

## **Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World**

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**By Douglas J. MacDonald**

Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992, 361 pp., with notes and index, \$39.95 cloth.

Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson

**I**t has become a tired cliché that all history since the fall of the Berlin Wall is opposite from and bears little resemblance to what came before. True, there have been big changes in the world yet even if one does not claim that history is dead, one knows that things will never again be the same. Of course the more one looks, the more continuities there are to be discerned; sometimes continuities with a more distant past, but important all the same.

Researchers who began their studies before late 1989 with no reason whatsoever to assume that great changes were coming, are in an unenviable position. There is a whole genre of scholarship, some of it with otherwise quite useful hypotheses, covered with the detritus of the cold war.

Douglas J. Macdonald's *Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World* is a case in point. Published in 1992, the research was presumably started, using the normal academic guides for delay, no later than 1988. There is nothing wrong with Macdonald's subject — how the United States can promote reform in Third World client states, and the styles of such efforts. Moreover his book is well written and admirably researched. Presumably Washington will always have a reform agenda somewhere in the less developed world, even if it is hard to envisage anything of the scope of U.S. intervention in two of the book's case studies: Vietnam (1961-1963) or China (1946-1948). It would even be difficult to replicate an effort on the scale of what was attempted in the Philippines, the third case of the study, in the early 1950s, considering the liberty American agents then had to use unconventional means for accomplishing their goals.

Of course one picks for special scrutiny what one knows most about. And of China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, I have quickly picked the last, having most recently researched and published thereon. But the points I make can also be made about the other chapters. Throughout the book, there is an assumption of benign intent on America's part that now, with communist bogeymen removed, can surely at last be critically examined.

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In the 1970s an embassy official in Manila whom one has to presume to be connected with the CIA told me that "this is one country we've got well enough wired." Macdonald assumes that what Washington was truly after was reforms and fair elections rather than the perpetuation or even the enlargement of American interests. During the 1951 elections in the Philippines, Macdonald notes that the CIA funded an organization in Manila, "NAMFREL", or the National Movement for Free Elections, which (he does not note) was to continue playing a large role in political life to the present day. Now it is no secret that at that time Washington had no taste for President Quirino, a preference that has come in for some revisionism in the Philippines today. America was for — indeed, America had helped to create — Ramon Magsaysay. Quirino had to go to Baltimore for medical treatment, and told President Truman that he was nevertheless well. But "the Truman Administration acquired his hospital records...which showed that he had an enlarged heart and kidney disease"(p.157).<sup>1</sup> Without going into depth about the power this kind of surveillance gives, I proceed to note that the head of an American military mission, according to Macdonald, "informed the State Department that another active political campaign at that time would 'kill him.' With Quirino incapacitated and out of the country, the United States stepped up its activities *to ensure a fair election*" (emphasis added).

To get these "fair elections", what manner of "fairness" was to be imposed on the archipelago? Did they include the distribution of large sums of money, favors, visas, agitprop, even military maneuvers and the like, "to ensure a fair election"? General Lansdale's memoirs along with other works are eloquent in this regard. Later, Macdonald says that though "Americans like doing things on a grand scale, it was the relatively small effort in the Philippines that was a key to helping the Filipinos solve their own problems. The costs of "the policy, therefore, were modest, and the benefits great" (p.184). But if the American effort to recruit and elect Magsaysay, indeed to turn the Philippine elite and government upside down, was modest then what manner of major conflagration would it take to be major?

And what results attended the American reform agenda in the Philippines? President Magsaysay indeed defeated the Huk insurgency, with substantial American assistance. Some desultory efforts were made to reform the political-economic structure of the country, but nothing lasted and just a little more than a decade later, Ferdinand Marcos came to power. A far more threatening insurgency, undefeated to this day, sprang up because the same inequities continued to glare. It is difficult therefore to see the basis for calling America's efforts a "success."

Professor Macdonald has thoroughly researched his cases and using the comparative method squeezed considerable insight out of them. Yet it all just

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1. The present writer, when first in a Pentagon position in late 1975, was curious about the similar American fascination over the imminent death of Francisco Franco. The detailed and precise descriptions of whose death watch in the daily intelligence bulletins revealed an intimate association of medical personnel in Franco's assemblage with American intelligence.

has too pat an appearance. For example, the "external reformer", that is America, must in general choose between a "Blitzkrieg" or a "Fabian" tactic in pressing for reform. It turns out that for the internal reformer, the Fabian approach is the preferred one, as so obviously so for the United States (p. 282). Macdonald writes that "despite the many asymmetries in the overall relationship, there is a symmetry of interest in the pace of implementation in which *the optimal tactics for the external reformer translate into the optimal strategy for the internal reformer*" (p. 282). In the real world, things do not usually work out so neatly. It is not assured, as Professor Packenham so neatly typecast the American liberal assumptions in the Third World, that "all good things go together."<sup>2</sup> In Vietnam, China, and the Philippines, that case is hard to make.

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2. Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World*, Princeton University Press, 1973, p.123.

## Contrasting Styles of Industrial Reform: China and India in the 1980s.

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By George Rosen

Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992. 176pp., with bibliography and index, \$25.95 paper.

Reviewed by Shalendra D. Sharma

China and India, two populous Asian neighbors and intense rivals for much of this century, have long invited comparisons. At the time of India's independence in 1947 and the victory of the Communists in mainland China in 1949, the two countries faced remarkably similar socioeconomic problems arising from a history of colonial domination, acute demographic pressure on limited resources, a negligible industrial base, stagnant agriculture, and widespread poverty. When these new governments, with strikingly different political systems and representing opposing ideologies and "developmental paths" initiated ambitious plans for national development in the charged atmosphere of the Cold War, "China-India contrasts" became a veritable growth industry. The most minute evidence of successes and failures in each system was taken to indicate the superiority or inferiority of either democracy or Communism.

What distinguishes George Rosen's important study is that it is free of this ideological cant. As one of the American pioneers in the study of Chinese and Indian political economy, Rosen draws on over four decades of sound scholarship to provide a carefully reasoned and well documented analysis of a critical, yet poorly understood period in the recent history of these two Asian giants. First, he reminds the reader that despite the rhetoric on both sides there is no clear winner. While in both countries total national output has increased significantly since the 1950s, the per capita income in both China and India remains around US \$300, placing them among the poorer countries of the developing world. Moreover, in both countries the problem of providing employment to a rapidly growing work force with rising expectations remains serious. While both China and India have made significant gains in improving the quality of life of their citizens through improved health, education, and increased longevity, poverty and suffering still remain the lot of many in both countries.

By the end of the 1970s, even the achievements of these two countries in industrialization, which at one time were regarded by many as "spectacular", did not seem that impressive when compared to the progress made in East Asia and elsewhere. Rosen notes that while both China and India succeeded in

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building a reasonably diversified industrial base within a relatively short period of three decades by adopting a Soviet-style industrialization strategy, they were also burdened with the many ills associated with that system. That innovation was clearly not one of the hallmarks of the Soviet system of planning became painfully evident by the seventies: Indian and Chinese industrial know-how not only lacked the sophistication of comparable technology from the West, but their industries were also grossly inefficient and poorly managed, and did not produce the quality or variety of goods to meet world standards. In both countries, industrial expansion failed to achieve the broader development goals of greater availability of consumer goods, and brought little, if any, improvement in the individual well-being of the majority of the urban industrial work force. These were the circumstances that forced the leadership of both countries to "significantly restructure their economies" (p.7), focusing their reform on industrial systems in order to accelerate economic modernization. In both countries, the year 2000 was set as an interim target for achieving this goal.

Even with the extensive writings published in the last years on Chinese and Indian reforms, a number of questions remain. What has been the nature of the reform process and how successful has it been in each country? How important are the differences in political systems in determining the pace and extent of the reforms? What have been and remain the major constraints to reform? What does the future hold for reformism in both countries, and what lessons can be drawn from the Indian and Chinese experiences?

Rosen sensitively sheds new light on these complex and controversial issues, providing a detailed and fascinating account of a process still unfolding. His discussion of how political factors limit and shape economic policy is persuasively and elegantly presented, setting new standards for comparative analysis. Incisively cutting through the rhetoric and ambiguities that have characterized the reform process in both countries, Rosen unequivocally shows that although the reforms contributed to higher rates of industrial and overall economic growth in both China and India, the political systems of both countries caused them to founder. In China, there was a lack communication between the party leadership and large sections of the population hurt by rapid economic change. The party's failure to develop popular support for the reform measures, coupled with growing inequities, resulted in skyrocketing inflation, corruption, and widespread public dissatisfaction. The absence of a viable institutional political outlet to provide correctives to the reform program and channel public concerns resulted not only in bursts of unrest, culminating in the tragic Tiananmen massacre, but also in the reimposition of tight central control over the economy and politics. Rosen aptly notes that without democratization, China's "future reforms and achievements will probably move along in a series of spurts and halts, but with the spurts less strong and the halts more lengthy, as popular interest and belief in the reform process weakens" (p. 132).

In India, however, the lack of political will to deal effectively with the pressures for subsidies from politically powerful interest groups and modify business government relations, specifically with regards to regulations and patronage, set significant limits to reform. Yet Rosen remains optimistic about

India's prospects, believing the pressures for democracy may lead to the presentation of a more thorough reform program. Still, the results of reforms in India, like in China, remain to be seen.

Rosen uses these two cases to demonstrate clearly that economic reform is a political process and that effective implementation of reform programs will require building public support and encouraging participation. In sum, this book merits attention and should be read not only by area specialists but also by anyone interested in the comparative politics and political economy of Asia.

# Democracy and Socialism in Africa

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Edited by Robin Cohen and Harry Goulbourne

Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991, 272 pp., with list of contributors, bibliography, and index, \$41.00 cloth.

Reviewed by David Bryan Sullivan

Sometimes one can learn much about a book from its bibliography. In this volume of essays about Africa, the most frequently cited author is Lenin, famous for various other accomplishments but not for his scholarship on Africa.

*Democracy and Socialism in Africa* is composed of thirteen essays, of which roughly half are country-specific and the others address broad themes such as the position of women, peasants, or bureaucrats. Much of the book is doctrinaire, dated, or both, but a few sections are well worth reading. Notably, none of the essays in the collection analyze Francophone Africa, which may explain why the authors missed emerging grassroots democratic movements.

The premise which unites this collection of essays is that Africa must become more democratic in order for socialism to succeed. World events, since the 1989 conference which resulted in this volume, have drawn into question the utility of a socialist model. Despite a few holdouts like Cuba and North Korea, socialism is an anachronism, as much in Luanda and Dar Es Salaam as is in Prague and Warsaw. Much of this book tries to answer questions which are no longer being asked.

Although aid donors and international financial institutions may have coerced them toward this conclusion, African governments have almost entirely rejected socialism. In Mozambique the ruling party strongly recommended that the African National Congress of South Africa not follow its failed socialist experiment. To appreciate and understand the failings of African socialism, one need not look outside this volume. Pepe Roberts and Gavin Williams acknowledge the ideology's problems in their contribution, "Democracy and the Agrarian Question in Africa: Reflections on the Politics of States and the Representation of Women's Interests." They write that:

In Africa socialism has generally been another word for nationalism. ...Socialist governments have tended to vest authority and concentrate control over the allocation of resources in the hands of officials alienated from the rural populations they administer. If socialism, like democracy, is to be relevant to peasants, Socialists will have to

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abandon much of the ideology they have taken to be central to their analysis and practice (pp. 81, 92).

In a similar vein, M.A. Mohammed Salih explores how pastoralists have reacted to social democratic governments in the Horn of Africa, particularly in the Sudan. Not surprisingly, he concludes that liberal democracy and socialism are "incompatible with the prevailing ideology held by pastoralists" (p. 178). "The 'social democracy' of the military rulers in the Sudan and Somalia aimed to free the pastoralists ... from their exploitative traditional leaders" (p. 176), writes Salih, but the pastoralists themselves "saw socialism as: (1) an alien ideology whose objectives were not in line with their political and social values; (2) a totalitarian programme with a central political leadership that ... promoted the interests of the educated élites rather than peasants and pastoralists; and (3) a modern political leadership that was elitist, out of touch with the populace, and poorly trained in ideological orientation" (p. 178). Imposition of someone else's idealism has caused as much suffering in Africa, as elsewhere. Socialism has been yet another foreign ideology demonstrating that principle.

Some of the essays included stray from the volume's socialist premise and avoid the Marxist cant. However, Robin Cohen's introduction and the first two essays by Peter Lawrence and Ken Post do not. Their doctrinaire language seems empty, providing instances of dark humor. Ken Post, who is evidently the most radical author represented, posits single party socialism as the ideal solution for Africa and humbly envisions himself working from the Hague to facilitate the imminent revolution. "The international level is ... where people like myself would come in, using our privileged access to libraries and archives, capacities for electronic communication and desktop publishing, and possibilities to lobby in the liberal democracies of the centre for all necessary support work" (p. 50).

Similarly, Jack Parson strains Botswana's past and present through a sieve of Marxist class analysis, employing lingo such as "dissolution of the precapitalist mode" and "semiproletarianized" to generate a new term for the small-scale farmers of Botswana: the "peasantariat." Despite the fact that this term may be an oxymoron in Marxist theory, it adds nothing to our understanding of Botswana. He proceeds, appropriately and deftly, to question the depth of democracy in Botswana. Wondering why his "peasantariat" continually hands election victories to the "bourgeois" Botswana Democratic Party, Parson notes that in rural Botswana, "the mutual ties binding the rich to those less well off mediated the perception of differences in standards of living" (p. 195). Despite his dogma and jargon, Parson has stumbled across a critical obstacle to African socialism: the strengths of African kinship and community ties outweigh differences of ideology or class.

Unlike socialism, democracy in Africa is currently an important topic. While the West has acknowledged that democracy has gained ground in Eastern Europe, it has ignored similar trends in Africa. The African democratic movements of 1990 and 1991 deserve scholarly attention, as well as support from Western governments. Pertinent questions wait to be answered. How did these

movements begin? How democratic were they? What new leaders and new policies have they created? Will their changes last? How can they be nurtured? Regrettably, most of this book was written too early to address such important and forward-looking questions.

The collection of essays also suffers from the passing of time. In the two years between the writing of some of the essays and the publication of this book, many pertinent events occurred. Chapters on women, South Africa, Uganda and Ghana are interesting but dated.

Chris Allen, however, offers a worthwhile essay on an important topic, the participation of women in African politics. Using Kenya and Zambia as examples, she argues that women were involved in African anti-colonial revolutions. However, since independence men have continually pushed women off the African political stage. According to Allen democratic change requires the return of women to political life. Apparently, she wrote this before the 1990 and 1991 demands for democratic reforms in many African countries. The key roles played by women in those movements vindicates Allen's thesis.

Bola Dauda writes an essay which is neither doctrinaire nor dated. His essay, "Taking Democracy Seriously: Democracy-Bureaucracy Relations" deserves reading. In it Dauda, a Nigerian, rejects an idealized vision of African democratic socialism. Instead, he accepts African realities such as ethnic and religious differences and entrenched bureaucracies. African democracy must evolve within that framework. He further argues that bureaucracy may be the optimal basis for democracy. By providing egalitarian and meritocratic opportunities, bureaucracy can nurture democracy rather than threaten it. He points out that African bureaucracies employ small percentages of the population and are underpaid by Western standards. However, he fails to note that they are large and well-paid in comparison to local work forces. Opposing the orthodox philosophy that seeks to slash civil services, Dauda concludes that African democracies must grow among existing bureaucracies. As few intellectuals would dare to defend bureaucrats, his essay is fresh and provocative, albeit not entirely convincing.

Harry Goulbourne's conclusion, unlike the other essays here, was written after the collapse of socialism and the stirrings of democracy in Africa. Emphasizing the democratic theme of the book instead of its socialist strand, Goulbourne makes a case for the necessity of political freedoms and multiparty democracy in the African context.

Successful democracy (or "them-all-crazy," as described by a Nigerian quoted here) in African countries must use the valuable social building blocks which indigenous cultures provide. The concern of people for their extended families, communities, and ethnic groups must become the basis for, and not an obstacle to, civic interest. The necessary and missing ideological ingredients are tolerance and pluralism. As Bola Dauda states here, African democratic leaders must learn to accept "the need to institutionalize protest and simple dissension" (p. 54).

## Iran and the International Community

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Edited by Anoushirvan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh.

London: Routledge Press, 1991, 191 pp., with notes and index, \$45.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Kaveh Zahedi

It has been over ten years since the revolution swept Iran and replaced the Shah's "Peacock Throne" with Khomeini's clerical regime. The revolution re-focused the attention of the world media on this geopolitically important country and resulted in a realization that Islam continues to play a role in the Middle East despite years of secular rule and Westernization. Yet Western writing on contemporary Iran has concentrated on the revolution itself, its roots, and the reasons behind the rapid collapse of the Shah's regime. Much less attention has been paid to the rule of Ayatollah Khomeini and the unprecedented clerical regime that has governed Iran since 1979. *Iran and the International Community* attempts to rectify this shortcoming and examine Iran's foreign policy over this last decade, assessing its relations with the United States, Europe, the United Nations, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and Iraq.

There is little doubt that the revolution in Iran dramatically changed the way in which the Islamic world is analyzed and treated by Western scholars and policymakers. However, it must also be noted that Iran itself has altered the way it operates on the global stage. The editors have assembled a distinguished set of experts, each with a distinct background, to examine Iran's new role in the international arena.

Initially, the editors present a glimpse of Iran's past position in the world order. They contend that historically Iran's international role has been a passive one. External forces molded Iran's foreign policy, especially the contest for influence between Russia and the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century known as the "great game". After the withdrawal of the British following the Second World War, the United States became increasingly involved in the region. Eventually as a result of its association with a repressive and autocratic regime, the United States incurred the wrath of the majority of the people of Iran.

In his introduction, Professor Fred Halliday argues that Iranian foreign policy in the post-revolution period has had two distinct characteristics. First, a militant foreign policy which has cost the country dearly, both in the loss of lives, and in economic and political isolation. Second, he argues, Iran has become the standard bearer of Islam, defying both the "imperialist West" and

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the "expansionist communists." As Professor Halliday notes, the most striking feature of its foreign policy is that Iran is an autonomous actor on the international scene. This has immediate implications not only for Iran's neighbors in the Middle East struggling to establish their own legitimacy, but also for the other Muslim countries both in North Africa and the Central Asian Republics, who are particularly susceptible to an export of Islamic revolution.

The relationship between the United States and Iran since the revolution has been characterized by indecision and irrationality according to this volume. The book argues that had it not been for four crucial factors, the memory of the humiliating hostage crisis would have been enough to steer the Reagan Administration away from any dealings with Iran. However, the country's strategic location and oil, its proximity to the Soviet Union, the reaction of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to its collapse, and Iran's continuing influence in Lebanon ensured that the U.S. would have to deal with Iran. The author traces the evolving U.S. policy towards Iran from America's attempts to isolate Iran diplomatically and politically, to Washington's clandestine initiatives and the Iran-Contra fiasco.

Indecision can also be seen in the European Community's (EC) relations with Iran. As Anoushirvan Ehteshami correctly points out, the EC is still very much divided over its own identity and therefore can hardly project a single voice over crucial matters to its member states in a consistent fashion. The "national interest" factor has often prevailed over wider EC identity. This theme is extended in George Joffe's chapter which deals not only with Europe but also the southern Mediterranean states. He claims that the inability by the European states to take a common stand reflects their "reluctance to allow pan-European organizations, such as the EC, to usurp the prerogatives of national sovereignty over matters of foreign policy" (p. 81). Joffe understands the development of relations between Iran and the European countries, in particular the United Kingdom and France, to be an evolution of the conflict between commercial interests and state policy, in light of the terrorist activities which proliferated in Europe and in Lebanon during the 1980's. According to Joffe, even the EC's unanimity in rejecting Khomeini's condemnation of Salman Rushdie soon gave way to national anxiety over commercial access to Iran.

As many of the authors imply, there has been little success in the export of the Islamic revolution, yet the foreign policies of many Western and Gulf Cooperation Council countries alike have been molded by this concern. Moreover, their perception of Iran has often been formed by fears of radicalism and Islamic fundamentalism. These perceptions have affected the nature of the West's dealings with Iran in the United Nations. As Sir Anthony Parsons demonstrates in his essay, the UN often adopted double standards in dealing with Iran. The ease with which the UN managed to stall any action against Iraq's aggression during the Iran-Iraq war was expressive of the confusion felt about this new clerical regime and the fear associated with Khomeini's fiery revolutionary rhetoric.

*Iran and the International Community* poses one central question: how significant is Iran in regional and international politics? The book assesses the past ten

years and the relations of the Islamic Republic with the crucial players on the global arena effectively. However, the merits of including the Ian Hampsher-Monk's piece concerning the Rushdie Affair and liberal relativism are questionable. The book makes a genuine attempt to assess the past ten years and their effect on the foreign policies of all the major powers and Iran itself.

The importance of this book lies its timely discussion of the way Iran carried out its foreign affairs as an Islamic state. However, the lack of attention paid to the strong ties between Iran's foreign policy and internal political struggles must be criticized. Under the leadership of the moderate Rafsanjani, the country once again finds itself at the heart of politics in the Middle East.

*Iran and the International Community* demonstrates the unfounded fear and rejection of Islamic fundamentalists the Western powers adopted in the post-revolutionary period. However, before the Western attempt to prevent Iran from exerting its influence over the Central Asian republics, they should step back and reflect on their responses to the Islamic Republic thus far. Indeed they should formulate their policies to a more balanced understanding of the role that Islam plays in the lives of these nations. This by no means implies the adoption of a singular foreign policy to all Muslim countries. Indeed the search for an "Islamic foreign policy" will be a fruitless one, and the West would do best to move toward a more studied reaction to the often divergent realities of life in Muslim countries.

# Japanese Economic Development: Theory and Practice

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By Penelope Francks

London and New York: Routledge, 1992, 288 pp., including notes, glossaries, guide to further reading, bibliography, and index, \$19.95 paper.

Reviewed by Pamela Rotner Sakamoto

It may be difficult to imagine Japan as a once developing country when the images that so readily come to mind today are, at best, of Japan as an economic giant or, at worst, an economic threat. Penelope Francks compels readers to set aside contemporary notions and accompanying biases of Japan to perceive it as the first rice-growing culture to attain a high level of economic development and industrialize while maintaining a vital and considerable small-scale business sector. For these reasons alone, Japan is worth studying. By placing Japan in the context of developmental economics and evaluating its course of development and industrialization, the author seeks to close the large gap between the specializations of Japanese studies and developmental economics. She also presents elements of Japan's development history that differ from the course of western economic development and, therefore, demonstrate an alternative to the western examples that many presently developing nations find inappropriate to their own needs.

The author traces Japan's history of development from the mid-nineteenth century when the isolated country was forced into contact with the industrialized west, until World War II when the nation had developed sufficiently to compete in the world economy. Professor Francks discusses this period in terms of the role of the state, agriculture and industrialization. She begins each section by presenting both the dominant theoretical models of developmental economics and the concepts relevant to Japan. The author then employs microeconomic analysis of specific economic sectors to challenge common assertions regarding Japanese economic development.

The Japanese state is often viewed as the prevailing force in determining and guiding the course of Japanese industrialization. Through case studies of the shipping and steel industries the author shows that, in terms of objectives and success, the private and public sectors have not always been in harmony. In the 1880s, the Mitsubishi and Mitsui companies engaged in fierce competition over shipping routes, which nearly bankrupted both companies and endangered the government's goal of expanding the shipping industry. The development of the steel industry was notable for having coordinated the public and private sectors through industrial policy, but it is difficult to determine the relationship between this early industrial policy and the growth of the industry. Professor

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Francks asserts that the role of the state has been exaggerated by other observers, in part because of the networks of formal and informal connections between bureaucrats and businessmen and the application of this web of contacts to national ends.

The author finds that the dual economy perspective on agricultural development, based on the European industrialization process, does not explain the Japanese situation. Distinguishing between the "'traditional' agricultural household" and the "'modern' industrial enterprise" is difficult in Japan's case (p.116). Farm families actively acquired new technology yet were still dependent on employment in other business areas, while industry made use of farm labor and investment capital. Small farms did not become extinct during the industrialization process. The relative success of Japanese agricultural development may appear inspiring to presently developing countries. The author cautions however, unlike farmers in developing countries who experienced a legacy of colonial domination, that Japanese farmers were capable of obtaining and adapting technology partly because they had gained useful experience during Japan's period of isolation. In addition, technology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries required more labor than the sophisticated technology in use today.

The final section on technology, labor, and industrial structure challenges the easy, all too popular argument that Japanese industry is distinct from that of the west because of intrinsic cultural values and norms. Professor Francks argues that differences arose from the manner in which Japan speeded up its industrialization process in the pre-war period. Today's work ethic and company loyalty may be much espoused, but during the industrialization stage Japanese workers were known for their inability to adapt to fixed working hours and tendency to switch employment. In an effort to maintain a stable labor force, some Japanese companies began instituting wage scales, bonus systems, and corporate benefits — a precursor to the contemporary Japanese employment system.

While Japanese pre-war industrialization is largely perceived as successful, Professor Francks reminds the reader that the Japanese economic experience, coupled with political and military pressures, contributed to the exacerbation of tension with the west during the highly protectionist 1930s. Developing nations pursuing similar industrialization policies today should beware of the potential trade problems generated. The author ends with the statement that, since fear and lack of understanding are often sources of friction between nations, those who study a particular society have a responsibility to explain *how* distinct national characteristics have resulted from the interaction of economic, political, and social factors, rather than simply attributing them to unique cultural attributes.

Well written and superbly organized, *Japanese Economic Development: Theory and Practice* is a thorough synthesis of developmental economic theory and Japanese economic history. My only criticism is that the author described certain well-known Japanese institutions without ever mentioning the equivalent Japanese term. In explaining the practice of hiring of senior bureaucrats for

important positions in the private sector upon their retirement from the government, the author never uses the Japanese word *amakudari* (descent from heaven). Although she uses the English translation in a subsequent reference, it seems out of context because the phenomenon was not initially presented using the expressive Japanese term. For those who lack a background in Japanese yet are interested in the developmental economics elements of this book, vocabulary should be presented. Ultimately, *Japanese Economic Development: Theory and Practice* is rich in theoretical frameworks, microeconomic analysis, and cogent arguments. It is worth reading for both the Japan specialist and the development economist.

# Only One World: Our Own to Make and Keep

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By Gerard Piel

New York, NY: W.H. Freeman, 1992, 367 pp., with list of nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, and an index, \$29.95 cloth.

Reviewed by Cymie Payne

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) introduced to the general public the idea that economics and ecology have more in common than an etymological root. From academia to the mass media, the discussion has focused on the mutual interdependence of the global environment and economic development. *Only One World* is Gerard Piel's optimistic contribution to this debate, heralded in a glowing foreword by the Secretary General of UNCED, Maurice F. Strong.

Drawing on forty years of experience as the publisher of *Scientific American*, Piel comprehensively outlines current thought on biological evolution, demographics, and industrial and economic development. He focuses on the carrying capacity of the earth, weighing the physical constraints of resources against human need and technology. He argues that population growth is the greatest threat to the environment and that industrial development is the appropriate way to manage the effects of population growth. Piel writes that:

Industrial revolution is the ultimate population-control measure. ... Industrial revolution has to be recognized also, therefore, as the ultimate environmental protection measure. Hazards to the environment laid by industrial technology, it has been shown, are subject to cure by technology (p.284).

Therefore, his prescription is rapid industrialization in the pre-industrial countries.

Although Piel's analysis is elaborate, some of his key assumptions are questionable. First, he assumes that technology will provide its own cures. However, negative effects of technology, such as toxic waste sites across the United States, dispel the validity of this assertion. Efforts to restore damaged wetlands and tropical forests have had limited success, despite more than a decade of research. Species extinction seems irreversible, despite the highly sophisticated field of genetic manipulation. The question of whether safe technologies, like solar energy can evolve before traditional, "dirty" technology irreparably damages critical ecosystem functions cannot be ignored.

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Piel also assumes, in his prescription for the future, that humanity will be responsive to the threat of environmental disaster. It is interesting that he takes full account of the flaws in the international economic system, stating:

The economic calculus motivates the same behavior that made deserts of the Mediterranean lands. The peasant got the tree and, centuries later, the goat ate the last blade of grass. In modern parlance, the calculus internalizes benefits and externalizes costs (p.93).

Simultaneously, he makes the wildly hopeful statement that "In the aftermath of [UNCED], people will ... join the worldwide industrial revolution to end poverty," yet never reconciles political reality with his optimistic vision (p. 314).

Piel recommends growth in industrialized economies, debt forgiveness, free trade, and massive redistribution of income as tools to encourage industrialization in poor nations. "The economy of growth," he says, "must give way at last to the economy of equity" (p.328). His anticipation of a radical shift in global economic institutions is hard to justify, given current economic turmoil and recession. The industrialized world is unable to achieve growth in its own economies and the "peace dividend" has evaporated. Income redistribution remains a controversial political problem within and between nations. Expanding free trade through GATT and other international agreements is the one truly realistic element of his proposal.

Piel's approach of integrating science with history and economics is valuable because it is essential to combine these disciplines in order to address the problems of the future. His forecast seems idealistic given the tensions that characterized the UNCED conference. Far from catalyzing the support of citizens in the industrialized nations for massive financial transfers to develop preindustrial countries, the conference defined the conflict between the North and the South. Nonetheless, some may heed the path Piel has marked toward a sustainable future.

Stephan Schmidheiny, a Swiss industrialist, shows how the private sector can make a commitment to sustainable development in his new book *Changing Course: Global Business, Environment, and Development*. In the public sector, the Japanese government has dedicated US\$8.1 billion for environmental cleanup and preventative measures in less developed nations. Perhaps *Only One World's* upbeat confidence in the potential of modern industrial society can convince the forces of industry to act responsibly toward the goal of sustainable development.

# Oppenheim's International Law, Ninth Edition, Volume I, Peace

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Edited by Sir Robert Y. Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts

Harlow, Essex, England: Longman Group UK Ltd, 1992, lxxxvi, xc, 1333 pp., with preface, table of cases, index, £395 cloth.

Reviewed by Professor Alfred P. Rubin

For almost 90 years successive editions of Oppenheim's outline of the international legal order and its substantive rules have been classics of legal literature. The publication of the ninth edition of Volume I is an appropriate time to review the history of this work and to affirm it as *the* indispensable reference work for all serious practitioners, scholars, and students of public international law.

Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim, born in Germany in 1858, began a career as an academic at Freiburg and Basel, but moved to England in 1895. He published the first edition of this treatise, an outline of the entire international legal order, while Lecturer in Law at the London School of Economics. Volume I, *Peace*, was published in 1905 and Volume II, *War and Neutrality*, in 1906.

Acknowledged as an extraordinary contribution to the literature of public international law from its first publication, Oppenheim's treatise by now is almost completely the work of the successive editors. Its style has always been readable and magisterial, reaching the form familiar to the current generation of serious students of public international law in the superb Lauterpacht editions of 1952 (seventh edition of Volume II) and 1955 (eighth edition of Volume I).

Oppenheim's basic organization has been maintained and expanded for almost ninety years. Volume I sets out the entire corpus of the international legal order and its substantive rules in four parts. The volume has now expanded to the point that it now occupies two tomes. The first contains an introduction and part I, the second parts II through IV.

Part I begins by outlining current orthodoxy of the international legal order subject by subject. By providing a theoretical underpinning and a summary history, the volume gives a notion of the evolution of legal conceptions over time. This section is followed by definitions of the subjects of the legal order, states in their various guises, and the other formal actors on the international stage. Recognition, state succession, various forms of subordination, and other restrictions on the legal capacity of states lead to analyses of the legal "rights" of states to defend themselves, protect their interests in various ways, intervene

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in the affairs of their neighbors, and exercise their own jurisdiction over their territory and their nationals and, to some degree, over the actions of foreigners abroad.

The reverse side of the same coin is state responsibility, and the section that follows the analysis of state rights deals with that. A final section in part I deals with the organizations of the international community, primarily the United Nations. Part II deals with territory, including the land territory of states and the law of the sea. It also deals with the status of aliens and the concept of nationality. More particular issues considered are the position of individuals in the international legal order, the protection of minorities, extradition, the rights of labor, and human rights in general, including various human rights organizations.

Part III outlines the mechanisms by which states interact in times of peace: diplomatic relations, consular relations, and the peaceful stationing of military forces in foreign territory. Part IV concludes the work with an analysis of the mechanisms of international transaction: negotiation and treaties.

As the editors say in their preface: "Perhaps the most substantial change [from the Lauterpacht eighth edition] has been the recognition of the extent to which the law and practice relating to international organizations have now become a separate field of study. It no longer seems useful to attempt to include a necessarily brief summary in the present volume" (p xii). In addition to a new Volume II dealing with the international law of war and disputes, the editors anticipate a new Volume III focusing on international organizations. The previous edition has been popular with legal scholars largely because it simplified research. In that edition, there was hardly a work published before 1955 dealing with any topic pertinent to the study of international law that was not mentioned in an appropriate and easy-to-find footnote. The editors of the ninth edition have continued the practice of citing in footnotes the major works pertinent to further research in any subject discussed in the text. Indeed, the footnotes to the ninth edition are the scholarly essence of the work.

In both the older edition and the new one, there is no bibliography or table of authorities cited; no index of persons mentioned. Since the index has been substantially shortened in the new edition, a bibliography and a table of proper names would have been useful. With modern word-processing techniques, they are much easier to compile than an index of subjects and would serve an equivalent purpose. On the other hand, the sheer number of citations is daunting and I cannot even estimate the number of additional pages that would have been necessary had a complete bibliography of works cited and index of persons been attempted.

The job of selecting representative and seminal major works from the mass of specialized writing in public international law is now beyond human capacity. While practitioners and scholars have been helped by the editors' sifting through the mass for the few kernels of wisdom to give a starting place for deeper research, the overall problem has been to some extent alleviated but not solved. I found many works cited as if important that in my opinion do not deserve emphasis. Many books and articles that I regard as deeply insightful

are not mentioned in the places I would have thought pertinent. This sort of disagreement is routine among scholars now that the body of literature concerning international law has exceeded the bounds that made possible the inclusiveness of the eighth edition. Since my judgment of quality cannot be defended as any more "objective" than that of the editors, our differing evaluations of seminal literature simply illustrate the problem. Since Lauterpacht's solution of inclusiveness is no longer feasible, the problem cannot be avoided.

The single most important test of the utility of any comprehensive text is the ease with which the information in it can be retrieved. The expanding complexity and refinement of the rules of substantive international law are quantitatively evident in the extensive table of cases. But many legally significant incidents were not "cases". To find what the editors had to say about the *Rainbow Warrior* incident, one must first look up self-defense in the table of contents. Three pages into the pertinent section, there is a footnote citing the *McLeod* case. It refers to a footnote in a later section in the other tome. That footnote contains an elegant, short, and precise summary of the *McLeod* correspondence, but no mention of the *Rainbow Warrior* or the possible relevance of the *McLeod* case to that later incident.

Using the table of contents, the researcher can find a section titled "Clandestine agents: spies" in which there is a reference to the *Rainbow Warrior*. Since the French agents in that case were clandestine agents but not spies as usually defined, it was proper that the footnote mentioning the incident referred to yet another section. The other section is in the other tome. It is titled: "Internationally injurious acts of administrative officials and members of armed forces." There, in a footnote is all the information needed to complete the search, including citations to other works (and they are the very ones to which I would have referred a colleague who knew nothing about the literature surrounding the case). But the French agents had not been "administrative officials" and, although called "French military personnel" in the editors' note, it is not at all clear that all of them fit that category either, or, if they did, that the category was anything other than arbitrary; dependent solely on French municipal law and governmental organization and not obvious to a foreigner or even a French practitioner or scholar attempting to find a place a place to start research on the incident.

Utility is also affected by the extent to which parochialism might have influenced the editors' selection of cases or conclusions of law. This new work, like its predecessors, was compiled by British editors. The territorial dispute between Argentina and Great Britain over sovereignty in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands seemed a promising place to look for evidence of bias.

The table of contents lists a section on "Consequences of occupation" where there is a cross-reference to a section on "Six modes of losing state territory" that in turn refers in a footnote to the "alleged abandonment by Great Britain of the Falkland Islands in 1774." There is a reference to the war in a section devoted to "Renunciation of force or threat of force and title to territory." But, the dispute is mentioned there only as pertinent to the question of whether an unlawful conquest can result in lawful title. It is properly pointed out that the

title to the section is no clue to finding a reference to the Falkland/Malvinas dispute because neither the United Kingdom nor Argentina based its claim to the disputed territory on conquest.

The much more interesting question of whether the Falkland/Malvinas struggle involved the prohibition on the threat of use of force in international relations codified in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter is not directly addressed. It is certainly correctly implied that neither of the two contesting states is much superior to the other in this regard. Probably the editors felt that the other issues related more to disputes, Volume II, or the United Nations, the anticipated Volume III.

I looked for other evidence of British bias in sections less directly involved with disputes and war. One was the fate of the 1985 Supplemental Extradition Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom, which tries to exempt "murder" and "kidnapping" from the "political offense" exception to the basic extradition treaty. The index was not the best place to begin the hunt. The entry for "Extradition" says merely "see under Aliens." Since many countries, including the United States, freely extradite their own nationals as well as aliens, this seemed odd. Anyhow, under "aliens" there is a heading "extradition," and under that heading is an entry "political criminals." It says, "see non-extradition of political offenders." Still in the "aliens" entry, about twenty three lines further down, are the pertinent headings, with easy-to-find page references, all within the ten-page discussion of the "Principle of Non-Extradition of Political Criminals." In that discussion, there is a reference to the Supplemental Extradition Treaty as having been influenced by several earlier multilateral conventions requiring extradition or trial of those accused of various offenses with random victims, like aircraft hijacking. But there is no mention of the treaty's having been refused application by American courts in the *Doherty* case (which is not listed in the table of cases or mentioned in this section), or various theoretical problems, such as the issue of whether what the Supplemental Treaty calls "murder" or "kidnapping" might not be categorized as "military action" or "taking a prisoner" if the requested state concludes that the law of war applied to what a requesting state calls a common crime. Indeed, if the law of war could apply, it is up to the requesting state to argue that it should not if it wants the extradition to proceed without jeopardizing the "neutrality" or objectivity of the requested state. There is no discussion of these issues in that place.

Another entry carefully tailored to avoid the imputation of bias might be the one about a Libyan agent shooting and killing a British policewoman during a riot outside the Libyan Embassy in London in 1984. It was hard to find (buried in the 4th paragraph of note 30 in the section on Inviolability of Diplomatic Premises, but not under Libya in the index, and not the subject of any known case). No position is taken on the rights or wrongs of British action in response to the incident, which might in fact have been rather different than presented by the references cited by the editors. Nor is there any mention that I could find of the American violation of the residence of the Nicaraguan Ambassador in Panama in 1989 or the rock concert held outside the Nunciature there to make

the continued presence of General Noriega in the Nunciature intolerable to the Papal Nuncio.

Oppenheim's original edition incorporates the biases of his time. The intervening editions record the biases of theirs. And the ninth edition must record today's "conventional wisdom." For example, the notion is currently popular among international lawyers, almost to the point of orthodoxy, that some "human rights" are implicit in the legal order's substantive rules, and that all states have the legal authority under that order to enforce those "rights" *erga omnes*, against any violator. In the first section of Part I the editors write: "[O]bligations deriving from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, and from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination, are such that all states have an interest in the protection of the rights involved" (p. 5), citing a few publicists and a 1970 decision of the International Court of Justice. The assertion, conventional wisdom as it is, is dubious in law. The frequently cited 1970 ICJ decision, none of these categories was before the court, and "standing" to present a case was in fact denied to the petitioning state. The editors do point out in a later passage that "The [International] Court [of Justice] has so far found no occasion to rely on this particular source," the teachings of publicists as a source of law (pp. 42-43). Fortunately, the experience and wisdom of the editors quickly sets their first assertion into better perspective; they note, despite that there is at present "no agreed enumeration of rights and obligations *erga omnes*" and "the law in this area is still developing" (p. 5). No prediction is made as to whether that course of development will eventually give substance to the category or prove the category to be empty.

The delicacy and precision of the editors' writing style is beyond praise. The completed Volume I is uniform in style and coherent in organization and analysis. As to substance, the silences and ambiguity of the ninth edition will keep us all equally happy.

The retail cost of the two tomes of Volume I place it hopelessly beyond the reach of all but a very few students and, indeed, beyond the reach of most professional academics. It is a necessary purchase for those foreign ministries that can afford it and for the major libraries of the world. Wherever it is not protected by copyright, and perhaps even where it is, the temptation will be overwhelming to give to the Xerox industry the money that should have gone to the publishers.

## Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era

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Edited by Cheryl J. Brown and Timber M. Schraub

Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1992, 376pp.,  
with bibliography and index, \$21.95 paper.

Reviewed by Brian Regli

Those who argue that history has ended and liberal democracy has triumphed throughout the world need only turn to the developing world to see the argument disproved with a vengeance. Although the Cold War has come to a close, the weak nation states of the ill-defined Third World struggle to overcome internal division and external threats. The disappearance of superpower patronage has also left Third World leaders with fewer resources at their disposal to satisfy their citizens. Even the most optimistic assessments of the future of Third World states suggest that the situation will most likely get worse before it gets better.

Western understanding of the developing world is also at a crossroads. The superpower conflict not only provided political justification for conflicts, but also gave political theorists an easily definable calculus for explaining those conflicts that often obscured more than it revealed. Theoretically awkward concepts such as ethnicity and religion were pushed into the background as observers weighed the gains and losses in each superpower move.

Recent explorations of this subject include the book, *Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era*, edited by Cheryl J. Brown and Timber M. Schraub. The editors have brought together an impressive group of writers in an attempt to provide a general overview of the issues. It is a welcome, albeit incomplete, addition to the expanding examination of the future of the developing world.

W. Scott Thompson sets the tone in the introduction and presents the conceptual framework of the book: "The notion that conflict — along with hunger, malaria, and small-pox — has become unacceptable in the world is a peculiarly Western notion, one that has not yet spread to what we have called the Third World for the past thirty years" (p. 2). Tensions that have caused conflicts in the past remain. Easily obtainable weapons exacerbate ethnic, religious, and colonial tensions to create bloody local conflicts. The Third World still faces difficulties even as superpower cooperation and international and regional organizations offer new mechanisms for conflict resolution. "In nearly three quarters of the world," Thompson concludes, "history will not be over in the foreseeable

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future" (p.2).

The articles in the first section of the book describe the fundamental sources of Third World conflict. In the essay "Weak Democracy and the Prospect for Peace and Prosperity in the Third World," Robert Rothstein examines the impact of further democratization in the Third World. Rothstein characterizes these states as "weak democracies", states with limited options. Facing severe resource constraints, these countries are not necessarily disposed towards peace or development. Unless the United States adopts an understanding of the trend toward democracy which differentiates between specific regions and key societal institutions, unrealistic expectations could threaten the development of democracy throughout the world.

Three of the strongest barriers against the development of democracy in the Third World are ethnic divisions, underdevelopment, and arms races. Essays by Ted Gurr, Geoffrey Kemp, and Nazli Choucri place these issues into context. In an extensive survey of ethnic diversity throughout the world, Gurr argues that the end of the Cold War will intensify ethnic conflicts. His prudent assessment is echoed in Kemp's description of emerging regional arms races and the range of weapons available to power hungry Third World leaders. Both Kemp and Gurr argue that U.S. policy must rely on a solid understanding of specific regions and groups, rather than the articulation of a general policy. Choucri, on the other hand, develops a general paradigm for development aid projects. By introducing key environmental concepts into the framework, she reaches beyond the traditional analysis of developmental economics and to convincingly argue that donor policies must reflect environmental priorities.

The second part of the book is comprised of a discussion of conflict prevention and resolution. In the opening essay, Dennis Austin echoes the pragmatism of Rothstein's earlier essay. He argues that democracy will not solve all of the problems of the Third World, "but at the start of a new decade there is at least the hope of better things" (p. 165), as the trend toward democracy continues. George Weigel's "Religion and Peace: An Argument Complexified" is the most provocative essay in the book. Weigel argues that religion is the foundation of political culture and provides the societal values essential for stability and conflict prevention. The last three essays in the collection address the role of mediators, superpowers, and regional organizations in conflict resolution. Chester Crocker provides a strong vision of the future with and without superpowers. The book concludes with a summary of conference proceedings from the Institute of Peace on United States foreign policy in the Third World.

This book does not aim to answer questions but rather to pose them. Unfortunately, in doing so, the editors have let key issues pass with only a cursory glance. Only Thompson's introduction mentions that the whole concept of the Third World seems to be out of place in the post Cold War order. The book's title, however, conspicuously uses the label and the articles tend to use the term "Third World" as if it were as relevant today as it was twenty-five years ago. Only if there were certain identifiable experiences and relevant models that apply to the entire Third World should use of the term continue. It is not methodologically or analytically helpful to lump two-thirds of the world's

population into a single category. At best, it is a term of convenience. At worst, it complicates the discussion by obstructing real progress in parts of the developing world. Many of the authors distinguish and appreciate the large differences in political and economic conditions in the developing world, yet continue to rely on the term "Third World". The editors have chosen not to address these or other methodological issues, leaving the book incomplete.

Nevertheless, there is more than enough material to stimulate discussion. For this, the editors and authors deserve credit. However, unless the West changes its conceptions of the developing world, old patterns of conflict will persist to the detriment of all.

# Shining Path of Peru

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Edited by David Scott Palmer

New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, 271 pp., with glossary, bibliography, list of contributors, and index, \$45.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Robert J. Filippone

During the past twelve years, Peru's Shining Path guerrilla movement has turned Peruvian society on its head and taken more than 25,000 lives, yet it remains as mysterious as its enigmatic leader, Abimael Guzman Reynoso. In an effort to elucidate the activities of the Shining Path, David Scott Palmer has compiled a collection of essays by a renowned group of international scholars, all of whom have experience with this Peruvian conundrum. While several of the essays are excellent, the book suffers from a lack of cohesion commonly found in edited works. In addition, the collection is an unfortunate victim of recent events in Peru, including the capture of Guzman, which have made the analysis prematurely obsolete.

Palmer attempts to put together a single comprehensive work on the Shining Path by bringing together writers with a wide variety of backgrounds and perspectives. The result is somewhat disjointed and incomplete, and the book falls short in its attempt to be a definitive work on the Shining Path. The fifteen contributors provide distinct interpretations of the movement, but fail to provide a clear narrative of its history. Readers unfamiliar with the Shining Path will suffer from the book's inability to place important stages of the group's struggle into the context of the overall movement. The various strategies employed by the Shining Path in order to win control of society and the nature of a Peru led by the shining Path are both important issues that lack sufficient clarification in this collection of essays.

For the serious student of the Shining Path or Peru, the book falls short as well. It fails to go beyond the existing material published on the Shining Path or to add any significant insights into the movement's future. While reading *The Shining Path of Peru*, I continually found myself disappointed at the conclusion of chapters, feeling as though I had read it all before. Palmer himself speaks of the problems related to the length restrictions that were placed on him by the publisher. Perhaps this explains in part the lack of depth and continuity in the collection. Anyone who follows the Shining Path will undoubtedly have read more extensive works previously published by the authors included in this collection.

The book will still be of interest to those who are conducting research on the

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subject and are looking for a sampling of relevant literature. Individual chapters provide valuable insights into certain aspects of the movement. Truly outstanding writers, such as Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano and Cynthia McClintock, display enough of their talent to inspire the reader to pursue their other works. Sevillano's explanation of the Shining Path's organizational structure clearly describes the movement's daily functions. Particularly interesting is the role women have played in the armed struggle, assuming leadership positions and committing some of the most ruthless assassinations. The revolutionary movement has provided Peruvian women with an escape from their traditional role in Peruvian society, that of the oppressed and the marginalized. The violence typical of the Shining Path acts as an outlet for the movement's women to vent their anger at the confines of the traditional system.

One particularly relevant aspect of the book is its exploration of a contemporary communist movement. *The Shining Path of Peru* explains the appeal of communism to certain constituencies and reminds the reader that communism is not monolithic. The Shining Path has tailored its brand of communism to the peculiar circumstances of Peru. However effective the armed struggle, it is the ideology created by Guzman that has sustained the movement and won the hearts and minds of the peasants in many areas of Peru. The possibility exists for communist movements to develop in Latin America and other parts of the developing world as the Shining Path did in Peru.

Through no fault of its own, *The Shining Path of Peru* falls victim to bad timing. The political situation changed dramatically shortly after the book went to press as President Alberto Fujimori unconstitutionally extended his authority with the stated goal of destroying the Shining Path. Guzman capture in September caught all observers by surprise and caused a re-evaluation of the previous assumptions regarding the fate of the Shining Path. Guzman, referred to as the fourth sword of Marxism by his followers, was the ideological and strategic center of the organization. It is unclear whether the movement will continue without his leadership.

The arrest of key members of the Central Committee has further weakened the organization. The likelihood of these events seemed extremely remote at the time *The Shining Path of Peru* went to press. These events have, however, created the greatest changes in the Shining Path since the movement began its armed struggle in April of 1980. Unfortunately for David Scott Palmer, they occurred precisely as his book was being released, making it almost immediately obsolete.

The events of the past year have raised new questions about Peru and the future of the Shining Path. Yet this book is unable to address them. Predictions made in the essays are clearly unrealistic when viewed with the benefit of hindsight, due more to the widespread lack of knowledge about the Shining Path than to the authors' misreading of events. The Shining Path may now be better understood, but there is much work to be done before it can be said that a comprehensive study exists that captures the full scope of the movement.

## The Telecommunications Revolution: Past, Present and Future

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Edited by Harvey Sapolsky, Rhonda Crane, W. Russell Neuman,  
and Eli M. Noam

New York, N.Y.: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 1992, 217 pp., with  
bibliography and index, \$49.95 cloth.

Reviewed by Denis Fred Simon

Few would deny that the global revolution in telecommunications has had a major impact on the conduct of international relations and international business. The constraints of time and space have been largely overcome in terms of the flow of information and data around the globe. The full impact of this revolution, however, had been moderated, to some extent, by the prevailing structures of regulation and control at the national level. These structures, which were characterized by the predominance of traditional, state-controlled monopolies, stood in the way of the globalization process by creating cross-border barriers to entry for an assortment of telecommunications flows and services. The authors in *The Telecommunications Revolution* document the process by which these structures have given way to two even more powerful imperatives — de-regulation and privatization. The result is that the nature of the global telecommunications industry has undergone a tremendous transformation.

The book, the result of a symposium held at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to commemorate the contributions of Ithiel de Sola Pool to the field of communications research, documents not only the path of change within the telecommunications industry in the US and several other countries, but also what Douglas Pitt and Kevin Morgan call “regulatory turbulence” in their chapter on the divestment of AT&T (p.45). While the individual chapters are uneven in quality and depth, the collection of articles does do a good job in capturing the essential dynamics of change in the telecommunications sector.

Interestingly, the book begins with a skeptical chapter by Lester Thurow, currently the dean of the Sloan School of Management at MIT, who admits from the start that he has doubted the extent to which the information and telecommunication revolution has truly altered the landscape of economic relationships and business competition. Thurow goes on to say that while there clearly has been some impact on economic life, the reality is that in two key areas —

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productivity improvement and decentralization of economic activity — the results remain less than “revolutionary”. While the majority of the other authors in the book are much more optimistic about the “transformational” character of the telecommunications revolution, several of the authors, including Peter Temin, express concerns about whether “excessive enthusiasm for technological change will prevent full consideration of the economic consequences of major innovations for industry and especially market-leading firms”(p.xiii). Similar concern is expressed in the last chapter of the book by W. Russell Neuman which discusses the disruptions brought about by the telecommunications revolution and the ensuing crisis surrounding the resolution of such issues as privacy, equity, rate and spectrum regulation, and bilateral and multilateral trade relations.

Another fascinating aspect of this book is its use of the experience of the United States as a backdrop to understand and appreciate the similarities and differences between the American telecommunications industry and its foreign counterparts. As the chapter by Kenneth Robinson reveals, the US experience with de-regulation and the break-up of AT&T had an impact on telecommunications developments in other countries. In the report *NTIA Telecom 2000*, which became a sort of guideline for US telecommunications policy in the 1980s, it is argued that, “all other things being equal, the less regulated a given telecommunications market is, the faster it will grow”(p.33). This point seems to have carried a lot of weight among a broad range of countries considering what to do with respect to their own existing telecommunications policies and management methods. Charles Jonscher shows in his chapter on the “economics of international competition”, that while there are no simple answers in terms of specific impacts, there is evidence that when competition increased, the range and quality of telecommunications services have gone up and costs to the end-user have come down. While the benefits of the move towards liberalization in the telecommunications sector around the world have not been equally shared, “world wealth and consumer benefits” seem to have been affected positively.

The book also contains an intriguing series of chapters that focus on the experiences of Germany, France, and Japan. In the case of Germany, Eberhard Witte discusses the work of a special commission created in 1985 to review existing German policies. As a result of this commission’s work, a major liberalization of the industry occurred, though the author does stress that there were clear limits, albeit political in nature, to the liberalization movement. France has become a real leader in telecommunications through the introduction of such services as Minitel, but because the network is state-run there are still some constraints. Nonetheless, in areas such as mobile communications, radio paging, telematic services, and cable networks, Jean-Pierre Chamoux remains optimistic about the rate and direction of change in France. Finally, in the case of Japan, Tetsuro Tomita discusses the privatization of Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT), which has forever changed the face of the Japanese telecommunications industry. Tomita suggests that while “harmonious competition” may have prevailed in the past in Japan, by the mid-1980’s “excessive

competition" became a more appropriate characterization of the situation in the telecommunications market.

All in all, this is an important book because it forces the reader to think about the multiple dimensions of technological change in the so-called "telecommunications revolution". The remaining chapters, which discuss international trade and the world information economy, further reinforce some of the themes noted above from a more global perspective. While it would have been useful to have some authors, such as Neuman, go into greater detail in their respective chapters, this important collection of articles urges the reader toward a re-conceptualization of the telecommunications revolution. It would be interesting if the authors could come together again in five or ten years to assess whether their concerns were justified or whether they were too moderate in their calls for a re-thinking of the broader implications of the changes stimulated by the onset of the telecommunications age.