policy in the Middle East.

Now that the President has been in office for more than two years, the world has had time to reflect on his performance thus far in the Middle East. Many would argue that the achievements over these two years have been limited. From the outset, President Obama took a firm stance with Israel, and for the first time in many years Israel felt less secure of its preferential treatment. There appeared to be a brief moment of hope for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process when Israel agreed to a ten-month moratorium on the construction of settlements. Unfortunately, the moratorium was both short-lived and ineffective.

Negotiations with Iran, which seemed promising at the beginning of President Obama's tenure, were hindered by post-election turmoil within Iran while an opening for progress on nuclear negotiations—this time in Geneva—closed yet again without securing an agreement. Since that time, negotiations over Iran's

nuclear program have been placed on the back burner. In Lebanon, the international tribunal on the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri threatened to cause an outbreak of violence, as Hezbollah braced itself for the possibility of an indictment. Continued mistrust between the political elites of Iraq has inhibited progress in establishing an effective government there. At the same time, Iraqi refugees have now become the second largest refugee population in the world.

While U.S. efforts have more or less effectively ousted al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, the group has now established a stronghold in northwestern Pakistan and has secured global reach through a network of partners. Pakistan has become more unstable than ever and could represent the next frontier of violent conflict if not managed properly. Meanwhile, President Obama's December 2009 announcement of troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, some argued, signaled to the Taliban that all they must do is wait for the U.S. to depart before they can retake power.

It is clear that most of the issues facing the U.S. in the Middle East when President Obama was inaugurated continue to challenge his administration to this day. Domestic setbacks—specifically the global economic meltdown, high unemployment, and the healthcare debate—surely inhibited the President's ability to make progress on these issues over the last two years. Yet, while there have been setbacks, President Obama did set the right tone at the beginning of his presidency by offering words of respect to the Muslim world. Hopefully, he can still draw on the good will engendered by those words and begin anew his efforts to make tangible progress on key issues in the Middle East. The opportunity is not yet lost and the avenues for potential partnerships to develop and successful collaborations to proceed still exist. For the U.S. to take advantage of these opportunities, the Obama administration must continue to demonstrate respect and a willingness to negotiate and compromise with the people of the Middle East through its actions as well as its words.

COMMON THEMES

Given this context, the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies hosted the conference "Engaging the Middle East: After the Cairo Speech" at Tufts University in October 2010. Referencing the groundwork laid by President Obama's speech, invited speakers from academia, the press, civil service, and the military reflected on Muslim-American relations across the Middle East and South Asia, noting where progress was made and where there was room for significant improvement. During the two-day conference, panelists discussed much more than the President's role in restoring Muslim-American relations; they offered poignant analysis of key concerns facing the region. The panel sessions addressed issues including Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; the ongoing situations in Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon; the war in Afghanistan and the context next door in Pakistan; the rise of a new conflict paradigm based on irregular warfare; America's relationship with the Muslim world; and the potential for employing soft power rather than military force across this region. Both keynote lectures discussed and lamented the lack of a coherent, over-arching Middle East strategy—a reality reiterated by other panelists.

The following themes were pervasive during the two-day conference:

- *Action* speaks louder than words.
  Since his inauguration, President Obama has given several noteworthy speeches addressing Muslim communities around the world, including addresses from Cairo and Istanbul and his video message marking the Iranian New Year, but people across the Middle East and South Asia are waiting for the follow-up to these expressions of respect and intention. Already, the seeds of goodwill sown in Cairo have begun to wither. Real progress on key political issues is urgent to demonstrate that the President's words were genuine.

- *America's relationship with the Muslim world has consistently been defined by its differences rather than its commonalities.*

  The discourse expressed by many U.S. politicians, and occasionally by the American media, often gives credence to the notion of a "clash of civilizations" between the West and Islam. As President Obama stated in his Cairo speech, "So long as our relationship is defined by our differences, we will empower those who sow hatred rather than peace, and who promote conflict rather than the cooperation that can help all of our people achieve justice and prosperity." The U.S. and the Muslim world share many joint objectives, yet opportunities for cooperation have long been overlooked in favor of a focus on the differences that characterize the two regions.

- *U.S. engagement in the Middle East over the last decade has been primarily military-based and has underutilized important elements of soft power.*

  America has been engaged in two wars in the Middle East for the better part of the last decade, yet these military efforts have not necessarily resolved the many issues that confronted America in this region at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It is time, many panelists argued, for the U.S. to pursue more palatable forms of engagement with the people of the region, based, for example, on educational, economic, and intellectual partnerships rather than on a military presence. Doing so will not only benefit the U.S. and these communities, but could also work to alleviate the tensions that continue to breed extremist activities in the region.

- *America has not developed a coherent, overarching framework for addressing its most pressing and most achievable objectives in the Middle East.*

  The U.S. has been waging a series of battles—both military and non-military in nature—across the Middle East for the past decade with limited coordination among independent endeavors. Many of these efforts are interrelated and the U.S. would benefit from taking a step back and developing a regional framework in which its objectives are achieved harmoniously, rather than in conflict with one another.

- *The selection of Israeli settlements as the key issue to spark U.S. re-engagement in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations was perhaps ill advised.*

  When President Obama chose to negotiate the settlement issue in order to demonstrate U.S. commitment to Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, his administration may not have given proper deference to the serious repercussions of failure. Despite the achievement of a brief moratorium on settlements, which was riddled with loopholes, the President was not able to secure long-term Israeli cooperation on curbing the construction of settlements. Many interpreted this failure as a sign of the inability of the U.S. to effectively serve as a mediator powerful enough to elicit compromises from both sides in the resolution of this difficult conflict.

PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE

More than a year and a half after President Obama's Cairo address, his administration's Middle East foreign policy achievements are somewhat limited. Undoubtedly, U.S. domestic constraints hindered the President's ability to achieve many of the objectives outlined in his speech. Given this lack of progress, panelists at the conference offered recommendations on how President Obama could reignite America's foreign policy agenda in the Middle East and begin to make progress on promises outlined early in his presidency. Their suggestions included concrete steps to restoring America's image in the region, and emphasized the need to move beyond military engagement, which has been the cornerstone of the U.S. presence in the Middle East for the last ten years, and the need to strengthen other elements of partnership and collaboration.

Panelists, occasionally in disagreement with one another, recommended that the U.S. administration:

- Shift its focus from religious differences with Islam toward the resolution of political issues affecting the Muslim world.
- Strengthen forms of engagement other than the security paradigm by fostering economic, diplomatic, and intellectual relationships with Muslim communities.
- Empower Muslim communities and pursue collaboration based on education, science, and technology.
- Continue to develop and improve upon strategies to wage non-conventional warfare, where necessary, given that the new irregular warfare conflict paradigm is here to stay.
- Make known its opinion regarding what a "fair" resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would constitute.
- Continue to pursue a policy of deterrence in Iran, maintaining the sanctions regime, in hopes that the Iranians will eventually oust their current government.
- Reflect, as well, on the possibility that Iran's request to pursue peaceful nuclear technology is legitimate, assuming that it agrees to international inspections.
- Transition the American presence in Afghanistan from military-based engagement to a more sustainable, long-term presence in which Afghans assume control over military and law enforcement operations.
- Recognize the validity of some of Pakistan's security concerns.
- Utilize relationships with India and Pakistan to cultivate trust between the two nations.
- Support various facets of post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq including training parliamentarians; ensuring access to education, healthcare, and employment; and embracing the Iraqi military.
- Emphasize the importance of police reform, the rule of law, and good governance in Iraq and Afghanistan as the U.S. military withdraws.
- Respect the sovereignty of nations.
- Be more modest in its pursuits and objectives in the Middle East.

* * *

The recommendations offered by the panelists confirm that the U.S. has made some progress in improving its relationships with communities and nations across the Middle East since the end of the Bush administration, but their comments also confirm that America has a way to go in order to achieve the objectives established by President Obama at the beginning of his presidency. While President Obama sent the right message to reverse worsening relations with the region, all participants agreed that concrete action is the necessary next step. The President still has time to act upon his assurances, and as the economy recovers and domestic issues settle slightly, he may well be capable of doing so.

Amelia Cook
MALD 2008
The Fletcher School
Tufts University

Note: All conference participants were given the opportunity to review the following summaries.

Keynote Address: "Is There a Workable U.S. Strategy for the Middle East? No! Then What?"

SPEAKER:
Leslie H. Gelb, Former correspondent for *The New York Times*;
President Emeritus and Board Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

CHAIR:
The Honorable Stephen W. Bosworth, Dean, The Fletcher School

Leslie Gelb began the keynote lecture of the 2011 Fares Center conference with a caveat: he is not a Middle East expert, but rather an expert on U.S. foreign policy who has spent his life moving from conflict to conflict worldwide. The central premise of his lecture was the lack of American strategy in the Middle East and the difficulties of developing an effective foreign policy strategy for this complex region.

Following an introduction by Fletcher School Dean **Stephen Bosworth**, in which Bosworth noted Gelb's transformative role at the Council on Foreign Relations and his Pulitzer Prize-winning journalism, Gelb set about to explore this "hot button" of American foreign policy known as the Middle East. He began by defining the concept of "strategy," a term that signifies to Gelb being "clear-eyed" about one's objectives and making them achievable. Gelb argued that U.S. engagement in the Middle East has been led by a series of impulses and pressures—resulting from domestic demands related to oil, concerns about terrorism, U.S. democratization efforts, U.S. military presence in the region, and American commitments to Israel—rather than by a comprehensive strategy.

Part of the reason that the U.S. does not have an effective Middle East strategy, Gelb stated, is that there is no more complex region in the world. The Middle East and its global relevance incite an emotional response, argued Gelb. He noted the specific difficulties caused by America's relationship with Israel. He

reviewed the state of affairs in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt, and commented that American interest in countries across the Arabian Peninsula is due only to its fear of losing access to oil.

Gelb remarked on the foolishness of the American involvement in Iraq, which destroyed the sole regional counterweight to Iran and has caused a significant mess within the country itself. The danger of Iran, in reality a poor and powerless country, has been blown out of proportion, Gelb contended. Many of the region's problems are domestic or regional in nature, and therefore the U.S. can only do so much to influence them.

None of these nations, however, should cause the U.S. as much concern as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Gelb expressed apprehension over America's presence in these two countries, where he believes a U.S. presence is neither sensible nor logical. After all, the initial American objective in Afghanistan of eliminating al-Qaeda has been rendered irrelevant by the group's now having global reach. American desires to protect Pakistan, on the other hand, seem odd given Washington's lack of ability to fix Pakistan's internal problems and Pakistani military support for the Taliban, which fight U.S. forces in Afghanistan. As well, few countries have given the U.S. more problems than Pakistan. While Iran is threatening to create nuclear weapons, Pakistan—an extremely unstable country—already has them. Across a troubled region, Gelb pointed to Turkey as one of few bright spots, due to its pragmatic Islamic government and economic progress.

Given this laundry list of highly complex issues, it is understandable why the U.S. has had so much trouble creating a workable strategy in the Middle East. Gelb suggested first and foremost that the U.S. become more modest regarding its objectives and the extent of its power to achieve those objectives. He commented that the list of vital American interests in this region is actually quite limited. Furthermore, Gelb recommended that the U.S. work with regional leaders such as Egypt and Iran (actually, despite appearances, a natural ally). He also suggested that the U.S. gear its Middle East policy towards the future of these strategic partnerships and move away from the worries it is currently preoccupied with. To do so, the U.S. will also need to look at the nuclear issue from Iran's point of view. Given that countries such as North Korea, India, Israel, and Pakistan already possess nuclear weapons, Gelb argued that Iran's request to pursue peaceful nuclear technology is not unreasonable and calls for an understanding response. He advised that the U.S. pursue a policy of deterrence toward Iran, continue with sanctions, and encourage Iran to open up its nuclear programs to inspections. At the same time, the U.S. should illuminate the consequences for Iran if it develops nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them.

Meanwhile, the U.S. must scale back its efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan so that it can focus on Iran and other more complicated and more important matters to U.S. interests. The U.S. must develop a sustainable long-term presence in Afghanistan, based on the Afghan people quickly assuming principal responsibility for their own defense—with Washington in a supporting role. Pakistan, on the other hand, consists of approximately 180 million people over whom the U.S. cannot expect to exert control. Gelb suggested letting China or India take some responsibility there.

In conclusion, Gelb argued that the U.S. must not entangle itself in situations where it is not likely to succeed. America's "impulses" in the Middle East have propelled it toward failures. And failure represents a dangerous loss of power. Above all, Gelb concluded, America must be far more modest in its pursuits within this complicated region.

Session I: The Arab-Israeli Conflict

SPEAKERS:

Ruth Margolies Beitler, Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics, United States Military Academy, West Point

Robert H. Pelletreau, former U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain, Tunisia, and Egypt; former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs

Shai Feldman, Judith and Sidney Swartz Director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies and Professor of Politics, Brandeis University

Rami G. Khouri, Editor-at-Large, *The Daily Star* (Beirut); Director of the Issam Fares Institute of Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut

CHAIR:

Nadim N. Rouhana, Professor of International Negotiation and Conflict Studies, The Fletcher School

Ruth Beitler began by analyzing Israeli Prime Minister (PM) Benjamin Netanyahu's decision not to extend the moratorium on settlement building beyond its original ten months. She noted that PM Netanyahu must hedge his bets while maintaining his coalition and ensuring that the Palestinians remain at the table. The ruling Likud party, which does not have a majority among the coalition, is in a sense held hostage by the objectives and concerns of the other members of the coalition, including the Labor Party, the Shas Party, and the Jewish Home Party. Beitler noted that after examining his relationship with the Obama administration, which offered inducements for Israel to continue the moratorium given the mid-term elections, and with the Palestinians, who have limited options beyond negotiation, PM Netanyahu concluded that there might be sufficient U.S. pressure to encourage President Mahmoud Abbas to remain at the table despite continued settlement building.

While the number of new settlements actually being built is fairly small, Beitler contended that their existence has enormous symbolic significance. Additionally, discussions regarding

the Israel Oath proposed by PM Netanyahu, in which non-Jewish citizens of Israel must pledge their loyalty to a Jewish and democratic state, present another issue of major symbolic value, although again the number of people it would actually affect is small. Beitler commented on the difficultly of creating a liberal democracy based on citizens taking a religious oath. PM Netanyahu has requested that the Palestinians recognize that Israel is a national home for the Jews in exchange for coming to the table. Interestingly, this pre-condition for negotiations has significant impact on the Palestinians' right of return. Once negotiations resume, if the establishment of borders is the first issue addressed, Beitler noted, then the settlement issue will be inherently resolved, as land becomes either a part of Israel or Palestine.

Given this complex picture and the balancing act that PM Netanyahu is attempting to navigate, Beitler reviewed his options, commenting that they "are not good." He could call for early elections, but in doing so risks the security of his own political position for the sake of the peace process. Or, he could work on his coalition.

Beitler concluded that in the face of failed negotiations, only Hamas and Iran would benefit. The positions of parties on both sides will harden further, and move farther apart. For negotiations to work, on the other hand, Israel will have to concede on several extremely volatile issues, including relinquishing the settlements and returning to 1967 borders. Palestine, for its part, will have to concede on the issue of right of return. Beitler closed pessimistically by noting that all of these issues unfortunately have been discussed in the past without progress.

Robert Pelletreau discussed the tone set by and the impact of President Obama's Cairo address. He noted the disastrous set of Middle East challenges that the President inherited when he came to office in January 2009. These include Iraq, where reconciliation between Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds remains illusive; Iran and its conservative clerical leadership, which resists engagement with the West; a resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan; unrest in Pakistan; al-Qaeda extending its reach; and the unpromising state of Arab-Israeli negotiations. Despite these challenges, President Obama set about taking action, including the appointments of Richard Holbrooke and George Mitchell as Special Representatives to the region. He used the moment in Cairo to call for a new beginning between the U.S. and the Muslim world. In his speech, the President noted the importance of the Arab-Israeli peace process and asked that initial steps be taken there, including that Palestinians abandon the use of violence, Israelis cease settlement-building, and Arab states step forward.

Unfortunately, Pelletreau noted, it soon became clear that this elevated rhetoric was not matched by the realities on the ground. Stopping Israeli construction of settlements proved near impossible. Even the ten-month moratorium on settlement building was filled with holes and contingencies such that there was not a single day during the ten-month period when settlements were not constructed. Furthermore, using the settlement issue as a first step was ill advised, Pelletreau argued, as it heightened the importance of the issue in the eyes of Palestinians and represented a test of the ability of the Obama administration to secure Israeli cooperation. The second mistake made by the U.S. was its assumption that the Saudis would allow the Arab Peace Initiative to be utilized as a malleable inducement for the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Saudis, on the other hand, intended for the Arab Peace Initiative to be enacted contingent upon a successful Arab-Israeli peace negotiation. These two setbacks immediately hindered progress on Arab-Israeli negotiations for the U.S.

Simultaneously, U.S.-Israeli relations appeared to cool off during the course of President Obama's first year. Israel felt its "special" relationship with the U.S. had weakened. Time soon proved, however, that despite the President's open criticism of certain Israeli policies, Israeli security and cooperation remain key American priorities.

As Mitchell's understanding of the situation on the ground grew, he pressed for proximity talks as a gateway to a second wave of American engagement. Yet despite a successful meeting between President Abbas and PM Netanyahu in September 2010, the ten-month moratorium on settlements was not renewed. Sadly, Pelletreau concluded, these realities point to a continua-

tion of the status quo as the most likely outcome, in which the U.S. strives "to manage the situation, rather than resolve it."

Shai Feldman reviewed the major reasons why there is an eighty-five percent chance that no breakthrough will be made in Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, and the reasons why there is a fifteen percent chance that one will. On the pessimistic side, there are no leaders today who are capable of making breakthroughs as there have been in the past. Second, PM Netanyahu is working with a right-wing government. Third, the settlers are gearing for a fight in case there is a breakthrough and their existence is threatened. Fourth, President Abbas presides over a fractured entity, known as Palestine, which is divided between two geographic regions—the West Bank and Gaza—and two political parties—Hamas and Fatah. Fifth, it is unclear whether this situation is truly an American priority. Sixth, it is uncertain whether a breakthrough in this situation would actually assist the U.S. in resolving its many other challenges in the Middle East. And, finally, the U.S. has perhaps overestimated its ability to serve as a mediator in this debate.

On the other hand, several reasons exist that encourage parties on both sides to push for a breakthrough. First, Feldman argued, in the absence of an agreement Hamas will be the only credible alternative to lead Palestine, because Fatah is neither a more competent nor a more honest organization. Second, Salam Fayyad's state-building plan will likely collapse if the top-down approach does not align with the bottom-up approach. Third, in the absence of a breakthrough, the creation and training of a new Palestinian security force under Fayyad's plan will be vulnerable to the Hamas narrative that it will only serve to protect Israelis.

There are also several key issues on the Israeli side that support the small chance of a breakthrough. First, PM Netanyahu has emphasized his commitment to this process; if he fails, Feldman argued, he and his colleagues will lose credibility. Second, PM Netanyahu has no domestic excuse for inaction. As Feldman noted, he "cannot say he can't, because he can." Third, if Iran is truly a threat to Israel, then Israel cannot risk its relationship with the U.S., the only country capable of containing Iran, by continuing to stall progress. Fourth, there is no alternative resolution to the current campaign to delegitimize Israel. Fifth, barring a breakthrough, Feldman asked, how will PM Netanyahu be able to realize his vision of turning Israel into a regional economic force? The prime minister realizes that the political reality cannot be severed from the economic reality.

In closing, Feldman hypothesized that the Obama administration will continue to pursue negotiations, and he is banking on the small chance that all of the parties involved will ultimately "do the right thing."

Rami Khouri outlined four dimensions to President Obama based on the President's past experience. These include the President as community organizer, law student/professor, politician, and basketball player. Each of these dimensions portends its own course of action. The community organizer seeks to mobilize people. The law professor pursues the rule of law and the rights of people. The politician is willing to make compromises, pander to the crowd, and negotiate deals. Finally, the basketball player engages in a game of strategy, assessing when it is time to press full court and when it is appropriate to take a timeout.

Khouri described eight significant issues that President Obama faced when he came to office, including: the security of energy sources, Israel and its security, Iraq, the battle against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, Afghanistan, public diplomacy within the Muslim world, Iran, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The President recognized that each of these issues was interconnected in various ways. He specifically understood the role that the Arab-Israeli conflict plays in forming public opinion in the region. Therefore, his administration attempted to address all of the issues simultaneously. Unfortunately, Khouri argued, it lacked an effective strategy for doing so.

When President Obama came to power, the reputation of the U.S. was in such peril in the Middle East that the U.S. could hardly accomplish anything there without employing military force. Across the Middle East, the U.S. had lost respect as well as its ability to instill fear. At one point, Khouri noted, the Arabs, Turks, Israelis, and Iranians were simultaneously refusing American

requests, something of a novelty in recent history. President Obama understood that credibility had to be restored in order for the U.S. to move forward in the region.

Following President Obama's first year in office, the verdict on his performance in the Middle East among Americans was mixed, while among Middle Easterners it was largely negative. The U.S. has expressed determination in its re-engagement on the Arab-Israeli issue. However, Khouri remarked, the largest hindrance to U.S. involvement in the negotiations is that even the key players still do not know the American position on the major issues under review. The U.S. must make known what it believes is a fair resolution to the situation. Khouri suggested that, while Israel and the Palestinians have made some historic concessions, ultimately all parties must examine the offers on both sides and determine which offers are aligned with international law and are also realistic. Only then can the negotiations move forward effectively.

Session II: New Strategies for Managing Old Conflicts: Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon

SPEAKERS:

Farideh Farhi, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii

Barbara Slavin, Journalist and Author

Randa M. Slim, former Vice President and current Board Member, International Institute for Sustained Dialogue

Deborah Amos, National Public Radio Foreign Correspondent

CHAIR:

Robert M. Hollister, Dean, Jonathan M. Tisch College of Citizenship and Public Service, Tufts University

Farideh Farhi limited her remarks to Iran, where she argued that the Obama administration has pursued a series of tactics rather than an overarching strategy. While President Obama continued to employ the general "carrot and stick" strategy of former President Bush, he hinted at a strategic reorientation in U.S.-Iranian relations in which the two parties would negotiate with each other. Initially, Iran appeared to be open to this possibility.

In his Iranian New Year speech, President Obama took a new approach by avoiding the historic tendency of trying to drive a wedge between Iranians and their government, or among the Iranian leaders themselves, and made it clear that the negotiation process would not be advanced through threats. Iran responded positively to President Obama's overtures, through a direct message from Ayatollah Khamenei, who nevertheless warned that the old style of communication backed by pressure would not be acceptable. The Ayatollah suggested that Iran was interested in a process of give and take. The June 2010 election in Iran, however, derailed these negotiations temporarily.

In October, both sides met in Geneva and drafted an interim

agreement that involved confidence measures, including the removal of substantial amounts of uranium from Iran. However, there were concerns that the agreement with external powers would lend legitimacy to the Iranian government, which continued to commit domestic human rights abuses. As a result, no deal materialized in Geneva. The Obama administration ratcheted up sanctions once again, and in response, President Ahmadinejad escalated his anti-American rhetoric while simultaneously claiming that Iran was ready to negotiate.

The contours of a final agreement are visible, argued Farhi. Under such an agreement, Iran would maintain some of the enrichment that it has already undertaken while allowing a thorough inspection regime and accepting the condition not to enrich beyond five percent. Unfortunately, both the U.S. and Iran will have trouble selling an agreement to their respective publics. How can President Obama make a deal with a country that has openly challenged the 9/11 narrative, Farhi asked? How can the Iranian leadership sell a U.S. agreement as a victory to its people given the increased sanctions? In conclusion, Farhi noted, the real losers in this process sadly have been the urban middle class and the private sector in Iran.

Barbara Slavin contended that President Obama deserved significant credit for his attempts to negotiate with Iran during his first year in office. This is far more than any other American president has done. She also noted that the June 2009 election in Iran severely affected the likelihood of successful negotiations. It became difficult for the U.S. to ignore the human rights violations taking place in Iran in response to the post-election protests. At that time, the leadership in Iran was becoming increasingly paranoid about its own security situation, leading to increased abuse of the opposition and allegations of foreign interference.

Engagement, Slavin argued, means something different to each side. For the U.S., engagement is a means to an end. The U.S. hopes ultimately to contain Iran's nuclear program as well as other behavior that the U.S. regards as objectionable. For Iran, engagement serves as a way to obtain the respect of a global leader without making any significant concessions.

Slavin argued that the U.S. intends for Iran to buckle under the weight of increased sanctions. Meanwhile, perhaps due to a slowing in Iran's nuclear program, the Obama administration appears to be feeling less urgency about achieving a diplomatic resolution of the issue. The current U.S. objective, claimed Slavin, is to prevent the production of a nuclear weapon long enough for domestic pressures in Iran to reduce the belligerency of the Iranian leadership. As a side note, in the unlikely event of successful negotiations between the U.S. and Iran, Slavin commented on the difficulty of undoing the strict sanctions that have been implemented recently.

In regard to domestic pressures, Slavin hypothesized that the Iranian leadership appears to have "weathered the storm" of the Green Movement but faces major challenges in the future. The biggest concern before the government now will be the reform of a major subsidy program that costs the government approximately $100 billion per year. The leadership is concerned with public response to the changes it has begun to enact to this program. Strikes have already taken place in response to an attempt to increase the value-added tax on bazaar merchants, and the public has been frustrated with increased airplane and train fares. Yet, Slavin contended, unless the price of oil falls below $70 per barrel, the Iranian regime should be able to withstand these public pressures. Slavin concluded that the most that we can hope for in any continued negotiations is limited cooperation on issues such as Afghanistan and perhaps Iraq, but the core stalemate will likely remain in place as long as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is in office.

Randa Slim addressed the ongoing crisis in Lebanon over the UN investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. The current crisis was fueled by the publication of media reports indicating that the tribunal might implicate Hezbollah in the murder. In response, Slim noted, Hezbollah launched a campaign to discredit the tribunal beginning in April 2009. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah publicly commented on the first phase of the tribunal, which focused on Syrian involvement, as biased. The second phase, leading to the release of four generals

held without bail for four years pending possible charges of involvement in the assassination, was acceptable, according to Nasrallah. And finally, he claimed that it is yet to be seen how the tribunal will behave during the third phase.

As a result of the media accounts, Hezbollah officials are now convinced that the indictment will implicate them. Slim outlined the three most important concerns for Hezbollah: first, an indictment would damage the reputation of Hezbollah across the region and it would become recognized as a terrorist organization; second, an indictment risks inciting the outbreak of Sunni-Shiite violence; and third, an accusation that Hezbollah used its military arsenal to assassinate a leading Sunni Muslim would damage the regional support network for its resistance movement.

The stakes of the tribunal are equally high for [the then] current Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, Slim noted. His constituency would not tolerate failure to cooperate with an international tribunal aimed at determining his father's killer. Slim outlined the key elements driving the current Lebanese crises, including Sunni-Shiite tensions, weak state institutions incapable of providing a framework to prevent political crises, a society suffering from identity fissures, and the involvement of regional players in Lebanese affairs, especially Syria and Saudi Arabia. She argued that it is in the interest of both Saad Hariri and Hassan Nasrallah to avoid violence in resolving the current crisis. Hezbollah's exit strategy, she predicted, will be to ensure that the tribunal's prosecutor cannot prove his case "beyond a reasonable doubt" and they will utilize pressure tactics to force Hariri to choose between stability and justice.

Hezbollah currently stands at a crossroads between resisting and governing, Slim argued. As for justice, Slim does not personally believe that Hezbollah was responsible for Hariri's assassination, because the organization had nothing to gain from it. However, she noted the possibility that a rogue cell loosely tied to Hezbollah could be responsible. The American role in this process, Slim concluded, should be to refrain from commenting on the tribunal's work beyond expressing support for it, and to support the Lebanese Army, which is the only state institution capable of preventing civil strife in Lebanon.

Deborah Amos began by reflecting on her presence at President Obama's speech in Cairo, noting that when he began his speech with, "as-salamu alaykum," the audience responded with a uniform intake of breath before thundering applause—a sign that the Bush administration was over and that the Arab world believed in the promise of the new, charismatic President. Sadly, Amos noted, by now the sentiments evoked in Cairo have all but disappeared, and the moment of good will has essentially been squandered.

Amos focused her remarks on the political context in Iraq. Due to persistent distrust among the Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish political elites of Iraq, she argued, no one truly "won" during the March 2010 elections, and the parliament remained divided. Over the summer of 2010, she attended a series of workshops in Beirut hosted in honor of a selection of newly elected female parliamentarians from Iraq. As these women understood it, it was their job to use Iraq's oil wealth to the benefit of the country. A group of newly elected male politicians had shunned these female parliamentarians from negotiations over a new Prime Minister. Meanwhile, Amos noted, many male politicians spent their leave abroad, leaving them ignorant to the growing internal cynicism within the country.

Amos also pointed out the extreme nature of the current refugee situation in Iraq. The estimated number of internally displaced Iraqis exceeds one and a half million, while UNHCR documents 200,000 Iraqi refugees living outside the country's borders—likely a grave underestimate, as many exiles do not sign on with the UN office. Still, the reported numbers make Iraqi refugees the second largest refugee population in the world. Very few of the exiles, who are primarily Christian and Sunni Arab, have expressed intentions to return home. There are increasing issues with trafficking in Iraqi woman and children along unmonitored borders, Amos added. Within refugee communities, children often abandon schooling in order to work. Most of the refugees came from Iraq's elite middle class—those who could afford to leave when war broke out. Today, these same Iraqis are becoming a new underclass in the Arab countries where they have sought refuge.

More than nine months after the March 2010 elections, Iraq continues to lack an effective governing coalition. A contingent

of Green Zone politicians still exists, but most were beaten in the polls by politicians who were successful in organizing on a grass roots level, such as Muqtada al-Sadr and Nuri al-Maliki. Those who could not afford to leave the country, Iraq's original underclass, are those who will inherit the power, Amos noted, while the moderates and liberals have become weaker by the day. In conclusion, Amos suggested that the U.S. undertake several specific initiatives in response to the current state of affairs in Iraq. These would include: embracing the Iraqi military; training female parliamentarians; supporting job programs, scholarships, healthcare, and the exiles; and, finally, preventing the underclass from becoming a breeding ground for the disenfranchised.

Session III: Afghanistan and Pakistan

SPEAKERS:

C. Christine Fair, Assistant Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Shuja Nawaz, Director, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council

Trudy Rubin, Foreign Affairs Columnist, *The Philadelphia Inquirer*

Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

CHAIR:

Malik Mufti, Professor of Political Science, Tufts University

Christine Fair expressed concern over the number of U.S. soldiers and officers who do not understand why they are in Afghanistan. The U.S. explains its presence there for two main reasons: to prevent al-Qaeda from having a safe haven and to stabilize Afghanistan in order to thwart the further destabilization of Pakistan. Fair responded to this reasoning, claiming that al-Qaeda has already for the most part been routed out of Afghanistan and is now well established in Pakistan. Further, she would argue that Pakistan is responsible for the (de)stabilization of Afghanistan, rather than the other way around.

In a discussion of U.S.-Pakistani relations, Fair commented on America's support of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, an organization that Pakistan sees as a proxy for India. In some regards, Pakistani fears are justifiable; the Indians are in fact involved in Afghanistan and have supported the Northern Alliance, Fair argued. But many in Pakistan take this link further: they ascribe responsibility for all attacks that occur within their borders to India, whether or not India is actually involved. American dismissal of Pakistan's security concerns, whether these concerns are founded or not, will imperil the U.S. position there. Fair urged the U.S. to see the world as Pakistan sees it, and recognize the ties between the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and the internal security of Pakistan.

Fair expressed significant concern about the efficacy of the current U.S. counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan, which is based on a post-colonial model in which the insurgency can effectively be differentiated from the civilian populace. This is not the case in Afghanistan today. Furthermore, the high cost of continued American presence in Afghanistan and the low probability of success are worrisome. Fair believes the true epicenter of U.S. efforts to fight al-Qaeda should be located in Pakistan and as long as the U.S. continues to focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan will remain a secondary theater.

In conclusion, Fair proposed that the U.S. get out of the counter-insurgency business in Afghanistan altogether. As it stands, the U.S. relationship with Pakistan is dependent upon Pakistan's role in supporting U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Fair recommended that the U.S deal with Pakistan as a separate entity instead. In doing so, the U.S. must develop more useful "carrots" that over time can assist Pakistan in achieving some of the incremental measures that will lead to its long-term stability.

Shuja Nawaz emphasized, along with many speakers, the high hopes felt across the region for President Obama following the Cairo speech. With others, Nawaz predicted, however, that the new U.S. President would not be able to "walk on water," and that an inevitable gap would form between what was promised and what could be accomplished on the ground.

Nawaz noted that historically U.S. aid to Pakistan has increased when a military regime is in power and decreased in times of democratic leadership. President Obama attempted to break this pattern in order to develop a more stable, long-term relationship with Pakistan. The President's talk at West Point, however—when he announced pending troop withdrawals from Afghanistan—left Pakistan believing that the U.S. would abandon an unstable regional situation and that Pakistan would be left to pick up the pieces.

Nawaz also addressed Pakistan's internal security, specifically focusing on the insurgency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This insurgency was the first major internal insurgency in Pakistan's history, and was a direct result of the

U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. In reaction to the insurgency, the Pakistan Army erred when it sent non-local forces who did not know the terrain well and were not Muslim to the region. These troops were seen as an alien force, and their presence strengthened both the insurgency and local hatred of the Pakistan Army.

Punjabi militants, who were part of the jihad in Kashmir, added an additional volatile element to the Pakistani insurgency. They trained local militants inside FATA and provided initial bomb-making skills. Nawaz argued that Pakistan's response to the insurgency has been lacking. The inadequacy of the civilian administration's response has inadvertently increased the military role there. As evidence, entire areas of Pakistan have been handed over to the army to control, and civilians are expected to follow military lead in those areas. At the very least, this increased militarization will hinder the restoration of democracy in Pakistan, Nawaz claimed.

In conclusion, Nawaz commented on the strategic relationship that the U.S. has now developed with both India and Pakistan, which offers an opportunity for America to help these two nations reconcile their differences. The U.S. should utilize "strategic altruism" to help assuage some of Pakistan's fears regarding India and reduce the need on both sides for increased militancy, Nawaz concluded.

Trudy Rubin offered a journalist's perspective, utilizing the metaphor provided by the death of British aid worker Linda Norgrove to explore the inherent confusion in U.S. policy within Afghanistan. Norgrove ran an extremely effective foreign aid project, which was successful in part because it employed an almost entirely Afghan staff and interacted out in the open with the population, rather than living behind closed walls or inside armored vehicles as most Western aid workers do. Rubin's interviews with people in the region showed that they were supportive of the project, despite the fact that many feared that their support endangered them.

Norgrove was kidnapped while driving to the opening of a new irrigation project. According to Rubin's investigation, it appeared there were several opportunities to work with community elders in order to negotiate Norgrove's release. However, a

U.S.-led rescue effort resulted in her death, most likely from a grenade fragment thrown by an American soldier. Rubin argued that Norgrove's death was perhaps the result of a contradiction between counter-insurgency (COIN) and counter-terrorism tactics and ideologies—the former emphasizes civilian engagement as a strategy, the latter can lead to a kinetic response in this type of situation.

Rubin continued to elaborate on the confusing nature of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. She noted the campaign spearheaded by General Stanley McChrystal, which aimed to change the psychology of the war and convince Afghans that the Taliban could in fact lose. This campaign included a reintegration program for Taliban members, a program that unfortunately still has not gotten off the ground. The overall plan was to weaken and fragment the Taliban on many fronts, especially politically, militarily, and economically.

Following President Obama's West Point speech, however, Afghans intuited that the U.S. was leaving the region and therefore the Taliban would return. At this point, McChrystal's "psychology" strategy fell apart, Rubin argued. Given that the U.S. has scheduled its departure, it will be very difficult to achieve the compromises with the Taliban that it hopes to achieve. The focus of the U.S. presence there has become kinetic once again. Unfortunately, Rubin concluded, it is unlikely that this strategy will succeed; after all, the Taliban only has to "wait us out."

Michael O'Hanlon responded to several disheartening assessments of the situation in Afghanistan with "a case for hope." He began with a discussion of why Afghanistan matters and why a rapid U.S. military departure would be unproductive. First, a U.S. withdrawal would be extremely harmful to the thirty million Afghans who will remain, particularly the women. Second, the U.S. attempted to depart quickly once before, following the Soviet retreat in the 1980s, and it was not effective. Third, the argument that a large, ungoverned or Taliban-governed "Pashtunistan" would be no worse for American security than small al-Qaeda cells in places like Yemen and Somalia is misguided. A "Pashtunistan" of this nature could become a fifteen to twenty-five million-person sanctuary capable

of providing refuge to groups like al-Qaeda or Lashkar-e-Taiba. It is naive to believe that the Taliban would suddenly shun al-Qaeda, O'Hanlon argued, should the U.S. depart. The case against disengagement is, therefore, very strong. This is not to say that a continuation of the current strategy is better, O'Hanlon added.

On the hopeful side, several things are going well in Afghanistan. First, most of the violence is concentrated in small areas and Kabul is more or less a functioning city. Additionally, Afghanistan has experienced roughly an annual ten percent increase in economic growth over the past decade. While some of the growth stems from opium sales, military contracts, and the influx of aid, quality of life in Afghanistan has improved for most Afghans. Access to education and healthcare has improved. Ultimately, polls show that upwards of eighty percent of Afghans prefer the current state of affairs to a return to Taliban rule.

O'Hanlon agreed with other panelists that the July 2011 troop drawdown announced by President Obama was counter-productive, especially given that the President's Afghanistan policy is far more robust than he made it sound. Afghanistan is and will remain a top U.S. foreign policy priority, despite any withdrawal of military personnel.

In closing, O'Hanlon offered his thoughts on a potential back-up plan, a "Plan A-minus." He argued against the use of long-range counter-terrorism, as proposed by some officials today, because such tactics tend to fail due to their lack of on-the-ground intelligence. O'Hanlon suggested that President Obama voice stronger support for the current strategy of counter-insurgency tactics. If this course of action fails, O'Hanlon concluded, the President should fall back not on a plan B representing major change, but on a "Plan A-minus," that is, a more nuanced shift from the existing strategy, which would involve phasing out the American military presence in Afghanistan over a two to four year period during which time the U.S. would continue to train the Afghan army and police.

Webcast Keynote Address: "Strategic Directions in the Middle East"

SPEAKER:

General (Ret.) John P. Abizaid, former Commander of the United States Central Command (2003-2007); Distinguished Chair, West Point Combating Terrorism Center; Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution

CHAIR:

Richard H. Shultz, Professor of International Politics and Director, International Security Studies Program, The Fletcher School

John Abizaid noted that while many aspects of the strategic landscape in the Middle East have remained the same over time, the security environment in 2001 was characterized by the U.S. role as an unrivaled superpower. At the beginning of its campaign in the Middle East, the U.S. operated with essentially unlimited resources. By 2010, the rise of potential rivals to American power was palpable and where resources were once unrestrained, today they are severely limited by the domestic environment in the U.S. Thus, Abizaid argued, the U.S. must now determine what affordable strategic maneuvers are available to it in order to advance its existing campaigns in the Middle East.

Abizaid claimed that, despite past presumptions, no foreign power has controlled or will control the Middle East. Given that reality, he outlined four strategic issues in this region that currently face President Obama, as they faced President Bush before him, including: the rise of Sunni militant extremism; the rise of Shiite militant extremism—specifically in Iran; the continued Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and Western dependency on Middle Eastern oil.

Abizaid lamented the fact that while some might find the categorization "Sunni militant jihadism" offensive, America has not developed any accepted terminology for describing the main contingent of people in the Middle East that it is there to fight. This group operates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia,

and elsewhere, and it has grown rather than declined over the last nine years. The narrative forwarded by this loosely associated group of militants has spread into the U.S. and Europe. In order to effectively battle them, Abizaid argued, the U.S. must begin by developing an accurate categorization of who the group really is and what their ultimate objectives are.

According to Abizaid, while Sunni extremism consists of a disparate collection of groups with similar objectives, Shiite Islamic extremism is spearheaded by a single nation-state: Iran. The movement began with the Iranian revolution in 1979. Although the majority of the Iranian public does not accept it, Shiite extremism presents a significant danger within the region and to the U.S. specifically due to the threat of war between the two countries.

The situation in Israel and Palestine, as well, portends the outbreak of war in an extremely volatile region if nothing is done to resolve it. The global community must address this conflict, Abizaid claimed, and work towards some form of resolution if it wants to avoid the outbreak of further turmoil in the eastern Mediterranean.

Finally, Middle Eastern oil continues to significantly impact the global economy. While cost-effective and efficient alternatives to oil may be successfully implemented in the future, Abizaid expressed concern over the immense power this commodity holds over the world and the damage caused by this dependency.

Over the past nine years these four factors have remained the most powerful issues facing the U.S. in the Middle East, Abizaid argued, yet the U.S. has still not developed a comprehensive and effective strategy for battling them. Unlike during past campaigns, such as WWII or the Cold War, no framework exists today that will allow for unified strategic action. Abizaid stressed that an effective version of this framework would battle Sunni Islamic extremism with a combination of military, economic, informational, and diplomatic power in cooperation with the people of the region and would involve a shift from American-led military operations to locally-controlled ones. Simultaneously, the U.S. must further its policy of containment in Iran until the Iranians themselves move to oust the current government. And, finally, the U.S. must encourage the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as best it can, and move to reduce its dependency on foreign oil. Unfortunately, Abizaid concluded, these objectives must be accomplished at a time when American power and influence in the world have become compromised by the increasing influence of other nations and when its resources are severely constrained.

Session IV: Conflict and War Today

SPEAKERS:

Richard H. Shultz, Professor of International Politics and Director, International Security Studies Program, The Fletcher School

Querine H. Hanlon, Dean of Academic Affairs, College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University

Hassan Abbas, Quaid-i-Azam Professor, South Asia Institute, Columbia University

John A. Nagl, President, Center for a New American Security

CHAIR:

Stephen W. Van Evera, Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Richard Shultz introduced research he recently undertook with Querine Hanlon and other colleagues, which examines changes in the global conflict and security paradigm since the end of the Cold War by assessing the sources of instability and conflict and determining patterns among them. Beginning in the late 1990s, some among the security studies community began to notice an increase in irregular warfare. General Rupert Smith, an officer in the British Army, noted a change from the industrialized warfare of the past to a new form of "war among the people," which involved both state and non-state actors. General Stanley McChrystal commented on this change, as well, noting that in this new type of conflict, U.S. armed forces should not focus on the insurgency, but rather on the population in order to protect them from the "violence, corruption, and coercion" of the insurgency.

Utilizing the findings from his research with Hanlon and others, Shultz outlined some of the basic characteristics of the new, twenty-first-century conflict paradigm. Armed groups and other non-state actors, often aided by authoritarian regimes, are employing irregular tactics in conflict. Many of these groups, Shultz argued, are not necessarily local groups, but often have

regional and even global impact. The significant quantity of weak, failing, and failed states in existence today, which have greatly increased in number over the last thirty years or so, facilitate this new conflict and security paradigm. Shultz and his colleagues concluded that this new type of warfare is here to stay primarily because the presiding conditions that foster it show no signs of receding.

Shultz pointed out that the roughly fifty percent of the world's nations that are either weak, failing, or failed provide a haven for these armed groups to form and grow. Many of these states are unable to control their territories and/or groups that reside within them. Shultz described those he refers to as "enhancers" who empower these groups today. Oftentimes, authoritarian regimes cooperate with armed groups, helping the groups to extend their influence. Additionally, it is often difficult to gain an understanding of the groups because they consist of many different types of aggressors, including terrorists, criminals, insurgents, and militias, each of which has a unique mission and a distinct set of tactics that they utilize to achieve their objectives.

In conclusion, Shultz argued that this new conflict and security paradigm is especially persistent in the Middle East due to the large majority of weak and failing states that exist there.

Querine Hanlon contended that a primary driver of insecurity today is the fragility of many states, a reality that has increased the complexity of today's security environment. Armed non-state actors take advantage of these states to pursue their objectives. The security situation has become more complex as the number of states has increased over the last century from fifty countries to approximately two hundred today. More than half the global population, Hanlon added, lives within the borders of fragile states.

Hanlon, Richard Shultz, and their colleagues have developed a framework for characterizing states in this new security paradigm. Countries are characterized first by type, as either strong, weak, failing, or failed, a typology that is determined by several factors, including their ability to control their territory, their capacity to perform the core functions of the state—especially the provision of security—and their vulnerability to challenges

to their legitimacy. Hanlon and her colleagues also characterize states by their system of governance, either democratic or authoritarian. Hanlon noted that there are less than forty democratic states in the world, most of which are considered strong. There are approximately seventy authoritarian states in the world, most of which are weak, failing, or failed. The exceptions to this category include Iran, China, and Russia. In the Middle East, most states are either weak democracies, or weak or strong authoritarian states.

Utilizing these two characterizations—strength of a state and system of governance—all states can be placed along a continuum. Hanlon posited that all strong states, whether democratic or authoritarian, derive their strength from competent institutions of coercion. Essentially, these states, which range from the U.S. and the countries of western Europe to China, Russia, and Iran, "maintain a monopoly on the use of force within their borders." Strong democratic states tend to rate highly in GDP growth and political freedom. In strong, authoritarian countries, state institutions are competent but tend not to be constrained by the rule of law; instead they rely on coercion to rule. More than half of the world's strong, authoritarian states are located in the greater Middle East, and they are likely drivers of instability and conflict in the region.

Failed and failing states number approximately twenty around the world, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Yemen in the Middle East. Hanlon noted that these states exhibit limited territorial control and face serious challenges to their authority. Armed groups exploit these weaknesses to their advantage. Ultimately, Hanlon concluded, these armed non-state actors have "transformed the peripheral forums of twentieth century" warfare into the "battleground of the twenty-first century."

Hassan Abbas voiced support for the hypothesis of co-panelists Richard Shultz and Querine Hanlon that when it comes to providing a safe haven for non-state armed groups, much depends on whether a state is weak or strong. However, Abbas argued, war changes societal dynamics in significant ways. A country that once may have maintained functioning state institutions

will likely not as a result of war. Abbas continued by noting that the prevalence of militants in the Muslim world has expanded recently, and while President Obama appears to have developed a strong vision in response to this threat, bureaucratic hurdles within the U.S. government seem to hinder action.

Focusing on South Asia, Abbas outlined seven key features of militancy in the Muslim world today. First, most militant groups are a product of conflict, not the other way around. Second, increased militancy is also the result of the degeneration of religious political thought in Islam. Third, conflict zones provide these groups with sanctuaries from which they are able to organize and expand. Fourth, publications in print and on the web incite modern militants and their constituencies and attract recruits. Fifth, police action in response to these groups has been markedly absent. Where the military is trained to kill, police forces are trained to work according to the rule of law—to gather enough evidence to prosecute armed groups through the courts. Allowing this process to unfold will inherently strengthen the rule of law in these struggling states, Abbas argued. Sixth, militants utilize peace deals to their advantage by compromising for a brief period of time, then breaking these compromises as time passes and expanding their reach. Finally, a new generation of militants exists that is pursuing a form of leaderless jihad.

Abbas outlined two presiding challenges for U.S. foreign policy resulting from this increased militancy in the Muslim world. First, as the U.S. develops its foreign policy towards South Asia, it must consider the significant South Asian diaspora living in the U.S. and Europe and understand that its South Asian policy will have domestic consequences. Second, the use of drones by the American military, while partially effective, is extremely controversial. For the most part, collaborators in their use are not willing to take responsibility for drone attacks.

In closing, Abbas recommended that U.S. efforts in the region focus less on the military response to militant Islam and more on police reform. Finally, the U.S. should pursue de-radicalization strategies and better utilize the sectors of the populace that are willing to stand up to the militants.

John Nagl argued that by the end of the twentieth century the U.S. had become so superior to its enemies in conventional warfare that the latter could no longer hope to compete conventionally, forcing them to engage in new strategies of combat. While the first Gulf War offered evidence of just how good the U.S. had become at conventional warfare, the experiences of the British in Malaya and the U.S. in Vietnam offered two cases in which conventional armies were forced to learn to fight irregular warfare.

Reviewing several of the core elements of counter-insurgency efforts, a strategy that arose out of the shift from conventional to irregular warfare, Nagl noted that emphasis was placed on several key objectives, including: gathering intelligence, protecting the population, establishing secure areas, isolating the population from the insurgency, supporting the police, denying the insurgents sanctuaries, and embedding advisors within indigenous forces. Nagl and colleagues utilized some of these best practices to write the U.S. Army/Marine Corps counter-insurgency field manual; in fact, many of its principles were supported by a RAND study of counter-insurgency campaigns. Experience has shown that in response to irregular warfare one cannot “kill or capture” one’s way to success; there will always be others who will rise up and fight in place of the fallen. Instead, Nagl suggested that the best tactic is to alter the way people see their world. Additionally, it is critical to train and support national security forces, both police and military.

In addition to the military-based tactics outlined in the counter-insurgency manual, Nagl and his colleagues outlined several non-military objectives necessary to a successful counter-insurgency fight. These objectives tend not to fall under the purview of the military and include providing services to the population, facilitating good governance, and assisting with economic development. The U.S. must also pursue a successful information operations campaign that aims to increase support for the national government and addresses the shared objectives of both the government and the counter-insurgency.

The U.S. Army/Marine Corps counter-insurgency manual was published in December of 2006. Since then, it has been downloaded across the globe millions of times. General David Petraeus

put the manual to the test in Iraq and helped break the sectarian cycle of retaliation, Nagl argued. He recommended that the U.S. push for the establishment of a functioning government in Iraq. An Iraqi government would likely want to establish a security relationship with the U.S., a move that is in both countries' interests. In closing, given the likelihood that irregular warfare will continue to increase in prevalence, Nagl suggested that the U.S. prepare itself to continue improving its counter-insurgency tactics.

Session V: Engaging the Muslim World

SPEAKERS:

John L. Esposito, University Professor and Founding Director, Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University

Marc Lynch, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Director of the Institute for Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program, George Washington University

Emile A. Nakhleh, (retired) Senior Intelligence Service Officer and Director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program, Central Intelligence Agency

Muqtedar Khan, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations, University of Delaware

CHAIR:

William A. Rugh, Visiting Scholar, Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies, Tufts University; Edward R. Murrow Visiting Professor of Public Diplomacy, The Fletcher School

John Esposito described President Obama's initial commitment to the Middle East as a foreign policy priority. More than two years later, the question on the table is how has the President advanced his commitment? In response to this question, Esposito introduced the most recent Gallup Poll data, which offer insight into how Muslims view President Obama's performance. While the Obama administration has pursued some successful domestic initiatives, including programs to promote entrepreneurship, disease eradication, scholarly exchanges, and women's education in Muslim-majority societies, critics argue that these are only cosmetic changes. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the lack of progress on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and continued relations with authoritarian regimes belie any real progress.

Gallup Poll data on Muslim-American relationships, collected between 2006 and 2010 across fifty-five countries or areas, suggest that Muslims residents of the Middle East and North Africa

(MENA) place the highest importance on Muslim-American relations. Generally, the poll found that MENA residents believe that these relations have worsened over the last year, but they are divided as to the reason. For a large majority, the fault lines lie primarily along political or religious differences. Among those who believe political differences are the reason for the deterioration in Muslim-American relations, most feel that violent conflict can be avoided, while those who believe religion is the source of tension tend to be more pessimistic about avoiding conflict. Very few of those surveyed felt that cultural differences were the cause of worsening of relations. Part of the problem, Esposito argued, is that while sixty-three percent of Muslims believe that predominantly-Muslim communities respect the West, only twenty-eight percent believe that the West respects the Muslim world. Data on Americans, fifty-three percent of whom claim that the West does not respect Muslim-majority countries, support this statistic.

In response to the Gallup Poll data, Esposito provided several recommendations. He suggested that the U.S. increase its focus on local initiatives and partnerships that address concerns beyond the security field, chiefly in economic development, technology, and science. In its diplomatic relations, he recommended that the U.S. emphasize respect and negotiate jointly beneficial policies.

In conclusion, Esposito stated, "we need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions and much more about what our actions communicate." Specifically, Esposito proposed that U.S. politicians, journalists, and citizens shift their focus from religious differences to the resolution of political concerns.

Marc Lynch offered insight into the Obama administration's "theory of the case," an explanation of what President Obama was trying to accomplish in reaching out to the Muslim world. The President felt that the mending of Muslim-American relations was critical to restoring America's image across the globe. According to Lynch, President Obama and his team were under no illusions that they could repair America's image overnight, but felt that the inauguration provided for a new beginning. The President focused his message on issues facing the U.S. that nations around the world have in common and therefore could become a basis for cooperation. However, at the root of the problem, Lynch argued, is the fact that the President over-promised and under-delivered, and this created a perception of failure that ultimately undermined the message.

President Obama did not expect to repair relations with the Muslim world simply by expressing words of respect. He understood that the U.S. would simultaneously have to address the political grievances at play in the Middle East. Additionally, he understood that progress hinged upon his ability to re-frame America's relationship with the Muslim world in such a way that it was not based on terrorism. According to Lynch, the President intended to build networks of common interest and specifically to reach out to Muslim youth and develop relationships grounded in common pursuits, such as new media, education, science, and technology.

These efforts appeared to pay off initially, but have since lost steam among many Muslims. Lynch explained this loss of belief in President Obama's intentions as the result of two main factors: the President may have promised too much and delivered too little, and tangible changes did not materialize. The choice of Israeli settlements as a key issue, and the failure of these negotiations to produce meaningful results, became a symbol of the President's lack of delivery. The inability for many to differentiate between the Bush policy of 2008 and President Obama's current policy signaled to critics a lack of concrete transformation. This transformation, noted Lynch, primarily occurred between 2003 and 2008, when the Bush administration implemented most of the changes that the U.S. felt capable of making.

Given that President Obama has been unable to make substantial progress on these key issues, Lynch recommended focusing on a concern where progress could be made, such as portrayals of Islam by U.S. politicians. Their use of anti-Islamic rhetoric is extremely irresponsible, Lynch argued. Ultimately, it strengthens al-Qaeda's narrative that a culture clash exists between the Muslim world and the West and weakens America's ability to address this critical gap in understanding.

Emile Nakhleh set the stage for the Cairo speech, noting that five years prior to this speech the U.S. administration had gathered data on Muslims that uncovered information relevant to President Obama's address. First, the data showed that Muslims felt that Muslim-American tension was policy-driven, not due to differences in core values. The specific policies of greatest importance were related to Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Guantanamo, and the stereotype of terrorism applied across the Muslim world. President Obama was therefore aware that these key issues must be addressed in order to improve Muslim-American relations. Nakhleh pointed out that the President took action to address many of these issues, including the appointment of a special representative to the Arab-Israeli conflict, announcements regarding the closing of Guantanamo and troop withdrawal from Iraq, and the delivery of several key speeches aimed at improving relations with the Muslim world.

Based on this history, Nakhleh outlined six key arguments regarding U.S. engagement with the Muslim world. First, engagement and public diplomacy will not succeed in a vacuum, but must be accompanied by tangible initiatives that improve people's daily lives. Second, Washington must pursue a more nuanced approach toward engagement, including establishing relationships with Muslim communities, not only with regimes. Third, the U.S. must accept that the resonance of the Cairo speech has dissipated. Fourth, the U.S. should engage with credible indigenous groups, because these groups understand their community's needs best. Fifth, engaging the Muslim world is not simply an American agenda; it is a global process and therefore must involve cooperative efforts. And, sixth, it is in the interests of both parties for the U.S. to engage broader segments of Muslim societies in an effort to improve their quality of life.

Engagement is a critical process for the U.S., Nakhleh argued, both because it is a confirmation of American values and because it will benefit America's national security. Challenges will inevitably arise. For example, while the U.S. sees engagement as a global concern, many of its potential partners in western Europe see it as a domestic issue. The ongoing regional conflicts will inevitably hinder engagement. Tensions in many countries

between authoritarian regimes and civil society will impede progress. Engagement with religious groups will be especially difficult, as will building the capacity of national governments. Simultaneously, preventing excessive government involvement in the engagement process will also be tricky.

Given the unique nature of each Muslim society, Nakhleh asserted that engagement must be tailored to each context. The process will not be quick and the U.S. will have to prioritize it for many years. A focus on empowering communities—despite resistance by regimes—will be crucial. In closing, Nakhleh argued that although engagement will be difficult, we must consider the alternative.

Muqtedar Khan noted that while panelists are calling for U.S. engagement with the Muslim world, the U.S. has in fact been engaged with the Muslim world for centuries. The U.S. should thus be focused instead on transforming its current style of engagement. It must also recognize that public diplomacy goes beyond the action of state department officials. "Everybody engages in public diplomacy," argued Khan, "even those who burn the Quran." To illustrate his argument, Khan pointed out that some who advocate negotiating with Iran do so because they believe that a military strike will ultimately fail, not because they believe that it is the correct way to engage. He emphasized that the U.S. cares about Iran only because of its relationship with Israel, a fact that Iran is very aware of. This sort of demeaning approach will not lead to successful engagement.

Interestingly, Khan pointed out, the U.S. has chosen to engage with its lackeys rather than with its adversaries—groups such as the Iranians, Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Muslim Brotherhood. What purpose does it serve, Khan asked, to engage with those who are already on your side? He suggested that the U.S. should engage its adversaries. Currently, the message the U.S. has sent to Muslims around the world has been that they are not worthy of engagement.

What America has failed to recognize, Khan noted, is that engagement through dialogue fundamentally transforms both parties who partake in it. Historically, the U.S. has expected dialogue

to lead to the successful attainment of its objectives, without the U.S. having to change, compromise, or shift its position. This is not how engagement works, Khan argued. Thus, when President Obama came to office he had to prepare to engage the Muslim world, but also to transform the U.S. in the process.

Khan also pointed out that war as a means of engagement is not effective, as the heightened threat to American national security, the increase in Islamophobia, and the deflated American military of today demonstrate. In order for the U.S. to successfully engage the Muslim world, the U.S. must first work on itself such that it can credibly claim that its population is no longer anti-Islam. The U.S. must also back up its words with actions. The election of President Obama, a man who Muslims believe understands them, offers an opportunity to successfully pursue these objectives. Unfortunately, no future U.S. president is more likely than President Obama to achieve these goals. If he fails, concluded Khan, it will have lasting and devastating implications for future U.S. engagement with the Muslim world.

Plenary Session: "The Future of U.S. Soft Power in the Muslim World"

SPEAKERS:

Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development, University of Maryland, College Park; Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution

Chas W. Freeman, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia; Chairman, Projects International

Ayesha Jalal, Mary Richardson Professor of History, Director of the Center for South Asian and Indian Ocean Studies, Tufts University

CHAIR:

Vali Nasr, Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School; Associate Director, The Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies, Tufts University

Shibley Telhami began with a discussion of the concept of the "Muslim world," which he argued does not accurately capture the series of unique communities to which people want to refer when they use this term. Such a characterization lends itself to the unproductive belief that the troubles in the Middle East are a "Muslim thing."

When relations between the U.S. and other societies sour, Telhami contended, the U.S. tends to look at cultural, social, and religious differences to explain the disintegration of relations. Given the close relationship between India and the U.S., such a cultural/religious divide between the U.S. and the Muslim world seems an unlikely cause. Yet many Americans assume that being Muslim will define a person's relationship with the U.S. more than any other aspect of his or her identity. In reality, for most people in the Muslim world, Telhami pointed out, political issues rather than religious ones determine how they feel about America. Therefore, the actions of individuals like Terry Jones, who publicly burned the Quran, are not the problem but rather a symptom of the problem.

Given that Muslim communities' grievances with the U.S. are issue-based, Telhami set about describing what these issues are. In a reiteration of what other panelists have said, he noted that the Arab-Israeli conflict is the most important prism—"the prism of pain"—through which Arabs view the United States. The American military presence in Iraq is also critical. Additionally, issues such as the religious divide between Sunnis and Shiites are not as important as previously assumed, as a poll of Sunni Arab countries showing support for the Shiite organization Hezbollah during the war in Lebanon in 2006 demonstrated—although it certainly remains an issue within countries that contain a Sunni-Shiite mix.

The Obama administration has attempted to alter the paradigm of how the U.S. interacts with the Muslim world, for example by referring to "Muslim communities" rather than to "the Muslim world" and by suppressing the paradigm of the "clash of civilizations" pushed by many analysts during the Bush administration. While this shift in paradigm is productive, Telhami concluded that the U.S. will have to tackle the key issues that Muslim communities care most about in order to make real progress.

Chas Freeman lamented the fact that throughout the American campaigns in the Middle East the U.S. has given little regard to the deaths of foreign forces and non-combatants while it has meticulously tallied the deaths of its own. Such an imbalance in sympathies does not garner the U.S. any allies. Each death, Freeman argued, "deserves our grief." In reference to America's damaged reputation in the Middle East, Freeman eloquently stated, "all that is necessary to be hated is to do things that are hateful." America's apparent indifference to the colossal damages and disruption the wars have caused the region further damages its reputation.

Freeman painted a sorrowful and realistic portrait of war as a traumatic, frequently immoral, and immensely destructive affair. He utilized comparative statistics to illuminate the depth of the impact of the U.S. wars and other ongoing conflicts in the Middle East. In reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Freeman noted that as a proportion of the national population the number of Israelis killed since the 2000 intifada would be equivalent to the deaths of approximately 45,000 Americans and the number of Palestinians killed during this same period would be equivalent to approximately 460,000 Americans. Such realities are not conducive to peace or goodwill and continue to induce extremist activities on all sides. The surge in anti-Islamic hate speech within the U.S. reinforces the existing antagonism, he added.

In a similar recounting of statistical comparisons, Freeman noted that the number of Iraqi deaths caused by the Iraq war, which could range from 100,000 to 1,000,000 would be equivalent to the deaths of between one and thirteen million Americans. The proportions of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons are even more significant. As a result of these realities, Freeman argued that the U.S. is amassing a huge contingent of enemies with personal, religious, and nationalistic reasons for seeking revenge.

The only successful American response, Freeman argued, is to find alternatives to military interventions as the primary instrument of American foreign policy in the Middle East. The U.S. must also remember its own historic tradition—espoused long ago by John Quincy Adams—of respecting the sovereignty of other nations. There are some situations that invasion and occupation will not resolve. The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed the limits of American power, Freeman concluded, and demonstrated that the U.S. must address its dangerous over-reliance on military instruments of statecraft.

Ayesha Jalal described the checkered past that has existed between the U.S. and Pakistan, a relationship that has primarily been characterized by the deployment of U.S. hard power to the region—presently in the form of drones—to the exclusion of the more appealing elements of American culture. Many Pakistanis have long questioned the wisdom of signing military pacts with the U.S., given that historically these arrangements have not resulted in the betterment of the Pakistani people, the majority of whom remain extremely poor, but rather in the enrichment of a select few.

Jalal pointed out that despite the far reach of the Muslim world, the U.S. has done little to reach out to countries beyond the boundaries of the Middle East. For example, the Obama

administration has not yet extended a hand to the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia. At the same time, the U.S. has not been willing to broach the truly tricky issues, such as the topic of Kashmir. Kashmir is emblematic of the sorts of difficult issues that the U.S. must address, not evade, Jalal claimed.

Rather than continuing to pursue a military-based relationship with Pakistan, Jalal argued, the U.S. should take the opportunity to employ elements of soft power, through such avenues as popular culture, consumer products, and intellectual exchanges. In order to do so effectively, however, the U.S. must acknowledge that Pakistan has more to offer than a safe haven for terrorists. It must allow American students to study in Pakistan and vice versa. It must facilitate cultural, intellectual, and commercial exchanges. In closing, Jalal aired a video performance of a group of Pakistani musicians funded by the Coca Cola Company as an example of the sort of mutually beneficial "thoughtful indulgence" that the U.S. could and should offer Pakistanis in place of its current military-based relationship.

Participants

Hassan Abbas holds the Quaid-i-Azam Chair at Columbia University's School of Public and International Affairs in New York. He is also a senior advisor at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School and a Bernard Schwartz Fellow at the Asia Society. Previously, Abbas was at Harvard Law School, as a visiting fellow at the Islamic Legal Studies Program (2002–03) and a visiting scholar at the Program on Negotiation (2003–04). He is the author of *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism* (M. E. Sharpe, 2004), which was a bestseller in Pakistan and India and was well received internationally. His forthcoming book is entitled *Letters to Young Muslims on Science, Sovereignty and Sufis*. Abbas also runs WATANDOST, a blog that covers Pakistan and its neighbors as well as U.S. relations with the Muslim world. Abbas received a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy (MALD) and a Ph.D. from The Fletcher School at Tufts University and an LLM in International Law from Nottingham University, UK, where he was a Britannia Chevening Scholar in 1998–99.

John P. Abizaid is a General (Ret.) in the United States Army and former Commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) from 2003 to 2007. In July 2003, he was elevated to a four star general and succeeded General Tommy Franks as Commander, CENTCOM, a position that he held until March 2007. Abizaid retired in May 2007 after 34 years of military service and was named the first Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University in June 2007. He is also Distinguished Chair at the West Point Combating Terrorism Center. Abizaid is a member of the board of directors of the George Olmstead Foundation, USAA, and RPM Inc., as well as a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He speaks regularly on leadership and international security. Abizaid earned an M.A. in Area Studies at Harvard University and was an Olmsted Scholar at the University of Jordan in Amman, Jordan, where he also studied Arabic.

Deborah Amos is a foreign correspondent who covers the Middle East for NPR News. Her reports can be heard on NPR's award-winning "Morning Edition," "All Things Considered," and "Weekend Edition." Previously, Amos worked in television news, including ABC's "Nightline" and "World News Tonight" and the PBS programs "NOW with Bill Moyers" and "Frontline." She has won several awards, including the Edward R. Murrow Lifetime Achievement Award from Washington State University (2010), the Edward Weintal Prize for Diplomatic Reporting from Georgetown University (2009), the Alfred I. DuPont-Columbia Award (2004), and a Breakthru Award. Amos, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, spent 1991–92 as a Nieman Fellow at Harvard University and 2010 as a Shorenstein Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School. She is the author of *Lines in the Sand* (Simon and Schuster, 1992) and most recently *Eclipse of the Sunnis* (Public Affairs, 2010). Amos began her career after receiving a degree in broadcasting from the University of Florida at Gainesville.

Lawrence S. Bacow became the twelfth president of Tufts University on September 1, 2001. A lawyer and economist whose research focuses on environmental policy, he holds five faculty appointments at Tufts: in the departments of Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning, Economics, and Civil and Environmental Engineering; in Public Health and Family Medicine at the School of Medicine; and at The Fletcher School. Prior to his appointment as president of Tufts University, Bacow served in various capacities at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology during his 24-year tenure, including chancellor from August 1998 to June 2001, director of the MIT Center for Real Estate Development, chair of the MIT Council on the Environment, and chairman of the faculty. Bacow received a B.S. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an M.P.P., a J.D., and a Ph.D. from Harvard University.

Ruth Margolies Beitler is Professor of Comparative Politics in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy where she serves as course director for Middle East Politics and Cultural Anthropology. She has been the director of the Conflict and Human Security Studies Program (CHSS) since its inception in 2007. Beitler is author of three books: *The Path to Mass Rebellion* (Lexington Press, 2004), *The Fight for Legitimacy* (co-author, Praeger, 2006), and *Women's Roles in the Middle East and North Africa* (co-author, Greenwood Press, 2010). Her manuscript, with Cindy Jebb, entitled *Egypt as a Failing State: Implications for U.S. National Security,* was published as an occasional paper by the Institute for National Security Studies in July 2003. Her article, with Richard Shultz, "Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in Al Qaeda Operations," appeared in the *Middle East Review of International Affairs* (2004). Beitler has appeared as a guest commentator on the CBS morning news and MSNBC. She has lived and traveled extensively in the Middle East. A graduate of Cornell University with a B.A. in Near Eastern Studies, Beitler holds a MALD degree from The Fletcher School at Tufts University, where she also received a Ph.D. in International Relations.

Jamshed Bharucha is Provost, Senior Vice President, and Professor of Psychology at Tufts University. Previously, Bharucha spent his academic career at Dartmouth College, where he was the John Wentworth Professor of Psychological and Brain Sciences. He held several leadership posts at Dartmouth, including deputy provost and dean of the faculty. Bharucha has served as editor of the interdisciplinary journal *Music Perception* and was a trustee of Vassar College from 1991 to 1999, where he also chaired the Budget and Finance Committee. He is currently a trustee of the International Foundation of Music Research. A psychologist who studies cognitive neuroscience and music perception, Bharucha's research has focused on the cognitive and neural basis of the perception of music, using perceptual experiments, neural net modeling, and functional magnetic resonance imaging. Among his publications is "Activation of the Inferior Frontal Cortex in Musical Priming" (in *Cognitive Brain Research,* 2003). Bharucha received an M.A. in Philosophy from Yale University and a Ph.D. in Cognitive Psychology from Harvard University.

Stephen W. Bosworth is Dean of The Fletcher School at Tufts University and U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy. He has served in the U.S. Foreign Service both abroad and in Washington, D.C., including as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (1997–2000), the Philippines (1984–1987), and Tunisia (1979–1981); as Director of Policy Planning; as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; and as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. In 1987, he was recipient of the American Academy of Diplomacy's Diplomat of the Year Award. In the past, Bosworth has served as the executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and as president of the United States-Japan Foundation. He co-authored *Chasing the Sun* (Century Foundation Press, 2006), among other works. Bosworth has held teaching and oversight positions at various colleges and universities including Columbia University and Dartmouth College, where he received an honorary LLD.

John L. Esposito is Founding Director of the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where he is also Professor of Religion and International Affairs and of Islamic Studies. Prior to Georgetown, he was Loyola Professor of Middle East Studies, chair of the Department of Religious Studies, and director of the Center for International Studies at College of the Holy Cross. He is president of the Executive Scientific Committee for La Maison de la Méditerranée's 2005–2010 project, "The Mediterranean, Europe and Islam: Actors in Dialogue," and a member of the World Economic Forum's Council of 100 Leaders, as well as the High Level Group of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations. Esposito is a recipient of the American Academy of Religion's 2005 Martin E. Marty Award for the Public Understanding of Religion, of Pakistan's Quaid-i-Azam Award for Outstanding Contributions in Islamic Studies, and of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service Award for Outstanding Teaching. His more than thirty books include *Islamic World* (Oxford University Press, 2004), *Who Speaks for Islam?* (Gallup Press, 2008, with Dalia Mogahed), and *The Future of Islam* (Oxford University Press, 2010). He is also editor-in-chief of the four-volume *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World* (Oxford University Press, 1995). Esposito obtained an M.A. from St. John's University and a Ph.D. from Temple University.

C. Christine Fair is an assistant professor at Georgetown University in the Security Studies Program with the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. Previously, she served as a senior political scientist with the RAND Corporation, as a political officer to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, and as a senior research associate in United States Institute of Peace's Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. She is a senior fellow with the Counter Terrorism Center at West Point and a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations. She has authored, co-authored, and co-edited several books including *Fortifying Pakistan* (USIP, 2006), *Treading Softly on Sacred Ground* (OUP, 2008), and *The Madrassah Challenge* (USIP, 2008). Fair received an M.A. from the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago where she also earned an M.A. and a Ph.D. in South Asian Languages and Civilizations.

Fares I. Fares is the founder of WEDGE Alternatives Limited, a London-based firm specializing in alternative investments, Chairman of WEDGE Real Estate Holdings, and Director and Executive Vice President of WEDGE Group, a Houston-based company that provides products and services worldwide in a variety of sectors including hospitality, energy services, process engineering, banking, and real estate. Fares is also a member of the executive committee of the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies and a trustee of Tufts University, having been elected to the Tufts Board of Trustees in 2002. He also serves on the Investment Committee at Tufts University. Previously, he worked in the Corporate Finance Department at Oppenheimer & Company in New York, where he focused on public offerings and restructuring. Fares received a B.A. in History from Tufts University.

Farideh Farhi is an independent scholar and affiliate graduate faculty member at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. Previously, she taught comparative politics at the University of Colorado, Tehran University, and Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran. In the 1990s, Farhi was a research associate and English editor of the *Iranian Journal of International Affairs,* published by the Institute of Political and International Studies, Tehran. She has worked as a consultant for the World Bank and International Crisis Group and has been a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Her publications include *States and Urban-Based Revolutions* (University of Illinois Press, 1990) and numerous articles and book chapters on comparative analyses of revolutions and Iranian politics and foreign policy. Farhi received a B.A. in Economics and Political Science from the University of California, Santa Barbara, and an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Colorado, Boulder.

Leila Fawaz is Founding Director of the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies and Issam M. Fares Professor of Lebanese and Eastern Mediterranean Studies at Tufts University. She holds a joint appointment as Professor of Diplomacy at The Fletcher School and Professor of History at Tufts University. Her editorial posts have included editor of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (IJMES) and editorial board positions with the *American Historical Review, IJMES,* and the *British Journal of Middle East Studies,* among others. Fawaz received a Carnegie Scholar award for 2008–2010 to undertake research on World War I. Currently, she is on Harvard University's Board of Overseers and serves as president of the board for 2011–2012. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations as well as a member of the Comité Scientifique of the Maison Méditerranéenne des Sciences de l'Homme at the University of Provence. Her publications include *Modernity and Culture from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean* (co-editor, Columbia University Press, 2002), *An Occasion for War* (I. B. Tauris, 1994 and University of California Press, 1995), and *Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth Century Beirut* (Harvard University Press, 1983). Fawaz received a Ph.D. in History from Harvard University.

Shai Feldman is the Judith and Sidney Swartz Director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies and Professor of Politics at Brandeis University. He is also a senior fellow and a member of the board of directors of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) where he serves as co-chair (with former Under-Secretary of State Nicholas Burns) of the Crown-Belfer Middle East Seminar. Feldman is also an associate fellow of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. In 2001-2003, he served as a member of the UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. From 1997 to 2005, Feldman was head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, where previously he was a senior research associate since its establishment in 1977. Feldman directed the Jaffee Center's projects on "U.S. Foreign and Defense Policies in the Middle East" and "Regional Security and Arms Control in the Middle East." In 1994, Feldman was a Visiting Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a senior research fellow at BCSIA from 1995 to 1997. Among Feldman's numerous publications are *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence* (Columbia University Press, 1982), *Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East* (MIT Press, 1997), and *Track-II Diplomacy* (co-author, MIT Press, 2003). Educated at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Feldman was awarded a Ph.D. by the University of California at Berkeley in 1980.

Chas W. Freeman, Jr. gave thirty years to public service. His last positions in government were Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (during the Gulf War of 1990–91). Since 1995, Freeman has chaired Projects International, Inc., a Washington-based firm that helps American and foreign clients to arrange business transactions internationally. Previously, Freeman was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the U.S. mediation of Namibian independence from South Africa and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. He also served diplomatic assignments in Beijing and Bangkok. Among his publications are *Arts of Power* (U.S. Institute of Peace, 1997) and *America's Misadventures in the Middle East* (Just World Books, 2010). Freeman received a B.A. from Yale University and a J.D. from Harvard Law School.

Leslie H. Gelb, a former *New York Times* columnist and senior government official, is author of *Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy* (HarperCollins, 2009), a book that shows how to think about and use power in the twenty-first century. He is also president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, where he was president from 1993 to 2003. Gelb was Director of Policy Planning in the Pentagon from 1967 to 1969, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution from 1969 to 1973, the *New York Times* diplomatic correspondent from 1973 to 1977, and Assistant Secretary of State from 1977 to 1979. He then returned to *The New York Times* where he was an op-ed page editor and a foreign affairs columnist. In 1985, he was awarded a Pulitzer Prize in Explanatory Journalism and in 1981 he received an American Political Science Association Woodrow Wilson Award for the best book on international relations. Gelb received a B.A. from Tufts University and an M.A. and a Ph.D. from Harvard University.

Querine H. Hanlon is Dean of Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of International Security Studies at the College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University. She is also a fellow at the National Strategy Information Center. She came to the College of International Security Affairs in August 2006 from the United States Naval War College, where she taught for nine years as an adjunct professor of strategy in the CDE Department of Strategy and Policy. Hanlon's research interests include ethnic and sectarian violence, armed groups, failed states, strategic theory, and the Middle East. She has published "Globalization and the Transformation of Armed Groups" in *Armed Groups* (Naval War College Press, 2008), *The Three Images of Ethnic War* (Praeger, 2009), and *Armed Groups and Irregular Warfare,* with Richard Shultz and Roy Godson, (National Strategy Information Center, 2009). Hanlon received a B.S. from Georgetown University and a MALD degree and a Ph.D. from The Fletcher School at Tufts University.

Robert M. Hollister is Dean of the Jonathan M. Tisch College of Citizenship and Public Service and holds the Pierre and Pamela Omidyar Chair of Citizenship and Public Service at Tufts University. Previously, Hollister held the positions of dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, director of the Lincoln Filene Center for Citizenship and Public Affairs, and chair of the Department of Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning at Tufts University. A specialist in nonprofit organizations and public policy, he has been engaged in teaching graduate and undergraduate students, practicing professionals, and citizens for over thirty years. For the past twenty-five years, he has directed the Carol R. Goldberg Seminar, an action-planning initiative cosponsored by the Boston Foundation that brings together leaders from business, non-profits, and government to address community problems in the Boston area. His publications include *Development Politics* (co-author, National Governor's Association, 1979), *Governing, Leading and Managing Nonprofit Organizations* (co-editor, Jossey-Bass, 1993), and *Cities of the Mind* (co-editor, Plenum Publishing, 1984). Hollister received a Ph.D. from the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Ayesha Jalal is the Mary Richardson Professor of History at Tufts University where she teaches in the History Department and at The Fletcher School. She is the director of the Center for South Asian and Indian Ocean Studies at Tufts University and a non-resident senior fellow with the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. Jalal has also taught at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Columbia University, and Harvard University. Previously, she was a MacArthur Foundation Fellow, a fellow of Trinity College, a Leverhulme Fellow at the Centre of South Asian Studies at Cambridge, a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, and an Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. Her publications include *Self and Sovereignty* (Routledge, 2000) and *Partisans of Allah* (Harvard University Press, 2008). Jalal received a B.A. in History and Political Science from Wellesley College and a Ph.D. in History from Trinity College at the University of Cambridge.

Muqtedar Khan is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Delaware, where he founded the Islamic Studies Program and was its first director from 2007 to 2010. He is also a fellow of the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. Previously, he was a non-resident senior fellow with the Brookings Institution, a fellow of the Alwaleed Center at Georgetown University, and the President, Vice President, and General Secretary of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists. Khan is the author of *Jihad for Jerusalem* (Praeger, 2004), *Islamic Democratic Discourse* (Lexington Books, 2006), and *Debating Moderate Islam* (University of Utah Press, 2007), among other publications. His political commentaries regularly appear in newspapers in over twenty countries. Khan earned a Ph.D. in International Relations, Political Philosophy, and Islamic Political Thought from Georgetown University.

Rami G. Khouri, a Palestinian-Jordanian and U.S. citizen, whose family resides in Beirut and Nazareth, is Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut and editor-at-large of the *Daily Star* (Beirut). Khouri is a non-resident senior fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and at the Dubai School of Government and a lecturer at the University of Chicago and Northeastern University. During the 2001–02 academic year, he was a Nieman Journalism Fellow at Harvard University, and has also held fellowships at Stanford University, Syracuse University, and Mt. Holyoke College in addition to the Fares Center at Tufts University. He is a book author and writes an internationally syndicated weekly column. Khouri received a B.A. and an M.S. in Political Science and Mass Communications, respectively, from Syracuse University, NY.

Marc Lynch is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Director of the Institute for Middle East Studies, and Director of the Middle East Studies Program at George Washington University (GWU). At GWU's Elliot School of International Affairs, he teaches courses on Middle Eastern politics and international relations. Lynch edits the Middle East Channel for ForeignPolicy.com and is a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. He is the author of *State Interests and Public Spheres* (Columbia University Press, 1999) and *Voices of the New Arab Public* (Columbia University Press, 2006), and writes frequently on Arab media, public diplomacy, Islamist movements, Iraq, and Middle East politics for various journals and political blogs. Lynch received a B.A. in Political Science from Duke University and an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University.

Malik Mufti is Professor of Political Science at Tufts University, where he teaches courses in international relations and Middle Eastern politics. His current research centers on *Realpolitik* in Islamic political thought. Mufti is a recipient of the Lillian and Joseph Leibner Award for Distinguished Teaching and Advising. He is the author of *Sovereign Creations* (Cornell University Press, 1996) and *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), as well as several articles on the foreign and domestic policies of Jordan, Egypt, Israel, and Turkey, including "The Many-Colored Cloak" (in *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences,* 2002) and "Jihad as Statecraft" (in *History of Political Thought,* 2009). Mufti has a B.A. from Middlebury College, an M.A. from Yale University, and an M.A. and a Ph.D. from Harvard University.

John A. Nagl is President of the Center for a New American Security. A retired Army officer, he served in both wars in Iraq and helped General Petraeus write the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. He is a member of the Defense Policy Board, a visiting professor in the War Studies Department at King's College of London, a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies. Nagl was a Distinguished Graduate of the United States Military Academy Class of 1988 and served as an armor officer in the U.S. Army for 20 years, retiring with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He is the author of *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (University of Chicago Press, 2005). Nagl earned a Master of the Military Arts and Sciences degree from the Command and General Staff College, where he received the George C. Marshall Award as the top graduate. He earned a Ph.D. from Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar.

Emile A. Nakhleh is a retired Senior Intelligence Service (SIS) officer with the Central Intelligence Agency. Among other roles, he was the director of the Islam Strategic Analysis Program and chief of the regional analysis unit in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Prior to joining the CIA, Nakhleh was professor and department chair at Mount St. Mary's University. He was previously a Fulbright senior research fellow in Bahrain and Jerusalem, a visiting professor at Bir Zeit University, a Woodrow Wilson Guest Scholar, and a National Endowment for the Humanities research fellow. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Nakhleh most recently authored *A Necessary Engagement* (Princeton University Press, 2009). Nakhleh holds a B.A. in Political Science from Saint John's University, Minnesota, an M.A. in Political Science from Georgetown University, and a Ph.D. in International Relations from American University.

Vali Nasr is currently Senior Advisor to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan with the U.S. State Department, in addition to his roles as Professor of International Politics at The Fletcher School and Associate Director of the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies at Tufts University. As a specialist on political Islam, Nasr has worked extensively on political and social developments in the Muslim world with a focus on the relation of religion to politics, violence, and democratization. In 2006, the Carnegie Corporation of New York named him a Carnegie Scholar. He has also been the recipient of grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, and the American Institute of Pakistan Studies. Nasr is an adjunct senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. His books include *The Shia Revival* (W. W. Norton, 2006) and *Forces of Fortune* (Free Press, 2009), among others. Nasr received a MALD degree from The Fletcher School at Tufts University and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Shuja Nawaz is Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. He regularly writes for leading newspapers and for *The Huffington Post,* and speaks on current topics before civic groups, at think tanks, and on radio and television. Previously, Nawaz was a division chief at the International Monetary Fund, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria, and editor of the *Finance and Development Quarterly.* He has worked with RAND, the United States Institute of Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and other leading think tanks on projects dealing with Pakistan and the Middle East. His latest book is *Crossed Swords* (Oxford University Press, 2008). Nawaz was educated at Gordon College, Rawalpindi, where he obtained a B.A. in Economics and English Literature, and at the Graduate School of Journalism of Columbia University in New York, where he was a Cabot Fellow and won the Henry Taylor International Correspondent Award.

Michael E. O'Hanlon is Director of Research and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, homeland security, and American foreign policy. He is also a visiting lecturer at Princeton University, an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations. Before joining the Brookings Institution, O'Hanlon worked as a national security analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. O'Hanlon recently served on the Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board. His latest books are *The Science of War* (Princeton University Press, 2009), *Budgeting for Hard Power* (Brookings, 2009), and *A Skeptic's Case for Nuclear Disarmament* (Brookings, 2010). O'Hanlon has also written several hundred op-eds in newspapers including *The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, The Washington Times,* and *The Japan Times.* Currently, he is working on books on Afghanistan and the future of nuclear weapons policy, while contributing to the Brookings Institution's Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan indices. O'Hanlon received a B.A., an M.A., and a Ph.D. from Princeton University.

Robert H. Pelletreau has served as U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain, Tunisia, and Egypt, as well as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, over the course of his 35-year career in the Foreign Service. While in Tunisia, Pelletreau conducted the first official U.S. dialogue with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. As ambassador to Egypt, he joined the U.S. delegation to the 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference. As assistant secretary, he traveled frequently to the region as a member of Secretary Christopher's negotiation team. Other assignments while in the Foreign Service included posts in Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, and Syria, as well as senior positions in the Departments of State and Defense. Pelletreau frequently dealt with Arab-Israeli matters. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Foreign Service Association, and the American Academy of Diplomacy, and serves on the boards of several Middle East-related organizations. Pelletreau received a B.A. from Yale University and an LL.B. from Harvard Law School.

Nadim N. Rouhana is Professor of International Negotiation and Conflict Studies at The Fletcher School at Tufts University. His current research includes work on the dynamics of protracted social conflict, collective identity and democratic citizenship in multiethnic states, transitional justice, international negotiations, and the questions of reconciliation and multicultural citizenship. Much of his research and writing focuses on the Arab-Israeli conflict and on Israeli and Palestinian societies. Prior to joining The Fletcher School he was the Henry Hart Rice Professor of Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. He has held various academic positions in Palestinian, Israeli, and American universities including at Harvard University, The Fletcher School, and MIT. He was a co-founder of the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Harvard's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs where he co-chaired the Center's seminar on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution from 1992 to 2001. Rouhana is also the founding director of "Mada al-Carmel—The Arab Center for Applied Social Research" in Haifa. His publications include *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State* (Yale University Press, 1997) and numerous academic articles. He is currently completing a book on a new paradigm in conflict resolution. Rouhana received an M.A. from the University of Western Australia and a Ph.D. from Wayne State University.

Trudy Rubin writes the Worldview column for *The Philadelphia Inquirer,* which appears in many other U.S. papers. A former Middle East correspondent for *The Christian Science Monitor,* she travels regularly to the region. In 2009-2010 she made three lengthy trips to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Over the past seven years, she visited Iraq ten times, and also wrote from Iran, Israel, the West Bank, Gaza, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, China, and South Korea. In 2001, she was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize for her columns on Israel and the Palestinians and in 2008 she was awarded the Edward Weintal Prize for International Reporting. Rubin is the author of *Willful Blindness* (The Philadelphia Inquirer, 2004).

William A. Rugh, currently an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute, was a career Foreign Service officer with the U.S. Information Agency from 1964 to 1995. He served as U.S. Ambassador to the Yemen Arab Republic from 1984 to 1987 and to the United Arab Emirates from 1992 to 1995. Currently, he is a trustee of the American University in Cairo, a board member and past president of AMIDEAST, a board member of the Middle East Policy Council, and an executive committee member of the Public Diplomacy Council. He was visiting scholar at the Fares Center at Tufts University in the spring and fall of 2009 and the fall of 2010 and the Edward R. Murrow Visiting Professor of Public Diplomacy at The Fletcher School from 2008 to 2010. His books include the edited anthology *Engaging the Arab and Islamic Worlds Through Public Diplomacy* (Public Diplomacy Council, 2004), *Arab Mass Media* (Praeger, 2004), and *American Encounters with Arabs* (Praeger, 2005). Rugh holds an M.A. from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.

Richard H. Shultz is Director of the International Security Studies Program and Professor of International Politics at The Fletcher School at Tufts University. During his academic career, he has been the beneficiary of three chairs: the Olin Distinguished Professorship of National Security Studies at the U.S. Military Academy, Secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow at the U.S. Naval War College, and Brigadier General H.L. Oppenheimer Chair of Warfighting Strategy, U.S. Marine Corps. He has served as a consultant to a variety of government agencies, including the U.S. Department of Defense, Congress, and the National Security Council. Shultz co-authored *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias* (Columbia University Press, 2006; 2009 paperback ed.), with Andrea Dew, and *Armed Groups and Irregular Warfare* (National Strategy Information Center, 2009), with Querine Hanlon and Roy Godson. He recently published the report *Adapting America's Security Paradigm and Security Agenda* (National Strategy Information Center, 2010) with Roy Godson. Recently, Shultz completed a book on the U.S. Marine Corps' 2004-2008 irregular warfare campaign in al-Anbar province in Iraq. Shultz has a Ph.D. in Political Science from Miami University.

Barbara Slavin, an expert on U.S. foreign policy, is the author of an acclaimed book on the U.S. and Iran, *Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies* (St. Martin's Press, 2007). She wrote her book on Iran as a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 2006 and spent October 2007–July 2008 as a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, where she researched and wrote a report on Iranian regional influence, entitled "Mullahs, Money and Militias: How Iran Exerts Its Influence in the Middle East." She is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council specializing on Iran and a contributor to *Foreign Policy* magazine and AOLNews.com. Slavin is the former assistant managing editor for world and national security at *The Washington Times* and a former senior diplomatic reporter for *USA Today.*

Randa M. Slim is an independent consultant with extensive experience in Track II dialogue and peace-building processes in the Middle East and Central Asia. The former vice president (2005–08) and executive director (2002–04) of the International Institute for Sustained Dialogue, Slim has also been a senior program advisor at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, a guest scholar at the United States Institute of Peace, a director of Middle East programs at Resolve, Inc., and a program officer at the Kettering Foundation. She has consulted for a number of organizations including USAID, UNDP, and the Swiss Federal Department for Foreign Affairs. Slim has taught at Royal Roads University in Canada and at the American University of Beirut. The author of several studies, book chapters, and articles on mediation, conflict prevention, dialogue processes, and post-conflict peace building, she is currently working on a book about Hezbollah's political evolution (1985–2009). Slim earned a B.S. and an M.A. at the American University of Beirut and a Ph.D. at the University of North Carolina.

Shibley Telhami is the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park, and a non-resident senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Previously, Telhami taught at Cornell University, Ohio State University, the University of Southern California, Princeton University, Columbia University, Swarthmore College, and the University of California at Berkeley. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and serves on the boards of several educational and non-governmental organizations. Among his numerous publications are his best-selling book *The Stakes* (Westview Press, 2004), *Liberty and Power* (co-author, Brookings Institution Press, 2004), and *Reflections of Hearts and Minds* (Brookings Institution Press, 2006). Telhami received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley.

Stephen W. Van Evera is Ford International Professor in the MIT Political Science Department. Van Evera works in several areas of international relations: the causes and prevention of war, U.S. foreign policy, U.S. security policy, U.S. intervention in the developing world, international relations of the Middle East, and international relations theory. He has published books on the causes of war and on social science methodology, and articles on American foreign policy, American defense policy, nationalism and the causes of war, the origins of World War I, and U.S. strategy in the war on terror. His recent publications are "A Farewell to Geopolitics," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds., *To Lead the World* (Oxford University Press, 2008); "Public Diplomacy" (in *Middle East Policy,* 2009); and "Using U.S. Leverage to Abate Conflicts that Harm U.S. Security," in Stephen Van Evera and Sidharth Shah, eds., *The Prudent Use of Power in American National Security Strategy* (The Tobin Project, 2010). Van Evera received an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley.

Ibrahim Warde is Adjunct Professor of International Business at The Fletcher School and Associate Director of Business Programs at the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies. He has also taught at the University of California (Berkeley, Davis, and Santa Cruz) and at the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 2007, he was named a Carnegie Scholar for his research on financial networks and practices in the Islamic world. Warde's books include *The Price of Fear* (University of California Press, 2007), which has been translated into Japanese, French, and Italian, and *Islamic Finance in the Global Economy* (Edinburgh University Press, 2000; second ed. 2010). He is also a writer for *Le Monde Diplomatique*. Warde received a B.A. at Université Saint Joseph in Beirut, an M.B.A. at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC), France, and an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley.

The Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies

The mission of the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies at Tufts University is to create an academic environment for the promotion of greater understanding of the rich heritage of the Eastern Mediterranean, and of the significant challenges that this region faces at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The Fares Center acts as a major focus for cross-regional and cross-cultural analysis, providing a forum for the articulation of a broad diversity of viewpoints in the belief that this will serve as an effective means of conflict resolution.

The main countries concerned are Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, and the neighboring countries of Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Turkey, together with any other country or region of the world whose history and politics affects them. The region's history and its pivotal role in world politics have attracted the interest of scholars concerned with fields as diverse as the origins of writing and the beginnings of modern science. In focusing on the Eastern Mediterranean, the Fares Center is a rich source of current information and data on the area, encouraging the consideration of policy issues from an international perspective.

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