

**Determinants of Carbon Intensity in the US Electric  
Power Sector: A State Level Empirical Analysis**

**A Thesis submitted by**

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**In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of**

**Master of Science**

**in**

**Economics**

**Tufts University**

**May 2015**

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## **Abstract**

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency recently announced the Clean Power Plan, a plan to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from existing electric power plants. The proposal will require states to reduce their carbon intensity (carbon emissions per megawatt hour of generation) below fixed caps. My thesis analyzes the drivers of carbon intensity in the electric power sector using a state-level data set from 1990-2012. I decompose the carbon intensity with a generalized Fisher index approach and the decomposition results show that recent reduction in carbon intensity mainly came from switching from coal to natural gas. The decomposition motivates the hypothesis that higher natural gas price would result in higher carbon intensity. I first construct an analytical model to show intuitively under what conditions the hypothesis holds. Second, I empirically test the hypothesis with the state level data and the empirical results support the hypothesis. I further prove that a coal tax would be more effective at reducing the carbon intensity in the power sector than a carbon tax. The results implicitly support the design of the EPA's Clean Power Plan.

## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Gilbert Metcalf, for his encouragement and guidance. He helped me develop my thesis topic and taught me how to conduct research. I am grateful to him for his mentoring. Without his assistance this thesis would not have been possible. I would also like to thank my reader on the thesis committee, Professor Jeffrey Zabel, for his help and insightful comments throughout the writing process as well as during the defense. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my wife, Luqi Yan, for her love and support.

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# 1. Introduction

Carbon dioxide is a main type of greenhouse gas. In 2009, President Obama made a pledge of a 17 percent reduction of total greenhouse gases by 2020 compared with the level in 2005. Recently, he announced a new target to cut greenhouse gas emissions 26 percent to 28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025. To achieve President Obama's goal, policies in the electricity power sector will play a vital role, since this sector is responsible for nearly one third of annual US carbon dioxide emissions.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently announced the Clean Power Plan, a plan to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from existing electric power plants 30 percent below 2005 levels by 2030. The proposal will require states to reduce their carbon intensity (carbon emissions per megawatt hour of electricity) below fixed caps and this type of policy is referred to as an emission performance standard. Given the huge amount of annual electricity generation, even a small percentage decrease in carbon intensity will yield a large reduction of carbon emissions. To determine the goal for each state, the EPA assessed the practical and affordable approaches that states can use to reduce carbon emissions from the power sector. They established the "Best Systems of the Emissions Reductions" (BSER) at the national level. The state-specific goal is calculated based on the BSER with state specific information. The BSER consists of four "building blocks". Building block one is heat rate improvement in fossil fuel power plants. Building block two is shifting electricity generation from most carbon-intensive coal-fired power plants to less carbon-intensive gas-fired power plants. Specifically, the utilization of natural gas combined cycle generation is proposed to go up to 70 percent capacity factor. Building block three is expanding electricity generations from non-fossil sources such as

renewable energy. Building block four is developing energy efficiency programs to lower the electricity demand. According to the four building blocks, the BSER in the Clean Power Plan discourages electricity generation by coal and it is analogous to a coal tax in the power sector. This implicitly suggests that a coal tax in the power sector may be the most effective approach to reduce carbon emissions in the power sector.

One feature of the Clean Power Plan is that it allows states to conduct flexible policy approaches to achieve the reduction.<sup>1</sup> Although they can follow the four “building blocks”, states need not use BSER methods. Therefore, understanding the determinants of carbon intensity at the state-level is important in designing local policies to comply with the Clean Power Plan. In this paper, I analyze carbon intensity with a particular focus on fuel prices. I also compare the effectiveness of policies that may be considered by states to reduce the carbon intensity including a carbon tax and a coal tax. The results show that a coal tax is more effective than a carbon tax at reducing carbon emissions in the power sector, which support BSER methods.

I first use a generalized Fisher Index approach to decompose the carbon intensity to understand its changes, using US national data. Reductions in carbon intensity can come from heat rate improvement and fuel switching; fuel switching in turn can be decomposed into switching among fossil fuels and switching between fossil fuels and non-fossil fuels. I show that the recent decrease of carbon intensity is driven mainly from switching within fossil fuels and more precisely, switching from coal to natural gas. This result and the recent decreasing natural gas price motivate the hypothesis that an increase in natural gas price could result in growing carbon

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<sup>1</sup> See Burtraw et al. (2014) for a survey of the major policy approaches that may be considered by states to achieve Obama’s pledge, as well as their potential consequences.

intensity. Carbon pricing, whether through a cap and trade program or a carbon tax, will increase both the prices of coal and of natural gas. If this hypothesis holds, while a carbon tax will be an effective driver of reduction in carbon intensity, a coal tax will be even more effective in the short run.

Second, I construct a simple analytical model to address potential consequences of a carbon tax and a coal tax. I assume inelastic electricity demand in which the change in carbon intensity is equivalent to the change in carbon emissions. A carbon tax is assumed to raise both prices of coal and natural gas while a coal tax will only increase coal price. The results show that an increase in coal price will always reduce carbon emissions, assuming no change in natural gas price. However, the effect of higher natural gas price on carbon emissions depends on certain conditions, assuming no change in coal price. The higher price of natural gas results in increasing wind power generation as well as increasing coal generation. Under certain circumstances, the effect of increasing coal generation will dominate the effect of increasing wind power, which results in larger carbon emissions. The analysis based on the model implies that under certain situations, the hypothesis will hold and therefore a carbon tax will be less effective than a coal tax.

Finally, I conduct a statistical analysis of state-level carbon intensity in the power sector, focusing on carbon intensity as a function of personal income, electricity generation, fossil fuel prices, state-level policies, and other determinants of carbon intensity. In addition to the static model, a dynamic panel model is also estimated to allow for the partial adjustment mechanism. By controlling the total electricity generation, I test the hypothesis with the empirical model and the results support the hypothesis.

This paper makes three main contributions to the literature on carbon emissions study. Unlike the literature on carbon pricing (Cullen and Mansur 2013, Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 2014, Newcomer et al. 2008, Burtraw et al. 2014), this paper focuses on carbon intensity in electricity generation. By focusing on carbon intensity rather than carbon emissions, my paper will be consistent with the Clean Power Plan regulation. I also use a state-level dataset covering 43 continental states during 23 years, while the above literature either used a regional level or plant-level dataset with different time frequency and smaller coverage.

Second, I used different estimation techniques to obtain bias-corrected and consistent estimators. The literature on forecasting carbon emissions (Auffhammer and Steinhauser 2012, Auffhammer and Carson 2008, Aldy 2005, Auffhammer and Steinhauser 2007) focused on models' out-of-sample prediction power and this process of model selection does not guarantee unbiased or consistent point estimators. The bias-corrected and consistent estimations are preferred in understanding the determinants and designing local policies.

Finally, I follow the spirit of Metcalf (2008) by applying a generalized Fisher index approach (Ang, Liu, and Chung 2004) to decompose the change of carbon intensity into three parts: heat rate improvement, switching within fossil fuels, and switching between fossil fuels and non-fossil fuels. The decomposition result motivates the hypothesis mentioned previously and my advocacy of a coal tax. Regression analysis using state-level data with these three indexes as dependent variables help to understand through which channels the determinants affect the carbon intensity and verify the robustness of the basic result.

The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. I review the literature in the next section. The method for decomposing the data is described in the Section 3 with results using national

level data. I construct the analytical model and empirical model in Section 4. The state-level data are summarized in Section 5. The results are presented in Section 6 and Section 7 provides conclusions.

## 2. Literature Review

### Reducing Emissions in the Power Sector

Efforts to study carbon emissions in the electricity power sector have mainly tried to understand the impact of changes in fuel prices on carbon emissions. This is important because the potential effects of a carbon tax should be accurately evaluated to compare with other available policies. Burtraw et al. (2014) summarized the major policy approaches that may be considered by states to achieve Obama's pledge and estimated their potential consequences based on their highly parametrized partial equilibrium model. Using the same model, Burtraw and Woerman (2013b) also found that the cost of reducing carbon emissions by improving the heat rate in coal plants was four times higher than that by fuel switching. Lu, Salovaara, and McElroy (2012) conducted a regression analysis of coal generation shares and the cost differential between natural gas and coal. They found that coal generation switched to natural gas generation only when the cost differential was sufficiently small, below 2-3 cents/kWh. They used their analysis to conclude that a carbon price would be most effective when the cost differential was at low level. Linn, Muehlenbachs, and Wang (2014) theoretically and empirically characterized the effects on the environment and electricity prices from the decrease in natural gas prices from 2008 to 2012. They concluded that in the short run, lower natural gas prices reduced carbon emissions. They also found a 0.04 elasticity of coal generation and a -0.37 elasticity of natural gas generation with respect to the price of natural gas. Cullen and Mansur (2013) estimated the response of carbon emissions to changes in relative fuel costs of coal to natural gas for three interconnections separately. They found that when the ratio of the natural gas price to coal price was high, a lower natural gas price would not significantly reduce carbon emissions. The effect of the lower natural

gas price became large as the cost ratio approached one. They further estimated how a carbon price would affect the cost ratio and suggested a modest carbon price would be fairly effective while a higher carbon price would reduce carbon emissions at a decreasing rate. Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw (2014) also found evidence that the effect on the utilization of coal from a coal price increase was sensitive to the price ratio of natural gas to coal, with a smaller effect at a higher ratio. Their main finding was that a 10% increase in the coal price would result in 0.1% - 0.4% heat rate improvement in coal power plants. Newcomer et al. (2008) conducted an analysis of the impact of a carbon tax on the electricity markets using regional data, and found most of the carbon reduction would come from less electricity consumption while less than 2.5% reduction would come from fuel switching by a carbon tax at \$20/ton.

There are also studies discussing differentiating standards for different fuels and for different regions. Burtraw and Woerman (2013a) analyzed the effects of differentiating emission rate performance standards, for a given national emissions target. Differentiating for fossil fuels would result in a more relaxed standard for coal with a more tightened standard for natural gas. They argued that modest differentiation across coal and natural gas generation would be preferred because it could even have a beneficial impact on abatement cost. Contrary to Burtraw's argument, Bielen (2014) was against this kind of differentiating. He examined the short run effects of differentiation in tradable performance standards through both analytic and simulation models. According to his findings, coal usage would increase under this type of policy since within-coal switching would be less expensive relative to switching from coal to natural gas. The average efficiency of coal plants would also increase as a result of within-coal switching. In sum, the literature supported the effectiveness of carbon pricing, while whether differentiation in the performance standards would be preferred was still unclear. The two

extreme cases for such kind of differentiation are only taxing coal and only taxing natural gas, with a carbon tax being a mixture of the two. Therefore, it is important to study these two extreme cases because the effect of a carbon tax lies between those two.

## **Fisher Index Decomposition**

The Fisher Index proposed by Fisher (1921) is given by the geometric mean of the Laspeyres index and the Paasche index and it has desirable properties like perfect decomposition without residuals. However, the conventional Fisher Index can only be used to do two-factor decomposition. Ang, Liu, and Chung (2004) developed a generalized n-factor Fisher index decomposition approach and compared its properties with other five Index Decomposition Analysis approaches. Among all the six tests, the generalized Fisher Index passed five of them including the factor-reversal and zero-value robust tests, which are two important properties (Ang and Zhang 2000). Passing the factor-reversal test means that the Fisher index gives perfect decomposition without residual term. The Fisher index can accommodate zero values in the data since it also passes the zero-value robust test. In my construction of indexes, there are zero values because generating electricity by non-fossil sources produces zero carbon emissions. With these two desirable properties, I apply the generalized Fisher index approach to decomposing the carbon intensity at the national level to understand the move of carbon intensity. I further use regression analysis to assess the impacts on the components of carbon intensity by all the determinants at the state level.

## Environmental Kuznets Curve Study

For studies on carbon emissions, a popular theory is the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), which indicates an inverted U-shaped relationship between pollution and per capita income (Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson 1998, Holtz-Eakin and Selden 1995, Auffhammer and Carson 2008, Auffhammer and Steinhauser 2012, 2007, Aldy 2005, 2006). Based on the EKC theory, some studies focused on forecasting carbon emissions and their analysis included very limited explanatory variables (Auffhammer and Steinhauser 2012, Auffhammer and Carson 2008, Aldy 2005, Auffhammer and Steinhauser 2007). The empirical EKC relationship is fragile with at best mixed results and its theoretical reasoning is also suspicious for carbon dioxide (Aldy 2005, Brock and Taylor 2005), which is a global public good. The model specified in this paper does not rely on the EKC theory because the analysis is to the electricity power sector and the dependent variable is the carbon intensity, instead of per capita emissions. However, the EKC studies inspire me to assess the impact of personal income using a more flexible functional form.

### 3. Decomposition of Carbon Intensity

In this section, I hope to understand the change in the carbon intensity of the power sector. The reduction of carbon intensity can be attributed to heat rate improvement, switching between fossil fuels to non-fossil fuels and within fossil fuel switching. By applying a generalized Fisher Index, I decompose the carbon intensity into the above three components. Before turning to state-level analysis, I provide an overview of the decomposition using the national level data and compare the move of these components with the move of fuel prices. The comparison motivates my main hypothesis in this paper that an increase of natural gas price may result in growing carbon intensity.

#### 3.1. Decomposition Method

Using  $F$  to represent the group of fossil fuels and  $N$  to stand for the group of non-fossil fuels, the carbon intensity  $I$  of the power sector can be written as:

$$I \equiv \frac{\sum_i Z_i}{\sum_i E_i} = \sum_{i \in F} \underbrace{\frac{Z_i}{E_i}}_{H_i} \times \underbrace{\frac{E_i}{\sum_{i \in F} E_i}}_{W_i} \times \underbrace{\frac{\sum_{i \in F} E_i}{\sum_i E_i}}_{B_i} + \sum_{i \in N} \underbrace{\frac{Z_i}{E_i}}_{H_i} \times \underbrace{\frac{E_i}{\sum_{i \in N} E_i}}_{W_i} \times \underbrace{\frac{\sum_{i \in N} E_i}{\sum_i E_i}}_{B_i} \quad (1)$$

Variables in equation (1) are defined as follows:  $Z_i$  is the carbon emission from fuel  $i$ ;  $E_i$  is the generation from fuel  $i$ ;  $H_i$  is the carbon intensity for fuel  $i$  and captures the heat rate improvement in using this fuel;  $W_i$  is the generation share of fuel  $i$  in its own group and captures the within switching effect;  $B_i$  is the generation share of fuel  $i$ 's group in total generation and captures the between switching effect. The equation (1) means the carbon intensity of the whole power sector is the weighted average carbon intensity for each fuel  $i$ , where the weighting factor

for  $i$  is the product of its share in its group and its group's share in total generation. For each time period  $T$ , carbon intensity can be written as:

$$I^T = \sum_i H_i^T \times W_i^T \times B_i^T \quad (2)$$

Note that for each of the non-fossil fuels with the exception of geothermal, the carbon intensity is zero and thus the within switching effect is zero.<sup>2</sup> Since geothermal shares less than 1% of total generation, I ignore the effect of geothermal generation. Therefore,  $W$  only captures the effect of switching within fossil fuels.

To conduct the three-factor decomposition, I use a residual-free generalized Fisher index approach, which has several decent properties (Ang, Liu, and Chung 2004). Denoting  $H_i^0$ ,  $W_i^0$ ,  $B_i^0$  as the indexes in the base period, the three Fisher indexes at period  $T$  can be computed as follows:

$$f_H^T = \left[ \frac{\sum_i H_i^T W_i^0 B_i^0}{\sum_i H_i^0 W_i^0 B_i^0} \cdot \left( \frac{\sum_i H_i^T W_i^T B_i^0}{\sum_i H_i^0 W_i^T B_i^0} \cdot \frac{\sum_i H_i^T W_i^0 B_i^T}{\sum_i H_i^0 W_i^0 B_i^T} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \cdot \frac{\sum_i H_i^T W_i^T B_i^T}{\sum_i H_i^0 W_i^T B_i^T} \right]^{\frac{1}{3}} \quad (3)$$

$$f_W^T = \left[ \frac{\sum_i H_i^0 W_i^T B_i^0}{\sum_i H_i^0 W_i^0 B_i^0} \cdot \left( \frac{\sum_i H_i^T W_i^T B_i^0}{\sum_i H_i^T W_i^0 B_i^0} \cdot \frac{\sum_i H_i^0 W_i^T B_i^T}{\sum_i H_i^0 W_i^0 B_i^T} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \cdot \frac{\sum_i H_i^T W_i^T B_i^T}{\sum_i H_i^T W_i^0 B_i^T} \right]^{\frac{1}{3}} \quad (4)$$

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<sup>2</sup> I do not take backup generation into consideration because it is recorded as fossil fuel generation.

$$f_B^T = \left[ \frac{\sum_i H_i^0 W_i^0 B_i^T}{\sum_i H_i^0 W_i^0 B_i^0} \cdot \left( \frac{\sum_i H_i^T W_i^0 B_i^T}{\sum_i H_i^T W_i^0 B_i^0} \cdot \frac{\sum_i H_i^0 W_i^T B_i^T}{\sum_i H_i^0 W_i^T B_i^0} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \cdot \frac{\sum_i H_i^T W_i^T B_i^T}{\sum_i H_i^T W_i^T B_i^0} \right]^{\frac{1}{3}} \quad (5)$$

As noted above, the generalized Fisher index provides perfect decomposition without any residual as below ( $\frac{I^T}{I^0}$  is called the relative carbon intensity):


$$\frac{I^T}{I^0} = f_H^T \cdot f_W^T \cdot f_B^T \quad (6)$$

### 3.2. National Level Decomposition Overview


I first conduct the analysis using annual national-level data from 1990 through 2012. I partition the aggregate electricity power generation into eight types of sources: coal, natural gas and petroleum, which are fossil fuels; nuclear, geothermal, hydro-electric, wind and solar, which are non-fossil fuels. The data sources are described in Section 5.

Figure 1 shows the decomposition indexes and the relative carbon intensity with 1990 as the base year. Figure 2 shows the decomposition indexes and the relative carbon intensity with 2005 as the base year, which is the base year in Obama's pledge.

**Figure 1** Decomposition Results using 1990 as the base year



**Figure 2** Decomposition Results using 2005 as the base year



Carbon intensity in the power sector has fallen by 17 percent since 1990 with some fluctuations. The within switching index was 86 percent of its 1990 level. In other words, had the heat rate and the percentage of generation from fossil fuels not changed between 1990 and 2012, the


carbon intensity would have been 86 percent of its 1990 level. The 14 percent reduction in the carbon intensity was due to switching within fossil fuels. Given the fact that the average percentage of petroleum generation in fossil fuel generations was less than 4 percent between 1990 and 2012, the decrease in within switching index was considered mainly due to switching from coal to natural gas. The heat rate index was 96 percent of its level in 1990 and the between switching index was 99 percent of its 1990 level. This means only 4 percent and 1 percent reductions in the carbon intensity were from heat rate improvement and switching from fossil fuels to non-fossil fuels. Therefore, roughly 80 percent of carbon intensity reduction in the power sector can be attributed to switching from coal to natural gas.

A more specific look at Figure 2 tells similar stories. The carbon intensity was 85 percent of its 2005 level and 11 percent reduction was due to switching within fossil fuels. This means roughly 70 percent of carbon intensity reduction can be attributed to switching from coal to natural gas. The remaining 30 percent can be attributed to switching from fossil fuels to non-fossil fuels, since the between switching index has fallen by 4 percent. The heat rate index was almost constant during this period and thus heat rate improvement can be considered to have no impact on the carbon intensity in the power sector during this period. Regardless of the choice of base year, switching from coal to natural gas was the key driver in reducing the carbon intensity in the power sector.

I further make a comparison between the within switching index and the ratio of natural gas price to coal price in Figure 3. The within switching index seems to be correlated with the ratio since 2005 and the correlation coefficient is 0.66. More specifically, the within index is positively correlated with the natural gas price and the correlation coefficient is 0.86. The correlation

coefficient of the coal price and the within index is -0.61. Although from the figure this relationship cannot simply be considered as causal, one recent study (Linn, Muehlenbachs, and Wang 2014) concluded that the lower natural gas price from 2008 to 2012 reduced carbon emissions in the power sector. The figure and the conclusion by the study motivate the hypothesis that a higher price of natural gas may even result in growing carbon intensity. If the hypothesis is true, then carbon pricing applied to the power sector, will not be more effective than a coal tax. This is because a carbon tax will also raise the price of natural gas.

**Figure 3** Coal Price, Natural Gas Price and Within Switching Index since 2005



In this section, I have decomposed the change of carbon intensity into three factors with a generalized Fisher index approach. I show that most of reductions in carbon intensity were due to switching from coal to natural gas. I further compare the trend of within switching index with prices of coal and natural gas. The comparison and the findings from literature motivate the main hypothesis of this paper. Therefore, it is important to know when this hypothesis will be true and test the hypothesis with data. In Section 4, I construct a simple analytical model to help figure

out under what conditions the hypothesis will be true. I also build an empirical econometric model to test the hypothesis and understand the determinants of carbon intensity in the power sector using state-level data.

## 4. The Model

The comparison between decomposition results and the changes in natural gas price motivated the hypothesis that an increase in natural gas price could even cause growing carbon intensity in the short run. An increase in natural gas price will affect within switching by encouraging using more coal. It will also affect between switching by encouraging using more non-fossil fuels. The hypothesis will be true if the effect of switching to coal is greater than that of switching to non-fossil fuels. It is important to understand under what conditions, one effect will dominate the other. If the hypothesis is true, then a policy like a carbon tax will be less effective than a coal tax because the carbon tax will increase the price of natural gas while the coal tax only increases the price of coal. An even more effective way is to subsidize the natural gas. In Section 4.1, I construct a simple analytical model to intuitively show under what circumstances, the hypothesis will be true. I also compare the potential consequences by a carbon tax, a coal tax and a subsidy on natural gas. In Section 4.2, I build a linear regression model to test the hypothesis and understand the determinants of carbon intensity in the power sector.

### 4.1. A Simple Analytical Model

In this model, there are only three firms generating electricity: a coal firm, a natural gas firm and a wind power firm. The electricity demand and price are assumed to be exogenous and constant. Therefore, the firms behave in a cost minimization way and the changes in carbon emissions are equivalent to the changes in the carbon intensity. All these firms are assumed to be price takers and cannot affect fossil fuel prices. I also assume that, in the short run, these firms cannot invest

more in their fixed assets and thus they will only make decisions based on their marginal costs. During this period, taxes can only affect fuel prices and the producers bear all the tax.

Denoting the coal firm as  $c$ , the natural gas firm as  $g$  and the wind power firm as  $w$ , I construct their cost functions  $C_i$  ( $i = c, g, w$ ) in the following way:

$$C_g(E_g, P_g) = FC_g + P_g \cdot E_g + \alpha \cdot E_g^2 \quad (7)$$

$$C_c(E_c, P_c) = FC_c + P_c \cdot E_c + \beta \cdot E_c^2 \quad (8)$$

$$C_w(E_w) = \begin{cases} FC_w + \gamma \cdot (E_{w0} - \theta \cdot E)^2 = FC_w + \gamma \cdot E_w^2, & E_w > 0 \\ FC_w, & otherwise \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

$$E_w = E_{w0} - \theta \cdot E, 0 < \theta < 1 \text{ and } \alpha, \beta, \gamma > 0$$

$E_i$  ( $i = c, g, w$ ) is the electricity generation from firm  $i$  and  $E$  is the total electricity demand.  $P_j$  ( $j = c, g$ ) is the price of fuel  $j$  and  $FC_i$  ( $i = c, g, w$ ) is the fixed costs for firm  $i$ . The firms are assumed to have increasing marginal costs. This is characterized by the quadratic terms in the cost functions. The coefficients of the quadratic terms capture how fast the marginal costs increase.

For the wind power generation, backup generations are needed to compensate for imbalances between load and generation. These imbalances can arise from the nature of the generation technology, which depends on the wind. If the wind power provides a small share ( $\theta$ ) of the system's power, the existing fossil fuel plants will be able to compensate for the imbalances. However, if the wind power shares a significantly large amount of the system's power, additional backup generators will be required, which are usually natural gas generators. (see Ortega-Vazquez and Kirschen (2009)) Therefore, in my model, the wind power firm can produce  $\theta \cdot E$

amount of electricity at approximately zero marginal cost. To generate  $E_{w0}$  ( $E_{w0} > \theta \cdot E$ ), the wind power firm has to operate additional backup generators that shares the same variable cost as the natural gas firm. Although the wind power firm is assumed to never use the backup generators, they have to pay the operating and maintenance fees for the backup capacity.

It is obvious that the wind power firm will produce at least  $\theta \cdot E$  amount of electricity since the marginal cost is zero. The three firms then face the rest of the electricity demand  $(1 - \theta) \cdot E$  and the load dispatch is done on a least-cost basis. In the equilibrium, the marginal costs from equations (7) (8) (9) will be equal for all the three firms:

$$P_c + 2\beta \cdot E_c = P_g + 2\alpha \cdot E_g = 2\gamma \cdot E_w \quad (10)$$

$$E_c + E_w + E_g = (1 - \theta) \cdot E \quad (11)$$

Solving the above linear system of equations (10) (11), generation by the three firms at the equilibrium is given by:

$$E_g = \frac{\gamma \cdot P_c - (\beta + \gamma) \cdot P_g}{2(\alpha\gamma + \beta\gamma + \alpha\beta)} + \frac{\beta\gamma(1 - \theta) \cdot E}{(\alpha\gamma + \beta\gamma + \alpha\beta)} \quad (12)$$

$$E_c = \frac{-(\alpha + \gamma) \cdot P_c + \gamma \cdot P_g}{2(\alpha\gamma + \beta\gamma + \alpha\beta)} + \frac{\alpha\gamma(1 - \theta) \cdot E}{(\alpha\gamma + \beta\gamma + \alpha\beta)} \quad (13)$$

$$E_w = \frac{\alpha \cdot P_c + \beta \cdot P_g}{2(\alpha\gamma + \beta\gamma + \alpha\beta)} + \frac{\alpha\beta(1 - \theta) \cdot E}{(\alpha\gamma + \beta\gamma + \alpha\beta)} \quad (14)$$

The carbon emission function  $Z$  from electricity generation is the sum of fossil fuel  $j$ 's emissions  $Z_j$  ( $j = c, g$ ), where  $Z_j$  equals the product of emission rates  $R_j$  and fuel  $j$ 's generation  $E_j$ :

$$Z(P_c, P_g) = Z_c + Z_g = R_c \cdot E_c + R_g \cdot E_g \quad (15)$$

To see how the fuel prices will affect the carbon emissions, I take the derivatives of function  $Z$  with respect to fuel prices:

$$\frac{\partial Z}{\partial P_c} = \frac{\partial Z}{\partial E_c} \cdot \frac{\partial E_c}{\partial P_c} + \frac{\partial Z}{\partial E_g} \cdot \frac{\partial E_g}{\partial P_c} = \frac{-(\alpha + \gamma) \cdot R_c + \gamma \cdot R_g}{2(\alpha\gamma + \beta\gamma + \alpha\beta)} \quad (16)$$

$$\frac{\partial Z}{\partial P_g} = \frac{\partial Z}{\partial E_c} \cdot \frac{\partial E_c}{\partial P_g} + \frac{\partial Z}{\partial E_g} \cdot \frac{\partial E_g}{\partial P_g} = \frac{\gamma \cdot R_c - (\beta + \gamma) \cdot R_g}{2(\alpha\gamma + \beta\gamma + \alpha\beta)} \quad (17)$$

Equation (16) is negative since the emission rate by coal is larger than that of natural gas ( $R_c > R_g$ ). The negative derivative in (16) means that an increase in coal price will always result in less carbon emissions. If the derivative in (17) is positive, then the hypothesis that raising natural gas price increases carbon emissions will be true. The condition for a positive sign of (17) is:


$$\frac{R_c - R_g}{R_g} > \frac{\beta}{\gamma} \quad (18)$$

An increase in natural gas price will increase both coal generation and wind power generation. The left hand side of the inequality (18) measures how many more carbon emissions are produced through coal than through natural gas to generate one unit of electricity. The emission rates of coal and natural gas generations depend on heating efficiency and may vary across power plants. If the emission rate of coal is very large as compared to natural gas, then even a small increase in coal generation will lead to a large increase in carbon emissions. This large increase will not be compensated by the decrease in carbon emissions that comes from higher wind power generation. Thus the hypothesis is more likely to hold if the emission rate of coal is relatively larger and the emission rate of natural gas is relatively lower.

Based on the construction of the cost functions,  $\beta$  is the slope of coal generation firm's supply curve and  $\gamma$  is the slope of wind power firm's supply curve because the marginal cost curves are the supply curves. Thus the right hand side of the inequality (18) is the ratio of slopes of supply curves. A flat supply curve with a smaller slope is more elastic than a steep supply curve with a larger slope. An inelastic supply curve means that the electricity supplier can hardly adjust its generation output. If  $\gamma$  is very large and the supply of wind power is very inelastic, then an increase in natural gas price will lead to very limited switching from natural gas to wind power. On the other hand, the increase natural gas price will also encourage coal generation. Since the supply curve of coal generation is more elastic as compared to that of wind power, there will be more increase in coal generation than that in wind power. As a result, the carbon emissions will go up as relatively more coal is used while there is only a small increase in the wind power. Therefore, the hypothesis is more likely to be true if the supply of electricity generation by coal is more elastic and the supply of electricity generation by wind power is less elastic.


As noted previously, the backup generation for wind power is natural gas. Although the wind power firm is assumed to never use the backup generators in this model, they have to share the same variable cost as the natural gas firm other than the fuel cost for the backup capacity. Therefore,  $\gamma$  is expected to be close to  $\alpha$ . The comparison between  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  is based on the electricity dispatch curve and a hypothetical electricity dispatch curve provided by U.S. Energy Information Administration is shown in Figure 4. This hypothetical dispatch curve may differ from the actual dispatch curve but it implies how fast the marginal costs increase. The slopes of coal and natural gas generation variable costs show that the marginal cost of coal generation increases more slowly than natural gas generation and thus  $\beta$  is less than  $\alpha$ .

**Figure 4** Hypothetical dispatch curve



With  $\alpha \approx \gamma$  and  $\beta/\gamma < 1$ , the inequality (18) holds if  $R_c/R_g \geq 2$ . I further use state-level data to calculate the ratio of the emission rates  $R_c/R_g$  for the 43 states in 2012 and the distribution of the ratio is displayed in Figure 5. The data sources are explained in Section 5. Among the 43 states, 34 states have a ratio greater than or equal to 2. This means the hypothesis is true for at least 34 states in 2012. In 2012, the national-level ratio is 2.23 and this also supports the hypothesis in the national level.

**Figure 5** Distribution of the emission rate ratio for 43 states in 2012



As mentioned at the beginning of this section, I claim that a carbon tax will be less effective than a coal tax if the hypothesis holds. In this section, I compare the following three policies: A tax of  $\$t$  (a negative  $t$  means a subsidy) per unit of carbon emissions from coal generation, (a coal tax); A tax of  $\$t$  per unit of carbon emissions from natural gas generation (a gas tax); A tax of  $\$t$  per unit of carbon emissions from both types of generation (a carbon tax). The carbon tax can be viewed as a combination of the coal tax and the gas tax.

To prove my claim, I make assumptions about the effects of a tax on fuel prices. I assume that a coal tax only increases the price of coal and has no effect on natural gas price. Similarly, a natural gas tax only raises the price of natural gas and has no effect on coal price. The tax is also assumed to be fully passed forward to power producers in the form of higher fuel prices. This assumption is supported by the analysis of a number of computable general equilibrium models. For instance, Bovenberg and Goulder (2001) find that more than 90 percent of burden of a \$25 per ton carbon tax is on consumers of coal. They assume world pricing for natural gas so the

entire tax impact is borne by consumers of natural gas. In another study by Rausch et al. (2011), the consumer price for coal is also found to rise by over 90 percent of the carbon price and the consumer price for natural gas rises by 75 percent.

**Assumptions:** Denoting  $t_c$  as the coal tax,  $t_g$  as the natural gas tax and  $t_z$  as the carbon tax, these assumptions can be written as:

$$\frac{\partial P_g}{\partial t_g} = \frac{\partial P_g}{\partial t_z} = a, \frac{\partial P_c}{\partial t_c} = \frac{\partial P_c}{\partial t_z} = b, \frac{\partial P_g}{\partial t_c} = \frac{\partial P_c}{\partial t_g} = 0 \quad (19)$$

$$0 < a < b$$

**Hypothesis:** Raising the natural gas price will increase carbon emissions,

$$\frac{\partial Z}{\partial P_g} > 0 \quad (20)$$

**Theorem:** Under the above assumptions, if the hypothesis holds, then a carbon tax will be less effective than a coal tax at reducing the carbon emissions in the power sector.

**Proof:** The effect on total carbon emissions of a carbon tax  $t_z$  is expressed as:

$$\frac{\partial Z}{\partial t_z} = \frac{\partial Z}{\partial P_c} \cdot \frac{\partial P_c}{\partial t_z} + \frac{\partial Z}{\partial P_g} \cdot \frac{\partial P_g}{\partial t_z} = b \cdot \frac{\partial Z}{\partial P_c} + a \cdot \frac{\partial Z}{\partial P_g} \quad (21)$$

The effect of a coal tax  $t_c$  on total carbon emissions is:

$$\frac{\partial Z}{\partial t_c} = \frac{\partial Z}{\partial P_c} \cdot \frac{\partial P_c}{\partial t_c} = b \cdot \frac{\partial Z}{\partial P_c} \quad (22)$$

With the hypothesis of inequality (20), (21) is larger than (22) and thus:

$$\frac{\partial Z}{\partial t_z} > \frac{\partial Z}{\partial t_c} \quad (23)$$

The theorem implies that a carbon tax will result in less reduction of carbon emissions than a coal tax. Similarly, a gas tax will even increase carbon emissions if the hypothesis holds:

$$\frac{\partial Z}{\partial t_g} = \frac{\partial Z}{\partial P_g} \cdot \frac{\partial P_g}{\partial t_g} = a \cdot \frac{\partial Z}{\partial P_g} > 0 \quad (24)$$

These results suggest a coal tax with a natural gas subsidy in the power sector will be a most effective policy that aims at reducing the carbon emissions in the power sector, if the hypothesis holds. In the next section, I build a simple linear regression model to test the hypothesis directly using data in the state-level. First, I discuss the variables in my econometric model. By including the electricity generation as an independent variable, the effect on the carbon intensity of fuel price changes will be equivalent to that on the carbon emissions. Second, I briefly discuss the econometric techniques that are used to estimate my model.

## 4.2. The Empirical Model

States are assumed to be the price takers in my empirical model because both coal and natural gas are in the global market. Denoting the carbon intensity as  $I$ , the coal price as  $Cprice$  and the natural gas price as  $Ngprice$ , the primary reduced form model of interest is:

$$\ln(I_{it}) = \beta_0 + \beta_c \ln(Cprice_{it}) + \beta_g \ln(Ngprice_{it}) + \mathbf{X}_{0it}' \boldsymbol{\beta}_{\mathbf{X}_0} + v_i + u_{it} \quad (25)$$

$v_i$  is state  $i$ 's fixed effect. The vector  $\mathbf{X}_0$  contains the logarithm of electricity generation, heating degree days and cooling degree days. The logarithm of per capita income and the square of its logarithm are included in the  $\mathbf{X}_0$ . State-level policy variables like the renewable portfolio standards, League of Conservation scores and the deregulation ratio are also in the  $\mathbf{X}_0$ . I discuss these variables in details in the Section 4.2.1. By controlling for electricity generation, the

change in carbon intensity will equal the change in carbon emissions. With the fact that carbon intensity and the natural gas price are all positive, the hypothesis is true if and only if  $\beta_g > 0$ . In Section 4.2.2, I build a dynamic model by allowing for a partial adjustment mechanism. I discuss the econometric specification issues in Section 4.2.3.

#### **4.2.1 Variables in the Reduced Form Model**

##### *The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)*

The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) tries to build the relationship between pollutions and economic growth. The EKC states that pollution will at first increase and begin to fall at certain turning point as economy grows. The EKC is treated carefully when it is used to build the relationship between carbon emission and income in this paper. First, this paper only focuses on electricity power sector while the EKC literature studied the pollution from all sectors. Second, unlike the EKC literature using per capita emission to describe the pollution levels, carbon intensity is used in this paper to capture the pollution. In spite of these considerations, I include the logarithm of per capita income and its squared term to account for possible non-linear response of the carbon intensity to income.

##### *The Electricity Dispatch Curve*

In this paper, I want to answer the following question: Does larger amount of electricity generation imply higher carbon intensity? This question is equivalent to asking whether a one percent increase in electricity generation causes more than a one percent increase in the carbon emissions. To answer the question, the total generation of electricity is included as an explanatory variable in the model. However, only including the generation is not sufficient for answering the question since the fuel mixture in electricity generation not only depends on

annual total generation, but also depends on the number of extreme hot and cold days. In these extreme days, the electricity demand will rise above the usual level, which results in the change of fuel mixture as the dispatch curve shows in Figure 4. The dispatch curve illustrates the relationship of variable operating cost and generation capacity, which tells which systems are operating when electricity demand increases. It is clear that renewable, nuclear and hydro power generation forms the base load of daily electricity generation as they cannot be easily shut down and restarted. In early morning hours, demand is relatively low and some coal and natural gas plants are operating. As demand goes up, more natural gas capacity begins to come on line and it can be expected that the carbon intensity will decrease since natural gas generation is less carbon intensive than coal. However, in extreme cases when petroleum is used to generate electricity, the carbon intensity goes down since petroleum generation is more carbon intensive than natural gas. Therefore, to control for the effect of extreme hot and cool days, measures of cooling degree days and heating degree days are also included in the model.

### *State-level Policies and Political Concerns*

The most popular state-level policy encouraging lower carbon intensive generation is the renewable portfolio standard (RPS). The policy requires that a minimum amount of renewable energy is included in the portfolio of electricity generation. The empirical research on the effectiveness of RPS showed mixed results (Menz and Vachon 2006, Adelaja and Hailu 2008, Kneifel 2008, Yin and Powers 2010, Carley 2009, Delmas, Russo, and Montes-Sancho 2007, Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011). The different results by these studies partly come from the different dependent variables (generation of renewable energy, wind capacity and renewable capacity) they used to measure the effectiveness of the policies. The different results are also due to substantial differences in policy stringency across states and even no two of the states define

the “renewable” in the same way (Schmalensee 2011). Other differences include policies’ coverage, treatment of existing capacity, restrictions on renewable energy credits trading and penalty. Yin and Powers (2010) developed a measure of stringency to deal with this problem while the measure did not fully characterize the stringency of the policy. Moreover, decisions to adopt the RPS are endogenous to the political system and the effect of RPS can hardly be considered as a casual effect (Schmalensee 2011).

In this paper, the effect of RPS on carbon intensity is estimated by simply including dummy indicators, which is admittedly an inaccurate measure. I do this because it is challenging to develop a perfect measurement as discussed above and the main variables of interest are the fuel prices. Without controlling for RPS, the coefficients of fuel prices will be estimated biasedly. For instance, a state facing lower fossil fuel prices may be less willing to adopt RPS because it can generate electricity using fossil fuels cheaply. On the other hand, if a state already faces very high fossil fuel prices, this state is more likely to adopt RPS since the opportunity cost of using renewable sources is relatively low. Therefore, fossil fuel prices are positively correlated with adoptions of RPS and the coefficients of fuel prices estimated without RPS will bias upward.

As mentioned previously, decisions to adopt RPS are not randomly made. For example, if the citizens in a state care more about the environment, then the state might be more willing to adopt RPS. To controlling for such effects, the average League of Conservation Voters (LCV) scores is also included in the model as a measure of the citizens’ environmental preferences. Finally, the ratio of generation by independent power producers to total generation is added as a proxy for state level deregulation progress. The deregulation progress is believed to be correlated with the adoption of RPS because it affects the development of renewables. On one hand, deregulation

will lead to greater product differentiation and encourage investment and development of renewable energy (Delmas, Russo, and Montes - Sancho 2007). On the other hand, deregulation may encourage a rise in fossil fuel generation merely due to the cost advantage of fossil fuels over renewables.

#### 4.2.2 A Partial Adjustment Model

The actual carbon intensity in the power sector may differ from the long term equilibrium since the generating equipment cannot adjust quickly. Thus a partial adjustment mechanism may make sense, and a dynamic model is estimated in addition to the static model. The partial adjustment mechanism assumes that only  $(1 - \delta)$  fraction is adjusted ( $0 < \delta < 1$ ). For simplicity, I use  $\mathbf{X}$  to represent all the independent variables and use  $\varepsilon_{it}$  to replace  $v_i + u_{it}$  in (25), and the desired carbon intensity  $\ln(I_{it})^*$  in state  $i$  in year  $t$  can be written as:

$$\ln(I_{it})^* = \mathbf{X}'_{it} \boldsymbol{\beta}_X + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (26)$$

The partial adjustment mechanism can be described by the following equation:

$$\ln(I_{it}) - \ln(I_{i,t-1}) = (1 - \delta) \cdot (\ln(I_{it})^* - \ln(I_{i,t-1})) \quad (27)$$

Inserting (28) into (29), I get:

$$\ln(I_{it}) = \mathbf{X}'_{it} \widetilde{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_X + \delta \cdot \ln(I_{i,t-1}) + \widetilde{\varepsilon}_{it} \quad (28)$$

where  $\widetilde{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_X = (1 - \delta) \cdot \boldsymbol{\beta}_X$  is the short run impact on the logarithm of carbon intensity and  $\widetilde{\varepsilon}_{it} = (1 - \delta) \cdot \varepsilon_{it}$ . The long run impact  $\boldsymbol{\beta}_X = \widetilde{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_X / (1 - \delta)$  can be calculated once (30) is estimated. A partial adjustment model is preferred to the static model if the adjustment factor  $(1 - \delta)$  is less than one.

### 4.2.3 Econometric Specification

#### *Static Model*

To account for unobserved state-fixed heterogeneity, the static models are estimated using a fixed effects model or a random effects model. The estimation technique for the fixed effects model is the “within” (also called Least Square Dummy Variable, LSDV) estimator (Greene 2008). The random effects model estimation is more efficient than the fixed model under the null hypothesis that the state fixed effects are uncorrelated with other covariates and the estimation technique is GLS (Baltagi 2008).

#### *Dynamic Model*

Complications arise in estimating (30). In both the fixed and random effects settings, the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term by construction even if there is no serial correlation in the error term (Baltagi 2008). Therefore, both the traditional “within” estimator and the GLS estimator are biased and inconsistent for large N and small T. One approach is to first-difference the data, which eliminates the state-fixed effects  $v_i$ , and to use  $\ln(I_{i,t-2})$  and  $\Delta\mathbf{X}_{it}$  as the instrumental variables for  $\Delta\ln(I_{i,t-1})$  (Anderson and Hsiao 1982):

$$\Delta\ln(I_{it}) = \Delta\mathbf{X}'_{it}\widetilde{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_{\mathbf{X}} + \delta \cdot \Delta\ln(I_{i,t-1}) + \Delta\widetilde{\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}}_{it} \quad (29)$$

While the above estimation using 2SLS is consistent, it is inefficient and additional lagged dependent variables can serve as instruments (Arellano and Bond 1991). Arellano and Bond suggested estimators based on moment equations constructed from further lagged dependent variables and the first-differenced errors. They derived corresponding one-step and two-step generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimators, as well as the one-step robust variance estimators. Theoretically, the two-step GMM estimator is more asymptotically efficient but the

standard errors are biased downwards. Windmeijer (2005) developed an estimation of the finite bias in the two-step standard errors and used it to derive two-step robust variance estimators. If the assumption that the first difference of the lagged dependent variable is uncorrelated with the error term holds, the system-GMM estimator using additional level equation conditions outperforms the Arellano-Bond difference-GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond 1998).

Nickell (1981) derived an expression for the inconsistency in the dynamic model with fixed effects. Kiviet (1995) used asymptotic expansion techniques to approximate the sample bias of the LSDV estimator and proposed to correct the LSDV estimator based on the bias approximation. The bias approximation was further refined (Kiviet 1998, Bun and Kiviet 2003) and the corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC) was demonstrated through Monte Carlo simulation to perform better than GMM estimators for moderately small T and large N (Judson and Owen 1999), which is the case in this paper. Therefore, for the dynamic panel model, the two-step system-GMM estimators, as well as the LSDVC estimators are reported.

## 5. The Data

The annual data of carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation by sources for all states from 1990-2012 are estimated by U.S. EIA (Energy Information Administration) based on fossil fuel consumption within the boundary of the states. Although there are other datasets about carbon emissions available (Aldy 2005, Blasing, Broniak, and Marland 2004), the emission dataset used in this paper is the only officially published one by EIA. The annual electricity net generation data by sources by producer type for each state are also from EIA. These two datasets match precisely by source categories. The average price of coal and natural gas delivered to each state was from EIA's State Energy Data System. The data on heating and cooling degree days from 1990-2012 were obtained from U.S. NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration). The annual income data by states come from U.S. BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis). The data of LCV scores was from LCV's website. The deregulation ratio, defined as the percentage of electricity generation by independent power producers, is calculated by the author from the above electricity generation dataset. The renewable portfolio standards data are from DSIRE (Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency) and the RPS variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the state adopted the policy. By 2012, there are 29 states have RPS policy. Table 1 provides the description and sources of the variables and Table 2 provides summary statistics for these variables.

## Table 1. Data Description and Sources

Variable	Description	Unit	Source
int	Carbon Intensity	Metric Tons/MWh	U.S. EIA's (Energy Information Administration) website: <a href="http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/state/emission_annual.xls">http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/state/emission_annual.xls</a> ; <a href="http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/state/annual_generation_state.xls">http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/state/annual_generation_state.xls</a>
gen	Electricity Generation	10 <sup>6</sup> MWh	
income	Per capita real Income	1000\$/person	U.S. BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis): <a href="http://www.bea.gov/regional/downloadzip.cfm">http://www.bea.gov/regional/downloadzip.cfm</a>
hdd	Heating Degree Days	F degrees	U.S. NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration): <a href="ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/cirs/climdiv">ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/cirs/climdiv</a>
cdd	Cooling Degree Days		
cprice	Price of Coal	\$/million Btu	EIA's State Energy Data System: <a href="http://www.eia.gov/state/seds/seds-data-complete.cfm?sid=US#CompleteDataFile">http://www.eia.gov/state/seds/seds-data-complete.cfm?sid=US#CompleteDataFile</a>
ngprice	Price of Natural Gas		
reg_ratio	Deregulation Ratio	0% - 100%	The percentage of generation by independent power producer. Calculated by the author from the <a href="#">electricity generation data</a>
avg_lcv	Average League of Conservation Score	0% - 100%	League of conservation's website: <a href="http://scorecard.lcv.org/scorecard/archive">http://scorecard.lcv.org/scorecard/archive</a>
rps	Adoption of Renewable Portfolio Standards	rps = 1 if adopted	DSIRE (Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency)
fish_h/b/w	Fisher index for heat rate improvement/ switching between fossil fuels and non-fossil fuels/ switching within fossil fuels		
lvariable	log(variable)		

Table 2. Summary Statistics for 43<sup>3</sup> States from 1990-2012

	Mean	SD	Between SD	Within SD	Min	Max
Intensity	0.65	0.23	0.22	0.06	0.04	1.18
IncomePer	21.60	3.82	3.15	2.20	13.29	35.05
Generation	823.79	657.84	652.00	130.00	44.83	4301.62
HDD	4973.85	2004.47	1995.83	351.07	430.00	9866.00
CDD	1152.26	813.95	807.60	157.52	42.00	3827.00
CoalPrice	1.63	0.66	0.42	0.52	0.55	4.45
NGasPrice	4.39	2.20	0.43	2.16	1.08	12.11
RegRatio	0.16	0.27	0.18	0.20	0.00	0.97
LCVScore	0.46	0.23	0.21	0.10	0.00	1.00
RPS	0.13	0.34	0.14	0.31	0.00	1.00
lIntensity	-0.52	0.49	0.47	0.14	-3.22	0.16
lIncomePer	3.06	0.17	0.14	0.10	2.59	3.56
lGen	17.93	0.82	0.82	0.15	15.32	19.88
lhdd	8.40	0.52	0.52	0.08	6.06	9.20
lcdd	6.77	0.80	0.78	0.21	3.74	8.25
lcprice	0.42	0.37	0.27	0.26	-0.60	1.49
lngprice	1.36	0.49	0.11	0.48	0.08	2.49
fish_h	0.98	0.08	0.06	0.05	0.68	1.81
fish_w	0.95	0.11	0.07	0.08	0.20	1.07
fish_b	1.16	0.77	0.66	0.40	0.53	8.48

<sup>3</sup> RI, VT, ID are dropped for they never use coal and NH, ND, ID are dropped for they do not use natural gas every year from 1990-2012; HI, AK, DC are dropped since they are not comparable with other continental states.

## 6. Results

In this section, I first provide the regression results from the static models. Based on the results from static models, I decide to capture the time effects by allowing a quadratic time trend. I further conduct the regression analysis with the Fisher indexes as dependent variables to show through which channels the determinants affect the carbon intensity. In section 6.3, I present the results from dynamic models with LSDVC estimators, system-GMM estimators. Results from LSDV estimators are also presented for comparison. With the estimated coefficients from dynamic models, I can calculate the short run and long run elasticity of fuel prices. Finally, I compare a carbon tax and a coal tax at reducing the carbon emissions to achieve Obama's goal.

### 6.1 Basic Results

The regression results from the static fixed effects model are presented in Table 3. Considering the potential problems raised by endogenous policy variables, I report the results without these variables in the first three columns. I take two approaches to control for the potential time trends: including year dummy variables to characterize year fixed effects in column (2) (4); allowing a quadratic time trend by adding year and its square term in column (3) (5).

A comparison of the first three columns with the others shows that the coefficients only change slightly when the policy variables are added. The carbon intensity exhibits a quadratic response to the per capita income, rising first and then falling. The turning points range from \$22015 -

\$25867<sup>4</sup>, which are all slightly above the mean level of the per capita income in the data. This implies that the per capita income has positive impact on the carbon intensity in some states while in other states it has negative effect. Take the result from column (6) for example, the per capita income has negative impact on the carbon intensity in 15 states in 2012. The coefficients of the log generation show that one percent increase in electricity generation will result in half percent less carbon intensity. In other words, the carbon emissions will increase by half percent if the generation goes up by one percent. The effects of weather variables are not significant. This may be resulted from their small within variations and their between variations are captured by the state fixed effects. The RPS has significant negative impact as expected while effects of the deregulation ratio and the LCV scores are insignificant.

The main variables of interest are the fuel prices. The large negative effects of coal prices in column (1) and (4) become less significant after controlling for time trends. However, the signs are all negative, as expected based on my analytical model. The less significance possibly comes from the low variations of the coal prices. Similarly, the effects by changes in natural gas price are no longer significant after including year fixed effects. Unlike the coal price, the effects of natural gas price do not change much when a quadratic time trend is allowed. By allowing a quadratic time trend, the relationship between natural gas price and the carbon intensity is less likely to be spurious. A candidate explanation for the less significant coefficients with year fixed effects is the low between states variations of the natural gas price. With the low between states variations of the natural gas price, much of its effects are captured by the year fixed effects.

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<sup>4</sup> Dollars are all in 1990.

Therefore, compared with the year fixed effects, a quadratic time trend will be a more appropriate approach to rule out the possibility of “spurious” regression.

To conclude, the positive effects of natural gas price are evidence that supports the hypothesis. A one percent increase in natural gas price will result in 0.06 percent increase of the carbon intensity. By controlling for the total electricity generation, this will be equivalent to a 0.06 percent increase in total carbon emissions, which is a large amount. In the next section, I use the Fisher indexes as the dependent variables to conduct further regression analysis. Given the poor performance of the static model with year fixed effects, I report the regression results with a quadratic time trend.

**Table 3. Static Model Results With State Fixed Effects**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ln (Per capita income)	6.437*** (1.604)	6.637*** (1.586)	6.723*** (1.583)	4.294*** (1.467)	4.333*** (1.453)	4.411*** (1.452)
ln (Per capita income)_2	-1.041*** (0.258)	-1.052*** (0.257)	-1.046*** (0.252)	-0.660*** (0.236)	-0.683*** (0.232)	-0.678*** (0.228)
ln (Generation)	-0.557*** (0.116)	-0.511*** (0.125)	-0.508*** (0.124)	-0.528*** (0.106)	-0.510*** (0.114)	-0.507*** (0.113)
ln (Heating Degree Days)	0.0250 (0.0315)	0.0263 (0.0573)	0.00600 (0.0344)	-0.00266 (0.0336)	-0.0121 (0.0584)	-0.0346 (0.0486)
ln (Cooling Degree Days)	-0.00758 (0.0148)	-0.0186 (0.0242)	-0.00330 (0.0172)	0.000225 (0.0126)	-0.0143 (0.0228)	-0.000339 (0.0151)
ln (Coal Price)	-0.219*** (0.0373)	-0.0742 (0.0583)	-0.0736 (0.0526)	-0.184*** (0.0407)	-0.0793 (0.0670)	-0.0850 (0.0613)
ln (Natural Gas Price)	0.0692*** (0.0174)	0.0143 (0.0292)	0.0606*** (0.0156)	0.0693*** (0.0170)	0.0212 (0.0275)	0.0615*** (0.0158)
Deregulation Ratio	-	-	-	-0.0857* (0.0508)	-0.0914 (0.0630)	-0.0872 (0.0571)
Average LCV Score	-	-	-	0.143 (0.101)	0.138 (0.125)	0.151 (0.107)
RPS	-	-	-	-0.0967*** (0.0284)	-0.0765*** (0.0268)	-0.0800*** (0.0282)
Year Fixed Effects	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
Time Trend	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
R-squared	0.342	0.385	0.368	0.393	0.418	0.404
Turing Point for Income	3.092	3.154	3.214	3.253	3.172	3.253

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: A Hausman Test failed to reject that the fixed effects are correlated with the independent variables and so fixed effects regressions are reported.

## 6.2 Regression with Fisher Index

It is important to understand through which channels these determinants, especially the variable of natural gas price, affect the carbon intensity. As I mentioned previously, an increase in the natural gas price will encourage both the use of coal and non-fossil fuels. If the effects of switching to coal dominate that of switching to non-fossil fuels, the hypothesis will be true and the carbon intensity will go up. With the logarithm of Fisher indexes as dependent variables, I can conduct the regression analysis to see how natural price affect these switching effects. The equation (6) shows that the sum of the logarithm of Fisher indexes is equal to the logarithm of the relative carbon intensity (the ratio of current year carbon intensity to that in the base year). The base year carbon intensity is then absorbed by the state fixed effects.

The results presented in Table 4 are based on the static fixed effects model with a quadratic time trend. No variables have significant impacts on heat rate improvement. Surprisingly, the effects of RPS are not significant in column (6), which implies that RPS does not result in more non-fossil fuels being used. The effects of coal price on these indexes are no longer statistically significant, which is not surprising given the low variation of coal price. It is notable that in column (2) and column (4), the coal price has large negative effects on within switching indexes. The positive effects of natural gas price in column (2) and column (4) show that an increase in natural gas price will cause switching from natural gas to coal and this leads to more carbon emissions. The positive signs of natural gas price in column (3) and column (6) mean that as the price of natural gas goes up, there will be switching from non-fossil fuels to fossil fuels. This further confirms that more coal is used than non-fossil fuels when the price of natural gas increases because the carbon intensity increases.

In conclusion, the regression with Fisher indexes also provides evidence that supports the hypothesis. In addition, the natural gas price affects the carbon intensity mostly through changes in between switching more than changes in within switching and heat rate improvement. The coal price affects the carbon intensity mainly through changes in within switching.

Table 4. Regression With Fisher Indexes

Dependent Variables in Ln	(1) Heat Rate	(2) Within Switching	(3) Between Switching	(4) Heat Rate	(5) Within Switching	(6) Between Switching
ln(Per capita income)	0.0767 (0.842)	2.439 (1.892)	4.208** (1.971)	0.327 (1.106)	0.286 (3.177)	3.797 (2.948)
ln(Per capita income)_2	0.00266 (0.134)	-0.360 (0.297)	-0.689** (0.314)	-0.0371 (0.177)	-0.0111 (0.503)	-0.630 (0.463)
ln(Generation)	-0.0536 (0.0434)	-0.164** (0.0638)	-0.290** (0.142)	-0.0546 (0.0443)	-0.171** (0.0673)	-0.281** (0.136)
ln(Heating Degree Days)	-0.00649 (0.0203)	0.119** (0.0567)	-0.107* (0.0567)	0.00234 (0.0189)	0.110** (0.0455)	-0.147** (0.0710)
ln(Cooling Degree Days)	0.00805 (0.00651)	0.0149* (0.00826)	-0.0263 (0.0176)	0.00712 (0.00658)	0.0160 (0.00971)	-0.0234 (0.0151)
ln(Coal Price)	0.0332 (0.0476)	-0.171 (0.121)	0.0638 (0.0923)	0.0360 (0.0480)	-0.171 (0.123)	0.0505 (0.0948)
ln(Natural Gas Price)	-0.00505 (0.00437)	0.0131 (0.00939)	0.0526** (0.0204)	-0.00479 (0.00503)	0.0203** (0.00953)	0.0461** (0.0211)
Deregulation Ratio	-	-	-	0.0152 (0.0259)	-0.0910 (0.0909)	-0.0114 (0.0977)
Average LCV Score	-	-	-	-0.0437 (0.0302)	-0.0239 (0.0459)	0.219 (0.156)
RPS	-	-	-	0.00669 (0.0162)	-0.0493 (0.0322)	-0.0373 (0.0340)
R-squared	0.153	0.239	0.125	0.162	0.266	0.145

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### 6.3 Dynamic Results

In this section, I further estimate the dynamic panel model to allow a partial adjustment mechanism in Table 5. I control the time effects by allowing a quadratic time trend. The first three columns are excluding policy variables. For the system-GMM estimators, I reduce the number of instruments by instrumenting the lagged carbon intensity up to two lags to avoid weakening the Hansen J Test (Roodman 2006, 2009). I also report the results from LSDV estimator for comparison purpose. The adjustment coefficient  $\delta$  estimated in the LSDV model is biased downwards (Nickell 1981) and thus the true value of  $\delta$  should be larger. The values of  $\delta$  in the LSDVC and the system-GMM models are larger than those in the LSDV, which is expected. The majority of the coefficients in the LSDVC and the system-GMM models have the same signs as those in the static models. The standard errors in the system-GMM models are much higher than those in the LSDVC model. The effects of weather variables become significant and their positive impact on the carbon intensity is as expected. The effects of policy variables are still unclear, with RPS marginally reducing the carbon intensity.

As equation (30) implies, the long run elasticity  $\beta_x = \widetilde{\beta}_x / (1 - \delta)$ , where  $\widetilde{\beta}_x$  is the short run elasticity and  $\delta$  is the adjustment coefficient. With the estimated short run elasticity and adjustment coefficient in Table 5, I calculate the long run elasticity of the fuel prices. The short run and long run elasticity from the dynamic models and elasticity from the static models are presented in Table 6 for comparisons.

Table 5. Dynamic Model Results With State Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	LSDV	LSDVC(1)	GMM(1)	LSDV	LSDVC(2)	GMM(2)
Lag.ln(Carbon Intensity)	0.522*** (0.0425)	0.563*** (0.0302)	0.877*** (0.0517)	0.500*** (0.0468)	0.540*** (0.0307)	0.877*** (0.0516)
ln(Per capita income)	4.238*** (0.956)	3.858*** (0.667)	3.486 (2.528)	3.220*** (0.955)	3.169*** (0.680)	5.392 (3.528)
ln(Per capita income)_2	-0.655*** (0.152)	-0.596*** (0.103)	-0.570 (0.404)	-0.492*** (0.153)	-0.485*** (0.106)	-0.870 (0.568)
ln(Generation)	-0.359*** (0.0952)	-0.341*** (0.0297)	-0.128 (0.0806)	-0.366*** (0.0935)	-0.348*** (0.0306)	-0.127 (0.0780)
ln(Heating Degree Days)	0.0825** (0.0367)	0.0818* (0.0442)	-0.0143 (0.0387)	0.0590 (0.0400)	0.0606 (0.0462)	-0.00236 (0.0348)
ln(Cooling Degree Days)	0.0416*** (0.0153)	0.0409** (0.0162)	0.0598 (0.0379)	0.0412*** (0.0149)	0.0408** (0.0166)	0.0554 (0.0369)
ln(Coal Price)	-0.0630* (0.0364)	-0.0579** (0.0257)	-0.0575 (0.0622)	-0.0690* (0.0408)	-0.0649** (0.0267)	-0.0132 (0.0582)
ln(Natural Gas Price)	0.0474*** (0.0132)	0.0454*** (0.00826)	0.0589** (0.0220)	0.0495*** (0.0135)	0.0474*** (0.00886)	0.0602*** (0.0223)
Deregulation Ratio	-	-	-	-0.0368 (0.0280)	-0.0295 (0.0240)	0.0195 (0.0647)
Average LCV Score	-	-	-	0.0604 (0.0554)	0.0561** (0.0276)	-0.108 (0.0811)
RPS	-	-	-	-0.0403** (0.0181)	-0.0362*** (0.0107)	0.0206 (0.0265)
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(1) p-value	-	-	0.026	-	-	0.026
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(2) p-value	-	-	0.139	-	-	0.147
Hansen J Test p-value	-	-	0.590	-	-	0.648

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: The standard errors reported for LSDVC estimators are calculated from bootstrap. For GMM estimators, the traditional Sargan Test is not robust for heterogeneity in the error term and tends to over reject the validity of the instruments. Therefore, I reported the alternative Hansen J test of over-identification. To avoid weakening the Hansen Test by using too many instruments, I restrict the maximum lags instrumented to be 2.

**Table 6. Estimated Price Elasticity**

<b>Price Elasticity</b>		<b>Static (1)</b>	<b>Static (2)</b>	<b>LSDVC (1)</b>	<b>LSDVC (2)</b>	<b>GMM (1)</b>	<b>GMM (2)</b>
<b>Coal</b>	Short Run			-0.0579	-0.0649	-0.0575	-0.0132
	Long Run	-0.0736	-0.0850	-0.1325	-0.1411	-0.4675	-0.1073
<b>Natural Gas</b>	Short Run			0.0454	0.0474	0.0589	0.0602
	Long Run	0.0606	0.0615	0.1039	0.1030	0.4789	0.4894

Note: The results of Static (1), LSDVC (1) and GMM (1) come from regressions without policy variables, allowing for a quadratic time trend. The results of Static (2), LSDVC (2) and GMM (2) are from regressions with policy variables and a quadratic time trend. The long run elasticity is the short run elasticity divided by the adjustment coefficient  $\delta$ .

The short run effects of fuel prices are slightly smaller than those from static models and the long run effects are larger than those from static models, which are expected. The short run elasticity of coal price ranges from -0.013 to -0.065 and its long run elasticity ranges from -0.107 to -0.468. The short run elasticity of natural price ranges from 0.045 to 0.060 and its long run elasticity ranges from 0.104 to 0.489. The positive effects of natural gas price from the dynamic models also support the main hypothesis.

With the long run elasticity of fuel prices, I can further estimate how fossil fuels in the power sector should be taxed to achieve the goal of the Clean Power Plan and Obama’s pledge, assuming the same percent reduction of carbon dioxide in the power sector. As mentioned previously, LSDVC estimator outperforms the GMM estimators for data with small T and large N (Judson and Owen 1999), which is the case in this paper. Based on the significant coefficients of both coal and natural gas prices, I use the results from LSDVC estimator. Since the results from LSDVC do not change much with and without policy variables, I use the one without policy variables in the next section.

## 6.4 Comparing a Coal Tax with a Carbon Tax

I conduct the tax analysis at the national level with the long run elasticity of fuel prices estimated from LSDVC (1). To estimate how much taxes are required to achieve Obama's goal, I make the following assumptions: 1. Independent variables, except electricity generation and fuel prices, are assumed to be constant; 2. A coal tax will not affect the price of natural gas; 3. Taxes are fully passed forward to power producers in the form of higher fuel prices. The second and third assumptions are the same assumptions discussed in the Section 4.1. The projection data of electricity generation is from EIA<sup>5</sup> and the conversion ratios of heat to carbon dioxide by types of fuel are also provided by EIA<sup>6</sup>. By 2012, the carbon emissions are already 15.8% below the 2005 level and an additional 1.45% reduction is required to achieve Obama's 2020 goal. Similarly, an additional 14.51% reduction since 2012 is required to achieve 28% reduction goal by 2025. Finally, achieving the Clean Power Plan's goal requires an additional 16.88% reduction since 2012. Based on the projection by EIA, the electricity generation will increase by 7.18% from 2012 to 2020, increase by 12.45% from 2012 to 2025 and increase by 17.45% from 2012 to 2030. The fuel prices used are the national average fuel prices in the power sector in 2012. I then estimate how a coal tax and a carbon tax should be designed to achieve different reduction targets. I also present the corresponding percent increases in fuel prices under these taxes. The results are in Table 7.

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<sup>5</sup> [http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/MT\\_electric.cfm](http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/MT_electric.cfm)

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=74&t=11>

**Table 7. Comparing Coal Tax and Carbon Tax**

		17% By 2020	28% By 2025	30% By 2030
Coal Tax	Tax on CO2 from Coal (\$/Metric Ton)	5.86	33.40	40.13
	Price Increase of Coal	22.82%	130.13%	156.36%
	Price Increase of Natural Gas	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Carbon Tax	Tax on CO2 from Both (\$/Metric Ton)	8.45	48.20	57.91
	Price Increase of Coal	32.93%	187.82%	225.66%
	Price Increase of Natural Gas	12.90%	73.56%	88.38%

The results in Table 7 quantitatively suggest that a coal tax is more effective than a carbon tax at reducing the carbon emissions in the power sector. If we tax only coal, in order to achieve a 17 percent reduction in carbon emissions, we need to implement a tax of \$5.86 per metric ton of carbon dioxide that comes from coal. If we tax all the fossil fuels, in order to achieve the same reduction in carbon emissions, we need to implement a tax of \$8.45 per metric ton of carbon dioxide that comes from coal and natural gas. Not only does the coal tax result in a lower tax rate, but it also results in a less drastic change in fossil fuel prices. With a coal tax of \$5.86 per metric ton, the price of coal will increase by 22.82 percent, while the price of natural gas will stay the same. With a carbon tax of \$8.45 per metric ton, coal price will rise by 32.93 percent and natural gas price will increase by 12.9 percent. The simulation results tell the same story if the reduction target is changed. Compared with a carbon tax, a coal tax can achieve the same reduction with a lower tax rate, 50 percent less price increase of coal and no increase of natural gas price. Therefore, a coal tax is more effective than a carbon tax at reducing carbon emissions in the power sector.

## 7. Conclusions

This paper analyzes the drivers of carbon intensity in the electric power sector using a state-level data set from 1990-2012. I decompose the carbon intensity into three parts: heat rate improvement, switching between fossil fuels and non-fossil fuels, and within fossil fuel switching. By applying a Generalized Fisher index decomposition approach, I show that the recent reduction in carbon intensity mainly came from switching from coal to natural gas. This motivates the hypothesis that an increase in the natural gas price will result in higher carbon intensity. I conduct analysis taking two steps. First, I construct a simple analytical model to show under what circumstances, the hypothesis will be true. I further prove that a coal tax would be more effective than a carbon tax when the hypothesis holds. Second, I undertake a statistical analysis estimating linear regression models of state-level carbon intensity in the power sector, focusing the carbon intensity as a function of fuel prices, state-level policies, and other determinants of carbon intensity. The empirical results provide evidence to support my hypothesis. I further conduct the regression analysis with the Fisher indexes and find that the natural gas price affects the carbon intensity mainly through changes in between switching. Allowing for a partial adjustment mechanism, I build a dynamic panel model to estimate the long run elasticity of natural gas price. Using the estimated long run elasticity, I compare a carbon tax and a coal tax under certain assumptions. The comparison suggests that a lower coal tax can achieve the same reduction as a carbon tax, with 50% less increase in coal price and no impact on the price of natural gas.

In conclusion, I suggest that a coal tax would be more effective than a carbon tax at reducing the carbon intensity and carbon emissions in the power sector. This finding implicitly supports cost-

effectiveness of the EPA's Clean Power Plan. When setting the target for each state, the EPA considered several approaches to reduce emissions including greater use of natural gas and renewables, which is analogous to a coal tax. Compared with a carbon tax that also penalizes using natural gas to generate electricity, the Clean Power Plan is more cost-effective. My analysis is limited on reducing the carbon emissions in the power sector and the potential consequences of a coal tax and a carbon tax in all sectors are beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, the speculation that a coal tax is more effective than a carbon tax is suggestive in the power sector only and further research can be conducted to compare these two taxes in all sectors.

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