

The Interwar Foundations of Security Studies: Edward Mead Earle, the Carnegie Corporation and the Depression Era Origins of a Field

Abstract:

Security studies, as an American field of inquiry, has deeper historical roots than commonly accepted. Contrary to established narratives, it was the unraveling of the international order in the 1930s that compelled a collection of internationalist institutions and individuals to reconsider their approaches to world affairs. A leading figure was Edward Mead Earle who bound together a variety of new and traditional disciplines to create an entirely new field focused on the problem of security with the goal of establishing a new grand strategy for the United States. In this campaign, Earle had considerable support from various sectors. Critically important was the continuing support of major foundations, specifically the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Collectively, these efforts had significant impacts on the evolution of security studies and are still felt today.

This article is based on an original work entitled "Present at the Creation: Edward Mead Earle and the Depression-Era Origins of Security Studies", *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 107–141. © 2011 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Reprinted with kind permission.

The author would like to thank the guest editors and the anonymous reviewers of *Global Society* for their comments on this article.

Keywords: Security Studies, US Foreign Relations, Edward Mead Earle, history of the 1930s, foundations, Carnegie Corporation of New York

THE DEEPER FOUNDATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY SECURITY STUDIES

Security studies and its close cousin strategic studies have established impressive institutional and intellectual authority. A set of influential institutes and centers at prominent universities produce a steady stream of research and scholars meant to influence academe, policy, and the shape of public debate on the diverse issues bearing on security. Behind these sit a phalanx of patrons—the government, a select group of

foundations, and wealthy individuals—that assure that field has the wherewithal to go about their tasks.

A central, and now rather forgotten, figure in the emergence of this influential field was historian Edward Mead Earle. He integrated different areas of inquiry to create a new field, defining it in ways that remain relevant. He built structures that nurtured numerous individuals who would go on to be lively figures in security studies' postwar "golden age." Security studies' origins also provide insight into how new capacities were created to support an emergent form of American globalism that was maturing well before U.S. entry into World War II.

Security studies, as defined by Joseph Nye, Jr. and Sean Lynn-Jones, is "not a discipline but a problem." Although there is no universally agreed upon definition of security studies, the major problem guiding research tends to be violence in world affairs (both between states and within them) and the variety of threats that can bring conflict about. The issue of maintaining security in the face of such threats has typically, but not entirely, been viewed through the prism of the nation-state.¹ As the problems of security touch a wide selection of social, cultural, economic, psychological, environmental, historical, legal, and political questions, the lens of one discipline is inadequate. Because of this, the field is ecumenical and predisposed to interdisciplinary approaches (even if international relations and political science predominate). Even the long-awaited institutional history of security studies repeats the received wisdom that the field is a recent innovation and locate its origins in the years after World War II and explicitly links its evolution to the appearance to nuclear weapons.²

But many elements that define the field today emerged in the crisis years of the Depression. A selection of interventionist scholars, not unlike their security studies successors today, sought to influence not just the policies of state, but also society's grasp of world affairs. But the action of scholars (and academic institutions) could not accomplish such an ambitious mission alone. Foundations have had significant impact on the shape of security studies. The "renaissance" many saw in the security studies field during the 1970s and 1980s was a product of university and foundation investment as much as methodological and intellectual innovation. This type of catalytic patronage, however, was an echo of the decisive investment made by foundations in the efforts of American and international scholars to forge a new U.S. grand strategy to face a degenerating world order.

EDWARD MEAD EARLE

Retracing the career of Earle exposes this longer heritage. His intellectual journey hugged the shifting contours of American higher learning during the last century. Born in 1894, Earle was positioned to take advantage of these changes. Undergraduate education drew him to Columbia University. In 1917 Earle was swept into World War I, serving in both the field artillery and Air Service. Returning to Columbia, Earle completed a Ph.D. in history in 1923 and immediately graduated to an assistant professorship at his alma mater.³ A sign of Earle's prominence and promise was that the newly formed Institute of Advanced Study (IAS) picked him to join its first class of scholars in 1935. By 1937, like many other observers Earle had become profoundly worried by what he considered unprecedented threats to international order and with them the security of the United

States. Two powerful and interlinked forces were responsible—the rise of totalitarian states and the unrelenting global Depression.

This brought a change to Earle as a scholar. In the 1920s his scholarship was marked by a concern that as the United States extended commercial, political, military and diplomatic interest into various parts of the globe, particularly the Middle East, it risked folly and grief by inserting itself into the imperial competition swirling around that flashpoint.⁴ With the new formulations of the 1930s, he embraced a mission of explaining how the United States would have to change and set itself firmly in the world to contain emerging threats. His ideas would be important, but his institutional status was just as vital to mustering the right resources to the cause. His goal was expansive and ambitious: build a new regime of inquiry that would serve as a standing resource for U.S. national security.

A STRATEGY TO CONFRONT TOTALITARIANISM

Earle's conception of the threat gripping the world was built around totalitarian regimes. With their authoritarian governance, firm hold on the media, control of the schools, and other aspects of civic life that came with the "extension of government control into virtually every domain of human relations," these regimes were perceived as something new to history. These relationships fused into a domestic character where everything was subordinated to struggle. Earle's view, shared by increasing numbers of liberals, was that in totalitarian countries, the state was war. Even in peacetime the organization, national rhetoric, and economic policies of totalitarian regimes were geared to struggle.⁵ This domestic orientation made them a threat internationally. They looked

upon “war rather than peace as the normal law of life.” By 1937 Earle felt that peace existed only in name, as “the world may now be said to be in various stages of mobilization for war.” This did not just mean specific armed preparations but the control of exports, the husbanding of strategic raw materials, boycotts, food rationing, civilian populations “kept in a febrile state of emotional excitement” by propaganda and high military expenditures. It was a sober reminder that the “nation in arms” was “all-embracing” and that any effort to explicate this reality would have to be similar in scope. It also meant that the broad sweep of military issues was nonnegotiable and forced the question of whether liberal, democratic societies could adapt to meet this qualitatively different threat.⁶

The historical uniqueness, intensity, and persistence of the totalitarian threat required a long-term, coordinated national response. Global and historical forces had instigated this menace, but the response had to be American. Most existing scholarship, Earle believed, had failed to foresee this problem. The “superabundance” of research on collective security, international law, and the role of international institutions (i.e., the League of Nations) that had dominated interwar international relations was now moot in the face of a new world disorder.⁷ Earle’s project, set apart with its orientation toward military and strategic issues, was specifically meant to contend with a world in flux.⁸

A focus on security and strategy along with a focus on high-level research (there were to be no graduate or undergraduate students) made Earle’s program stand out in this growing international relations community. He envisioned not a single “*project* but a *subject* for research.” (emphasis original)⁹ The creation of this subject was imperative because Earle “doubted whether the United States has any officially recognised military policy.”¹⁰ The military had plans, but these were based on the last war, and there was little

liaison between the services and key branches of the government. A full-fledged grand strategy would have to coordinate the diplomatic, military, and executive branches. Indeed Earle assumed this need for integration, often speaking of change to military as well as foreign policy. In later comments Earle was clear about the particular value of scholars given the perspective and distance they could provide. Social scientists were provided a prominent role in his vision. Earle desired serious research, but from the start he was out to create the means to influence the course of national policy. Any attempt to facilitate strategic thinking would require changing public opinion along with scholarly discussion. Earle optimistically thought that the public's isolationist tendencies would melt away when it was presented with a well-articulated national security policy.¹¹ Scholars in this new field would produce monographs but it was equally important to distill ideas so they could easily be manipulated by the "hands of persons who actually influence the course of events in Washington."¹²

A FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGY: THE CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK

Yet, even with the support of the IAS, there were limits to what a prominent academic and institution could catalyze on their own. Constructing a new field of inquiry and assuring it had a rapid and pronounced impact on the strategic posture of the United States was unthinkable without significant funding. Earle had to perform rites still known today in the internationalist arts: he sought out a foundation patron, specifically the Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY).

The Carnegie Corporation emerged as an outgrowth of steel magnate Andrew Carnegie's personal philanthropy. Incorporated in 1911 to "promote the advancement and

diffusion of knowledge and understanding among the people of the United States” Carnegie’s death in 1919 left the foundation on an independent institutional footing.¹³ Although the corporation’s charter limited the scope of its grants it still had a dramatic impact on the shape of global affairs. Structured by a staff steeped in mainstream liberal internationalism the foundation’s domestic, educational, and scholarly grants sought to create the capacity in American society to contend with global change.¹⁴

Earle was a known quantity to CCNY. After his appointment to the IAS, the corporation provided him travel funds, and its president, Frederick Keppel, considered himself a “member of the society for the Preservation of Ed Earle.”¹⁵ Despite this, there would be disappointment. Earle approached CCNY in late 1937 to support his expansive vision and met with reservations. Lacking his sense of urgency, the corporation’s trustees considered the project tantamount to propaganda and suggested that the government might better fund such work, if it was to be done at all.¹⁶

Persisting, Earle offered a revised request in November 1939. He did not back away from the view that issues surrounding national defense remained “the most pressing problem facing the United States in this decade,” and he was confident that “nothing which has happened in the intervening time has altered this prophecy.” So the prophet made an explicit call for “a historical and critical study of a Grand Strategy for the United States.” His definition of the concept would find adherents in security studies today:

“[Grand strategy is]...that combination of domestic and military policies by which the vital interest of a nation may be most effectively advanced and defended. In some circumstances the diplomatic and in others the military instrumentalities will be more important, but they are always inextricably connected.”

As in his 1937 appeal, Earle thought that articulating such a strategy would benefit not only policymakers but also the public in grasping issues behind military preparedness

and potential threats. Earle was not establishing the idea of strategy—it had a long and venerable history—but he was recasting inquiry into it as something beyond simple military or political questions while helping to create the societal and governmental means in the United States to contend with its complexity. This restructuring would assist in rousing and preparing the country as a whole for the dangers abroad. This time Earle did not have to place much emphasis on the forces and threats that justified his plans: events had done that for him.¹⁷

Others had come to share Earle's sense of threat, assuring that CCNY took just three months to assent to his request. World events and the corporation's response to them opened the vault for the experiment. Carnegie extended a significant first grant of \$6,500 (over \$102,000 in 2010) for the formulation of "a theoretical 'Grand Strategy' for the United States" with "especial emphasis on the interrelation of diplomacy and arms as alternative and interdependent means of achieving national security."¹⁸ These pennies were overture for the pound, as CCNY would remain a loyal supporter of Earle for the next fifteen years.

Loosened purse strings at CCNY reflected a hinge moment of the twentieth century. World War II had begun. Carnegie, like other foundations and internationalist bodies were already moving to educate the American public and build national capacity for greater engagement in world affairs.¹⁹ Just a few months after CCNY made its grant to Earle, calculations for a new grand strategy became imperative after the abrupt subtraction of the national power of France from the mathematics of global power in the summer of 1940.²⁰ As the shattered Third Republic fell to pieces, CCNY was among those internationalist and interventionist bodies shocked into vigorous action. Keppel earmarked \$500,000 (over

\$7.8 million in 2010) of the foundation's budget for a program to build capacity in the United States for the trouble ahead. Elihu Root Jr.—son of a pillar of the establishment and one time president of CCNY, Elihu Root—offered a blueprint for this “emergency program.”²¹

In the fall of 1940 Root proposed a troika of themes. Like Earle's proposal, these were prefaced by the all-encompassing totalitarian challenge that threatened not just a stable world order but the very survival of liberal societies. Root's point A asked whether modifications were “desirable” to U.S. foreign policy in light of recent “changes in the international situation.” This was not a matter solely for the State Department as “minds a little more removed from the stress of the diplomatic struggle” (i.e., historians, economists, and philosophers) might be able to make useful suggestions. Point B asked a deeper question about how the “democratic system” might have to mutate to survive in a “rapidly shrinking and highly militarised” world. Root was mixing some of the fears of a “garrison state”—popularised by political scientist Harold Lasswell—with more diffuse fears that the democratic process in the U.S. “involves too much delay and waste motion to fight successfully with tyranny.” The trick was to find a blend where inefficiency could be avoided “with a minimum of danger to the essentials of the process [democracy] itself.” Point C posed the problem of “morale” and how to understand its good and bad sides. Root was gingerly raising the controversial point that propaganda was needed to make the public toe the interventionist line.²²

Leading members of the U.S. foreign policy establishment were solicited for comments on the feasibility of Root's program and to put “flesh on the bones.”²³ The pack, which including Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Charles Beard, Lasswell, Henry Luce, and Earle

did not merely rubber-stamp the Root program. However, in the unsettled fall of 1940, they concurred with its general outlines. Beard thought the program identified “three great problems of our troubled times” and proposed an integrated research program to attack it.²⁴ Luce agreed that “pro-democracy propaganda” was at the heart of the matter. He was willing to apply the “horrid word,” propaganda, a term that so many others tactfully replaced with the term “morale” to obscure the reality that they were attempting to influence the public.²⁵

What emerged was the “National Emergency Program” (NEP) that straddled the United States’ entry into World War II. The NEP and the response to it demonstrate that the basic terms of debate and similar beliefs about the state of world affairs were shared across this elite group. Those involved in its creation also understood that the problems they faced were beyond the capacity of the government alone. Success would require a range of social resources be committed to the fray. Like Earle, many involved in foreign affairs had come to accept that global upheaval, particularly the Great Depression, had triggered malevolent forces. The interconnected and interdependent world of the “machine age” was Janus faced. Various epoch-making technologies such as radio and aircraft held amazing promise. These forces, however, destabilised societies and left room for a new type of regime to emerge. Totalitarian governments could bend modern technologies to their own ends, enhancing their ability to control their populations and extend their influence. With these capacities, these regimes appeared to be a rising and permanent force in world affairs.²⁶

As the NEP and Earle’s program (something that quickly came to be known as the “Princeton seminar”) both gained momentum, Carnegie asked Nathaniel Peffer, professor

of international relations at Columbia and a contributor to *Harper's Magazine* to review Earle's program:

[Earle's seminar] work is nearest to being basic, most nearly related to what the corporation had in mind when it laid down its emergency program... Its purpose can be summed up as the study of the place of war in history and, therefore, of the first principles of the larger strategy, 'the grand strategy' of America's place in the world. Neither of these subjects has yet been really faced in American contemporary thought, still less in American education. This is not a program that can be carried out in one year or two, or perhaps, ten...There is, then, promise that the Institute seminar will develop into a full-fledged Center of Military and Political Studies, the first of its kind in the country. But whether it fulfills the promise or not, the need for such an institute is clear.²⁷

Earle's program at the IAS was one node of a wide-ranging response to a wide-ranging crisis. The NEP's relation to Earle's program is a reminder that the seminar was synchronised with a broader sense of national urgency. More to the point, for several formative years, sustaining grants for Earle's program were provided under the NEP. Nevertheless, this does not take away the originality and importance of what was gestating in New Jersey—a unique attempt to integrate various aspects of strategic scholarship and self-consciously bind together a new scholarly enterprise.

INSTITUTIONALISING A NEW VIEW OF STRATEGY

Even before the Carnegie money was in the till, there was action at Earle's encampment in New Jersey. By late 1939, the reputation of the IAS and its proximity to the resources of Princeton University allowed Earle to mobilise a methodologically and topically diverse seminar.²⁸ It drew on scholars from American universities, particularly those from the growing throng of international relations institutes and programs, as well as institutions abroad. In its first three years, the seminar was able to build an impressive

roster. A biographer of one participant noted that it included just about every scholar working on strategy in the United States.²⁹ This exaggerates, but only slightly.

From the start, the seminar operated like an institute, bringing together those focused on strategic issues. Grant funds provided research support, travel funds, and salaries for many participants. Then as now, this sort of aid had outsized benefits for junior members who were able to finish research projects and raise their profiles. This was planned to have immediate and crosscutting impacts. One goal was to change the academy. Young alumni would insinuate themselves into university departments around the country and established scholars would return to their home institutions carrying “new concepts of national problems and international relations” after a stint at the IAS.³⁰ Accordingly, the IAS and Earle were quick to highlight their successes in placing seminar members in faculty positions, influencing curricula at other institutions, and the warm reception given their own publications—a common trait in security studies institutes today. As their contributions gained legitimacy it would alter public debate and government policy. It would produce a cadre of civilians able to integrate the complex issues comprising strategic thought. If the emergency demanded, these individuals would participate in military and government affairs.³¹

With the interventionist focus of the seminar, Earle was disavowing earlier, more circumspect views of American global activism. His earlier concerns about the United States lurching into imperial competitions and the conflict they could inspire disappeared. He lamented how the academy had failed to engage issues surrounding strategy and military issues in a utilitarian manner before the war. He jabbed peers, wondering, “why” other academics “have been notably negligent in discharging their obvious responsibility to

provide the data which are essential to an intelligent consideration of the critical issues of defense and foreign policy which the nation now faces.” He and others were left to ask, “what does our history and the experience of others suggest as to the wisest policies to be pursued” in the face of this transformation.³² In the spring of 1941 Earle stated that the problem of strategic studies was not bounded by the immediate crisis—although world war provided “added importance and urgency.” Research and teaching on security required perpetual efforts to create “a body of expert knowledge essential to the formulation of public policy” and this standing “reserve of trained scholars who...devoted...[a] considerable portion of their lives to problems of strategy would be of inestimable service to the nation.”³³

Within their focus on politics, society, and security, seminar participants shared a set of largely unstated assumptions. All believed in the value of protecting liberal life from the dangers of totalitarianism (although this did not mean that all were uncritical of liberal societies). Even so, there were terms to be sorted out. One of these was national security. Historians have suggested that national security was a new doctrine that “did not emerge apart from Soviet-American relations” and was not in common use before 1946. Yet “national security” was a catchphrase for the seminar from its start and was regularly applied to pre-World War II threats by its members.³⁴ Defining the boundaries of U.S. national security was vital to the construction of any new grand strategy. Appreciating the importance of the term “national security,” the seminar held an exchange, led by Albert Weinberg (his first book, *Manifest Destiny*, was a defining work on the subject), to pin down its meanings.³⁵ There were as many views as there were participants, although a consensus emerged that it referred to the ability of a nation-state to secure its territory,

rights, political independence, and national interests. There was firmer agreement, however, that the term was decisively subjective and could have numerous meanings—particularly when the vague idea of national interest was emphasised.³⁶

What all seminar members could agree on was that the bases of U.S. national security had been smashed by the upheaval of the 1930s. A reigning assumption among them was that a “relatively stable international order” was necessary to achieve national security. This order was a thing of the past. Totalitarians had reset the world stage, voiding the established world order. Until the crisis of the 1930s, a balance of power in Europe and Asia, British command of the seas, the geographical position of the United States, a liberal economic system founded on the gold standard and free trade, as well as that aforementioned “relatively stable” international order had collectively offered security. Earle had a decidedly rosy view of the century after 1815 asserting that its “spirit...was fundamentally anti-militarist and anti-imperialist,” that there was “a vague aspiration for a brotherhood of man,” and that the “general assumption that democracy was the desirable state of things” prevailed. The interwar period had brought irredeemable alteration. War only emphasised that standing assumptions about security had become dangerous illusions. German victories had destroyed what remained of the power equilibrium and their effects were cascading into international affairs. The Triple Alliance and Japan’s attempt at a “new order” in Asia were largely reflections of Nazi domination of Europe. These aggressive regimes had emerged because of the Depression, which had corroded liberal international economic order and the stability it was presumed to bring. This had given the opportunistic infection of totalitarianism a chance in the global body politic. Its continued virulence “constitutes a basic challenge to liberalism, capitalism, and democracy.” The two

sects of totalitarianism, the “creeds” of communism and fascism were a “negation of every accepted tenet—liberal and conservative—of organised society.” They sprang “the revolutionary age in which we live,” with its perplexing leaps in technology that abetted the totalitarian urge to extend their power and subvert their enemies. German success, flowing from the ability of totalitarian societies to marshal these forces, underlined the fact that conventional strategies were frighteningly outmoded to assure American security.³⁷ Earle’s views were not entirely unique. There were many mainstream voices who shared the view that totalitarian regimes were a challenge to liberal life. What did set him and his program apart in 1939 was its activism and desire to permanently reshape American strategy and with it the way the United States engaged the world.

Harnessing the seminar’s resources, its members pushed their own projects forward. Bernard Brodie established his scholarly bona fides by publishing a monograph on the revolutionary impact of industrial technology on naval affairs, quickly produced *The Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy* to channel his scholarly knowledge into public discussion, and prognosticated at conferences on naval strategy in the Atlantic.³⁸ Harold and Margaret Sprout offered further perspective with additions to the library on U.S. naval power.³⁹ True to the full spectrum of inquiry the project demanded, there was work on non-military issues. Stephen Possonby worked up a project on the psychological aspects of modern conflict. Bailey completed his *Diplomatic History of the American People*, the first of 10 editions of what became a standard text.⁴⁰ These and other works were accompanied by a flurry of articles and editorials aimed at wider audiences.

THE SEMINAR GOES TO WAR

For all the seminar's accomplishments, the goal was never solely to push the boundaries of scholarship and improve the academic commons. Perhaps the seminar's most powerful impact would not come from drawing the government into the seminar but by insinuating the seminar into the government. Earle's own engagement rapidly blossomed into government service. In February and March 1941, he toured British and U.S. territories in the Caribbean, including those offered to the United States in the "destroyers for bases" deal of 1940, to report on "morale." Although made at the request of the Office of Naval Intelligence (possibly for Secretary of War Henry Stimson with whom Earle was said to have a "confidential relationship"), the tour was paid for by CCNY.⁴¹ On the heels of this trip, in July 1941, William "Wild Bill" Donovan summoned Earle to Washington to help organize and staff the Research and Analysis Division of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).⁴²

By late 1942 Earle was lamenting to backers at Carnegie that the academic side of the seminar was becoming hard to sustain, as the Allied war effort siphoned off members.⁴³ Earle himself became even more heavily invested in government service once the battle was joined. After working with the OSS, he was made special consultant to the commander of the Army Air Forces. In this role he became central to the organization of the Committee of Operations Analysts. It was a bland title for a body that was to decide the pivotal question of how to best deploy Allied air power against the German and Japanese war economies. Using entrepreneurial skills honed in New Jersey, Earle enlisted and coordinated the relevant Allied agencies involved while gathering "able and distinguished men."⁴⁴ Their magnum opus was the "Combined Bomber Offensive" (CBO), which restructured Allied bombing efforts. Synchronizing the operations of the Royal Air Force

and the U.S. Army Air Force the CBO offered a blueprint for this ultimately successful strategic campaign.⁴⁵

It is often assumed that scholars were swept into the war effort and that this experience left a willingness to work closely with organs of state during the Cold War. The wartime service of members of the Princeton seminar and particularly Earle's activities demonstrate that this was hardly true for all influential academics. Before the war they agitated to be close to the centers of authority. Government service was a fulfillment of this goal. Scholarship was tailored to their image of national security and the needs of the national policy they thought necessary to assure it. Their involvement not only helped to build the state's capacities but also altered the scholarly terrain on which others would work. The sort of closeness to government power that ginned up considerable criticism in the 1960s and beyond was not something foisted on figures in security studies by the Cold War; it was something implanted as a basic element of the security studies enterprise from the beginning. What is more, wartime service did not end the emergency. Even after fascism's defeat, the dangers of totalitarianism remained.

INTO THE COLD WAR

Following the end of World War II, Earle believed that imperatives defined in the 1930s had not dissipated. With the unprecedented role that the United States was taking on in shaping the postwar globe, the need for extensive study of the issues surrounding grand strategy was even more pressing. This reality fed Earle's view that the United States "cannot escape the role of Great Power that History and Destiny have thrust upon us." It had to continue to grow into the understanding that United States' national power was an

extensive and multifaceted mix “[of] modern industry, modern agriculture, modern communications, and modern finance...It is also education, the press, the church and the spirit of our youth” and, in fact, “there is no phase of American life which does not contribute to our national power.” Like Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union could not be treated as a normal state, as its totalitarian nature led it to “operate under particular laws of dynamics.” It was “armed Jacobinism” that put force first with its goal of establishing a “new social order by subversion, revolution, and arms.” These goals were obviously antithetical to the “relatively stable world order” that Earle had earlier articulated as the basis of U.S. national security. Once again, the United States was impelled to mobilise its national capacity for a global struggle.⁴⁶

Carnegie remained a stalwart benefactor, generously funding the renewed efforts of what they referred to as the “Earle Seminar” through the late 1940s and early 1950s.⁴⁷ From Washington, a steady stream of officials made the trip to Princeton for IAS symposiums. These seminars became increasingly well known, even to the public. A *New York Times* profile of the IAS in 1950 portrayed Earle and his seminar as constituting an authoritative segment among “one of the most dramatic assemblages of intellectual power to be found anywhere in the world today.”⁴⁸

Postwar meetings were indeed impressive and maintained the seminar’s internationalist credentials. The presence of esteemed scholars such Edward Hallet Carr and Arnold Toynbee only enhanced the seminar’s profile. Their careers were aided as well. Each was offered financial support for extended time at the IAS and entry into Earle’s seminar. This support facilitated their various writing projects but also further exposed them to American scholars and public.⁴⁹ Carr first visited in 1948, as his keystone work,

The Twenty Years Crisis, was becoming a bible for realist disciples. It was the culmination of a determined campaign by Earle to entice Carr to Princeton to help clarify “power problems” that were still “shockingly abused and misunderstood by American scholars and publicists.”⁵⁰ Earle, however, was quickly disappointed by Carr’s contributions.⁵¹ Precisely why is unclear, but the two had plenty of room for disagreement. Earle’s unwavering view that the Soviet Union perpetuated the totalitarian menace must not have sat well with Carr, a man whose sympathy with the Soviet project was apparent in his writings (although he was not uncritical).⁵² They also sparred over major U.S. Cold War initiatives such as the Marshall Plan. Carr saw the plan as bound up with the desires of American producers to see their “exports subsidized by the American government,” while Earle preferred to see it in glowing terms as “a spectacular example of a fundamental Anglo-American principle of statecraft—enlightened self-interest.”⁵³

The waning years of the seminar corresponded with the early years of the Cold War. The well-established pattern of integrating academics, intellectuals, policymakers, and military figures begun before the war continued in a Cold War world. Topics included the condition of France, the dynamics of Soviet Policy, and discussions of the state of liberalism as a political philosophy.⁵⁴ One of the more influential meetings held under the auspices of the seminar was a November 1950 conference on German rearmament. The meeting drew regulars such as Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert but also prominent Europeanists Franz Neumann and Hajo Holborn. The U.S. government sent a delegation of U.S. Army generals and Robert Tufts of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. Raymond Aron was also in attendance, as was a newcomer to the IAS, a Foreign Service Officer on leave from the State Department—George F. Kennan.⁵⁵

Alumni continued to fan out across the country. Brodie moved to the Institute of International Studies at Yale in 1945 and on to RAND in 1950. In 1951, William T.R. Fox was picked by Columbia to head its new Institute of War and Peace Studies (IWPS). While undoubtedly gratified, Earle might not have been surprised by his alma mater's choice of a seminar veteran given that he was on the institute's advisory board.⁵⁶ The founding of IWPS was one sign that study of war and peace within the academy was moving toward the strategic emphasis marked out at the IAS and that the ideas Earle pioneered were firmly entrenched in the intellectual landscape. Today IWPS remains an influential hub of security and strategic studies.

LEGACIES

Earle and his seminar remained in an influential position but no one knew their time was marked. Earle's health problems returned, laying him low for much of 1952-53. On June 24, 1954, just days after receiving an honorary degree from Columbia, renewed illness struck him down at the age of sixty.⁵⁷ Carnegie's policy was to end grants with a grantee's death, and with that Earle's seminar abruptly ended.⁵⁸ Although the IAS continued historical work, it did not continue Earle's strategic studies in anything like their full form. It is ironic that a scholar who worked so long to establish the support for the study of foreign and military policy failed to leave a specific institution tied to his reputation. Propelling relevant ideas and individuals outward, not drawing them into a single organization would be his legacy and it is one reason for Earle's relative obscurity today.

Many aided or influenced by the IAS seminar—Brodie, Craig, Carr, Fox, Gilbert, Sprout, and others—had outsized impact in their respective academic fields as well as in

the nexus of policymaking. The seminar's intellectual products still define basic aspects of the field. Others aided by Earle still have resonance in central scholarly debates, even if their reputations and publications have faded. Some did this by transmitting assumptions from the 1930s into the emerging Cold War. Bailey is one of those whose notoriety has shrunk with his passing but in the 1940s and 1950s his was an influential voice. Bailey's *America Faces Russia* followed the seminar's pattern of turning scholarship into a tool to confront the problems of the present. "God forbid," Bailey wrote his publisher, "that the present cold war should develop into a shooting one, but if it does, I suspect that my book would be widely used in the armed services for indoctrination services."⁵⁹ Bailey unequivocally blamed the Soviet Union for initiating the Cold War. His accusation followed patterns of ideas that permeated and were propagated by the seminar—that totalitarian regimes upset global stability and demanded a U.S. response. It is also a model "orthodox" interpretation of the origins of the Cold War. Bailey's and similar interpretations remain one enduring panel in the "trptych" of Cold War historiography in which generations of scholars have positioned themselves for or against in an argument without end.⁶⁰

The evolution of security studies cannot be seen as a simple scholarly progression. Earle, like numerous of his successors today, sought to influence not just the mechanisms of state, but also society's understanding of world affairs. Earle was a unifying figure, but he could not have accomplished what he did without other institutional support and hospitable historical conditions. It is a reminder that in a policy-oriented field of inquiry, external imperatives have tremendous influence on the opportunities available to even the most accomplished (or entrepreneurial) minds.

¹ Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field" *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1988), p. 6; and Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 8.

² Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, pp. 8, 73, 98-99.

³ Edward Mead Earle Curriculum Vitae, 1954, box 7, EFF, Shelby White and Leon Levy Archives Center, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ (hereafter IASA).

⁴ Edward Meade Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism* (New York: MacMillan, 1923), p. 350; Edward Mead Earle, "The Outlook for American Imperialism" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 108 (July 1923), pp. 104-107; and "Trade Imperialism Called War Peril," *New York Times*, May 14, 1926.

⁵ Akira Iriye, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations Vol. III The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); pp. 164-169; See also David Reynolds, *From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt's America and the Origins of the Second World War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001), pp. 69-101, 102-132

⁶ Edward Mead Earle, "Military Policy and Statecraft: A Proposed Field of Study in International Relations," n.d. [November 1937], box 6, EFF, IASA.

⁷ Brian C. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 189-225.

⁸ Earle, "Military Policy and Statecraft," p. 5.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6-7.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-5.

¹² "Supplementary Statement on American Military Policy," n.d. [1938], box 6, EFF, IASA.

¹³ Carnegie Corporation Charter, Constitution and Bylaws, <http://carnegie.org/about-us/governance-and-policies/> (accessed 4 January 2012).

¹⁴ See Inderjeet Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (New York: Palgrave, 2004); and Inderjeet Parmar, *Special Interests: The State and the Anglo-American Alliance, 1939-1945* (London: Frank Cass, 1995).

¹⁵ Record of Interview, 8 October 1937; Grant, 5 May 1938; box 135, Carnegie Corporation of New York Archives, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University (hereafter CCA).

¹⁶ Report on Grant, Studies in Military and Foreign Policy, box 178, 23 June 1942, CCA.

¹⁷ All quotations in Earle to Dollard, "Memorandum Concerning a Study of American Military Policy," 2 November 1939, box 178, CCA.

¹⁸ Corporation Secretary to Aydelotte, 3 February 1940; and Grant, 1 February 1940, box 178, CCA.

¹⁹ Inderjeet Parmar, "The Carnegie Corporation and the Mobilisation of Opinion in the United States' Rise to Globalism, 1939-1945," *Minerva* Vol. 37, No. 4 (2000), pp. 355-378.

²⁰ Marvin R. Zahniser, "Rethinking the Significance of Disaster: The United States and the Fall of France in 1940" *The International History Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1992), pp. 252-276; Reynolds, *From Munich to Pearl Harbor*, pp. 69-101.

²¹ Elihu Root, Jr., "Notes in Regard to the Formulation of an Emergency Program for Carnegie Corporation," 4 October 1940, box 251, CCA.

²² Quotations in this paragraph are taken from Elihu Root, Jr., "Notes in Regard to the Formulation of an Emergency Program for Carnegie Corporation"; On Lasswell's "garrison state" formula see Harold Lasswell and Jay Stanley, *Essays on the Garrison State* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1997), pp. 17-75.

²³ Dollard to Keppel, 11 October 1940, box 251, CCA.

²⁴ Beard to Keppel, 26 October 1940, box 251, CCA.

²⁵ Luce to Keppel, 27 October 1940, box 251, CCA.

²⁶ Abbot Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 31-50.

²⁷ Jessup to Root, 25 June 1942, box 251, CCA.

²⁸ Although the seminar was often referred to as the "Princeton Seminar" (and occasionally the "Princeton Military Seminar"), this denoted geographic, not institutional location. The IAS convened it.

²⁹ Barry H. Steiner, *Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), p. 2.

³⁰ Edward Mead Earle, "The Princeton Program of Military Studies" March 1942, box 24, Earle Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University [hereafter MLP], p. 4.

³¹ Report of Work Accomplished Under a Grant, 13 February 1941, box 178, CCA.

³² Edward Mead Earle, "Memorandum Concerning a Possible Volume on the Changing Conditions of American Security, Past, Present, and Future," 4 December 1940, box 33, Earle Papers, MLP.

³³ Edward Mead Earle, "The Princeton Program of Military Studies" March 1941, box 24, Earle Papers, MLP, 3. See also Edward Mead Earle, "The Princeton Program of Military Studies," *Military Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1942), pp. 21-26.

³⁴ Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), pp. 12, 194-201.

³⁵ Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935).

³⁶ Various Memoranda, 1940, box 33, Earle Papers, MLP.

³⁷ Edward Mead Earle, "Memorandum Concerning a Possible Volume on the Changing Conditions of American Security, Past, Present, and Future," 4 December 1940, box 33, Earle Papers, MLP; and Edward Mead Earle, "The Future of Foreign Policy," *New Republic*, 18 November 1939, p. 92.

³⁸ Bernard Brodie, *Sea Power in the Machine Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1941); Bernard Brodie, *A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1942); Bernard Brodie, "The Strategy of the Atlantic" Paper Presented at the Conference on North Atlantic Relations, Prout's Neck, Maine, 4-9 September 1941.

³⁹ Harold Sprout, *Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1940).

-
- ⁴⁰ Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (New York: F.S. Crofts, 1940).
- ⁴¹ Record of Interview, CD and Edward M. Earle, 13 February 1941, box 135, CCA.
- ⁴² Earle to Aydelotte, 13 October 1945; and Abstract from Army Air Force Recommendation for Medal of Merit, EFF, box 7, IASA.
- ⁴³ Record of Interview, WAJ and Edward Earle, 22 September 1942, box 178, CCA.
- ⁴⁴ Abstract of Army Air Forces Recommendation for Medal of Merit for Edward Mead Earle, n.d. [1945], box 7, EFF, IASA.
- ⁴⁵ Charles W. McArthur, *Operations Analysis in the United States Army Eighth Air Force in World War II* (Providence: American Mathematical Society, 1990), pp. 8-16.
- ⁴⁶ Edward Mead Earle, *National Power and World Order* (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1948), p. 17.
- ⁴⁷ Record of Interview, Edward M. Earle and PH, April 22, 1946; Earle to Herring, 8 May 1946; and Earle Seminar Grant, 4 March 1948; box 178, CCA.
- ⁴⁸ Gertrude Samuels, "Where Einstein Surveys the Cosmos," *New York Times*, 19 November 1950.
- ⁴⁹ Jonathan Haslam, *The Vices of Integrity: E.H. Carr, 1892-1982* (New York: Verso, 1999), p. 142; and William H. McNeill, *Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 208.
- ⁵⁰ Haslam, *The Vices of Integrity*, p. 141.
- ⁵¹ Record of Interview JG and Ed Earle, 6 April 1948, box 178, CCA.
- ⁵² See Michael Cox, ed., *E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), pp. 145-197.
- ⁵³ Edward Mead Earle, "The American Stake in Europe: Retrospect and Prospect" *International Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1951), p. 429.
- ⁵⁴ Conference on Modern France, 1-4 February 1950; and Members of the Seminar on the Dynamics of Soviet Policy, Spring Term 1948; both in box 7, EFF, IASA.
- ⁵⁵ Conference on German Rearmament, 10 November 1950, box 7, EFF, IASA.
- ⁵⁶ "Columbia Founds War-Peace Study," *New York Times*, 10 December 1951.
- ⁵⁷ Earle to Anderson, 3 December 1953, box 178, CCA; Earle to Oppenheimer, 17 September 1952, box 7, EFF, IASA; and "E.M. Earle Dead: Military Expert," *New York Times*, 25 June 1954.
- ⁵⁸ Oppenheimer to Lester, 13 September 1954; Anderson to Oppenheimer, September 20, 1954; Oppenheimer to Anderson, 22 September 1954, box 178, CCA.
- ⁵⁹ Quoted in Novick, *That Noble Dream*, p. 306.
- ⁶⁰ David Reynolds, ed. *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 27-48.