Intelligence, Policy and the New Terror

JOHN D. MOORE

REVIEW OF PAUL PILLAR

Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy

(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001) $24.95 cloth

Terrorism is not new. The use of violence, or threat thereof, against non-combatants to achieve political ends is a tactic that has been used by emperors, kings, presidents, religious and ethnic leaders, as well as revolutionaries throughout history. Yet, terrorism has evolved. In the wake of the terrorist strikes against the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the threat of militant Islamic terrorism—rooted in the Middle East and South Asia—has taken center stage. While these extremely violent religious extremists represent a minority view, their threat is real. As pointed out by RAND's Bruce Hoffman in 1980, two out of 64 such groups were categorized as largely religious in motivation; in 1995 almost half of the identified groups—26 out of 56—were classified as religiously motivated; the majority of these espoused Islam as their guiding force.

As the impact of the September 11 attacks plays out on the world stage, a closer look at the systemic and symptomatic nature of terrorism is essential. Moreover, such analyses must be tapped to inform and underpin both counter-terrorism and broader national security policies. Paul Pillar's new work, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, is a useful primer for those unfamiliar with the subject. Pillar, former deputy chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's Counter-Terrorism Center, does not offer new insights into the nature of modern inter-national terrorism—the modality of terrorism most affecting the United States—nor does he provide an alternative paradigm for countering current and future threats.[1] The genius of *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* is that it provides

John D. Moore, a former political-military analyst with the U.S. Defense Department and terrorism analyst with the State Department, is currently a master's degree candidate at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

a prism through which counter-terrorist policy and rhetoric can be gauged against the analytical thinking within the American intelligence community.

The disintegration of many states in the post-Cold War period, and the Cold War legacy of a world awash in advanced conventional weapons and know-how, has assisted the proliferation of terrorism worldwide. Combined with the increasing ease of transnational transportation and communication, and the presence of states and non-state actors to provide financial, material, and operational support, the lethal potential of terrorist violence has reached new heights. As with many leading academics and counter-terrorism practitioners, Pillar underscores the decentralized, networked nature of Islamic terrorism.[2] Unlike the hierarchical structures typical of state military and security structures as well as mid-twentieth century guerrilla and Leftist-Marxist terrorist groups, actors such as Al-Qaeda are correctly characterized as either one or a group of nodes representing only a portion of the threat.

At the same time, the loosely networked nature of many groups does not imply a Soviet-style "terrorist international," wherein one or a few leaders provide the critical ideological, financial, material, and operational support. Others may fault Pillar for not seeing Al-Qaeda as a more monolithic entity directing Islamic terrorists worldwide. Such attempts to paint Islamic terrorists as representing a singular threat, as much of Washington's rhetoric does, loses the critical nuance given by Pillar. This is not to say that Osama bin Laden's organization is not international, nor lacks the capability to conduct operations in various locations against a variety of targets. However, Al-Qaeda is but one of several actors that tap into resources of other groups and provide aid to individuals who coalesce for single or several attacks and subsequently dissolve back into the larger stream of radical Islam. Al-Qaeda is an enemy, but not the only or possibly even the central threat. Pillar reflects the reality of trying to counter the ambiguous chimera of modern Islamic terrorism, whereas policymakers often try and see terrorist actors, and policies to counter them, through a decidedly ineffective—and dangerously simplistic—Western lens.

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Pillar makes another key point, particularly salient as the fear of biological weapons spreads in the wake of the anthrax mailings in the United States: that the emphasis on one type or modality of terrorism is counter-productive. While the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorist attacks as well as the threat posed by Islamic radicalism must be taken seriously, a balanced approach to assessing from where threats will emanate is required. The September 11 attack was

unique not in that it employed an exotic weapon, but that the terrorists used a tra-
ditional tactic—aircraft hijacking—in a new way to carry out a mass casualty event.
Terrorists are typically evolutionary in their tactical development and also change
over time. State use of terror has far outweighed international terrorism in terms of
casualties and impact on global stability. The threat of Islamic radicalism, while real,
should not overshadow the threats from other non-religiously motivated actors.
Analytical complacency, reinforced by policy attempts to paint the threat as mono-
lithic, ensures continued vulnerability of U.S. interests at home and abroad.

Pillar analyzes the primary effectiveness of various policy tools—diplomacy,
criminal law, financial controls, military force, intelligence, and covert action—in
relation to the formulation of a coordinated approach to countering terrorism.
Financial controls and military action deserve special attention given the policy
rhetoric adopted by the Bush administration. Despite grand pronouncements
made by government officials, attempts to mitigate terrorism through financial
interdiction are problematic. Terrorism is a relatively cheap enterprise. While pre-
vious attempts to interdict or freeze assets has netted mainly funds belonging to
state sponsors, non-state actors, dependent upon small amounts of cash with
transactions conducted outside formal banking systems, are difficult to disrupt
financially. In turn, military force is limited in its ability to deter and destroy ter-
rorist actors. In the case of Afghanistan, the American bombing campaign, while
ostensibly aimed at destroying Al-Qaeda's Taliban sponsor and thereby denying
the group safe haven, cannot target either the systemic or symptomatic causes of
Islamic radicalism, much less Al-Qaeda's capability to mount or inspire new anti-
U.S. attacks. Moreover, if military action is not followed with a coordinated, effec-
tive internationally mandated and led action to provide relief and assistance in the
creation of a new Afghan state, any short-term military-effected gains will be
negated and will likely propagate, not mitigate, the terrorist threat while further
bringing the U.S. into conflict with the Islamic world.

Pillar is correct when he points out that countering terrorism is an ongo-
ing process. There is no victory or end game that signals the eradication of ter-
rorism; it will remain a fixture of human interaction. The objective is to use the
best mix of available options to save lives and mitigate the growth and effective-
ness of terrorists. Zero defects in combating terrorism is impossible; risk is ever-
present. However, this difficulty is a poor excuse for a lack of critical thinking and
responsible leadership. Countering terrorism requires seeing through the smoke
to determine what constitutes the threat and the best ways to mitigate those
threats; the integration of intelligence into diplomatic and military decision-
making is central. A lack of dynamic, "outside the box" thinking to project pos-
sible scenarios, prioritize threats, and take effective action could be fatal. In turn,
it should be understood that terrorism is one of many threats facing Washington
and should not be overstated. Determination and patience, combined with

proactive and dynamic application of social, economic, law enforcement, diplo-
matic, intelligence, and military tools are the keys to disrupting and destroying
terrorist capacity and saving lives. ■

NOTES

1 The distinctions laid out by Paul Wilkinson help delineate terrorist types. He defines them as follows: state
effected – commonly referred to as state terror; factional – commonly referred to as terrorism; international
terrorism – terrorist violence involving the citizens of more than one country; domestic terrorism – state or
factional terror confined within the borders of a country (although even domestic cases typically have transna-
tional linkages). See Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, (London: Cass,
2000).

2 The use of Islam here does not imply that those carrying out attacks in the name of Islam are Islamic in belief
and practice. Indeed, actors such as Al-Qaeda do not represent either Koranic edicts or popular sentiment in
the Islamic world.

Of Aid and Emperors

SUE LAUTZE AND ANGELA RAVEN-ROBERTS

REVIEW OF MARK DUFFIELD

*Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of
Development and Security*

(London: Zed Books, 2001) $75 cloth, $29.95 paper

Two years ago in a meeting at the Overseas Development Institute in London, Mark Duffield asked the conflict resolution experts present to give an example of a success story from their work. While this seemed a reasonable request, his question generated considerable dissatisfaction as well as a firm reminder by the chair that such comments were unnecessarily provocative and "below the belt." For some years now, Duffield has been critical of the emperors of the aid industry's "new clothes;" however, he has been doing so in an almost unreadable fashion. Duffield, a professor at the Institute for Politics and International Studies at Leeds University, seems at last to have located an editor with whom he can work. Gone are the maddening fragment sentences and convoluted grammar that characterized his earlier important but fairly inaccessible articles such as "The Symphony of the Damned: Racial Discourse, Complex Political Emergencies and Humanitarian Aid"[1] and "Complex Emergencies and the Crisis of Developmentalism."[2] In their stead, Duffield has gathered his ideas in a readable, coherent volume entitled *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security.*

Global Governance and the New Wars is about the violent processes of globalization and the less-than-stellar performance of aid agencies in understanding and responding to the human costs associated with wealth generation and the consolidation of power, particularly in the post-Cold War era. The book begins with a powerful description of the macro context of crisis and war, and concludes with an applied analysis of the internally displaced Dinka living in Darfur in the west of Sudan. Duffield's book is replete with his rather idiosyncratic language employed to describe connections between the North and the South.

Sue Lautze is Director of the Livelihoods Program at the Feinstein International Famine Center at Tufts University, and an instructor at the Tufts School of Nutrition Science and Policy. Angela Raven-Roberts is Acting Director of the Feinstein International Famine Center.

This book should be read by all aid policy makers, practitioners, and academics, although it is unlikely they will. Indeed, the humanitarian aid practitioners are not likely to engage with Duffield's assertions because they fundamentally challenge the aid community's way of doing business. In addition, he has previously not made his analysis easily accessible to the average reader. Now that a decipherable critique is available, it will be interesting to see if aid agencies will rise to the challenge and change their way of business. "Functional ignorance" on the part of the aid industry is likely to prevail, with tragic consequences for those who struggle to survive where the forces of globalization collide.

In *Global Governance and the New Wars*, Duffield explains that globalization has strengthened the ties that bind the regionalized communities of North America, Europe and, to a lesser extent, Asia. However, rather than causing the emergence of a single, homogenized world, globalization has resulted in the kind of intense fragmentation and competition that are articulated in a range of violent forms. This process, which continues to yield growth and prosperity for some, has led to deepening poverty and violence for others. While unapologetically defending the usefulness of philosophically (rather than geographically) dividing the world into North and South, Duffield wants to ensure that we understand that peace, war, and crime are not three distinct and unrelated phenomena: they are merely different outcomes of the same underlying process of globalization.

Duffield is critical of aid agencies that view conflict as wholly unrelated to peace processes. Conflict is commonly described as a local affair and is seen as a temporary setback to the otherwise normative process of progress, a worldview Duffield has coined "developmentalism." Thus, instead of seeing violence as specific and functional, aid policymakers understand it as a time of social regression, of failed states, and the breakdown of "civilization." Duffield outlines an alternative analysis that suggests that conflict is an aggressive, pro-active form of social transformation— that is, of viewing violence as a response to the pressures of globalization.

The differences between these two approaches make for more than interesting theory. They hold important implications for understanding and responding to global events such as the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, since violence can be viewed as the irrational work of a few, select madmen, or as a logical part of a broader response to the stresses of globalization. In the former, the acts are seen as incomprehensible aberrations, devoid of any broader context. The rational policy response informed by such an understanding would be to demonize the attackers and to subsequently hunt them down as deviant, criminalized elements. Using Duffield's interpretive lens, however, globalization can be understood to engender a range of violent processes that includes not only terrorist attacks on the U.S., but also atrocities committed by armies and rebels from Palestine and Israel to Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Sierra Leone. Moreover,

it would also include more subtle, violent processes such as natural resource extraction, human trafficking, and the desperate poverty that characterize the South. An invigorated aid agenda would be required to address the fundamental and deepening inequalities between the rich and the poor; a global "wake up call" would have to be issued to declare that such violence will no longer be an acceptable cost to processes of wealth creation and political control.

Global Governance and the New Wars is a disturbing account of how we are reaping the seeds of our own prescriptions in the name of development and "progress." The International Monetary Fund's structural adjustment requirements are telling examples of the demand for de-bureaucratization and privatization coming at the expense of civil society and social welfare responsibilities. Moreover, power has been reconfigured in disparate and unaccountable fashions. The resulting "governance gap," as Duffield calls it, means that there is little to tie the powerful few with the voiceless governed masses. There is a tendency to describe the poverty, conflict, disease, and crime that characterize this gap as innate to politically immature systems, to less educated people, or to less developed areas of the world, particularly in Africa. The epitome of such de-contextualized analysis is journalist Robert Kaplan's 1994 article "The Coming Anarchy," an unfortunately popular article published in *The Atlantic Monthly* that seeks to explain conflict in West Africa as rooted in innate African tendencies, set loose by a lack of development and education. Duffield appropriately dissects Kaplan's work as essentialist, racist, and barbaric. Such Kaplan-esque thinking nevertheless continues to inform the aid industry.[3]

According to Duffield, the security world has undergone a revolution similar to the reinvention of the development industry. No longer concerned with avoidance of nuclear holocaust and the clash of world powers, the North now views underdevelopment and poverty as the primary threat to its security. One might hope that the logical extension of such analysis would be to address poverty and inequality through meaningful investment and assistance as rational responses to security threats. Alas, short-term humanitarian aid is often used as the primary form of crisis containment, rather than using more substantive means of addressing "root causes." Thus, the resulting merger of the aid and security agendas, Duffield asserts, has made for bad practice with poor results.

The author also describes how a myriad of networks including the UN, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), human rights agencies, private security companies, corporations, and the military have come together to respond to crises. Duffield posits that these "strategic complexes" have emerged as key actors in a global governance system whose main aspiration is not merely to regulate and manage the outcomes of today's new wars, but rather to strive for a broader program of "liberal" governance that has at its core a radical program of societal

transformation. Through the lens of global governance, conflict is seen as an opportunity to remake troubled and failing societies, but this is a view that Duffield challenges as both ahistorical and a threat to the difficult task of providing effective, life-saving humanitarian relief.

Duffield criticizes several NGOs, including the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE). His sharpest critique is reserved for Mary Anderson, proponent of the "Do No Harm" framework that has been adopted by a wide range of NGOs, UN bodies, and donor agencies. Duffield argues that Anderson's work is based on "consequentialist" ethics, implying that humanitarian action should not be undertaken if it threatens future development options. The implication of Anderson's work is that the humanitarian imperative—the obligation to immediately relieve suffering—is no longer the overarching principle that drives relief interventions if such humanitarian actions would jeopardize future development initiatives. Duffield is critical of the apparent arrogance of this position that places so much faith in development that, despite its shaky track record, it supersedes concerns for immediate life-saving relief assistance.

Considering this track record, it would seem logical that the aid industry would be chastened and humbled by the depth of its failures. Instead, Duffield notes, the industry has proceeded to reinvent itself in an uncritical fashion. Not only has the development industry avoided any blame for the sorry state of global affairs, it has been reinvigorated with a renewed sense of mission and importance. In the 1990s, development emerged absolved of its Cold War failures. Three of the largest recipients of USAID development assistance in the 1980s—Sudan, Somalia, and Liberia—serve as examples of this absolution. Despite these failures, aid is making new pronouncements that, even in the midst of violent conflict, it can lay the foundations of development, establish accountable forms of governance, or sow the seeds of peace. The irony here is that the development community now claims that it can achieve in conflict and crisis arenas what it earlier failed to achieve under conditions of relative peace and stability.

While Duffield traditionally has been resistant to providing clear guidance for NGOs—avoiding what he calls writing the "television repair manual for humanitarian action"—his book is rich with practical advice for aid organizations. It also contains a useful account of the recent history of development theory, which is convenient given that the relatively young age of today's relief and development workers means they have had little, if any, exposure to Cold-War development discourse. He reminds us that not so long ago it was acceptable to see a direct link between wealth creation and deepening poverty, and sketches out how the North has evolved from an ethos of declaring war on poverty to the current war on the poor themselves. This in itself is a refreshing and important exercise because it gives readers permission to refocus on the inherent flaws of the global system rather than the current less-than-successful focus on the symptoms

of poverty and conflict that the system has generated. Duffield compels his readers to take note of the fact that development is no longer oriented towards eliminating the gross disparities that accompany the processes of enrichment. Now, he suggests, it is geared towards containing threats and hence accommodating violence as something regrettable but unavoidable. Such a sad conclusion should compel us all to resist the alarming nature of the modern development enterprise and to challenge this perversion of development's original, more noble aims. ∎

NOTES

1 Mark Duffield, "The Symphony of the Damned: Racial Discourse, Complex Political Emergencies and Humanitarian Aid," *Disasters: The Journal of Disaster Studies, Policy and Mana*gement 20 (3) (September 1996): 173-193.

2 Mark Duffield, "Complex Emergencies and the Crisis of Developmentalism," *IDS Bulletin* 25 (4) (October 1994): 37-45.

3 Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly,* February 1994, 44 –76.

U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Pendulum Still Swinging

HASSAN ABBAS

REVIEW OF AMBASSADOR DENNIS KUX
The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies
 (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 2001) $22.95 paper

An absorbing and gripping read, Ambassador Dennis Kux's new book, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies,* traces events from the initial encounter between the United States and Pakistan in 1947 to President Bill Clinton's visit to Islamabad in March 2000. Kux's personal experiences during his two tenures as a U.S. diplomat in Pakistan, as well as his access to senior Pakistani officials playing key roles in Washington D.C., allow readers rare insight into the making of U.S.-Pakistani history. Much of this history has remained far from public view until now.

Few relationships in the international arena have been as turbulent as the one between Pakistan and the United States. Kux aptly describes how Washington's engagement with Islamabad over the past 50 years has swung like a pendulum, always dependent on the changing realities of the international power game. The shifts were evident even in the first few years of the country's existence. Kux notes that when Pakistan emerged as a new state in 1947, the U.S. State Department believed that it would soon collapse. This belief soon changed, however, after Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's founding father, impressed American diplomats sufficiently to develop a friendship. Unfortunately for Pakistan, even as the country made it clear from the outset that its foreign policy priority was to align with the West, America considered the more sensitive and influential India to be more important, and Pakistan was to remain without financial or military assistance in these initial years. Even after Pakistan joined the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), the token military assistance provided by the United States was conditional upon a guarantee of India's safety from attack.

Hassan Abbas, an officer in Pakistan's police service, is a master's degree candidate at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

The Cold War was to vastly improve Pakistan's status. Military assistance increased substantially after Pakistan gave the U.S. a military base from which it could spy on the Soviet Union. This increased cooperation marked the beginning of a "friendship phase" between the two countries, despite remaining concern in Washington that this arrangement was unsettling to India, which viewed the warming U.S.-Pakistan relationship as dangerous to its interests. Kux, in fact, is critical of the way this shift took place and describes Nixon's personal interest in "tilting" towards Pakistan during the 1971 East Pakistan crisis (during the independence movement of what is now Bangladesh) as a serious policy mistake. Nixon's move met with strong opposition from the State Department, he says, and cost the United States India's goodwill.

Despite the improvement under Nixon, a souring of relations with Pakistan continued throughout the 1970s, and culminated in October 1979, when the U.S. warned Pakistan's foreign minister, Agha Shahi, against the country's attempt to build a nuclear weapon. But here again the relationship shifted: when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan suddenly became a vital ally as a frontline state against the communist threat. With substantial quantities of arms and money being made available by the U.S., the friendship between the two countries was at its best during this decade, especially from Pakistan's vantage point, Kux notes. The relationship is perhaps best exemplified in a conversation between General Zia's chief of staff, General K.M. Arif, and Secretary of State Alexander Haig, in April 1981: "We would not like to hear from you the type of government we should have," Arif told the Secretary of State. "General, your internal situation is your problem!" Haig replied.

Kux sharply criticizes Washington for not doing enough to stabilize Afghanistan after the Soviet departure. He is also not kind to Pakistan, which failed to realize that its continuous support of the Taliban militia in Afghanistan and that the military take over by General Pervez Musharraf in October 1999 were contrary to U.S. interests in the region.

This *laissez faire* attitude would last long. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Kux describes how pressure was once more brought to bear upon Pakistan, now a democracy, to cap its nuclear program or face a total assistance cutoff from the United States. Pakistan refused to budge, however, and U.S. policy in South Asia reverted to its pre-1979 line. By 1998, the U.S. had imposed sanctions on Pakistan for pursuing its nuclear program, and the West seemed to have forgotten that Afghanistan ever existed. Kux sharply criticizes Washington

for not doing enough to stabilize Afghanistan after the Soviet departure. He is also not kind to Pakistan, which failed to realize that its continuous support of the Taliban militia in Afghanistan and that the military take over by General Pervez Musharraf in October 1999 were contrary to U.S. interests in the region. Pakistanis became increasingly disillusioned, meanwhile, as they watched U.S.-Indian relations blossom.

There are several entertaining anecdotes in this book, illuminating Pakistan's role within the minds of American foreign policymakers. In one memorable sketch, John Foster Dulles explains to legendary American journalist Walter Lippmann that Pakistanis were the only real fighting men in South Asia. "We could never get along without the Gurkas," Dulles said. "But Foster," Lippmann responded, "the Gurkas aren't Pakistanis, they're Indians." "Well," said Dulles, they may not be Pakistanis, but they're Muslims." "No, I'm afraid they're not Muslims, either; they're Hindus," Lippmann said. "No matter," said Dulles, who then proceeded to lecture Lippmann on the virtues of SEATO in stemming communism in Asia.

Such a lack of understanding on the part of Americans is only too common to most Pakistanis, who have felt that the United States has always dumped Pakistan once its own interests were served. In this regard, Ambassador Kux attempts, with moderate success, to assuage Pakistanis' misgivings about America's lack of sincerity in bilateral relations. From a Pakistani's point of view, the narration of events as documented by State Department officials is the most fascinating aspect of the book. Kux offers a perspective on the priorities and worldviews of American policymakers which stand in sharp contrast to what Pakistanis have believed these to be.

With Pakistan re-emerging as a frontline state for the United States, the analysis comes at an important time. The discussion of the United States' sincerity toward Pakistan has again fallen under intense discussion, even among educated and pro-Western thinkers in the South Asian country. Given the shifting dynamics between the U.S. and Pakistan today, Kux's book is invaluable to understanding the nature of this changing relationship. ■

Books in Brief

Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger
G.R. BERRIDGE, MAURICE KEENS-SOPER, THOMAS OTTE, EDITORS
(Palgrave, 2001) $21.95 paper

As foreign services around the globe struggle to deal with the highly volatile post-September 11 international order, there may be no better time to examine the historical development and role of the diplomat in foreign affairs. *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* provides an ideal starting point for such a study. In nine cogent and concise essays, the authors examine the works of some of the greatest scholars of diplomatic theory: Francesco Guiccardini, Hugo Grotius, Cardinal Richelieu, Abraham de Wicquefort, François de Callières, Sir Ernest Satow, Harold Nicolson, and inevitably, Machiavelli and Kissinger.

Each essay focuses on one scholar, beginning with a biographical sketch. The authors then list each scholar's relevant works, discussing their approaches to various topics in diplomatic theory. In this respect, it is clear the authors intended their text to serve primarily as a "guide to the diplomatic classics." A reader seeking an in-depth analysis of Machiavelli's opinions on the role of force would probably gain little from *Diplomatic Theory.* However, as an introductory text and springboard for further research, this book belongs on the bookshelf of any student of diplomacy.

By featuring scholars whose works span six centuries, the book reveals that a number of current issues in diplomatic theory are as old as diplomacy itself. For example, should diplomatic negotiations be conducted in secrecy, or should they be open to public scrutiny? The earlier scholars such as Guiccardini treated secrecy as a useful diplomatic tool and emphasized the importance of secrecy while conceding the necessity of imparting some information in order to obtain other information. As more contemporaneous works in the book show, however, the tension between secrecy and democratic ideals became increasingly apparent. Nicolson, a post-World War I product of the British Foreign Service, embraces the Wilsonian notion of "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at." Meanwhile Satow, Nicolson's predecessor in the British Foreign Office by a few decades, maintains that secret tactics such as bribery and coercion, while ethically questionable, are indispensable for effective diplomacy. Kissinger, whose skillful use of back-channel negotiations during the 1970s enabled the circumvention of the

entire State Department bureaucracy, would be inclined to agree with Satow. But Kissinger's back-channel diplomacy remains highly controversial, and the authors are quick to point out that successive administrations have avoided similar strategies for practical and ethical reasons.

What role can secret negotiations play in a broad multilateral coalition, such as the one the U.S. seeks to maintain in the war against terrorism? Hopefully, by examining the works of past diplomatic figures, today's students will be able to find an answer to the question capably examined in *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger.*

—*Waqar Hasib*

Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds

BY STEPHEN KINZER

(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001) $25 cloth

During a recent talk at Harvard University, Stephen Kinzer, former Istanbul bureau chief for *The New York Times*, likened Turkey's potential to a main course at dinner that never arrives. For almost 80 years the world has waited as the country has served up a number of mouth-watering precursors to what could be a huge feast of economic, political and cultural prominence, Kinzer said. With the big dish never arriving, however, the world's patience is wearing thin. Soon, it will leave the table.

This sense of urgency echoes throughout the Kinzer's new book, *Crescent and Star*. Unsure of its identity and future, Turkey has struggled to fulfill its destiny of becoming a prosperous, democratic, and modern secular country. Despite rising demands for true democracy and better-shared wealth, the entrenched elite continues to suppress human rights and calls for greater freedom, fearful that Turkey will crumble like the Ottoman Empire. The country now stands paralyzed at the crossroads, and must decide quickly between true democracy and the status quo.

Which path will Turkey choose? Kinzer does not provide a definitive answer, but argues passionately that Turkey must embrace democratic reform. If the country's leadership can liberate itself from its paralyzing fears and support genuine democracy, "it will raise the Turkish people to levels of prosperity and self-confidence they have never known before," he says. As the first Islamic democracy, Turkey could then be a beacon for the entire Muslim world.

Turkey will have to overcome enormous obstacles to become a truly democratic nation, Kinzer says. It will have to acknowledge past misdeeds, most notably the slaughter of Armenians in 1915, ensure human rights, and remove the military's influence over political life. To undertake such dramatic moves,

Turkey needs to reaffirm its commitment to the principles enshrined by the country's founder, Kemal Mustafa Atatürk, Kinzer says. "It is in his true image, not in the distorted one promoted by the modern Kemalist elite, that the new Turkey must be shaped."

Kinzer devotes an entire chapter to Atatürk, a man he says deserves every bit of the reverence he receives in Turkey for the national movement he spear-headed after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1923. Atatürk firmly believed that only a Turkey deeply anchored in the West could reach its full potential, and with raw power and revolutionary zeal he swept away many remnants of traditional Turkish life and adopted Western values. The customary veil was banned, Arabic script was replaced by Latin letters and women were enfranchised. For his accomplishments, writes Kinzer, he "deserves to be recognized and celebrated as one of the twentieth century's most successful revolutionaries."

For Turkey watchers, these arguments will not be new, but many will appreciate the personal reflections of Turkish life, culture, and history that Kinzer weaves into his chapters. These personal vignettes capture Turkey's richness and mystique, providing a well-rounded picture of the dilemma facing the country as it strives to join the club of wealthy democracies. The end result is a satisfying book that will surely intensify the reader's desire to see Turkey finally fulfill its enormous potential.

—*Kimito Mishina*

The Mobilization of Shame:
A World View of Human Rights
By Robert F. Drinan
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001) $29.95 paper.

It is with great optimism that Robert Drinan addresses the problems and complexities of international human rights law in his new book, *The Mobilization of Shame*. Drinan, a Georgetown University Law Professor, former Massachusetts Congressman, and Jesuit Priest, explores the question of whether human rights pronouncements, primarily through organs of the United Nations, have had a genuine and comprehensible effect on the status of freedom and equality around the world. Although Drinan outlines obstacles currently facing the progress of international human rights law, his ultimate response is power-fully in the affirmative.

Clearly written and easily digestible, *The Mobilization of Shame* will serve well as a primer for those interested in the evolution of international human

rights since the 1940s. Veterans of human rights work should also find of inter-
est Drinan's discussion of some of the most thorny issues still facing human
rights, such as sovereignty claims and problems of enforcement. Of particular
notice is Drinan's discussion of the freedom of religion as perhaps being "the most
fundamental human right of all," and the question of whether theistic human
rights activists may have an inherent advantage over humanistic activists in their
propagation work.

Drinan begins his argument by extolling the outcome of the UN World
Conference of Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993. At the Vienna Conference,
Drinan explains, the false dichotomy between political and economic rights fos-
tered by the Cold War was finally discarded. Thus, in the 1990s, the debate no
longer referred to the content of international human rights, but rather to the
methods by which they might be enforced.

Drinan clearly believes that the world has therefore moved to a liminal point
in which it is poised to take a great step towards the advancement of international
human rights. Peering into the pre-September 11 future, Drinan asks whether some
event on the horizon might galvanize American leaders to shake off their xenopho-
bia, fully embrace the "human rights revolution," and assist in the creation of a
"global moral force." Only time will tell whether his optimism is deserved.

It is in Drinan's discussion of the problems of human rights enforcement
that the meaning of the book's title becomes clear. One of the hallmarks of an
effective system of law is the degree to which it is amenable to enforcement. Is
international human rights law enforced? As Drinan explains, "kind of." Despite
the lack of legal sanction available for violating states, other kinds of sanction do
exist. Indeed, the "mobilization of shame" is a powerful tool deftly wielded by
many proponents of human rights, from groups like Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International to national governments.

Not discounting the value of legal sanctions, Drinan argues that the moral
climate which would ultimately nourish the appropriate environment for such
sanctions must first be in place. "Even if the enforcement were vigorous, law
cannot prevail unless there is an acceptance of it a deep level," he writes. It is in
part due to the public act of shaming that a culture of human rights is develop-
ing. Even though a given state may know that its violations will not bring "real"
sanctions, it is becoming ever clearer that its capacity to function and succeed is
dependent on its moral and political acceptance in world forums.

—*Justin Stein*

The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda

BY ALAN J. KUPERMAN

(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001) cloth $38.95, paper $16.95.

Taking aim at the conventional wisdom that a timely placement of peace-keeping troops could have thwarted the Rwandan genocide, Alan Kuperman's new book, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda* will no doubt ruffle a few feathers among the interventionist set. As Kuperman argues, even a major intervention could have only saved a fraction of the 800,000 Tutsi that were murdered in April 1994. The analysis is a sobering contrast to much of the breathless criticism of U.S. policy that we have heard. Anyone who has thought about foreign intervention in response to humanitarian emergencies would be well advised to consider his message.

The short book is an expanded version of a controversial article published in *Foreign Affairs* last year. Kuperman's main point is that even if the Clinton administration had known that genocide was occurring (and he doubts that it did), and even if it had mustered up the will to intervene, it never could have stopped the genocide because of the logistical difficulties of transporting U.S. troops to such a remote area 10,000 miles away.

The common argument about the possibility of preventing the genocide, or at least saving more lives, is attributed to Roméo Dallaire, the former commander of the doomed United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, which was implemented after the 1993 Arusha peace accords. Dallaire, who led an ill-equipped peacekeeping force of 2,500, requested 5,000 high-quality reinforcements from the UN just after the killing started in early April in the belief that a show of force would halt the killing. Though the UN Security Council approved his request, deployment was delayed, and Dallaire stood helpless as the tragedy unfolded. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and others have since endorsed Dallaire's position.

Kuperman does not deny that tens of thousands of Rwandans might have been saved if the international community had acted earlier, but he is much less sanguine about what an American decision to intervene might have actually accomplished. His analysis of intelligence from non-governmental organizations, the CIA, diplomatic sources, and the media shows that while the violence was widespread, almost everyone believed it to be a resumption of civil war involving both Hutu and Tutsi, not genocide (an event which creates a greater moral imperative for foreign intervention). As a result, he says, policymakers could not have understood that genocide was taking place before April 20, 1994, two weeks after the killing started. This finding is notably different than those found in other

prominent studies, including one last year by Harvard Univerity's Samantha Powers in *The Atlantic Monthly*. Kuperman argues that what accurate reporting that had existed, including a now-famous set of Defense Intelligence Agency reports, was buried under a flood of less accurate information. In this context, early intervention would have set an unsustainable precedent: "There are simply too many such conflicts around the world to permit prolonged intervention in every case," he says.

This is not to say that more could not have been done. In his conclusion, Kuperman blasts the international community's overall strategy to force President Habyarimana to sign the Arusha accords while giving him only a pallid peace-keeping force to protect the deal. "Had the international community intended to promote genocide, it could hardly have devised a better strategy," he says. It's not exactly a feel-good ending, but it shouldn't be.

—*Daniel Langenkamp*

Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace
BY GREGORY J. RATTRAY.
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001) $49.95 cloth

Information structures and the potential threats to U.S. national security via its information highways make for good science fiction plots, but do they represent a clear and present danger in the real world? In his new book, *Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace*, Gregory Rattray argues that attacks on and in cyberspace pose significant threats to national security, and that information systems may also serve as both the weapons and the targets of such assaults. Moreover, due to the transglobal nature of corporate activity in building these information structures, the very development and sales of required key support technologies should be included in any analysis of where threats lie and how best to combat them in the future.

Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace is written in clear and concise non-sensationalistic language. The author analyzes complex information-age technology and defense vulnerabilities with pinpoint accuracy without reverting to "techspeak"—a major feat in and of itself. In addition to the accessibility of the information, Rattray, who is currently the Commander of the 23rd Information Operations Squadron responsible for U.S. Air Force information warfare tactics and target development, uses the development of U.S. Strategic Airpower from 1919 to 1945 as a real world example of strategic information warfare as an emerging and nebulous threat to national security.

In the final chapter of his book, Rattray argues that this new form of combat differs from its predecessors because digital warfare tools are more readily

available to non-state actors, that governments must cooperate with the private sector to build defenses against cyber attacks, and that a high degree of organizational coordination and rapid adaptability are particularly crucial in information warfare. In addition, he concludes that understanding the significance of vulnerabilities and their potential disruptive influence is the key to developing necessary national offensive and defensive capabilities to protect U.S. security.

In the epilogue of *Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace,* the author addresses the mismatch between expectation and reality regarding predicted year 2000 cyberspace chaos. On an optimistic note, both the lack of major disruptions and cascading knock-on failures offer some reassurance about the inherent robustness of information infrastructures. However, since little is known about the relative interconnectivity of global information systems and what effects random targeting by dedicated cyber warriors would have on the systems, it is certainly too soon to sit back and relax.

Rattray provides a detached, probing and scholarly analysis of U.S. vulnerabilities and the possible effects of cyber war, and makes a very strong argument that the U.S. needs to continue developing and reassessing its strategies, knowledge, and capabilities of defending information systems against attack. This very readable and timely book rings true for all aspects of national defense.
—*Andrea Dew*

A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya
By Anna Politkovskaya
Translated from the Russian and edited by John Crowfoot
(London: The Harvill Press, 2001) $17 paper

The war in Chechnya is anything but over. It has just been forgotten—or, rather, made forgotten. Indeed, the intent to make the world forget has played a key role in this so-called "anti-terrorist operation," masterfully planned out on Russia's borderlands with hidden vested interests and very little strategic rationale. *A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya* tells readers exactly who profits, why, and how. It also talks at length about the protagonists who end up paying a price: the miserable federal conscripts who, lacking food, clothes, and purpose, are fed alcohol and narcotics before being sent out to fight an invisible enemy, and the even more miserable Chechen civilians who slowly go mad amid mindless atrocities and unending hunger. We have to be grateful for this book: the world has given up on the horror of Chechyna, but Politkovskaya has not.

Reading this account, one begins to realize how quickly a war among the starved turns into a maelstrom of desperation and hatred, paving the way for the

worst crimes imaginable. But it is not only the people on the ground that are guilty. As Politkovskaya makes clear, the vicious cycle of guilt and violence begins with the lack of responsibility or interest Russia's top political and military officials have taken for the entire affair. But the wrong does not end there. As we are shown, the more dead there are, the more corpses need to be transported, identified, and buried—and the more federal money is required. These funds flow comfortably into private pockets, while the bodies lie where they fell, and while families wonder about the locations of their loved ones. Finally, more refugees flee, and more humanitarian aid disappears somewhere between Moscow and the local authorities. Life, death, dignity—anything is for sale.

As Politkovskaya travels between Chechnya, the neighboring Ingushetia, and Moscow, the war she witnesses loses any clear characteristics of a military campaign. The rebels are invisible, except at night, when they slip across the federal check posts, seen by everyone yet some how remaining safe. Politkovskaya shows how this war has been destructive for both sides, and how very few people, particularly on the federal side, are really willing to sacrifice their lives for it. At the same time, the shelling and "cleansing" of Chechen villages continues, followed by Russian media reports of another "decisive victory" for the federal forces. Newly built refugee camps inside Chechnya are immediately destroyed by mysterious perpetrators. Medical supplies intended for the only working hospital in the Chechen capitol, Grozny, disappear en route. Arms are traded across invisible front lines. People are traded as well, and ransom is divided between the alleged enemies.

This book is an eyewitness account of a war that no longer has a purpose. Nor does it have an end. Tragically, there seem to be many who want this hell to continue.

—*Mariya Rasner*

The Civil Corporation:
The New Economy of Corporate Citizenship
By SIMON ZADEK
(London: Earthscan Pubications Ltd, 2001) $29.95 cloth

The Civil Corporation is a unique and valuable contribution to the increasingly important field of corporate social responsibility. According to Zadek, the civil corporation is one that takes full advantage of the opportunities for learning and action in its social and environmental objectives by developing internal values and competencies in its core business. Zadek posits that these corporations represent an active, deliberate effort to engage broader stakeholder interests in defining, monitoring, and verifying the social and environmental performance of

corporations. Civil corporations emerged as an outcrop of the "New Economy," which brought forth radical changes in the nature of state and business institutions, and redefined the individual and collective role of the citizen.

Zadek's analysis falls short, however, in answering the fundamental question he seeks to address: What should we reasonably expect from the business community in addressing the aspirations underpinning sustainable development? He does not adequately identify and inform his audience of the key drivers that encourage corporations to be more progressive in pursuing environmental and social objectives. These shortcomings are perhaps a reflection of Zadek's overly ambitious attempt to analyze every facet of corporate social responsibility. His predilection for endless hierarchies and typologies detracts from the central premise of his argument. For example, in the second chapter Zadek puts forth six possible reasons for the lack of adequate corporate citizenship to date. This is followed by several typologies, such as the four categories that describe why businesses should choose to act in a socially responsible way. These categorizations are useful in and of themselves, but the reader loses sight of the bigger picture while wading through endless typologies. Despite this, Zadek's book does provide a useful framework for dissecting the many layers and perspectives of corporate social responsibility, and for deconstructing the powerful myths surrounding business and the civil corporation.

—*Krista Salman*

Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Minority Protection
Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Independence
BY THE OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE
(Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2001) $40 each, paper

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The march toward European Union membership has been difficult for even the hardiest post-communist reformers in Central and Eastern Europe. According to *Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Minority Protection,* that road will not get any easier either, especially when it comes to implementing minority protections necessary for EU membership. After all, as this useful volume points out, even the stars of the post-communist transition, like Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia have yet to counter deeply entrenched discrimination against their Roma populations. Some countries, like Bulgaria, do not even seem to be trying. It is a sobering message, and we should be thankful that the Open Society Institute (OSI) has provided it.

George Soros, the billionaire financier and philanthropist who founded OSI, has arguably done more to push for democratization and openness in the

former communist bloc than any other individual in the last decade. OSI has often been willing to look at issues that others do not have the time or inclination to worry about. Minority rights and judicial independence are two of these issues, and it is therefore not surprising that no other books to date has taken such a broad and deep look at them. *Minority Protection* will be a vital tool for scholars, researchers and activists and a strong independent voice for ensuring greater minority protections as accession debate heats up in the next months.

This is not to say the book is perfect: OSI's decision to focus exclusively on Roma and ethnic-Russian minorities will leave anyone interested in the treatment of Hungarians in Slovakia looking elsewhere (or divining the answer from the information about the Roma). Sadly, it also seems that the reporting on some countries is better than on others.

The second volume in the EU accession project, *Judicial Independence*, addresses an aspect of the accession process that has received too little attention amid the fanfare surrounding reforms in the areas of civil society, privatization and elections. Given the problems that many of the former socialist countries are now facing in firmly establishing the rule of law, this lack of attention to judicial systems now seems a mistake. *Judicial Independence* is all the more important for this reason.

As the volume shows, an impartial and independent judiciary is essential for the protection of civil and political rights. In retrospect, it comes as no surprise that EU favorites like Slovenia and Hungary have the best and most independent court systems (as the volume notes), while those with the greatest democratic deficits, such as Romania or Bulgaria, lumber along with executive branches that persistently seek to manipulate them. Independent and credible research like this is essential in the process of holding states to their human rights obligations amid EU expansion. Journalists, students, rights advocates and researchers are going to find both of these books welcome references.

—*Daniel Langenkamp*

Russia and Its New Diasporas
By IGOR ZEVELEV
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001) $19.95

Igor Zevelev's insightful book on the search for a new Russia and the impact of the country's "new diasporas" provokes as many questions as it answers, and therein lies its value. Focusing his inquiry on Russia's political and sociological reaction to the "new diasporas"—the many ethnic Russians who have migrated to other regions in the former Soviet Union—the author outlines the

various methods by which Russia can reinforce a bond with the expatriate ethnic Russian community, and weighs the advantages and risks of each. The result is an in-depth study of the dangers of ethno-nationalism spurred by the desire to build a Russian "nation-state"—an entity that will restore territorial congruence between nation and state by fixing the state's borders around the settlements of ethnic Russians. In this context, Zevelev conducts a thorough review of Russian politics relating to the diasporas and touches on the individual and national identity crises inherent to the kind of shift in borders that many Russians faced after the crumbling of the Soviet Union.

A significant part of the book dwells on the "Russian Question," or the uncertainty surrounding the formation of the country's identity in the post-Soviet era. Zevelev argues in favor of a new analytical framework that will take into account the forces of globalization and the realistic options for the new Russia. He concludes that without this revised analysis, the United States, fearing a return to Russian imperialism, may promote the building of a nation-state in an attempt to constrain the extension of Russian borders. Zevelev urges the United States to encourage integration of the diasporas in the Russian territory instead as the best way to stem the rise of militant Russian ethno-nationalism.

Zevelev concludes by noting that the security and stability of the international system depends on the way the U.S. approaches the question of Russian identity. While he may not provide the answers to the many queries he poses, Zevelev's suggested analytical framework does bring the "Russian Question" into the new post-Soviet world, and thus may help to do the same with Russia itself.

—*Katherine Miller*

Recent Publications by the Fletcher Community

The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, established in 1933, is the oldest school in the United States devoted exclusively to the graduate study of international affairs. The mission of The Fletcher School is to provide high-quality, interdisciplinary instruction and research in the fields of law, diplomacy, economics, history, politics, business and regional studies. In an effort to provide a wider audience for the innovative research done by The Fletcher School's faculty, students and recent graduates, *The Fletcher Forum* publishes a list of recent publications by the Fletcher community in each issue.

STEVEN BLOCK, "Political Business Cycles, Democratization, and Economic Reform: The Case of Africa," *Journal of Development Economics,* 67(1) (February 2002): 205-228.

ANDREA M. CURTI, a master's degree candidate at The Fletcher School, is author of "The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: An Unlikely Weapon in the Fight Against AIDS," *American Journal of Law & Medicine,* (27)4 (2001).

DAN FAHEY, a master's degree candidate at The Fletcher School, is the author of "The Uses and Hazards of Depleted Uranium Munitions," *Policy Issues for Amnesty International,* Amnesty International, International Secretariate, POL 34/010/2001.

JOHNATHAN M. HARRIS, Adjunct Associate Professor of International Economics, is the editor of *Rethinking Sustainability: Power, Knowledge and Institutions* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2000).

JAMES A. HELIS, a master's degree candidate at The Fletcher School, is author of "Haiti: A Study in Canadian-American Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere." in David G. Haglund ed., *Over Here and Over There: Canada-US Defence Cooperation in an Era of Interoperability,* A special edition of *Queen's Quarterly* (2001): 113-144.

ALAN HENRIKSON, Associate Professor of Diplomatic History, is author of "Geographical Antipathy, and the Personification of 'Place Hate,'" *Political Geography* 20(1) (January 2001): 17-23. He is also author of "The Role of Metropolitan Regions in Making a New Atlantic Community," in Eric Philippart and Pascaline Winand, eds., *Ever Closer Partnership: Policy-Making in US-EU Relations,* (Brussels: PIE-Peter Lang, 2001): 187-227. He also wrote "The Constraint of Legitimacy: The Legal and Institutional Framework of Euro-Atlantic Security," in Pierre Martin and mark R. Brawley, eds., *Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?* (New York: Palgrave, 2001): 41-56.

JAMES HOLMES, a Ph.D. candidate at The Fletcher School, is author of "The Crusading Ethos in International Conflict: The Strange Case of the Third Crusade," *Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict* (September/October 2001): 71-89. He is also author of "Why the Middle East Confounds American Sanctions...And What America Should Do About It," paper presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, November 9, 2001.

KAREN JACOBSEN, Visiting Assistant Professor at The Fletcher School, and SUE LAUTZE, Adjunct Lecturer at The Fletcher School and Director of the Livelihoods Initiatives Program at the Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University, are authors with Abdal Monim Kheider Osman, of "Sudan: the Unique Challenges of Displacement in Khartoum" in Marc Vincent and Birgitte Sorensen, eds., *Caught Between Borders: Response Strategies of the Internally Displaced* (London: Pluto Press, 2001). Jacobsen is also author of "The Forgotten Solution: Local Integration for Refugees in Developing Countries," UNHCR, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 45., July, 2001. <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/pub/wpapers/wpno45.pdf>

LAURENT JACQUE, Professor of International Finance and Banking, and PAUL VAALER, Assistant Professor of International Business, are editors of *Financial Innovations and the Welfare of Nations* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001). Professor Jacque is also author of "The International Control Conundrum With Exchange Risk: An EVA Framework," *The Journal of International Business Studies* 33(1) (2001).

IAN JOHNSTONE, Assistant Professor of International Law, is coauthor with Shashi Tharoor of "The Humanitarian Security Dilemma in International Peacekeeping," in D.S. Gordon and F.H. Toase, eds., *Aspects of Peacekeeping* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001). He is also author of "UN Peace-building: Consent, Coercion and the Crisis of State Failure," in *From Territorial Sovereignty to Human Security,* Canadian Council of International Law, ed., (New York and London: Kluwer Law International, 2000); and "The United Nations in an Evolving Global Climate," in Magnus Jerneck and Ulrich Niemann eds., *Asia and Europe: Regional Cooperation in a Globalising World* (Singapore: Asia-Europe Foundation, 2001).

MATTHEW E. KAHN, Associate Professor of International Economics, is author of "The Beneficiaries of Clean Air Act Legislation," *Regulation* 24, no. 1 (2001): 34-39.

FARIS KHADER, a master's degree candidate at The Fletcher School, is the author, with Ellen Berman, of "Distributed Energy: You Can Get There From Here," *Natural Gas,* 18 (2), September 2001, 9-19.

ELLEN L. LUTZ, Adjunct Associate Professor of International Law, is co-author with Kathryn Sikkink of "The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America," *Chicago Journal of International Law* 2 (1) (Spring 2001).

MICHELE L. MALVESTI, a Ph.D. candidate at The Fletcher School, is the author of "Explaining the United States' Decision to Strike Back at Terrorists," in *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13(2) (Summer 2001).

LEE W. MCKNIGHT, Associate Professor of International Communication, and William Lehr, are authors of "No Optical Illusion," in *Worldlink,* the Magazine of the World Economic Forum, May/June 2001. McKnight is also author, with William Lehr and Pedro Ferreira, of "Wavelength Markets: Scalable Optical Network Technology and Policy Challenges," *Technology Forecasting and Social Change,* Special Issue on International Technology Policy and Innovation, in press, 2001. He also wrote "Survival of the Fastest. 21st Century Internet Business Practices," *The Journal of Regulation, Policy and Strategy for Telecommunications, Information, and Media,* 3(1) (February 2001).

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ALFRED P. RUBIN, Distinguished Professor of International Law, is author of "Actio Popularis, Jus Cogens and Ofenses Erga Omnes?" *New England Law Review,* 35 (2001): 265-280. He is also author of "The International Criminal Court: Possibilities for Prosecutorial Abuse," *Law & Contemporary Problems,* 64 (2001): 153-165; and "The Kosovo Commission Report (Review Article)," *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 6 (1) (2001): 147-155; and "The International Criminal Court; A Skeptical Analysis," Naval War College "Blue Book" (on the 80th Birthday of L.C. Green) 75 (2001): 421-438.

JESWALD SALACUSE, Henry J. Braker Professor of International Law, is author of "Renegotiating Existing Agreements: How to Deal with 'Life Struggling Against Form'," *Negotiation Journal* 17(4) (2001). He is also author of "Renegotiating International Project Agreements," *Fordham International Law Journal* 24 (2001): 1319-1370.

JOEL TRACHTMAN, Professor of International Law, is author of "Transcending Trade and...-an Institutional Perspective,"(working title) forthcoming in *American Journal of International Law* (2001). He is also author of "Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction and Choice of Law," forthcoming in *Virginia Journal of International Law,* 42 (1) (2001); "International Trade as a Vector in Domestic Regulatory Reform: Discrimination, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Negotiations," *Fordham International Law Journal* 24 (726) (2000); "Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction in International Securities Regulation," in Daniel Esty and Damien Gerardin, eds., *Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration: Comparative Perspectives* (2001); "Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction," 3 *Journal of International Economic Law,* 331 (2000). "Assessment of the Effects of Trade Liberalization on Domestic Environmental Regulation: Toward Trade-Environment Policy Integration," in *Assessing the Environmental Effects of Trade Liberalisation Agreements: Methodologies,* OECD, (2000).

Banu Ozcan, Burkhard Schrage, **PAUL VAALER,** Assistant Professor of International Business, and Michael Watkins are authors of "The Privatization of Anatolia National Telekom" (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2001).

THANOS VEREMIS, Constantine Karamanlis Professor of Hellenic and Southeastern European Studies, is coeditor with D.Daianu of *Balkan Reconstruction* (London: Frank Cass, 2001). He is also author of "The Ever-Changing Contours of the Kosovo Issue," in *What Status for Kosovo? Chaillot Papers,* 50 (October 2001): 85-98. He is also coeditor of the new *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,* whose first issue is due in January 2001 (London: Frank Cass Publishers).

JOSEPH VORBACH, Ph.D. candidate at The Fletcher School, is author of "The Vital Role of Non-Flag State Actors in the Pursuit of Safer Shipping," *Ocean Development and International Law,* 32(1) (2001).

ALAN WACHMAN, Assistant Professor of International Politics, is author of "Does the Diplomacy of Shame Promote Human Rights in China?" *Third World Quarterly* 22(1) (2001): 257–281. He is also author of "Challenges and Opportunities in the Taiwan Strait: Defining America's Role," Conference Report, *China Policy Series* 17. (New York: National Committee on United States China Relations, January 2001).

TOSHI YOSHIHARA, Ph.D. candidate at The Fletcher School, is author of *Chinese Information Warfare: A Phantom Menace or Emerging Threat?* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2001).