

"These Wars that Devour Us:" Anti-Colonialism
and the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* ,
1886-1909

A thesis submitted by

Matthew Lawrence Ehrlich

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
History

Tufts University.

May 2015

Adviser: Dr. Christopher Schmidt-Nowara

Abstract:

This thesis analyzes how the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* utilized criticism of colonialism to express its alternative visions of Spain, in the process of defining simplified but compelling alternative proletarian identities. The period from 1889-1909 saw the height of European imperialism. The Spanish colonial experience in that era, by contrast, proved disastrous and debilitating. Spanish colonialism was tied to the efforts of the small ruling elite to effectuate a nation-building process that would economically modernize the country and consolidate a centralized, stable state. Colonial failures- notably, the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines in 1898, and costly, prolonged conflicts in Morocco in the early twentieth century exposed the fragility of their project, causing immense economic, political, and cultural dislocations. Competing ideologies arose to challenge the system and vie for control of Spain's future. The key formative years of the PSOE coincided with this period in which colonial questions were at the forefront of "the Spanish Crisis." Spanish Socialists developed a distinct anti-colonial ideology as a central component of their political and intellectual conceptualization. Critically assessing contemporary and historical colonial processes, they compared working-class experiences in the metropole to those of oppressed peoples in the peripheries. The common unifying factor was exploitation by the Spanish bourgeoisie. By contextualizing broader socio-political tensions influencing the evolution of this multifaceted discourse, I reevaluate earlier interpretations of Spanish anti-colonialism as superficial,

arguing instead that opposition to colonialism played a key role in forming
Socialist identities -with important repercussions for their historical development.

Table of Contents:

Preface.....	p. v
Chapter I:	
<i>Introduction</i>	p. 1
Chapter II: <i>Anti-Colonialism, Anti-Patriotism and Anti-Militarism, 1886-1893</i>	p. 21
Chapter III: <i>Cuba and the Philippines</i>	p. 60
Chapter IV: <i>The Disaster of 1898</i>	p. 115
Chapter V: <i>"A Tale that Never Ends:" The Moroccan Conflicts of the 20th Century</i>	p. 144
Conclusion:.....	p. 171
Bibliography:.....	p. 177

Preface

The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party was founded in 1879, five years after *a coup d'etat* by General Arsenio Martinez de Campos had put an end to a brief and disastrous experiment with a Republic and reinstated the Bourbon monarchy under Alfonso XII. Structured by the politician Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, the Restoration system was designed to provide Spain with a measure of stability and peace after a chaotic forty years of civil wars, revolts, abdications and political violence. A constitutional monarchy with a liberal parliamentary system on the surface, the Restoration program was in reality structured around the routine exchange of power between two centrist parties, and sought to exclude autocratic traditionalists like the Carlists and liberal Republicans alike through electoral fraud and systems of patronage. The participation of the body politic of Spain was therefore decidedly limited, with widespread illiteracy and high levels of poverty ensuring that the majority of Spaniards were not involved in the political process of the era. Increasingly, this began to change, and the parties of the Restoration faced incipient challenges to their facade of hegemony. In 1885 Alfonso XII suddenly died at the age of 27. His unborn son, Alfonso XIII succeeded him as heir. Until 1902, his mother, Maria Christina reigned as Queen Regent. This brief sketch should give a preliminary impression of the social and political landscape in which the founding members of the PSOE lived and worked for the majority of their lives and the entirety of the period treated by this thesis.

The reader will doubtless be aware that this simplified explanation belies a far more profound reality of great political, social, and cultural complexity throughout this period. There were, in fact, genuine differences between the policies of the Liberals and the Conservatives. So too, the republican movement which opposed it was broad and diverse, as were regional nationalists, reformists, Ultramontane monarchists, Carlists, anarchists, etc. Challenges came from every quarter. But the lengthy persistence of the Restoration system in the face of this fractiousness demonstrates how this form of government did, to a large degree, revolve centrally around the preservation of a relatively narrow group of élite interests, banded together to ensure the exclusion of other elements.

The pages of *El Socialista* and other socialist works give every indication that the individuals who composed the PSOE understood the complexity of political atmosphere they operated in. However, their doctrines and isolationist political policies allowed them to broadly locate all the myriad parties of the Restoration government within a simplified category - "bourgeois". Where important changes in government and policies resulted in concrete effects relating to the topic of this thesis, I have explained them. Elsewhere, I trust the reader will understand that the picture that will be painted of Spanish political landscape is necessarily flattened in this work by the simplifying lens of Socialist rhetoric.

The Spanish Socialist Workers Party itself was no less diverse, although its scheme of organization was designed to emphasize centralization and homogeneity. There were in fact frequent and important differences and disagreements between regional sections of the party scattered in cities and

provinces throughout Spain. The official party organ, however, along with its National Committee, was based in Madrid. Historians have judged the former, the weekly periodical *El Socialista*, "the best barometer for knowing the health of the party,"¹ and it is indeed true that most important Socialist business undertaken throughout Spain and internationally made its way into the pages of that weekly periodical. Nevertheless, there were other regional papers of importance - *La Lucha de Clases* of Bilbao, in particular, has been an important resource for historians. This researcher regrets that temporal limitations have not permitted further investigation into regional socialist press - much of which remains uncollected and unpublished. But the centralized view that results does illuminate the PSOE's conceptualization of their national organization, which revolved around Madrid.

The majority of the primary and secondary sources used in this thesis are in Castilian Spanish in the original. I have translated these myself to the best of my ability. In most cases, I believe I have managed to preserve the original language intact. Occasionally, however, archaic phrasing or lengthy sentences have required me to paraphrase, or rely on American idioms to accurately convey the meaning of the original text. I have also made certain decisions in translation for the purpose of consistency. For example, the Spanish socialists used the nouns *proletario*, *asalariado*, *obrero*, and *trabajador* interchangeably. Though the meaning of each is slightly different, in all cases the Socialists were referring to the same general entity: the proletariat or working-class. I have tried to faithfully

¹ Sandoval, E. Moral. *Prensa obrera de Madrid: 1855-1936*. p. 543-544

adhere to their variances in translation here, but occasionally I use my own judgment when paraphrasing lengthy articles where several of these terms are used, in the interest of exigency and clarity.

Other concepts present greater challenges in translation. For example: in referring to Spain, the socialists sought to highlight a distinction between the *nación* or *patria*, and the organic *país* or *tierra*. The former two were meant to indicate the construct of the Spanish nation-state, which the Socialists argued was bourgeois or feudal in origin, and therefore artificial. The latter two referred to a more temporal idea of Spain, that is to say the Iberian Peninsula and its natural inhabitants. I have relied on the context provided by the text in my translations, leaving *patria* un-translated, particularly in passages where alternative phrases are implemented to evoke contrasts between these different concepts. Similarly, other related terms were freighted with contradictory meanings. *Patriotismo* I have translated as patriotism; for its malevolent companion, *Patrioterismo*, I have chosen to use the Anglo-American slang 'Jingoism.' I believe this is the most appropriate word to describe this concept, arising from the same historical context in which that term gained wide currency.

The noun 'bourgeoisie,' and adjective 'bourgeois' (*burgués/burguesa* and *burguesía*, respectively) appear *ad nauseum* in socialist writings. I hope the reader will forgive their frequent appearance here, and understand that when I use the word as a descriptor, I intend it as shorthand to refer to a broad and diverse class of people that the socialists categorized thusly. The PSOE became increasingly sophisticated in their understanding of the nuances of class structures as time

progressed. For the purpose of this paper, however, it should be noted that the primary distinctions made by the socialists were between the *élite* bourgeoisie capitalist class that controlled the economy, and the auxiliaries which supported their hegemony: those in the government, the press, the Church, or the military. Parsing out the nuances of *petit bourgeoisie* and labor elites was not a central concern of the Spanish socialists in this era. Where distinctions are made in the original text, I have noted and contextualized them. Otherwise, the reader should understand that the Socialist Party was engaged in a discourse of opposition, directed against a system that was perceived to have multiple facets, but in the end understood to be part of the same monolith.

I feel one final note about historicity is necessary. The Spanish socialists generally approached the pressing issues of their day according to their particular interpretation of Marxism, as well as their own observations as individuals living within the 'present society' they were critiquing. Whatever biases their ideologies and propaganda imparted to their interpretation, scholars do not seriously contest the empirical veracity of many of the major problems they critiqued. As the reader will discover below, the PSOE condemned (for instance) the horrific conditions in which hundreds of thousands of Spanish soldiers were quartered and transported to overseas conflicts, and the broad failure of the Spanish state to support them when they returned malnourished, stricken with illness or maimed from combat. This was very much the reality. So too was the fact that the rank and file of the Spanish armed forces was overwhelmingly composed of the poorer elements of Spanish society; the 'irritating inequality' that allowed for better-off families to

buy their sons out of obligatory service military service was also widely exercised (a Royal Decree at the end of 1909 finally put an end to this practice). The descriptions of the Spanish socialists were often not exaggerated or sensationalist propaganda, but rather painfully accurate descriptions of deep problems that wracked their society.

Matthew Lawrence Ehrlich,
Tufts University 2015

Chapter One

I. Introduction: National Identity, Socialism and the European Age of Empire

The European Age of Empire lasted roughly from 1875 until the beginning of the First World War in 1914. In Eric Hobsbawm's estimation, the period marked an era in which Europe appeared to lead the world in economic industrial development, technological and scientific advances, military power and population growth; a complex series of developments which observers soon began to understand as an interrelated historical phenomenon, broadly defined as 'modernity' or 'progress'. Not incidentally, these processes also coincided with an enormous burst in the territorial acquisition by some nations of large overseas empires. Imperialism, then (the term which began to see widespread use in the last decade of the nineteenth century) began to be justified through a pretension to bring the modern civilization that been developing in Western nations to peripheral regions of the globe. Yet Hobsbawm notes that these colonizing projects frequently "dramatized the contrast between progress as a universal aspiration, and indeed reality, and the patchiness of its actual advance." Whereas

some nations in the Western European sphere appeared to have already attained (or were rapidly developing) the hallmarks of modernity - defined by Hobsbawm as "Industrial-capitalist economies, liberal constitutionalist states and bourgeois societies on the Western model"- others appeared to be stagnating, or even regressing. Furthermore, it became apparent that there was no clear-cut dichotomy between civilized centers and barbarian peripheries. Within Western metropolises, "the gap between the 'advanced' (who were also, in general, the wealthy) and the 'backward' (who were also, in general, the poor) was enormous and dramatic."²

The perception of a growing gulf of inequality was frequently mutual. The 'Age of Empire' coincided with the Age of Socialism, as elements within societies that felt themselves to be becoming increasingly disenfranchised, marginalized and exploited, began to coalesce in mass movements based on the conceptualization of a distinct class identity. The political and economic leaders of European nation-states, threatened by these challenges to their power, often attempted to utilize concepts of empire and colonizing successes in the periphery to ameliorate discontent at home. This 'social imperialism,' Hobsbawm explains, used "imperial expansion to diminish domestic discontent by economic improvements or social reforms or in other ways."³ Concretely speaking, the tangible benefits of colonial projects were generally superficial and secondary. Of greater importance for the stability of the metropole was:

"The familiar practice of offering the voters glory rather than costly reforms: and what was more glorious than conquests of exotic territories and dusky races, especially as these were usually cheaply won? More generally, imperialism encouraged the masses, and especially the potentially

² Hobsbawm, Eric. *The Age of Empire: 1875-1914*. (1987) P. 32

³ *ibid.* P. 69

discontented, to identify themselves with the imperial state and the nation, and thus unconsciously to endow the social and political system represented by that state with justification and legitimacy."⁴

Yet the viability of this discourse of "patriotic flag-waving" in the process of constructing nation and empire was not straightforward. In countries where "liberalism and the more radical left had acquired strong anti-imperial, anti-military, anti-colonial or more generally anti-aristocratic traditions,"⁵ colonial policies could easily backfire, with the contradictory effect of provoking further discontent. Nowhere was this more evident than in Spain. The 19th century saw the concepts of national identities broadly consolidating in many Western European countries, such as France, Germany and Great Britain. Among other things, this process introduced ideals of a communal civic identity, held by a broad and diverse body politic with a shared, vested interest in the success of their nation-state. In Spain, however, historians have generally held that the small governing élites of that country essentially failed to develop a similarly durable and convincing nationalism along this Western liberal modern paradigm.⁶

Furthermore -and uniquely among European colonial states during an age of imperial expansion- the Spanish government under the restored Bourbon monarchy not only managed to lose control of their remaining overseas colonies to the United States in the decisive war of 1898, but in fact spent the majority of the period from 1890 to 1923 engaged in costly and unsuccessful colonial conflicts, whose deep unpopularity and detrimental economic and political

⁴ Hobsbawm, Eric. *The Age of Empire: 1875-1914*. (1987) p. 70

⁵ *ibid.*

⁶ See for instance: Borja de Riquer, *La debil nacionalización española del siglo XIX*

repercussions profoundly destabilized the Spanish peninsular metropole. As Juan Linz has argued, "the crisis of Spanish national identity [at the end of the nineteenth century] cannot be separated from the crisis of the Spanish state."⁷ And the crisis of the state was heavily tied to its colonial troubles: national wars of liberation in the *Ultramar*, and resistance to economic and military expansion in Morocco. This extended period of crisis indelibly stamped the instability that characterized Spain's experience in the twentieth century, resulting in the brutal civil war of 1936-39 and the subsequent dictatorship of General Francisco Franco - himself a product of colonial warfare in Morocco. Whether Spain's turbulent twentieth century could have been avoided, as Linz goes on to suggest, if the Spanish state had been more successful in their international policies is speculative. But it is certainly safe to say that Spanish colonial ventures in their various forms not only failed to ameliorate inherent cultural and socio-economic tensions within the Spanish bourgeois nation-building project, but in fact profoundly exacerbated them.

The resultant discord has been amply discussed by scholars, who have found, for instance, the massive acceleration of regional nationalist movements in the wake of the loss of the Spanish *Ultramar*, whose lucrative and protected markets had previously provided an incentive for Catalan industrial elites (for instance) to identify with the Spanish nation-state;⁸ or traced the origins of the *Semana Trágica* of 1909 to a bitter popular reaction to the escalation of military

⁷ Linz, Juan José. "Los nacionalismos en España: Una perspectiva comparada" *Historia y Fuente Oral* No. 7 *Analfabetismo y Política* (1992) P. 133

⁸ Alvarez-Junco, *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* (2011) P. 368,

operations in Morocco in 1909.⁹ The apparently general lack of enthusiasm on the part of the majority of Spaniards for colonial ventures was a cause of great concern to the Spanish elite. As José Alvarez-Junco points out, in the nineteenth century, these élite elements were composed of the "educated middle classes with a nationalist awareness." To them, the apathy of many Spaniards during the wars of 1895-1898 "demonstrated the disastrous *situation* of the country....popular indifference had shown that the masses had *not* been indoctrinated to the same extent as the middle classes."¹⁰

The charge of indifference was not quite accurate, however. Increasingly, elements of "the masses" were indeed beginning to develop political and social consciences. To the discomfiture of the political and economic élites, however, it was often revolutionary ideologies with alternative conceptualizations of progress and modernity that began to appeal to large swaths of Spaniards. Yet the development of working-class identity and politics, like many other nineteenth century processes in Spain, was slow and uneven. This was a source of great frustration for the leaders of the young *Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, a Marxist party with orthodox pretensions that arose out of debris of the First International Workingmen's Association in 1879. The PSOE found itself small and politically marginalized throughout much of this period, unable to attract the large swaths of impoverished, disenfranchised Spaniards that it hoped to organize

⁹ See: Bachoud, Andrée. *Los españoles ante las campañas de Marruecos* (1988); or Ullman, Joan Connelly. *The Tragic Week* (1974)

¹⁰ Alvarez-Junco, José. *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* (2011) P. 359

into a class-conscious, revolutionary proletariat.¹¹ The party's founder, a young *madrileño* typesetter named Pablo Iglesias, found himself in this early period "the editor of a newspaper without readers, and president of a party without members, in a country without citizens."¹² The Spanish socialists constantly attempted to articulate their own vision of a proletarian class of Spaniards, separated from and opposed to the nationalizing projects of the state and its bourgeois supporters. At key historical junctures, when the state attempted to assert the strength and integrity of the Spanish nation through colonial connections, the socialists actively combated these efforts, seizing on the opportunity to illustrate the debility and tensions inherent in the Spanish national construct. They then attempted to assert their alternative visions, but with limited success.

As I shall examine below in more detail, in Spain the decentralized and uneven nature of economic and political modernization resulted in the absence of a large and literate mass of industrialized workers who could develop a shared class identity based on common experience. As a result, the Spanish socialist perception of class identity was from the outset predicated upon a shared sense of anti-nationalism. At its root, this was a negative identity based on opposition, rather than positive construct. It was articulated through the language of a disenfranchised *pueblo*, of poor workers who (after the Communist Manifesto) had no nation. Because the nation-state was, in the view of the Spanish socialists, solely the creation and interest of the bourgeoisie, it was rejected part and parcel. The socialists were keenly aware of the cultural role of patriotic rhetoric, and

¹¹ The party tended to refer to itself as merely the *Partido Socialista Obrero* in its Spanish publications. Most scholars refer to it by its full title.

¹² J.J. Morato, *Pablo Iglesias, Educador de muchadumbres*. 2nd Ed. (1968) p. 88

sought, at every opportunity, to critique it and emphasize the separation of the working-class from an alien and exploitative *patria*.

On these grounds, colonialism was especially highlighted as a powerful example of exploitation by the Spanish bourgeoisie. Colonies, the PSOE insisted, only served the interests of a handful of Spanish capitalists, and the benefits they reaped were at the expense of colonized peoples. Worse, colonial dominance was paid for in the blood, sweat and money of the unwilling Spanish working-class, who were forced to fight as cannon fodder in colonial conflicts against their brothers in the peripheries for the sole gain of the bourgeoisie. In socialist rhetoric, therefore, a unique discourse developed in which the PSOE sought more or less constantly to equate the exploitation of the Spanish proletariat with that of the colonized 'other.'

However, the ideology, organization, and tactics of the PSOE were constantly being contested and evolving from internal and external pressures throughout this period. In the wake of the disastrous Spanish-American conflict of 1898, rooted in colonial problems, Sylvia Hilton notes, "the Spanish Socialist Party garnered considerable political credit for its opposition to the war. Internal divisions plagued the Party at the start of the Cuban rebellion, but by late 1897 Spanish socialists were again united and able to conduct a campaign designed to reflect and cultivate popular hostility to the war."¹³ This statement disguises a deeper dialectic between the PSOE and the 'colonial question'. Not least among the internal conflicts within the Socialist movement was a gradual (but bitterly

¹³ Hilton, Sylvia. "The Spanish American War of 1898. Queries into the Relationship between the Press, Public Opinion and Politics." *Revista española de estudios norteamericanos*. (1994), n. 7 P. 79

divisive) shift away from haughty and uncompromising goals, which accepted nothing less than a complete economic and political revolution; towards a limited program of reform based on political participation within the established system to effect the immediate improvement of temporal ills. The attempts of the PSOE to come to terms with this question was reflected by the European socialist movement as a whole, whose doctrinal disagreements were exposed in increasingly divisive International Congresses that attempted to resolve this paradox between revolutionary ends and immediate gains. In few areas was this tension more evident than in their debates on how best to approach the growing and interconnected phenomena of imperialism and militarism.

Despite the schisms that increasingly plagued the Socialist International, it must be emphasized that while ideologies and strategies could and did undergo important evolutions, broadly speaking, anti-colonialism remained a central tenet of their identity. For the PSOE, their unique situation at the junctures of Spanish colonialism and national projects, and local and international working-class politics resulted in a distinct discourse that highlights the tensions inherent in all these factors. For the Spanish socialists, anti-colonialism provided an important theme for an oppositional discourse that could be articulated in dozens of ways - humanitarian, internationalist, anti-militarist, and above all, anti-patriotic- and wielded to great practical effect. But this dynamic was interactive, and the tensions wrought on the PSOE by the changing realities of colonialism, nationalism, and international socialism continually challenged the Spanish socialists and forced them to adapt and evolve in ways that indelibly marked their

historical path. The Spanish socialists developed, through party newspapers, meetings, demonstrations and political campaigns, a unique and important anti-colonialist rhetoric. An analysis of their role at these intersections reveals important elements of inherent socio-political contradictions and tensions that beset Europeans faced with 'the colonial question' at the height of the 'Age of Empire.'

II. Reevaluating the Anti-Colonialism of the Early PSOE

The origins of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, founded in Madrid in 1879, we are informed some years later by a prominent member and chronicler, "cannot be explained without the Communist Manifesto or without The International."¹⁴ In his eponymous history *El Partido Socialista Obrero*, published in 1918, Juan José Morato insists that from the outset, the PSOE was doctrinally identical to the parties of the world proletariat, and composed a natural branch of international Socialism. Within Spain, meanwhile, the PSOE could be distinguished from every other party in two fundamental ways: "in that it is international, and that it is a class-based party, and of class against class."¹⁵ That Morato felt it necessary to preface his work¹⁶ with such an emphatic insistence on both the party's inherent internationalist character and its adherence to orthodox Marxism is telling of the central preoccupations of Spanish Socialists in the preceding decades.

¹⁴ Morato, Juan José. *El Partido Socialista Obrero* (1918) P. 12

¹⁵ *ibid.* P. 11

¹⁶ It was, in fact, the first published general history of Socialism in Spain. Brenan defines it as 'the best source for the study of Spanish Socialism.' Brenan, Gerald. *The Spanish Labyrinth*. (1943)

More recent scholars have challenged Morato's assertions. The doctrines and practices of the early PSOE have fared roughly in the historiography of socialism in Spain. Paul Heywood writes of a "decaffeinated Marxism," emphasizing that "indigenous Marxism in Spain has never been noted for its innovative theory." Heywood's dismissive estimation was itself a reiteration of earlier perceptions. Even the prominent 20th century Socialist Luis Araquistáin rather self-deprecatingly remarked: "I think we Spaniards have contributed nothing original to the theme of modern socialism."¹⁷ In the heyday of Spanish labor history of the 1980s, scholars continued to be generally dismissive of the theoretical simplicity, and apparent lack of intellectual debate present in the early PSOE. This, they argued, originated from an overreliance on the imported interpretations of the French socialist Jules Guesde, whose analytical hallmarks were the "reduction of the notion of class struggle to a dichotomic bourgeois-proletarian conflict, a Manichaeian presentation of this contest, fierce revolutionary rhetoric, and more than a touch of millenarian promise." As practiced in Spain, then, Guesdist-influenced Socialism "amounted to a simplistic and schematic version of Marxism that incorporated a number of pre-Marxist ideas and was weak on dialectics."¹⁸

The most common explanation given for the undeveloped, unsophisticated nature of early Spanish socialist discourse lies in the political and economic realities present in Spain during the era of the Bourbon Restoration (1874-1923). At the turn of the twentieth century, the Spanish state "remained imbued with pre-

¹⁷ Araquistáin, Luis. *El pensamiento español contemporáneo* (Buenos Aires 1962) p. 98

¹⁸ Gillespie, Richard. *The Spanish Socialist Party* (1989) P. 8

capitalist features, and had made scant and uneven progress along the transitional road towards industrial capitalism."¹⁹ The supposed general failure of the preconditions for Marxism within Spain, i.e. industrial capitalism, contributed to the absence of a sophisticated theoretical discourse in the formative decades of the PSOE. Thus, as Heywood remarks, "The PSOE leaders were plainly laboring under severe misapprehensions about the socio-political and economic situation in Spain."²⁰ However, as we shall later see, the early PSOE was not as unaware of these realities as Heywood claims. They keenly observed their limitations, and based their propaganda and political agenda around them.

The absence and distrust of intellectualism within the early PSOE is often credited to the working-class composition of the party's founders. As Heywood explains, "the majority of early members of the PSOE came from a working class which enjoyed neither leisure nor the facilities to acquire more than basic levels of education."²¹ The association of Madrid typesetters that composed the charter members of the PSOE were better educated, perhaps a labor aristocracy in the Hobsbawmian sense, but they were not an intelligentsia.²² Pablo Iglesias and his circle of printer companions "did not come to socialism through philosophy or thought, but by the acquisition of a class consciousness through personal experience."²³ Understanding the leadership role of Pablo Iglesias is integral in understanding the development of the PSOE in this period. Iglesias was fiercely

¹⁹ Heywood, Paul. *Marxism and the Failure of Organized Socialism in Spain, 1870-1936*. (1990) P. 8

²⁰ *ibid.* p. 9

²¹ *ibid.*

²² Hobsbawm, Eric. *The Age of Empire. 1873-1914* (1987) P. 115

²³ Guerra Sesma, Daniel. *Socialismo y el cuestión nacional en España*. Doctoral thesis, (2008) p. 69

practical and single-minded in his vision for the PSOE. He was "never an ideologue, but an organizer, communicator and a propagandist..." In his vision for the party, "[he] did not want ideologues, but good organizers of strikes and resistance societies; he was not interested in theory, but the tactic."²⁴ Because of this early emphasis on party organization at the expense of intellectual debate, Heywood judges that "the political activities of the PSOE seemed to bear increasingly little relation to the theoretical ideas from which they were supposedly derived."²⁵ Gillespie too notes that the early PSOE "earned itself a reputation for doctrinal intransigence and sectarianism which it was slow to lose."²⁶ This critical interpretation was, as we've seen, nothing novel. Indeed, as early as 1901, in an article published in the journal '*La Nueva Era*,' Morato had felt compelled to defend the PSOE from the implication that Spanish socialist theory was "slavishly translated from the French- the critique is not justified by anything. There are no great theorists in Spanish socialism, certainly; however, there is no shortage of original works of various kinds, nor can it justly be said to have taken from outside anything other than what is common to all countries."²⁷

Works published more recently have also begun to reassess the early discourse of the PSOE. A more impartial and academic interpretation of Morato's early defense is offered by Juliá Santos, whose analysis downplays the influence of Guesdism and posits that the early Socialists could hardly analyze the situation in another way, given the striking realities of inequality in nineteenth-century

²⁴ Guerra Sesma, Daniel. *Socialismo y el cuestión nacional en España*. (2008) p. 9

²⁵ Heywood, Paul. *Marxism and the Failure of Organized Socialism in Spain, 1870-1936*. (1990) P. 15

²⁶ Gillespie, Richard. *The Spanish Socialist Party* (1989) P. 6

²⁷ Morato, Juan José. "El Socialismo español" *La Nueva Era*, 1901 p. 85

Spain.²⁸ Likewise, Gillespie conceded in his 1990 study that the PSOE "fashioned itself in this image in the belief that it was following Marxist prescriptions, though undoubtedly it was responding to domestic circumstances too." He suggests, therefore, that "the early attitudes and policies of the party...must be understood in terms of its understanding of Marxism and the practical problems faced by a group that was seeking to establish and build a workers' party in a country where the working class was in its infancy- still vulnerable, as the socialists saw it, to ideological contamination by the Republican parties and bourgeois society."²⁹ And it must be noted that, within their temporal context, there was not necessarily a "right" course for the socialists to follow. International Socialist theory was certainly not unified, and many of the most respected intellectuals of the period were champions of a variety of assumptions and practices that were contradicted by subsequent events. Historical interpretation of the Spanish socialist movement can be excessively deterministic, marked more by explaining what they failed to do rather than what they did - and more importantly, *why*.

Recently, therefore, scholars have begun to suggest that the historiography of the Spanish working class movements is due for a general reassessment. In a 2008 essay, Miguel Ángel Cabrera, Blanca Divassón and Jesús de Felipe detailed how new theoretical perspectives have "resulted in a profound reinterpretation of the history of the Spanish labor movement and morphology and the formation of identities present within the working and acting class conflicts and struggles

²⁸ Juliá Díaz, Santos. *Los socialistas en la política española, 1879-1982* (1997) pp. 22-24

²⁹ Gillespie, Richard. *The Spanish Socialist Party* (1989) P. 6-7

featuring its members. Both mutations have been the result largely of adoption, explicitly or not, the concept of *experience*.³⁰ This is "understood as the medium through which the material conditions of existence and economic and social changes impacted on subjectivity of workers and let them get to become aware of their common interests." One central preoccupation of these historians has been to explain how labor movements and a common proletarian class identity could arise out the context of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Restoration Spain, in which the apparently necessary preconditions of widespread industrial capitalism were so notably absent. "In these circumstances, the forging of a common identity had to be explained as necessarily involving factors other than the purely economic and material. That is, based on factors such as mediation of culture, vocabularies available, and political ideologies with which workers came into contact."³¹

These interpretations suggest that we reposition our analysis of the discourse and agency of the early PSOE away from a critical lens of its theoretical Marxism, which has been clouded by subsequent developments, such Marxist-Leninist interpretations. This would allow a deeper understanding of the actual political and cultural realities, in both a local and international context, in which the PSOE operated in during its formative decades. For: "if the formation of the working identity was a historical process that took shape in the cultural sphere, socialist ideologies should be conceived as political languages, among several

³⁰ Angel Cabera, Miguel; Blanca Divassón and Jesús de Felipe. "Historia del movimiento obrero. ¿Una nueva ruptura?" *Historias de España Contemporánea*. Burguera, Mónica and Christopher Schmidt-Nowara eds. (2011) P. 49

³¹ Angel Cabera, Miguel; et. al "Historia del movimiento obrero. ¿Una nueva ruptura?" P. 51

possible, which workers could use to express their concerns and claims arising from their experience. In this sense, Marxists and anarchists had to adapt to the ways in which workers' identity was forming in order to be able to influence the process."³² Absent a strong industrial proletariat with a solid class conscience, the PSOE utilized a distinct (though admittedly simplified) interpretation of Marxism, creating a discourse that was more concretely based on their perceptions of the lived situations of the era. They attempted to form a proletarian class conscience where there had previously been none, seeking to appeal to a disparate and undeveloped mass of Spaniards, whose main unifying communal experience was a sense of political and economic disenfranchisement in the elite oligarchic liberalism of the Restoration state.

One of the most effective demonstrations of the plight of the working class came from the series of military conflicts the Spain was constantly engaged in between 1890 and 1910. As Carlos Serrano has noted, "the first steps of socialism in Spain were almost constantly accompanied by the persistence of serious colonial problems." The Melilla campaign of 1893, the Cuban insurrection and the disastrous war with the United States in 1898, the increasing military commitment in Morocco after 1906, and the fateful *Semana Trágica* following the call up of the Reservists and the simultaneous disaster of the Battle of the Barranco del Lobo in 1909 presented central challenges for the early leaders of the PSOE, but in turn were the catalysts for the development of "a distinct anti-

³² Angel Cabera, Miguel; et. al "Historia del movimiento obrero. ¿Una nueva ruptura?" p. 54

colonialist practice" in the party's discourse.³³ The tensions inherent in this practice both reflected and enhanced growing contradiction within Spanish socialism, which would result in major shifts and schisms that launched the PSOE on a trajectory to profound relevancy in twentieth century Spain.

The majority of the studies of the PSOE's anti-colonialism and activities in this period were published in the 1980s and early 1990s. Broadly speaking, they have argued that the PSOE's treatment of the "colonial question" was essentially introverted. Anti-patriotic and anti-militarist in nature, it was primarily concerned with protesting the detrimental effects that colonial conflicts would have on the Spanish workers in the metropole.³⁴ The colonial wars, as I have indicated, were understood to have been undertaken for the sole economic and political benefit of an elite bourgeois, while the Spanish proletariat was required to sacrifice their lives and economic well-being for a cause in which they had no vested interest.

In this historiography, some of the broader themes of anti-colonialism which surface in the admittedly vast socialist rhetoric of the era -such as those that elaborated on the concept of an international brotherhood of the proletariat which transcended the boundaries of bourgeois patriotism, and explicitly sought to identify the interests of the Spanish working class with those of the similarly-exploited working classes of the nations they were called upon to subjugate - have been glossed over, or else critiqued as superficial, insincere; undeveloped or ill-considered. In the analysis of these historians, the PSOE mostly failed to

³³ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y las cuestiones coloniales (1890-1914)" *Hispania: Revista española de historia*. vol. 58 issue 198 (1998) P. 283

³⁴ Núñez Florencio, Rafael. *Militarismo y antimilitarismo en España (1888-1906)* (1990) P. 248

comprehend the reality of the political situations in the intersection of colonial conflict and its international relevance, and therefore could not take advantage of it beyond limited increases in local power. They did not adequately grasp, for instance, the deep working-class support for the Cuban insurrection, or perceive the legitimacy of Riffian opposition to Spanish military incursion. Insofar as it affected Spaniards, they opposed colonial warfare and paid superficial homage to internationalism- but their discourse remained fundamentally based on limited peninsular concerns. Helen Graham goes so far as to claim that "the Spanish left had never developed an anti-colonialist discourse. Its opposition to the war in North Africa [in this case she is discussing the Moroccan conflicts of the 20th c.] had always been based on a defense of Spanish workers' rights (as the soldiers who died in these campaigns) rather than on the wrongs of colonization."³⁵

A central contention of this thesis is that a reassessment of Spanish socialist anti-colonialism is in order. I posit instead that the PSOE did develop an anti-colonial discourse that continually recognized and sought to cultivate a international proletarian identity within the framework of the Second International. Inseparable from this was their attempt to imagine the Spanish proletariat within a separate "*patria*," which was itself subject to colonial exploitation by an elite bourgeois. A profound *theoretical* analysis was lacking, perhaps, in their discourse, but Rafael Núñez Florencio writes that they "were *viscerally*³⁶ anti-colonial: they could neither accept the bourgeois proposal of superior and inferior peoples, nor believe the alibi of "civilizing help" for those

³⁵ Graham, Helen. *The Spanish Civil War, a Brief Introduction* (2005). P. 34

³⁶ Emphasis mine.

suffering exploitation, but as they were oppressed, they felt an almost spontaneous solidarity with other subject peoples."³⁷ Thus, in more or less explicit terms, Socialists repeatedly sought to communicate a message to the Spanish working classes by analyzing the plights of exploited peoples of Cuba, Morocco, and elsewhere. In her study on Spanish attitudes regarding colonialism in Morocco, Andrée Bachoud argues that the Spanish Socialists eventually developed "a generous anti-colonialism, based in the perception of a similarity, a brotherhood, to employ their own vocabulary, that permitted to understand from the interior the position of the other."³⁸ Moreover, this "perception of *semejante*" was understood to extend beyond specifically Spanish spheres of colonial interaction. At the height of the fin-de-siècle Age of Empire, the metaphor of colonial capitalist exploitation could be expanded to a global perspective; witness the Bilbao socialist paper *La Lucha de Clases* lamenting the working conditions of Spanish miners in 1894: "Never before have the conditions of slavery in the mining zone reached the point where they are today, to the extent that only the faces of the workers give the lie to the perception that these exploitations are located in Senegambia."³⁹

A reassessment of the role played by anti-colonialist themes in socialist development is also necessary from the perspective of recent revisions in studies of Spanish nationalism. If we understand the 'colonial question' as one central to the liberal Spanish nation-building attempt in the nineteenth era, as Christopher

³⁷ Núñez Florencio, Rafael. *Militarismo y antimilitarismo en España (1888-1906)* (1990) p. 249

³⁸ Bachoud, Andrée. *Los españoles ante las campañas de Marruecos*. (1998)

³⁹ *La Lucha de Clases* 10 July 1894

Schmidt-Nowara has suggested,⁴⁰ then *anti*-colonialism is perhaps equally central to the Socialist formation of a working class counter-identity. In sum, I argue, Socialist anti-colonialism was not merely a tangential and pragmatic political tool of the PSOE utilized to seek limited local gains, but a focal point in their broader conceptualizations of an alternative Spanish identity.

Throughout the period analyzed here, the PSOE based their anti-colonialism on a mixture of contemporary Marxist theory and the lived experience of broad sectors of Spanish society (even paradoxically borrowing from Spanish nationalist imageries and historical narratives with some frequency.) This occasionally places their discourse in a gray area that is not easy to decipher. Increasingly, they sought to explain their actions through emphasizing their internationalist credentials - yet the Second International was itself riven by arguments on the questions of colonialism and nationalism in the years prior to the Great War. The PSOE itself wavered, on distinct occasions, between a strictly international socialist line that admitted no such legitimacy to a nation and condemned patriotism as a bourgeois institution, and claims to possessing a superlative patriotism because their visions responded to the interests of the largest sector of society. This was consistent with dissonant views argued throughout the Western socialist movement. The Spanish socialist definition of 'nation' included none of the empty "flags, hymns and exalted harangues of the bourgeoisie, who then dodge their commitment to the Nation on the battlefield," but was a *transcendental* patriotism based on "the living conditions of the

⁴⁰ Schmidt-Nowara, Christopher. *The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the Nineteenth Century*. (2006) P. 191

majority of the population." In his dissertation, Daniel Guerra Sesma interprets this as a variety of "civic nationalism, committed to the political, social, economic and cultural development of the country confronted against another reactionary identity."⁴¹ This positive sense of the national theme only began to be championed in the wake of the Spanish American War. But while this later 'socialist patriotism' was usually discussed in using the vocabulary of nation, as we shall see below, it was still pragmatically understood that these were short-term solutions that were necessary preconditions for the catalyzing of an international socialist future, and was moderate and limited in comparison with other more exaggerated interpretations on this theme, which eventually undermined the Second International's solidarity during the First World War.

⁴¹ Guerra Sesma, Daniel. *Socialismo y el cuestión nacional en España*. P. 58

Chapter Two. Anti-Colonialism, Anti-Patriotism and Anti-Militarism in the Early Discourse of the PSOE, 1886-1893.

I. Slavery, Patriotism and Colonial Metaphors in Early Socialist Propaganda, 1886-1894

Of the myriad colonial questions that Spain confronted in the Restoration period, two figure most heavily in historical memory. The Cuban Insurrection, launched in February of 1895, ground on for three bloody years until the intervention of the United States in April 1898. That brief war, an unequivocal catastrophe for Spain, saw the final and dramatic loss of their last overseas colonies, and provoked a national crisis of identity.⁴² Over the course of the following decade, the escalation of military endeavors in Spain's new sphere of influence in the north of Morocco eventually resulted in the simultaneous massacre in 1909 of a column of Spanish troops in the Barranco del Lobo, and a destructive civil uprising in Barcelona which was bloodily suppressed. This 'Tragic Week' originated as an organized General Strike against the government's call-up of reservists for service in Morocco, but quickly evolved into massive riots, an expression of popular anger directed against a host of entities deemed representative of the oppressive apparatus- especially the Church.⁴³

⁴² See: Ruiz-Manjón, Octavio and Alicia Langa, eds. *Los Significados del 98: la sociedad española en la génesis del siglo XX* (1999) especially Elorza, Antonio "El 98 y la crisis del estado-nación; or Balfour, Sebastian. *The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898-1923*. (1997)

⁴³ Ullman, Joan Connelly. *The Tragic Week: A Study of Anti-Clericalism in Spain, 1875-1912*

The centrality of these events generated a massive corpus of commentary at the time, and they have since figured centrally in the historiography. The role of anti-colonialism in both appears in most works devoted to either subject (although, in the case of the *Semana Trágica*, it is under-emphasized). Likewise, histories whose focus is oriented to anti-colonialism, in its myriad forms, tend to focus the majority of their analysis to those two periods.⁴⁴ This study will not be able to avoid a detailed treatment of either, assessing the large body of extant research and commentary already devoted to the subject. But it will revisit the primary source material, approaching them from a more contextual and comparative analysis and drawing some differing conclusions.

Fundamentally, however, I believe a more complete understanding of the complexities of Socialist anti-colonialist discourse can be gained by extending the chronological scope of analysis, beginning with the first published editions of the party's official organ, *El Socialista*, in 1886. A methodical scouring of sources in the years prior to the beginning of the Cuban insurrection in 1895, the period in which most studies begin to treat the topic of Spanish anti-colonialism, yields interesting elements of nascent socialist commentary which speaks to their conceptualizations of the interconnected themes of colonialism, militarism, and patriotism. Indeed, anti-colonial arguments are centrally featured in the pages of *El Socialista* as early as 1893, at the outset of the Melilla campaign in Morocco- a brief and relatively limited conflict whose historical implications nevertheless

⁴⁴ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y las cuestiones coloniales (1890-1914) and "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba (1895-1897)." The former quickly dismisses anti-colonialist discourse prior to 1895.

extended far beyond the conclusion of hostilities.⁴⁵ This was the first case of open colonial warfare that coincided with Socialist publications.⁴⁶ From the outset of the Melilla campaign, the Socialists stridently and sarcastically lampooned Jingoist nationalism and bellicosity, drew sharp distinctions between the *patria* of the profiteering bourgeoisie and the *tierra* of a exploited *pueblo*, and critiqued the hypocrisy of a 'civilizing mission' as an explanation for European expansion. These interrelated themes grew in frequency and intensity over the course of the colonial conflicts and tensions of the next two decades, likewise evolving in tone, and eventually resulting in concrete political actions that provided the socialists with new problems of doctrine and policy to contend with.

But while strident anti-colonialist rhetoric first figures as a *primary* topic in the propaganda of the PSOE in 1893, their treatment of connected issues predates this, and should not be ignored. A close reading of the early discourse of the Spanish socialists reveals, in some examples, an explicitly anti-colonialist ideology. In other places, we can infer hypotheses about the Spanish socialist worldview from a comparative reading of the sources. While it would be a mistake to claim that questions relating to the tensions of colonialism are the predominant subjects treated in the pages of *El Socialista* before 1893, certain elements do appear which require deeper analysis.

⁴⁵ Rodríguez González, Augustín Ramón. *La Guerra de Melilla de 1893* (2008) p. 5

⁴⁶ The Ten Years' War concluded in 1878, a year prior to the official foundation of the party by Pablo Iglesias. The first edition of *El Socialista* was not published until 12 March 1886.

II. The Proletarian Atlantic versus the 'Empire of the Bourgeoisie:' Slavery and Immigration

A natural starting point is, of course, the first issue of *El Socialista*. that presents for its readers "The Program of Our Party." In generically Marxist terms, this article begins by describing the unjust nature of a society divided into "two unequal and antagonistic classes;" the bourgeoisie, that dominates through possessing the means of production, and the proletariat that possesses nothing more than their labor, and is therefore dominated. Furthermore, "the economic subjection of the Proletariat is the primary cause of slavery in all of its forms: of social misery, intellectual degradation and political dependency."⁴⁷ Further reading of the manifesto appears to support the contention of historians that the early PSOE lacked a sophisticated rhetoric or a practical application of Marxist theory to the specifically Spanish case; the only evidence that the text is geared towards an audience in Iberia rather than France or England is the insistence that the apparently aristocratic and theocratic elements characterizing the Restoration elite disguises the fact that the latter were a completely and thoroughly developed capitalist bourgeoisie.

In a different article in this first issue, the PSOE elaborated on its claims to international solidarity. Since the Manichean dichotomy between the bourgeoisie and proletariat was universal, the Socialist platform of the Spanish workers party must also be identical to that of other workers' parties "in every country."

⁴⁷ "El Programa de Nuestro Partido." *El Socialista*, 12 March 1886.

Immediately, however, the statement is qualified somewhat. In the United States, it notes, the workers' movement originated as a response to "the importation of Chinese laborers, which permitted the exploiters of that country to lower the already-insufficient salaries of Anglo-American workers, or of other European origin." But no mention is made of the salaries of Chinese workers, many of whom worked in slave-like conditions. It becomes clear here that 'international' in the socialist worldview in reality refers primarily to European or Western nations. This Eurocentrism was not accidental, and we will soon come to understand the theoretical justification behind their interpretation.

Their treatment of matters closer to home elaborated this specificity in even more striking ways. In their long list of "immediate aspirations" of the Party published in their first edition, no mention is made, for instance, of the impending abolition of the *patronato* system in Cuba. The subject of social or political racial relations in Spain's Ultramar is not discussed at all, in fact, until well after the end of the *patronato* system was decreed. This may be partially credited to the rapid decay of slavery under the *patronato* - from 200,000 in 1877 to 25,000 in 1886.⁴⁸ It is also true that the early years of *El Socialista* saw the majority of its columns devoted to news of the development of workers' movements in England, France, Germany and the United States, published correspondence from the socialists in those countries to their Spanish comrades, or articles and serials translated from foreign leftist publications. But a more concrete explanation for the general lack

⁴⁸ Scott, Rebecca J. *Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor, 1860-1899* (1985) p. 460

of commentary on Cuban slavery in the first months lies in the fact that the Socialists actually viewed chattel slavery as a lesser evil than wage slavery, and an antiquated form of exploitation. The first mention we have of the issue in *El Socialista* comes during the discussions between the Spanish parliament and Cuban planters in 1886 to end the *patronato* system. On 6 August, *El Socialista* lamented that "white slavery is going to be substituted in Cuba for that of the blacks," as the Cuban deputies had asked the Government to intervene in the labor shortage there by fostering immigration of cheap wage laborers from the Peninsular rather than raise the salaries of workers already in Cuba.⁴⁹ It seemed that "those *señores* who seemed pained and indignant about the slavery that weighed on the blacks, try now to foster it among the whites, putting them in competition with another, obliging them to submit to the tortures that the others suffered."⁵⁰

The conditions of the modern wage slavery, importantly, were argued to be worse than those that chattel slaves had lived under. Capitalism was an evolved economic system with a correspondingly refined exploitation. At an eventful meeting in Burgos held 31 July 1889 (Pablo Iglesias was in attendance, chastising a group of rowdy bourgeois who attempted to disrupt the lecturers), a *compañero* Lucio "established a parallel between the situation of the antique slave and the *free* worker of today," but found that while the slaves of old did not have to work constantly and were maintained by masters in order to "conserve their property,"

⁴⁹ Scott, Rebecca J. *Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor, 1860-1899* (1985) p. 473

⁵⁰ *El Socialista* 6 August 1886

wage slaves were kept in the most "frightful misery...not even able to cover our most immediate needs."⁵¹ Worse, poverty and unemployment in the Peninsula combined with demands for cheap labor in the Americas was giving rise to a modern day slave trade. Manuel Gómez Latorre, speaking about the phenomenon of mass emigration at a meeting in Madrid, emphasized that "slavery has not disappeared, as evidenced by the *negrero* ships that continually depart from our coasts," carrying workers to another continent, "where a slavery awaits them that is harsher than that which they suffered in Spain."⁵² An article by Rafael Salinas emphasized the mutually exploitative designs of the bourgeoisie on both sides of the Atlantic: "immigration could be a powerful medium for them to secure their empire, because with it they will achieve a double objective," leaving Europe with fewer hungry, desperate workers who might challenge bourgeois privilege, and providing a influx of laborers who would drive down salaries in the New World, proving cheaper than "the cost of the former African slavery."⁵³ Salinas ended on a positive note, however: the trans-Atlantic 'Empire' of the bourgeois was, like all things pertaining to that class, doomed to crumble as emigrants from Europe would carry their class-consciousness with them to the Americas. There it would grow until the eventual and inevitable revolution.

The Spanish Socialists' complaint that black slavery in the Americas had given way to the slavery of white immigrants from Europe was expressed, we have seen, on multiple occasions. Nor was the rhetoric about a bourgeois

⁵¹ "Carta de Burgos" *El Socialista* 9 August 1889

⁵² "Meeting Socialista en Madrid" *El Socialista* 30 August 1889

⁵³ "La Emigración es propaganda socialista" *El Socialista* 26 April 1889

"empire" spanning the Atlantic meant to be understood as an abstract economic or political motif. Rather, Spanish socialists were aware of the *historical* role of black slavery and indigenous exploitation in the formation of the Spanish empire. In the same article cited above, the starving and desperate immigrants of the modern age were contrasted with the conquistadors, who were driven by "a thirst for gold or the prospect of a brilliant future," or, later, emigrants inspired by the "colossal fortunes rustled up by some *indiano*- fortunes amassed with the blood of slaves." Modern workers, by contrast, were now developing class-consciousness, as they began to understand that they going to be forced to supplant "those emancipated slaves" who had been freed, not because of humanitarian reasons, but because the selfish bourgeois understood that wage slavery would be more profitable method of benefiting from their trans-Atlantic domination.⁵⁴ The charge that abolitionist motives disguised a pragmatic capitalist cynicism was reiterated on numerous occasions. In response to a speech attacking Socialism given by the prominent Spanish abolitionist Rafael María de Labra in the Fomento de las Artes, *El Socialista* questioned the sincerity of Labra and his supporters: "Black slavery did not disappear - ¡Ay! - because of humanitarian spirit or justice: it disappeared because these days, so-called free labor is cheaper than slave. This is the truth, and Sr. Labra, jealous defender of the capitalist class, took advantage of it as an argument to convince the slave-drivers." But Labra and his fellows would have substantially less success, *El Socialista* noted, in their campaign against revolutionary socialism. For, "how is he going to convince the wage slaves

⁵⁴ "La Emigración es propaganda socialista" *El Socialista* 26 April 1889

[*esclavos de salario*] black, white and yellow, that they should not break the chains to which they are subjected?"⁵⁵

This last line is important. While early socialists were, in theory, willing to extend the prospect of general sympathy to any member of an oppressed group regardless of race or nationality, the fundamental identifying factor for *proletarian* solidarity was a shared exploitation through wage slavery. In a Marxist understanding, this was the result of industrial capitalism. In these terms, a successful strike could be hailed in China; but it was admitted that, on the whole, the conditions were not yet developed enough there for a Socialist movement.⁵⁶ In the understanding of the early PSOE, this was held to have developed only in the modern European West, although the socialists increasingly greeted the rise of Japan as an industrial power with enthusiasm, noting the corresponding growth of a working-class movement, and commenting that their rhetoric was as socialist as "any workers' newspaper in our civilized Europe".⁵⁷ Thus while oppression and exploitation in other forms could and did exist elsewhere in the unindustrialized world, they were inherently of a less developed or less refined - even, less "civilized"- character. One article mentioned how Spanish anti-slavery activists in the early 1870s had made great use of the image of Cuban slave owners who raised dogs specifically to "hunt down the poor negro who had the fortune of being able to escape his *ingeniero*..." It went on to argue that modern "Capitalist feudalism" was by turns more odious and more refined -

⁵⁵ "La Semana Burguesa" *El Socialista* 2 November 1888

⁵⁶ "Desarrollo del Socialismo" *El Socialista* 21 June 1889

⁵⁷ *El Socialista* 8 June 1898

"the *negrero* of today doesn't have to go through the bother of raising dogs for this objective." They had, instead, the full disposal of the State, with its *Guardia Civil* and *Mozos de Escuadra* to break strikes, enforce privilege, and keep the workers in their factories.⁵⁸ This advanced structure of exploitation required a scientific and specific form of socialism to destroy it.

III. Civilization and Barbarism: Colonial Metaphors and Mutual Oppressions

The fact that non-European societies had evolved less was generally taken for granted by the Spanish Socialists. Where they differed, perhaps, from other European commentators of the day was in explicitly comparing their own exploitation with that of those peoples. This "perception of similarity," to use Andrée Bachoud's phrase, took several forms, but three fundamental elements can be detected to have been originally expressed in the early years of Socialist discourse. These themes remained more or less in constant use throughout the period in question, though they evolved in sophistication and practical application, as we shall see:

Firstly, that the exploitation of the working class within Spain by the bourgeois class and its political protectors was equal to, or worse, than the exploitation of peoples living under "semi-savage" or "barbarous" regimes in the non-European world or during previous epochs of history. Secondly, therefore, the idea of a colonial "civilizing mission" undertaken by a modern European

⁵⁸ "Feudalismo Moderno" *El Socialista* 5 September 1890

bourgeoisie was a hypocritical farce, because their degree of savagery at home and abroad surpassed any of the older forms of oppression. Thirdly, since the sole motive for colonial ventures was the glory and profit of the European bourgeoisie, the metropolitan proletariat reaped no benefit from them. Moreover, by virtue of their *own* oppression by the same class, the Spanish workers were often in an identical situation as those exploited on the periphery. Finally, because of the strength of the bourgeois power structure, it could compel the Spanish working-classes to fight contrary to their own interests and those of peoples abroad in colonial wars. On all these grounds, colonialism was to be opposed.

Very often, this formulaic reasoning appears in virtually the same form as I have outlined above. However, fragmented permutations of this overarching synthesis appear now and again, particularly in the earlier publications, which can be disorienting if the underlying ideology is not understood. In 1886, for instance, the sentencing of eight anarchists in connection with the Haymarket affair provoked the scorn of *El Socialista* - it was surprising, the paper noted, that such the news of "such savagery and ferociousness" had come from Chicago, since at first glance it could be mistaken as having occurred "some city in Russia, Morocco or Zululand."⁵⁹ A condemnation of the conditions in a factory-colony administered by Antoni Sedó i Pàmies in Olesa carried the critique that it was in danger of becoming a Riffian territory any day.⁶⁰ But as we will see shortly, *El Socialista* tended to use the classic image of foreign barbarity more or less tongue-in-cheek. In the Moroccan case, their discourse was even more

⁵⁹ *El Socialista* 27 August 1886

⁶⁰ "Carta de Olesa" *El Socialista* 20 September 1889

specifically designed as a rejection of the traditional Spanish myths dating from the *Reconquista* that portrayed the *Moro* as the ultimate 'other.' The historical legend of Moroccan savagery was resurrected as a pretext for colonial conflict and to foster a patriotic Spanish identity, and was consequentially a special target of Socialist opposition.

In these instances, I argue, it was never the intent of the Socialists to demonstrate that the Moroccans were a barbarous or alien race - rather, that the Spanish bourgeoisie were far worse offenders than their own favorite savage 'other,' whose image they created and maintained to distract from their own excesses. A demonstration of this rhetoric can be seen during a short-lived crisis with the Moroccan Sultanate in 1889 that coincided with two deadly railway disasters in Spain, leading *El Socialista* to condemn the "bourgeois *Kabiles*" who owned the railroads as presenting a far greater threat to the proletariat than the Moors they might be forced to combat in Africa.

In general it can be said that, prior to the Melilla War of 1893, the PSOE paid scant attention to colonial questions or discussion of the world outside of the sphere of European and North American labor relations. As we have seen, it did make some use colonial histories of black chattel slavery as a metaphor and rubric for understanding the exploitation of the Spanish working class. Spain's own colonial empire, the Ultramar, does not figure largely in its writings until the Cuban insurrection. The paper did on occasion express support for various labor movements in Cuba, such as an 1886 strike by Havana tobacco workers,⁶¹ or an

⁶¹ 'El movimiento obrero de Cuba es importante, sobre todo entre los obreros empleados en la producción tabaquera.' *El Socialista* 10 September 1886

1889 strike by female factory workers.⁶² (Apparently *El Socialista* did have subscribers in Ultramar. A trimestral subscription cost 1,25 pesetas in Ultramar, a 25 centimo increase from the Peninsula. In neighboring Portugal, it was 1,50. More research could be done on whether the paper was ever actually circulated to any extent in Ultramar) Yet on certain occasions, the colonies appeared in greater relief. The historian Javier Morilla-Alicea has explained how the Philippine Exposition of 1887 highlighted the "tensions of empire" between colonial elites who hoped to carve out a larger place for the colonies in the metropolitan imagination, and critics who felt that the exposition's real goal was "presenting the archipelago as backwards and thereby justifying the 'civilizing mission.'"⁶³ *El Socialista*, for its own part, ran an ironic critique of the exposition, saying that its cost "proves that we are not so poor," but proposing another exposition to follow in a similar manner: a "National Exposition of Unemployed Workers."

"It could be very curious. In it would be presented the families of the workers in installations, in order to represent the sumptuous palaces that they live in; in the presence of distinguished and respectable public will take place the succulent meals that it is their custom to have; children of four or five years will give a demonstration (because after this age, it has to be assumed they will be already bent over a machine) of the brilliant instruction they receive in the municipal school; it will have grand albums, in which might appear the signatures of all those workers who owe some favor, or benefit, or good treatment of any kind to their bosses, and, at the end, they will give a simulation of what they will do on the day, not very distant, of the *grand reparation of social injustices*. If the government wants to open it, we promise our cooperation."⁶⁴

⁶² *El Socialista* 24 May 1889

⁶³ Schmidt-Nowara, Christopher & John Nieto-Phillips, eds. *Interpreting Spanish Colonialism: Empires, Nations and Legends*. (2005) P. 38

⁶⁴ *El Socialista* 26 August 1887

IV. "No Tenemos Patria:" Anti-Militarism and Anti-Colonialism as Rejections of the National Project

One of the central themes running through the threads of the Socialist discourse of opposition to the Restoration state throughout this period was that the great masses in the Peninsula suffered in conditions of abject poverty, while the government, unwilling and unable to alleviate the situation, attempted to deflect discontent by fostering national pride and silencing critiques as unpatriotic. The Socialists were quick to roundly condemn those elements of society that expressed patriotic enthusiasm, pointing out that their pride was sorely misplaced.

On the one hand, "patriotism" was nearly always condemned by socialists in the abstract. Internationally, socialist parties of this period tended to believe that the *Patria* was a bourgeois invention which the workers had no share in, and indeed, which exploited them mercilessly.⁶⁵ Following the spirit expressed in the Communist Manifesto, *El Socialista* would declare (at the outset of the Cuban insurrection in 1895) that "the dispossessed, the poor, don't have a *patria*, and it is an injustice to make them fight for that which is not theirs, for that which others possess."⁶⁶ In earlier times, when the immediate threat of open conflict was not present, Spanish socialist commentary was no less critical of nationalism. The republican paper *La Izquierda Liberal* of Málaga published a criticism of the PSOE in response to Rafael Salinas' article on immigration (cited earlier) that condemned the Socialists for being unpatriotic by critiquing Spain. Salinas replied

⁶⁵ Guerra Sesma, Daniel *Socialismo y el cuestión nacional sobre España*. p. 56

⁶⁶ *El Socialista* 15 March 1895

in an open letter to that paper, retorting that the editorialists "demonstrate their lack of understanding of socialist doctrines when they try to argue with us, taking up the Christ of the Jingoist. The *Patria!* This word is a very pretty antique to deceive fools," but it was not a concept seriously considered by workers when considering pressing issues of survival. Forced to choose between "dying of starvation while sheltered in the folds of the red and gold banner" or searching for sustenance abroad, the workers pragmatically opted for the latter option. National pride alone did not put bread in the mouths of the impoverished.⁶⁷

By extension, the colonies in Ultramar were held to be administered by the State on behalf of its elite bourgeois patrons, and were viewed as an important component of the exploitative system. Patriotic explanations for the importance of colonial possessions and the attendant international honor and prestige that accompanied it were, in the Socialist view, sinister ploys to distract the masses from their awful exploitation at home. Rather than work to alleviate the economic crisis in Spain, the government devoted what little resources it had to maintaining and advancing the selfish interests of bourgeois capitalists abroad.

Some of these projects, such as a campaign to modernize and expand the Spanish Navy, were in actuality met with a fair degree of patriotic enthusiasm that cut across many elements of Spanish society, including significant portions of the working class.⁶⁸ Understandably, in an era in which the strength of British, French, German and American military and economic power was being obviously demonstrated throughout the globe, many Spaniards hoped that strengthening the

⁶⁷ *El Socialista* 31 May 1889

⁶⁸ Alvarez-Junco, José. *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* (2011) p. 355

navy would allow them to preserve their status as a European potentate, even if it might be second-rate.⁶⁹ This military spending and the attendant patriotic fervor were roundly condemned in the Socialist press. As I have argued, the Socialists throughout this period were engaged in a propaganda campaign to construct an alternative 'anti-national' identity for the Spanish proletariat. Besides their theoretical commitment to a general Marxist philosophy of international solidarity that cut across borders and rejected nationalism (which became identified with a concrete organization after the foundation of the Second International in 1889),⁷⁰ they were threatened in a very real sense by the popular appeal which military development and colonial conflicts held for significant swaths of the Spanish population. After the disastrous year of 1898, when the Socialists' critiques appeared justified in the eyes of many disillusioned Spaniards, their discourse appears far more confident.⁷¹ Demonstrable defeat meant legitimacy for Socialist anti-patriotism. From that moment on, paradoxically, the Socialists could now lay claim to being the only 'true' patriots, because they were the only ones who had refused the comforting opiate of jingoism and had insisted on telling the bitter truth. But the fruition of their prognostications forced the leaders of PSOE into a reckoning with its own role in failing to prevent it, which altered the party's discourse and political aims in notable and controversial ways.

⁶⁹ For more, see: Rafael Nuñez Florencio, *Militarismo y antimilitarismo en España (1888-1906)* (1990)

⁷⁰ *El Socialista* 9 August 1889

⁷¹ Walker, DJ. *Spanish Women and the Colonial Wars of the 1890s*. (2008)

V. Peral's Submarine and the Modernization of the Spanish Navy

Prior to those events, a certain note of defensiveness in the face of popular patriotism can be detected. For example, one article was quick to dismiss the ephemerality of mass patriotic demonstrations, claiming that in reality, "the lure of the *patria* deceives few." The bourgeois who believed there was a strong patriotic spirit among Spanish workers were "deceived by certain unconscious enthusiasms, which were never the best barometer to calculate the strength of ideas...There must be a distinction between true enthusiasm, that originates in a deeply rooted ideal, and the unhealthy curiosity...that led to cheers for Peral because he invented a submarine, which later turned out to be a piece of junk." This was a reference to the widespread enthusiasm that arose in Spain following the news in 1889 that a naval officer, Isaac Peral, had apparently invented the first effective, battle ready submarine. As José Alvarez Junco explains, however, "a number of faults [were] discovered during the first trials...further problems then ensued. The government's reports became less enthusiastic. One suspects that, though Peral's vessel was capable of short immersions, he had not produced a vessel capable of fighting on the high seas."⁷² Despite this, the popular celebrations and demonstrations of support for Peral continued, until the government officially scrapped the plan in 1890 amid public indignation.

⁷² Alvarez-Junco, José. *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* (2011) p. 355

Some historians have seen the immense spectacle surrounding the Peral affair as "the catalyst of popular patriotism."⁷³ Socialist editorialists, of course, had a rather different perspective on the matter. While the élite were busy toasting the "glory of their generous protector Peral"⁷⁴, and the grateful country showered him with patriotic accolades for the "magnificent business of the submarine," elsewhere, national pride was distinctly lacking. Citing an article from a 'bourgeois paper,' *El Socialista* noted that "many of the emigrants from Málaga who were embarked on the steamship *Sulferino*, when this ship began its journey to Buenos Aires, crowded the gunwales and cried like madmen: "Death to Spain! Death to the *caciques*! Death to the country that leaves the poor to perish!"⁷⁵

The furor over Peral nevertheless increased over the next year.⁷⁶ *El Socialista* even joined in. In the profoundly sarcastic regular feature "The Bourgeois Week", it was 'proudly' announced that the development of the submarine would assure Spain's status of a 'first-rate power.' The Spanish had solved:

"the problem of underwater navigation, to the point that other nations were dying of envy...or laughter, as some bad Spaniards say. But if even this might not be considered a sufficient merit to give us an instrument in the European concert, there is also the huge momentum that we are giving to our navy, which must soon be ranked above the first in the world. Praise, then, to those who with patriotic and powerful intelligence conduct us with colossal steps towards the desired national regeneration! And you, civilized and uncivilized countries...empires,

⁷³ *ibid.* citing Juan Pablo Fusi.

⁷⁴ About the man Peral himself, *El Socialista* lamented that he had wasted his intelligence, which could have been directed towards improving the future of humanity, to machines of war. Gutenberg, Franklin, and Jenner were offered as examples of truly heroic innovators (*E.S.* 25 July 1890)

⁷⁵ *El Socialista* 26 July 1889

monarchies, republics... Tremble, wretches, for now Spain is preparing to meet the high destinies that Providence has reserved for it!"⁷⁷

The 'huge momentum' was an ironic commentary on the fact that, not only was there a hypothetical submarine in the works, but one of the several cruisers that the Ministry of the Marine had ordered constructed had just been launched. *El Socialista* had earlier been delighted to expose the "admirable harmony of interests" that prevailed among the industrialists of Cádiz, Ferrol and Bilbao, "three sister maritime provinces that scratch at each other to pluck the tasty prize" of a contract to construct cruisers. How was the "*mother patria* -represented by the government"⁷⁸ going to be able to content them all? The delight of the Socialists at the image of a henpecked State vainly trying to satiate the needs of the disunited, selfish bourgeoisie gave way to a more pointed critique. When the "bourgeois gentlemen of Cádiz" discovered they were not to be awarded the contract, they "reached a paroxysm of fury...railing at the central government with clenched fists, shouting all sorts of insults at it," and forgetting their own rhetoric of grave respect towards the *patria*. What would the hypocritical bourgeoisie have done, and "what would the government have done...if the working classes themselves had formulated their request in the manner you have just done? Would you have not responded with force to what you would have qualified as an unacceptable imposition?"⁷⁹

It was true, the Socialists admitted, that the building of new cruisers might lead to a rise of employment in the shipyards. But this immediate benefit to

⁷⁷ "La Semana Burguesa" *El Socialista* 12 September 1890

⁷⁸ *El Socialista* 7 September 1888

⁷⁹ *ibid.*

workers "willing to build terrible war machines..." was counterproductive, as the bourgeoisie would later use these armaments to further oppress them.⁸⁰

Furthermore, the staggering cost of the cruisers was one Spain could ill-afford.

Upon the launch of one at in 1890, *El Socialista* dryly commented: "What splendor! What grandeur! What waste!"

The summer of 1890 saw the apogee of the furor over Peral. It also saw the execution of Higinia Balaguer, a working-class maid who had been charged and convicted of murder in a sensational scandal, the "Crime of Fuencarral Street" that had captivated the nation and aggravated deep social divisions. *El Socialista* was quick to draw a parallel between the two: "by a diabolical combination...in the capital of Spain these two events have coincided, which seem to be so dissimilar." In reality, both occurrences could be seen as symptoms of the same root illness "when examined from the height of socialist doctrine." Between "the patriot and the executioner there is an intimate linkage that not even the hypocrisies of a deficient civilization suffice to break. The concept of *patria* is negation of the sublime ideal of human fraternity," while the scaffold, meanwhile, bares the reality of a social state that "can be differentiated from barbarism only in ephemeral appearances."⁸¹

VI. Civilization and Barbarism: The Moroccan Question

⁸⁰ *El Socialista* 7 September 1888.

⁸¹ *El Socialista* 25 July 1890

As we have seen, words such as 'civilization' and 'barbarism' were utilized with some flexibility. The Socialists could acknowledge little that was positive in bourgeois civilization. Using the discourse available at the time, the most obvious language to utilize in contrast, then, was 'barbarism.' Yet, as the bourgeoisie themselves claimed to exemplify civilization, (hypocritically, to use the favorite socialist adjective) and argued for its expansion as a pretext for exploitative colonial projects, the socialists of this period simultaneously sought to demonstrate how their *own* bourgeoisie surpassed the worst elements of a rhetorical uncivilized barbarism. This required them to simultaneously negate the *actual* barbarity of those targets of 'civilizing missions.' The first practical iterations of this delicate discourse appear during the crisis of 1889, one of many small ripples in the turbulent Hispano-Moroccan affairs that had last resulted in open conflict during the War of Africa (1859-60) and would again develop into the Melilla War of 1893 (discussed more extensively in Section VII of this chapter).

The origins of the crisis were petty. Fundamentally, the foreign policy of the Spanish Restoration government was threefold, as Agustín Rodríguez González notes: "neutrality in Europe, defense of the Ultramar and expansion in Africa."⁸² In the period in which competing European powers vied for economic penetration of Morocco, eroding the authority of the Sultan and provoking endless diplomatic crises between the *Makzhan* (the state apparatus of Morocco) and potentates, small incidents tended to stir up outsized reactions. Spain, with its

⁸² Rodríguez-González, Agustín. "El conflicto de Melilla en 1893" *Hispania: revista española de historia* vol. 49 issue 171 (1989) p. 237

historic enclaves on the African coast, and desirous of maintaining their claims to the northern areas of Morocco in the face of much stronger European incursion, tended to react with bellicosity. The crisis began with the seizure of a small Spanish merchant boat that had been forced to land in Agadir, a port closed to European commerce by the Moroccan government. The crew was imprisoned for three months. While this was occurring, another ship was seized near Alhucemas Bay on the suspicion that it was carrying contraband arms to Riffian tribes. Sent to investigate the matter, the gunship Cocodrilo apparently came under fire from the coast. In response, a Spanish squadron of six ships was sent to Tangiers to demand restitutions from the Sultanate. Most of these were quickly granted, and the tensions abated for the moment. *El Socialista* condemned the possibility of conflict in no uncertain terms; furthermore, they used the prospect of war with Morocco as a launching point for a broader anti-colonialist commentary. In the initial stages of the crisis, when no one was certain if matters would result in open conflict or be a mere "a summer cloud," the column "The Bourgeois Week" opined that, in the latter case, it would be a great disappointment indeed for those "patriots of good faith," who recalled the African War of thirty years earlier and were looking forward to showing off how a "civilized" country could surpass the savages "in matters of atrocity." But should matters lead to war, the column continued, it would no doubt be pleasing to all parties involved - including the proletariat, who would be better off "dying from a the strike of a *gumía* [A Moorish dagger] than suffering the barbarity of bourgeois exploitation, succumbing in the end to the rigors of hunger." And, the sarcastic article

continued, what did it matter that some people argued that the Riffian inhabitants of the coast had been justified in their actions? "To arms, valiant Spaniards! We will crush the Moroccan empire; and if some other nation would dare to head off our conquistador push with powerful navies [a reference to the high potential for foreign intervention] all the better: it would be the perfect occasion to demonstrate to the world that for this eventuality Providence endowed us with the *Peral* submarine."⁸³

The tone was less flippantly sarcastic in the next issue of September 27, by which time it had become known that the Sultan had acceded to the demands of the Spanish government. He had defused the situation, "instantly disrupting those ridiculous conquering projects forged by some vociferous scroungers...arrogant and provocative, at the cost of the blood of poor soldiers." Thankfully, on this occasion, the "*pueblo trabajador*" of Spain, who normally paid the price of "all conflicts promoted by the *gente parásita*" in blood and money, would escape the horrors of war this time, due entirely to the good judgment and parsimony of the government of a 'semi-savage' country - despite the "conduct of those pantomime warriors that have agitated in vain all the recourses of grotesque jingoism to animate the hatreds of religion or race." That the Socialists should compliment a foreign feudal autocrat on his wisdom speaks volumes about the message they were trying to communicate to their readers about their own government.

Though the immediate danger of colonial war had apparently passed for the moment, it is clear the colonial question at large continued to preoccupy the socialists, particularly as there was a segment of Spaniards who actively sought

⁸³ *El Socialista* 27 September 1889

regeneration through a colonial project in Morocco,⁸⁴ arguing that a Spanish civilizing mission there would place Spain among the ranks of the imperial powers which were even now scrambling for Africa. The Socialists disagreed. In October of 1889, one *compañero* Mir Pargas, from Barcelona, spoke at a meeting in San Andres de Palomar in general condemnation of colonialism. He "strongly attacked bourgeois governments for the conduct they follow in uncivilized countries, where by the pretext of bringing culture and combatting barbarism, or exploiting their habitants, submitting them to a labor that they did not have before, or making them consume a part of the merchandise that the bourgeoisie have stored. And those who do this in the name of civilization, leave a great number of workers to die for lack of means in their respective countries."⁸⁵ And less than a year later, in the stirrings of another crises over the true borders of Melilla, *El Socialista* followed in the same vein in the specifically Spanish case, dismissing the "Providential mission that various well-informed *señores* say that we are called to complete in Morocco." This civilizing mission would be:

"Identical to those which are effected through blood and fire in other savage countries, by such refined nations like England, France, Italy, Portugal and others: If not precisely so that they [the colonized] might enjoy the benefits of progress, then at least so that they might enjoy the sweetness of capitalist domination after the loss of their independence and subsequent plundering of their products."

⁸⁴ For recent treatments on the phenomenon of '*Africanismo*,' see: Martínez Antonio, Francisco Javier and Irene González González, eds. *Regenerar España y Marruecos: ciencia y educación en las relaciones hispano-marroquíes a finales del siglo XIX* (2011); Salavert, Vicente and M. Suárez Cortina, eds. *El regeneracionismo en España* (2007) Cheyne, George. *Joaquín Costa, el gran desconocido*. (2011)

⁸⁵ *El Socialista* 11 October 1889

However, on this particular occasion in 1889, the bellicose trumpeting of the profiteers and jingoists, 'the legitimate patriots' had not been echoed; the calls for "*guerra al infiel marroquí*" had not been seconded by the normal masses. These, *El Socialista* jested, were likely still hung-over from the recent street festivities in honor of Peral. On the other hand, at least one "patriotic squadron" had mounted up, ready for action - the wine sellers!⁸⁶

VII. The Melilla War of 1893: Legitimizing the Agency of the Moorish

'Other'

Through the sabre-rattling that preceded the Melilla War of 1893, as we have seen, *El Socialista* critiqued the jingoism of the bourgeoisie from numerous angles. It mocked the military pretensions of an impoverished and decayed power; it criticized patriotism both in the abstract- as nationalist divisions were fostered by the bourgeoisie state purely for profit, and were antithetical to international proletarian harmony- and in concrete terms, in that it distracted attention and resources away from pressing problems within Spain. It had critiqued colonialism on similar grounds, and condemned the idea of a 'civilizing mission' as hypocritical. We have also seen how Socialists seized upon the metaphors provided in the Spanish colonial experiences with African slavery, conquest in the

⁸⁶ *El Socialista* 8 August 1890. The Socialists frequently implied that bartenders were the ones who gained the most from patriotic festivities. When a demonstration was held in 1890 demanding the Naval board reverse its decision to scrap the Peral project, *El Socialista* expressed its surprise that a squadron of tavern-keepers had not been present - for "who is more of an authority than them in aquatic matters?" (*E.S.* 29 August 1890) Later, at the outset of the 1893 Melilla campaign, it claimed that popular patriotism in favor of the war had not nearly reached the level it had during the *chocolatera* of Peral - because "at least then the *taberneros* were enthusiastic." (*E.S.* 27 October 1893)

Americas, and the Filipino Exposition, and attempted to apply it to the realities faced by their own working-class. But, as I have mentioned, the most obvious colonial question that confronted the Socialists during this period was Morocco. The socialists opposed any colonial conflict in Morocco, through the doctrinal trinity I have elucidated above: anti-militarism, anti-patriotism, and anti-colonialism. Many historians have claimed that the central contention of their opposition was that any war undertaken by a capitalist state - whether in the colonial periphery, or a "general" war (i.e. between industrial nation-states) - was harmful, first and foremost, to the metropolitan proletariat. As unwilling cannon-fodder for the bourgeois exploiters, they would shoulder the burden in blood and treasure. In the Spanish case, it was argued, the Socialist discourse therefore paid scant attention to the experiences and role of those peoples in the colonial periphery who were the targets of such campaigns.

I have mentioned above several ways in which this understanding of Spanish socialist rhetoric can be complicated. Turning our analysis more specifically toward the Moroccan case, and specifically the Melilla campaign, it becomes clear that in fact the socialist opposition to colonial conflict was manifold: certainly, the socialists will be seen to make great use of the damaging effects of conflict on their own working-class. But their portrayal of the agency and legitimacy of the would-be colonized Riffians demonstrates a deeper element of their discourse, and cannot be dismissed. For Morocco was not merely another of the distant lands whose borders and fates were being arbitrarily decided over diplomatic tables in Berlin, Paris, or London - Morocco represented the ultimate

historic "other," the age-old enemy by which Spaniards, insofar as they could be said to have developed a collective identity at all, measured themselves since at least 1492. The legacy of the *Reconquista*, the triumphant figure of St. James the Moor-Slayer (*Santiago Matamoros*), and the costumed pageant-battles of Christians and Moors all formed crucial parts of Spanish cultural identity.⁸⁷ The equalization of the Moroccan with the "Other" was so ubiquitous that the word *Moro* became general: witness the use of the term to describe Filipino insurrectionaries at the end of the century (although the PSOE did not use this derogatory word). Morocco, therefore, presented not just any colonizing project, but one that carried deep historical ties that resonated with the mythology of a 'traditional' Spain. Unlike many other colonizing nations at the height of the 'age of imperialism,'⁸⁸ Spaniards across the socio-political spectrum were acutely conscious of deep historical relationship (though usually portrayed in antagonistic and stereotypical terms) spanning the straits of Gibraltar. By complicating or rejecting the portrayal of the "Moroccan Infidel [*infiel marroquí*]" the Socialists were consciously rejecting 'tradition' and forming their own modern identity.

⁸⁷ The body of scholarly work devoted to this subject is massive; José Alvarez Junco's *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* (2011) and Carlos Serrano's *El nacimiento de Carmen* (1999) are important recent works which discuss this aspect of Spanish national identity. Likewise, Susan Martin-Marquéz' *Disorientations* (2008) is an enlightening study of the complications this discourse underwent during the 19th and 20th centuries.

⁸⁸ In Thomas Pakenham's opus *The Scramble for Africa* (1992), he notes: "The Scramble for Africa bewildered everyone..." Up to the mid-1870s, much was unknown about the 'Dark Continent.' "Suddenly, in half a generation, the Scramble gave Europe virtually the whole continent, including thirty new colonies and protectorates, 10 million square miles and 110 million dazed new subjects," about which and whom little was known in Europe. (p. xxi)

In his treatment of Socialist discourse surrounding the Melilla War, Rafael Núñez Florencio notes the "bitterly ironic" commentary that appears in the paper during this conflict, but concludes that: "*El Socialista* derived its analysis more from the notion of *patria*- or the subversion of the bourgeois nation of *patria* - than from the colonial problem."⁸⁹ I have previously argued that for the socialists, anti-patriotic, anti-militarist and anti-colonialist themes were all facets of an integrated discourse, and that the emphasis by other historians on Spanish insularism is misleading. In the example of the Melilla campaign, I believe that a close reading of the sources supports my argument that while the Socialists were indeed predominately concerned with discrediting the peninsular bourgeois notion of the *patria*, they did so precisely *through* an explicit rejection of the hypocrisy of colonialism and 'civilizing' mentalities. This resulted in the Riffians being accorded a similar status and agency -or *semejante*- with the working class readers of *El Socialista*- certainly, less parochial an attitude than previously thought.

During earlier stirrings accompanying the 1890 dispute over Melilla's borders, *El Socialista* felt they understood the true issue succinctly. The edginess of the bourgeoisie, those who "had something to lose and were afraid to see it lost" in Morocco, explained their bellicose sabre-rattling at every sign that "the African *kabiles* were not too comfortable with seeing the Spanish flag flown a few steps away from their houses, in areas that were once their permanent dwellings." The Spanish occupiers of Moroccan enclaves lived in constant terror,

⁸⁹ Núñez Florencio, Rafael. *Militarismo y antimilitarismo en España* (1886-1906) (1990)

with the "*conquistadores*" fearing every moment that "these hordes will take revenge, the case for which we have always had at our disposal the indispensable catalog of swear-words and disparagements, of phrases of melodramas and novels in installments: those of 'turbulent, savage tribes, impossible to subject if not through the force of cannons and bombs and machine guns; barbarians eager for plunder, thirsty for slaughter, spiteful and vindictive, of evil intentions, worthy of cruel, energetic and exemplary punishment, worthy of being executed in tens and shot in hundreds...' "

The paper showed itself deeply aware that vocabularies of fear and hatred of the peripheral Moorish 'other' had been inculcated in the historical memory of Spaniards. It here attempted to outline a sociological explanation for the phenomenon, and then to dismiss its legitimacy by demonstrating how the same rhetoric had applied to its readers. For it was not incidental, the article went on to say, that the same rhetoric was used to oppress the poor Spanish workers when they likewise made claims to what had always been theirs. The theft of property was an offense punishable by law in Spain, and rigorously enforced by the 'civilized' bourgeoisie state - was not "the act of claiming territory that is not ours" equally contemptible? Were the Moors not well within their rights to "try to toss the usurper from their soil?"⁹⁰ Why should a common thief be condemned but colonizing projects be cheered? "Should we have the right... to punish the victims of our spirit of imitation of those great nations, the most civilized on Earth, who put law and reason into the mouths of their cannons...?" Clearly, the editorialist argued, Spaniards could not support colonialism on these grounds. Spanish

⁹⁰ *El Socialista* 5 September 1890

workers could reflect on the experience of the Riffian on the other side of the straits and detect the same pattern of their own oppression.

In early October 1893, the situation in Melilla spiraled out of control after a series of tensions and incidents provoked by the Spanish construction of fortifications beyond the city limits. Local Riffians protested against one such fortification (Sidi-Guarach) on the grounds that it overlooked a Muslim cemetery; their petitions were denied and the situation intensified as the Spanish military believed that tribesmen were sabotaging the construction of the fortress by night. In early October, a large force of Riffians attacked the Spanish garrison but was easily repulsed. But the "bellicose trumpet" blared loudly in Spain, especially after it was claimed that some Spanish corpses had been mutilated.⁹¹ While the Moroccan Sultan attempted to appease the Spanish government's demands, the Rif had historically lain in the *Bled-el-Siba*, large regions of Moroccan territories whose inhabitants recognized the Sultan in ceremonial religious terms but rejected virtually all other elements of his authority.⁹² The token force dispatched by the Sultan made no impact, and the Spanish government blamed the Sultanate for its failure to control the actions of its subjects. The height of the crisis came at the end of October, when a sortie led by General Juan García y Margallo attempted to

⁹¹ Socialist editorializing on these events can be found in *El Socialista* 13 October 1893. An empirical description can be found in chapter IV of Rodríguez González, Agustín Ramón. *La Guerra de Melilla en 1893* (2008)

⁹² The dichotomy between "bled es-siba" and "bled al-makhzan" has recently been argued to have been an Orientalist simplification of the state of Moroccan affairs, a justification for the later establishment of a protectorate. Burke III, Edmund. *The Ethnographic State: France and the Invention of Moroccan Islam* (2015), p. 81, is probably the most recent major work to argue for this revised view.

break the siege of the Spanish garrison, but was repulsed with heavy losses, including Margallo himself (a scandal later arose when it was disclosed that he had been engaged in illicit arms-trafficking with the Riffians). Spanish reinforcements led by General Arsenio Martinez-Campos and naval bombardments stabilized the situation, so that by December *El Socialista* could conclude that the affair had worn itself out. Hostilities officially concluded with the Sultanate paying Spain an indemnity of 20 million pesetas.⁹³

The previous elements of discourse we've traced in *El Socialista* leapt to the forefront during this period. Discussion of the conflict figured in the front pages of the paper from 13 October until 8 December 1893, when it began receding into the background as the campaign petered out. Nevertheless, aspects of the conflict continued to be touched upon for some time after, including most notably a serialized column "Impressions of a Reservist," which to my knowledge has not been treated at length in published histories since. On October 13, the first edition published after the outbreak of open hostilities, the leading article of *El Socialista*- the familiar satirical feature, "The Bourgeois Week", proclaimed: "The hour to sound the bellicose trumpet has arrived! *War, war/ to the Moroccan infidel!* sing the good patriots, which all of us Spaniards are, naturally...the Riffian barbarians have insulted us, and the Press, that never wastes an occasion to keep alive the sacred fire of patriotism, calls for the extermination of the *moritos*, and it is necessary that they be exterminated. In the name of civilization and the *patria*." It was true, of course, that Melilla was "enclaved" in Africa, rather than Iberia, but

⁹³ Pennell, C.R. *A Country with a Government and a Flag: The Rif War in Morocco, 1921-1926*. (1986) p. 13

patriots could conveniently ignore this, just as they were ignorant of the location of the Caroline Islands (in 1885, there had been a diplomatic battle with Germany over the possession of these distant Pacific territories). It was also true, *El Socialista* noted, that the Riffians, "who also have the right to be patriots, don't have to take a good view of Spanish domination in their country," but of course, 'civilized' nations hypocritically understood that patriotism only applied to the strong, and not the weak. Under the 'civilized' capitalist regime, the institutionalized thievery of the bourgeoisie was legitimized by the power of the State. Colonialism was an identical thievery exercised abroad, legitimized by patriotism and nationalism.

The charge that Riffians had mutilated Spanish corpses was also mockingly dismissed- such disrespect could not be tolerated by the "Spanish lion!" Even though it had been preceded by the Spanish bombardment of a mosque and Muslim cemetery, what did it matter? In the end: "they are Mohammedans. And we hold communion in a religion of peace and gentleness. But now, we will teach them to respect our dead," by testing the range of our Mausers in the bodies of the living, "to teach them not to be *savages*." The Riffians' religious complaints about the location of the fortifications under construction showed their irrational Islamic fanaticism. Sardonicly, the column suggested that Spaniards were more demonstrably more tolerant, because they were content to throw people into prison if they were found to be absent during

processions of the Eucharist. But this was only because they could no longer burn them alive, as in the days of the Inquisition.⁹⁴

VIII. Patrioters and "Those Who Pay For the Broken Glass." Profiteers and Reservists at the Intersection of Class and Colonial Conflict.

There were two constant topics, more insular in character, that were expressed by *El Socialista* throughout the period treated in this thesis. Scholars have detected and analyzed these in depth, and their perspectives on these valuable.⁹⁵ Yet an overwhelming focus on these elements without the larger context has, I believe, been the result of the general conclusion that the socialists were primarily parochial and unsophisticated in their early rhetoric, and later in their political action surrounding colonial conflicts. While I maintain that this view is too simplistic, and that a nuanced and distinct anti-colonialism was present as an integral part of socialist discourse, it is nevertheless undeniable that local concerns did form the most significant element of socialist opposition. Moreover, specific topics pertaining to metropolitan concerns eventually evolved to occupy a central role in the platform of the PSOE, as their early discursive propaganda developed into concrete political actions during the Cuban Insurrection (the process and significance of which I chart below in chapter III).

⁹⁴ *El Socialista* 13 October 1893

⁹⁵ e.g. Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y las cuestiones coloniales" (1890-1914); López García, Bernabé. *El Socialismo español y el anticolonialismo (1898-1914)*. (1976)

Fundamentally, these issues were: a condemnation of "false patriots" who profited from colonial conflict in an auxiliary capacity, in a symbiotic relationship with the bourgeois businessmen, industrialists and politicians; and the contention that the laws on military service in Spain unfairly ensured that only the proletariat would suffer the privations of a soldier in peacetime and war.

The former is best understood as a critique of the more indirect machinations by which Spanish bourgeoisie propped up their assumed socio-political hegemony. It further simplified the class dichotomy and, therefore, strengthened a separate socialist working-class identity apart from the *patria*. Throughout the Melilla campaign (and more or less through this entire period) one way this was argued was through condemnations of the "jingoist press." It was argued that they stirred up popular patriotism and war furor, through what would soon be termed 'yellow journalism,' purely in order to sell more papers.⁹⁶ These columnists, wage-workers themselves who slavishly did the bidding of their wealthy bosses, influenced popular opinion to force the government into unnecessary conflicts- all in order to sell more editions.⁹⁷ The sensationalism and exaggerations of this "patriotic-mercantilist" press was roundly lampooned. How was it that the "people of Hernán Cortez, who burned his boats and conquered the

⁹⁶ Hinton, Sylvia L. "The Spanish American War of 1898: Queries into the Relationship between the Press, Public Opinion and Politics," *Revista Española de Estudios Norteamericanos* (1994)

⁹⁷ The founding members of the PSOE were predominately printers, and the constant early financial struggles of *El Socialista* can only have further embittered the editorial staff against those who sold their souls for a "crust of bread" to the "*prensa de gran circulación*." Heywood notes that the paper "had to wage a constant battle against bankruptcy." *Marxism and the Failure of Organized Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936*. (1990) p. 14

unconquerable," lauded as immortal heroes those who launched grenades at targets more than 3,000 meters away, and at no danger to themselves?⁹⁸ A more shameful element of this state of journalistic affairs, of course, was that while the "poor children of the people...have gone in force to defend a piece of land that has no purpose," the only sacrifice of the 'papers of great circulation' had to make was to "spill rivers...of ink in defense of the *patria*."⁹⁹ A good summation of the general socialist view on the matter can be seen when *El Socialista* asked: "Who are the greater barbarians? The Riffians who defend their patria, or the salaried journalists who, to augment the profits of the bourgeois," agitated the people to a war that will result in the deaths of many proletarian children? *El Socialista* posed the question, but they insisted: "their mothers should answer."¹⁰⁰

Another species in the taxonomy of 'hypocritical patriots' was the profiteer, usually a small businessman or a military officer with personal involvement in colonial projects, whose avarice was so intense that it led them to sell contraband war materials to the very elements that would then turn those weapons on them.¹⁰¹ Of course, when this happened, these profiteers would clamor for the support of the State and its army to protect their other interests, and the proletariat, reluctantly composing the rank-and-file of the former, would be perpetually caught in the vise. Bitingly, *El Socialista* suggested that these particular *patrioteros* were motivated not by profit, but by honorableness

⁹⁸ *El Socialista* 3 November 1893.

⁹⁹ *El Socialista* 3 November 1893.

¹⁰⁰ *El Socialista* 20 October 1893

¹⁰¹ Núñez Florencio, Rafael. *Militarismo y antimilitarismo en España (1888-1906)* p. 139. Arturo Barea also describes endemic gifting of military materiel in the Spanish army during later colonial ventures in Morocco in *The Forging of a Rebel* p. 244-245

[*hidalguía*], because they desired a fair, chivalric contest - so that the Riffians could "fight with equivalent arms."¹⁰² A few weeks later, after mocking the extensive expressions of popular overenthusiasm masquerading as patriotic ardor ("don Fulano de Tal offers to go as a volunteer, don Mengano de Cual"¹⁰³, apothecary, donated 500 grams of cotton...one wants to *eat the Moors alive*, the other...*to become drunk on Moorish blood*...A butcher in Triana, hearing notice of the brutal aggression of the 2nd [of Oct.] had his beautiful dog named "Allah" put to death ...¹⁰⁴) it cited an article from *El Liberal* which exposed that approximately 20,000 rifles had been sold to the Riffians, and that "among those dedicated to such lucrative and patriotic business can be found an officer of the Army."¹⁰⁵ Similar charges would be levied during the Cuban insurrection, and the Socialist press would miss no opportunity to comment on them.

In their number corresponding to 1 December 1893, *El Socialista* expressed regret. Since the 'patriotic' press continued to exploit the situation in Morocco mercilessly, they had "no choice but to talk about 'the campaign of the Rif.'" Although hostilities had mostly abated by then, the call-up of the Reserves for service by the Minister of War had provoked a strong reaction from the paper regarding the second topic of their peninsular concerns. The PSOE would soon latch on to the injustice manifested through a compulsory military service that could be avoided through paid exemptions as a central platform of their party's political agenda. By the height of the Cuban insurrection, the Socialists' first

¹⁰² *El Socialista* 18 October 1893

¹⁰³ Both are placeholder names.

¹⁰⁴ *El Socialista* 20 October 1893

¹⁰⁵ *El Socialista* 17 November 1893

major campaign of activism would revolve around this issue. Although the famous motto "*O todos o ninguno*" had yet to appear at this stage, its precedents can be easily traced back to the Melilla war. We have already seen several examples of how *El Socialista* lamented throughout this early period that, in modern war, the "sons of the proletariat" were the only ones forced to make costly and detrimental sacrifices at the profane altar of the *patria*, which gave them no recompense. The experience of Spanish reservists appeared to give credence to this claim. On 8 December 1893, the paper began running a serialized column, six in total, written by "A Socialist" then serving with reluctance in the ranks of the Reserves. These "Impressions of a Reservist"¹⁰⁶ deserve some analysis.

In the first article, the anonymous correspondent blamed the 'patriotic journalists' for convincing the government that it was necessary to call up the reservists and "dress me up in a military uniform," along with 112,000 other unfortunates whose households suffered immensely in their absence.¹⁰⁷ Prior to the call-up, he had worked in a factory with another individual "as patriotic as any of the other impressionable readers of *El Liberal*...[a mainstream paper]" On hearing the news of renewed assaults on fortifications near Melilla at the end of October, he sought out his co-worker to ask his opinion, but found him severely distracted by the loss of his ruler, and refusing to discuss any question of Melilla or any other subject until he found it. The *reservista* replied "Hombre, a ruler isn't worth two *reales*, or is it that your patriotism isn't worth that money?" But the man dismissed him and continued his search. From this encounter, the *reservista*

¹⁰⁶ *El Socialista* Nos. 405, 406, 409, 410, 412, 416

¹⁰⁷ *El Socialista* 8 December 1893.

and his leftist friends concluded that "patriotism isn't worth .50 centimos," the daily wage of reservists.¹⁰⁸ In the next installment, the anonymous reservist described the "criminal and inhumane" conditions of military life, a situation the officers were well aware of, "because they would have to be very inept to ignore that neither one blanket nor two could give warmth to a man on cold nights in the barracks, where the air circulates as if it were the open street." The maltreatment and neglect that the reservist and his comrades were subjected to, the anonymous individual noted, "were the reason that I cling more and more to the socialist ideas, because this abandonment by the *jefes*, when they speak so much of patriotism and the honor of the Spanish soldier, indicates to me the disdain that the inferior class inspires in the superior."¹⁰⁹ Whether through purposeful neglect or lack of means, the Spanish military showed itself incapable even of feeding the reservists properly- the correspondent paints tragicomic scenes of starving reservists taking to the streets of La Coruña with guitars and accordions, begging for alms. He appeals to working-class fathers, who struggled through every privation to raise their sons, only to have to deliver them to the 'exploitative class' that: "tears out these pieces of your soul to inter them in barracks, where many of them learn immoral games and acquire habits of idleness that are highly damaging."¹¹⁰

In the following article he reiterates that debilitating effects of military service on both the soldiers, and their working-class widows, orphans, mothers, and families that struggle to survive in their absence. "*Obreros y obreras*: you are

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ *El Socialista* 15 December 1893

¹¹⁰ *El Socialista* 29 December 1893

the only ones that suffer the sad consequences of war..." War, he speculated, was a result of the divisions of class, nation, and race. Our anonymous reservist philosophized:

"I don't think I'd be wrong if I suppose that among the first inhabitants of the earth there was no other law than force, and those that utilized it made themselves owners of pieces of land; and in the passage of time that which was at first an abuse became a right. After this, Humanity divided in races, forming these heaps of *patrias*, that through the ambition of those who ruled them declared the bloody wars that redden the pages of history. If there weren't opposed interests; if natural products, and those created by the forces of man, instead of being monopolized by one class, belonged to Humanity, through this there would come the harmony that is so necessary to impede those who hate and tear apart those who are brothers. Pay attention, workers: the narrow idea that we have of the *patria* is the origin of these wars that devour us."¹¹¹

It would be curious to know the extent of this anonymous reservist's socialist education. He makes no mention in his articles of Marx, Engels or Guesde, dialectical materialism or "scientific socialism." What is more certain -and striking- is that he repeatedly makes the claim that his own understanding of the roots of racism, patriotism, and national conflict, and the development of his own class-consciousness, were forged in the context of his lived experience as an unwilling soldier in a colonial conflict. The bellicose colonial projects undertaken by the bourgeois state, in his view, were the best possible propaganda for socialism. His reservist comrades and their families who might once have "believed that the bourgeoisie has the capacity to feel pity for the workers left disappointed, and saw confirmed the prophecies of the propagandists of Socialism."¹¹² In the next chapter, we will see how the Spanish socialists reacted

¹¹¹ *El Socialista* 5 January 1893

¹¹² *El Socialista* 25 January 1893

to the experiences of the grinding colonial campaigns in Cuba and the Philippines, and analyze how the PSOE attempted to interpret and forestall the harrowing consequences these presented for Spain.

Chapter Three: Cuba and the Philippines

I. "From First Principles to Direct Action?" The Role of the Cuban Insurrection and the Disaster in the History of the PSOE.

The Spanish defeat at the hands of the United States in the brief and disastrous war of 1898 has since figured centrally in Spanish historiography as the moment when Spain's long decline in the international sphere- and its more recent stagnation when compared to the rapidly developing economic and political landscapes of other Western nations in the last three decades of the nineteenth century- was strikingly laid bare.¹¹³ At the height of European colonial expansion and international hegemony, Spain appeared to be the only country which had *ceased* to become an 'empire.'¹¹⁴ More recently, some scholars have convincingly argued that the concrete, immediate repercussions to Spain were less dramatic than the psychological shock of defeat, noting that the Restoration system with its *Cortes*, constitution, king, and political parties remained in power for long

¹¹³ Balfour, Sebastian. *The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898-1923* (1997) p. 6

¹¹⁴ Pan-Montojo, Juan, José Álvarez-Junco et. al. *Más se perdió en Cuba. España y la crisis de fin de siglo.* (1998) p. 10

afterwards, with a few minor alterations;¹¹⁵ that the negative effects to the Spanish economy which resulted from a costly war and the loss of profitable colonies were soon overcome, and that many of the major effects previously understood to have arisen from the period, such as the intellectual crisis of the 'Generation of '98' or the dramatic rise in class- or labor-based political factions, were merely local iterations of international fin-de-siècle phenomena, deriving from factors largely independent from the 'Disaster.'¹¹⁶

Where the Spanish experience departed, however, was that "the end of century crisis acquired among...cultural elites a special dimension: the defeat [of 1898] was experienced in terms of the failure of the Spanish national project."¹¹⁷ The conflict and subsequent loss of the colonies marked a decisive blow to the efforts of nineteenth century elites to construct a Spanish identity as a modern imperial nation-state. At the same time, it was also a catalyst for powerful new conceptualizations of Spanish identity. The defeat destroyed the myth of Spanish national strength that had arisen from the War of Independence, displaying the uncomfortable reality that Spain was a 'second-rate military power.' But, as Juan Pan-Montojo explains, "if Spain wasn't a country of superior culture like Germany, or a country of liberty like France, or an imperial power like Great Britain," and not even, as it was hoped on the eve of the war, a "sleeping lion" still populated by the "indomitable people" who had spontaneously arose to drive out

¹¹⁵ Pro Ruíz, Juan *ibid.*

¹¹⁶ Pan-Montojo, Juan. *Más se perdió en Cuba. España y la crisis de fin de siglo.* (1998) p. 11

¹¹⁷ *ibid.*

the French invader, "Spanish identity would have to be redefined as a process previous to, or parallel to, the Hispanicization [*españolización*] of the Spanish."¹¹⁸

As Pan-Montojo notes, these competing visions did not spring like Athena from the skull of 1898. The *zeitgeist* of fin-de-siècle Europe, provoked by a second industrial revolution, urbanization, increasing democratization, and new imperialism,¹¹⁹ had already provoked an uncertain atmosphere that was generally conducive to reevaluations of all varieties. The *Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, as we have seen, had been engaged in the decade preceding 1898 in a determined discursive effort to construct its own 'parallel' identity for a working-class Spanish identity, fundamentally based in an opposition to the bourgeois myth of the 'patria.' The repercussions of the Cuban insurrection and the shock of the Disaster of 1898 cut through all sectors of Spanish society, and left a culture that we might expect to have been deeply receptive to the anti-colonial, anti-militarist, and anti-patriotic ideologies of the Socialist party. Despite recent evidence that, in general, the Spanish economy recovered from the conflict relatively rapidly in material terms,¹²⁰ the immediate human and economic costs of the 1895-1898 war were undeniably tremendous. In a little over three years of conflict, 200,000 Spanish soldiers were mobilized, less than half of whom returned alive. Those who did were generally in poor health, ravaged by disease or mutilated in combat and suffering badly from the hard conditions of their trans-Atlantic crossing; and ill-cared for upon their arrival back in Spain. The war cost

¹¹⁸ *ibid.* p. 27

¹¹⁹ Pan-Montojo, Juan. *Más se perdió en Cuba. España y la crisis de fin de siglo.* (1998). p. 10

¹²⁰ Tafunell, Xavier and Albert Carreras. *Historia Económica de la España contemporánea* (2004) p. 200–208

a staggering two billion *pesetas*, and prompted a rise in the price of sustenance and a simultaneous fall in wages. The poorer segments of Spanish society experienced the greatest burden. Balfour writes: "the wars...dislocated the lives of innumerable working-class and peasant families."¹²¹ An analysis of the actual role of the PSOE in this period cannot, as Mariano Esteban de Vega accurately points out, be disassociated from this context.¹²²

Given the apparent fecundity of the situation for popular discontent, it is therefore surprising to discover that there is a general consensus among scholars that, as a whole, the Spanish Socialists abjectly failed to take advantage of the national and colonial crisis. Even the contemporary apologist Juan José Morato titled his section detailing the PSOE's experiences during this period as a "passage through the desert," a motif often repeated in later works.¹²³

The historiographical treatment of this period has upheld the general perception of an intellectually impoverished Spanish Socialism, incapable either of grasping the true nature of the situation or acting upon it effectively. Approached from a theoretical perspective -leaving aside a qualitative political assessment for the moment- the central failure of the socialists derived from their unwillingness or inability to understand the conflicts in coherent, developed anti-colonialist terms. Carlos Serrano has noted that the "young Spanish working class was one of the first in the world to have to articulate themselves when faced with

¹²¹ Balfour, Sebastian. *The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898-1923*. (1997) P. 113-114

¹²² Esteban de Vega, Mariano. "El Partido Socialista en la crisis del 1898," *El Socialismo en España: desde la fundación del PSOE hasta 1975*. coord. Santos Juliá Díaz p. 88

¹²³ Morato, Juan José. *El Partido Socialista Obrero* (1918) p. 121-153; the phrase appears in Esteban de Vega and Núñez Florencio as well.

a true war of national independence in the Antilles."¹²⁴ But the socialists, it is argued, generally failed to articulate themselves adequately. Instead they contented themselves with portraying the conflicts in Cuba and the Philippines in abstract terms, utilizing a generic and superficial rhetoric of opposition to *all* wars as bourgeois concerns that had to be opposed on practical grounds because of their inherently negative effects on the proletarians of the world (an element of discourse that will by now be familiar to the reader). This is the prevailing historical interpretation of Socialist activity and thought from 1895-98. I have previously argued that this assessment has been too broadly applied, failing to take into account the periods before and after, and the way in which the Socialists understood concepts such as colonialism and nationality. Yet, in first analysis, it is easy to understand why historians of the period have found the Socialist response to the complexities of the evolving conflict wanting when they focus their attention on the party's treatment of the Cuban insurrection.

II. Insurrection 'In' Cuba or 'Of' Cuba?

The vocabulary of the propaganda appearing in the pages of the Socialist newspapers, in particular *El Socialista* and *La Lucha de Clases* (of Bilbao) has been subjected to extensive interpretation. In particular, scholars have pointed out that the socialists failed to acknowledge or understand the aims of the Cuban and Filipino rebels. Instead, as Carlos Serrano notes: "in the tradition of a cheap

¹²⁴ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y La Guerra de Cuba," *Estudios de historia social*. vol. 8-9 (1979) p. 287

Marxism, the class communalism of the proletarians of all countries against capital was underlined." The bourgeoisie, both "of here and there" were the instigators, while the "white slaves" of Spain had to go to fight the "black slaves" in Cuba.¹²⁵ A simplified and inaccurate class dichotomy was assigned a "vague geographic localization," and by locating the insurrection "*in* Cuba," rather than "*of* Cuba," Serrano views the socialists as attempting to "avoid recognizing an entity, endowed with its own political or national identity."¹²⁶ One might add that this is unsurprising: as we have seen above, the PSOE had previously been particularly preoccupied with negating the idea of a Spanish *patria* in the elucidation of their own working-class identity. They were hardly likely to admit the legitimacy of a nationalist movement elsewhere, particularly one whose pre-eminent intellectual voice, José Martí, had earlier deemed Socialism as 'the future slavery.'¹²⁷

The complex nature of the movement in Cuba, and its strong working-class support, would seem to have presented the socialists with an awkward dilemma. In this understanding, one might be tempted to locate the roots of the socialists' reluctance to directly address the Cuban insurrection as a unique phenomenon in the same vein as their inflexible hostility towards Republicanism. They had expressed this in innumerable critiques throughout the period, directed both towards foreign 'bourgeois Republics,¹²⁸ and against the fractious Spanish

¹²⁵ *El Socialista* 15 March 1895.

¹²⁶ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba" *Estudios de historia social*. vol. 8-9 (1976) p. 288

¹²⁷ Martí, José. "La Futura Esclavitud," (1884) <www.literatura.us/marti>

¹²⁸ One need not search hard for examples - the exploitation of the indigenous population under the Republic of Peru presents one of many interesting examples.

republican movement - the latter on the grounds that republicanism was the ideology most likely to appeal to the working-classes, and was therefore a direct competitor with the PSOE for influence.¹²⁹

If there is any debate in the historiography surrounding the socialist approach to the colonial conflicts from 1895-98, it is centered on the question of whether their propaganda underwent a noticeable evolution towards a more nuanced and profound anti-colonialism, or if their understanding remained consistently 'impoverished'. The lynchpin of this debate involves the increasing level of support for the aspirations of the Cuban rebels. Heywood writes that, faced with "a struggle for independence...the party did not perceive the Cuban struggle to be one of national liberation, to be supported for that reason. The Socialists' emphasis was upon the need to end a costly war, and only gradually did they come to advocate Cuban independence." In his article "*El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba*," Carlos Serrano argued the PSOE eventually came to terms with the reality of the aims of the Cuban *insurrectos*, and thereafter supported them. Rafael Nuñez Florencio, on the other hand, believes that this vision of "a coherent evolution in the socialist position is debatable."¹³⁰ And indeed, a close reading of *El Socialista* and *La Lucha de Clases* demonstrates that the Socialists frequently vacillated, demurred, contradicted themselves or revised their opinions on the

(E.S. 3 May 1889). The main target throughout the era was the French Third Republic; during 1897-98 the United States became a favorite, for obvious reasons.

¹²⁹ Heywood, Paul. *Marxism and the Failure of Organized Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936*. (1990) p. 12

¹³⁰ Nuñez Florencio Rafael. *Militarismo y Antimilitarismo en España (1888-1906)*, (1990) P. 258

question throughout the period.¹³¹ Fundamentally, however, the PSOE understood that the Cuban conflict was not a revolutionary Socialist struggle. They increasingly expressed sympathy for the aims of national liberation and self-determination, but accurately assessed that Cuban independence would not result in the destruction of a capitalist economic system on the island. Since this was the ultimate conflict that must be fought, the socialists came to advocate for an autonomous or independent Cuba, whose proletariat would develop class-consciousness against their own bourgeoisie once the immediate aim of throwing off the oppressive Spanish yoke had been secured.

This eventual attitude was slow to develop. It is undeniable, however, that the Socialists were consistent and staunch opponents of the war in generic terms.¹³² The question then becomes one of nuance: was this opposition exclusively influenced by introverted and petty concerns, subjected to the practical exigencies of organizational growth and political advances? Was the Spanish socialist party intellectually incapable of recognizing the movements of national liberation in Ultramar as a legitimate form of response to oppression? Finally, there is the difficult but important question of the manner and extent that the private convictions of the party's leadership were mediated or suppressed by outside factors.

¹³¹ Esteban de Vega, Mariano. "El Partido Socialista en la crisis del 1898," *El Socialismo en España: desde la fundación del PSOE hasta 1975*. coord. Santos Juliá Díaz p. 89

¹³² Heywood, Paul. *Marxism and the Failure of Organized Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936*. (1990), p. 16

III. A Sparse Strategy or a Tangible Success?

One thing that becomes abundantly clear is that the necessity of addressing the colonial conflict exacerbated deep tensions within the party regarding fundamental questions of strategy. Pablo Iglesias, critiqued by many contemporaries and subsequent historians for a narrow-minded and dogmatic preoccupation with organization and doctrine, insisted the party's activities be strictly legal.¹³³ This necessarily limited their rhetoric. But it must be remembered that there was a very real threat of government repression, in the form of censorship or arrests, and extrajudicial military violence. The survival of the PSOE can be attributed in no small part to this caution, even if their rate of growth suffered in the interim. Even when they operated in this legalist framework, socialist leaders were periodically imprisoned for their political activity and printed statements.¹³⁴ As a result of this insistence on building and preserving a strong, organized party, the PSOE of the 1890s was generally risk-adverse. When anarchists lobbed bombs in Catalonian theaters and assassinated politicians, or soldiers mutinied, the PSOE condemned these acts as endangering rather than helping the proletariat [*masa obrera*].¹³⁵ Furthermore (to the disgust of early party founders such as Dr. Jaime Vera and Francisco Mora) Iglesias had

¹³³ Esteban de Vega, Mariano. "El Partido Socialista en la crisis del 1898," *El Socialismo en España: desde la fundación del PSOE hasta 1975*. coord. Santos Juliá Díaz p. 89

¹³⁴ Iglesias was imprisoned several times for his roles in strikes in Málaga and Madrid in 1895 alone. Morato, Juan José. *El Partido Socialista Obrero* (1918) p. 141-2

¹³⁵ "El manifiesto de nuestro Partido y la prensa burguesa" *El Socialista* 23 March 1896

long insisted that the party dedicate its energies towards electoral strategies, while simultaneously refusing to consider alliances with other parties- especially not the Republicans! This appeared to be sound tactics. Heywood remarked: "the nature of the Spanish regime counseled intransigence, if not the sectarianism to which this was inextricably bound." Unfortunately for the PSOE, due to the "manipulation of the electoral system by the dynastic parties, the power of local party *caciques*, and widespread apathy among the people bred by powerlessness, poverty and illiteracy," this strategy could not hope to actually succeed.¹³⁶ Even when their opposition to the colonial conflicts saw the socialists begin to depart from their customary caution, and the party became:

" outspoken and virulent in its denunciation of Spanish involvement in the war, its voice was weak and became lost amongst the welter of forces calling the system into question. The beneficiaries of this surge of discontent, therefore, were not the Radicals and the Socialists, but the 'regenerationists'...the *caciquista* system effectively functioned to exclude the PSOE from any parliamentary role, and the party's posturing remained largely irrelevant to a Spanish political process in which the working class and peasant masses were definitely *personae non gratae*."¹³⁷

But the Spanish socialists saw it differently. Esteban de Vega writes that in the course of their "*O todos o ninguno*" campaign against the colonial wars, the Socialists "held 40 meetings, attended by 100,000 people." Since "it was the biggest mobilization effected by the party up until this moment, and due to the political value of the great support gained, we can't absolutely say the campaign

¹³⁶ Heywood, Paul. *Marxism and the Failure of Organized Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936*. (1990) p. 13

¹³⁷ *ibid.* p. 16-17

was a failure. "¹³⁸ Sebastian Balfour notes also that the period did correspond to "a spectacular rise in the membership of the UGT [the Socialist labor union] from around 6,000 in 1896 to 29,000 in 1900, 40,000 in 1902 and almost 57,000 in 1904."¹³⁹ Even Heywood concedes that the propaganda and political demonstrations organized by the party in opposition to the war " showed the PSOE becoming more politically sophisticated: it was beginning to use tactics rather than acting on the basis of first principles."¹⁴⁰

By contrast, however, Bernabé Lopez García asserts that the Spanish socialists failed to develop a coherent and effective strategy when faced with the colonial crisis. He indicates that this failure derived from their perception of colonialism as a distraction from their primary task of seeking political growth. This pragmatism, he suggests, accounts for the vacillations and uncertainties that plagued their discourse. This is almost certainly incorrect. The conflicts of 1895-98, if anything, provoked an *overabundance* of philosophies and strategies, few of which can seriously be understood if interpreted purely as campaigns for votes. In the face of pressing issues, Socialist leaders and intellectuals felt forced to intervene in some manner, even if the outcome was not clearly of immediate benefit to the growth of the party- a definite abandonment of Iglesias' earlier policies. The colonial crisis provoked the party's leaders to descend from their safe, haughty and abstract pronouncements, and embark on substantially risky

¹³⁸ Esteban de Vega, Mariano. "El Partido Socialista en la crisis del 1898," *El Socialismo en España: desde la fundación del PSOE hasta 1975*. coord. Santos Juliá Díaz p. 96

¹³⁹ Balfour, Sebastian. *The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898-1923* (1997) p. 113

¹⁴⁰ Heywood, Paul. *Marxism and the Failure of Organized Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936*, (1990). p. 17

actions in the hope of obtaining concrete results for the Spanish working-class. The apparent spontaneity of these demonstrates the socialists' recognition of the centrality of these issues for future of Spain, and their changing vision of their own role within it. At the same time, the actions of the PSOE in this era were manifestations of internal tensions within the international Socialist movement, as immediate gains were increasingly favored over long-term revolutionary development. The lessons that Spanish Socialists drew from their successes and failures in the face of the pressing questions of militarism and colonialism were by no means unanimous, but tended in favor of the former. This new emphasis in the party's policies saw their passage out of the 'long march through the desert' into unprecedented growth at the turn of the century, but also sowed the seeds of a later schism.

IV. 1895-98: Contextualizing Socialist Attitudes

As I have previously argued, the Spanish socialist attitudes *vis a vis* the crisis were fundamentally based on their broad theoretical assumptions. These were consistently derived from the international projection of the experiences of the exploited Spanish working-class (as the socialists saw it) to the colonial periphery. The socialist mentality did allow that "the inhabitants of the island of Cuba," like the 'dispossessed' in the Peninsula, were justified in seeking to escape from the oppressive governance of the bourgeois Spanish state. Where they erred was in failing to acknowledge that those 'inhabitants' perceived their struggle as a

national war for independence, rather than through an internationalist and dichotomous class perspective that the PSOE insisted was the only valid one. In attempting to identify their *own* opposition to the Spanish state with a very different oppositional movement that was patriotic and nationalist in character, the socialists were forced to tread an uncertain path between ideology and reality. Yet they eventually came to a consensus that allowed them to accept more immediate national liberation as a means to an end of the spread of Socialism. Furthermore, in charting the evolution of this discourse, we must weigh it in the historical context of an era in which the international socialist movement as a whole was just beginning to seriously grapple with the questions posed by colonialism and imperialism. At this stage, there was as of yet, no definitive theoretical consensus on the matter to turn to for comparison. A critique of the intellectual poverty of Spanish socialism from a Marxist perspective cannot therefore be justly made in this case. The socialist attitude on Cuban and Filipino national liberation "can not be considered outside the fact that, in this theoretical field, they lacked clear guidance to turn to."¹⁴¹ Neither Marx nor contemporary socialist intellectuals abroad provided answers. In the developing debate on colonialism, militarism, and imperialism, the Spanish Socialists of necessity assumed a significant degree of agency, approaching the problem presented by colonial insurrection on their own terms and based on their own experiences and unique context.

¹⁴¹ Esteban de Vega, Mariano. "El Partido Socialista en la crisis del 1898," *El Socialismo en España: desde la fundación del PSOE hasta 1975*. coord. Santos Juliá Díaz p. 89

V. 1895

The Socialists, as noted, were slow to comment on events in Cuba, and delayed in outlining a definitive philosophy to explain the conflict. As a result, the commentary that appears in the pages of *El Socialista* in the first year of the conflict is not specific either about the true nature of the insurrection or the way in which it might be resolved. In this last point, it is important to understand that, from the earliest stages of the insurrection, and in keeping with their general philosophy regarding colonial wars, the Socialists emphasized that the Spanish working class had no interest *whatsoever* in the possession of Cuba. In nearly every instance in which colonial matters are discussed, socialist editorialists utilized the same linguistic techniques to clearly separate the interests of the workers of Spain from that of the bourgeoisie and its State. In the same manner that the socialists rejected the *patria* of the bourgeoisie, they likewise rejected ownership of the colonies in Ultramar. The text continually makes ironic references to "*our Antilles*,"¹⁴² and emphasizes that the working class of Spain has no interest in preserving "that which the bourgeoisie call *integrity of the patria*."¹⁴³ With resignation, *El Socialista* announced in April that "once again the rebellion in the Great Antilles explodes, and once again the possessors of those territories, those who amass enormous fortunes there, invoke the name of the patria and send numerous forces to suffocate the insurrection and preserve their properties." The Spanish workers, meanwhile, who "are excluded from smoking

¹⁴² *El Socialista* 12 April 1895

¹⁴³ *El Socialista* 19 April 1895

the rich tobacco that Cuba produces, from consuming its magnificent sugar, from being customs agents, intendants, governors, captain generals" had no interest in Cuba.¹⁴⁴

It was therefore the most grotesque of injustices that it was those "disinherited that go [to Cuba] to battle so that their executioners can continue to enjoy the bargains that they have in the aforementioned Isle...They go there to die, not in defense of their interests, but to perpetuate the irritating privileges of their mortal enemies, of their own exploiters."¹⁴⁵ In vivid language, the Socialist press expressed what Cuba did represent for the Spanish workers. While for the bourgeoisie, Cuba was an "excellent mine...for enriching themselves" through legal or extralegal robbery,¹⁴⁶ for the proletariat it was an "immense slaughterhouse." In "the inhospitable forests and sterile savannahs of the Isle of Cuba bleach the unburied bones of thousands of Spaniards," who had been forced to fight there against their interests.¹⁴⁷

As most scholars have observed, the primary concern of the Socialists at this juncture was the damaging effects that the Cuban insurrection would have on the Spanish working class who composed the vast majority of the rank and file of the armed forces, a theme we have seen expressed on earlier occasions. An article published only a short time before the outbreak of rebellion in Cuba at the end of February 1895, "Reflections of a Recruit" reiterated the theme that the poor were

¹⁴⁴ *El Socialista* 31 January 1896

¹⁴⁵ *El Socialista* 31 January 1896

¹⁴⁶ *El Socialista* 17 January 1896

¹⁴⁷ *El Socialista* 19 April 1895

made to serve as instruments of their oppressors.¹⁴⁸ This persistent complaint became exponentially more bitter as the outbreak of hostilities provoked massive call ups of reservists. On 15 March *El Socialista* noted with alarm that " The government has dispatched 6,000 men, and declared that if this isn't sufficient, they'll send 10,000, 20,000. As is natural, these soldiers will be mostly working-class."¹⁴⁹ By September, "the well-informed" press was speculating that 200,000 men would be sent to Cuba.¹⁵⁰ While in theory every physically able Spaniard of military age was constitutionally bound to military service, another law permitted individuals to excuse themselves from duty through the payment of 1,500 or 2,000 pesetas.¹⁵¹ The injustice that the socialists perceived lay in the belief that the bourgeoisie were the only ones who were actually concerned with perpetuating their vested interests in Cuba, but that they hypocritically spouted patriotic drivel while forcing the proletariat to bear the burden. *El Socialista* opined that the colonial conflict in Cuba,

"In which the lives of thousands and thousands of proletariats are given in forced tribute, and which has consumed millions and millions of pesetas torn from the true producers of riches, offers a broad field for observation and critique from the point of view of the socialist doctrine."¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ *El Socialista* 15 February 1895

¹⁴⁹ *El Socialista* 15 March 1895

¹⁵⁰ *El Socialista* 29 September 1895

¹⁵¹ The figure was not clear - it is possible that the amount varied depending on where it was collected. On 18 October 1895 *El Socialista* critiqued a delegation of middle-class fathers who asked the government to clarify the price. It suggested that the fathers would render a better service to their "*beloved patria*" if they sent their sons to fight "against the enemies of national integrity" - and this would also have the advantage of saving them some money.

¹⁵² *El Socialista* 2 August 1895

Such it was that the "white slaves" of the Peninsula were sent to fight the "black slaves of Cuba," while: " The *chicos* of the aristocracy enjoy themselves...as they are not going to Cuba to combat against the enemies of the *patria*, they demonstrate their *courage* in small-town fights against bulls [*becarradas*]...If they had gone to demonstrate that same valor in the jungle [*manigua*]," the war effort "against the enemies of national integrity" might not be going so badly. However, *El Socialista* dryly noted, "those enemies are not young bulls, precisely."¹⁵³

VI. *Insurrectos* and Recruits: The Legitimizing Role of Motivation in Socialist Imagery

The imagery and terminology used to describe the Cuban rebels is interesting. The socialists sought to demonstrate their determination, ferocity and skill in comparison to the feeble and unmotivated Spanish soldiers. In both their own writings, and those they reproduced in the pages of *El Socialista* from other publications (expressing tacit agreement with the sentiment expressed, if not necessarily full support of political beliefs of those authors) they painted vivid pictures of the "warlike impetus of the separatists" in contrast with the "working youth" of Spain.¹⁵⁴ The uneducated, unmotivated Spanish conscript was "torn by real force from the bosom of their families," and was forced to combat "volunteer soldiers, who raise the separatist banner."¹⁵⁵ On April 5th 1895, *El Socialista* republished a poem by Sinesio Delgado (who was not a socialist but demonstrated

¹⁵³ *El Socialista* 23 August 1895

¹⁵⁴ *El Socialista* 12 April 1895

¹⁵⁵ *El Socialista* 19 April 1895

in his literary compositions "a fine spirit of critic...against the vices which corrode the present society...we might say that Sinesio Delgado, though without stating it, is a socialist down to the marrow of his bones"- they later reversed this opinion).

The text of the poem lionized the *insurrectos*:

*Hardened men, toughened in the fight
of surprises, throat-cutting and ambushes
they arose with rifles and machetes
against the dominion of the mother patria
And the metropolis, agitated and convulsed
with fierce spasms of rage
called from the mouth of the government:-War!
Soldiers, to arms!
The country must make a sacrifice
of money and of blood, although it lacks them.
And there went, piled up in the ships
And restraining with bravery their tears
children of twenty Aprils, torn
from the bosom of poor villages...*¹⁵⁶

Meanwhile, the lack of enthusiasm on the part of Spanish soldiers was used to demonstrate the awareness of the working class that their interests were opposed to that of the bourgeoisie who sent them to war. Not all conscripts, of course, were educated enough to have a class-consciousness. But " it can't be hidden that they go to combat without enthusiasm, without energy, without anything of that which is necessary in any fight..."¹⁵⁷ When it was reported that General Martinez Campos, then in command of Spanish operations in Cuba, had exalted the bravery of the soldiers under his command despite the fact that they were "young and unaware," a columnist of *El Socialista* rhetorically interrupted him - "Excuse me,

¹⁵⁶ *El Socialista* 5 April 1895.

¹⁵⁷ *El Socialista* 22 November 1895

my general - the soldiers may be ignorant of many things, but they know why they are battling.

"They battle...because you make them."¹⁵⁸

Another poem, this time by the socialist poet Alvaro Ortiz, has the [presumably bourgeois] narrator question a passing soldier:

*"-Where are you going, soldier?
-To the battlefield,
where I will expose my life
fighting 'for the patria' "*

Explaining his air of disconsolation, the soldier laments how "the laws have separated me " - from his poor parents and village, the young girl he loves, and the "thousand affectionate faces" of his friends and companions. He is forced to leave them all behind because of his "duty."(quotations in the original). He asks the narrator:

*"Who imposed this duty on me?
-¡The patria!
'-And what is the patria?'
-A second mother.
'-More like a stepmother!' "*

It is a mother for some, the poem's soldier admitted, for those who stayed behind in comfort and luxury and force the poor to fight the wars that they cause, but it was not a mother for the sad individuals who slaved for inadequate wages and "live in the saddest and bitterest misery - for them it is never a mother!" The irate bourgeois narrator tells the soldier to "shut up!...and run, even though it burdens

¹⁵⁸ *El Socialista* 6 December 1895

you, to defend the patria!" and the poem concludes with the death of the soldier in combat, lamenting the role of the élite who stay far away from the battlefield, *"trusting in 'our' army, trusting in 'our' navy"* to ensure the triumph of Spain, which in the socialist understanding is synonymous with bourgeois interests. While it would be going too far to say that the Socialists therefore actively hoped that Spain would *lose* the conflict, it is unambiguously stated that either victory or defeat would be detrimental to the working class. The only winners in war were the élite profiteers, and the only victory for the proletariat would be an immediate end to war.

VII. "Los Verdaderos Culpables"

As I have suggested, the contrasting portrayal of the Cuban rebels was meant to imply that they were more effective warriors because they were motivated by the justness of their cause. Beyond their rhetorical role as counterexamples, one must search to find explicit support for the specific aims of the insurrection in the pages of *El Socialista*. Despite the arguments of other scholars, a close examination of the text yields fairly convincing evidence that the socialists were generally supportive of their cause. While the official party statements appearing in *El Socialista* evaded pronouncing on the question of autonomy or independence until fairly late in the conflict (as we will see below) we can detect much earlier evidence of the true feelings of the party leadership and individual socialists. As early as 15 March 1895, *El Socialista* was blaming the rebellion on "the

antagonism of interests and a torpid and reactionary policy, [which] has made it so that in the Isle of Cuba there arise in arms those who want independence at all costs." Some months later, in a meeting in Palma de Mallorca in October of 1895, the socialist leader Antonio Garcia Quejido "dedicated long paragraphs" to the war in Cuba, "declaring that in all questions, the will of the people, once constituted, comes before the will of the government"¹⁵⁹ By the beginning of 1896, *El Socialista* proclaimed that since the proletariat of Spain were themselves "slaves that crave redemption," then they could not justly "support the governance of anyone against their will. Not having suffered offense or any harm from the inhabitants of Cuba, we don't have to any reason to hate them nor to fight them."¹⁶⁰ This was in stark contrast to the bourgeoisie who "suck the fig of the *honorable* Cuban administration, those who in customs offices and bureaucratic centers have established the '*turno pacífico*' to fatten themselves at the cost of that country, and afterwards, upon returning to the Peninsula, become scandalized that the robbed revolt against the thieves."¹⁶¹ The élite exploiter class did indeed have a logical reason to feel threatened by the insurrection, but of course the socialists were hardly sympathetic to it, condemning "the despotism of the Spanish bourgeoisie in forcibly subjecting a people who want to be free and govern themselves." *El Socialista* continually suggested that class-conscious workers in the peninsula must view the conflict in this light and, understanding it from the point of view of their own experience of oppression at the same hands, work through any means necessary ("within the means permitted by the law", at

¹⁵⁹ *El Socialista* 1 November 1895

¹⁶⁰ *El Socialista* 17Jan 1896

¹⁶¹ *El Socialista* 2 August 1895

least) for the immediate end of the conflict according "to the principles of justice." What these principles amounted to, and what exactly the necessary means were, remained to be concretely explained.¹⁶²

In the spring of 1896, the Cuban conflict began to take on a new character of crisis as rumors spread that American businesses and politicians, desirous of gaining access to Cuba's rich sugar and tobacco market, were underwriting the insurrection. This prompted a burst of sabre-rattling that added another element to socialist analysis. While *El Socialista* did not initially believe that the agitations would actually lead to war between the United States and Spain, it did wish to go on record that the United States was not to blame for the Cuban insurrection. It was true that the U.S., like all nations in which the bourgeoisie held the reins of power, viewed Cuba from the avaricious lens of their own material interests (which they arguably did, from a historical perspective), and might even be supporting the insurrection on these grounds. Despite this, the origins of discontent in Cuba could not be blamed on that nation in any way. The "truly guilty" ones were the "Spanish bourgeois parties," who bore the blame for the origins of the insurrection, and would likewise be at fault in the event of a war with the United States. "What active campaign have the mentioned parties undertaken since the other insurrection [1868-1878] to ensure that the inhabitants of Cuba administer and direct themselves in the manner that seems best to them? None."¹⁶³ Instead, the élite Liberal and Conservative parties of the rigged Restoration system of "pacific turns" had legislated inept and exploitative

¹⁶² *El Socialista* 17 January 1896

¹⁶³ *El Socialista* 13 March 1896

policies, "the worst, the most prejudicial for the sons of [the Antilles]," at the same time enriching themselves and their families through the most grotesque nepotism.¹⁶⁴ And when the "marked disgust and indignation of the inhabitants of the Great Antilles" provoked an armed insurrection, they reacted by offering them marginal reforms that would not have satisfied them even in the best of times, only further insulting those who had already felt forced to take up arms to gain the "greatest measure of liberty".¹⁶⁵ Thus, if it had not been for the inflexible and exploitative colonial policy of the Spanish bourgeois parties, there would not have been need for an insurrection; if there was no insurrection, the attention of the United States would not have been drawn.

VIII. "National Integrity:" Exposing the Construct of Spanish Patriotism

In the meantime, the socialists continued in their work of dismantling the construct of the Spanish *patria*. Central to their critique of the colonial conflict was their condemnation of the hypocrisy of the bourgeoisie who championed the idea of "national integrity" while evading any actual sacrifice. As we've seen, this was most obnoxiously evident, in the socialist view, by those who bought their way out of military service. But the criticism was broadened to encompass all the elements and machinations that supported the capitalist system. The charges previously levied against 'war profiteers' during the Melilla campaign were

¹⁶⁴ A modern study of these policies can be found in Sandoica, Elena Hernández. "La España de ultramar: Cuba y Puerto Rico." *Los significados del 98: La sociedad española en la génesis del siglo XIX*. Ruiz-Manjón, Octavio and Alicia Langa, eds.p. 21-30

¹⁶⁵ *El Socialista* 13 March 1896

resurrected with a vengeance during the present conflict. Not only were the capitalist élite and its auxiliaries (journalists, politicians, clergy, etc.) exempt from the hardships born by the working-class, but they actually profited from the conflict. In August 1895 *El Socialista* bitterly condemned those speculators in the stock exchange who "patriotically exploit bad news of the campaigns," wealthy business owners such as the Marquis of Comillas, owner of the *Transatlántica* shipping company and personification of the modern capitalist bourgeoisie, "who pocket a fabulous amount from the maritime and terrestrial transportation of the troops,"¹⁶⁶ and those both in Cuba and the Peninsula "that enrich themselves with the contract for provisioning for the same troops on campaign."¹⁶⁷ In this dystopian state of affairs, patriotism was demonstrated by the degree to which one could successfully exploit both the Cuban and the Spanish working classes, and continue to reap profits through pitting them against each other. The *patria* was a cruel farce, and therefore: "if patriotism is nothing more than this, this could explain why the Bourgeoisie seems to so worried about the loss or break-up of one of its mainsprings for its dominion over the proletarian mass [i.e. Ultramar], while at the same time rejoicing in it."¹⁶⁸

If national and patriotic sentiments were indeed such a cynical lie, then it followed that its symbols and mythology were likewise empty of higher meaning. Continually, the Socialists rejected patriotic appeals to Spaniards to emulate glorious historical deeds of the national past. When a clergyman offered

¹⁶⁶ The awful conditions on board the packed ships of the *Transatlántica* company are expressed in a letter written by an anonymous socialist in the ranks of the army, published in *E.S.* 10 January 1896

¹⁶⁷ *El Socialista* 2 August 1895

¹⁶⁸ *El Socialista* 2 August 1895

benedictions and exhorted a contingent of Spanish troops departing for Cuba to recall "*our glorious* deeds of arms in Salado, Las Navas, Otumba and Callao," the emptiness of that rhetoric was implied in the italics. In a lengthy article on March 27 1896, "Chauvinisms and Shoulder Arms," which cited at length various bellicose articles in the mainstream Spanish press that had appeared in response to rumors of 'Yankee' support for the insurrection, which provoked a spell of war fever against the United States, *El Socialista* lampooned those who sought "to demonstrate to the foreigner that we are the people of Numancia and Sagunto," those who felt that the decadent Spaniards had too long "rested on the laurels of Calatañazor and Otumba" and needed to fight a war to revive this essential spirit, even if the country could not afford it. Even more absurdly, *El Socialista* noted, the editorialist Eusebio Blasco of *El Liberal* had written:

" with pride - we believe - of the fact that in Spain there are tens of millions of inhabitants who don't know how to read or write, and he attributes to this consequence a truly comforting result: '*greater ignorance, more faith, more fanaticisms, more personal bravery, more love of the land, blind patriotism, and as a result, a foolproof and solid nationality!*'...And later, he adds, to round out his thoughts, '*this seems reactionary, but is however, simply human.*'

Hombre, do not be so modest: this is simply stupid."¹⁶⁹

The socialists took other opportunities in this juncture to elaborate their opposition to the constructs of "national identity," which they interpreted as a historical process in much the same manner as Hobsbawm would argue later. In many cases, they used this understanding to explain their position regarding the Cuban question, in opposition to the point of view expressed by people such as

¹⁶⁹ *El Socialista* 27 March 1896

the Conservative leader Antonio Cánovas, who declared it was necessary to fight in Cuba until the very last soldier in order to preserve "national integrity."¹⁷⁰ In the 20 March issue of *El Socialista*, which was devoted, as was typical for the periodical in March, to commemorating the Paris Commune, García Quejido (writing under his *nom de plume* 'Fidel'¹⁷¹) wrote that the Commune "was, certainly, an anti-national movement...by substituting the national tricolor flag for the red one, the Paris Commune declared their banner that of the universal Republic." The Communards emphasized that they "had nothing to do with the *created interest* of the bourgeoisie that they called a nation, an interest that bleeds the people with permanent armies and directs them to absurd wars." In the example of the Commune, 'Fidel' conveniently noted the presence of "two diverse but convergent elements: the decentralization movement, with the return of free communities separated from all coercive nationalism," and the International Socialist movement. For Spaniards, he opined, these aspects of the free commune of Paris are particularly relevant in light of present events. But here, coming dangerously close to the question of Cuban autonomy or independence, 'Fidel' abruptly veers away, obliquely writing that this analysis was "never more opportune than now, while Spanish jingoism shrieks against Yankee chauvinism...while among the sound of these shouts the Spanish and American bourgeoisie continue exploiting the proletariat of one or the other country." It is hard to see how García Quejido's emphasis on decentralization and local autonomy could be interpreting purely in the context of a war fever

¹⁷⁰ *El Socialista* 24 July 1896

¹⁷¹ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba" *Estudios de historia social*. vol. 8-9 (1979) p. 296

between the Spanish and Americans, unless we are understand that underneath the surface of this conflict, between "*one or the other country*" lurks a commentary on Cuba. I do not think 'Fidel' says all that he means here.¹⁷²

IX. "He could not say all that he felt:" Obliqueness, Evasion, and Metaphor

In fact, throughout the first two years of the conflict, we frequently see the socialists speaking in veiled phrases and conspicuously avoiding the crux of the matter of Cuban independence. Indeed, the above article was not the first time García Quejido's words were apparently abbreviated in the pages of *El Socialista* . In the published report of the minutes of a meeting held in Mataró in August of 1895, the correspondent mentioned only that García Quejido had spoken "on the subject of the war in Cuba, and explained in brilliant terms what we must understand by *patria*," a topic that "the audience listened to with true delight."¹⁷³ And at a meeting in Santander on 25 September, one comrade Miguel Fernández, "with great facility of speech...made some allusions to the war of Cuba, saying that he could not say all that he felt about it because of the seriousness of the situation."¹⁷⁴

While I shall analyze some of the specific factors that may have influenced this suspect vagueness below, I do not think it would be overly conspiratorial to propose that, beyond the artful usage of sarcasm, textual tools such as italics and quotes, and evasive language (such as the above) which leave

¹⁷² *El Socialista* 20 March 1896

¹⁷³ *El Socialista* 30 August 1895

¹⁷⁴ *El Socialista* 4 October 1895

conclusions unspoken, the pages of *El Socialista* reveal a greater picture when considered holistically. It is probably fair to assume that the editors of the paper generally expected their readers to read through each edition and absorb the basic tenets of their propaganda, though the specific topic treated in each column might vary depending on events and focus (Although in most matters -to be blunt - the socialist reader could expect to find the bourgeoisie convicted as "the truly guilty" ones for virtually all the maladies in "the present society"- phrases that appear time and again regardless of the topic.)

One such example may be found Francisco Mora's "The International in Spain," one of the serialized works that *El Socialista* usually ran in its final pages throughout the period. It was a history of the early activities of the First International in Spain in the 1870s - predating the official foundation of the PSOE. In the numbers corresponding to *El Socialista* of 24 May and 14 June 1895, Mora discussed how various workers' organizations in Madrid had opposed the local festivities celebrating the national *Dos de Mayo* holiday on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War.¹⁷⁵ A leaflet which was posted next to the posters announcing the *fiesta* planned by the *Ayuntamiento* of Madrid exhorted workers not to attend the festivities, because: "Patriotism is an idea that tends to separate peoples between themselves, and constantly maintains the spirit of hate between men." In the distant and savage past, patriotism perhaps had a use - "but now, in the days of international ideals, the *patria* doesn't have any purpose." Furthermore

¹⁷⁵ As such, this leaflet "To the Workers of Madrid" was particularly concerned with negating anti-French hostility.

(the leaflet argued) of what use was it to commemorate the dead of any specific country? In the countless large wars and minor conflicts of history, "the victors of today will be the conquered tomorrow." One's own martyrs existed in historical memory alongside one's own victims. "Workers! Don't go to the Dos de Mayo, because its likely that, beside those venerated tombs, covered in crowns of laurel...will rise the threatening, blood-drenched ghosts of the sacrificed American race, inhumanely destroyed in the name of civilization by our forbearers, the *conquistadores* of the New World."¹⁷⁶ One wonders if this interesting exercise in historical memory, written decades earlier and appearing at this juncture purely through the banal mathematics of publication, might nevertheless have provoked some to reflect on the Spanish colonial past at a time when such questions were definitely at the forefront of public consciousness.

In other instances, however, we need not engage in speculation about the link some Socialists saw between the violence of past Spanish colonialism and the present conflict. The Bilbao-based Socialist paper *La Lucha de Clases* (which Carlos Serrano and Rafael Núñez Florencio have interpreted as by turns more radical and theoretically profound than the Madrid-based *El Socialista*) sarcastically commented within a week of the outbreak of the Cuban rebellion that "we made them slaves, we civilized them with the whip, and yet there are still incorrigible hearts that desire to separate Cuba from her dearly-loved mother." Such ingratitude could not be comprehended! *La Lucha de Clases* went even further in tackling the sacred national mythology of the *Dos de Mayo* and the War

¹⁷⁶ Mora, Francisco. *La Internacional en España: Apuntes para la historia del socialismo obrero español* no. xv. *El Socialista* 14 June 1895.

of Independence. Like the Spaniards against Bonaparte, "the Cubans...also fight for the emancipation of their own [country]." ¹⁷⁷ Here the paper was on less certain ground. Serrano hypothesizes that such explicit recognition of the ideological motives of the Cubans' struggle were rare because, if the Socialists as a rule rejected the legitimacy of the '*patria*,' then "the Cubans did not have one either; their national combat was therefore suspect." ¹⁷⁸ It is clear, however, that this did not prevent some socialists from hinting at their acceptance of the national character of the Cuban struggle in the early years of the war. In the summer of 1896, the Fourth International Workers' Congress, held in London, would explicitly give the Spanish socialists legitimate grounds to support the Cuban independence movement on its own terms. But the manifold strains of socialist interpretation of the colonial conflict prior to this can best be summarized by no less an authority than Miguel de Unamuno, in his column "Peace and Work" published in *El Socialista* on May Day, 1896. The first duty of class-conscious workers in the present times "is to protest the war that carries so many workers to Cuba to kill and to die, [workers] whose moral and material progress is in no way hindered by the *insurrectos*."

X. Socialist Self-Critique

¹⁷⁷ *La Lucha de Clases*, 7 April 1895, cited in Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba" *Estudios de historia social*. vol. 8-9 (1979) This researcher was regretfully unable to access this periodical in the course of the research for the present thesis, and therefore trusts the validity of the ellipses and bracket provided in Serrano's transcription.

¹⁷⁸ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba." p. 289

I have attempted to outline the central tenets of the early propaganda of the socialists regarding the colonial conflict, analyzing them in a way that I believe complicates the earlier portrayal of a generally impoverished anti-colonial attitude in the first years of the war in Cuba. I have presented several examples of published critiques of Spanish colonial policy, rejections of the validity of 'national integrity' and 'patriotism' on the basis of internationalism; expressions in favor of self-governance and decentralization, and tacit or explicit sympathy with the struggle of "the inhabitants of Cuba". I have also, however, proposed that a conspicuous silence or evasive language displayed on certain occasions might be understood less as an intellectual inability to comprehend the aims and motivations of the Cuban struggle for national independence, but rather through a lens of the historical context present in *fin-de-siècle* Spain, which influenced the official propaganda and activism of the PSOE based on their perception of their own role in the socio-political process.

In general, this perception was one of insecurity and weakness.

Throughout the 1890s, the Spanish socialists repeatedly admitted their own glacial growth and low political influence. A letter from the illustrious German socialists Bebel, Liebknecht, and Singer to their Spanish colleagues on May Day, 1893 had encouraged them to keep up the fight and not to be disheartened: "If the results that you have obtained are not equal to those that the socialist workers of those more industrialized countries in Western and Central Europe have reached, it is not your fault, we know very well, but that of the economic inferiority of your country, due principally to bad administration of your directorial class throughout

entire centuries."¹⁷⁹ On 3 January 1896, *El Socialista* took stock of the new year and lauded the progress of French, Belgian, German, Italian and Danish socialists in their electoral victories, the noticeable growth of Socialist parties in England, Argentina and the United States, etc, and finally hoped that "we - the Spanish socialists- who, for causes explained many times, figure in the rearguard of the socialist movement, should manage in coming year to increase our forces, to awaken the dormant consciousness of many workers and make it so the spirit of class -awareness reveals itself to the wage-workers who have up until now left their interests undefended."¹⁸⁰ A primary goal of the Socialists throughout much of 1896 was to garner votes in the hopes of electing Socialists in regional and national elections. In their campaign for votes, they tended to downplay discussion of Cuban independence, capitalizing instead on the increasing discontent that the war was producing throughout Spain. The socialists welcomed a surge of popular discontent in the summer of 1896. In the first months of the conflict back in 1895, *El Socialista* had confessed to a rhetorical bourgeois audience that " we know that you currently have enough power to make us fight, but don't forget that 'those you judge as your slaves' are gaining consciousness of what they are, and they will unite, and that the day will arrive...when you order them to fight for your patria, they will reply to you: '*You* fight. Our blood we reserve, not for selfish interests or ruinous ideas, but the emancipation of all Humanity.'" Since then, the socialists had latched on to every indication that the long-awaited class-consciousness was developing. In August 1895, the party

¹⁷⁹ Republished in *El Socialista* 6 September 1895

¹⁸⁰ *El Socialista* 3 January 1896 no. 513

organ noted with delight that "in Valencia, Tafella, Haro, Gerona and we don't know if in other areas as well, the reservists have become insubordinate, refusing to be put on the route to Cuba, where, according to them, they have nothing to lose."¹⁸¹ And the particular resonance of the socialist platform of ending the conflict and ensuring the return of the "sons of the people" throughout first few months of 1896,¹⁸² appeared to bear fruit in the elections called by Cánovas, who assumed the role of Prime Minister after the fall of the Sagasta government.¹⁸³ The Liberal leader's resignation was provoked by an affair in which indignant military elements sacked the offices of two newspapers that had published articles offensive to the army.¹⁸⁴ The elections were held in April, and saw the PSOE receive 14,000 votes, twice the number as it had three years earlier.¹⁸⁵ As a result, Socialist deputies were elected in Bilbao, El Ferrol and Mataró.¹⁸⁶

XI. Channeling Popular Protest

Despite its relative success in the spring elections of 1896, the Socialist Party was still weak and admitted that it would not alone be able to exorcise the problems that plagued the nation as a result of the Cuban crisis. What it could and would do, however, "is influence and weigh on the bourgeois party that occupies the

¹⁸¹ *El Socialista* 16 August 1895 no. 493

¹⁸² Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba" *Estudios de historia social*. vol. 8-9 (1979) p. 292

¹⁸³ Morato, Juan José. *El Partido Socialista Obrero* (1918) p. 200

¹⁸⁴ Valera Ortega, Jose. "Aftermath of Splendid Disaster: Spanish Politics Before and After the Spanish American War of 1898." *Journal of Contemporary History* p. 317

¹⁸⁵ *El Socialista* 8 May 1896

¹⁸⁶ Morato, Juan José. *El Partido Socialista Obrero* (1918) p. 196

Government, with a view to oblige them to adopt those solutions that benefit or damage least the great mass of the country."¹⁸⁷ This marked a major change in Socialist tactics. Henceforth, the PSOE would dedicate energy not only towards elections on a local level, but to organize popular opinion to pressure the government to enact immediate reforms.

Foremost among the solutions that the socialists wished to see adopted throughout 1896 was an alleviation of the burden placed by the war on the Spanish workers.¹⁸⁸ Cuba would inevitably be lost, *El Socialista* announced in their issue of 10 July 1896, and everyone in the country knew this, but neither of alternating élite political parties wished to be in power "when the loss of Cuba becomes an official fact." It was therefore the duty not only of socialist-affiliated workers to pressure the government to terminate the conflict, but incumbent upon "all the sane elements" of society to "feel their influence in the Cuban question," and combat this "criminal conduct."¹⁸⁹ Miguel de Unamuno too emphasized the immediacy of the situation, calling on "every truly honorable man," to "combat, without truce or rest, the savage honor and the irrational glory" that perpetuated the conflict.¹⁹⁰

In fact, throughout the summer and fall of 1896 it seemed that the called-for surge of popular opinion against the war was indeed occurring. Disturbances and riots wracked the country, in Valencia, Barcelona, Alicante, Chiva and other

¹⁸⁷ *El Socialista* 9 October 1896

¹⁸⁸ Serrano, Carlos "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba" p. 292

¹⁸⁹ "Conducta Criminal" *El Socialista* 10 July 1896

¹⁹⁰ Unamuno, Miguel "Paz y Trabajo" *El Socialista* 1 May 1896

towns.¹⁹¹ Desertions, evasion of service, and insubordination skyrocketed,¹⁹² and *El Socialista* reported that departing soldiers now spoke of going for "Ultra-tomb rather than Ultramar."¹⁹³ A major protest organized by mothers of conscripted soldiers in Zaragoza destabilized the government and divided public opinion; supporters of the war and the government saw the conspiratorial hand of American finance and Cuban *Filibustero* agitation in every instance of "antipatriotic conduct," as *El Socialista* sardonically phrased it.¹⁹⁴ Filibusters did not organize the protests of the 'Mothers of Zaragoza', of course. Rather, it was a typical expression of popular feminine discontent, as D.J. Walker explains in her study of the phenomenon. Nor was the protest organized by the PSOE, although this in no way prevented them from expressing their wholehearted support for the movement, whose participants could be certain that "the opinion of the people who spill their blood and money for the war is with them," and recommended that other follow in their example.¹⁹⁵ Of course, *El Socialista* jested, their own support of the Zaragoza protest might be suspect. The government and bourgeoisie papers had claimed that Cuban filibusters had provoked the mothers. "If this is true...who knows? Perhaps we also find ourselves unconsciously influenced by filibuster schemes."¹⁹⁶

¹⁹¹ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba" *Estudios de historia social*. vol. 8-9 (1979) p. 294

¹⁹² Walker, D.J *Spanish Women and the Colonial Wars of the 1890s*. (2008) p. 53-57

¹⁹³ *El Socialista* 24 July 1896

¹⁹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ *El Socialista* 31 July 1896

XII. Filibusters, Anarchists and the Congress of London

The humor must have masked a genuine feeling of apprehension. Throughout the summer, the political and economic crisis in Spain deteriorated, gravely threatening the Restoration system.¹⁹⁷ More than a year of costly warfare against Cuban *insurrectos* had raised the specter of popular dissent in the Peninsula. To this were added rumors of a Republican insurrection, and even the old Carlist threat reared its head again.¹⁹⁸ In August, another separatist revolt began in the Philippines. According to Prime Minister Cánovas, all of these disturbances had been provoked by Cuban-American filibuster machinations in order to fatally weaken Spain. Looming large in the background was the vulture of the United States, which funded the filibusters and eagerly awaited its chance to pick at the carcass of Spain and its empire. Cánovas, as Walker notes, "vowed to take whatever steps were necessary to maintain public order," resulting in widespread arrests and state oppression of anything considered seditious.¹⁹⁹ Amid this unhealthy atmosphere in the summer of 1896, a Spanish socialist delegation departed to attend the Fourth Congress of the Socialist International, held in London from 27 July to 1 August.

The Congress was of great historical importance. It was the first congress of the Second International to explicitly discuss questions of nationalism,

¹⁹⁷ Valera Ortega, Jose. "Aftermath of Splendid Disaster: Spanish Politics Before and After the Spanish American War of 1898." *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 15 No. 2 (April 1980) p. 318

¹⁹⁸ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba" *Estudios de historia social*. vol. 8-9 (1979) p. 295

¹⁹⁹ Walker, D.J. *Spanish Women and the Colonial Wars of the 1890s* (2008) p. 55

militarism and colonialism. The congress met in the open air in Hyde Park amidst the twin disruptions of a torrential downpour and anarchist agitation (which prompted their ultimate expulsion from the Second International²⁰⁰). The first resolution voted on by the delegates affirmed that "peace between nations is the base of international brotherhood and human progress," and that capitalist avarice was the only cause of war, and, therefore, the universal enemy of the workers. Therefore, "between the workers of the diverse nationalities there must not exist enmity."²⁰¹ The Spanish delegates were the luminaries of the PSOE: Pablo Iglesias, Dr. Jaime Vera, Carlos Muñoz; and Antonio García Quejido. The erratic founder of the *Nueva Escuela* movement, Francisco Ferrer, and the prominent Italian anarchist Erico Malatesta also attended petitioning to be acknowledged as Spanish delegates, but Pablo Iglesias motioned that they be excluded from participation as the former was unknown and the latter an anarchist, prompting a bitter retort from Malatesta.²⁰² The motion was, however, carried. The rest of the congress was no less tumultuous and controversial, and the reports of its proceedings in *El Socialista* are no less interesting. The paper mentioned, for instance, in their 31 July issue that, in addition to the expulsion of anarchists, "according to news of bourgeois origin, some Cuban filibusters" had also been excluded. No other commentary is made regarding this astonishing statement, and a rigorous search of English, French, American and Spanish newspapers and publications regarding the congress yields no allusions to this. Where was this

²⁰⁰ *El Socialista* 31 July 1896

²⁰¹ *El Socialista* 31 July 1896

²⁰² Hamon, Augustin. *Le socialisme et le congrès de Londres: étude historique.* (1897) p. 135

news originally published? Were there in fact Cuban representatives who petitioned to participate? If so, on what grounds were they rejected? Most importantly, what motive did *El Socialista* have in re-publishing this claim? Was it denying that filibusters were behind the International Socialist movement, or was it denying libelous charges of an incomplete socialist internationalism?

This is far from the only mystery surrounding the activities of the Spanish socialist delegation abroad. One of the topics voted on over the course of the tumultuous congress was, as Carlos Serrano notes, "the colonial question." Two of the final published resolutions indeed support this: Resolution No. 4 declared the Congress "in favor of the autonomy of all nations and expressed sympathy for the workers of those various countries that presently suffer under the yoke of military despotism." In the next resolution, the Congress declared that "whatever might be the pretext of colonialist policies, whether religious or so-called civilizing, it is nothing more than an extension of the field of capitalist exploitation," and of course must be opposed.²⁰³ Furthermore, Francisco Ferrer, who was apparently in the end allowed as a French delegate due to his residence in Paris, proposed a motion "in support of Cubans, Cretans, Macedonians and Armenians who fight for their independence, which was accepted by the French majority and proposed to the congress by Paul Argyriadès. It is unfortunately unclear what prompted this motion from Ferrer, and what (if any) discussion was had about it among the Spanish socialist delegation. Morato, writing decades later, claims that when the congress "voted a motion for sympathy for all those

²⁰³ The text here is translated from *El Socialista*, but accurately corresponds to that published in Hamon, Augustin. *Le socialisme et le congrès de Londres: étude historique* (1897)

who fought to win their nationality; the Spanish Delegation was the first to support the motion."²⁰⁴ And the contemporary notice published in *El Socialista* references a vote held on "a motion presented by citizen Argyriadès, declaring the sympathies of the Congress for all those who fight to win their nationality."²⁰⁵ It is a fair assumption that the textual similarities indicate the sources refer to the same motion. If that is the case - that it was proposed by a Spaniard and enthusiastically supported by the Socialist delegation, then it all the more noteworthy that (as Carlos Serrano points out) that the notice published in *El Socialista* replaces the specific names of the countries with a vague message of support.

Serrano hypothesized that the paper's evasive language "might be due, above all, to an oratorical precaution when faced with Spanish authorities" rather than a fundamental dissention of the PSOE delegates against the clearly pro-independence message of the resolution. This circumspection on the part of the Spanish party became noticeably dramatic throughout August, as Pablo Iglesias and his colleagues returned from abroad and embarked on a whistle-stop tour of the Peninsula to discuss the resolutions of the congress. The conservative militarist *El Correo Militar* published the following notice:

"The propagandist Pablo Iglesias, passing through Paris on his return from London...was asked by the editor of *Le Soir* for his assessment on the events of Cuba. Comrade Iglesias said that the Cuban insurrection was noble and generous; that Spain was atoning for past failures and would now be forced to give Cuba autonomy. These declarations of the chief of socialism produced natural and just indignation in the whole Spanish community [residing in Paris] who energetically condemned these statements. This big-shot of separatism is now returning to Spain, and since

²⁰⁴ Morato, Juan José. *El Partido Obrero Socialista* (1918) p. 206

²⁰⁵ *El Socialista*, 14 August 1896

insurrectionary propaganda is not permitted, the Government will see what it will have to do with him."²⁰⁶

In the context of reactionary fears of 'filibusterism' and, as Esteban de Vega notes, "conscious of the repression that anarchist and federalist papers had suffered," the party desperately downplayed this rhetoric.²⁰⁷ "Indeed," *El Socialista* demurred: "Our friend has made some declarations about the Cuban question for a Parisian paper," but those declarations were not the expressions of sympathy for separatists that appeared in the bourgeois press, but simply the same general protests against unjust military service, inept colonial politics, bourgeoisie hypocrisy, etc. which had appeared in the paper on many occasions before.²⁰⁸

The fear of repression was manifested in print and in practice: at a meeting in Burgos on August 28, with Iglesias in attendance, the president of the meeting ordered a Comrade Abad to cease his discussion of the war in Cuba. Abad insisted that he was within his rights to do so, but stood down so that "the meeting would not be illegally dissolved."²⁰⁹ And on 4 September, the paper noted laconically that Pablo Iglesias appeared to be under official surveillance.²¹⁰

But if for the moment the Socialists were shying away from emphasizing dangerous topic of Cuban independence, it cannot be said that they ceased to oppose the war. Instead, they adjusted their propaganda to be in tune with the

²⁰⁶ *El Correo Militar*, 8 August 1896

²⁰⁷ I was not able to discover the original text in *Le Soir*, but both Serrano and Esteban de Vega seem to accept that Iglesias was not misquoted.

²⁰⁸ *El Socialista*, 14 August 1896. That paper does not identify *El Correo Militar* specifically. This researcher could not find other examples of this claim in the digital periodical archives of the Biblioteca Nacional Española.

²⁰⁹ *El Socialista* 28 August 1896

²¹⁰ *El Socialista* 4 September 1896

surge of popular discontent that, as we've seen, manifested itself in a series of disturbances throughout the summer and fall. They also surreptitiously left the question of Cuban autonomy or independence on the table. Putting on a show of bravado in an article at the end of August, *El Socialista* wrote that the socialists did not care that some individuals had already marked them for auxiliaries of filibusterism. The socialists emphasized that they preferred the truth to popularity, and the truth was that "the people ask for peace from all quarters." In demonstrations throughout Spain, in the ports of embarkation, and in every possible way, the poor masses of Spain demanded peace. And this was also what the Socialists asked: peace, always peace. But this was not the only demand of the people. In *lieu* of peace, the people demanded that the government comply with the Constitutional requirement for obligatory military service for all able-bodied Spanish men by eliminating the system that allowed wealthy and middle-class Spaniards to buy their way out of service.²¹¹

The socialists did not see a practical discrepancy between these two seemingly contradictory demands. Their doctrine assumed that the bourgeoisie only engaged in wars because they reaped a profit and paid no price. Since the government was the auxiliary of the élite, they would end any given war if faced with the prospect of damaging the interests of their clients. It was one thing to sit in a comfortable home making patriotic exhortations, but quite another to face yellow fever and *insurrecto* bullets. In fact, Morato later indicated that the original article had been specifically tailored to avoid government persecution,

²¹¹ *El Socialista* 28 August 1896

remaining within the realm of legality by arguing from a Constitutional perspective.²¹²

Another article, "Models of Patriotism,"²¹³ parried accusations of seditious filibusterism, noting: "we are in a bind." The Socialists therefore sarcastically expressed a desire to demonstrate their enthusiasm for the "love of the 'sacred integrity of territory.'" Where could they find an example of patriotism to idolize and emulate? First, they recited an ironic hagiography of "true patriots," who profited from the war, such as the Marquis de Comillas; the 'grand patriot' Romero Robledo, owner of sugar mills in Cuba who treated the blacks in his employ so paternally that a child died from beatings; the Cuban bourgeoisie who patriotically supported the Spanish government that protected their interests; the jingoist papers, etc. In contrast to these were those "auxiliaries of filibusterism," men like the anti-war federalist republican Francesc Pi y Margall, or the mothers who had sons in Cuba, people who "loved truth, justice and peace. Which is to say, a handful of felons who do not love their country, nor hate, as God commands, those who fight for their independence in Cuba." The Socialists, who "up until now have found ourselves in this latter class of patriots," presented with such 'convincing' counterexamples, satirically professed themselves repentants. By employing irony, they could harshly critique while avoiding explicit statements.²¹⁴

²¹² Morato, Juan José. *El Partido Obrero Socialista* (1918) p. 207

²¹³ *El Socialista* 4 September 1896

²¹⁴ *El Socialista* 4 September 1896

XIII. Cruelty and Maladministration in Ultramar: Anti-Colonialism

Resurfaces

The anti-colonialist element of their discourse, despite its suppressed tone, nevertheless rose to the surface periodically in late 1896 despite the general trend towards focus on the repercussions of the conflict for the Peninsular masses. In the same issue cited above in which the Socialists avoided specifically advocating Cuban independence, another article noted that the Cuban insurrection, as well the violent disturbances which had recently broken out in the Philippines, were the natural symptom of Spanish colonial despotism. The governance of Ultramar was characterized by "a domination that tends to benefit exclusively...some particular interests, that do not develop public resources in any way," under a disorganized and corrupt administration. These were the constant hallmarks of Spanish colonial policy, which was compounded by the "abusive dominion of the friars" in the case of the Philippines.²¹⁵ These colonial failures were perceived to be uniquely Spanish in character, but I do not believe, as some scholars have suggested, that the Socialists were suggesting that the implementation of a more progressive colonial policy was desirable. In the first place, all forms of capitalist economic or political domination were held to be intrinsically exploitative. Colonialism in this interpretation was simply the overseas manifestation of the same process exercised at home. The utter backwardness of Spanish *caciquismo*, which accounted in the Peninsula for the debility of the national project, and their slow

²¹⁵ *El Socialista* 4 September 1896

and uneven industrialization, likewise resulted in an antiquated myopic colonial policy.²¹⁶ Spain's egoistic élite had learned no lessons from the Latin American wars of Independence, or the previous Ten Years' War in Cuba. This ensured that resistance to their continued exploitation in the colonies was particularly vibrant.²¹⁷

But the socialists were not at this juncture arguing that the Spanish government *ought* to modernize its colonial policy and engage in a real project of a civilizing mission. In theory, they sometimes suggested, this could be done, and some Spanish socialist articles proposed that ameliorating reforms should be undertaken as means to an end in their immediate goal of ending the conflict that was such a burden on the Peninsular working-class. These proposals were usually vague, but almost always advocated the concession of autonomy or outright independence.²¹⁸ But this was not meant as an endorsement of modern colonialism, merely as temporary exigency to alleviate an acute symptom of a fundamentally unworkable system.

Indeed, they condemned the imperialist projects of other, more modern European nation in strident tones on numerous occasions. In February of 1895 they had denounced the genocide of a tribe of Australian aborigines, commenting that European civilizing missions were undertaken with rifles, fire, and firewater.²¹⁹ They also rejected the idea that colonialism could be improved or

²¹⁶ Raymond Carr explains that this critical term, which referred to the corruption of the oligarchic élite, summed up the "political and moral defects" of the Restoration monarchy. Carr, Raymond. *Modern Spain, 1875-1980* (1980)

²¹⁷ *El Socialista* 4 September 1896

²¹⁸ *El Socialista* 4 September 1896

²¹⁹ *El Socialista* 22 February 1895

justified by progressive political regimes - one socialist editorialist opined "it seems to me that it is not true that with a Republic there would not be campaigns like those of Melilla and Cuba. France now has her Madagascar, and it is a Republic."²²⁰ This was in contrast to a growing strain of intellectual discourse in the broader European movement that argued that progressive socialist colonialism was both possible and desirable. The argument reached its apogee in the 1907 Congress of Stuttgart, but was anticipated by more than a decade within the files of the PSOE.

In their interpretation, while the economic system remained capitalist, any political system would remain inherently exploitative. Their approach to colonialism was likewise based in this economic understanding. Thus, when the socialists argued that the "bad colonial policy" of the present Spanish administration might be reformed, they were philosophically separating (as Morato suggested in the October 1896 meeting in Madrid which concluded to socialists' return tour after the Congress of London) "the colonial problem, as it is understood and resolved by the bourgeoisie, and as it is understood and will be resolved by Socialism in its day."²²¹ In the final estimation, the socialists argued, the only thing to be expected from the international bourgeois class was "wars like those in Tonkin, Cuba, and Abyssinia."²²² Through their own negative experiences with colonial conflicts, according to Morato, European workers in the end would comprehend the sordid mechanisms of colonialism and "oppose the policy of conquest, of tyranny, and of exploitation that the capitalist class follows

²²⁰ "A 'La Asamblea Regional'" *El Socialista* 9 August 1895

²²¹ "<<Meeting>> Socialista en Madrid" *El Socialista* 23 October 1896

²²² "¡18 de Marzo 1871!" C. Muñoz. *El Socialista* 20 March 1896

in colonial matters," and replace it with "the policy of peace, fraternity and civilization that Socialism symbolizes."²²³ For the Spanish socialists, the precise means by which *that* civilization might become universalized remained a question for the future to address.

XIV. 1896-1897: The Crisis Abates

In the fall of 1896 disaster loomed large. *El Socialista* rattled off the litany of threats: "the war in Cuba, the war in the Philippines, a possible uprising in Puerto Rico, the threat of a resumed civil war; the *kabiles* of Morocco preparing to try and reconquer that which we snatched from them one day by force, and the specter of an armed fight with the United States." It was, the paper noted, a "sad situation!"²²⁴ But over the next several months, the colonial situation actually began to appear to be heading towards resolution. In December, the news of the death in battle of the Cuban leader Antonio Maceo led broad sectors of Spanish society to assume the insurrection was effectively over.²²⁵ Prime Minister Cánovas ordered General Weyler to moderate his savage and much-critiqued campaign of reconcentration, and announced that "a limited form of autonomy agreed by parliament in 1895" would be implemented in areas of Cuba still under Spanish control. As Sebastian Balfour explains, these half-measures satisfied none of the parties concerned in the end; but for the time being, the crisis

²²³ "<<Meeting>> Socialista en Madrid" *El Socialista* 23 October 1896

²²⁴ *El Socialista* 2 September

²²⁵ Balfour, Sebastian. *The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898-1923*. (1997) p. 95

appeared to abate somewhat over the winter of 1896-97.²²⁶ The Socialists did not seriously believe that either the death of Maceo or Cánovas' reforms would fix the situation, maintaining that, as the colonial problem was at its root capitalist, Socialism was the only definitive "regenerating element" for the country.²²⁷ And a correspondent from Palma de Mallorca noted that the death of Maceo had failed to leave the population of that region enthusiastic, despite the triumphalist drivel of the bourgeois papers and celebrations held by the town council. The socialists in Palma, meanwhile:

"have sought to convince the workers that they don't gain anything with these masquerades, rather, they lose with them, since the purpose of them is nothing more than to embed in them hatred towards other proletarians, and this way maintain a divide in the working-class family. Yes, the socialists of Palma, like all those of Spain, say to the workers: do not support the monstrosities that the jingoists are conducting, nor get excited with the nonsense written by those who don't believe anything they say; if they are partisans of the war, then they should support it, they should give their blood and their lives. You, the workers, must demand peace; you must demand for those who work in Cuba, who are your brothers, equal rights and equal benefits to your own, and unite, organize, and make yourselves strong to finish off with everything that signifies oppression, tyranny and slavery."²²⁸

Carlos Serrano notes how the socialist discourse devoted to the colonial conflicts tapered off at the end of 1896 and into the first weeks of 1897, as it appeared that, in the analysis of *El Socialista*, the government was finally determined to pave the way for a socio-diplomatic solution to the Cuban Insurrection, if only because of

²²⁶ Balfour, Sebastian. *The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898-1923*. (1997) p. 21-22

²²⁷ *El Socialista* 25 December 1896

²²⁸ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba" *Estudios de historia social*. vol. 8-9 (1979) p. 296

the pressure of the United States.²²⁹ Despite their doctrinal belief that wars were inevitable while capitalism reigned, the socialists welcomed a peace in the present. The end of the current colonial conflict would be a good thing, primarily because it would save peninsular resources and lives. But the socialists also believed that autonomy would "satisfy the very legitimate aspirations of the inhabitants of Cuba."²³⁰

It was soon disillusioned, however, as it became apparent that the vested interests of "the wealthy Cubans and Peninsular capitalists established there" obstructed the government's attempts at reform.²³¹ Sebastian Balfour suggests that by 1897, a political or military solution for Spain's troubles in Cuba may no longer have been possible: "the Cuban insurrectionists commanded too much support amongst the population for any proposals for autonomy, however radical, to be the basis for a settlement."²³² The socialists, for their part, continued to develop their economic interpretation of colonialism in order to explain the persistence of the conflict, now in its second year.

As the war continued over the spring and summer of 1897, the Socialists were at a crossroads. Carlos Serrano suggests that their expressions of sympathy for the aims of the Cuban and Filipino insurrectionaries became increasingly explicit in this period, and it is certainly true that with autonomy now on the table *via* government endorsement, the Socialists were able to speak of the "legitimate

²²⁹ *El Socialista* 8 January 1897. Morato later wrote that the government was moved "not by the recognition of an error, but by pusillanimity." Morato, J.J. *El Partido Obrero* p. 208

²³⁰ *El Socialista* 8 January 1897

²³¹ *El Socialista* 19 February 1897

²³² Balfour, Sebastian. *The End of the Spanish Empire 1898-1923* (1997). P. 22

aspirations" of the rebels in much more open language.²³³ But in practice, the Socialists were nonplussed by the continuation of hostilities, which had led to a severe economic depression.²³⁴ Furthermore, the hope expressed early in 1897 by the Socialists that a colonial peace might provide a reprieve in which the PSOE could strengthen working-class organization and develop a strong Socialist party were dashed as it became clear that the war would drag on.²³⁵ From their earlier enthusiasm about the prospects for social commentary offered by the conflict, the party's leaders began to feel that the centrality of the Cuban question was an obstacle to socialist propaganda, as it drew energy away from economic matters. Esteban de Vega notes that Pablo Iglesias considered public attention "excessively centered in the colonial war".²³⁶ As a result, in general anti-war and anti-colonial discussions appear less frequently in the pages of *El Socialista* in the first half of 1897. By September, the paper complained: "this is already a tale that never ends."²³⁷

XV. "O Todos o Ninguno" and the Anarchist Terror: Between Peace and Violence

²³³ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba" *Estudios de historia social*. vol. 8-9 (1979) p. 297

²³⁴ A letter "From Sitges" *El Socialista* 15 October 1897 details the unemployment and poverty in that town resulting from the effects of the war in Cuba.

²³⁵ "Más sobre la paz," *El Socialista* 8 January 1897

²³⁶ Esteban de Vega, Mariano. "El Partido Socialista en la crisis del 1898," *El Socialismo en España: desde la fundación del PSOE hasta 1975*. coord. Santos Juliá Díaz p. 95

²³⁷ *El Socialista* 24 September 1897

The socialists were increasingly wary of government repression; which had surpassed its usual levels in the wake of the anarchist bombings of the Corpus Christi procession in Barcelona the previous year.²³⁸ General Valeriano Weyler had participated in this parade and rounded up hundreds of suspects, who were imprisoned in appalling conditions, and many tortured, in the formidable fortress of Montjuich. For both the Spanish socialists and global opinion, Weyler personified the cruelty of the Spanish government. His reputation was further cemented by the harsh strategies he implemented some months later as the new Captain-General of Cuba. The socialist *La Lucha de Clases* of Bilbao, whose rhetoric was generally more radical than its *madrileño* counterpart, had to contend with this government repression throughout 1897, suffering closure and arrests, though *El Socialista* seems to have been less affected.

The colonial wars appeared to be resolving slowly but favorably in favor of Spain. Paradoxically, as José Valera Ortega notes, "the political success of the government was in inverse proportion to its military fortunes."²³⁹ The opposition Liberal party heightened their criticism of Weyler's Draconian strategy, and began to champion Cuban autonomy. In August 1897, the Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, the architect of the Restoration system and pre-eminent Conservative politician, was shot to death by an anarchist in revenge for the Montjuich affair. Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, who was appointed to lead the government in October, implemented the Liberals' autonomy proposal, which

²³⁸ See: Bookchin, Murray. *The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years. 1868-1936* (1998) p. 109

²³⁹ Valera Ortega, Jose. "Aftermath of Splendid Disaster: Spanish Politics Before and After the Spanish American War of 1898." *Journal of Contemporary History* vol. 15 (1980) p. 318

appeared to garner U.S. diplomatic approval, as was the recall of the loathed General Weyler.²⁴⁰ But while the situation in the Philippines appeared to be resolving itself favorably (from some perspectives, at least), the conflict inexorably dragged on in Cuba, where hundreds of thousands of Spanish soldiers still remained stationed. It was in this context that the PSOE launched their most salient political action against the war.

The campaign, whose launch was signaled in *El Socialista* of 24 September 1897, was nothing more than the official adoption of the propaganda expressed the previous summer during the mass discontent that manifested itself most prominently in the protests of the Zaragozan mothers. The demands were the same: in lieu of the failure of the Spanish government to conclude a peace satisfactory to all parties (which remained the ultimately desired outcome, even if it required the total independence of Cuba²⁴¹) the Socialists proposed a campaign of political action to force the government's hand by demanding it comply with the constitutional law requiring universal military service, without exemption. The watchword "*O Todos o Ninguno*" [Either All or None] was hardly revolutionary, as the Socialists had admitted on multiple occasions before. It bears repeating, as well, that from a doctrinal perspective, the PSOE had every reason to expect that, rather than allow the mass conscription of the sons of well-off or middle class families, the government would sooner seek a rapid peace at any cost.²⁴² As Serrano notes, the campaign sought to mobilize the Spanish masses

²⁴⁰ Balfour, Sebastian. *The End of the Spanish Empire 1898-1923* (1997) p. 22

²⁴¹ *El Socialista* 22 October 1897

²⁴² Núñez Florencio, Rafael. *Las Españas del 1898: de la guerra en ultramar a la crisis nacional*. (2000) p. 117

through "a form of action that they could immediately respond to."²⁴³ The socialists consciously abandoned all pretenses of strict adherence to Marxism and sought concrete results. Pablo Iglesias admitted as much when he said that the campaign was not "claiming that solutions be adopted to end the war in harmony with the ideas that we support."²⁴⁴ The party, he confessed, was too weak to influence the issue in a revolutionary manner. The political strategy pursued by the Socialists is understandable in this context and represented, as numerous historians have shown, a significant step in their passage from theory to practice, as well as one of their first acknowledgements that exigency could trump idealism *in extremis*. It is less clear why the socialists chose to begin the "*O todos o ninguno*" campaign at particular juncture, more than two and a half years after the beginning of the insurrection, when circumstances seemed to indicate a potentially favorable conclusion to the colonial conflict. A simple explanation proposed by Esteban de Vega is that the PSOE perceived itself becoming isolated in the rapidly-shifting political climate, and sought relevancy through a popular political movement that might attain concrete results.²⁴⁵

In doing so, Serrano argues, they once again chose to evade the "question of the legitimacy of the fight of the Cuban insurrectionaries," in order to appeal to the broadest sector of society and place themselves well within legal guidelines.²⁴⁶

²⁴³ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba" *Estudios de historia social*. vol. 8-9 (1979) p. 297

²⁴⁴ *El Socialista* 1 October 1897

²⁴⁵ Esteban de Vega, Mariano. "El Partido Socialista en la crisis del 1898," *El Socialismo en España: desde la fundación del PSOE hasta 1975*. coord. Santos Juliá Díaz, p. 96

²⁴⁶ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba" *Estudios de historia social*. vol. 8-9 (1979) P. 297

Alternatively, however, the decrease in the anti-colonialist element of their discourse could be interpreted in light of the autonomist concessions of the Sagasta government. The PSOE's leaders (and they were not certainly not alone in this) mistakenly assumed that the reforms had satisfied the desire of most Cubans for liberation, and that the war only persisted because of torpid momentum and the 'interests of a few,' either élite Spanish reactionaries living in Cuba who inflexibly rejected any decrease in their power that autonomy might permit; or those who hoped to profit from the war, such as American capitalists who sought the annexation of Cuba through the pretext of continuing Spanish failure to enact a satisfactory solution. This perception, combined with the demonstrable reality that hundreds of thousands of Spanish soldiers still remained stationed in *Ultramar* in lamentable conditions of disease, privation, and attrition from guerilla combat, likely explains the overwhelming socialist focus on the peninsular side of the colonial issue. I would argue that in this campaign, anti-colonialism *per se* receded very definitely into the background. Given their earlier expressions of specific opposition to colonialism, I suggest that this was an intentional and calculated policy. The party did not present or understand the campaign to be a step towards the progress of international Socialism, but a local action to alleviate a specific ill; an analogy can be found in their approach to labor strikes or municipal elections.²⁴⁷

This is further highlighted by the fact that we can see examples in which their anti-colonial philosophies remained intact, though directed elsewhere for the moment. The insistent emphasis given to the role of climate, disease, and shipping

²⁴⁷ Castillo, Santiago. *Historia del Socialismo Español* vol. 1 (1989) p. 134

conditions in the death of Spanish soldiers, rather than on *insurrecto* bullets, indicates that at any rate they were uninterested in attacking the motives of the Cuban nationalists.²⁴⁸ So too, reports of meetings in various towns throughout Spain in which the topic was raised indicate that many Socialists continued to view the Cuban struggle through a more rigorous anti-colonialist lens, such as shouts in Gijón: "Long live the brotherhood of the people! Down with borders! Long live the union of the workers! Down with the privileges of the capitalists!"²⁴⁹

The '*O todos o ninguno*' campaign lasted throughout October and into November of 1897. Its official conclusion was announced in *El Socialista* on 19 November. In that short period, according to Socialist calculations, 40 meetings had been held throughout Spain, attended by over 100,000 people.²⁵⁰ This was certainly the largest action organized by the PSOE up until this point. The official organ declared: "a better demonstration of unity and discipline cannot be given than that which has been demonstrated...by our young Party."²⁵¹ Their real success was more relative, of course. Esteban de Vega notes that the '*O todos o ninguno*' protests were "the only national attempt to channel popular discontent against the war." This had real political value, raising the visibility of the PSOE and providing a morale boost to a party struggling in isolation. However, the large popular support did not generally translate to recruits to the party, and membership increased only incrementally over the next year. Their campaign did

²⁴⁸ *El Socialista* 1 October 1897

²⁴⁹ *El Socialista* 15 October 1897

²⁵⁰ Carlos Serrano charts precisely when and where each meeting occurred in "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba," p. 298.

²⁵¹ *El Socialista* 19 November 1897

attract attention and support from other political elements, among whom were Republicans of varying shades. Blasco Ibáñez and Lerroux both lauded their efforts, prompting *El Socialista* to publish a recount of the historic differences in their positions²⁵² (yet it must be said that, despite the PSOE's insistence to contrary, the line was indeed increasingly becoming blurred).

If the true purpose of the campaign, as Juan Pablo Fusí and Esteban de Vega suggest, was indeed to increase party visibility and membership, then we might see the campaign as a (very) qualified success, as Serrano maintains it was.²⁵³ If we take the party's propaganda - calling only for the equalization of military service as a means to ending of colonial conflict- at its word, then we must conclude that they utterly failed. In a face-to-face meeting with Prime Minister Sagasta at the end of the campaign, the representatives of the PSOE formally delivered their petitions for compliance with the Constitutional law demanding universal service. Sagasta replied that their petition was "logical and just," and that the government was determined to fulfill their request.²⁵⁴ This answer was so anticlimactic that when Morato -who was actually present as a socialist delegate at the meeting- wrote of it in his history written decades later, he felt compelled to spice up the story. Admitting the apocryphal nature of the tale, he claimed that months prior, Sagasta -then the minister of War- had dithered to a different popular delegation:

Yes, the whole government and I myself, personally, believe obligatory service is just; but things are so bad in barracks! The poor generally do

²⁵² Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba" *Estudios de historia social*. vol. 8-9 (1979) p. 302

²⁵³ *ibid.* p. 301

²⁵⁴ *El Socialista* 19 November 1897

better with service; as well, they are better fed than in their house, they enjoy amenities that the haven't known; but who would have the children of good families go to those horrible barracks that we have? They have to be taken care of. Poor boys!

In fact, whether Sagasta indicated disagreement on the previous occasion or agreement in the present one, the end result remained the same. As Morato dryly notes, the Socialists' November 1897 meeting ended with Sagasta "promising that the law would be complied with...The law was not complied with."²⁵⁵

Chapter Four: The Disaster of 1898

By all indications, the conflicts appeared to be winding down at the end of the year. In December 1897, the military appeared to have successfully ended the insurrection in the Philippines with the peace agreement of Biyak-na-Bato (unfortunately, *El Socialista* noted, the tyrannical domination of the religious missions had not ended). So too, the U.S. government appeared to find the Spanish government's autonomy proposal acceptable.²⁵⁶ The Socialists, for their part, felt accomplished in their efforts - they had spoken, and for once the government had apparently listened. Their organizational initiative had alerted the interests of "the great part of the working mass" to their own plight, and while this may not have immediate effects, the PSOE could look forward to capitalizing on this working-class awareness in the coming year.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁵ Morato, Juan José. *El Partido Obrero Socialista* (1918) p. 208

²⁵⁶ Balfour, Sebastian. *The End of the Spanish Empire 1898-1923* (1997) p. 22

²⁵⁷ "Balance del año" *El Socialista* 31 December 1897

Paradoxically, the beginning of 1898 saw the PSOE supporting - for once - the politics of the Liberal government as it sought to implement its autonomist proposals. Most others viewed these less favorably. Sebastian Balfour notes how "in one of those fateful military interventions that so mark the history of modern Spain, a group of ultra-loyalist officers and civilians smashed up the offices of a Havana newspaper which had been campaigning for autonomy."²⁵⁸ This action, among others, demonstrated that the end of the Cuban insurrection was not as close as some had believed. As an incidental result of this, the U.S. President McKinley dispatched a warship, the USS Maine, to the harbor of Havana to monitor the situation and pressure the Spanish government to resolve the tensions that now besieged it from all quarters. In response to the decaying situation, the government ordered the dispatch of a reinforcement of 20,000 more soldiers to Cuba. The Socialists reacted with vehemence. On 14 January, a communication of the National Committee of the party castigated the duplicity of the government that had failed to implement the equal service they had promised. It was clear to the socialists that this "infamy" proved that the party had been mistakenly naive in its campaign of the previous fall. If the government, the ministries, and the Crown would not explicitly and formally institute the equality demanded by the constitution, then the masses of Spain would have to demand that "not one more soldier" be sent.²⁵⁹ Carlos Serrano paints this as a further evolution in their discourse, although Núñez Florencio notes that it is difficult to see it as anything

²⁵⁸ Balfour, Sebastian. *The End of the Spanish Empire*. p. 22

²⁵⁹ *El Socialista* 14 January 1898

other than a "(frustrated) parenthesis within a anti-bellicose attitude, without concrete alternatives."²⁶⁰. Nevertheless, the Socialists continued to parrot this theme in the early months of 1898, engaging in a petition campaign that secured no results. They also seized upon the electoral strategy once again, announcing in *El Socialista* of January 28 that the working masses of Spain must organize "all the forces possible" to ensure that the deputies elected understood that "NOT ONE MORE SOLDIER SHOULD GO TO CUBA," in a rare utilization of bold, capital letters.²⁶¹ The tone of urgency was great, but it corresponded as well to their sense of powerlessness as events began to spiral out of control.

On 15 February, the U.S.S. Maine exploded in Havana harbor. As it became increasingly apparent that the United States was seriously entertaining the possibility of war with Spain over Cuba, the country was plunged into a furor. Popular opinion in Spain became more patriotic and bellicose than it had been for years. Even the Republicans, who the previous year had sympathized with the PSOE's anti-war campaign, now clamored for war.²⁶² To the horror of the Socialists, "the mood in the streets, to judge from the frequent and boisterous demonstrations...was belligerently pro-war."²⁶³ The Spanish government eventually declared war on the United States in April. Mateo Sagasta later claimed that he had been forced to do so by public opinion - had they not done so,

²⁶⁰ Núñez Florencio, Rafael. *Militarismo y antimilitarismo en España (1888-1906)* (1990) . p. 258

²⁶¹ *El Socialista* 28 January 1898, *ibid.* 4 February, etc.

²⁶² Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba" *Estudios de historia social*. vol. 8-9 (1979) p. 304

²⁶³ Balfour, Sebastian. *The End of the Spanish Empire 1898-1923* (1997) p. 26

the Spanish nation would have disintegrated.²⁶⁴ The 'national integrity' that the Restoration parties sought to preserve at the outset now appeared to be threatened not only in Ultramar, but in the Peninsula itself. The Queen Regent and government appear to have given up Cuba for lost, but felt that they could not grant independence without provoking a chaotic backlash in the peninsula. The government as Balfour noted, felt that "any voluntary abandonment of the Island on their part would bring about the collapse of the Restoration system and the downfall of the monarchy."²⁶⁵ Though military and political opinion was utterly pessimistic about their chances, war with the United States, perversely, was felt to be 'the only honorable means whereby Spain could lose what little was left of her immense colonial empire,'²⁶⁶ and salvage the situation in the peninsula.

I. Understanding Independence: Socialist Economic Explanation for Cuban Nationalism

For the socialists, the coming conflict with the U.S. further complicated their analysis of the fundamental connections between colonialism, capitalism, nationalism and war, and hampered the possibility of their actions. Núñez Florencio notes: "the socialists, who had not secured anything practical during three years of colonial war, could do so even less now with an exacerbated patriotism, a fatuous bellicosity and a ridiculous triumphalism that extended to all

²⁶⁴ Hilton, Sylvia. "The Spanish American War of 1898: Queries into the Relationship between Press, Public Opinion and Politics" *Revista española de estudios norteamericanos*. p. 71

²⁶⁵ Balfour, Sebastian. *The End of the Spanish Empire* p. 25

²⁶⁶ The Conde de Romanones, cited in *ibid.* p. 27

parts."²⁶⁷ Their discourse now had to factor in the possibility of war with another capitalist power in addition to colonial conflict. As a result, however, their interpretation of the Cuban question became more refined and explicit. While the conflict in Cuba was presently assuming the character of a political struggle, Pablo Iglesias wrote, it was and had always been, at its base, an economic issue - as were "all matters that preoccupied peoples." The struggle -both the tension of within the Spanish empire, or the impending battle between the bourgeoisie of Spain and the U.S. -was essentially over the same economic issue.

Iglesias continued: "Spain, or better said, the dominant class of Spain, has maintained in Cuba a restrictive policy to monopolize that market, the Great Antilles has fought for their autonomy and their independence with the primordial end of securing their own control over their market." The United States supported them, "not so that the Cubans might enjoy more liberty and make themselves more prosperous from their soil," but to make themselves the owners of the Cuban market. The reluctance to give up a protectionist monopoly explained why the first class- the Spanish exploiters- was so long opposed to conceding autonomy, advocating it only now that the greater threat of U.S. interests loomed. Iglesias concluded that the best possible outcome would be to "concede autonomy to Cuba" before it was too late, so that "the market of that country escapes the power of the bourgeoisie of the United States." Autonomy from Spanish or American domination would " be a benefit to those who live in the Great Antilles."

²⁶⁷ Núñez Florencio, Rafael. *Militarismo y antimilitarismo en España, (1888-1906)* (1990) p. 256

Iglesias believed, however, that it was inevitable that the U.S. economy would eventually come to dominate trade with Cuba, because of its proximity and its overwhelming lead over the debilitated Spanish economy. This would not be occurring so rapidly and would not carry with it the possibility of a ruinous war if not for the intractable and myopic Spanish government and bourgeoisie. Since the Cubans or the Americans were destined to win the battle for economic control, it was a terrible shame that the Spanish ruling classes had dragged out a conflict over a moot political point that was entirely secondary in nature. The "independence of Cuba" or national integrity mattered little in word, if the economic fact was that the Americans and Cubans would inevitably seize control of their market. Autonomy here was understood to translate to *de facto* economic independence from the Spanish empire. Because the socialists believed that all expressions of patriotism and nationalism were superficial expressions that disguised underlying capitalist economic struggles, they felt that the political nature of the present Cuban struggle had already been essentially settled.

If the Cuban and Spanish bourgeoisie persisted in fighting over the question of terminology, it was because of the hatred engendered by the brutality of Spanish policy for the former, and the illogical attachment to an ephemeral patriotism for the latter. The Spanish government should immediately grant official recognition of the autonomy that the Cubans had already secured for themselves, and if this was not enough, grant independence. If this had been done at the outset, it would have prevented the needless and costly conflict, whose

price was be paid, as always, by the proletarians of all nations involved. That the Spanish élite still delayed in reconciling themselves to this eventuality now dramatically imperiled not only their Peninsular interests, but the far more important interests of the proletariat, who would naturally would be sacrificed by this blind and futile patriotism.

Instead, *El Socialista* proposed that the loss of Cuba could be a positive step for Spain. In the absence of a protected colonial market, Spain "could and must develop [internally]..." Therefore, it begged the government: "Abandon Cuba, if necessary, and revolutionize the administration and public education [in Spain] - this is what everyone in Spain demands, bourgeois and workers."²⁶⁸

Whether it was termed autonomy or independence, it was assumed that the end result for Cubans would be that their own bourgeoisie would now be in charge of the Cuban economy (provided independence came before the U.S. could intervene). But in Iglesias' view, at least, this was not necessarily perceived as a negative development. In his understanding of Marxist determinism, the end of a nationalist campaign of independence would resolve "the question that preoccupies the Cuban bourgeoisie and distracts the attention of those workers, and will clear the terrain so as to openly plant in Cuba the question that has existed so far in other countries: the fight between wage-payers and wage-worker, between rich and poor."²⁶⁹

²⁶⁸ *El Socialista* 8 April 1898

²⁶⁹ "La Cuestión Cubana," P. Iglesias. *El Socialista* 18 February 1898. One might idly wonder how Iglesias might have interpreted the 1956 Cuban Revolution.

Serrano has seen the activity and discourse of the PSOE in the first months of 1898 as characterized by a "double orientation: the reduction of the Cuban claims, and a greater determination in opposition to the war."²⁷⁰ Iglesias' analysis was perhaps reductionist in its understanding of the complex aims of the Cuban nationalists, but his interpretation is somewhat understandable. In the first place, as we have seen, the Spanish socialists viewed the world through simplistic class dichotomy. But the possibility for nuance in this intellectual vision becomes apparent through Iglesias' acknowledgement that an economically independent Cuban bourgeoisie had a necessary role to play in the development of their own industry, which would eventually result in a strong and class-aware industrial force. In fact, the PSOE would soon begin to express similar aspirations for their peninsular capitalist class.²⁷¹ While the socialists' discourse had now and then detected bourgeois interests within the Cuban insurrection, it notably never condemned it on those terms. Another factor that limited their analysis is that the socialists, adhering to the policy of "accentuated legalism," had no contact with the *insurrectos* throughout the duration of the war.²⁷² This would necessarily confine them to speculation. Whatever their true grasp of the situation, the Socialist leadership had, in the article by Iglesias cited above, attempted a concrete reckoning with the possibility of Cuban independence for first time.

While his hypothesis may have been speculative and his perception vague, the

²⁷⁰ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba" *Estudios de historia social*. vol. 8-9 (1979) p. 304

²⁷¹ Carr, Raymond. *Modern Spain: 1876-1980* (1980) p. 48

²⁷² As far as historians have been able to determine. It would be interesting to investigate this question in greater depth, for example in the private communication of Socialist leaders, or the experiences of PSOE adherents living or traveling abroad.

conclusion was unequivocal - Spain could not and should not hope to preserve their control of the politics or economy of the island. Their continuing insistence on trying to do just that was leading the country towards an armed confrontation with the United States, which the PSOE viewed as the single worst possible outcome.

On March 4th, 1898, *El Socialista* published a full-page electoral manifesto to announce their electoral campaign for the coming April elections. The first item on the agenda in the party's declared platform was a promise to "immediately terminate the Cuban war, via the most ample autonomy or the independence of the Island, avoiding at the same time any fight with the United States." Although they could not hope to gain anything but a minority presence in the Cortes, it was hoped that a seat in the government, combined with an energetic demonstration on May Day, would have a greater resonance on the majority party's policies (the party was not successful in the elections).²⁷³ In the same issue, the paper compared the French rightists who called for the death of Dreyfus and the Jews to the "chauvinists" in Spain who shouted for the death of the North Americans. "The two are twin peoples, peoples who have been born in the 19th century through a chronological error."

II. International Solidarity and Peace at Whatever Cost

The internationalist pretensions of the Spanish Socialists in the face of an overwhelming surge towards war displayed itself on multiple occasions in the

²⁷³ *El Socialista* 4 March 1898

next few weeks. One perceives that the socialists felt that they had adequately addressed the Cuban element of the equation in Pablo Iglesias' statements, or at any rate that the vastly greater threat posed by a war with the U.S. demanded they direct their attention towards that nation. In no uncertain terms, the PSOE professed the utmost working-class solidarity with the American proletariat and rejected anti-'Yankee' discourse.²⁷⁴ On March 25th *El Socialista* noted with pleasure that this gesture of good-will had been returned by "our North American comrades," who were going to publish a manifesto opposing the war in their own country. Unfortunately, the American socialists apologized, "in that country *only they* had made declarations against the war." Despite this, the Spanish socialists declared themselves satisfied that there existed in America "brothers...whose sentiments are one with our own...the Spanish socialists will continue to consider their colleagues on the other side of the Atlantic as comrades."²⁷⁵ On 8 April, the annual published missive from the National Committee announcing preparations for May Day demonstrations, worrying (presciently) that this years' celebrations would see the Spanish and American workers hearing the "clash of bloody battles;" that perhaps that on that day -"a day of love -cannons might be carrying out their work of extermination," provoked by the murderous contention between the bourgeois of Spain and the United States, at the cost of the deaths of "thousands of unlucky and unwilling proletarians." That same working class was

²⁷⁴ In *El Socialista* of this period, the spelling is interchangeably Yankee, Yanki, and Yanqui.

²⁷⁵ *El Socialista* 25 March 1898

urgently advised to "abandon the indifference that enervates you" and exert all possible efforts to avoid war.²⁷⁶

On April 15, the front page headline of *El Socialista* was simply "Peace." No one wanted war; not the soldiers in Cuba, wracked by disease and weakened by years of campaigns and poor rations, neither their "mothers, fathers, brothers, wives, or children" wanted a new war. War must be avoided "at whatever price....Independence, if it takes that; nobody should be afraid of it." *La Lucha de Clases* was more explicit the next day: "We ask vey loudly, but very loudly, that Cuba be conceded the independence for which they have been fighting, since it is an inescapable law that colonies will emancipate themselves sooner or later from the aegis of the metropolis." On the 22 of April, when war now appeared to be inevitable, *El Socialista* published an article that declined to blame hostilities on the United States. In precisely the same language it had used years earlier, it laid the blame on the "truly guilty...those of our own country. To what do we owe the war of Cuba and all the things that have resulted from it? To the bad colonial policy of Spain." At any point, the column continued, the Spanish government might have quieted the discontent in Cuba by instituting liberal reforms, but this was not within the nature of the Spanish government who always ever saw Cuba as "a simple market for a handful of capitalists, and a pretty mine for their friends and protégés." They followed this with a detailed history of the previous three years, listing all the various junctures at which the government could have arrested their spiral into disaster, but failed to do so. As I have suggested earlier, at this point the socialists were dealing in the hypothetical. Both their doctrines

²⁷⁶ *El Socialista* 8 April 1898

and their lived experiences over the previous years had demonstrated that the government was structurally incapable of acting in the best interests of the Spanish masses; here, they were now suggesting that they were also incapable of acting in the best interests of their own bourgeoisie. Unfortunately, the flames they had already stoked would burn the proletariat. Hindsight might lead us to view this particular article through a particularly fatalist lens, a sort of Socialist *alae iacta est*. Three days after its publication, the Spanish government officially declared war on the United States of America. But for the Socialists, the present course towards war had determined long ago, and the usual suspects, i.e. "almost all the bourgeois elements" of Spain, bore responsibility for it.²⁷⁷

III. A Eulogy on May Day.

It is not within the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed narrative of the course of the short Spanish-American War from a military perspective, but it is a well-known historical fact that it was a decisive and catastrophic defeat for Spain. One week after the declaration of war, on the First of May, as the socialists had prophetically predicted, the American Asiatic squadron under Commodore Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet in the Pacific at the battle of Cavite, near Manila. By the end of June, a massive U.S. army had been landed in eastern Cuba and was besieging Santiago. On July 3rd, the Spanish Atlantic fleet made a desperate attempt to break through the blockading American navy, but was

²⁷⁷ *El Socialista* 14 April 1898

annihilated. Shortly thereafter, the land forces in Santiago surrendered.²⁷⁸ The conflict was virtually over for Spain, yet diplomatic talks dragged on until hostilities concluded on August 4 - enough time for an American expeditionary force to sail for the Philippines and besiege Manila, along with thousands of Filipinos who had seized the opportunity to rise in revolt again.

On May Day, while, as Juan José Morato later put it "the colonial power of Spain was sunk at Cavite" halfway across the world,²⁷⁹ *El Socialista's* front page reiterated the same sterile professions of international solidarity with the working-class of the United States. Yet in this issue of the paper, which ran articles by many of the party's luminaries, the severity of events appears to have provoked a visceral reaction that flavored their articles with a sentimental tone uncharacteristic of their rhetoric to date. The front page traced the colonial roots of the conflict only to the "infamous colonial policies of our bourgeoisie," a fairly common assessment by this juncture.²⁸⁰ Another article, by one R. Oyueles, started out well within the lines of the orthodox PSOE discourse to date, arguing that war as a general phenomenon was due to the conflict of particular economic concern, "baptized...with the well-known and pompous name of national interests....The present one of Spain with the United States is plain proof...the conflict has its origins in the separatist war of the Isle of Cuba." He continued his analysis:

And what causes have produced that war? Purely economic causes: the *administrative or public immorality*, which is to say, the rapacious conduct of

²⁷⁸ Balfour, Sebastian. *The End of the Spanish Empire 1898-1923* (1997), pp. 34-37

²⁷⁹ Morato, Juan José. *El Partido Socialista Obrero* (1918) p. 210

²⁸⁰ *El Socialista* 1 May 1898

the majority of the functionaries sent to Cuba, truly the *purulent discharge* of the Metropolis...the *monopoly of the colonial market* by determined Spanish producers, and the *fight of the bourgeois classes*, or perhaps between the native or Cuban bourgeois and the imported or peninsular one, for the conquest of the bureaucracy of the Isle. In a word: the battle for the exploitation of it between the natives of it, who believe it must be for them, and the emigrants from the *mother patria*, who wish to live on the riches of the *daughter*.

So far, Oyueles had generally summed up the explanations developed by the Spanish socialists to date. But unlike Pablo Iglesias, he then spins an elaborate and strange analogy of a wealthy, powerful suitor (the United States) asking for the hand of a poor but honorable young lady, and being rejected by her mother. The lustful man then tries to press the virtue of the victimized girl, acting "through the most reprehensible means to satisfy his proposal." Spain is either the girl herself and/or the unheeded "*mother of the offended girl*," (Oyueles claims both in separate paragraphs) but this classic chivalric analogy, which smacks of bourgeois sentimentality, does not shed much light on the proper role Spain should play in Oyueles' socialist world-view. It does, however, indicate that some socialists must have found it very hard indeed to reconcile their political doctrine with the very tangible loss of Cuba and the heightened emotion of war. Even Morato could not refrain from eulogizing at the deathbed of the Spanish empire. The socialist historian reached far back into the legend of Spanish failure²⁸¹:
"Four centuries ago- after seven of fighting- the Spanish nationality was constituted [at the culmination of the *reconquista* in 1492]. Such a long time

²⁸¹ This unique element of national identity was no less powerful for its pessimism. As José Alvarez Junco explains in *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* (2011) the symbolism of a Spain long-martyred on the cross of foreign commitments by its ruling class dated at least back to the reign of Carlos V in the 16th century.

fighting created deep wounds, that only peace could have healed." Spain might have taken advantage of that peace to settle down to industrious and honest labor, which would have "made our land prosperous and happy," but this was, in the end,

"A vain dream! The impulse given from throwing the Moors out of the Peninsula carried our arms to the other side of the straits; the offspring of royal marriages with ambitious princes, born in foreign lands, brought the seeds of endless war; industrious men who did not profess the faith of Christ were thrown out of Spain; with suspicious and cruel intolerance all were obligated to worship the same God, and, to make matters worse, America was discovered by Castile.

A great discovery for civilization, but disastrous for Spain!"

The treasures of Guanajuato and Potosí, instead of financing the development of Spain, led to its ruin (here no mention is made of the bloody ghosts of sacrificed American races, etc), awakening the "spirit of adventure which killed the affinity for work and sustained interminable and disastrous wars... and four centuries of errors" left Spain debilitated, with a vainglorious plutocracy now determined to honorably sacrifice the remnants of the empire.²⁸² It is worthy of note that in May of 1898 the Socialists ceased using the pronoun 'our' in sarcastic or ironic terms. When Dr. Jaime Vera referred to the "tremendous misfortunes suffered by our poor Spain" in this same issue, one must see this as a genuine lament. And even Francisco Mora, while admitting that the "incapability or lack of foresight of the Spanish bourgeoisie had produced the war in Cuba that has cost the nation the lives of 100,000 soldiers," insisted that the colonial question was "exclusively a Spanish issue and only we have the right to fix it." This, it will be noted, is rather far from the PSOE's earlier discourse that separated Cuba and 'our' Ultramar, a

²⁸² Morato, J.J. "Liquidación." *El Socialista* 1 May 1898

concept that the proletariat of Spain had no interest or stake in. Mora, and the other Socialist leaders writing in *El Socialista* on May 1st, appeared to have been provoked into a certain sense of patriotic emotion in the extremity of the moment.

In their following issues, the editorial staff of *El Socialista* appear to have gathered themselves and returned to a more settled analysis. Castigating the foolish patriotism of all the bourgeoisie parties that had selfishly led the country to disastrous war, it reiterated that peace was the only desirable outcome. To that end, for the good of the country, "our party...declared without circumlocutions or evasions that if, to achieve that [peace], the independence of Cuba was necessary, then independence must arrive."²⁸³ It reiterated this theme the following week on May 13, noting as well that the declaration of martial law had resulted in the arrest of several socialists throughout Spain and the suspension of the Asturian socialist paper *La Aurora Social*. It also returned to its critique of the brutality of Spanish colonialism as the origin of the conflict: "Spain would not have had insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines if it had not executed a barbarous policy in those countries, or made them into the patrimony of a handful of exploiters, of a handful of political adventurers and a *posse* of some friars; if, in place of a regime of privilege and hatred, there could have existed a truly humane and civilized social state...we would not have had a colonial policy supported by bayonets and cannons if the current regime, instead of attending to the production of merchandise that "millionaire-izes" [*enmillonan*] a handful of individuals, had aspired to amply satisfy the necessities of all human beings." But the "bourgeois regime"(as the reader will no doubt be amply aware), could not have followed

²⁸³ *El Socialista* 8 May 1898

that policy, and those ills could only be remedied by "erasing it quickly so that barbarism ceases and Humanity is emancipated."²⁸⁴

Further bad news came from the Philippines in June as a new rebellion exploded. The socialists commented: "the mass uprising of the Filipino people against Spanish domination cannot be seen as a deed produced through spontaneous generation: it is the result of three centuries of missionary domination, of lawless outrages revolting to every honest conscience, of banditry exercised by the Peninsular bureaucracy."²⁸⁵ Another article in the same issue attacked the racist slurs used in the mainstream press describing the Filipinos as 'uneducated herds of apes,' insinuating that they were so primitive that they had yet to lose their tails. *El Socialista* rejected such language, but did not necessarily deny that the Philippines were fundamentally uncivilized. Instead, it called out those who "have never clamored to improve the miserable and infamous condition of the natives of the Philippines." The failure of the Spanish bourgeoisie to bring the benefits of modern Western civilization to the "Magellanic archipelago" was evident in the hostility of the population, who, while the nation that dominated them was engaged in an epic war for its survival, "arose as one man against the representatives and defenders of the metropolis..." It was insinuated that Spanish colonial policy had entirely itself to blame. "Spain has reigned in the Philippines for centuries. If its natives are today in a state of barbarity and savagery, whose fault is it - theirs, or that of their *civilizers*?"²⁸⁶ Earlier, it has issued broad critiques of the hypocrisy of the imperialist claims to undertake a 'civilizing

²⁸⁴ *El Socialista* 27 May 1898

²⁸⁵ *El Socialista* 17 June 1898

²⁸⁶ *El Socialista* 17 June 1898

mission.' But in this case, *El Socialista* demonstrates the beginning of a deep ideological shift that would rapidly develop in the following months, as the catastrophic Spanish-American war drew to its disastrous conclusion.

IV. 'Civilizing 'the Spanish Bourgeoisie

While peace would not be concluded until August, the Socialists tended to speak throughout that summer as if the war had already terminated, as it arguably had after the destruction of the Spanish fleets at Cavite and Santiago de Cuba. While throughout the period, *El Socialista* continued its broad condemnations of the brutal and exploitative nature of Spain's "bad colonial policy" as the origin of the conflict, the socialists rapidly began to develop a more detailed and profound analytical explanation, focused on their perception of the failures of their own élite class.

The PSOE had been broadly predicted disaster as a result of Spanish colonialism for years, but had been unable to prevent it. Now that it had arrived, and their prophecies had come to pass, they sought a deeper understanding. Anti-colonialism was now not merely a theoretical doctrine, but one whose practical validity had been amply demonstrated. The Socialists now felt compelled to grapple with the fundamentals, and analyze the colonial question on its own terms. In the second half of 1898, the Spanish socialists developed more elaborate explanations for colonialism, and explicated the terms of their own opposition to it. The experiences of 1898 provided basic points of departure for the anti-

colonialist themes that would carry them through the first decade of the new century.

The Spanish socialists had long argued that the PSOE differed from other political philosophies in Spain because it was based on a 'scientific' analysis of actual conditions. Up until this point, this had been only vaguely applied to colonialism as a phenomenon, although no less stridently. The end goal of socialism, in the Spanish understanding of Marxist theory, was an international social republic of the proletariat, controlling the means of economic production of an industrialized world. This "brotherhood" would abolish the arbitrary cultural and national divides that had been produced firstly during the distant and "barbarous" past. These harmful divisions been maintained, refined, and made more harsh by the advent of western capitalism and the new international bourgeoisie class. Nations and their imperialist pretensions were therefore consistently opposed in general terms, as we have seen in previous chapters.

What should be reiterated here is that their understanding of history required the previous step of modern industrial capitalism in order to fulfill its progress. Because industrialization and bourgeoisie civilization had unevenly developed throughout the world, the ultimate social revolution was necessarily distant. Socialists would of course understand, in abstract terms, that the bourgeoisie as a class were destined to disappear and be replaced by a universally-just economic system. In the discourse of the PSOE, we have seen quite clearly that they utilized a separate vocabulary for the "present society" and "the future socialist" one. On these grounds, they could unilaterally condemn all

previous colonial projects, and present the capitalist claims of imperial "civilizing missions" as exploitative, while not rejecting that there *was* a form of civilization (which is to say, Socialism) whose global spread was desirable and necessary.

In the present, however, western Socialists debated the question of whether certain advanced forms of capitalist imperialism could be supported, on the grounds that the bourgeoisie of the colonizing nation would bring industrialization and modernity to primitive corners of the globe. Exploitative as this undoubtedly must be at its beginning, it could be seen justified as the means to an end. If colonialism could bring modernization and industrialism to the colonial periphery, some argued, it would invariably spark class-consciousness. This was by no means a consensus or even majority view; the myriad challenges posed by the imperial phenomenon sparked major fissures in the Socialist International over the next decades, leading directly and indirectly to its disintegration.

These tensions aside, it was generally accepted as socialist doctrine at the turn of century that the more vibrant the capitalist economy was in a given country, the stronger the framework was for an class-aware industrialized proletariat that would organize into the socialist movement.²⁸⁷ European socialists found evidence to support this in the fact that the most numerous and powerful socialist parties existed in Germany, France, and Great Britain (in roughly that order). All three shared booming industrial economies that led to the desirable infrastructure of 'civilization.' Their theories appeared to be reinforced by the rapid industrialization of Japan and the resulting appearance of a socialist

movement there.²⁸⁸ At the same time, because of their shared capitalist system, those benefits were distributed unequally²⁸⁹. It mattered little that imperial Germany was more politically autocratic than Republican France; the political system was merely an auxiliary to maintain the power of the economic bourgeoisie, either through force or duplicity. Until such time as the international economic conditions provoked a global socialist revolution, reform through established political means was an acceptable path to ameliorate the more immediate plagues resulting from social and economic inequality.

This, at any rate, was the general understanding of the PSOE, from which it had derived its political philosophy and plan of action, although Pablo Iglesias had restricted some of the more liberal tendencies of this reformism within the party. As Spanish socialists had noted on multiple occasions, however, the process within their own country did not appear to match the expected pattern. Increasingly, therefore, the socialists began to argue that this was because the torpid Spanish bourgeoisie had failed to fulfill their *own* role in the industrialization and modernization of Spain. As consequence, the growth of socialism was necessarily stunted as well. In the Disaster of 1898, the failure of the élite was starkly exposed for all. The defeat, *El Socialista* claimed on 17 August 1898, was " a reflection of the debility and misdirection of the Spanish bourgeoisie."

²⁸⁸ *El Socialista* 8 June 1898

²⁸⁹ And, not incidentally, empires. John Hobson blamed Imperialism for inequality in the metropole in his seminal work. The European bourgeoisie artificially diverted economic resources to colonies in search of greater profits, to the detriment of all but wealthy capitalists.

Paradoxically, then, the PSOE insisted that over the previous years it had not only attempted to defend the interests of the Spanish masses, *but the interests of the bourgeoisie as well*: "Yes, it has been the rare case that the Socialists have had to defend, against the conduct of the directorial class, not only the interests of the proletarians, but of [the directorial class] themselves."²⁹⁰ The blind and indolent Spanish élites had still persisted in their folly, and lost their own colonies at the cost of hundreds of thousands of proletarian lives and millions of *pesetas*. However, some good might come of it yet.

Indeed, there was some sense of relief that Spain's colonies would no longer hamper the development of the Spanish economy by providing a protected market for a "lethargic national industry." The colonies had only ever been a burden to Spain, Morato reckoned in a history "Spain and the Discovery of America," serialized in *El Socialista*. The rulers of Spain had crippled the country since 1492, ensuring (for instance) with the expulsion of the Jews that same year that there would be no merchant class to wisely invest the new riches. And the immense wealth that did flow from the colonies was wasted in the costly wars of the Hapsburgs, rather than invested in the Peninsula. Spain had stagnated for four centuries, but the results were now clearly apparent. In this sense Morato and other socialist writers drew off of many of the same historiographical assumptions that influenced the Regenerationist movement.²⁹¹ (Indeed, Morato later reflects with some pride that the PSOE's arguments and activities in this period attracted

²⁹⁰ *El Socialista* 12 August 1898

²⁹¹ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba." p. 306 For more on regenerationism, see: Salavert, Vicente, and M. Suárez Cortina, eds. *El regeneracionismo en España: Política, educación, ciencia y sociedad*. (2007); Perez de la Dehesa, Rafael. *Pensamiento de Costa y su influencia en el 98* (1966)

"the sympathies of opinion and of distinguished men, among whom we recall the great Costa."²⁹² At the time, however, Pablo Iglesias stringently rejected most Regenerationists as too bourgeois.)

It was on these grounds that, during the peace talks between the United States and Spain, the Socialists fervently argued for the abandonment of the Philippines.²⁹³ The Spanish bourgeoisie had demonstrated themselves incapable of governing it effectively, and the possession of any colonies would render no benefit to Spain while it remained a lethargic and undeveloped country. Oddly, the *O todos o ninguno* campaign could now be recast a genuine attempt to catalyze the Spanish bourgeoisie to action [although this connection was not explicitly made]. Yet in the end, they had demonstrated their lack of drive by their general failure to serve in the military, which highlighted the debility of their national project. They had been happy enough to play the role of "Captain Spider"²⁹⁴ and dispatch poor Spanish workers to be slaughtered overseas, but ultimately did not care enough to put their own lives on the line for the much-vaunted "integrity of the *patria*." The workers, of course, had supposedly never been enthusiastic about defending the interests of a handful of élites. By contrast, the Socialists presented the American army, whose industrious drive and conquering zeal could be discovered in the fact that its troops had included "*el*

²⁹² Morato, Juan José. *El Partido Socialista Obrero* (1918) p. 208

²⁹³ *El Socialista* 26 August 1898

²⁹⁴ Capitán Araña was a mythical figure who had, according to legend, appeared in port towns throughout the south of Spain during the wars of South American independence, recruiting young men with tales of glory, high pay, and booty. The next day, as the ships full of recruits set sail, Capitán Araña would have mysteriously disappeared. Some have suggested that the legend was based on a real individual, possibly a Basque named Arana whose surname was corrupted.

regimiento de Rough Riders, composed of capitalists."

I do not suggest, as some scholars have insinuated, that this economic pragmatism and positive view of American expansionism amounted to a suggestion that colonialism *could* or *should* be refined. It was still held to be an inherently cruel process. So while it was true, as Morato prefaced his work on the Conquest of the Americas, that " much has been said about the cruelty of Spain...and with such reason!" this was not still not the main hallmark of Spanish backwardness.

"since the most remote antiquity all colonization was equivalent to rapine, dispossession, murder and destruction, and to condemn the horrendous attacks committed against humanity in the name of civilization, we do not need to go very far back in History- It's enough to read in the daily papers the colonial news of the present! Spain has committed horrors, true; but no *civilizing* nation can cast the first stone. All- some more, some lesser - have followed, and presently follow the same conduct."²⁹⁵

Morato and other socialists now insinuated that the specific myopia of Spain's governing élite therefore did not lie in the brutality of their colonial policy, but from their utter failure to make their exploitation pay any dividends for themselves. More advanced imperial powers were at least acting upon an rational, understandable model of capitalist greed, even if their methods were deplorable. Thus, a few months after the conclusion of the war, Pablo Iglesias explained that "our politicians have not seen that colonial nations of today are those that have a surplus of productivity that they cannot apply within their own natural territory...Did this happen with Spain? Spain, that is not apt either to cultivate its soils, nor to exploit the natural sources of its production? How were we going to have colonies but to hold them by force, and losing them when this failed?" As a

²⁹⁵ *El Socialista* 5 August 1898

consequence, the government must henceforth put colonies out of their mind, and concentrate "all of its attention in the Peninsula." The bourgeoisie and its political parties were "the ones who had degenerated." Regeneration would come in the present through economic modernization, and this necessarily required the bourgeoisie to fulfill its historical imperative.²⁹⁶ In every eventuality, "socialism will always advance in Spain and will reach the end that it proposes." But the PSOE hoped, however, that "it will progress more rapidly and conquer sooner if the bourgeoisie of our country, completing the historic mission that they are assigned, increase the productive force and erase all antiquated forms of production."²⁹⁷

V. The Aftermath of 1898

The socialists of Spain had opposed colonial wars from the beginning, and critiqued specific aspects of colonialism on innumerable general and specific occasions in the past. But between 1895-98, they had been faced with a conflict that- Serrano notes- "partially escaped their usual theoretical schema."²⁹⁸ When they finally seized on a particular strategy as an immediate remedy to a deeper ill, they had been hindered in their ability to effectively act by the weakness of their party, which they blamed on the depressed and backwards Spanish economy. But in the second half of 1898 they rapidly developed a tenable synthesis. It justified

²⁹⁶ "Los que han degenerado" *El Socialista* 5 August 1898; "lo que se impone" 23 December 1898, etc.

²⁹⁷ "El Partido Necesario." *El Socialista* 19 August 1898

²⁹⁸ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba." *Estudios de historia social*. vol. 8-9 (1979) p. 310

the precepts of their economic analysis and rationalized the contradictory aims of their political strategies. It could attract both Spanish workers and liberal bourgeoisie, providing them with a positive role for the future. It absolved the majority of Spaniards from any particular blame for colonial exploitation by demonstrating their lack of complicity in the process, while simultaneously fulfilling its international Socialist commitments by condemning the imperialism exercised by other nations in its modern form. On the latter point, the PSOE made it clear that they understood that colonialism would "have to end along with the regime of bourgeois capitalism."²⁹⁹ The nature of this socialist anti-colonial synthesis proved a persistent one, and this is the form that their discourse maintained throughout the first decades of the twentieth century. In many ways, it evaded the debate on imperialism that would increasingly divide the Second International in that period. For the moment, the PSOE could adhere to an orthodox anti-colonialism without compromising their party's position, because, for better or worse, colonies were out of the question for a country whose bourgeoisie was not yet 'civilized' itself.

On a more temporal level, we can agree with Rafael Núñez Florencio, in his final analysis, when he admits that the socialists were generally justified in their assertion that they had been the "only" ones to consistently oppose the war in all its phases, failing primarily because of the small strength of the party. And it was equally true that they were the only ones who has courageously succeeded in launching "a mass mobilizing campaign against what appeared to pass for the general opinion of the country (bellicose patriotism) in an especially difficult

²⁹⁹ *La Lucha de Clases* 9 July 1898

context, marked by a grave economic crisis and a tenacious political repression.³⁰⁰ And after the cessation of hostilities, as Spain dealt with the profound repercussions of the disaster, the PSOE seemed poised to see the fruits of its labor pay dividends.

In part, this was due to the fact that in many ways, the economy did begin to develop in the manner the socialists hoped for. Catalan and Basque industries experienced a boom at the turn of the century, catalyzed by the return of investments from Ultramar.³⁰¹ This coincided with a spike in the rate of Spanish urbanization provoked by a decline in agricultural production, providing the socialists with a much greater mass of industrialized workers to proselytize to. Prior to this, the immediate economic crisis in the wake of the war had provoked bread riots, protests, and a massive spike in labor strikes. Likewise, the shock of defeat left large sectors of Spanish society disillusioned and searching for new answers. As a combination of these factors, membership in the Socialist UGT rose exponentially, from 6,000 in 1896 to nearly 57,000 in 1904.³⁰²

As Balfour writes, the post-war "dual crisis of legitimacy and modernization weakened the ability of the Spanish state either to draw upon traditional values to re-establish its authority or to create a popular base for a new nationalism based on military or commercial penetration into Africa. This was in marked contrast to the surge of interest in imperialism in many other parts of

³⁰⁰ Núñez Florencio, Rafael. *Militarismo y antimilitarismo en España (1888-1906)*. (1990) p. 256

³⁰¹ Harrison, R.J. "Catalan Business and the loss of Cuba 1898-1914" *Economic History Review*, XXVII (1974) and Nadal, Jordi *El fracaso de la Revolución industrial en España 1814-1913* (Barcelona, 1975)

³⁰² Balfour, "Riot, Regeneration, and Reaction: Spain in the Aftermath of the 1898 Disaster." *The Historic Journal*. 38 -2 (1995) p. 410

Europe in the same period. The Disaster exposed the hollowness of the patriotic rhetoric orchestrated by the local and national élites and cut short any incipient growth of popular imperial sentiments."³⁰³ What the crisis did *not* do, however, was destroy the old order in Spain. Instead, the Restoration system with its élite oligarchy persisted in a largely unchanged form until it finally collapsed in 1925 due to the repercussions of another colonial disaster. And the promising economic growth did not take off as the socialists hoped; Spain remained a largely unmodernized society. The political weakness that haunted the PSOE likewise persisted. While the party experienced definite growth in strength after the turn of the century, mass appeal escaped them. In part, this was exacerbated by the strict isolation of '*Pabloismo*,' which rejected alliance, as always, with bourgeois parties. Some liberal regenerationists who had been initially attracted to Socialism in the aftermath of the Disaster retreated in the face of this uncompromising doctrine. Amid the tumult and discontent that reverberated throughout Spain in the post-war years, the lower-middle classes "feared the revolt of the masses more than they hated the inertia of the establishment. They were caught in the classic dilemma of the lesser bourgeoisie."³⁰⁴

Within the PSOE, the failure of the socialists to capitalize on the turbulence of the post-war years provoked a major reckoning. The foundation of the short-lived journal *La Nueva Era* by García Quejido in 1901 was an attempt to introduce theoretical debate amid the intense intellectual questionings of the years

³⁰³ Balfour, Sebastian. *The End of the Spanish Empire 1898-1923* (1997) p. 123

³⁰⁴ Balfour, "Riot, Regeneration, and Reaction: Spain in the Aftermath of the 1898 Disaster." *The Historic Journal*. 38 -2 (1995) p. 414

following the Disaster.³⁰⁵ It was an indication that many within the PSOE felt that the narrow doctrines of the Spanish socialists required an update. Though the party- and Iglesias himself- had expressed the philosophy that the growth of Socialism in Spain would necessarily depend on a healthy and progressive bourgeoisie in the months after the Disaster of 1898, Iglesias now retrenched, hoping to leave that task to other parties and to maintain the doctrinal purity and isolationist organization of the PSOE. When it became clear in the first years of the twentieth century that the old order had neither collapsed nor revived, Iglesias faced challenges to his "messianic pronouncements" from within the ranks of his own party. García Quejido and others formed the core of the *renovador* movement within the PSOE, which sought to move the party away from Iglesias' policy in the hopes of facilitating an intellectual and electoral alliance with Republicans to effect the desired reforms which were frustratingly slow to arrive.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁵ Ledesma, Manuel Pérez. *Antonio García Quejido y La Nueva Era: Pensamiento socialista español a comienzos de siglo*. (1974)

³⁰⁶ Heywood, Paul. *Marxism and the Failure of Organized Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936* p. 20

Chapter Five: "A Tale that Never Ends." Colonial Conflict in the 20th Century.

In 1900, a PSOE delegation attended the International Socialist Congress of Paris, where the problem of the phenomenon of new imperialism was the order of the day. The colonial competition of European powers, it was recognized, posed a great threat to world peace. In the opening of the Congress, Pablo Iglesias extended fraternal greetings to the international delegations, making use of the occasion to condemn, *ex post facto*, the wars in Cuba and the Philippines, as well as the Boer War presently raging.³⁰⁷ In the final session of the congress, a motion was proposed which considered that "the colonial policies of the bourgeoisie has no other object than to augment the benefits of the capitalist class and maintain the bourgeois regime, exhausting the blood and money of the proletarian producers and committing numberless crimes and cruelties with the indigenous races of the colonies conquered through force of arms." The organized proletariat had therefore to use every means at their disposal to combat imperialism.³⁰⁸ The proposal was voted unanimously.

Throughout the first years of the 20th century, *El Socialista* commented with some frequency on topics relating to the loss of Spain's colonies. The exceedingly insufficient support given to repatriated veterans provided a rich panorama for socialist critique of the government's continued failures to enact the

³⁰⁷ *El Socialista* 5 October 1900

³⁰⁸ *El Socialista* 5 October 1900

necessary social change. Their insistence on the nakedly commercial motives of the United States for intervening in the Spanish colonial conflict also appeared to be borne out by subsequent events, as the U.S. now battled to assert their control over the Philippines. While they still continued to argue that a more progressive policy might have saved Ultramar (the loss of Puerto Rico in the final treaty was particularly difficult for the Socialists to comprehend) the re-opening of communications with the former colonies brought to light news which validated their earlier condemnations of Spanish colonialism. From Havana, a paper reported that a customs inspector who in theory made a salary of 400 pesetas had managed to build a house in Madrid worth 100,000 dollars from cheating his Cuban employees. Sarcastically, *El Socialista* commented: "reading these things, it cannot be understood why the Cubans have been such ingrates towards 'their mother patria'."³⁰⁹

In general, however, Spanish socialists preoccupied themselves with organizational efforts, strikes, and political tensions within the PSOE and against other parties in the Peninsula. It commented often on the colonialism of other European powers, such as the savagery displayed by allied troops in China in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion,³¹⁰ and lambasted the government whenever it showed any inclinations towards military regeneration. A request by the Navy for more funding in 1900 provoked *El Socialista* to cruelly suggest they would use those millions "to add pages our history as glorious as those of Manila and

³⁰⁹ *El Socialista* 18 November 1898

³¹⁰ *El Socialista* 5 October 1900

Santiago de Cuba."³¹¹ But the phenomenon of colonialism was approached with hindsight or from the privileged perspective of outside observer. In 1904, however, it once again arrived at the forefront of Spanish socialist concerns.

I. The "Moroccan Question" Returns

Within the wider Regenerationist movement, there were elements that had been advocating for a new colonial project as a means of economic recovery practically since the end of the war of 1898. Even prior to that, however, there had long been a strain of discourse known as *Africanismo*, which solidified as a school of thought in the early years of the Scramble for Africa.³¹² In post-1898 Spain, these precepts began to gain serious credibility. Many saw in Morocco a chance to start anew and embark on a modern colonial venture that would simultaneously rejuvenate Spanish civilization and rehabilitate them on the stage of international affairs. Peninsular industrialists, deprived of their markets in Ultramar, hungrily eyed the rich mineral deposits across the straits. Many army officers also saw a chance to negate the humiliation of defeat by gaining new triumphs on African soil. Both industrialists and militarists had a friend in the form of King Alfonso XIII, who had finally reached adulthood and been crowned in 1902 after the long regency of his mother.

³¹¹ *El Socialista* 2 November 1900

³¹² See: Fernández Rodríguez, Manuel. *España y Marruecos en los primeros años de la Restauración (1875-1894)* (1985)

Yet the catalyst that turned this discourse into a reality came from outside quarters and was not immediately noted. The inter-European tensions that had been a driving motor underpinning the vibrant imperial expansion of the proceeding decades had by now become a generally feared phenomenon. In 1898, France and Great Britain nearly went to war over a colonial matter. The showdown at Fashoda was resolved, but imperial rivalry continued to threaten continental peace. The assertive militarism of the German empire finally drew the French and British into an *Entente Cordiale* in 1904, in which it was tacitly agreed that the British would retain rights to a 'zone of influence' in Egypt, and the French would have a free hand in Morocco. Morocco had long been an attractive area of commercial activity for European powers, but by playing off foreign economic competitors against each other, the Moroccan Sultanate had managed to retain much of its political sovereignty throughout the height of the Scramble for Africa. The Anglo-French Entente promised to tip the balance in favor of the latter. In a misguided show of force, the German Kaiser made a surprise visit in 1905 to the Moroccan port of Tangier (in theory an "international city"), where he affirmed the sovereignty of the Sultan and insisted on the right of free and fair international trade in Morocco. This provocation caused a major diplomatic crisis that threatened to bring France and Britain to war with Germany. As a result, the following year a conference was held in Algeciras, Spain, to settle the "Moroccan question."

As early as 1900, the French government had been in discussion with Spain about Morocco, generally respecting Spanish economic interests in the northern Rif region. In the 1904 *Entente Cordiale*, a secret clause had more explicitly granted Spain a "sphere of influence." The geopolitical motivation was obvious - as cordial as the agreement might be, Britain and France remained rivals. Britain could concede Morocco, but was loathe to allow another potentate to occupy the strategically valuable strip opposite their stronghold of Gibraltar, one of the lynchpins of their empire (the Suez Canal and South Africa being the others - and the latter had only recently been secured after a disastrous Anglo-Boer war).

The conclusion of the 1906 Algeciras conference seemed to further legitimize Spanish and French involvement in Morocco. But the Spanish government, still debilitated from the wars of 1895-98, was wary of colonial adventures - especially ones that might provoke angry reactions from a powerful protector with its own vested economic or political interests in the region, or provoke unrest amid the broad segments of Spanish society that were understandably hostile to colonial projects. The specifics of the diplomatic agreements that gave Spain a mandate in northern Morocco were therefore a (badly kept) secret from the public until 1911.³¹³ Throughout the 1900s, however, Spanish mining companies and railroads increasingly began to expand operations into the mountainous Rif region surrounding the historical coastal enclaves of

³¹³ López García, Bernabé. *El Socialismo español y el anticolonialismo (1898-1914)* p. 10

Melilla and Ceuta.³¹⁴ The process was slow and dangerous - the Berber inhabitants of the area were notoriously fractious, and their complicated tribal politics resisted the type of collaborative alliances with local elites necessary for "peaceful penetration."³¹⁵ Spanish troops were therefore increasingly committed to protecting threatened interests throughout the first decade, and the colonial administration -such as it were- became more and more invested in consolidating control, which tended to have the contradictory effect of destabilizing Riffian politics and drew them into conflict with slighted local interests. The Government of Antonio Maura was essentially reformist in character, and had little desire to become further involved in Morocco. Yet he faced strong pressure from economic interests and increasing demands from the military for resources to protect their gains.

II. The International Congresses

The Socialist International throughout this period was acutely aware of the danger that European imperial tensions posed to world peace. In the Congresses of Paris (1900), Amsterdam (1904) and Stuttgart (1907), the twin topics of colonialism and militarism were central concerns. The Congress of Amsterdam declared in even more explicit terms than that of Paris that it was the duty of all socialists to oppose "all imperialist or protectionist methods, all colonial expeditions, and all

³¹⁴ The Socialists' favorite enemy, the Marques de Comillas, was heavily invested in these projects. See: Rodrigo y Alharilla, Martín. "Una avanzadilla española en África: el grupo empresarial Comillas" *Marruecos y el colonialismo español* [1859-1912], Eloy Martín Corrales ed. (2002)

³¹⁵ Brett, Michael and Elizabeth Fentress, *The Berbers*. (1996)

expenditures towards colonies." They must also "denounce without rest the acts of oppression against indigenous populations."³¹⁶ Yet the battle between idealistic future and pragmatic reality, which we have earlier seen was beginning to divide the PSOE, was also playing out on a grand scale among European socialists. The same factors that led to a debate on whether immediate reform within a bourgeois framework could be justified in movement with a revolutionary end led to dissent. The delegations of colonial powers such as Britain or France opposed imperialism in theory, but since it was a *fait accompli*, reform might be justified to ameliorate the present ills while the revolution awaited. Thus, the same congress that so unequivocally rejected imperialism also proposed that socialists use every means capable "to improve the condition of the indigenous, works of public utility, methods of hygiene, creation of schools, etc." This qualified anti-imperialism was not clearly distinguishable from the bourgeois rhetoric of the 'civilizing mission,' as many socialists bitterly mentioned.

The PSOE, apparently, did not have to grapple with this particular debate in 1904. Spanish socialists felt they did not have to worry about the colonial issues for the moment, for the simple reason that they had no colonies. They could instead claim that the Spanish working classes themselves were a people in need of those civilizing reforms proposed during the congress. The central impression of the conference for the Spanish socialists, therefore, was that of a conflict between those who advocated collaborative reform and those who rejected it. The PSOE's leadership did not vacillate on this question (at least in public). *El Socialista* proudly noted that the Spanish delegates had been most stridently in

³¹⁶ *El Socialista* 2 September 1904

favor of the latter, and claimed that "in no country is the tactic of intransigence as necessary as in Spain. The ignorance of the people and the moral atmosphere of the leftist bourgeois parties imposes on the Spanish socialists an isolation greater than that of foreign ones."³¹⁷ Cooperation with bourgeois parties would corrupt the party and divert it from its slow but certain organization towards the day of revolution. However, the PSOE continued to seek elected positions, justifying this doublethink as a way to ensure that working-class conditions improved at the same rate as bourgeois industrialization. The structural system of inequality would be unchanged but in the meantime, both classes should advance at a similar rate until the day when the whole system could be abolished at once.

This day was still very far off for Spain. While that country remained so deeply backwards, there could be no discussion of civilizing colonies, and the Spanish socialists in 1904 held high hopes that the immense shock of colonial war had broadly soured Spanish opinion of further ventures. As a consequence, anti-colonialism as it were did not figure largely in the socialists' discourse. Of tangential interest to the Spanish was the increasingly extra-European presence at the 1904 Amsterdam Congress. For the first time, delegates from Asia (Japan and India) were present. And in the minutes of the third session, chaired by Iglesias, communiqués of support were read from international workers' organizations that had not yet been admitted into the Second International. Among these were missives from Cuba directed to Iglesias.³¹⁸

³¹⁷ *El Socialista* 9 September 1904

³¹⁸ Servy, Victor. *Sixième Congrès Socialiste International* (1904)
<<http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011819823>>

Events the following year dramatically brought the problems of anti-colonialism, anti-militarism and anti-patriotism firmly back into the socialist consciousness. In June and July of 1905, as we have seen, the Tangiers Crisis shook Europe with apprehension. The Spanish socialists viewed the events with trepidation, but not from an anti-colonial lens. All European powers made firm protests for Moroccan independence at this juncture; this was indeed what provoked the crisis in the first place. What terrified European socialists was the idea that the confrontation in Tangiers would lead to war between Germany and France. The Socialist parties of both nations were by far the strongest and most powerful in the world, but it was feared that they were not sufficiently developed enough to prevent their governments from a general war which would, as a consequence, destroy their working-classes and give the lie to socialist solidarity.

So it was with broad relief that socialists viewed the de-escalation of the crisis. *El Socialista* triumphantly declared in July that war between France and Germany had been defused by a major show of Socialist solidarity between the organized workers of both countries that had forced their governments to stand down. The Socialist leader Jean Jaurès had traveled to Berlin to affirm their international brotherhood; some days later, the German Bebel traveled to Paris for the same purpose. The Spanish socialists hoped to impart a valuable lesson to their readers from this striking example. Countries with less-organized proletariat suffered the horror of conflict: the Anglo-Boer war and the Russo-Japanese war presently raged because their respective socialist parties had been too weak to prevent their leaders from going to war. Though not explicitly mentioned, Spanish

readers of *El Socialista* would obviously understand that this lesson applied as well to their own failure to prevent the conflict of 1898.³¹⁹

To settle the Moroccan question, as we have seen, European diplomats met in the first part of 1906 in Algeciras, Spain. Confident that any settlements reached at Algeciras Conference would be to the sole benefit of capitalist interests, European socialists held a counter-conference in Brussels. Commenting on the dual meetings in April, *El Socialista* wrote of the different aims of the Capitalist class and the international proletariat: "the diplomatic representatives of the first met in Algeciras, the representatives of the second in Brussels. The first meeting was impelled by an anxiety to dominate, and the exploitation of human force."³²⁰ The second met to discuss the liberation of all men. The Eurocentric nature of Socialism and its repercussions for the colonial question had been broached by the German socialist Hyndman, who declared: "Here we fight not only for the people of Europe, but for those who are who we are annihilating: for the Indians, for the indigenous of the Congo and of South Africa. We are all responsible for the horrors inflicted on the primitive humanities. I hope to see those people emancipated from our European yoke and to be in charge of their own destinies."³²¹ And *El Socialista*, in its annual ritual call to May Day demonstrations, exhorted its Spanish readers to remember that the battle for liberation was international: "Against Governments, whether monarchist, imperialist or republicans...arise the oppressed class...that does not only try to *improve* their fate, but that wants to *redeem*, redeeming at once *all* men." [italics

³¹⁹ "La guerra y el socialismo" *El Socialista* 7 July 1905

³²⁰ *El Socialista* 6 April 1906

³²¹ *El Socialista* 23 March 1906

mine]. It was clear that the intellectual trend in 1906 favored an uncompromisingly humanitarian approach to Socialism, and left no room for imperialism, patriotism or war.

Still, Spanish socialists did not believe that the issue was of immediate concern to them. In a characteristically contrarian article contributed to *El Socialista* by Miguel de Unamuno on the occasion of the May Day, he argued that there was, presently, no such thing as militarism in Spain. The esteemed rector of Salamanca actually declared that he *desired* militarism in Spain, because that phenomenon was nothing more than a last-ditch, terrified reaction of an industrialized bourgeoisie against a threatening, powerfully organized proletariat - neither of which Spain had yet succeeded in developing. Obviously, Unamuno's hallmark philosophy of paradoxes is evident here, and one must appreciate the poignant tragedy that later faced Unamuno during the Spanish Civil War when his 'hope' became a bitter reality. But this remarkable article speaks to the general understanding of Spanish socialists that militarism and colonialism were not threats that they personally had to counter at this stage.

The situation slowly began to change. The following year, an incident occurred in Casablanca where discontented Moroccans killed ten Europeans laborers, among them individuals of French and Spanish nationality. The French military retaliated swiftly, bombarding the coast and increasing garrisons. The Spanish government, which had been about to adjourn for a summer break, was forced to deal with the Moroccan "Volcano." *El Socialista* lampooned the image of sweaty, apathetic politicians in the Cortes, passing law after useless law as

rapidly as possible so as to escape the suffocating heat of Madrid for gentler climes like San Sebastián, suddenly becoming alert and focused by the prospect of war. But how could this be, simple folk might exclaim? Didn't the "memorable Conference of Algeciras end in an agreement between all nations interested in matters of the Maghreb and that the "pacific" and "civilizing penetration" would not be disturbed by any type of bellicose incident?"³²²

The socialists, of course, understood that the conference had been a sham that only resolved for a short time the imperialist 'conflict of interests' in Morocco. But, given their assumptions that Spaniards for the moment had learned their lesson about the danger of colonial wars, they expressed hopeful doubt that the disturbances of Casablanca would provoke an armed Spanish response. Even the papers that had so eagerly clamored for war in 1895-98 appeared to be soberly against Spanish involvement. Most elements of the bourgeoisie saw the folly of "spending the sparse energies available to us and which must be employed in internal reconstitution on adventures." And if the "sensible bourgeois elements reason in this manner," what "must our opinion be - not only the socialists and organized workers, but all the working-class in general- who already know through terrible experience that in the end all the sad consequences of bellicose adventures weighs on them?" Unfortunately, despite their optimism that the present crisis would pass peacefully, recent history had shown that the Spanish masses could place little trust in the "serenity of our governors." In order to avoid a repetition of the horrors of the previous colonial war, as a precautionary

³²² *El Socialista* 9 August 1907

measure, the PSOE announced that should events escalate, they would immediately reactivate the "*O Todos o Ninguno*" campaign.³²³

The tone was less dismissive in the following issue. The headline article in *El Socialista* on 16 August wrote: "the events that are developing in Morocco, because of their undisputable seriousness, and for the way they might affect Spain especially, constitute the preferred topic of the present among us." This was an apology to the readers for the scant discussion devoted in that issue to the International Congress of Stuttgart, due to begin on the 18th of that month. The mobilization of Spanish troops and ships ordered by the government raised fears that they might pursue a "foolish policy" which would see the Spanish proletariat "immolated in a holocaust of crazy ambitions of unnecessary and impossible expansion." The government had promised that their intervention would be limited and in accord with international commitments, but the socialists were naturally wary of these "ambiguous explanations."³²⁴

By the next issue it had become clear enough that -for the moment at least -neither France nor Spain appeared to desire further military action. But a rumor that French troops had forced some Moorish prisoners to dig their own grave before being shot provoked *El Socialista* to reflect on the hypocrisy of European civilizing missions. Thankfully, the socialists reiterated once again, "it seems that our bourgeoisie feels the absurdity of a war in these conditions..." But the above example nevertheless demonstrated the inherent brutality of capitalist imperialism; as did news that the Japanese had executed a delegation of Koreans

³²³ *El Socialista* 9 August 1907

³²⁴ *El Socialista* 16 August 1907

who had gone to the Hague to ask for protection of their nationality in the face of Japanese colonial oppression.³²⁵

International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart was held at the end of August, and a report on its proceedings occupied the majority of *El Socialista* of 6 September 1907. All of the contradictions and concerns that had plagued the Spanish socialists were laid bare in this deeply controversial congress. The conflict between reform and revolution played out in fierce arguments in the sessions devoted to Militarism and Colonialism. The most luminous European socialists hotly debated the appropriate Marxist approach to these topics. The commission on colonialism had been asked by the majority of delegates to issue a resolution that left room for acceptance of progressive forms of colonialism, as a force for civilization. Although this tenet was eventually voted down, after lengthy debate, the majority opinion demonstrated to many observers that the Second International was becoming corrupted. Lenin, who attended the conference, summed up the issue:

"The Congress was to discuss present-day colonial policy, which was based on the downright enslavement of primitive populations. The bourgeoisie was actually introducing slavery in the colonies and subjecting the native populations to unprecedented outrages and acts of violence, "civilizing" them by the spread of liquor and syphilis. And in that situation socialists were expected to utter evasive phrases about the possibility of accepting colonial policy in principle! That would be an outright desertion to the bourgeois point of view. It would be a decisive step towards subordinating the proletariat to bourgeois ideology, to bourgeois imperialism, which is now arrogantly raising its head."³²⁶

³²⁵ *El Socialista* 23 August 1907

³²⁶ Lenin, V.I. *Proletary*, No. 17, October 20, 1907 www.marxists.org

The debate that raged over militarism was no less indicative of the divisiveness that plagued the Socialist international. The premise of departure started off uncontroversial enough: all wars were caused by capitalism, and therefore must be opposed by the proletariat. But a radical proposal by Hervé that all wars be opposed by a general strike and a working-class uprising against the state appalled many. They argued that not all wars had the same character, and more importantly, not all working-classes were sufficiently organized or powerful to ensure the success of their blatant challenge to their state. The "notable discourse" given by Vandervelde in explanation of the committee's decisions confessed that the commission had been confronted with the "impossibility of establishing for every country and for every circumstance a uniform rule, and we have come to agree that each nationality will have to employ the methods most effective" in their own country and particular situation. For the reality, as Bebel and Vaillant had earlier pointed out, was that the existence of the International "implied the previous existence of autonomous nationalities...our federation is not an amorphous mass of individuals, but a free federation of existent nationalities." Vandervelde warned the attending socialists that bourgeois observers would receive this acknowledgement as evidence of the triumph of nationalism, and the failure of international socialism. In many ways it was: the disintegration of the Second International during the First World War owed much to the discord surrounding the issue of militarism and the and half-measure which allowed, in the final resolution, that the International could not codify, "in rigid formulas the necessarily diverse actions, following the times and the methods of the diverse

national parties, but the forces of the working class have the duty to intensify and coordinate everything possible against militarism and against war."³²⁷

What this amounted to, in the estimation of the PSOE, was an absolute justification of the anti-colonial and anti-militarist policies that they had heretofore utilized. The resolutions passed on in the Stuttgart Congress, divisive as they were, legitimized the legalist caution of the Spanish socialists. In their own commentary on the proceedings, they rejected Hervè's proposal as dangerous and misguided. An uprising during a time a war would not be in keeping with the "serene march of the universal conscious proletariat;" such a revolt would not have the necessary class conditions to institute the socialist society required. Furthermore, they argued that strong anti-patriotic uprising in a powerful country during a time of war would risk incurring a diametrically opposite effect from its intent. It would provoke all the forces of repression and crush the proletarian movement. Even in a country like Spain, which was not nearly as bellicose and organized, this backlash could be observed. "For having expressed our criteria about the Moroccan question and by defending (because it is not in our hands to impede a war) the necessity that, in case it is declared, both the rich and poor should go to it - a criteria to which even elements that are not socialist can be found to conform- they apply the law of Jurisdictions against us as if we had committed an offense against the country. What might not happen if we adopted the watchword of opposition by force, and at every moment, any confrontation between nations?" The socialists would undoubtedly be crushed. But this caution, the PSOE maintained, "does not mean to say in any way that the socialists have

³²⁷ *El Socialista* 6 September 1907

varied their criterion; now, as ever, our ideas are against all war. But this does not exclude the possibility that in the case of a strange eruption, we might not be the first in opposing it through every means."³²⁸

The Spanish socialists could decide the way and manner in which they would oppose a given war as they saw fit. It demonstrates the centrality of the colonial question in Spain that, despite this *carte blanche*, the PSOE continued to actively oppose Spanish involvement in Morocco. During the Congress of Stuttgart the French and Spanish delegates had jointly proposed a resolution condemning Franco-Spanish bellicosity in the Casablanca incident. As it became increasingly clear that the French government continued to cast greedy eyes on the "Sherifian empire", and as the Spanish government maintained concentrations of troops and ships ready to depart for Moroccan shores, the French and Spanish socialist parties determined to forestall any further conflict through joint action. They explicitly borrowed from the example of the German and French activities two years earlier. On 13 September 1907, *El Socialista* announced this new policy of "War on War." The following week, it more specifically outlined the intent of the campaign: to force the French and Spanish governments to withdraw from Casablanca and prevent the commitment of further troops in a nakedly capitalist land-grab. On 27 September, the front page of the paper contained a letter "To the Workers of France and Spain" jointly authored by the leaders of both parties. The blood of the workers was in danger of flowing more in Morocco once again - Capitalist interests, "in search of a market for their products, and financiers on the hunt for speculations have translated to bombardments, in massacres of the

³²⁸ *El Socialista* 30 August 1907

indigenous population, in the sacrifice of the sons of the people, burnt offerings to the appetites of the god Capital." The letter was clear in its rejection of a "civilizing mission" and "pacific penetration" as a flimsy excuse, referencing the mandate issued by the Stuttgart congress that all workers must utterly oppose all "the banditry that colonial policy represents." Possibly encouraged by the cooperation of their powerful French comrades, the Spanish socialists now demanded "not a man or a *céntimo* more for Morocco."³²⁹

While the Spanish socialists realized that their smaller numbers meant the effort would be unequal, they were determined to fulfill their role. Meetings were arranged in Socialist sections throughout the country, with a grand one in Madrid that was to be chaired by the leader of the French Socialist party. Meanwhile, Pablo Iglesias would travel to Paris and lead the French demonstration; just as Bebel and Jaurès had done in the Tangiers crisis. *El Socialista* even took the liberty of printing a 'sample' petition that each local meeting could personalize and direct to the president of the Counsel of Ministers. For once "the circumstances are favorable for this action," and the socialists had high hopes.³³⁰

The campaign did not go precisely as planned. The government of Antonio Maura arrested and deported the French representative Willm before he could lead the Madrid demonstration; Clemenceau had Pablo Iglesias seized at the station and likewise expelled. These setbacks proved, the Socialist press claimed, both the irrational tyranny of bourgeois governments, and the success of their own propaganda, which appeared to be backed by the full force of public opinion in

³²⁹ *El Socialista* 27 September 1907

³³⁰ *El Socialista* 4 October 1907

this case. It was becoming increasingly clear in the discourse of the socialists that they valued the opinion and support of liberal bourgeois elements, although this was not phrased as such. So too, the campaign was noticeable for the Spanish socialists' insistence that their objections were made on dual grounds. As always, they opposed colonial conflict first and foremost because of the potential damage it might inflict on the working class of their own country, but they were explicitly clear that they also opposed it because of the horrors it would wreak on Moroccans.³³¹ They cited the mandates of Stuttgart for this, but as we have seen, this was only a legitimizing update to the decidedly more organic humanitarianism displayed towards Moroccans in earlier eras. But despite the vibrancy of the campaign and its apparent success - there was no full-fledged military campaign in Morocco at this juncture- the PSOE must have both confused and clarified their anti-colonial and anti-war activities. On the one hand, they had demonstrated that a legalist and peaceful anti-war campaign in tune with national opinion could bear potential fruit, even if that opinion was bourgeois. On the other hand, the deportations of Pablo Iglesias and Willm must have weighed on their minds - even a successful, popular anti-war movement might have grave repercussions for the PSOE.

III. "La Semana Trágica"

The colonial war the socialists hoped to avoid in Morocco occurred anyway. In 1909, Spanish workers were killed constructing a railroad outside Melilla by

³³¹ *El Socialista* 4 October 1907, etc.

Riffian tribesmen. In response to military demands, the Maura government reluctantly issued a mass call-up of reservists.³³² The Socialists, unsurprisingly, began an emphatic protest, resurrecting " *O Todos o Ninguno* " a third time.³³³ Fundamental to their objections was their continuing emphasis that "a war with Morocco necessarily has to cause deep damage to the whole country...it entails considerable spending, and this raises taxes and increases the price of sustenance."³³⁴ Francisco Largo Caballero marveled at a government that spent millions of pesetas on a new conflict, but was not able develop public works, education or sanitation.³³⁵ In keeping with their long empathetic association of the plight of the Spanish masses with those of unfortunate victims of the European bourgeoisie, García Cortes defended the actions of the Riffians as self-defense in the face of Spanish exploitation. Pablo Iglesias, speaking at the same meeting, compared the actions of the 'Moors' to the Spanish resistance to Napoleonic invasion in 1808-1814.³³⁶

But anti-colonialist spirit which they had earlier detected in broad swaths of the liberal bourgeoisie and mainstream press melted away when it became known that the Spanish military now faced a major uprising in the form of a popular Jihad which threatened the small garrison in Melilla. Faced once again with an apathetic or even enthusiastic bourgeoisie, the assumptions of the PSOE over the previous decade were undermined. The Socialists would therefore have

³³² Ullman, Joan Connelly. *The Tragic Week: A Study of Anticlericalism in Spain* (1968) p. 129

³³³ *El Socialista* 23 July 1909

³³⁴ *El Socialista* 23 July 1909

³³⁵ *El Socialista* 16 July 1909

³³⁶ *El Socialista* 16 July 1909

to organize their own campaign that must "attract the largest number of proletariats." The Socialists hoped their campaign would make it so that "the other elements of the country that are against such madness, but apathetic and irresolute to combat it, might oppose it with some decision."³³⁷ Still self-conscious about their own abilities, the socialists sought to influence bourgeois decisions through a popular campaign of protest that would remind them of their interest and responsibility in investing in Spain. Yet the PSOE's long policy of political isolationism now placed it in a uniquely difficult situation. The disastrous events that followed from their anti-colonial protests in the summer of 1909 fundamentally altered the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party.

Throughout the previous decade, the PSOE, had managed to steadily increase their presence in their historical strongholds such as Bilbao and Madrid. They had fared less well elsewhere. In Catalonia, especially, they had been overwhelmed by the mass migration of landless southern Spanish agricultural workers who had moved to the increasingly industrialized region (by 1914, more than half of the population of Barcelona were recent immigrants)³³⁸. Anarchism had long been entrenched among them, and these new urban industrial workers joined with a solid preexisting anarchist segment in Barcelona whose strength increased exponentially. If anarchism and the Second International had tussled so bitterly in the preceding decades, the struggle was more acute in Spain, where anarchism was a sort of "millenarian doctrine, a pre-political ideology whose

³³⁷ *El Socialista* 9 July 1909

³³⁸ Meaker, Gerald. *The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914-1923*. (1974) p. 3

main strength lay in its emotional appeal to the masses."³³⁹ The PSOE had made their abhorrence of Anarchism absolutely clear, and struggled against its massive influence. The Socialist sector in Catalonia also faced the threat of marginalization from other quarters. Alejandro Lerroux, a demagogue *par excellence*, preached a radical populist Republicanism that attracted huge numbers of working class Catalans.³⁴⁰ The PSOE faced the awful fact that large segments of proletarians were filling the ranks of its most bitter political rivals. As more moderate opposition to the new colonial conflict evaporated away in 1909, the PSOE found itself, by virtue of its uncompromising anti-colonial stance, in a *de facto* alliance with its most dangerous bedfellows.

When the Maura government announced the call-up of reservists for service in Morocco, the anarchist and radical republican leaders debated a joint effort in protest. The Catalonian socialist leader pleaded with the national committee to demonstrate their solidarity by participating in this collective action. The party's leadership hesitated. A General Strike had earlier been proposed, to paralyze the country and prevent mobilization. This was one of those extreme anti-war measures that had been so vehemently argued over at the Congress of Stuttgart. The Spanish socialists were opposed to general strikes on principle, since they believed its effects could only have limited economic benefits and did not lead to the required seizure of political power by the proletariat. But others, mirroring the divide in the Second International, felt radical actions like this could

³³⁹ Esenwein, George R. *Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain, 1868-1898* (1989) p. 6

³⁴⁰ See: Alvarez Junco, José. *Alejandro Lerroux: El emperador del paralelo* (2005)

be justified in extreme situations. The socialists debated among themselves. At a meeting in Madrid hosted by the Socialist Youth and Feminine Socialist Group, distinctly different paths were suggested. All the speakers made allusions to the Cuban war. Tomás Angulo championed the limited reform of the immediate fulfillment of universal military service, vaguely stating that if this was not implemented, the Socialists should 'protest'. But Vicente Barria struck a more radical note, suggested that the Socialist Youth should begin recruiting men to form "another army to make a front against the army of bastards and bandits. We already have (according to his opinion- *El Socialista* noted) an interior war in Spain." García Cortés put the dilemma facing the socialists succinctly. "The socialists proceed according to law, but if necessary, we will face any danger, as men who deeply feel an idea know how to do." ³⁴¹

The mood within the party was more radical than it had ever been. Even the circumspect and cold Pablo Iglesias, whose iron moderation had only once before slipped during his visit in Paris in 1896, declared at a meeting over the summer that the deaths of the Spanish workers at the hands of the Moors had been a conspiracy by the government, who had purposefully placed the laborers in a position of danger to provide a pretext for a colonial conquest. And now the government committed atrocities in Morocco, shelling Moroccan villages and killing men, women, and children; and atrocities in Spain, as the poor reservists were once again torn from their own impoverished villages. "If tomorrow an indignant reservist...performed an act of revenge by burying a dagger in the breast of one of our political representatives, would we have any reason to condemn

³⁴¹ *El Socialista* 25 June 1909

him? No. I would applaud him." This shocking support of a violent means was met with "extraordinary applause" from the attendees, which Iglesias quieted, saying he had not been seeking oratorical effect but merely speaking what he felt in his soul.³⁴²

But the rhetoric revolutionary spirit was moderated by the old concerns of weakness. Fundamentally, the PSOE remained conservative in method. Could the socialists be expected, as weak as they were, to risk a massive reaction by the state in an attempt to fulfill their imperative to prevent all wars, pursuing their legalist route and preserving their gains for the moment? Events beyond their control forced their hand. The government of Maura cracked down on Socialist meetings and protests, and further radicalized the socialists, who now found their legal actions severely restricted.³⁴³ In the face of this, *El Socialista* declared, "Up until now we have proceeded legally; we would even still proceed legally, but since the path of legality has been closed, we will exercise our actions outside of legality. Demonstrations are prohibited, meetings are prohibited...the papers in which we combat the war are seized..." But there was still an ultimate legal recourse left: "The General Strike."³⁴⁴

At the end of July, Anarchists and Radical Republicans began to discuss executing this dramatic measure between themselves. The leader of the Catalan Socialists, Antonio Fabra Ribas, felt the only chance for the Socialists to remain relevant was to join the joint committee that was planning an immediate general

³⁴² *El Socialista* 23 July 1909

³⁴³ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y los cuestiones coloniales (1890-1914)" *Hispania: revista española de historia*. vol. 58 issue 198. (1998) p. 294

³⁴⁴ *El Socialista* 23 July 1909

strike in Barcelona. By the time Pablo Iglesias and the national committee of the PSOE determined to commit the support of the Socialists, the situation had spiraled well out of everyone's control. What had started as a planned strike action with the limited aim to end a colonial conflict exploded into general violence. As reservists marched through Barcelona to embark on the ships of the Marquis de Comillas- eerily recalling the events of 1895-98- the strike evolved into a riot, which soon became a full-fledged civil insurrection in that city. An anarchist marveled: "A social revolution has broken out in Barcelona and it has been started the people. No one has instigated it. No one has led it. Neither the Liberals nor Catalan Nationalists, nor Republicans, nor Socialists, nor Anarchists." The insurrection was a spontaneous outlet of popular anger, built up over decades of economic depression, exploitation and failures. Anti-colonial in origin, discontent swiftly surpassed that and everything representative of the established order became a target, particularly churches and convents. For this reason the *Semana Trágica* has been most often characterized as an anti-clerical phenomenon.

For the Socialists, the events of that week seemed to fulfill their most pessimistic predictions. The popular insurrection suggested by Hervè as a method for opposing war had incurred the result the Spanish socialists predicted it would. The government savagely repressed the disturbances in Barcelona and arrested hundreds it deemed responsible. Among the victims was the PSOE, which was not prepared to support a violent rebellion, and remained bewildered by the speed with which it had occurred. Pablo Iglesias, Francisco Mora and Francisco Largo Caballero were all imprisoned for a time; *El Socialista* was shut down and all

copies confiscated, and the Casa del Pueblo of Madrid was shuttered. Worse, the anarchists had ultimately come out the better for it, as the Socialist delay in supporting the General Strike harmed their working-class prestige in Catalonia. But the repercussions of the Tragic Week, especially the global outcry at the execution of Francisco Ferrer, who was widely understood to have had no part in the planning or execution of any aspect of the events that week, soon led to the fall of the government of Antonio Maura. Furthermore, the lingering shock in Spain after the Tragic Week allowed for the PSOE to quickly rebound. The long-term insistence of Pablo Iglesias on strong internal and international organization, which had seemed endangered, paid off in the end. Support and solidarity came from abroad, and within the peninsula, the party soon regrouped, taking up subscriptions for the benefit of imprisoned comrades and shuttered papers.³⁴⁵

The crumbling of the Maura government, combined with the trauma of the general strike, finally convinced Iglesias and the party leaders to abandon their political isolationism. The brief experiment with revolution had demonstrated the power of popular discontent; but the overwhelming support for the anarchists and radical republicans, and the subsequent success of the government in preventing the general strike and insurrection from spreading throughout Spain, convinced the leadership of the PSOE that the circumstances finally indicated that political alliances could be justified.³⁴⁶ The *renovadors* of the PSOE got their wish at the end of 1909, announcing an electoral alliance with Republican parties.

Furthermore, Pablo Iglesias declared that, given the political realities, the new

³⁴⁵ Serrano, Carlos. "El PSOE y los cuestiones coloniales (1890-1914)" *Hispania: revista española de historia*. vol. 58 issue 198. (1998) p. 294

³⁴⁶ *ibid.* p. 295

goal of the Spanish socialists for the moment would be to work towards the creation of a Spanish Republic.³⁴⁷ As a result of these factors, in 1910 Pablo Iglesias was elected as a Socialist deputy to the Cortes for the first time in the party's history. Pablo Iglesias confessed at a meeting in the Casa del Pueblo of Madrid in October of 1910 that the catalyzing factor of his acceptance of republican-socialist conjunction was the colonial war in Morocco.³⁴⁸

From 28 August to 3 September 1910, the Eight Socialist International Congress was held in Copenhagen. The congress unanimously voted a resolution of no less a luminary than Rosa Luxembourg, saluting the PSOE for its resolute actions in trying to oppose the "colonial venture in Morocco, in accord with the decisions of the International". In the eyes of the international Socialist movement, the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* had fulfilled its revolutionary duties to oppose colonialism and militarism. The decision to ally with republicans was also legitimized, as Rosa Luxembourg "saluted the election of Comrade Iglesias, the first deputy of the working class from the same capital of the monarchy [i.e. Madrid], a decisive indication of the awakening of the class-consciousness of the Spanish workers."³⁴⁹

³⁴⁷ *El Socialista* 19 November 1909

³⁴⁸ *El Socialista* 7 October 1910

³⁴⁹ *El Socialista* 16 September 1910

Conclusion

What appeared to be a radical departure from their strict policies to date was in reality the culmination of a gradual and tense processes in the party's political development over the course of several decades. At every major juncture, colonial crises both exposed and catalyzed this evolution, forcing the PSOE to reckon with itself. In 1893, a limited and brief war in Morocco had allowed them to develop the grounds of their moral and theoretical opposition to the colonialism and militarism of the Spanish state. But the party did not yet perceive these as specific phenomena to be approached and solved in their own right. Rather, they were local symptoms of the larger structure of international bourgeois exploitation. The party's program cast their hopes to the dismantling of that structure, first and foremost, and had neither the resources nor the inclination to fight losing tactical battles at the cost of the strategic end goal.

Between 1895-1898, however, the scale of colonial conflict escalated until its repercussions reached into all aspects of the political and economic landscape in Spain. Facing the rapidly disintegrating *status quo*, the Spanish socialists were forced to come to terms with colonial conflict in its own right. The instability that the crisis wrought in the Peninsula threatened the methodical paths of development that their strategy was predicated on. This provoked a change in tactics, as colonialism and militarism began to be treated as immediate problems that required immediate solutions in order to return to normalcy. At this juncture, the Spanish socialists could rationalize that their immediate anti-war aims did not

compromise their revolutionary credentials. As evidence of the sincerity of this belief, the socialists declined to overtly pursue any alliances with more moderate Spanish political and intellectual elements.

Yet the confused, vague, and contradictory nature of their anti-colonialist discourse in this era can best be understood through the hope of the PSOE's leadership that a legalist, limited, and upright campaign against an unpopular conflict would passively attract more moderate elements to the party's standard. These elements might desire peace, progress and prosperity, but would shy away from the virulent anti-nationalism that provided an underlying ideology for their anti-colonialism on earlier occasions. Initially, this policy appeared to bear some fruit, but the unwillingness of the PSOE to bend further soon alienated many of these individuals - Miguel de Unamuno left the party in disgust in 1897, complaining of their puritanical intransigence (although he continued to be sympathetic to their general aims, contributing the occasional article to *El Socialista*).³⁵⁰ In the last analysis, the contradictory path pursued by the PSOE when faced with the Cuban and Filipino insurrections and the Spanish American War seems, in the end, to have been the only feasible option given the context of their situation. Any overt propaganda or action taken against the nation-state at this juncture, whether in the form of explicit support for colonial liberation or revolutionary violence, would have almost certainly meant the complete repression of the party at the hands of the state. Likewise, the increasingly conservative nationalism and bellicosity which most republican elements began to

³⁵⁰ Gomez Molleda, Maria Dolores. *El Socialismo Español y Los Intelectuales: Cartas de los lideres del movimiento obrero a Miguel de Unamuno*. (1980)

espouse as the colonial crisis drew Spain towards war with the United States, would have utterly compromised the very core of socialist doctrines.

Consequentially, there were few leftist republicans left to attract.

The negation of the colonial question after 1898 allowed the Socialists to concentrate on more quotidian issues, gaining a relative boost from the immediate post-war economic crisis and a subsequent limited industrial modernization. It also allowed them to return to a more orthodox opposition to colonialism, although this was expressed in necessarily external criticisms of foreign imperialism until the middle of the decade. The PSOE fell on the side of the majority opinion that rejected all varieties of colonialism out of hand in each of the three International Congresses held during this period. At home, however, they could couch this unilateral opposition in the more moderate discourse of prioritizing national development over civilizing missions abroad. The gradual reawakening of Spanish colonialist ambitions in Morocco saw the socialists combine the strategy of limited Peninsular reforms for immediate which they had developed during the Cuban war, and combine it with a confident and developed anti-colonialist propaganda. This synthesis justifiably rejected colonialism from an insular perspective, as contrary to the best interests of nearly all in Spain. It also incorporated the developing rhetoric of opposition to imperialism on humanitarian terms, which was becoming more increasingly explicit and codified in international socialist dialogue.

But the Spanish socialists - both the Party apparatus, and the real individuals who made up its membership - understood these concepts on a

visceral level. Two decades of lived experience in ruinous colonial wars had deeply affected large segments of the Spanish population. Millions of Spaniards could trace the roots of their anti-colonialism to bitter personal experience. Hundreds of thousands of impoverished and traumatized veterans of Cuba, the Philippines, and campaigns in Morocco; millions of individuals who had lost sons, brothers, or fathers to those wars; thousands of families that struggled to survive the hunger and unemployment of economic crises provoked by continual conflicts. The propaganda of the PSOE had decried these tragedy and depredations from the beginning, and they were not speaking in abstract terms.

The moderation of the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* indicated by their alliance with republicans opened the door for an enormous influx of recruits to the party. Among these was the novelist, Manuel Ciges Aparicio, who had served as a soldier in the Melilla campaign on 1893 and Cuba in 1896. His experiences there soon made him a bitter and fierce critic of Spanish militarism and colonialism. An ill-advised letter to a friend expressing these sentiments and advocating for Cuban independence was intercepted by military authorities, leading to his court martial, and a long imprisonment in a military jail in Havana.³⁵¹ After the war, he served out the rest of his sentence in Spain. Further radicalized, he became a harsh and prolific critic of the harsh and decrepit colonialism, brutal militarism and hypocritical patriotism that the Spanish state exercised, publishing a number of memoirs and novels on these themes throughout the first decade of the twentieth century. At the end of 1909, he wrote

³⁵¹ Ciges Aparicio, Manuel. *On Captivity: A Spanish Soldier's Experience in a Havana Prison, 1896-1898* ed. & trans. by D.J. Walker (2012)

to Pablo Iglesias announcing his intention to join the PSOE. The deciding factor for Ciges Aparicio was that while other liberal or leftist elements had "not dared to rise against the absurd war in the Rif - neither more or less glorious for Spanish arms than those of Cuba or the Philippines -" the Socialist party had done so, with firmness and consistency.³⁵² He explained: "Life has taught me much more than books, and I prefer to forge my work among the gales of rough everyday life."

*

The Spanish state would continue their colonizing projects in Morocco into the mid-1920s, and Spanish reactions to these bloody conflicts and fresh disasters would become increasingly divisive, leading to directly to military dictatorship, a Republic and a Civil War. Correspondingly, the PSOE would experience major growth, dramatic schisms, a rise to national power, and eventual destruction and exile. All of these processes were centrally tied to their opposition to colonialism and militarism.

After 1910, the Socialists began to develop another permutation of this discourse that was markedly distinct from that which they developed in their long decades of political isolation. These new and evolving interpretations of anti-colonialism and militarism were now flavored by the large ingress of liberal intellectuals after the 1909 conjunction, the collapse of the Second International in 1916 as a result of the Great War and the Bolshevik Revolution, among other factors. These factors deserve to be treated to an in-depth analysis in their own right. But fundamentally, despite the major changes which Spain, Europe and the world would undergo as the 'long nineteenth century' gave way to the seismic

³⁵² *El Socialista* 12 October 1909

shifts of the twentieth, the character of the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* remained indelibly defined by a strong and distinct anti-colonialism forged in the crucibles of the decline and fall of the Spanish empire.

Bibliography

Periodicals

El Socialista
La Lucha de Clases
El Correo Militar
El Imparcial

Works Cited

- Álvarez Junco, José. *Alejandro Lerroux: El emperador del paralelo*. Madrid: Editorial Síntesis. 2005
- Álvarez Junco, José. *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations*. Manchester UP. 2011
- Araquistáin, Luis. *El pensamiento español contemporáneo*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada. 1962
- Bachoud, Andrée. *Los españoles ante las campañas de Marruecos*. Madrid: Espasa-Calpé. 1988
- Balfour, Sebastian. "Riot, Regeneration, and Reaction: Spain in the Aftermath of the 1898 Disaster." *The Historic Journal*, 32-2. pp. 405-423. 1995
- Balfour, Sebastian. *The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898-1923*. Calendon Press. 1997
- Brenan, Gerald. *The Spanish Labyrinth: an Account of the Social and Political Background of the Civil War*. Cambridge UP. 1943
- Brett, Michael and Elizabeth Fentress, *The Berbers*. Blackwell Publishing. 1996
- Burguera, Mónica and Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, eds. *Historias de España contemporánea*. Universitat de Valencia. 2008
- Burke III, Edmund. *The Ethnographic State: France and the Invention of Moroccan Islam*. Oakland: University of California Press. 2015
- Carr, Raymond. *Modern Spain: 1876-1980*. Oxford UP. 1980
- Castillo, Santiago. *Historia de socialismo español. Vol. 1*. Barcelona: Conjunto Editorial. 1989

- Ciges Aparicio, Manuel. (ed. & trans. D.J. Walker) *On Captivity: A Spanish Soldier's Experience in a Havana Prison, 1896-1898*. University of Alabama Press. 2012
- Cheyne, George. *Joaquín Costa, el gran desconocido*. Barcelona: Ariel. 2011
- De Riquer, Borja. "La débil nacionalización española del siglo XIX." *Historia Social*, no. 20. pp. 97-114. 1994
- Esteban de Vega, Mariano. "El Partido Socialista en la crisis del 1898," in *El Socialismo en España: desde la fundación del PSOE hasta 1975*. coord. Santos Juliá Díaz & Santiago Castillo. Madrid: Fundación Pablo Iglesias. 1986.
- Fernández Rodríguez, Manuel. *España y Marruecos en los primeros años de la restauración (1875-1894)*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Históricos. 1985
- Gomez Molleda, Maria Dolores. *El Socialismo Español y Los Intelectuales: Cartas de líderes del movimiento obrero a Miguel de Unamuno*. Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca. 1980
- Graham, Helen. *The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford UP. 2005
- Guerra Sesma, Daniel. *Socialismo y cuestión nacional en España (1873-1939)*. Thesis/Dissertation. Spain: UNED. 2008
- Hamon, Augustin Frédéric. *Le socialisme et le congrès de Londres: étude historique*. Paris: P.V. Stock. 1897 <accessed on www.hathitrust.com>
- Heywood, Paul. *Marxism and the Failure of Organized Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936*. Cambridge UP. 1990
- Hinton, Sylvia L. "The Spanish American War of 1898: Queries into the Relationship between the Press, Public Opinion and Politics," *Revista Española de Estudios Norteamericanos* pp. 71-87. 1994
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*. New York: Pantheon Books. 1987
- Juliá Díaz, Santos. *Los socialistas en la política española, 1879-1982*. Madrid: Taurus. 1997
- Ledesma, Manuel Pérez. *Antonio García Quejido y La Nueva Era: Pensamiento socialista español a comienzos de siglo*. Ediciones del centro. 1974

Lenin, V.I. "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart." *Proletary*, No. 17, October 20, 1907 <www.marxists.org>

Linz, Juan José. "Los nacionalismos en España: Una perspectiva comparada." *Historia y Fuente Oral*. no. 7. pp. 127-135

López García, Bernabé. *El Socialismo español y el anticolonialismo (1898-1914)*. Madrid, Edicusa. 1976

Martí, José. "La Futura Esclavitud." 1884 <www.literatura.us/marti>

Martínez Antonio, Francisco Javier and Irene González González, eds. *Regenerar España y Marruecos: ciencia y educación en las relaciones hispano-marroquíes a finales del siglo XIX*. Madrid: CSIC. 2011

Martin-Márquez, Susan. *Disorientations: Spanish Colonialism in Africa and the Performance of Identity*. Yale UP. 2008

Meaker, Gerald. *The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914-1923*. Stanford UP. 1974

Morato, Juan José. *El Partido Socialista Obrero: génesis, doctrina, hombres, organización, desarrollo, acción, estado actual*. Editorial Ayuso. 1976 (1918 first edition accessible through hathitrust.com)

Morato, Juan José. Pablo Iglesias Posse: educador de muchedumbres. Barcelona: Ariel. 1968 (first edition 1931)

Núñez Florencio, Rafael. *Militarismo y antimilitarismo en España (1888-1906)*. Madrid: C.S.I.C. 1990

Núñez Florencio, Rafael. *Las Españas de 1898: de la guerra en ultramar a la crisis nacional*. San Juan de Puerto Rico : Editorial LEA. 2000

Pan-Montojo, Juan (coord.) *Más se perdió en Cuba. España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial. 1998

Pennell, C.R. *A Country with a Government and a Flag: The Rif War in Morocco, 1921-1926*. Thesis/Dissertation. Wisbech: Middle East & North Africa Studies. 1986

Pérez de la Dehesa, Rafael. *Pensamiento de Costa y su influencia en el 98*. Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones. 1968

Ruiz-Manjón, Octavio and Alicia Langa, eds. *Los significados del 98: la sociedad española en la génesis del siglo XX*. Madrid: Editorial Biblioteca Nueva. 1999

Rodrigo y Alharilla, Martín. "Una avanzadilla española en África: el grupo empresarial Comillas" in *Marruecos y el colonialismo español [1859-1912]*, Eloy Martín Corrales ed. Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra. 2002

Rodríguez González, Agustín Ramón. *La Guerra de Melilla en 1893*. Almena Ediciones. 2008

Rodríguez-González, Agustín. "El conflicto de Melilla en 1893" *Hispania: revista española de historia* vol. 49 issue 171. 1989

Salavert, Vicente and M. Suárez Cortina, et. al. eds. *El regeneracionismo en España: política, educación, ciencia y sociedad*. Universitat de València. 2007

Sandoica, Elena Hernández. "La España de ultramar: Cuba y Puerto Rico." in *Los significados del 98: La sociedad española en la génesis del siglo XIX*. Ruiz-Manjón, Octavio and Alicia Langa, eds.p. 21-30

Schmidt-Nowara, Christopher and John M. Nieto-Phillips (eds). *Interpreting Spanish Colonialism: Empires, Nations, and Legends*. University of New Mexico Press. 2005

Schmidt-Nowara, Christopher. *The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the Nineteenth Century*. University of Pittsburg Press. 2006

Scott, Rebecca J. *Slave emancipation in Cuba : the transition to free labor, 1860-1899*. Princeton UP. 1985

Seco Serrano, Carlos. *El Nacimiento de Carmen: Símbolos, mitos, nacion*. Madrid: Taurus. 1999

Serrano Lacarra, Carlos. "El PSOE y la guerra de Cuba (1895-1897)." *Estudios de historia social*. Vol. 8-9, 1979. pp. 287-310

Serrano Lacarra, Carlos. "El PSOE y las cuestiones coloniales (1890-1914)." *Hispania: revista española de historia*. Vol. 58 Issue 198, 1998. pp. 283-304

Ullman, Joan Connelly. *The Tragic Week: A Study of Anti-Clericalism in Spain, 1875-1912*. Harvard UP. 1968

Serwy, Victor. *Sixième Congrès Socialiste International 1904*
<<http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011819823>>

Tafunell, Xavier and Albert Carreras. *Historia Económica de la España contemporánea*. Barcelona: Crítica. 2004

Valera Ortega, Jose. "Aftermath of Splendid Disaster: Spanish Politics Before and After the Spanish American War of 1898." *Journal of Contemporary History* vol. 15. pp. 317-344. 1980

Walker, D.J. *Spanish Women and the Colonial Wars of the 1890s*. Louisiana: LSU Press. 2008