Henry Kissinger, Geopolitics, and Globalization

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An internationally minded reader might be disposed to say, "Yes, of course," almost reflexively in answer to the question posed by Dr. Henry Kissinger in the title of his recent book, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?*.[1] Actually, the former national security adviser and secretary of state is posing a more difficult question, one that does not allow for so straightforward an answer. What Dr. Kissinger really is asking is whether a geopolitical foreign policy is needed, or even possible, in the present age of globalization.

For Kissinger, this issue is as much a philosophical as a practical one. As the concepts of geopolitics and globalization are relied upon heavily in this work, a brief definition of terms is needed. "Geopolitical," according to Kissinger's application of the term, refers to the doctrine that the interests of the United States, like those of other countries, are best defended through an accurate reading and skillful manipulation by the country's leadership of the changing international balance of power. As geopolitics is a *strategic* doctrine, the validity of its maxims depends somewhat on the particular political constellation being confronted at any given time. It is also informed by the geographical distribution of resources and assets, especially at the regional level.

The primary task of the statesman thus is to maintain equilibrium, a somewhat more inclusive term often preferred by Kissinger. Maintaining "equilibrium" implies a constant assessment of balances of many kinds, including internal political balances within countries, as well as external military and other force correlations. Economic comparisons are also relevant to his analysis, but these usually are made by him through a political lens in descriptive rather than in statistical terms. The central focus of Kissinger's geopolitical analysis is the phenomenon of power in all its forms and the subjective as well as objective realities that make it palpable.

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Proponents of geopolitics, including Kissinger, rarely specify the ultimate purpose of a policy of equilibrating rivalries of power. Purportedly scientific and neutral, it too is ideological, however. Generally, the goal sought by practitioners of equilibrium diplomacy is international stability or, sometimes, "order." They are less concerned with progress in any particular direction or even peace, if understood as a condition in which there is no reliance on force. Strife is inherent in a geopolitical world. Some neo-realist writers today even see "offensive" behavior implicit in the logic of interstate power equilibria. The prevailing theory, however, is that preservation of the status quo is the preferred and usual result.[2] Essentially, therefore, geopolitics is a conservative, and a moderating, doctrine. Its keynote is control.

The meaning of the term "globalization" is somewhat less fully articulated by Kissinger. He, like others, uses it to refer to those processes of commercial and other cross-border exchange, decentralized and originating on many different levels of human organization, that link states together not so much politically as technologically, economically, and to some degree socially in a truly worldwide, or "global," system. Globalization is a *systemic* doctrine. Moreover, it implies that the world-system is changing in part because the physical limits of earthly expansion are being reached, and humanity's dynamism is now turning back on itself as well as thrusting outward and upward. A century ago, Halford Mackinder perceived that the world was becoming a vast "echo" chamber.[3] Today, we could call it a gigantic feedback mechanism.[4] The reverberations that are produced within the progressively closed world-system mean that few events are purely local in their effects. Similarly, the ramifications of almost every political act (or inaction) are increasingly widespread and hard to anticipate or to contain. The keynote of globalization is cacophony, if not chaos.

The central focus of Kissinger's geopolitical analysis is the phenomenon of power.

What effect is globalization having on foreign policy? Will it not, as Kissinger seems to be suggesting, make the deliberate formulation and conduct of foreign policy more and more difficult and, in the long run, even futile? Politics and policy necessitate a concentration of power and decisive action. "Globalization has diffused economic and technological power around the world. Instantaneous communications make the decisions in one region hostage to those in other parts of the globe," Kissinger observes in *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?*. "And globalization—inevitable as it is—also has the potential of giving rise to a gnawing sense of impotence as decisions affecting the lives of millions slip out of local political control. The sophistication of economics and technology is in danger of outrunning the capacities of contemporary politics."

The management of a geopolitical U.S. foreign policy, in particular, might be put in jeopardy in a globalizing world. The pluralism that is necessary to maintain a geographically distributed pattern of interstate relations among autonomous "powers" can disappear, as societies become so interconnected at different levels that they cannot separate themselves (e.g., by shifting alliances or alignments) according to what their national interests might dictate. The very boundaries between countries, between what is inside them and what is outside them, can break down as a result of globalization. "International relations," the subject-field on which diplomacy depends, can become meaningless if there is no real distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. This, then, is the fundamental challenge posed by globalization to geopolitics.

Kissinger's book *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?*, unlike his memoir volumes *White House Years* (1979), *Years of Upheaval* (1982), and *Years of Renewal* (1999), and also his more theoretical-historical volume *Diplomacy* (1994), is mainly a work of policy analysis and prescription. Nonetheless, the personal and the principled are never very far apart for Dr. Kissinger. A reader, knowing of his past involvements and his current business and other relationships, may well suspect selection and distortion. But, in fairness to the author's singular expertise and statesmanly intent, the ideas and arguments advanced in *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* deserve to be presented and evaluated on their merits.

KISSINGER'S PERSPECTIVES ON HISTORY, POLICY, AND LAW

The practice of geopolitics for Henry Kissinger is not merely the mastery of the actual processes of global interaction. It is also the mental discipline of conceptually controlling, or purporting to control, the flow of history—the interpretation of it. As he wrote in his first book, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22*, the "great successes" of Austria's foreign minister, Prince Klemens von Metternich, were achieved through diplomatic skill—the ability "to control events by defining their moral framework."[5] Sometimes such conceptual control is more apparent than real. As the British diplomatic historian, Sir Charles Webster, wrote in a review of *A World Restored*, the impression Kissinger gave therein that the wily Metternich, whose dispatches and letters he seemed to accept at face value, "had foreseen everything and pulled all the strings" was just not realistic, or authentic, history.[6]

Even during the Cold War, which is the main basis of historical reference in *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?*, the regulation of international affairs by political figures sometimes was quite illusory. Yet the image of being in control, particularly of nuclear weapons, was considered vital to international stability and to preserving the idea of statesmanship itself at that time. The present era of globalization, by contrast, does not allow for such deliberate control by political foresight

or by moral framing. With no overall vision to master it, the processes of globalization seem blind. The results that globalization produces, therefore, are not history, for there is no rationality in it. They are merely occurrences. It is perhaps this condition, that of the non-rational "strategy-lessness" of globalization, that most provokes Dr. Kissinger intellectually.

What he argues and opines even with regard to issues he has written about before is of importance in part because his views remain so highly influential. He is rare in taking the longer view, one that reflects his own earlier experiences as well as his purely historical knowledge. The key to the maintenance of world order, he continues to hold, is leadership in foreign policy making. For him, as earlier noted, this means the projection onto international affairs of a rational cohesion. U.S. foreign policy, however, is not a world structure. It is at best a template that can help to form Americans' own expectations of future international action, as well as, owing to the power of the United States, many other countries' expectations of what is likely to happen. Statesman-like logic and intentionality, no matter how powerful the nation from which the force of reason emanates, cannot determine human activity on a global scale.

Kissinger's intellectual method of world-order-building-through-foreign-policy, involving frequent reference to historical precedent and reasoning by analogy from one region of the world to another, is evident in his discussion of many of the problems that the United States faces abroad today. He acknowledges in *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* that no "single formula" of foreign policy can be applied. He does not present a global blueprint. Nor would he recommend a single, comprehensive strategy for fighting the current War on Terror, though evidences of terrorist activity are widely spread.[7] In his book, Kissinger finds, consistently with his geopolitical approach, that different foreign policies for different parts of the world are needed. This is also necessary because so much of the world is "transitional." Different regions of the world, as he emphasizes, are in different stages of historical development. Moreover, they have different cultural contexts, which are partially determined by their geographical situations. It thus cannot be expected that one international solution will apply to the problems of all nations irrespective of region.

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Several of Kissinger's substantive positions, it may be noted, have changed somewhat since *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* was published early in 2001. His basic policy views, however, have not. For instance, he reportedly now is inclined to favor the inclusion of the three Baltic states in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In his book, however, he adheres to the more cautious view that taking Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania directly into NATO could threaten to

upset the geopolitical balance in Europe because of Russia's well-known objections to having NATO close to it. "One of the key challenges to the relations of the Atlantic nations with Russia," Kissinger writes, "is whether Russia can be induced to modify its traditional definition of security." Accordingly, "the West needs to be careful not to extend its integrated military system too close to Russia's borders." This position is counterbalanced, however, by the statement that "the West has an obligation to induce Russia to abandon its quest for domination of its neighbors."

Two related occurrences evidently caused Kissinger to reconsider his earlier doubt about the wisdom of formal NATO membership for the Baltic countries. Those are the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the cooperation the United States has received from Russia under its pragmatic new leader, Vladimir Putin, in addressing what is being represented by both countries as a common threat, whether centered in Afghanistan or in Chechnya. According to Bill Keller of *The New York Times,* Dr. Kissinger, who in his book had stated that allowing the Baltics into NATO would be "too inflammatory," changed his mind after listening to Mr. Putin.[8] It is likely that Kissinger still does not favor full incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into NATO's military structure, especially if that were to mean placement of non-Baltic troops and weapons in the Baltic area on a permanent basis.[9]

Ever mindful of the past, Kissinger remains wary of Russia, regardless of who its leader is.

Ever mindful of the past, Kissinger remains wary of Russia regardless of who its leader is. Thus he was critical of proposals, such as the scheme put forward by NATO Secretary-General George Robertson (following the lead of British Prime Minister Tony Blair) "to fit Russia into NATO" by creating a new NATO council including Russia, to discuss issues such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and refugees. NATO, in Kissinger's view, is "basically a military alliance, part of whose purpose is the protection of Europe against Russian invasion." Therefore, "to couple NATO expansion with even partial Russian membership in NATO" would be to merge "two incompatible courses of action." In order to develop a partnership with Russia, which he does favor doing, other "consulting mechanisms" outside NATO should be developed.[10] What finally has emerged is a new strategic relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation—the NATO-Russia Council, formalized in Rome in May 2002. This enables NATO members and Russia to meet "at 20," with all working "as equals," rather than, as before, with NATO as a group addressing Russia according to the formula "19+1." The "new quality" of the NATO-Russian relationship after 9/11, however, does not give Russia a veto over the NATO allies' military decisions.

The positions that Kissinger takes with regard to current issues generally are not far removed from positions he has taken before—even if he would sooner forget

some of his past involvements. Noteworthy in *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* are evidences of old battles and hints of personal apologia, even when Kissinger does not mention his personal role and interest. The motive of self-justification and self-preservation is perhaps most evident in his critique of "universal jurisdiction"—the legal doctrine according to which any government can claim the right to prosecute human rights violators, even non-citizens residing in other countries, for alleged offenses that may have been committed outside the national jurisdiction of its courts.

As Kissinger notes, two approaches to the goal of gaining jurisdiction over offenses against human rights and acts of aggression, no matter where committed, recently have been developed. The first is to empower national prosecutors to bring offenders into their jurisdictions by means of extradition procedures—as when, in 1998, a Spanish judge sought to extradite the former Chilean president, General Augusto Pinochet, from Great Britain to prosecute him in Spain for crimes committed earlier in Chile against Spanish citizens. The second is the effort to gain widespread recognition for the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, the statute for which was signed in Rome in 1998 by 95 states including the United States. Since then, the U.S. government, under President George W. Bush, has vigorously opposed the ICC, whose statute, however, has received enough ratifications to bring it into effect. The "danger," as Kissinger perceives it, is that the quest for universal jurisdiction against heinous acts will, if pushed to extremes, "risk substituting the tyranny of judges for that of governments." In history, he counsels, "the dictatorship of the virtuous has often led to inquisitions and even witch hunts." Kissinger's obvious fear is that today the effort to punish crimes internationally may "allow legal principles to be used as weapons to settle political scores."

Charges of violations of international humanitarian standards have caused Kissinger great indignation.

Kissinger's rejection of the far-reaching doctrine of universal jurisdiction and prosecution, though expressed mostly in theoretical terms, barely conceals his own worry about its being applied successfully to him. Understandably, he is concerned about being targeted for alleged misdeeds, which he either knew about or was himself a party to, during the time he served in government. Charges of his personal involvement in decisions, dating from the Vietnam War period, which resulted in violations of international humanitarian standards are serious ones. The fact that they continue to be made has caused him great indignation.[11]

THE WESTPHALIAN ORDER AND THREE CURRENT THREATS TO IT

Dr. Kissinger's basic concept of world order based more on power than on law is under siege today. The very discipline of international relations, which he

in his earlier scholarly writings and years of teaching at Harvard helped to establish, may now become obsolete, as the title of *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* itself suggests. He emphasizes that the theoretical foundation of the structure of world order is the doctrine of sovereignty, i.e., the supreme authority of the independent state, or nation-state. In apparently full and continued agreement with earlier sovereignty theorists, he writes that this historic principle "declared a state's domestic conduct and institutions to be beyond the reach of other states."

The modern system of international relations with the sovereign nation-state as its cornerstone originated with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. It was extended around the world by the European colonial powers with most of their colonies eventually becoming independent states in their own right. In its ideal form, the nation-state is a fusion of a nationality with a governmental entity. All states, large or small, are personalities under international law and thus nominally are equal. Although patently unrealistic, for states are unequal in actual power assets and also in political status, the Westphalian system was considered to be a significant advance—it stood in opposition to the expansion of vast empires and also to the sway of militant ideologies. Domestic rulers of nations, Kissinger reflects, were less likely to be arbitrary and oppressive than "crusading armies" bent on converting the peoples they conquered. The upholders of the fragmented and pluralistic Westphalian international order rejected the example of the Holy Roman Empire with its universal design as well as the experience of the bloody Thirty Years' War conducted in the name of religion (Catholic vs. Protestant). The new world leaders "sought to establish restraints by an equilibrium that prevented any one nation from being dominant."

The system established by the Peace of Westphalia was anti-hegemonic not only in resisting overweening power but also, Kissinger adds with present concerns in mind, in countering aggressive morality. "Its basic purpose (in modern terms) was to stop the merging of domestic and foreign policy or (in the language of the period) faith and diplomacy," as he explains.

> All signatories confirmed the principle of *cujus regio, ejus religio*—whoever rules determines the religion of his subjects. No other country had a right to intervene in this process. Thus was born the concept of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states, and it was developed for precisely the opposite reason it is being discarded today. It was the human rights slogan of the period; restoring peace and tranquility was its purpose, not legitimizing domestic oppression.

Today, the systemic combination of sovereign independence, which can shield states against foreign interference, and the balance of power, which can limit the scope of conflict between states, is being put in jeopardy, Kissinger warns.

The first contemporary threat to the inherited Westphalian system of international relations is the aforementioned "universal humanitarian intervention"

doctrine, which in its legal-prosecutorial form can be equated with the "universal jurisdiction" claim. Interventions in the name of morality are, of course, not historically unprecedented. The trend today toward acceptance of the notion of a universal moral order, which can be invoked virtually by anyone in a globalized world and can warrant military and other intrusion into the internal affairs of countries and the lives of residents therein, is deeply alarming to Kissinger—in part, as noted, for personal reasons. His main objection to the global morality trend, however, is philosophical and principled. He recognizes freely that the Westphalian international system has offered no solution to the problem of violence within states, arising from civil wars, ethnic conflicts, or the denial of human rights. "It dealt with the problem of peace and left justice to the domestic institutions," he acknowledges. Yet, this may be the right priority.

In the Kissingerian hierarchy, international peace is a more important aim to be sought than national justice. Peace is often a necessary condition of justice, if not necessarily a sufficient condition of it. "The contemporary human rights activists are arguing the opposite," objects Kissinger. "In their view, peace flows automatically from justice, and the nation-state, or perhaps any state, cannot be relied on to deliver justice; it must be put under some kind of supranational authority entitled to use force to make its writ run." In his contrasting view, the possession of political power held at the national level and exercised in relations between nations is a more reliable basis for responsible humanitarian behavior than the juridical application of purportedly universal principles on which there might not even be consensus. "On the whole," as Kissinger sums up the point, "the human rights activists trust jurists more than they do statesmen. The advocates of the Westphalian principles trust statesmen more than jurists." It is clear where his own confidence lies.

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The second contemporary threat to the long-established system of international relations is the "metamorphosis," as Kissinger describes it, occurring in the nation-state itself. At one time, the basic pieces played in the game of international politics were considered to be, in their interactions, somewhat like billiard balls, as many realist theorists imagined them. Hans Morgenthau in his realist treatise, *Politics Among Nations,* represented countries schematically as circles (labeled Nation A, Nation B, Nation C, and so on). These were arranged in diagrams showing states in various patterns of mutual opposition.[12] The interacting countries were unitary actors. They had uniform borders and a certain solidity and consistency of character, or identity.

Today, by contrast, it is the variability of countries—and the variety of social and other groupings within countries—that stands out. This condition, related to globalization, adversely affects a leader's ability to behave internationally in a decisive, "sovereign" fashion. Although called "nations," many of the world's states are not in fact linguistic or cultural units, Kissinger sharply points out. Even among today's "great powers," only Japan and the leading states of Europe are relatively homogeneous, and even they, owing to the increase of immigration and the need for labor, are becoming less uniformly "national" in composition and identity, he observes. America's "national" unity, too, is becoming doubtful. "The United States has increasingly equated its national identity with multiethnicity," Kissinger remarks with unmistakable regret. He himself had become a naturalized American at a time when the accent was on the concept "*one* from many" in the country's motto, *E Pluribus Unum*. In most of the rest of the world, it is "the rule" that states have culturally diverse populations. In many of these, ethnic groups, in the name of self-determination or national liberation, are seeking autonomy or even outright independence.

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At the same time, especially in Europe, historic nation-states, feeling themselves inadequate in size to play significant roles on a global political stage, are collecting themselves together in larger units. The European Union is the principal example. In reality, however, they may just be becoming "multiethnic" on a larger scale. "National" differences even within a constitutionally established United Europe might immobilize it, leaving its foreign policy ineffectual. "The emergence of a unified Europe is one of the most revolutionary events of our time," Kissinger does recognize. But the question he earlier famously asked—"Whom does one call when one wants to talk to 'Europe'?"—remains open. The answer is still likely to be "London" or "Paris" or, now, "Berlin," rather than "Brussels." To be sure, the European Union does now have a High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.[13] The responses one gets today from any of Europe's capitals, however, may not be as clear, consistent, or constant as in times past.

A third contemporary threat to the Westphalian system of state interaction that Kissinger perceives is technological change—the very mainspring of globalization. Technology has trumped territory, he points out, alluding to the Peace of Westphalia's emphasis on territorial sanctity as the premise of state security. "In the modern age, territory has lost much of its significance as an element of national strength; technological progress can enhance a country's power far more than any conceivable territorial expansion." Nuclear weapons during the Cold War may have prevented the outbreak of war between the world's technologically advanced

superpowers. However, if nuclear knowledge and materials continue to spread, and if nuclear and other highly engineered means of mass destruction fall into the hands of persons and groups—non-state actors—that disdain the status quo and its upholders, then technology might work perversely to destabilize the world.

Small countries, such as Singapore and Israel, have been able to harness technology to survive on a limited territorial footing. But these, and even much larger states with greater natural endowments and other geographical advantages, remain vulnerable, however. The 9/11 attacks, which turned modern aviation and even modern architecture against themselves, effectively illustrate Kissinger's point. There is today no guaranteed safety in territorial sovereignty, nor reassurance in the formal system of interstate relations which was founded on it. The billiard balls, although more numerous, are today fragile, both from the inside and from the outside.

These several factors—the humanitarian movement's challenge to sovereignty, the multiethnic challenge to state identity, and the technological challenge to national security—all have worked to undermine "international relations," as previously understood and managed by statesmen such as Dr. Kissinger. "Today," he thus concludes, "the Westphalian order is in systemic crisis."

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND FOUR "INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS"

According to Kissinger, "at least four international systems are existing side by side." The chapters of *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* describing these systems—the Atlantic, Asian, Middle Eastern, and African—constitute the main body the book. These chapters also contain most of Kissinger's specific foreign policy prescriptions, some of which are bold, and others surprising in their conventionality. Many of the actual topics addressed in the book are those one would expect to find, such as U.S. relations with the EU and post-Soviet Russia, economic cooperation in the Western Hemisphere, geopolitical rivalry in Asia involving Japan, China, and India, conflicts over oil and religion in the Middle East, and poverty and health issues in Africa. Though expected and familiar in a factual sense, some of these matters, particularly those concerning political relationships with the major powers of Europe and East Asia, are so thoroughly *his* subjects that they become, as Kissinger authoritatively discusses them in the light of post-Cold War developments and twenty-first century problems, novel.

Kissinger describes the four systems somewhat comparatively, perhaps inevitably from his own "Atlantic," or Euro-American, political and historical perspective. That remains his primary "mental map,"[14] which he consciously or unconsciously superimposes in his geopolitical analyses on other regions. The four juxtaposed systems, with their most salient characteristics noted, are: (1) the Atlantic system, now essentially peaceful, linking the United States with the demo-

cratic and market-oriented societies of Western Europe and increasingly also with the rest of the Western Hemisphere; (2) the Asian system, which is dominated fundamentally by strategic rivalries between Japan, China, India, and Russia; (3) the Middle Eastern system, where the political question of legitimacy—indeed, the very existence of the contending parties, particularly Israel and certain Arab regimes—is not settled, and "compromise" therefore is especially difficult to achieve; and (4) the African system, where most of its 46 countries are democratic in name, but there is no real unifying principle, either ideological or geopolitical, to organize their relationships, and where economic and social underdevelopment, dehumanizing health problems, and "savage" civil wars predominate. These four very different regional-international systems coexist within an overall global system that, as yet, has few common characteristics to define it. The dynamics of globalization may be producing a superficial homogeneity, but the results include sharper interregional and other discrepancies and tensions.

THE ATLANTIC SYSTEM: "THE WORLD OF DEMOCRACIES"

Kissinger describes the Atlantic political system as having been shaped, successfully, according to the principles of President Woodrow Wilson, of whose universal idealism he nonetheless intellectually remains skeptical. The Atlantic area, if not the rest of the world, has indeed been "made safe for democracy." Democracy as a system, in turn, has contributed to the region's safety. "The Wilsonian ideal of an international order based on a common devotion to democratic institutions and settling its disputes by negotiations rather than war has triumphed among the nations bordering the North Atlantic," as Kissinger writes. The prospect of another war among great powers in the region simply does not exist. This is partly because members of the Atlantic Alliance have come to "think of themselves as belonging to a unique and special community of values and not simply as an aggregate of national interests." This "partnership," formed among the nations of the Atlantic maritime realm, has been, and still is, central to the maintenance of order in the world as a whole, Kissinger is convinced. "Even after the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the Atlantic partnership has remained for the United States the crucial buttress of international order."

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Yet, following the Cold War, a sense of "common security" has been difficult to maintain, and agreement on a "common purpose" has been hard to achieve. A number of factors have weakened Atlantic cohesion—a subject that

has been of major concern to Kissinger for decades.[15] Among the more recent troubling factors, as he sees them, are: the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, a deplorable tendency "to treat foreign policy as a tool of domestic policy," and also the aforementioned growth of a sense of a separate European identity—the last of these causing people in Europe to consider that they have more in common with each other than they do with Americans, thus denying the sense of a larger, Atlantic identity.

Trade frictions and other transatlantic disputes also are, of course, irritants. But far more consequential than particular disputes over bananas or beef, interestingly writes Kissinger, is "the loss of human contact between the two sides of the Atlantic." Given the "unprecedented travel" across the Atlantic, this is a paradoxical perception. He explains:

> More Americans and Europeans are visiting the other continent than ever before. But they move about in the cocoon of their preconceptions or professional relationships, without acquiring a knowledge of the history and intangible value of the other side of the Atlantic. What the current generation of Americans knows about Europe grows far more out of business deals than political or cultural ties.

Among many Europeans, the disinterest seems to be reciprocated.

This may to some extent be an effect of globalization, in which the process of communication may be seen to displace the awareness of community. If so, this is surprisingly at variance with the belief of the political scientist Karl W. Deutsch and others that a community, such as the Atlantic community, *is* largely the communication that occurs within it.[16] What may now, in fact, be happening is that *intra*-European communication is intensifying at a more rapid rate than is *trans*-Atlantic communication. This would fit with the Deutsch findings and also with Dr. Kissinger's observation, regarding especially Europe's leaders, that the amount of time required for "elaborating the process of integration itself" is becoming a major hindrance—one rooted in structural-bureaucratic conditions—to cross-Atlantic awareness and understanding.

Kissinger, with his keen sensitivity to how institutional factors can constrain and even compel statesmen,[17] believes that a solution to the Atlantic "drift" problem must be in part organizational. His starting point—a major shift for him—is that NATO cannot serve any longer as "the sole institution for Atlantic cooperation." The European Union, too, must be included. What he recommends in the security field is that two interrelated steps be taken. First, he suggests: "The European Union must affirm its determination to safeguard its territorial integrity"—thus finally assuming political responsibility for Europe's security. Next, he proposes: "NATO needs to affirm that the territorial integrity of the European Union is a vital NATO interest"—thereby giving Europe's own security

commitment, and stated plans to create a "European" military force, the reality of American strategic backing.

The idea is innovative and strategically adroit. It is reminiscent of an earlier ingenious solution to a European security conundrum through a double-organizational action, namely: the simultaneous incorporation in 1954 of the Federal Republic of Germany into the Western European Union (WEU) and also into NATO. The WEU (formerly, the Brussels Pact) had the stronger formal commitment, but NATO had the greater real strength and could provide overall reassurance.[18] The combined EU and NATO pledges that Dr. Kissinger now recommends, as he shrewdly argues, would make it "possible to design security guarantees without forward deployments"—thus implicitly recognizing Russia's geopolitical position and sensitivity. Kissinger finesses the Russian factor, i.e., Russia's resistance to NATO's further military expansion, by adding that an "indispensable component" of the proposed EU/NATO combination would be "rapid membership of the Baltic states in the European Union" (rather than in NATO, this implies). A "union of three hundred million people," he comments as if to induce greater EU speed, should be able to make exceptions for "the eight million people in the Baltic region if the European and Atlantic interest requires it." Kissinger's complex scenario, it now appears, will be replaced by the Baltic states being admitted *both* to NATO and to the EU.

In the economic field, Kissinger boldly recommends a move toward establishing a Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA). Though not a new idea—it was put forward a decade ago by, among others, Klaus Kinkel, then Germany's foreign minister—Kissinger's TAFTA proposal is unusual in its extensive scope. He envisages the TAFTA formation as encompassing all of the nations of the European Union (including those that do not belong to NATO) plus the United States and Canada and, in time, Mexico. TAFTA would merge with NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement). At that point, Kissinger suggests, "new consultative machinery" in the political and social fields as well as the economic area would be required. This would "forge closer links between the Western Hemisphere and the European Union." Thus, all of Latin America might be brought in and, perhaps as an "associate member," a more constitutional and democratizing Russia as well.

Kissinger, as a complement to the above, firmly supports the movement toward a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) process, begun in Miami in December 1994. He criticizes the Clinton administration for not having persuaded Congress to renew the fast-track authority needed for the easier negotiation and expedited legislative approval of its FTAA plan. That failure has now been remedied by the George W. Bush administration, which has secured from Congress trade promotion authority, as fast-track is now called. For political as well as economic reasons, Kissinger is skeptical of lesser, potentially competitive

arrangements such as the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) zone, involving Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. At the same time, he does acknowledge: "From a strictly geographical perspective, Mercosur makes sense." He simply does not want the United States to be confronted "with a series of faits accomplis" of a subregional or regional kind. This would apply as well to the even more ambitious Brazil-proposed scheme of a South American Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), an idea that may now be in abeyance owing to the economic instability and related unrest in many parts of the South American continent.

Kissinger's worry is that throughout Latin America and the Caribbean a "new form of nationalism may emerge, seeking national or regional identity by confronting the United States." There is already evidence of such a reaction in Venezuela—owing to the anti-U.S. stance of its "Bolivarian" leader, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez. Modeling himself on Simón Bolívar, his country's revolutionary era liberator, President Chávez has summoned mass-based "Bolivarian circles" to lend him support. In Argentina, Brazil, and elsewhere in South America, there are new signs of anti-U.S. and, more broadly, anti-globalization sentiment. The recent election of the populistic Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula as he is commonly known) as Brazilian president is an example of this. He strongly opposes the "neoliberal" economic policies of his predecessor, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. A completed FTAA, however—should it be possible to negotiate a workable hemispheric agreement by the target date of 2005—might help to check this divisive trend.

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The continued strengthening of links between the Mercosur countries and the European Union, with its exclusivist appearance, also troubles Kissinger. The objective ought to be, instead, a three-way, or trilateral and inclusive, trade partnership with all international rivalries subordinated to the broader Atlantic interest and value system. As he advises from his deep historical perspective,

> The nations of this hemisphere should resist the temptation of reversing the dictum of British Foreign Secretary George Canning, who welcomed the Monroe Doctrine by stating that the New World had been called into being to redress the balance of the old. Is the European Union now to be called into being to encourage and then exploit a rivalry between Western Hemisphere blocs? Rather than using Europe as a counterweight to NAFTA, the goal should be to unite NAFTA, Mercosur, and the European Union in an Atlantic free trade area.

A TAFTA, progressively extended throughout the Caribbean area, Central America, and South America, could be one way to achieve that end in everyone's interest.

Despite his expansive Atlanticism, Kissinger's core affiliation clearly is the North Atlantic partnership. NATO, he frankly states, would remain "the key security organization." The development of a TAFTA would make for a stronger set of Atlantic economies. Kissinger recommends that there be further new political construction as well. An "Atlantic Steering Group" representing the United States, the integrated European Union, those European nations not part of the politically integrated Europe, NATO's secretary general, and the EU's high representative for common foreign and security policy could give political direction to the Atlantic community. Supported by a secretariat, as Kissinger outlines the Steering Group idea, it would meet at stated intervals. Its function would be to develop "parallel approaches" to world affairs and also "manage differences" as they arise. Taken together, the major parts of Kissinger's Atlantic ensemble—NATO (for security issues), a TAFTA (for economic issues), and an Atlantic Steering Group (for political issues)—would be a proper structure for the "growing community of democracies in the Americas and Europe."

THE ASIAN SYSTEM: "THE WORLD OF EQUILIBRIUM"

In the Asian international system, a region where the influence of the United States is much more limited, Kissinger acknowledges, the overriding objective must be to preserve equilibrium. Relations between the major powers of Asia today are much more contentious in comparison to the politics of the Atlantic world, and are likely to remain so. "Wars between them are not likely, but neither are they excluded," Kissinger states soberly. As seen through his comparative-historical lens, "the international order of Asia therefore resembles that of nineteenth-century Europe more than that of the twenty-first century North Atlantic."

Relations between the major powers of Asia today are much more contentious in comparison to the politics of the Atlantic world.

The Asian international system comprises the following significant units, as Kissinger characterizes them. There is an "advanced industrial country"—Japan—with an economy larger than that of any of the historic states of Europe. There are three countries "of continental scale"—India, China, and Russia. There are South Korea and Singapore, both of them approaching the economic and technological capacity of the most advanced industrial states. There are two "large archipelagoes," the Philippines and Indonesia, which between them control a number of the world's major sea lanes. There are Thailand and Burma, two "ancient nations with

populations approximating those of France and Italy." There is North Korea, a "rogue nation" now known to be developing nuclear weapons as well as possessing long-range missiles. Finally, there is Vietnam which, Kissinger notes with the respect due an old adversary, "has demonstrated its military prowess and fierce nationalism in wars against France, the United States, and China," and also "exercises a kind of dominion" over its neighbors in Indochina, Laos, and Cambodia.

From a U.S. perspective, Asia's economy may be even more important than its military strength, for the overall global equilibrium may be affected by disturbances in it. Globalization has linked markets everywhere. While Asia may now be joined to the world economy, Kissinger emphasizes, "it lacks a regional structure to mitigate that economy's turbulence or any financial firewall other that the strength of its various national economies." The Asian financial crisis of 1997 clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of Asia's smaller- and medium-sized economies to fluctuating interest rates and speculative capital flows.

An Asian Free Trade Area, though often proposed, has not yet developed despite support from China and some interest shown by Japan. Mutual "national suspicions" are still too great and "levels of development" too uneven to permit the Asian equivalent of a European Union, at least not in "the middle-term future," Kissinger estimates. He warns, nevertheless, that another significant financial crisis in Asia surely would accelerate efforts by Asian countries to gain greater control over their destinies "by the creation of an Asian counterpart to the existing regional systems." Inevitably, this would cause interregional friction, including difficulty with the United States.

"A hostile Asian bloc," combining the most populous nations of the world and vast resources, "would be incompatible with the American national interest," Kissinger bluntly asserts. In order to preclude such a formation, the United States "must retain a presence in Asia." Asia's "coalescence into an unfriendly bloc" would be "most likely to happen under the tutelage of one of its major powers"—by which he most likely means China. Here Kissinger instructively compares America's present strategic relation to Asia with Great Britain's similarly semi-detached role in the affairs of Continental Europe over a period of four centuries. Winston Churchill, in a 1936 address[19] that Kissinger quotes, laid down a guideline for Britain vis-à-vis the Continent that the United States would be wise to follow today in facing movements of the Asian power balance. Instead of succumbing to a temptation to "join with" the stronger, and enjoying "the fruits of his conquest," Churchill reflected with pride, Great Britain "always took the harder course, joined with the less strong Powers, made a combination among them, and thus defeated and frustrated the

From a U.S. perspective, Asia's economy may be even more important than its military strength.

Continental military tyrant whoever he was, whatever nation he led." In the parlance of present-day American political science, Britain opted for a "balancing" over a "bandwagoning" strategy.[20] It did not do so, however, on the basis of power calculation alone. There was a moral element in Britain's position. Churchill saw it as "a law of public policy which we are following, and not a mere expedient dictated by accidental circumstances, or likes or dislikes, or any other sentiment." Put differently, it was a matter of logic, even of doing the right thing. This could include acting out of loyalty to one's allies, although one's allies had to be chosen carefully so as not to put one's country on the wrong, i.e., "unlawful" or illogical, side.

Kissinger appears to favor just such an objective—a rationally principled analysis of the changing equilibrium of Asia and of such American action as might be required to help maintain it. He does, of course, recognize the differences between the older, smaller, more intricate European system, which was relatively homogenous, and the still inchoate, vast, and heterogeneous Asian system of today. In the structure of the Asian system he finds "two strategic balances": one in Northeast Asia, in which China, Japan, Russia, and the United States interact, with the Korean peninsula being a "potential flashpoint"; and the other in Southeast Asia, where China, India, Japan, the United States, and Indonesia are the principal contenders, with the South China Sea being one of the foci. Overarching both of these regional balances, as Kissinger points out, is the apothecary's scale of the global nuclear balance which the United States still maintains. The Asian nations beneath it "coexist in two different worlds simultaneously," he writes. "With respect to the global balance of power, they shelter under America's protection of the global equilibrium." This does not prevent them, however, from contributing to that equilibrium "by a doctrine of nonalignment which avoids formal political ties to the United States and leaves them free to participate even in policies designed to weaken America's alleged dominance"—or "hegemony," to use the term that Chinese theorists and other critics of American foreign policy in Asia sometimes employ. In reality, though Kissinger does not mention it, these countries, through their resistance and other responses to American presence and power, also are helping to maintain a global equilibrium.

Another significant financial crisis in Asia surely would accelerate efforts by Asian countries to gain greater control over their destinies.

Political and strategic conditions do not exist in Asia, Kissinger believes, for "drawing a dividing line and grouping all the nations on one side of it." This is "barring some major Chinese provocation." In comparison with the post-Second World War international environment in Europe, as he sees it, the current situation in Asia actually is quite favorable. "No Asian nation—not even China—is in

a position to threaten all its neighbors simultaneously, as the Soviet Union was able to do until the very end of the Cold War." The "geopolitical challenge" for every major Asian nation today is not, therefore, how it could conquer its neighbors—because it cannot—but "how to prevent these neighbors from combining against it." The divisions between them, of course, are still profound. This reality is sometimes obscured by meetings between leaders—especially those of China and Russia—who join in proclaiming "a strategic partnership" against American dominance. Only "relentless American bullying" actually could drive the Chinese and Russians into a deeper partnership, Kissinger believes. With every country in Asia plainly wishing to have "closer relations" with the United States than it does with any Asian adversary of the U.S.—this being "America's comparative advantage"—it is logical for the United States to maintain cooperative relations with all nations in Asia, and not, as Kissinger puts it, to assume "inherent hostility by any major Asian power until there is a clear demonstration of it." Thereby, the United States "will be in a position to make its support decisive when it is, in fact, needed and to avoid tempting other states into passivity or into playing America off against an adversary of its own making." At the same time, if and when American "national interests" actually are threatened, the United States must "turn implacable."

Only "relentless American bullying" actually could drive the Chinese and Russians into a deeper partnership.

How one defines those "national interests," of course, is a matter of policy and judgment. For Kissinger, the question of how America's interests are communicated—that is, transmitted through diplomacy—is almost as important as what those interests actually are conceived to be. Clarity of expression can avoid international miscalculation. When the stakes are high, as they are in U.S.-Chinese relations, certainty of mutual understanding can be critical. The issue of human rights is particularly illustrative. In this field, the realist's doctrine of "interest" as the touchstone of policy is not very useful and "value" language must be used. Though respectful of sovereignty and opposed to moral crusades, Kissinger recognizes, almost as if it were a concession, that "concern for human rights" will always be an important feature of American foreign policy. "It reflects the sort of people we are," he writes. "And it will affect governmental decisions where there exists scope for discretion." This last caveat indicates his firmly held view that human rights advocacy should not be an absolute policy commitment—an imperative carried out irrespective of actual or potential realities. The likely reactions of other governments, especially of powerful countries like China, are foremost among those realities. Yet, the reactions of others can and should be influenced. Thus Kissinger writes as a kind of advisory to the leadership of China and other countries in Asia: "Wise Asian

leaders will take America's values seriously and avoid endangering a relationship on which so much of Asia's stability as well as the peace of the world depend."

The issue of Taiwan is very similar in that the positions, as well as the interests and values that buttress them, of both sides must be well communicated—though not too precisely. Kissinger regards this issue as a "wild card" in U.S.-Chinese relations, in large part because it is "the subject of domestic pressure" in both countries. It is "governed by a process with its own imperatives," not readily subject to diplomatic control. As a deeply symbolic as well as substantive issue, the Taiwan problem must be understood by both sides accurately. This seems to contradict the diplomatic argument for ambiguity with which Dr. Kissinger himself once helped to invest the issue. The question of which Chinese government—the one in Taipei or the one in Beijing—the United States "really" recognized was, as he candidly recalls, "shelved in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972," a document that he, as national security adviser to President Richard Nixon, had the principal hand in writing.[21] The United States government "acknowledged" in this text that all Chinese living on both sides of the Taiwan Strait considered that there "is but one China." This clearly implied, though it did not clearly say, that the Communist regime on the mainland eventually would be recognized as the legitimate government for a single "China," however that entity was defined in geographical terms. At the same time, American officials also made it clear that the issue of the relationship of Taiwan to the mainland should be "settled peacefully"—in other words, not by military force or political intimidation. When at the beginning of 1979 President Jimmy Carter normalized relations with the People's Republic of China and Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, this same ambivalence in U.S. policy was maintained. The challenge now, as Kissinger describes it, is "how to live" with a problem that does not yet permit a "final agreement." Self-restraint on all sides still is needed. The government of the Republic of China in Taipei must not declare Taiwan's independence. Groups in the United States who are pressing for abandonment of the "one China" policy "by a series of seemingly marginal modifications" need to understand that "an explosion can occur." And Beijing must not threaten or use force.

The question of how America's interests are communicated is almost as important as what those interests actually are conceived to be.

Other matters in Asia—the Kashmir issue between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, for instance—also have explosive potential and require sensitive diplomatic handling with the United States needed even as an uninvited mediator on occasion. Generally, the U.S. interest in Asia is in "equilibrium" rather

than in any specific objective, Kissinger emphasizes. This applies to Chinese-Indian tensions as well. The United States has "no national interest to let itself be drawn into border disputes between China and India as long as neither side seeks to achieve its objective by force," he advises. "This is an issue for which America should not risk its relations with either country. It is a classic case of the need to understand the limits of American interests." Those three countries' possession of nuclear weaponry, however, is a serious and continuing challenge for the United States. China tested its first atomic bomb in 1964, India exploded its first device in 1974, and Pakistan followed suit with tests in 1998. "The nuclear testing thus serves to remind us that, despite the mantra of globalization, there are geopolitical realities that overwhelm fashionable reveries about universality," Kissinger comments. Technology can be used to break as well as to build relations.

Dr. Kissinger well recognizes that "world order—or Asian order—cannot emerge from a strategy of equilibrium alone." But "neither can it be achieved without it," he insists. In order to maintain the Asian balance of power, "a coherent view of the future of the region" is needed. The United States government "must maneuver among the various political constellations emerging in Asia with subtlety, persistence, and a firm long-range perspective." In dealing with Asia, Kissinger places a very high premium on diplomacy. Any other means, economic or military, of attempting to control the region, by themselves, would prove to be inadequate. The United States must "be present without appearing to dominate," he counsels. "And it should have a major role in dealing with the dangers without turning itself into the focal point of every controversy."

THE MIDDLE EASTERN SYSTEM AND THE AFRICAN SYSTEM: TWO NEIGHBORING "WORLDS IN TRANSITION"

"In the conflicts of the Middle East," Kissinger writes, "the emotional impetus derives from forces comparable to those of Europe during the seventeenth century"—that is, the Thirty Years' War, which ended when the Peace of Westphalia established a new principle of international legitimacy. As for today's Middle East, "schisms defined either by religion or by ideology tear the region apart." The "most prominent" of these is the Arab-Israeli conflict. "But the rifts within the Islamic world are not much less intense if less obvious," Kissinger adds, thus subtly relativizing the conflict that has so polarized the politics of the Middle East and also preoccupied American foreign policy makers, including himself especially during the time he served as secretary of state (1973-1977).

Having negotiated a disengagement of opposing military forces and arranged an uneasy truce between the hostile parties following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War through his famous "shuttle diplomacy," Kissinger knows the realities of this subject and has a sure sense of what is possible and what is not. Diplomacy

may not be effective in this setting. The "irony" of the American effort, made by President Bill Clinton in the final year of his administration, in trying to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict "once and for all," Kissinger writes critically, was that it "may well have taken it from the difficult to the intractable." Israel seeks "recognition for a homeland based on a Biblical claim and a symbolic end of the persecutions that have haunted the Jewish people for two millennia, capped by the Holocaust." To the "Arabs—and especially Palestinians—Israel's objectives appear as a demand for acquiescence in the amputation of their cultural, religious, and territorial patrimony." Any conflict defined in that manner is "unlikely to be settled definitively by an agreement (even if there should be one)," through precise verbal drafting or explicit consent. "The most realistic proposal is for a definition of coexistence," Kissinger believes. This is more likely to be brought about by "shaping the strategic and political environment" than trying to find "legal compromise formulae" through brokerage. Physical and psychological "exhaustion," rather than "compromise," usually is the way such conflicts are concluded. From this tragically realist perspective, it is possible to see the current deadlock, with Palestinian violence and Israeli retaliation continuing to drain the human and material resources of the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel itself as being, potentially, hopeful.

Clinton's efforts may have taken the Israeli-Palestinian conflict "from the difficult to the intractable."

The Israeli-Palestinian problem, to which the United States has devoted so much effort, may not be the most important geopolitical problem it must face in the Middle East. There may be other problems with a greater bearing on the American national interest, especially if defined mainly in power terms. Kissinger suggests two: "the challenges of the Gulf and the emergence of a fundamentalist Iran." These "pose as great a threat to American security and prosperity and, in the long run, perhaps greater ones."

As noted, Kissinger sees the Muslim world as being "rent by schisms of its own." Some of these are ancient cleavages, representing "the historic conflict between the civilizations of the Nile and those of Mesopotamia," Kissinger reflects, taking a very long geopolitical view. The rivalry between the "moderate secular" regime of Egypt and the "radical secular" regime of Iraq is a present-day expression of this contest, as well as a contemporary political struggle. A common religion, Islam, does not preclude hostility. Religious sectarianism, too, is rife throughout the Islamic world, and each of the intra-Islamic conflicts "has had its own internal gradations and tensions." Fundamentalist Iran, for example, has felt threatened not only by secular Iraq but also by "the fundamentalism of the Taliban in Afghanistan—more intense than even its own." In recent decades, Kissinger observes comparatively, there have been "more wars, and far bloodier

ones," among Muslim countries than between Israel and the Muslim world. Not surprisingly, Kissinger does not cite and may well not subscribe to Samuel Huntington's theory of the clash of broadly based confessional "civilizations."[22] At the same time, he does appreciate the power of religion as a motivator of political behavior in general.

"On this ocean of passion the United States is striving for a compass course," Kissinger writes of the current uncertainty of American statesmanship in trying to steer a way through the politics of the Middle East. Few of the "traditional navigational aids," as he terms them, provide much help. The conflicts of the region are not about "democracy," for among the contestants only Israel is a democratic state. As a result, America has been obliged to cooperate with a number of regimes—including monarchies—on the basis of "common security interests." And then there is oil. "The fact is that, quite simply, the industrial democracies cannot permit access to Gulf oil to be denied to them," Kissinger straightforwardly declares. Thus, it perhaps is still the 1979 Carter Doctrine, which declared access to Gulf oil resources to be a U.S. vital interest, that best articulates the American reason for continuing to be present, militarily and otherwise, in the Middle East. That dependence, however, is not necessarily permanent. Oil and gas supplies from other parts of the world are supplementing and even, to a degree, replacing, Middle Eastern sources. This could permit a change in relationships.

Kissinger notes from the historical perspective even of his own lifetime that the concept of "hostility" itself has been in flux in the Middle East. Its political transitions are very rapid and sometimes sudden. Until the late 1970s, for instance, Iran was "the linchpin" of American security policy in the Gulf. Iraq also has been close to the U.S. and only "turned into an adversary" after the end of its war with Iran in 1988. The continued political survival of Saddam Hussein after Iraq's military defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, occasioned by its takeover of Kuwait late the year before, "forced the United States into a policy of 'dual containment.'" Now "regime change" is being spoken of. Although Kissinger does not himself employ this expression of the George W. Bush administration, he does write, no less ominously: "Only after Saddam is gone—even if by actuarial causes—is a more flexible American policy toward Iraq possible and indicated."

By contrast, Africa is a slower "world in transition." Kissinger discusses it at lesser length, as it is not an area in which the United States traditionally has had vital or even major interests. Nonetheless, "Africa tugs at the American conscience." To this appeal, however, Kissinger's own response seems reserved and measured. "A significant part of the American population originated there," he recognizes. "Their ancestors were brought to these shores under circumstances that remain a blot on this country's history and were obliged to live before and after slavery under conditions of which no American can be proud." However, the United States "only compounds these indignities," he goes on to argue, "if

African policy is presented primarily as a sop to the past." This refers, presumably, to the demand currently being made for reparations to pay for the historical harm done to African-Americans, and to Africa itself, by the involvement of the United States in slavery and the slave trade.

It is not the past, but Africa's contemporary problems, that present a challenge to a world aspiring "to build a global order," Kissinger advises. Pervasive poverty, genocidal violence, rampant corruption, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and the exploitation of the resulting turmoil by terrorist groups, money launderers, and crime syndicates are grave matters. To be sure, they do not pose a direct *security* challenge to the United States—in the way the Soviet, and also Communist Chinese, presence in Africa during the Cold War arguably once did. The argument, then, was that Africa's mineral and other resources "must not fall into the hands of adversaries." That argument no longer holds. The very "absence of traditional geopolitical interests" in Africa, Kissinger now suggests, defines "an opportunity for our age." This, it would seem, is the chance to begin to form a truly global moral order. "If the term 'world community' has any meaning, it must find an expression in Africa," he states.

In diagnosing and prescribing for Africa, Dr. Kissinger finds that his method of historical comparison with Europe does not work very well. "I have found it useful in this volume to sketch the evolution of the various continents by analogy to epochs of European history. No such framework applies to sub-Saharan Africa, however, for the continent is *sui generis*," he admits. The only comprehensive interpretive scheme he can find, from his prior learning and knowledge, to help him explain the breakdown of Africa's international borders and national institutions is to trace the process to "a single origin: the implosion of colonial rule." Europe's governments, in order to prevent the emergence of a unified native opposition, often had "found it useful to divide up ethnic or tribal groups." Many of these are now seeking to be reunited.

It is not clear to Kissinger what political forms they should use. Neither the European "parliamentary system" nor the American "federal system" will work in current African circumstances, he reasons. The former presupposes that the political "majority" will fluctuate, with a minority sometimes becoming the majority and vice versa; but that does not easily happen in a tribal setting. The latter presupposes national homogeneity, or at least national spatial and social mobility. A federal structure that "mimicked" existing ethnic, tribal, or religious divisions would not necessarily encourage this. It might even increase, rather than decrease, secessionist pressures. One exception to this bleak pattern, Kissinger thinks, might be South Africa, where two extraordinary leaders, Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk, decided to try to overcome the legacy of institutionalized apartheid by espousing the ideal of a multiracial society. In the South African case, "the very multiplicity of its ethnic groupings provided a certain insurance against civil conflict."

U.S. policy toward Africa should, Kissinger argues, promote the growth of democratic institutions. The United States should condemn, even ostracize, governments that violate human rights. "But beyond this," he senses, "America's influence on the domestic political evolution is limited." To apply to Africa the principles of "humanitarian military intervention" that were followed in the Balkans would be "even more dangerous," he warns, for "a long period of outside supervision" would follow the occurrence of bloody conflict and "a new charge of colonialism would be raised." The American debacle in Somalia in 1993 is illustrative of the difficulty. The United States government was not willing in that case to sustain the effort of "institution-building" that would have been required. Having withdrawn from Somalia, it was even less likely to intervene the following year in Rwanda, where even more horrible things happened. "African security issues—largely civil wars and ethnic conflicts—should be left largely to African nations, with South Africa and Nigeria playing the principal roles," Kissinger believes. For the rest, in dealing with other problems, it should be for the international community—as a "test" of the ability of the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, multilateral financial institutions, and the private sector—to act "in pursuit of universal goals." Wilsonianism, it would appear, has a new merit in Dr. Kissinger's eyes. This may be in part because globalization, which is spreading some of Africa's problems to other regions, has increased the practical, as well as the moral, need for human solidarity. Humanitarian concern is now a matter of interest as well as of values.

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GLOBALIZATION, NORTH-SOUTH CONSENSUS, AND WORLD ORDER

The above are Henry Kissinger's policy perspectives on individual major geographical regions—highlighting, particularly, the need for partnership with Europe and Latin America, equilibrium for Asia, energy from and tranquility for the Middle East, and humanitarian assistance to Africa. But what about prescriptions for the world as a whole? "For the first time in history," as Kissinger himself emphasizes, "a single worldwide economic system has come into being. Markets in every continent interact continuously. Communications enable capital to respond instantaneously to new opportunities or to lowered expectations." The processes of globalization have both spatial and temporal effects. More and more, those who are interlinked geographically have also become, willy-nilly, co-participants in the same "global events." History itself thus may be becoming global.

Can political leadership, in countries large or small, cope with these nearly automatic surges of capitalist, and even societal, interest in distant places? National governments, with their limited jurisdictions, increasingly have lost control in the face of these shifts. By basing growth on "interdependence," Kissinger remarks, "globalization has served to undermine the role of the nation-state as the sole determinant of a society's well-being—though this is far less true in the United States than in many other regions."

Does America, now enjoying a "unipolar" moment in history,[23] have a special providence to restore order in the world? It does have a large responsibility, Kissinger recognizes, owing mainly to the causal impact of its exceptional power and of its policies as well. "The United States has been the driving force behind the dynamics of globalization; it has also been the primary beneficiary of the forces it has unleashed." The American model of economic management has become the standard. In most regions of the world, "governments are limiting themselves to facilitating the operation of the market, not to regulating it." International order, Kissinger fears, could be a casualty of this policy trend. The liberalizing process that has "produced greater wealth in more parts of the world than ever before may also provide the mechanism for spreading an economic and social crisis around the world." A major setback in the American economy, in particular, would have "grave consequences beyond the economic realm," and, depending on its magnitude, "it could threaten political stability in many countries and undermine America's international standing."

At this point, Dr. Kissinger makes a significant admission, calling into question the applicability of his geopolitical approach to the kinds of "crises" likely to be endemic to globalization as it progresses further into the twenty-first century. He states, "I have nothing to contribute to the debate about the economic measures needed to avert or to mitigate a recession." That, however, has not been his intention. Nor is it his peculiar competence. His purpose is, instead, to illuminate "the issues a farsighted statesmanship must address to prevent the political world from destroying the economic achievements of globalization."

Humanitarian concern is now a matter of interest as well as of values.

Through his geopolitical lens, Kissinger sees most economic developments and their possible larger consequences very clearly. The global system increasingly "rewards and punishes" its participants—including political leaders—by economic criteria, he perceives. As these criteria are "far too esoteric to evoke loyalties and commitments," a country's population will, in a crisis, "turn to its political leaders to ease the impact of the economic penalties." Yet, especially in developing countries, national leaders are being obliged by the U.S. government

as well as by the multilateral financial and economic institutions "to use up political capital" in order to restructure their economies, to eliminate waste, and to reduce overhead.[24] The result of such radical action can be massive social dislocation and unemployment incurred "for the sake of long-range benefits not demonstrable at the moment sacrifices are being demanded." Such an equation often is "anathema" to political or economic leaders if "the promised benefits" will arrive only long after they, themselves, have long left the scene. This is political realism.

Developing nations need time, and also others' understanding of the extreme difficulty of their evolution into modern nation-states. "Yet the advocates of the new gospel," Kissinger states sharply, "often seem oblivious to the historical record, which shows that the practices of reform took many decades to evolve in their own countries." Adopting the American model is, for most developing countries, "not primarily a technical challenge." It is "a revolutionary upheaval in familiar patterns," a social and a cultural challenge. For them, for example, it is not capital but, rather, labor that is their comparative advantage. The American model that sees competitive success as depending on "improvements in productivity sustained by constant technological progress" denies them the full value of this natural asset. For many countries of the South, it is also their geography—mineral resources, agricultural lands, and also physical location—that is no longer valued by the North as it once was as during the Cold War.

Does America, now enjoying a "unipolar" moment in history, have a special providence to restore order in the world?

The "demonstrations against globalization," most notably in Seattle in 1999 at the time of the World Trade Organization meeting there and at other international meetings as well, are "early warning signs of the political weight of those who believe themselves at the mercy of forces they feel powerless to influence," Kissinger cautions. The anti-globalization demonstrators sense, as he does, that there is a "mismatch between the world's political and economic systems." The units for political decision-making are too small. The spheres within which economic activity takes place are too large. He believes that the former must adapt. But how?

Americans, and American institutions, must take a leading role. "Solutions will not emerge," Kissinger writes, "unless the United States helps identify the problems and designs forums to deal with them." Curiously, he proposes, in organizational terms, nothing more specific than restoring the "annual economic summits"—the G-7, now G-8, including Russia—to their status as "a forum for deliberate discussion and decision to deal with the long-term challenges of the industrial world." Kissinger adds that the "historic antitrust policies" of the United States must find more global expression, so as to limit the scope of multinational

firms' dominance. The "international financial system" also needs to be better regulated, so as to reduce market volatility and to discipline speculative capital. A "better balance" must be established "between the claims of lenders and the social needs of affected societies." The United States and other advanced societies may wish to improve labor conditions and to protect the environment around the world while maintaining free trade. Yet, they should do so "without giving developing countries the impression that America's real goal is to throttle their competition."

What is missing in Kissinger's vision is a recognized place in the world's de facto *leadership group for the developing countries themselves.*

His last point regarding the North-South "balance" draws attention to the main conceptual lacuna—a blind spot?—in the Kissingerian vision of global governance. This for him is more a process of concerting among nations in the manner of Metternich and Castlereagh than of constructing formal international organizations. What is missing in his vision is a recognized place in the world's *de facto* leadership group for the developing countries themselves. He rightly warns that the international economy "may come to face a crisis of legitimacy"—that is, a general loss of acceptability. Proposals for regulating and otherwise reforming the world's system of trade, investment, and work must be, and must be seen to be, procedurally fair and substantively just. How can such global reform be arranged without somehow factoring in the co-leadership of China, India, Brazil, and other developing countries that have something to say about how international economic and political relationships are to be managed in the twenty-first century?

"World order requires consensus," Dr. Kissinger himself states. This presupposes that "the differences between the advantaged and those disadvantaged who are in a position to undermine stability and progress" be of such a nature that "the disadvantaged can still see some prospect of raising themselves by their own effort." Can there be any better way of engendering such hope for self-betterment than some degree of co-decision by the rich and the poor nations in remaking the world's rules? ■

NOTES

1 Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001). Quoted statements by Kissinger in what follows, unless otherwise noted, are from this book.

2 On the varieties of realist thought, see Glenn J. Snyder, "Mearsheimer's World: Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security," *International Security* 27, no. 1 (Summer 2002), 149-173.

3 Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," a paper read in 1904 before the Royal Geographical Society, in Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, with additional papers, ed. Anthony J. Pearce (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1962), 242.

4 This concept of the *context* within which the *text* of U.S. foreign policy has developed historically is presented in Alan K. Henrikson, "Beyond Global-Regional Thinking," in Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, eds., *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001), I, 197-213.

5 Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), 312.

6 C. K. Webster, "Review of Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored*," *The English Historical Review* 288, no. 38 (January 1958), 166-167. As didactic history—a work demonstrating that useful "lessons" can be drawn from history—*A World Restored* stands somewhat higher. That the lessons of diplomacy that Dr. Kissinger saw in the post-Napoleonic period in Europe reflected his own personal experiences in Germany before and just after the Second World War, as well as his effort to conceive rules for survival during the early Cold War period that followed, and that these early formulated, experience-based personal views continue to shape his political thinking, is rightly emphasized by Robert D. Kaplan, "Kissinger, Metternich, and Realism," *The Atlantic Monthly* 283, no. 6 (June 1999), 73-82.

7 That effort, though worldwide in extent, must be conducted locally as well as through functional cooperation between governments. "The key to anti-terrorism," Kissinger has written, "is to eliminate safe havens"—locale by locale. See Henry Kissinger, "Where Do We Go From Here?," *Washington Post*, November 6, 2001.

8 Bill Keller, "Join the Club," *The New York Times*, December 1, 2001.

9 The NATO Prague Summit Declaration of November 21, 2002, invited seven countries, including the three Baltic states, to begin accession talks, with formal membership likely in 2004. The other countries were Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

10 Henry Kissinger, "Russia: A Partner, But Not in NATO," *Washington Post*, December 7, 2001.

11 Christopher Hitchens, for instance, fiercely attacks Dr. Kissinger in *The Trial of Henry Kissinger*, which was published in 2001. The issues Hitchens and others have raised do not appear likely to go away, and Kissinger has had to learn to live with them, even enduring questions about his freedom of travel without arraignment and arrest. The issues arose again when he was named by President Bush to be chairman of a bipartisan commission to conduct an independent investigation of the causes of the September 11, 2001, attacks. See, e.g., Fred Kaplan, "Some See Kissinger as Wrong Man for the Job," *Boston Globe*, November 28, 2002.

12 Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed., rev. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), 179-182.

13 Benjamin Jones, "Mr. Foreign Policy: EU Leaders Choose Javier Solana as Their Foreign Policy Point Man," *Europe: Magazine of the European Union*, no. 388 (July/August 1999), 30-32.

14 For an elaboration of this concept, see Alan K. Henrikson, "Mental Maps," in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 177-192.

15 See, particularly, Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

16 K. W. Deutsch, S. A. Burrell, et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry in the Foundations of Nationality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), and *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (New York: The Free Press, 1966).

17 See his essay, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," in Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), 9-50.

18 See Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy*, no. 54 (Spring 1984), 66-84, and his book, *The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burden of Alliance* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), 181-183.

19 Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (Cambridge, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), 207-208.

20 For an application of this distinction, see Lisa L. Martin, *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 40-43.

21 The text of the U.S.-Chinese Joint Communiqué, dated February 28, 1972, is printed in Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 1490-1492.

22 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

23 Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (1991), 23-33. This historical notion is reflected in "The National Security Strategy of the United States" recently produced by the Bush administration. It is evident, for example, in the statement that "the president has no intention of allowing any foreign power to catch up with the huge lead the United States has opened since the fall of the Soviet Union." Quoted in David E. Sanger, "Bush to Outline Doctrine of Striking Foes First," *The New York Times*, September 20, 2002. Another way to characterize the present favorable international distribution of power, offered by John Mearsheimer in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001), is that it is an "unbalanced multipolar" system. In Mearsheimer's "offensive" version of neo-realism, which differs from classical realism in that security behavior is believed to be motivated by the interstate structure rather than by any basic *animus dominandi* in man himself, an "unbalanced multipolar" structure by definition contains a potential hegemon—a possibly dangerous power maximizer. The United States of America would seem to qualify. See Snyder, "Mearsheimer's World," 167. Kissinger, who must be considered only a "defensive" realist/neo-realist interested more in stability than in supremacy, may well have reservations about the logic, and indeed the hubris, of the new Bush doctrine.

24 Here Kissinger's criticism is probably influenced by the former chief economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, whose views he cites in his book. For an elaboration of Stiglitz's arguments, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2002).