

The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace

Edited by Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, 397 pp., expanded edition, \$18.00 paper.

Reviewed by Scot Macdonald

What were the causes of the Cold War's "long peace?" Will the future of Europe be peaceful? Why did scholars fail to predict the end of the Cold War? These are the questions the 11 essays in this well-organized and concise volume address, although at a more fundamental level, they address the questions of whether war is obsolete in the industrialized world and whether international relations are predictable.

The causes of the long peace, like the causes of World War I and the origins of the Cold War, will remain a subject of study for years to come, and the first four essays in Lynn-Jones and Miller's *The Cold War and After* offer a first attempt at answering the question. The answer relates to whether war itself is obsolete among developed states or if the long peace was a phenomenon unique to the bipolar structure of the mid-twentieth century. Four of the authors link the long peace to a trend toward the obsolescence of war in the developed world. They argue that increasingly destructive weapons, both conventional and nuclear, have made it unlikely that rational leaders will choose to wage war since the potential costs are so high. Other authors focus on the effects of the bipolar Cold War system, which, they argue, was stable because changes in alliances had little effect on the bipolar balance of power, given the Soviet Union's and United States' vastly superior power relative to other states. If increasingly effective weaponry has made war obsolete, then the future of Europe will be peaceful. If the long peace was caused by bipolarity, then Europe's future is uncertain.

In a seminal, provocative article, John Mueller of the University of Rochester offers the behavioral argument that Western leaders no longer consider the use of force because it is emotionally repulsive. He argues that arms have become so destructive as to make war too costly to undertake except in extreme cases such as self-defense. Mueller also argues that the great powers

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The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 20:2, Summer/Fall 1996

after 1945 were satisfied, so no major power was willing to start an all-out war. Leaders, Mueller argues, have learned from the experience of the two world wars that war is a bloody undertaking and unlikely to be cost effective. In reality, however, leaders of Western industrialized states do consider using force in circumstances short of self-defense, such as in Bosnia and the Persian Gulf.

Mueller uses the examples of dueling and slavery to support his argument that war has become morally abhorrent to leaders of Western industrialized states. However, his examples suffer from a levels-of-analysis problem. Slavery and dueling were conducted by individuals, not by states, and were abolished by states imposing and enforcing laws on their citizens. War, by contrast, is a state-level phenomenon and there is no authority higher than the state to impose and enforce laws against war. Mueller ignores this variable of the structure of the system and its importance in allowing states to wage war.

Another flaw in the obsolescence of war argument is the focus on the cost of war in an absolute sense, ignoring the cost of war relative to goals. World War II was extremely costly, yet Western leaders deemed victory to be worth the cost. In more recent history some leaders have viewed short, low-cost wars as profitable, at least in terms of popularity. The Falklands War boosted U.K. prime minister Margaret Thatcher's political standing, as did the invasions of Grenada and Panama for U.S. presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush, respectively. The perceived cost of a long, expensive war, which Mueller assumes to be the norm if force is used, probably does not enter many leaders' calculations since most leaders considering initiating a military operation assume that the war will be quick and victorious. They are sometimes correct, such as in the cases of Grenada, Panama, the Six-Day War, and the Persian Gulf War, but sometimes they are mistaken, as were the Japanese in World War II and the Soviets in Afghanistan. Yet there are enough examples of brief and successful wars that leaders can always find evidence to support their belief that their war will be quick, cheap, and victorious.

Mueller also puts a premium on leaders learning that war is not cost effective and argues that the world wars taught Western leaders the high cost of using force. It is unclear, however, why the horrendous casualties of past wars, such as the Thirty Years' War, did not teach the warring states not to use force again. There does appear to be a period of reluctance to wage war after particularly destructive conflicts, such as the Napoleonic Wars or the world wars, but it is a mistake to believe that such periods of peace will last forever. The structures established to prevent another war, such as the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, and the United Nations, which may provide order and great-power peace for a time, break down as new states rise and old powers decline. Old issues, temporarily settled by the previous war, arise anew or give way to new issues and conflicts. New generations come of age having forgotten the hell of war, and previously war-ravaged states rebuild, reacquiring the wealth and arms needed to wage war again. Modern media may keep the images of past defeat and carnage alive, but even the most realistic

media provide a pale rendering of the pain and loss of war, as any veteran will tell you.

Furthermore, even if one state learns that war is an ineffective and costly tool, other states may still view war as a cost-effective option. For example, the French learned the high price of war from World War I and built the Maginot Line to convince the Germans that another war would be a repeat of the 1914-1919 bloodbath. However, the Germans did not come away from World War I thinking that war was an ineffective tool of statecraft. Instead they learned to plan for lightning-fast offensives.

Stephen Van Evera of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology argues that democratic, developed states no longer have a desire to conquer their neighbors because knowledge-based economies have decreased the value of conquered states. He argues convincingly that it is more difficult to forcibly extract wealth from modern states than it was to extract resources from smokestack-age economies, because modern knowledge-based economies require freedoms, such as the free movement of capital, labor, and information, to function. Van Evera assumes that a conquered people will oppose a new ruler; however, some groups, especially minorities like the Catholics in Northern Ireland or the Arabs in Israel, may welcome a change in rulers.

Building on his earlier, pivotal works about the offense-defense balance and its influence on the origins of World War I, Van Evera also argues that nuclear weapons have stemmed aggressive behavior by states. This is because nuclear weapons favor defense by greatly increasing the potential damage to an aggressor even if an aggressor is victorious on the battlefield. However, his argument rests on little empirical evidence and on one case only: the Soviet-American nuclear balance. There has been little rigorous study of the situation between other nuclear states, such as India and Pakistan, or between nuclear states and their nonnuclear adversaries, such as Israel and the Arab states. This lack of study makes it difficult to make supportable assertions about the impact of nuclear weapons on a given interstate relationship or about their influence on the offense-defense balance. Even if nuclear weapons do favor the defense, they do not rule out all forms of warfare. Even though nuclear capabilities may deter total wars, they may still allow states to fight limited border wars, as evidenced by India and Pakistan's conflict over Kashmir.

The second question Lynn-Jones and Miller's book addresses is whether the future of Europe after the Cold War will be peaceful. Some of the authors argue that with bipolarity gone, the future of Europe will be unstable unless the United States retains a central role. These writers assert that only the United States has the power to maintain stability against regional powers that may attempt to upset the peace. Others argue that the spread of democracy, the impact of nuclear weapons in shifting the offense-defense balance toward

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defense, and the emerging dominance of economic over military competition support the prediction of a stable, peaceful future.

The European Community (EC) is based on the argument that economic competition can take precedence over military competition. The peace in Western Europe since 1945 provides support for this argument, derived from the Manchester theory of peace, which holds that increasing contact between nations through trade, travel, and student exchanges decreases the chance of war. However, economic issues can lead to armed conflict as much as political, territorial, or strategic issues. For example, the oil embargo imposed on Japan triggered the attack on Pearl Harbor, Iraqi debt strongly influenced the decision to invade Kuwait, and oil was a crucial factor in the Persian Gulf War. The argument sounds ominously reminiscent of explanations for the long peace after the Battle of Waterloo and of those who steadfastly argued before World War I that war was impossible between the European great powers because they were so economically interdependent.¹ The EC states today are more economically bound together than the states of pre-1914 Europe and hopefully have passed a threshold or share some other characteristic, such as knowledge-based economies or possession of nuclear weapons, that will make war a thing of the past.

A common weakness of all the authors' positions on the future of Europe is that they put forth either/or debates that are too extreme in real-world terms. Europe is not an unstable, war-torn continent, nor is it peaceful from Land's End to the Urals. Reality lies between the extremes. There is peace in Western Europe, marred only by an unstable peace process in Northern Ireland. However, war has raged in the former Yugoslavia, possibly ended by the recently signed Dayton Accords. Moldova has also become a battlefield and, depending on how Europe is defined—a definition which *The Cold War and After* lacks—wars in Azerbaijan and Chechnya could also be included in a roll of post-Cold War European conflicts. European contingents also fought in the Persian Gulf War, so West European states have recently been at war, although not with each other.

Ohio University's John Lewis Gaddis offers a final, landmark critique on an issue that is fundamental to the field of international relations and will continue to be a contentious and challenging topic of debate, theory, and research: the failure of behavioral, structural, and evolutionary theories to predict the end of the Cold War. Given the validity of these methods for description and explanation, Gaddis concludes with a call to continue to use these methods, but also to use the methods of the novelist and historian, including narrative, analogy, paradox, irony, intuition, and imagination. Scientific methods are valid for describing and explaining international phenomena, but they fail to predict accurately, which is where other methods must be used.

Ironically, by showing the failure of many theories to predict the end of the Cold War, Gaddis' essay casts doubt on the predictions made in the other essays in the volume, given that they are based on the same theories that failed to foretell the end of the Cold War. While these theories retain their descriptive and explanatory validity, they lack forecasting value. Because the

field of international relations is nonlinear and inherently unpredictable, Gaddis suggests that political scientists stop trumpeting predictive claims for their theories.

Most science is based on the assumption that linear phenomena, which are simple, stable, and regular, are the norm in the universe. Linear phenomena share two basic properties: proportionality, which means that changes in a system's output are proportional to changes in the system's input (size of cause equals size of effect), and additivity, which means that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts, or that the phenomenon can be taken apart, studied, and reassembled.

Nonlinear phenomena, which in contrast are complex, unstable, and irregular, are more common than linear phenomena. Nonlinear systems, such as weather, combustion, and international relations, violate proportionality and additivity. For example, a small cause can have a large effect, such as the shooting of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which sparked a world war, or a large cause can have a small effect, such as the Persian Gulf War, which, in some ways, changed little, with Saddam Hussein still in power and Kuwait still a weak state next to a stronger one. Furthermore, because a small change in initial conditions can lead to a great change in outcomes in a nonlinear system, cases cannot be compared, making prediction even more difficult. Nonlinear phenomena are also difficult to break down into parts because there are no clear boundaries around them, and the parameters that define nonlinear phenomena can change suddenly. Because of this, nonlinear problems are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to model and predict effectively.²

Even with these flaws, the essays in this volume stake out significant, provocative positions on fundamental debates in international relations. This skillfully edited volume reflects the fact that all of the essays in it were previously published in *International Security*. The essays are, without exception, models of clarity. *The Cold War and After* also contains an excellent section on suggested further readings which will be of service to students and researchers beginning projects on the issues covered by the book. Unfortunately, the essays on the future continue to focus on Europe—as during the Cold War—to the neglect of the rest of the world. Apart from this weakness, the essays in this volume are crucial to understanding the debates about the impact of nuclear weapons, bipolarity, and the effects of changing economic conditions on the phenomenon of war, as well as more fundamental questions regarding the predictability of international relations.

Notes

1. For a historical analysis of the Manchester theory of peace, see Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War*, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988).
2. Alan Beyerchen's "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security* 17 (Winter 1992-1993): 59-90 contains an excellent introduction to nonlinearity.

U.N. Peacekeeping: Japanese and American Perspectives

Edited by Selig S. Harrison and Masashi Nishihara

Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, distributed by Brookings Institution, 1995, 175 pp., \$12.95 paper.

Reviewed by Charles B. Dixon

In *U.N. Peacekeeping: Japanese and American Perspectives*, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace joined Tokyo's noted Research Institute for Peace and Security to provide perspectives on the future of the United Nations' role in peacekeeping activities. Bringing eight authors together, the study offers a variety of views on the frequently debated topic of peacekeeping policy. Peacekeeping raises controversy in many nations, but the difference between Japanese constitutional restrictions and American philosophical concerns is striking. Because of the strong cooperative defense relationship between the two nations, these differences are critically important.

The importance of this book is that it provides an American and a Japanese perspective on each of four topics. Starting with a look at the conceptual and legal underpinnings of the U.N. role, the book proceeds to examine domestic political issues, the potential for regional security arrangements, and finally prospects for future cooperation between the two nations in peacekeeping missions. Because the Japanese constitution renounces the use of force as a means of settling international disputes, Japan's participation in peacekeeping is problematic. The fact that the Japanese authors deal with this issue directly is one of the hallmarks of this book.

The first section lays the foundation for the book by examining the role of the United Nations in preserving international order. Considerable effort is made to define peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement as distinct operations. Most contributors agree that the United Nations should take an active role in preserving peace in the post-Cold War era. However, opinion is split regarding involvement in operations in which parties to the conflict have not granted consent. The authors trace the codification of peacekeeping with frequent reference to Chapter VI (peacemaking through diplomatic ef-

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The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 20:2, Summer/Fall 1996

forts) and Chapter VII (peace enforcement through coercive methods) of the U.N. Charter. Most recent peacekeeping operations fall somewhere between the two definitions and are frequently referred to as "Chapter VI ½" operations. One author demonstrates the complexity of the international peacekeeping debate by including peacekeeping operations that may belong under "Chapter VI ¾." The most important point is that peacekeeping operations are justified more by practice than by strict reliance on the charter.

The second pair of essays contrasts the public opinion and political obstacles in the two countries. In the United States the debate over peacekeeping is primarily political and philosophical, whereas in Japan the hurdle lies in constitutional interpretation. "Five PKO Principles" developed by the Kaifu government in July 1991 spell out restrictive criteria for involvement of Japanese forces. Some of the Japanese authors express the opinion that these restrictions will be relaxed over time. It is not clear on what foundation these optimistic views rest, one of a strong desire to take a leading role in the world, or one centered on the desire to earn a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. Regardless, the reality is that overcoming deeply rooted public and political reservations will not be easy. In reading this work one realizes that even those who believe Japan will liberalize its current policy do not foresee authorization of aggressive peace-enforcement operations conducted without the consent of the conflicting parties.

The third section reviews the possibility of regional security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region. The authors point out that Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter authorizes regional relationships to complement and bolster U.N. peace and security efforts. Although the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation are successful organizations, neither is truly designed to deal with security issues. Considerable change in the nature of these organizations must occur before Chapter VIII is viable in this region.

The final essays discuss opportunities for U.S.-Japanese cooperation in future peacekeeping operations. The U.S.-Japanese security arrangement is the most enduring alliance in the Asia-Pacific region, and joint peacekeeping operations present a promising venture for continued cooperation. The authors accurately recognize the challenges associated with such cooperation. For example, concern on both sides about Japanese possession of military power interferes with Japan's ability to acquire long-range airlift capabilities for peacekeeping uses. The recommendation to place future Japanese airlift assets under a nonnational authority is an insightful approach offered by one author.

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The authors highlight two additional areas for cooperation. First, Japanese and American leadership in technology provides opportunity for cooperative efforts in engineering, communications, logistics, and medical support. Conveniently, these areas challenge national obstacles to peacekeeping the least. Second, the continuing flash point in the South China Sea may require peacekeeping forces. U.S.-Japanese cooperation could form the core of such a force. Both nations possess significant naval forces while neither lays any claim to the disputed territory.

In *U.N. Peacekeeping: Japanese and American Perspectives*, the authors explore the different national approaches and perceptions of the two countries. For those involved in the current public debate on peacekeeping or for those ready to find out what all the discussion is about, this work is an excellent resource.

The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements

By Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996, 417 pp., \$49.95 hardcover.

Reviewed by Noah Rubins

In their first joint publication, Harvard law professor Abram Chayes and his wife, former undersecretary of the Air Force and Harvard faculty member Antonia Handler Chayes, have produced a valuable contribution to the theory and practice of international regimes. This work grew out of a course the two authors taught together on conflict resolution, an area where their divergent expertise is clearly complementary. Their book, a readable synthesis of international law and political science, is a valiant and coordinated attempt to answer Kenneth Oye's question: "If international relations can approximate both a Hobbesian state of nature and Lockean . . . society, why does cooperation emerge in some cases and not in others?"¹ The authors attempt to show that, under certain conditions, the complex of norms in the international system can induce states to cooperate—even when parties are unable to impose sanctions for noncompliance. This is the essence of what has been dubbed in some recent literature "the new sovereignty": in an atmosphere of increasing interdependence, states must relinquish part of their freedom of action in order to reap the benefits of membership in the international community.

In holding this view, the Chayes are pushing upstream against a brisk and well-fed current. Not so long ago, Robert Bork decried international law in general as a fiction, insisting that "[n]ations regularly act in ways that, we are assured by politicians and scholars, constitute clear violations of international law . . . and nothing happens. No police force goes into action, no grand jury indicts, no petit jury sits, no verdict is announced by a court."² This is a widely held legal variant of the extreme "realist" view that sovereignty precludes constraint on state behavior from without, barring the application of "carrots" and "sticks" that sweeten or embitter national leaders' cost-benefit analysis. The *realpolitik* approach is even more widespread in the field of international relations, from Machiavelli's statement that a "prudent ruler cannot keep his word, nor should he, where such fidelity would damage him,"

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to Robert Jervis' gloomy evaluation of the uncooperative inexorability of the well-known prisoners' dilemma, wherein he who first breaks his word enjoys an advantage over those who rely on universal good faith.

And yet, as the authors of *The New Sovereignty* point out, "In an increasingly complex and interdependent world, the negotiation, adoption, and implementation of international agreements are major elements of the foreign policy of every state" (p. 1). The Chayes do not argue that the cooperation dilemma was an illusion, but that in light of today's "new sovereignty," international legal instruments are potentially imbued with "teeth" by their very nature. They insist that such built-in structural incentives to comply have proven far more effective than the threat of punishment for violation of regulatory treaties.

The authors draw from a deep pool of examples in arms control, environment, and trade to make a convincing case to this effect. Military sanctions have rarely been applied, they argue, because they involve costs and other problems that are difficult to justify to domestic and international constituencies. "The spur of the Cold War was sufficient to induce the United States to assume the high costs of collective [military] action. . . . With the disappearance of this overriding motivation, even situations that raise serious problems of international political and military stability have not been enough to overcome these hurdles" (p. 43). Economic sanctions, exemplified by the cases of South Africa and Rhodesia, are of dubious value because their effect can be seriously undermined if even one state refuses to apply punishment. In general, the Chayes effectively illustrate the strangely inverse free-rider problem that plagues attempts to coordinate punitive measures against treaty violators.

To prove that sanctions are costly in blood, gold, and political legitimacy may be to knock down a straw man. Moreover, the Chayes admit that the evidence they have amassed is inconclusive as to the overall effectiveness of sanctions, beyond the truism that they are costly and imperfect. The authors, however, are interested not just in the mechanisms of foreign policy, but in what they see as the underlying causes of cooperation and noncooperation in regulatory regimes. This line of thought flows from their assertion that "only infrequently does a treaty violation fall into the category of a willful flouting of legal obligation" (p. 10). This argument rests on an analogy from the municipal legal concept of "good faith," which states that in some cases fault exists only if a violation can be proven willful. Although this analogy may not hold in the present international legal order,³ it leads the authors to explore the "circumstances, infrequently recognized in discussions of compliance, that . . . lie at the root of much of the behavior that may seem to violate treaty requirements" (p. 10). Since punishment may be too costly and can undermine the regime an enforcing state wishes to protect, there should be an effort to address the textual ambiguities, national capacity limitations, and regime nonresponsiveness to changing situations that the authors feel are at the core of most violations.

A glance at the regime established by the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna

Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer seems to support the assertion that instruments of active regime management, such as verification, adaptation, clarification, and technical assistance, can be highly efficacious in preventing defection. Public debate and deliberating bodies have progressively clarified the protocol's provisions, preventing inadvertent noncompliance. A technical assistance fund has begun to equalize the financial burden between developed and less-developed countries, which has proven instrumental in bringing China into line with chlorofluorocarbon standards. The proliferation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that monitor the environment has made verification a far more feasible task and made regime breaches more difficult for states to hide.

Although instruments of regime management similar to those proposed in *The New Sovereignty* are already included piecemeal in such agreements as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, some questions remain as to whether such structures would be desirable and effective in all cases. The most egregious treaty violators, powerful countries such as the United States, clearly have no lack of capacity to fulfill obligations. Verification, as efforts to monitor nuclear programs in Iraq and North Korea attest, can be problematic in the face of real obstinacy on the part of alleged violators. Treaty ambiguity, as Stanley Hoffmann reminds us, "allows policy makers in an emergency to act as if international law were irrelevant,"⁴ thereby avoiding dangerous escalation of conflicts. Perhaps making definitive clarifications of provisions left purposely vague by signers is not such a safe course of action. Finally, enshrining "changed circumstances" as a legitimate justification for treaty violation seems to undermine a body of customary and positive international law that has progressively narrowed this loophole and limited the means to escape obligations that become onerous.⁵ Despite these reservations, there is no arguing with the proposition that transparency, systematic reporting mechanisms, and other features mentioned by the authors may well mitigate the cooperation dilemma, if applied thoughtfully and flexibly.

Perhaps just as useful as the identification of self-enforcing treaty mechanisms is the authors' analysis of three primary structural factors that tend to reinforce regulatory regimes: norms, NGOs, and international organization bureaucracies. When discussing compliance, the first is often neglected by international relations theorists, while the latter two are sometimes given short shrift by legal scholars. Norms, the Chayes assert, "have a certain authority stemming from the mere fact that they have been promulgated by an accept-

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ed and acknowledged treaty-making procedure" (p. 134). NGOs provide the public exposure and constituency mobilization that activate compliance pressure. Regime secretariats and international organization bureaucracies set agendas and create back channels that facilitate domestic policy change in offending states. With these and other forces intertwined and in concert to encourage compliance, the authors write, treaty breaches should be managed and corrected as "something *wrong*" rather than "something *done wrong*," "problems to be solved, rather than . . . wrongs to be punished" (p. 109).

One of the many strengths of this book is an analytical style that is at once legalistic (emphasizing the binding nature of obligations) and political (recognizing the influence of power relationships, economic expediency, and municipal politics). Such an approach is clearly an attempt to bridge the gap between international relations scholars and international lawyers, as well as between theoreticians and policymakers. The authors' understanding is as broad as it is deep, as demonstrated in their valuable critique of Robert Axelrod's tit-for-tat theory from his influential work *The Evolution of Cooperation*. The synthesis of *The New Sovereignty* reveals the way in which the interlocking spheres of the legal, moral, sociological, economic, and political orders seem in many cases to reinforce one another, inducing treaty compliance independent of threats of reprisal. As the Chayes point out,

Costs [of noncompliance] come in many forms. The most obvious is loss of the anticipated benefits of the bargain. In trade cases, the response . . . may infect other aspects of the relationship between the parties. . . . [The] violator may also suffer more diffuse responses, [like] expressions of disapproval . . . , diplomatic intercourse, [and] various kinds of reputation effects (p. 152).

The Chayes have brought to bear an impressive array of case examples—particularly in arms control and the environment—to brighten an otherwise gloomy body of literature on treaty compliance. Their conclusion is simple: the existence of increasingly copious and tenacious international "rules of the road" undermines the common assertion that treaty compliance is determined exclusively by parties' cost-benefit analysis. The authors argue convincingly that the calculation of self-interest is complex and variegated in the age of interdependence, and that proper regime management can alter such calculations without traditional enforcement.

Notes

1. Kenneth Oye, "The Conditions for Cooperation in World Politics," in *International Politics*, ed. Robert Art and Robert Jervis, 4th ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1996), 81.
2. Robert H. Bork, "The Limits of International Law," *The National Interest* (Winter 1989/1990): 4.
3. There is some debate as to whether such municipal law concepts as "equity" or "good faith" can be applied in international law as "general principles" under Article 38.1 (b) of the ICJ Statute. See, for example, Wolfgang Friedmann, "The Uses of 'General

Principles' in the Development of International Law," *American Journal of International Law* 57 (1963): 279-299.

4. Stanley Hoffmann, "The Uses and Limits of International Law," in *International Law and Political Crisis*, ed. Lawrence Scheinman and David Wilkinson (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1968), xviii.
5. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention of the Law on Treaties, for example, holds that "fundamental change of circumstances" is justification for treaty abrogation *only* under certain, rather restrictive, conditions.

Security and Sacrifice: Isolation, Intervention and American Foreign Policy

By Elliot Abrams

Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 1995, 150 pp., with notes and index, \$12.95 paper.

Reviewed by Ryan Hendrickson

In the aftermath of the Cold War, in a world full of new and challenging issues, Elliot Abrams' book wrestles with the proper foreign policy role for the United States. Abrams, former assistant secretary of state for human rights and former assistant secretary of state for Latin America under Ronald Reagan, yearns for a return to values practiced during the Reagan years and, more specifically, to principles originating with the nation's founding fathers. His book will prove alarming in different degrees and respects.

Abrams begins by discussing the many new threats to U.S. national security. His list is long and comprehensive. Topics covered include nuclear proliferation, terrorism, intrastate conflict, the international trafficking of illegal drugs, and potential volatility in the Middle East and East Asia. At the systemic level, he maintains that multipolarity poses new concerns about world stability and envisions a "hell of global insecurity" that threatens many states (p. 32).

Abrams continues by presenting his version of U.S. history in foreign affairs. He contends that the founders believed in spreading democracy, while fearing and avoiding intervention abroad, that is, "European entanglements." He then examines the unfolding of U.S. foreign policy from the American Revolution to the Clinton administration. In Abrams' view, the United States evolved from a country with isolationist tendencies to a nation that believed it should "pay any price" and "bear any burden" to make the world a better place. His description of this policy change is the book's greatest strength.

In his effort to trace U.S. diplomatic and military history, Abrams pays particular attention to recent administrations. He gives the Reagan administration especially high marks, while criticizing President Bush and lambasting President Clinton's foreign policy record. Regarding Clinton, Abrams chronicles well the recent policy "flip-flops" and vehemently condemns both

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administrations for engaging in diplomatic negotiations with Syrian president Hafez al-Asad. Abrams holds that the proper response to such states is diplomatic isolation, followed by economic sanctions and the use of force if necessary.

The former assistant secretary closes by arguing for heavy investment in national defense and championing the role of nuclear weapons in the nation's security. Abrams maintains that further testing of nuclear weapons may be in the U.S. interest (p. 121). He also advocates the development of more ballistic missiles and anti-ballistic missile systems. Regarding the role of human rights in U.S. foreign policy, he supports a "practical" approach in which human rights are placed second to national interests (p. 136). For example, he cites the importance of maintaining positive relations with China because of its international economic importance. He also asserts that in the former Yugoslavia (unlike Iraq) "there were no concrete, American interests" to justify American involvement (p. 139). In his view, the United States cannot afford to sacrifice common sense for morally utopian ideas.

After reading this book it appears that Abrams is overly pessimistic—at times nearly paranoid—about the world's condition. Few other writers perceive so many elements of international politics as potentially threatening the United States. While a number of the dangers he mentions are real, Abrams fails to emphasize the many positive developments in international relations since World War II, particularly since 1989, which include the lack of interstate war between industrialized democracies, the spread of democratic systems, the gradual development of widely accepted international norms in human rights, and the slow deterioration of trade barriers. Abrams' perception of the state of the world is based on a Machiavellian fear and does not adequately address these significant changes in world politics.

Not only does Abrams seem somewhat paranoid about the intentions of other nations, his selection of historic examples recalling U.S. history is far from balanced. He fails to mention the concept of Manifest Destiny, argues that the Monroe Doctrine had no shade of imperialism, and maintains that the Spanish-American War was in alignment with the founders' principles on foreign policy. In the case of the Spanish-American War, Abrams leaves out such basic facts as President McKinley's weak domestic political position at the time, the rampant yellow journalism, and McKinley's alleged message from God supporting intervention, all of which encouraged invasion. The author's presentation of U.S. history suffers greatly from selectivity and, unfortunately, takes on a rather jingoistic tone.

Many readers will find it ironic that Abrams, convicted of wrongdoing in the Iran-Contra affair, takes the ethical high ground on U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis terrorism. He strongly opposes the support of terrorists and dictators, and advocates the approach employed during the Reagan years. The former assistant secretary for human rights essentially believes that Reagan's policy was more cost-effective than Carter's strategy, in that Reagan promoted human rights and democracy simultaneously, while combatting human rights violators and communists through third parties (p. 87). It quickly

becomes clear that Abrams views the world in sharp ideological divisions, which reduces policymaking to an exercise in labelling foreign governments and rebel factions as either good (democrats) or bad (communists). Consequently he neglects the moral and political inconsistencies raised by the Reagan administration's covert operations in Nicaragua, its backing of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, and its support of the government of El Salvador.

In sum, the book's policy suggestions will appeal to readers with a far right political ideology. But for those who lack this ideology and have even a basic understanding of U.S. diplomatic and military history, Abrams' study will prove disappointing.

A Concise History of the Middle East

By Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996, 5th edition, 374 pp., \$60.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Reviewed by Anthony Wanis St. John

History is made every moment of every day, as long as it is recorded in some form for later analysis. However, it is the momentous and lofty that capture human attention: events of magnitude that mark transitions and outline discernible patterns in the long web of human existence. In current times as in the past, the events that mark a great deal of our history are conflicts, their immediate outcomes, and their ultimate resolutions. In the Middle East, the site of rich cultural heritages accompanied by much historical conflict, one such transition seems to be taking place: the 50-year stalemate in the Arab-Israeli conflict has come to an end. The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements,¹ signed in September 1993, marked the end of one era and the commencement of another, in which differences are to be resolved through negotiation rather than in a bitter armed struggle between Israelis and Palestinians.

In *A Concise History of the Middle East*, Arthur Goldschmidt, a professor of Middle Eastern history at Pennsylvania State University, takes the reader on an intellectual journey spanning the rise of the region's civilizations to its division into modern states. Goldschmidt begins where most course texts on "Western civilization" abandon the Middle East, 476 A.D. By this date, "Roman power and culture had already shifted to the eastern Mediterranean" (p. 15). The author spends some time recounting an important element of Middle Eastern antiquity: the state of culture, civilization, and religion on the eve of Islam's birth. The predominant religion was Christianity, and the principal conflicts were among the various Christian sects such as the Arians, Nestorians, and Monophysites, separated by their opposing views on the nature of Christ.

Throughout the book, Goldschmidt links the past to the present and, in particular, to the non-Middle Eastern present. As an example, Goldschmidt traces the eventual predominance of Islam over Christianity to a single event:

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The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 20:2, Summer/Fall 1996

the 451 A.D. meeting of Christian Orthodox bishops at Chalcedon. There, the Monophysite claim of a wholly divine nature of Christ was declared heretic, and Monophysite Christians (today the Syrian Jacobites, the Egyptian Copts, and the Armenians) were consequently persecuted by the Byzantine religious authorities. The author links the present to the past by stating that "this policy turned dissenters against Constantinople and would later lead to the Arab conquests and the subjection of Middle Eastern Christianity to Islam" (p. 19). The Christian doctrinal disputes weakened the Byzantine Empire's political structure and thereby left an opening for Islam in the Middle East and for Protestantism in Europe.

The author cites other examples of ancient precursors to later developments: the Egyptian and Hebrew monotheisms, Egyptian and Mesopotamian hydraulic engineering feats (which have lasted into the modern era), and the Middle Eastern influence on Greek philosophies and Roman law, the bases of later Western law. The advent of an imperial kingship in the Middle East under the Sassanid Persians was perhaps most subtly significant. This rival to the Roman Empire set a precedent for a later Muslim-ruled but multicultural political organization under the Ottoman caliphs. A haven for scholars and students from Europe and Asia, the Sassanid Empire is credited by Goldschmidt for preserving the "humanistic heritage of the whole ancient world" by permitting scholars and others to escape the prejudice, dogma, and political restrictions of the Byzantine Empire (p. 20).

After this inquiry into pre-Islamic civilization, Goldschmidt gives little more than a footnote on Islamic belief and practice. He sets forth core beliefs such as the "Five Pillars of Islam" and basic aspects of Allah, his messengers, and angels. More relevant to the contemporary student, however, is the author's treatment of the principle of *jihad* . Goldschmidt clarifies the fact that Mohammed's concept of *jihad* did not call for conversion or massacre of Christians and Jews. Unfortunately, this is a very preliminary treatment of a subject of great significance, especially in light of the coming Palestinian-Israeli "final status" negotiations. Goldschmidt believes that the historical tolerance of Islam is poorly understood, and that a long view of history does not support the thesis that Arabs and Jews must be eternal enemies.²

In chapters addressing the emergence of Israel and the wars that followed, Goldschmidt presents a relatively uncritical view of U.S. policy and particularly Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's post-1967 "shuttle diplomacy."³ Nonetheless, Goldschmidt's account is valuable for its broad portrayal of concurrent events that provide proper analytical context. For example, the political succession struggles taking place in Libya (Colonel Qaddafi's rise to power), Israel (Golda Meir's becoming prime minister), and Iraq (two coups d'etat in 1968 resulting in Ba`th party rule) all influenced the "Rogers Peace Plan" then being promoted by the United States. These events created internal instability in a region already lacking stable interstate relations.

In other critical sections of the work, such as his survey of the current condition of the Palestinian people, Goldschmidt proceeds in a novel way for a writer of history texts. He begins by explaining the Zionist argument that

the plight of the Palestinians is the fault of Arab states that have not absorbed the refugees. He then explains that his own long-held belief that the Palestinians were actually being slowly integrated into both Israel and the Arab states is also incorrect. With refreshing candor, Goldschmidt refutes his own former arguments, as stated in previous editions of this work. He argues now that Israel and the Arab states have not integrated Palestinians at all, but have disenfranchised them further. The outbreak of the 1987 *intifada* (uprising), the continuing Israeli bombardments of Palestinian villages in southern Lebanon, the chaos resulting from the Lebanese civil war, and the post-Gulf War distancing of Arab states from the Palestinian cause all offer evidence of this. In further support of his new contention that the Palestinians have not been integrated, he details the progression of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) declaring itself the government-in-exile of the State of Palestine in 1988, to the Jordanian renunciation of claims to represent the Palestinian cause, to the outright Israeli and U.S. rejection of the PLO, and finally to the Israeli recognition of the PLO in September 1993 and Israeli-PLO cooperation and negotiation toward what will likely be a two-state solution. Goldschmidt's portrayal of these events shows the Palestinians' maintenance of a separate identity and their quest for statehood, disproving the theory that they were being "integrated" into surrounding states.

Goldschmidt attempts to transcend partisanship in his portrayal of both the ancient and modern history of this rich and volatile region, while at the same time addressing the principal acts and grievances that have culminated in the current state of affairs. In his concluding analysis, he provides the beginning student of the Middle East with a summary of the chief causes of regional conflict: 1) an incomplete transition from religious societies and divine law to modern nation-states, 2) the resultant perception of illegitimacy of current governments, 3) "the quest for dignity and freedom by highly articulate people (or nations) who have endured centuries of subjection and are determined never again to lose their independence," 4) "the involvement of outside governments . . . who cannot work with the hopes and fears of the Middle Eastern peoples and . . . play on them to serve their own needs," 5) the growing concentration of arms, 6) the rising need for food, water, and fossil fuels worldwide, and 7) overpopulation in some countries (pp. 371-373). This valuable summary derives from the balanced, clear, and historically rooted perspective that the author provides throughout his work.

In the end, the author encourages the reader to promote a genuine dialogue between Middle Eastern and Western ways of life, and expresses the hope that not only has history *not* ended, but that it will continue to evolve in

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surprising ways. He counters the warning cry of an impending "clash of civilizations" and instead issues a call for "comprehensive conflict transformation from war to dialogue" (p. 373).

Goldschmidt's updated edition is a welcome addition to the plethora of works on the modern Middle East and its immediate historical origins.⁴ The principal contribution of the present text is its synthesis of ancient civilization and modern history. Its simple but elegant language is written for newcomers to the field but does not diminish its contribution to historical scholarship. It consistently establishes links between East and West, past and present, and Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Perhaps most uniquely, it connects lasting peace with a genuine understanding of the underlying interests of all those who inherit the vast mantle of Middle Eastern civilization, for whom modern events are truly but a footnote.

Notes

1. The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements of September 13, 1993 is reprinted in 32 *International Legal Materials* 1525.
2. This is made clear in the scholarship of Dr. Walid Khalidi, who writes and speaks of the reverence Islam traditionally showed toward Judaism and Christianity until the creation of Israel, and who ties this tolerance to the ultimate resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. See, for example, the introduction to Walid Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians, 1976-1946* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991).
3. For excellent critical assessments of Kissinger's diplomatic and conflict management efforts in the Middle East, see Jeffrey Z. Rubin, ed., *Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1983).
4. See, for example, Albert Hourani, Philip Khoury, and Mary C. Wilson, eds., *The Modern Middle East* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993); Don Peretz, *The Middle East Today* (Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press, 1971); David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989); and Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).

