
PAPERS

The G8 Global Partnership: Addressing Threats Old and New

MARY BETH NIKITIN

Cooperative threat reduction (CTR) programs to contain and secure weapons of mass destruction revolutionized U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and defined a way forward for U.S.-Russian relations after the Cold War. U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar launched CTR in the 1990s as a forward-looking way of helping the financially-stressed states of the former Soviet Union meet their nuclear disarmament obligations with the United States. The programs also included non-proliferation goals—to prevent “loose nukes” from falling into the wrong hands and to curtail the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) expertise by heading off the emigration of scientists. At the outset, Nunn-Lugar programs were essentially a U.S. initiative, with the United States paying the lion’s share of the bill—a total of close to \$7 billion in the 1990s.

The attacks of September 11 in the United States created a new and different security challenge, and globalized the interest in securing and accounting for stocks of WMD and relevant materials as quickly as possible.

Mary Beth Nikitin is Research Associate at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) and Project Coordinator for the Strengthening the Global Partnership Project, a consortium of 23 research institutes in 18 European, Asian, and North American countries working to build political and financial support for G8 efforts to reduce the dangers from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. She also coordinates the Congressional Proliferation Prevention Forum, a bipartisan educational outreach project on the Hill. She has worked at the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs in New York and at the Center for Non-proliferation Studies in Monterey where she was Program Associate for the Non-proliferation Education group and the International Organizations and Non-proliferation project.

The principle threat was no longer the risk that Russia might regenerate its nuclear capability or turn back from its obligations under the chemical and biological weapons conventions. Instead, the international community realized that terrorists groups, al-Qaeda in particular, had the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction as a goal, and may have made progress along this path. The perception of the threat changed, and preventing nuclear or other sensitive materials from falling into the hands of terrorists or hostile regimes became an international objective. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan told the Security Council on September 14, 2001, “we must deny terrorists the means to carry out their attacks—above all weapons of mass destruction.”¹ The events of September 11 and subsequent revelations on al-Qaeda activity, together with other terrorist attacks around the world, showed that all countries were threatened by catastrophic terrorism and that all countries must bear responsibility to prevent it.

In 2002, in response to this new challenge, the leaders of the Group of Eight (G8) countries established the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP). They agreed to collectively raise \$20 billion over ten years to secure and eliminate WMD-related materials and equipment in Russia and elsewhere. In their joint statement, they recognized explicitly that the main purpose of the Global Partnership was to prevent WMD terrorism: “The attacks of September 11 demonstrated that terrorists are prepared to use any means to cause terror and inflict appalling casualties on innocent people. We commit ourselves to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology. We call on all countries to join us in adopting the set of non-proliferation principles we have announced today.”² Now a third of the way into the ten-year time frame, it is an appropriate time to assess cooperative threat reduction in Russia and its broader potential, as well as whether the Global Partnership effort is on track to meet its goals.

U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

The initiative by U.S. Senators Richard Lugar and Sam Nunn was bold and unprecedented: to pay for and assist America’s Cold War enemy to secure and dismantle its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. The two Senators worked together across party lines to author and build support for the “Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991,” which was passed by Congress in December 1991, weeks before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The senators’ vision was a radical shift in U.S. security

policy from the adversarial concepts of deterrence and mutually assured destruction to what has come to be known throughout the world as “cooperative threat reduction.” It was an initiative that ranks with the Marshall Plan in terms of historical significance.³

Because of the senators’ foresight, the United States was immediately able to begin helping the newly independent states of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus deal with the vast stocks of WMD they had inherited. Without Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction, the world would have had three more nuclear weapon states in a potentially unstable region. Instead, all nuclear warheads were removed from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and safely transported to Russia by 1996. Had the three former Soviet republics retained their inherited arsenals, they would have been the third, fourth, and eighth largest nuclear powers in the world.

As of June 2005, the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction programs had deactivated 6,632 nuclear warheads; eliminated 582 inter-continental ballistic missiles, 477 ballistic missile silos, 148 long-range bombers, and 28 ballistic missile submarines; and had sealed 194 nuclear testing tunnels.⁴ Tens of thousands of scientists formerly engaged in research on weapons of mass destruction have been employed in cooperative, peaceful pursuits under Nunn-Lugar.

The CTR set of programs eventually included the Departments of Defense, State, Energy, and Commerce and focused on weapons elimination, physical protection and material accounting, and expertise transition. CTR was not foreign assistance, but a way to meet U.S. national security needs at a low cost. This dynamic did not change after September 11, even if the reasons behind it had expanded. In the early CTR days, the U.S. was verifying the dismantling of its rival’s nuclear weapons, making sure that the newly independent republics did not themselves become nuclear weapon states and gaining access to Russian territory to verify security and elimination. Through the 1990s, as more was learned about the security conditions at Russia’s WMD facilities and as arms control goals were accomplished, the CTR program gradually evolved to focus increasingly on its non-proliferation mission, which has been characterized as the “most effective tool of non-proliferation policy to emerge since the end of the Cold War.”⁵ This mission included preventing the proliferation of WMD to states, as well as the black market trade in these materials to terrorist groups.⁶

FROM KANANASKIS TO GLENEAGLES: TURNING PLEDGES INTO PROJECTS

September 11 alerted the world to the possibility that terrorists might be willing to use weapons of mass destruction in an act of catastrophic terror. In this context, Canada, the 2002 President of the G-8, led an effort to respond to this threat using CTR tools as preventive measures against WMD terrorism. The G8 countries—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—announced the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction at the June 2002 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada. They pledged \$20 billion over ten years to fund projects, initially in Russia, to reduce the risk that unsecured weapons or materials of mass destruction might fall into the hands of terrorists or other states. The United States' contribution was \$10 billion, to be matched by the other donors, referred to as "10 + 10 Over 10." Since 2002, 13 additional countries—Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland—have also become donor members of the Global Partnership.

The Global Partnership statement by the G8 leaders at Kananaskis declared the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists to be priority concerns. The G8 leaders also agreed on six principles for the initiative and on a set of guidelines for implementation. The Global Partnership's "principles to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from gaining access to weapons or materials of mass destruction" outline key goals that the G8 would like to see included in the work of the Global Partnership. These principles are:

- Promote multilateral treaties that help prevent the spread of weapons, materials, and know-how;
- Account for and secure those items;
- Promote physical protection of facilities;
- Help detect, deter, and interdict illicit trafficking;
- Promote national export and transshipment controls; and
- Manage and dispose of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons materials.

The initiative's "guidelines for new or expanded cooperation projects" were designed to overcome impediments that contributing countries had

previously encountered in pursuing CTR projects in Russia. The G8 agreed to work both bilaterally and multilaterally to implement projects that address non-proliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism, and nuclear safety (including environmental) concerns. These guidelines include:

- Effective monitoring, auditing, and transparency measures;
- Environmentally sound and safe implementation procedures;
- Clearly defined milestones for each project;
- Use of equipment and technology for peaceful purposes only, no transfer to third parties, and adequate physical protection to prevent its theft or sabotage;
- Exemption from taxes, duties, levies, and other charges;
- Procurement of goods and services is to be in accordance with open international practices and national security requirements;
- Adequate liability protections from claims related to the cooperative project;
- Appropriate privileges and immunities for donor-government representatives;
- Effective protection of sensitive information and intellectual property.

The statement further indicated that the initial focus of G8 cooperation projects to prevent proliferation would be in Russia. However, at the 2003 Summit in Evian, France, the G8 leaders put forth an Action Plan in which they called for preliminary discussions with additional recipient countries that were prepared to adopt the Global Partnership guidelines.⁷ Discussions continued through the 2004 summit in Sea Island, United States, and efforts were begun to facilitate adoption of the guidelines by recipient states in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The G8 also agreed in 2004 to coordinate efforts outside the former Soviet Union, such as the reemployment of former Iraqi and Libyan weapons scientists.⁸

At the most recent G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, on July 6-8, 2005, the G8 countries and the 13 additional donors reaffirmed their commitment to raising \$20 billion before 2012 for Global Partnership activities. The donors also reiterated their focus on the spending priorities identified at the Global Partnership's outset—chemical weapons disarmament and the dismantling of nuclear submarines—while promoting further work in all areas of concern. The partnership states welcomed Ukraine as the newest recipient of Global Partnership funds, marking the first expansion of pledged money to projects outside of Russia, and continued

discussion on expansion of partnership projects to additional states of the former Soviet Union.

The initiative was created in response to the post-September 11 security environment, but it also served to better coordinate the myriad of international non-proliferation assistance and threat reduction programs that already existed in the former Soviet Union. By identifying spending priorities and defining implementation guidelines, the G8 and others would be able to carry out their commitments more efficiently.

The G8 countries have established a Senior Group (formerly the Senior Officials Group) and an expert-level Working Group to coordinate Global Partnership activities. The Global Partnership Working Group meets on a regular basis and has focused on resolving differences surrounding the implementation guidelines and translating financial commitments into concrete projects. The Working Group aims to coordinate Global Partnership projects, avoid program redundancy, and discuss implementation challenges. The Working Group has also become the forum to meet with non-G8 countries about participating in the Global Partnership as donors or recipients. This group publishes an account of pledges to date and the project areas to which they are allocated at each year's G8 Summit. The current G8 President, who sets the broad themes of the year's deliberations, has a significant role in setting the agenda of the Global Partnership. Its foreign ministry serves as an ad hoc secretariat for the partnership during that year.

PLEDGES AND PROJECTS

In the three years since Kananaskis, while significant progress has been made in sharing the financial burden and in coordinating efforts, pledges have fallen short of the \$20 billion goal and now comprise just over \$17 billion (\$19 billion including Russia's own contribution). Although significant progress has been made in overall threat reduction since the Global Partnership's inception three years ago, much work remains. The requirement of 20 billion would be better considered a floor than a ceiling. Pledges by donor country are as follows:

DONOR COUNTRY	TOTAL PLEDGE	TOTAL PLEDGE (IN US\$)*
Australia	AUS \$10,000,000	US \$7,500,000
Belgium	No pledge amount has been announced.	
Canada	CAN \$1 billion	US \$842,900,000
Czech Republic	US \$225,000	US \$225,000
Denmark	€ 17,200,000	US \$21,200,000
EU Commission	€ 1 billion	US \$1.2 billion
Finland	€ 15,000,000	US \$18,500,000
France	€ 750,000,000	US \$924,800,000
Germany	€ 1.5 billion	US \$1.8 billion
Ireland	No pledge amount has been announced.	
Italy	€ 1 billion	US \$1.2 billion
Japan	US \$200,000,000	US \$200,000,000
The Netherlands	€ 24,100,000	US \$29,700,000
Norway	€ 100,000,000	US \$123,300,000
New Zealand	NZ \$1,200,000	US \$832,000
Poland	US \$100,000	US \$100,000
Republic of Korea	US \$2,790,000	US \$2,790,000
Russian Federation	US \$2 billion	US \$2 billion
Sweden	€10,000,000 and US \$20,000,000	US \$32,300,000
Switzerland	CHF 15,000,000	US \$12,000,000
United Kingdom	US \$750,000,000	US \$750,000,000
United States	US \$10 billion	US \$10 billion

* *Conversions as of 8/31/2005: figures approximate.*

The bulk of promised funding has not yet been translated into projects, and there is often a gap between pledges and actual projects. This is a frequent complaint of Russian diplomats who argue that the lack of certainty in funding leaves them unable to correctly plan for costs in the Russian federal budget. This situation may be improving, however, as countries conclude bilateral legal framework agreements or find other means to channel their funds to existing projects.

Serious obstacles to implementation have also slowed progress on particular projects. Access and liability are regular issues, which test cooperation and the limits of sovereignty. The dispute over liability protections for the plutonium disposition program may have been resolved, but significant effort and funds will still be needed to place the program back on track. Access and transparency measures for some projects, such as monitoring arrangements at Russia's Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility, are

still being worked out.⁹ Such implementation delays risk causing donor or even recipient fatigue and distracting leaders from the central goal of the Global Partnership—the prevention of catastrophic terrorism.

Prioritizing projects in accordance with the mission of preventing WMD terrorism is one way to overcome this dynamic. However, there is not always agreement amongst the partnership countries on the highest priorities for funding. The Russian government has been very clear about its primary concerns and identified two priority areas of concern in March 2003: the destruction of chemical weapons and the decommissioning of general-purpose nuclear submarines.¹⁰ This reflects Russia's desire to meet its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and concern over the decaying submarine fleet in the Pacific and Northwest—both worthy goals.

Individual donors ultimately decide how best to spend the funds and tailor their contributions to their own top security concerns. For example, Japan has an interest in making sure decommissioned nuclear submarines in the Russian Far East are safely dismantled and do not contaminate the Sea of Japan. Switzerland's parliament has directed that Swiss funds only be used for the destruction of chemical weapons. The Global Partnership principles are meant to stimulate project funding in a variety of areas. However, donors should be wary of emphasizing some goals at the expense of other areas that may be even more relevant for preventing WMD terrorism. Some examples of neglected areas include:

- Of the estimated 600 metric tons of weapons-usable fissile material that is housed in Russia outside of nuclear weapons, more than half have not received any security upgrade to date; progress remains incremental.
- The numerous military and non-military institutes that made up Russia's vast biological weapons complex (by some estimates as many as 50) pose complex challenges to pathogen security, but only a portion are accessible to foreign security assistance. Funds for converting facilities to commercial enterprises still lag.
- Only approximately one percent of Russia's original chemical weapons stockpile has been destroyed to date. As much as 70 percent of Russia's remaining 39,000 tons of chemical weapons are not stored in adequately secure facilities.
- Over half of Russia's estimated 75,000 former weapons scientists are either unemployed or underemployed. Short-term research grants may not prove sufficient to permanently redirect scientists into peaceful activities.

All of these concerns, and others, should be addressed immediately.¹¹ As Nuclear Threat Initiative Vice President Laura Holgate explains, "U.S. and international programmes have not adapted to today's nuclear threat: terrorists' pursuit of nuclear weapons through theft of materials or weapons."¹² The same can be said of the prevention of biological terrorism. It will likely require persistence and initiative on the part of the Global Partnership donor countries to keep these two items on the agenda in 2006.

MAKING THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP TRULY GLOBAL

At its inception, the Global Partnership announced its intention to focus initially on Russia for cooperative projects. Russia was singled-out as the priority recipient of Global Partnership funding since it has the largest WMD stockpile and infrastructure in the world and has not been able to manage this Soviet WMD legacy on its own due to uncertain economic conditions. Russia's needs remain significant. Improvements to the physical security of facilities and WMD materials and the destruction of chemical weapons agents are just a few of Russia's immediate needs. Other threat reduction programs are aimed at providing former WMD program personnel with a decent living so they will not seek to profit from selling their knowledge to terrorist organizations or states trying to acquire WMD. At the same time, Russia is financially able to participate as a partner in this effort. While in the 1990s, Russia was purely a recipient of aid money; now, it plans to allocate at least \$2 billion in Global Partnership projects at home.

The Global Partnership does envision an expansion of non-proliferation and threat reduction assistance to other areas of the globe, particularly to additional states in the former Soviet Union. While Russian officials are reluctant to recognize the vulnerabilities of the Soviet WMD complex in Russia, at the same time, Russian diplomats reportedly resist proposals that Global Partnership donors spend the pledged money on insecure spots elsewhere in the world. The attitude of Russian officials toward the WMD terrorism problem, however, has begun to change, particularly in the past year.¹³ As President of the G8 in 2006, Russia could make itself an equal contributor to the Global Partnership by accepting the geographic expansion of partnership projects. While still receiving substantial funding itself, Russia could help in new threat reduction cases such as North Korea, where lessons learned in Russia will be crucial to success.¹⁴

In the United States, the Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Expansion Act passed in 2003 is clear evidence that CTR is evolving into

a program to meet global needs. This legislation authorizes the Secretary of Defense to use up to \$50 million of unobligated Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction funds for non-proliferation projects and emergencies outside the states of the former Soviet Union.¹⁵ The destruction of chemical weapons in Albania is an example of such an emergency project, funded through CTR.¹⁶

Since the role of the G8 as a non-proliferation policy-maker does not diminish with each summit, future Global Partnership mandates could encompass more than traditional CTR projects, as we see in the 2005 Lugar-Obama legislation,¹⁷ which bolstered funding for interdiction mechanisms to prevent WMD trafficking and also addressed conventional threats such as MANPADS. A Global Partnership effort to bolster interdiction and export control mechanisms would complement international initiatives such as the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which directs states to criminalize acquisition of WMD in their domestic law. This mandate is in need of funding and technical expertise, both of which are resources the Global Partnership countries have.

THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP IN 2006: RUSSIA'S G8 PRESIDENCY

For Russia's 2006 G8 presidency, President Putin has identified global energy security as the top priority for the summit,¹⁸ along with addressing changing demographics in both developing and developed countries. Other announced priorities include combating international terrorism and combating infectious diseases, which may include some discussion of the physical security of biological institutes as well as outbreak monitoring.

The Global Partnership is expected to at least retain the level of attention it has had in the summits since Kananaskis. As the chief recipient of Global Partnership assistance, Russia has clearly emphasized funding for the destruction of chemical weapons and submarine decommissioning. This focus can be expected to continue; chemical weapons destruction remains under-funded, and the decommissioning of nuclear submarines in the Russian Far East receives little attention from donor states at present. However, donor states will put pressure on Russia to also move forward on securing nuclear material and addressing security at Soviet-era biological weapons facilities. Both are important to addressing the risk of WMD terrorism. Solutions to these two contentious issues may also be discussed under the rubric of other topics of vital importance to Russia—nuclear energy and health and the life sciences revolution.

Using the G8 and other fora creatively to find solutions to the material security and safety issues, in coordination with the Global Partnership working group, could be a useful way to meet the goals of both sides.

Most importantly, the 2006 G8 Summit is an opportunity for Russian leadership. President Putin has clearly recognized the threat of WMD proliferation: "Along with international terrorism the spread of weapons of mass destruction remains the chief global threat in the 21st century." He further said that "overcoming the dangers of WMD proliferation" is one of Russia's "top-priority tasks."¹⁹ Russia's new political and economic conditions should be seized upon and an emphasis placed on the shared perception of threats within the G8. Remaining elements in the U.S-Russian bilateral threat reduction agenda should also be addressed.

Adapting the Global Partnership to address the greatest concerns of the day will require true partnership between Russia and its "donors". More than \$20 billion in funding will be required to address concerns in Russia as well as to pursue CTR globally. This will also require officials in all countries to refrain from counting pledges creatively or squabbling over how much is given to whom, but to be faithful to the Global Partnership's original mandate of preventing catastrophic terrorism. ■

ENDNOTES

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