

BOOK REVIEWS

Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. By Roger Fisher and William Ury, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1981, pp. 154, \$10.95.

Reviewed by ALAN DUNN*

Only the greenest negotiator needs a book to teach him the importance of compromise and self-restraint in successful negotiations. The virtue of *Getting to YES* is that it shows where and why compromise and self-restraint need to be applied and how a more comprehensive outlook can be systematically used to change and improve the negotiating game. Authors Fisher and Ury provide guidelines for successful negotiation which overturn much of the conventional wisdom about prudent and effective bargaining. They show how the classical — almost instinctive — negotiating strategies blur the negotiators' vision of important issues, exacerbate emotional conflict, and hinder the search for creative solutions by focusing myopically on particular positions taken up during the negotiating process. At the same time, Fisher and Ury recognize the power of self-interest. Their simple, straightforward and yet comprehensive theory retains the satisfaction of real needs as the driving force in all negotiations.

The book's critique of the conventional wisdom is founded on a common-sense understanding of human behavior.

Getting to YES begins by contrasting soft and hard bargaining strategies. The soft bargainer aims for agreement, changes his positions and makes concessions easily. He tends to trust others and yields to pressure. The hard bargainer, on the other hand, aims for victory in negotiation, digs into his position and demands concessions as a precondition of the relationship. He mistrusts others and constantly applies pressure. The shortcomings of soft bargaining are clear; the soft bargainer is vulnerable and frequently victimized, and his acquiescence earns scorn more often than concessions. The pitfalls of hard bargaining are harder to discern, and the sobriquet "hard bargainer" is nearly always a compliment. But this approach often damages a valuable relationship. Stonewalling in negotiation creates mutual incentives for delaying agreement and for

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adopting extreme positions at the outset in order to bargain for substantial concessions later on. Hard bargaining is thus inefficient and unwise because it generally produces lopsided agreements or mechanical "split-the-difference" compromises unresponsive to long-term needs. The hard bargainer is often deprived of the fruits of his own tenacity.

To avoid the pitfalls of soft or hard bargaining, Fisher and Ury suggest a middle path — "principled negotiation." They junk positional bargaining altogether and advocate focusing on underlying interests instead of prematurely adopting a particular stance. This effectively changes the game by centering the discussion squarely on the merits of the issue at hand and making the whole bargaining process more fluid. Literally refusing to take a position is a radical step and seems almost unnatural; experienced negotiators and laymen alike can appreciate how deeply ingrained habits push us in the opposite direction. The book, however, presents the technique in specific, concrete terms and shows how it can be made to work. The important thing to note is that principled negotiation requires the sacrifice not of interests, but only of positions.

The authors illustrate this distinction by showing how principled negotiation worked in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations over the

Sinai. Talks prior to Camp David proved unsuccessful, Fisher and Ury argue, because the contenders' *positions* were incompatible; Egypt refused to yield any territory in the Sinai and Israel rejected a return to the 1967 status quo. Consequently, negotiations went round in circles, with negotiators drawing and re-drawing possible boundary lines to divide the Sinai between Egypt and Israel. The negotiators were locked into their positions, in this case, geographical positions. The Camp David talks between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin (which, incidentally, were largely patterned after Fisher's "one-text" procedure) shifted discussion to underlying interests. Israel's primary concern was security; the Israelis wanted a buffer zone between themselves and Egypt, with an ancient historical claim to the Sinai, wanted to free its sovereign territory from foreign control. These underlying interests *were* compatible, allowing a compromise solution which would "return the Sinai to complete Egyptian sovereignty and, by demilitarizing large areas, would still assure Israeli security. The Egyptian flag would fly everywhere, but Egyptian tanks would be nowhere near Israel."¹

The authors emphasize the importance of knowing what one's real interests are before entering negotiation, and encourage resolute advocacy of those interests once negotiation begins. Does this tenacity

1. Roger Fisher and William Ury, *Getting to Yes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1981), p. 43.

where real interests are concerned mean that at some point, even in principled negotiation, one finally bumps up against inflexible positions after all — irreducible interests called by another name? Doesn't the distinction break down? The authors argue that even though vital interests are irrevocably opposed in certain situations, several positions exist which could satisfy every interest. Concentrating on these interests therefore makes a wider range of mutually acceptable solutions possible, whereas becoming locked into a rigid position is simply a short-cut to disagreement. Principled negotiation gives the negotiator additional opportunities to extend the domain of possible agreement and, alternatively, to identify the fundamental antagonism of interests as efficiently as possible. The possibility of disagreement itself does not, however, negate the fundamental distinction between interests and positions.

The authors suggest separating the people from the problem in order to facilitate agreement:

Fighting hard on the substantive issues increases the pressure for an effective solution; giving support to the human beings on the other side tends to improve your relationship and increase the likelihood of reaching agreement. It is the combination

of support and attack which works; either alone is likely to be insufficient.²

Being "soft on the people and "hard" on the problem deflects aggressive behavior in a constructive direction and injects rationality into the bargaining process, but it requires both self-control and command of a dynamic and generally volatile emotional situation. The authors also emphasize the importance of understanding the other side's perceptions and interests. This sensitivity is no exercise in selfless goodwill, but is based on the premise that "It is not enough to know that they see things differently. If you want to influence them, you also need to feel the emotional force with which they believe it."³

Getting to YES offers an economical alternative to simple haggling, a way to present both sides with an agreement that is acceptable because it comprehends each party's interests. Fisher and Ury consistently underscore the importance of a creative search for mutual gain. The negotiator must meet this challenge in order to change people's minds and satisfy his own self-interest at the same time. Moreover, better understanding and improved communication open up possibilities for low-cost gains to the alert negotiator; concessions on style or status in exchange for substantive

2. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

gains may satisfy the other party's real concerns as well as his own. As the authors show, these opportunities often remain hidden in a strictly adversarial bargaining process.

Fisher and Ury develop an efficient bargaining strategy responsive to real human needs and offer an insightful analysis of the psychology of conflict as well as of the immediate human problems characteristic of negotiation in general. The authors stick to the fundamentals, and the reader is certain throughout the book that they know exactly where they are going. Intended as a negotiator's field handbook, the work is well organized, with an analytical table of contents and an easy-to-follow format. At 154 pages, it makes for gratifying reading. The style is clear and economical which,

to paraphrase Seneca, is a sure sign of deep thought.

Getting to YES covers the whole range of potential conflict situations, from the prosaic hassles of everyday life to the weightier disputes of international relations. Principled negotiation strengthens every negotiator's hand without forcing him to resort to heavy-handedness. The authors advocate dealing with each problem concretely by divorcing the particular merits of each issue from black-and-white ideological preconceptions. In this respect, the book counters a new trend in American foreign policy towards facile, dichotomous thinking on genuinely complex issues, and points the way towards a more discriminating approach to international relations.

Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey. By V.S. Naipaul, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981, pp. 430, \$15.00.

Reviewed by IAN O. LESSER*

Readers familiar with V.S. Naipaul and his books will not be surprised by the quality of his most recent work of non-fiction. Present here, as in the past, is an undeniable mastery of expression. Indeed, as Irving Howe has stated in his review of *A Bend in the River* (1979) in the

New York Times Book Review, "for sheer abundance of talent, there can hardly be a writer alive who surpasses V.S. Naipaul."¹ *Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey* is, however, much more than meticulously crafted travel literature or journalism. It is a deeply critical, explicitly

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1. Irving Howe, *New York Times*, 13 May 1979, p. VII, 1.

political, and profoundly pessimistic piece of cultural observation.

This latest book is the product of Naipaul's extensive travel in four countries currently experiencing a resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism. In Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia, the author converses with a variety of religious and secular figures, including Ayatollah Khomeini, and numerous writers, journalists, students and others. The resulting description of his travels (one might term it an exposé) explores religious, cultural, and political perceptions, and most importantly addresses the interaction among these elements.

While it might be possible to examine any or all of these factors separately, Naipaul chooses not to do so. As in his past writing, he focuses on the characteristics of "civilizations" broadly conceived, and in particular what he has termed the "half-made" societies of the Third World. Naipaul's sharp criticism of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism centers on what he perceives as its nihilism and violent destructiveness, the latter frequently directed at domestic elements as well as the West. One particularly striking statement by the author is illustrative: "This late twentieth-century Islam . . . offered only the Prophet, who would settle everything — but who had ceased to exist. This political Islam was rage, anarchy."²

Any discussion of Islam and politics, especially one touching on the topic of development in the Third World and the relationship of the former colonial societies to the West, has the potential for raising strong opinions, both pro and con. In this sense, *Among the Believers* as an unconventional study of these issues is bound to be controversial. One suspects, however, that the author's background and its relationship to the subject of the book are at least an equal source of this controversy. Naipaul, 49, was born in an Indian community in Trinidad which he left in 1950 to attend Oxford. He began to write in London in 1954 and has, as the author's note in the Penguin editions of his books states, "followed no other profession." Naipaul has written sixteen books, half of them non-fiction, and has been the recipient of several prestigious literary awards. Since leaving Trinidad, Naipaul has returned to the Third World only as an observer.

Born in the Third World, and taking it as his subject matter, Naipaul is assigned by natural temptation the role of a non-Western observer. Reading his work, however, one is struck by the manner in which the author consistently resists any inclination to act as an advocate of Third World causes. Indeed, his approach is a detached one, to the degree that his critics have derided him as an apologist for

2. Charles Michener, "The Dark Visions of V.S. Naipaul," *Newsweek*, November 1981, p. 104.

colonialism. Thus, the criticism of radical Islam, common in the West in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis, should not seem any more startling for having been voiced by V.S. Naipaul. Specifically, Naipaul points to the nihilism of Islamic reforms ("Step by step, out of its Islamic striving, Pakistan had undone the rule of law it inherited from the British, and replaced it with nothing."), the tendency to rewrite history (in a chapter entitled "Killing History"), and the curious interaction between the new Islam and traditional culture, particularly in Indonesia ("such effort . . . to teach villagers to be villagers!").³

One may, perhaps, question the manner in which Naipaul derives his impressions of the four Islamic countries which he visited. Given the sort of fundamentalist ideology extant on an official level in Pakistan, for example, is it reasonable to expect anything other than exaggerated statements of belief, especially from the journalists and other professionals interviewed by Naipaul? Ultimately, however, this line of argument does not provide a very effective criticism of Naipaul's conclusions with regard to Islam, politics, or any of the other issues touched upon in the book. A more valid criticism might be that Naipaul's method is self-justifying in that many of his obser-

vations on turmoil and development are clearly traceable to his earlier works — *A Bend in the River*, for example.

Naipaul does not display very much reverence for cultural relativism; his criticism of Islamic fundamentalism is rarely qualified. Moreover, as he has stated in a recent interview, he is not particularly interested in the question of Western responsibility for the current Islamic turmoil, that is to say, in "attributing fault."⁴ Naipaul recognizes obvious elements of reaction, yet avoids becoming bogged down in the anti-Western rhetoric which he encounters in his conversations with believers and non-believers alike. A recurring theme is the manner in which Islamic fundamentalism has frequently incorporated long-standing domestic prejudices, such as the evident resentment of the Chinese in Malaysia. The author points out quite perceptively that "the primary victims of Islamic rage are not in the West."⁵

In the final analysis, the most striking feature of Naipaul's latest book is its profound pessimism. Here again, the book parallels much of the author's previous commentary on the Third World, in particular his two works on India, *An Area of Darkness* and *India: A Wounded Civilization*. This pessimism, together with the notions of political

3. V.S. Naipaul, *An Islamic Journey* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), p. 169, 341.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

nihilism and the distortion of history, represents themes both central and *prior* to Naipaul's journey among the believers.

Although this elegantly written account cannot be described as political analysis in the conventional sense, it is very much a work of

astute political observation. As such, it offers a unique and valuable perspective on the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism, and one of considerable interest given the current Western concern about stability in the Middle East.

National Defense. By James Fallows, New York: Random House, 1981, pp. 204, \$12.95

Reviewed by LARRY BECK*

As an Air Force Officer, I read *National Defense* by James Fallows with particular interest and mixed emotions. When several of the chapters came out in *The Atlantic* and *Washington Monthly*, I found myself agreeing with parts, and disagreeing with others. Though vaguely uneasy myself, I was totally unprepared for the vehement opposition I found in the Pentagon when the book was mentioned. I was equally unprepared for its almost universal acceptance within the academic community.

On reflection, the reason for my uneasiness may be tied to the general's vehemence and the graduate student's adoration, that is, our different understandings of technology. The unstated question of the book is, "How do we manage technology?" Fallows claims that the Pentagon has been seduced into

an uncritical love affair with technology that has led us to purchase unnecessarily complex weapon systems. Fallows's chapter title "Magicians" perhaps best describes the civilian attitude toward technology. There seems to be a distrust of technology bordering on fear among many concerned citizens and social scientists. My own uneasiness stems from Fallows's attempts to explain the problems of technological sophistication without an understanding of those problems. As my glee club teacher used to say, "The words are all there, but where's the tune?" Fallows, a Harvard-educated Rhodes Scholar, has listened to the arguments and has become a convert to the reform movement. He has produced a persuasive public statement for that movement, but his work is undermined by his lack of technological depth which seems to lead

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him to answer the central question, "How do we manage technology?" with "Ignore it."

The questions raised in *National Defense* are not new. The debates over quality *vs.* quantity weapon systems, maneuver *vs.* attrition warfare, draft *vs.* all-volunteer force, leadership *vs.* attrition warfare, careerism *vs.* professionalism, and others have been going on within the services and between the services and Congress for years. I have argued these questions in alert facilities, bars, and seminar rooms around the world.

What is new is the forum. Service magazines and trade journals have aired the arguments, but when they are printed in *The Atlantic* and a popular book, the number of "experts" on these issues mushrooms. This will be the most important national security book in years if it becomes the opening statement in a public debate of the issues it raises. Unfortunately, the rebuttal so far has been fragmented and largely unpublished; it has not received the reasoned, articulate public response it deserves.

Rather than presenting that rebuttal, however, this review will attempt to show some aspects of Fallows's work that the general reader might want to consider before uncritically accepting his side of the argument. Most of Fallows's examples are taken from studies of the fighter force done by defense

experts. My comments are based on twelve years' experience as a junior officer in fighter cockpits; they are not the official position of the Air Force.

Fallows's lack of technological expertise and understanding of the weapons he disparages is evident when he leaps from a detailed discussion of the drawbacks of the TOW anti-tank missile (which requires the gunner to remain exposed on the battlefield for ten seconds) to the assertion that after firing a radar missile, "the pilot must stay locked in a pattern with the other plane, flying a predictable course that lays him open to destruction from any other planes that happen to be in the area."¹ In reality, the pilot is required to maintain a radar lock-on for the time-of-flight of the missile, so he must limit his maneuvering to a 60° cone — a definite constraint but hardly a "predictable course" that can be compared with standing up on a battlefield. The lack of technological sophistication is further demonstrated when this argument leads to a call for the "simple" heat-seeker missile, the latest version of which, the all-aspect Aim-9L, is perhaps the most technologically advanced air-to-air weapon we possess.

Another such example is Fallows's use of the quotation that "Maverick missiles are so expensive that we fire only about 200 per year in training"² to imply that because

1. James Fallows, *National Defense*, (New York: Random House, 1981), p.23.

2. *Ibid.*, p.42.

of this expense, crew members cannot receive the training they need. This training is accomplished by the use of a "captive" missile which allows the aircrew to acquire a target and "lock-on" many times during a mission and then to review film of the mission on the ground with instructors to examine errors and improve techniques.

In my own experience, after literally hundreds of intercepts and simulated launches of air-to-air missiles in the air and in the aircraft simulator, I was pleased to have the opportunity to "live fire" the Aim-7 and Aim-9 missiles at "Combat Sage," but the experience itself was anticlimactic. Actually firing the missiles was good training, but it was in no way the most important or most valuable part of my training.

Another example of this is the reproduction of two charts showing information transfer loops to illustrate the hopeless complexity of modern command control communications systems. Before the reader readily accepts this hopelessness, he should try to diagram his own information transfer system. Fallows would be equally horrified by a diagram of information transfer loops within *The Atlantic's* operation.

Much of the book's information comes from a series of studies and briefings by a group known as the "fighter mafia:" Pierre Sprey, John Boyd, Everest Riccioni, Chuck

Spinney, and other very capable analysts who have devoted a considerable portion of their lives to developing and expounding the theories that Fallows popularizes. Boyd and Spinney have made many converts on Capitol Hill with their four hour briefings which one attendee labeled as "evangelical." I have not heard these briefings, but I was a young lieutenant in Korea when Colonel Riccioni was reassigned from the Pentagon for what Fallows calls "suspicions about his insufficient loyalty to the F-15."³

Impressed by the Colonel's knowledge, experience, and presence (many fighter pilots have plaques proclaiming themselves "World's Greatest Fighter Pilot"; Riccioni's said, "World's Last Fighter Pilot"), I quickly became converted to the Light-Weight Fighter Program. The "lightweight fighter" was to be a small, austere, inexpensive, clear airmass fighter that the US could field in large numbers. The argument for this simple airplane is illustrated by the idea that the US can buy either 1000 F-5s or 250 F-15s for the same amount of money. When these alternative fleets are multiplied by their projected sortie rates (2.5 per day for F-5 and 1 per day for the F-15), the "real fleet" is 2500 F-5 sorties per day *vs.* 250 F-15 sorties per day.⁴ My enthusiasm for the simple day fighter began to wane when my next assignment

3. *Ibid.*, p.103.

4. *Ibid.*, p.43.

was in Europe and I became aware that a very large percentage of the time night or bad weather grounds all but the truly "all-weather fighters." If Riccioni's "real fleet" figures are discounted for night/weather, the forces are much closer. I spent a lot more of my European tour sitting on the ground because of bad weather than I did waiting for broken F-4s. If Tactical Air Command's latest figures relating to F-15 sortie rates for surge are factored in, the "real fleets" become almost equal.

This argument of "more *vs.* better" or "quality *vs.* quantity" is the issue for which the book and Fallows are becoming known. The question of building a large force of simple fighters or a much smaller force of super-sophisticated, all-weather fighters is the most publicized. The same thinking is applied to other weapon systems in all the services. Congressional committees are talking seriously of buying three \$1 billion carriers instead of one \$3 billion carrier, thus abandoning a very sophisticated, very expensive nuclear-attack submarine in favor of many more smaller, simpler non-nuclear subs. The Army's XM-1 tank is under the same kind of pressure as are Air Force plans for a new transport. Similar arguments are also applied to antitank and air-to-air missiles.

Fallows takes this discussion as far as an examination of the "Prob-

ability of Kill" (PK) of various air-to-air weapons. He concludes, predictably, that the simple, cheap cannon is best because it has a much higher PK per trigger squeeze than the heat seeking missile which, itself, has a higher PK than the sophisticated, expensive radar missile.⁵ He does not discuss, and possibly never considered, the difficulty of attaining the position to squeeze that trigger. Air-to-air combat involves complex maneuvers and counter-maneuvers in three dimensions. The "envelope" from which an attacker can fire a radar missile is basically a bubble measured in tens of miles; for the old heat-seeker missile, it was a cone behind the defender measured in hundreds of yards. The cannon's range is measured in hundreds of feet and its "envelope" is much more complex, requiring the attacker not only to close to within a certain range but also to follow the path of the target and to aim where he will be when the bullets hit. Shooting birds is difficult enough from the ground. Try it from the perspective of another bird.

Another unmentioned aspect is "the threat" that our weapon systems are designed to counter. Fallows talks about the MIG-21, the Soviet equivalent of our F-5, which he favors, without mentioning that the Soviets have also developed modern all-weather fighters with a growing look-down/shoot-down ca-

5. *Ibid.*, p.99.

pability. The requirement for F-15s and F-14s to identify visually a target before firing distorted the AIM-VAL tests that Fallows cites so fondly. This requirement also hobbled fighters in Vietnam; when it was suspended for "Operation Bolo," the air-to-air kill ratio skyrocketed. Fallows accepts the requirement as unalterable. Sophisticated technology which our potential enemies do not have can eliminate the need for it. We must have an *effective* presence in the sky; presence alone is not enough. More fighters or more carriers may not be the answer if they are not effective.

Publication of *National Defense* coincided with the opening rounds of the battle over President Reagan's defense budget, so the quality *vs.* quantity issue has overshadowed the other important question Fallows raises. The unstated question, "How do we manage technology?" is complemented by "How do we manage our armed forces?"

The author briefly discussed his personal experience with the Vietnam War draft and warns of possible bias on this subject, yet the chapter on "Employees," which ends with a call for a more comprehensive draft, is the most unbiased chapter in the book. Fallows has quite obviously given much soul-searching thought to the question, "How do we man our armed forces?" His personal involvement results in a tightly reasoned treatise, although the very

valid points he makes are in danger of being rejected because of the severity of his attacks on the status quo.

After examining the all-volunteer force its problems, and proposed remedies, Fallows reluctantly concludes that the only way to have a representative army is through the draft.⁶ The key word is "representative." The problem is not only that the army is becoming more reliant on minorities and the less educated, but that middle- and upper-class Americans themselves have no experience with the military and no personal involvement through relatives and friends. The public and a growing number of servicemen look on the military as "just another job."

Service leaders have long deplored this drift from "professionalism" to a "9 to 5 ethic." They would applaud Fallows if he did not turn this into an attack on "careerism," which many senior officers take as a personal assault.

In addition to blurring the differences between management and leadership, careerism is seen as "the desire to *be* rather than the desire to *do*. It is the desire to have rank, rather than to use it; the pursuit of promotion." It takes the form of "ticket-punching" or "square-filling" assignments, service schools, a command position, a staff billet, an advanced degree, and a Pentagon tour, which are all seen as required

6. *Ibid.*, p. 173.

blocks that must be checked off if an officer is to advance. Fallows feels this approach was institutionalized during the Vietnam War by unrealistically rapid rotation of combat command positions to ensure that all officers were afforded this important "career development" opportunity.⁷ The six- or twelve-month commander never really had a chance to develop that essential "bond" with his troops. The careerist emphasis on "broadening" has led officers to acquire M.A.s and Ph.D.s, which not only do not make them more effective officers, but actually divert them from pursuits that would. Even the professional military schools have been seduced by this desire to broaden. "The ideal," Fallows suggests, "is the scholar-warrior, the man of action incorporated in the man of thought. The reality, most of the time, is the dilettante."⁸

I have argued these issues as well. As a more junior officer, I agreed with most of Fallows's positions. Either maturity or a growing stake in the status quo has altered some of my stands. My views on the leadership *vs.* management question are perhaps the most significant change. I'm sure the Army and Marines need a high proportion of leaders, but even those services (like the Navy and Air Force) are multi-billion dollar businesses that must be "managed" by someone. Perhaps

the distinction between "leader" and "manager" is overdrawn; in every operation, a good leader is a successful manager and vice versa. The armed forces today used to accommodate both functions in their officers if they are to be effective. Fallows wants the services to return to an emphasis on leadership; I would have them abandon the romantic notion that every officer must be a "leader."

Along with this, my attitude towards advanced degrees has changed. As a squadron scheduler, I was greatly frustrated with the aircrew members who were unavailable at times because they were working on M.A.s in Business Management or Counseling. I felt they were unnecessarily complicating my job. I have since found myself in Air Force jobs in which I wished I had some of that training. The self-discipline and study habits gained from formal education prove invaluable to many aspects of a professional officer's career.

My position on other aspects of the "careerist" ethic is less certain. I still deplore the need to have "broadening" assignments to get promoted, yet the ability to change jobs and working conditions every few years is one of the reasons I remain in the Air Force. I once complained that I had four squadron commanders and five wing commanders during my four years in

7. *Ibid.*, p.114.

8. *Ibid.*, p.118.

England and three squadron commanders during my twelve-month tour in Korea. Now I am concerned that the trend toward longer stabilized command tour will rob me of my chance to command.

Fallows states that "the conduct of war, and the preparations to avoid it, are basically different from other things that human beings do, and that the only way to think about them seriously is to understand them on their own terms." He understands the "people" aspects much

better than he understands the technological aspects. In both cases, he has listened to some very intelligent, very experienced and persuasive men. Fallows seems to have accepted his mentors' beliefs without serious question; the general reader should not accept Fallows as readily, and I have tried to show that there are other sides to the issues.

Secretary of the Air Force Verne Orr recently said:

Every so often someone writes a book or a magazine article and earns himself a tidy sum of money by criticizing weapon systems in one of the three services and by suggesting that all would be well if we would only make them simpler.

. . . The Administration did not come to Washington to lead in the sacrifice of American youth upon the false altar of inadequate inferior planes. I promise you we will continue to build sophisticated, capable weapon systems that will enable our pilots to fly with the least loss of life possible.⁹

I do not think Fallows wrote the book for the money. He seems to be a true believer. He deserves an equally articulate and persuasive response in the same public arena. *National Defense* should be read by his supporters and detractors, by the informed and the uninitiated. This work has already influenced many people. If it sparks a responsible

public debate, it can become a truly important book.

The military probably does need to change weapons procurement and personnel practices. The danger, however, is that the call for a change will be rejected out of hand along with the proposed solutions. Now is the time for a reasoned response, not a cursory rejection.

9. Address to Air Force Association Annual National Convention, 15 September 1981, as reported in *Air Force Magazine*, November 1981.