DISCOURSE MATTERS:
THE IMPACT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS ON THE POST-CONFLICT PLANNING PROCESS

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MARINA TRAVAYIAKIS

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JULY 2014

Dissertation Committee

ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR., Chair

ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES

DANIEL DREZNER

RESUME OF
MARINA TRAVAYIAKIS MELIDONIS

EDUCATION

PH.D. THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY
International Relations, August 2014
Dissertation Title: "Discourse Matters: The Impact of Civil-Military Relations on the Post-Conflict Planning Process"
Dissertation Committee Members: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (Chair), Antonia Handler Chayes, and Daniel Drezner
Comprehensive Exams: International Security Studies; International Negotiation and Conflict Resolution

M.A. THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY
Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy, May 2005
Thesis: "Knocking on NATO's Door: Civil-Military Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina"

B.A. BOSTON COLLEGE
Economics, Magna cum Laude, May 2000
Honors Thesis: "The Impact of the Underground Economy on Average GDP Growth in OECD Nations"
Awards: Phi Beta Kappa, Omicron Delta Epsilon, Golden Key National Honor Society, National Society of Collegiate Scholars, Certificat Pratique de Français Commercial et Economique, Der Generalkonsul der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Urkunde Certificate

INSTITUT D'ETUDES POLITIQUES
Certificat d'Etudes Politiques Européenes, 1999

HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS

The Fletcher School Scholarship, 2013-2014, 2012-2013, 2011-2012, 2010-2011, 2009-2010
Bradley Foundation Fellow, 2012-2013, 2011-2012, 2010-2011, 2009-2010
Sarah Scaife Foundation, 2012-2013
The Fletcher School Doctoral Research Award, Summer 2012, 2010
Dean's Discretionary Fund Award, The Fletcher School, 2010-2011
Graduate Institute for Teaching, Tufts University, Teaching Fellow, Fall 2010
International Security Studies Program Fellow, The Fletcher School, 2009-2010
H.B. Earhart Fellow, 2008-2009

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PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE • ACADEMIC

TEACHING & RESEARCH

THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY
Teaching Assistant, Security Studies and Crisis Management
Global Masters of Arts Program
Professor Richard Shultz, Spring 2010, 2011 (class size: 25 students)

- Managed the discussion board for an internet-mediated, graduate-level course
- Selected readings and designed review questions on a variety of topics including, the role of military forces in non-traditional crises, civil-military relations, the role of private military forces, counterterrorism, and the twenty-first century security environment

Teaching Fellow, The Role of Force in International Politics
Professor Richard Shultz, Fall 2010 (class size: 75 students)

- Delivered lectures on morality and the use of force, civil-military relations, strategic nonviolence, and peace operations
- Held office hours, mentored students, and conducted study review sessions
- Designed and graded final exams

Teaching Assistant, Civil-Military Relations in Post-Conflict Environments
Professor Antonia H. Chayes, Spring 2010 (class size: 25 students)

- Provided research support for the syllabus design and launch of a new course on civil-military relations
- Designed and organized a one-day simulation exercise on civil-military cooperation in post-conflict Afghanistan. Students were assigned various roles in a Provincial Reconstruction Team and tasked to redesign their mission and coordinate operations with US military and local government officials

Teaching Assistant, Professor Richard Eichenberg, 2006 – 2007 (class size: 40 students)

- Provided teaching support and graded exams for two undergraduate courses: *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* and *Building the EU*
- Held office hours and mentored students

Research Assistant, Professors Louis Aucoin and Eileen Babbitt, 2005 – 2006

- Conducted a comparative analytical assessment of the existing transitional justice initiatives in the Balkans by evaluating transitional justice mechanisms, such as prosecutions, vetting, truth-seeking, and reparations
- Research and writing included in the UNDP report on transitional justice titled *Transitional Justice: Assessment Survey of Conditions in the Former Yugoslavia* (Aucoin and Babbitt, 2006)

Research Assistant, Professor Antonia H. Chayes, Summer/Fall 2004

- Offered research and administrative support for the course *Law and Politics of International Conflict Management*

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE • NON-PROFIT AND CORPORATE

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT, BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT & FINANCE

INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, CAMBRIDGE, MA
Research Associate, 2006 – 2009

- Co-authored several publications and prepared concept papers, briefings and summary reports on a range of foreign and defense policy issues, including civil-military coordination, post-conflict stability operations, foreign assistance to overseas natural disasters, NATO transformation, and US-Japan relations
- Planned and executed workshops, seminars, and conferences in Washington D.C. and Japan
- Developed new project proposals for US and foreign governments, including Japan, South Korea, and Greece, and helped secure grant-funding and defense contracts for said projects

C.E. UNTERBERG, TOWBIN, NEW YORK, NY
Senior Analyst, Healthcare Investment Banking, 2002 – 2003

- Assisted domestic and international clients, often as the lead contact, with strategic and financing initiatives
- Performed company valuation and industry analyses, identified prospective acquisition candidates, and proposed appropriate transaction structure
- Prepared offering memoranda for sell-side assignments
- Conducted business and financial due diligence, participated in the negotiation of engagement letters, confidentiality agreements and term sheets

ABN AMRO INC. (FORMERLY ING BARINGS LLC), NEW YORK, NY
Analyst, Healthcare Investment Banking, 2000 – 2002

- Performed quantitative and analytical work in connection with public and private equity financings, debt offerings, and advisory assignments for middle-market, global clients

PUBLICATIONS

James L. Schoff and Marina Travayiakis, *In Times of Crisis: US-Japan Civil-Military Disaster Relief Coordination*, (Potomac Books, 2009)

Charles Perry, Marina Travayiakis, et. al., *Finding the Right Mix: Disaster Diplomacy, National Security, and International Cooperation,* (The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, on-line publication, 2009)

Charles Perry and Marina Travayiakis, "Reforming Military Support for Foreign Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance," *Liaison,* vol. IV, no. 1, 2008 (Center of Excellence DHMA)

James L. Schoff and Marina Travayiakis, *In Times of Crisis: Global and Local Civil-Military Disaster Relief Coordination in the United States and Japan*, (The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, on-line publication, 2007)

James L. Schoff and Marina Travayiakis, *The Pandemic Influenza Challenge: Multilateral Perspectives on Preparedness, Response Planning, and Areas for Cooperation,* (The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, on-line publication, 2007)

PRESENTATIONS

Marina Travayiakis, *The Failure to Coordinate: United States Civil-Military Relations in Post-Conflict Environments*, unpublished paper presented at the ISA 52nd Annual Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 16-19, 2011

Marina Travayiakis, *Civil-Military Coordination in Post-Conflict Settings: United States Policy and Practice*, unpublished paper presented at the ISA 51st Annual Convention, New Orleans, LA, February 17-20, 2010

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Graduate Institute for Teaching (GIFT), Tufts University, June 2010
Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Methods Research (IQMR), June 2010

OTHER

Proficient in Microsoft Office products for PC/MAC computers
Languages: Greek (proficient), French (intermediate) and German (elementary)
Affiliations: International Studies Association; American Political Science Association
Service: Ph.D. Committee Representative, 2009-2010; The Fletcher Doctoral Conference, Panel Organizer, 2009; Ph.D. Colloquium Coordinator, 2008-2009

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has engaged in a post-conflict reconstruction operation at least once every twenty-four months. Yet despite investing significant time and resources in these operations, the United States has repeatedly failed to capitalize on initial battlefield victories to achieve its political objectives. This has been devastatingly demonstrated in Iraq.

This dissertation investigates one factor influencing the post-conflict reconstruction planning process – the nature of civil-military relations at the apex of national security decision-making. How do civil-military relations impact the policy planning process for post-conflict environments?

Civil-military relations theory has largely focused on how civilian authorities control the military, what structures lead to civilian control, and what kind of relations best serve the interests of the state. Though recent scholarship increasingly addresses the need for greater equality in strategic decision-making, the issue of control continues to dominate the discussion.

What is missing from civil-military theory is an emphasis on the process of deliberation. This dissertation aims to shift the theoretical focus from issues of control to understanding how civil-military relations affect policy outcomes. Drawing on the literature of deliberative democracy, the dissertation introduces the concept of deliberative discourse to civil-military relations theory. Deliberative discourse involves a distinct process of learning about and considering issues from different perspectives. It includes an examination of divergent perspectives, a strategic assessment of assumptions, alternative options, and the exchange of information in order to reach a reasoned consensus on a policy that integrates political and military considerations.

To demonstrate the power of deliberation, this dissertation reviews the 2003 Iraq War and 2007 Iraq Surge planning processes. The cases highlight the need for deliberative discourse to characterize civil-military relations during the planning process. The findings contribute to civil-military relations theory by providing a new way to consider the role and responsibility of civilian and military leaders in the decision-making process. A significant policy implication revealed by this research is the need to reform the interagency process to ensure that policy matches political objectives to military capabilities, and most importantly, links "winning the war" to "securing the peace" in post-conflict environments.

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Dedicated to my loving parents,

Konstantinos and Carol Travayiakis

~

For encouraging my dreams and never doubting my ability

to succeed in all aspects of life

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I hope my son, Antonis Melidonis, will follow my example and fill his life with individuals of great character and wisdom, much like those that have inspired me throughout this journey. Antonis, may you aspire for greatness and use your knowledge to make a difference in this world.

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I) INTRODUCTION

The research project attempts to understand why the United States, with its rich history of involvement in post-conflict operations, fails to capitalize on battlefield victories to secure the peace and achieve its political objectives. Without discounting the potential role of other factors, this dissertation investigates how civil-military relations influence the planning process for post-conflict operations, and subsequently, the political and military outcome. To accomplish this, two distinct planning processes during Operation Iraqi Freedom – the 2003 Iraq War decision and the 2007 Iraq Surge decision – are examined to better understand how the nature of civil-military relations at the highest levels of government impacts the planning process for post-conflict environments.

Civil-military relations theory describes the relationship between civil society and the military organization established to protect it. Though a very broad subject, the literature for the most part has focused on how civil authorities control the military, what policies and structures lead to civilian control, and what kind of civil-military relations best serve the interests of the state in the long term.[1]

[1] Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 26, no. 1 (Fall 1999): 7-26; Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control." *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 149-180.

How exactly the civil-military relationship should be arranged to ensure civilian control of the military has been the main focus of the civil-military literature in the United States since the end of World War II.[2] With each significant change in the security environment, civil-military scholars have reviewed the proper role of civilian and military leaders in the decision-making process.

When the United States emerged from World War II, the Soviet threat forced the United States to engage in an arms race and maintain a large standing army and sizeable defense budget. In response, Samuel P. Huntington introduced the objective control model to guide the national security establishment, maintain civilian control of the armed forces, and safeguard American values.[3] Civilian control in the objective sense is the "recognition of autonomous military professionalism."[4] More precisely, it is respect for an independent military sphere of action that is free from political interference. The antithesis of objective control is subjective control. "The essence of subjective civilian control is the denial of an independent military sphere."[5]

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[2] Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State: Reforming the National Security Decisionmaking Process at the Civil-Military Nexus*, (Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), 67. Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations." *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 2, (June 1999): 211-241. Feaver explains how much that was written in the early Cold War period on how America should reconcile the need for a large standing army given its suspicions of the threats to liberty posed by a large standing army.

[3] Although the US Constitution and 1947 National Security Act provided some guidance for the civil-military relationship, there was no normative theory to arrange civil-military relations.

[4] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 20th ed., (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), 83.

[5] Ibid, 83.

Morris Janowitz disagreed with Huntington's strict separation of the political and military spheres, embracing instead the "civilianization" of the military profession given its increased involvement in limited warfare activities during the Cold War.[6] Meanwhile, the Vietnam War trauma sparked a renewed debate among scholars on the roles and responsibilities of the civilian and military leadership on decisions regarding the use of force. Many saw the relative lack of such analysis of military strategy and operations as a critical flaw in Vietnam.

The post-Vietnam view dominant within the military was that only professional soldiers could be trusted to decide how its operations would be conducted. Unfortunately, politicians accepted the military's (incorrect) reading of the Vietnam War, and in the decades that followed, the military's autonomy and competence over military matters grew substantially.

The end of the Cold War and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union led to a lack of consensus between the military and civilian leadership on what the military was expected to do in the new security environment.[7] The result was a crisis in civil-military affairs in which some observers worried the military had become too alienated from its civilian leadership, resistant to civilian oversight, and too influential in policy matters.[8] One again, scholars reiterated the need to

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[6] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait,* 2nd American ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1971).
[7] Mackubin Thomas Owens, "What Military Officers Need to Know About Civil-Military Relations," *National War College Review*, vol. 65, no. 2 (Spring 2012).
[8] Mackubin Thomas Owens, "What Military Officers Need to Know About Civil-Military Relations;" Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations."

keep the military out of civilian politics, as well make certain that civilians control military affairs.

Another reevaluation of the proper role of civilian and military leaders in the national security decision-making process began in earnest after September 11 as the military began fighting protracted, irregular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Eliot A. Cohen rejects the Huntingtonian division of labor between civilians who determine the goals of the war and the uniformed military who then execute the war strategy. He insists on greater civilian involvement in military affairs, and introduces the idea of an "unequal dialogue."[9] Richard K. Betts considers the civil-military relationship as one of "equal dialogue and unequal authority."[10] On decisions as crucial as the use of force, he writes, "Presidents have the right to be wrong in the end, but generals should have every chance to prevent error before that end."[11] Similarly, Frank G. Hoffman also emphasizes the equal exchange of civilian and military views in policy debates. Included within a his broad definition of civil-military relations is the "exchange of candid views and perspectives in the decision-making process. It is not about dictation from policy master to supplicants and servants. It is about the tenor of the dialogue and the

[9] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 209. It is a dialogue, in that both sides express their views bluntly, at times offensively, and repeatedly, and unequal, in that the final authority of the statesman is unambiguous and unquestioned.
[10] Richard K. Betts, *American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 224.
[11] Richard K. Betts, "Are American Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem," in *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, eds. Suzanne C. Nielson and Don M. Snider, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009): 40.

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quality of the resulting policy decisions and strategic plans."[12] Finally, Christopher P. Gibson introduces the Madisonian approach to civil-military relations, which promotes a running dialogue between civilian and military leaders.

Though recent scholarship increasingly addresses the need for dialogue – equal or unequal – the focus has remained on whether there is intrusive civilian direction or excessive military autonomy in national security decision-making [13] Discussions on how to promote greater dialogue have not advanced. Post-conflict operations demand the integration of civil and military instruments of power, and as such, civilian and military leaders should engage in a deliberative discourse during the planning process.

The aim of the research project is to address a significant gap in the civil-military literature and shift the theoretical debate from focusing on issues of control to understanding how civil-military relations affect policy outcomes. How do relations between the civilian and military leadership affect the policy planning process, and therefore, influence the political and military outcome of the policy? How should civilian and military leaders interact in the decision-making process?

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[12] Frank G. Hoffman, "Dereliction of Duty *Redux?*: Post-Iraq American Civil-Military Relations," *Orbis*, vol. 52, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 219.

[13] Richard K. Betts, "Are American Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem," 11-41; Richard K. Betts, *American Force*; Frank G. Hoffman, "Dereliction of Duty *Redux?*" 217-235; Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," 7-26; Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*; Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*. Peter D. Feaver, "The Right to be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision," *International Security*, vol. 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 87-125.

To understand how civil-military relations affect policy outcomes, the dissertation draws on the literature of deliberative democracy to introduce the concept of deliberative discourse to civil-military relations theory.

The theory of deliberative democracy promotes the idea that public decisions should be preceded by discussion among free and equal citizens. That is, for a democratic decision to be legitimate, it must be preceded by authentic deliberation.[14] Voting is not all that matters in well-functioning democracies, as it cannot legitimate collective decisions.[15] Instead, public policy decision-making should follow a process in which people exchange information and ideas. For deliberative democrats, deliberation is central to democracy, and the more authentic and inclusive the political deliberation, then the more legitimate the collective decision and democratic the political system.

A long epistemic tradition, reaching back Ancient Athens, suggests that rational dialogue between two or more individuals improves reasoning. Deliberative discourse is a type of public discussion rooted in deliberative democracy.[16] Deliberative discourse involves a distinct process of learning about

[14] John S. Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 2. "The only condition for authentic deliberation," writes John S. Dryzek, "is then the requirement that communication induce reflection upon preferences in a non-coercive fashion.

[15] Ian Johnstone, *The Power of Deliberation: International Law, Politics and Organizations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4.

[16] Deliberative democrats do not present their theory as an alternative to representative democracy. They only argue that deliberation is an important feature of all democratic societies.

and considering issues from different perspectives.[17] Through a deliberative process, participants engage in a careful examination of relevant issues and consider alternative views in order to produce reasoned, well-informed, collective decisions or recommendations with policy implications.[18] Deliberation forces the exchange of information. In a deliberative process, participants converse with one another, think critically, reflect about the options before them, and enlarge their perspectives, opinions, and understandings.[19] The objective, however, is not to maximize one's interests and preferences. Instead, participants must challenge and justify the validity claims inherent in their argument, but also be open to changing their views or interests in light of the better argument.[20] That is, participants not only try to convince each other to change their view, but also are themselves prepared to be persuaded.

The aim of the dissertation is to apply the concept of deliberative discourse to civil-military relations theory. I argue that when civilian and military leaders engage in deliberative discourse, the planning process will more likely include multiple perspectives and viewpoints, a critical analysis of all assumptions and policy options, and an exploration of alternative courses of action. More importantly, the civilian and military leaders will seek a reasoned consensus. In short, a deliberative process amongst civilian and military leaders

[17] Wolfgang Donsbach, ed., *The International Encyclopedia of Communication*, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008). Accessed January 20, 2014. Available from Blackwell Reference Online.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Thomas Risse, "'Let's Argue!' Communicative Action in World Politics," *International Organization*, vol. 54, no. 1 (Winter 2002), 7.

is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for successful policy outcomes. This dissertation explores the necessity of a new normative framework that insists on a deliberative discourse between civilian and military leaders.

A) Problem Statement

The United States has long been involved in post-conflict operations. After World War II, the U.S. government used a wide variety of political, economic, and military instruments to build stable, democratic institutions in Germany and Japan. Even during the Cold War, the U.S. employed varying degrees of limited military, economic, and diplomatic pressure to overthrow unfriendly regimes and install democratic ones. With the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent loss of external support from Washington and Moscow, a series of intrastate wars and ethnic and civil conflicts ignited across the globe. In response, the U.S. conducted a series of interventions in Panama, Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, as well as lent significant political and financial support to numerous peace-building operations run by the United Nations (UN). Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has begun a new post-conflict reconstruction operation every eighteen to twenty-four months on average, with each operation lasting between five to eight years, significantly longer than combat operations.[21]

[21] Robert C. Orr, "Preface," in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr, (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004), x. Defense Science Board, *Transition to and from Hostilities*, A Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study,

After September 11, 2001, growing concern about violent extremism, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) led the United States to intervene in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively. Yet despite its rich history of involvement in post-conflict operations, the United States did not absorb the lessons learned from past operations, and thus, failed to capitalize on the initial battle victories in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were two of the longest in US history. Total war funding through fiscal year 2014 reached $753 and $815 billion for Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, not including war-related social, political and environmental costs.[22] With regard to the Iraq War, and despite the immense resources devoted to the war effort, such as the $60 billion spent in reconstruction projects, the United States withdrew in December 2011 without any assurances that it had achieved its political objectives – regime change, the removal of weapons of mass destruction, and the establishment of a democratic Iraq.[23] Today, an escalating Sunni insurgency threatens to partition the country along sectarian lines. In Afghanistan, the United States plans to withdraw all remaining troops by the end of 2014, but it will do so without having defeated the enemy.

Washington, D.C., December 2004, (accessed April 20, 2011); available from http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA430116.pdf.

[22] National Priorities Project, "Counter Notes and Sources: More about the Cost of War Counters," (accessed May 21, 2014); available from http://nationalpriorities.org/cost-of/notes-sources/.

[23] Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., *"Learning from Iraq,"* A final report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, March 2013, (accessed June 29, 2014); available from http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/sigir/20131001083907/http://www.sigir.mil/learningfromiraq/index.html.

The Taliban remains a formidable threat to the fragile political and security order of Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the United States faces new security threats in the Middle East and North Africa as political uncertainty and violence in those regions continues to escalate. Beginning in late 2010, a wave of revolutionary demonstrations, riots, and civil wars spread across the Arab world. Known as the Arab Spring, these popular uprisings forced from power rulers in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. A civil war erupted in Syria and Bahrain, major protests broke out in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Sudan, and minor protests occurred in Mauritania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Western Sahara, and Palestine.

Now in its fourth year, the Arab Spring unfortunately has opened a Pandora's box of extreme Islamism. Ongoing struggles in Libya and Egypt, as well as the worsening internal conflict in Syria, have created opportunities for extremists groups to find ungoverned spaces. Moreover, political uncertainty in those regions threatens to spark violent ethnic and sectarian warfare. The United States and its allies therefore may soon become involved in future combat and post-conflict efforts in these regions.

Post-conflict operations are an inevitable, and ultimately, decisive part of war. Securing the peace at the end of major combat operations simultaneously requires the transformation of major aspects of the state, society, and economy.

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Broadly, there are four distinct issue areas associated with post-conflict operations – security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic wellbeing, and governance and participation. The first issue area, security, addresses all aspects of public security, particularly the establishment of a safe and secure environment. This includes the provision of individual security from immediate and large-scale violence, as well as the restoration of the territorial integrity of the state. The second pillar, justice and reconciliation, addresses the need for a legal system, including an effective law enforcement and judicial system. Social and economic wellbeing addresses fundamental social and economic needs, such as the restoration of essential services and foundation for a viable economy. Finally, governance and participation, addresses the need for legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes.

The first pillar of any post-conflict operation, security, is a necessary pre-condition for achieving successful outcomes in other issue areas. Without the establishment of a safe and secure environment, it becomes impossible to restore essential services, provide humanitarian assistance, rebuild the economy, or strengthen government institutions. To establish and maintain secure conditions, however, requires military power. Armed forces are needed to control belligerents, establish border control, reconstitute indigenous security institutions, and protect the populace, as well as key institutions and critical infrastructure. As security improves, civilian agencies, non-government organizations, and international institutions move to the forefront. Naturally, at all stages of the

operation, close coordination between the civilian and military actors involved is essential.

What does it mean to integrate the skills and capabilities of United States civil and military institutions for post-conflict operations? Civil-military coordination is about building relationships between military and civilian actors in order to reconcile varying, and in some cases contradictory, policies into a single coherent strategy.[24] It refers to processes and mechanisms for interaction, including the exchange of information, assessment and evaluation, strategic communication, and joint planning, between the civilian and military elements of an operation. Collaboration between US civilian and military actors can take place at the strategic level back in Washington, as well as between the strategic and field levels. It also can manifest itself in the field in an ad hoc manner as civilian and military actors converge upon a crisis situation. Largely conducted in response to a natural disaster, humanitarian crisis, war, and increasingly, during

[24] The United States employs the term "civil-military operations (CMO)." The Department of Defense defines CMO as "the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives" (Department of Defense, "Civil-Military Operations," *Joint Publication 3-57*, July 2008). NATO employs the term "civil-military cooperation" (CIMIC), which is defined as "the cooperation and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the [NATO] Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national, and non-governmental organizations and agencies" (Ministry of Defence, "Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC)," *Joint Doctrine Publication 3-90*, April 2006). The United Nations employs the term "civil-military coordination" (CMCoord). It is defined as "the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation" (OCHA, "Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies," (Geneva: OCHA, March 2003).

peace support or stability operations, it has become a key feature of post-conflict environments since the end of the Cold War.

Too often, however, post-conflict operations suffer from a lack of civil-military coordination. Political objectives are unclear and joint civil-military plans do not exist at the strategic level, leading military and civilian actors to work at cross-purposes and with limited knowledge of each other's activities at the operational and tactical levels.

In the United States, the National Security Council (NSC), and its application of the interagency process, is responsible for integrating civilian and military actors and capabilities. In theory, the interagency process allows disparate actors to develop a joint strategic plan of action, define common objectives, build relationships, resolve differences, and better understand their respective roles and responsibilities.[25]

Post-conflict operations unequivocally require an interagency effort. Since post-conflict tasks cut across multiple technical sectors – security, governance, humanitarian assistance, economic development, and justice and reconciliation – operations rely on multiple actors and agencies within the United States government. The two principal agencies, the Department of Defense and the Department of State (including the U.S. Agency for International

[25] Michèle Flournoy, "Interagency Strategy and Planning for Post-conflict Reconstruction," in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr, (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004), 106.

Development (USAID)), along with a host of other governmental departments and agencies, such as the departments of Justice, Treasury, and Commerce, must find ways to coordinate their core competencies from the earliest phase of the conflict if the desired strategic objective is to be met.

In its current form, the interagency process has numerous shortcomings, such as stove piped execution, a lack of unity of effort, poor planning, and incoherent implementation structures. In 2008, Michèle Flournoy (prior to her appointment as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) stated before Congress, "the U.S. government as a whole lacks established procedures for planning and conducting interagency operations…And when the United States actually conducts an operation, there is no standard approach to fully integrating the activities of military forces and civilian agencies on the ground."[26] In 2010, former National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley and former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry in a review of the 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review* noted that the executive branch lacks an effective "whole-of-government capacity that integrates the planning and execution capabilities of the many federal departments and agencies that have national security responsibilities."[27]

[26] Michèle Flournoy, "Achieving Unity of Effort in Interagency Operations," Prepared Statement of Michèle A. Flournoy, *Hearing on Prospects for Effective Interagency Collaboration on National Security*, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, January 29, 2008.
[27] Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, *The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs in the 21st Century*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 2010), (accessed April 23, 2011); available from http://www.usip.org/files/qdr/qdrreport.pdf, ix.

Unfortunately, the United States has fallen into a vicious cycle. The United States has engaged in a new post-conflict operation on average every eighteen to twenty-four months and at a significant cost. For example, the cumulative cost to the Department of Defense alone for stabilization and peacekeeping operations (not including combat operations) was $1.3 billion in Haiti, $15 billion in Bosnia, and nearly $6 billion in Kosovo.[28] Moreover, despite the US government's long history of involvement in post-conflict operations, nearly every lesson learned report from nearly every post-conflict operation since the end of the Cold War has flagged civil-military cooperation as an area in need of improvement.[29] In response, the US government has released several presidential directives calling for greater joint civil-military planning.[30] However,

[28] Defense Science Board, *Transition to and from Hostilities*, 194. These estimates do not include the cost of major combat operations.

[29] Michèle Flournoy, "Training and Education for Post-conflict Reconstruction," in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr, (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004), 129.

[30] One of the first efforts to address interagency coordination was in 1997 when President William J. Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. PDD-56 sought to improve dialogue and decision-making among government agencies in order to achieve unity of effort. PDD-56, however, was never fully implemented due to internal bureaucratic resistance. Soon after taking office, President George W. Bush abandoned PDD-56 and began to develop a National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) to improve the interagency process for post-conflict operations. However that new directive was never signed, and eventually abandoned, as the Bush administration began to prepare for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In December 2005, President Bush formally replaced PDD-56 by issuing NSPD-44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*. The directive established defense policy for planning, training, and preparing for stability operations, such as developing representative government institutions, reviving the private sector, and rebuilding local institutions. At the same time, the Department of Defense issued Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, which embraced reconstruction operations as a core US military mission comparable to combat operations, thereby extending the military's role in civilian relief efforts. NSPD-44 was issued in response to objections from the Department of State over the growing role of military forces in post-conflict operations and the militarization of foreign aid. Michèle Flournoy, "Interagency Strategy and Planning for Post-conflict Reconstruction," 107. U.S., The White House, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," *Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56*, May 1997, (accessed May 23, 2014); available from https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm. U.S., The White House, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," *National Security Policy Directive* (NSPD)

these past attempts at constructing an effective process that promotes joint civil-military planning have either failed or simply were ignored. As a result, in each new post-conflict operation, the United States struggles to coordinate its civilian and military resources. Rather than apply the lessons learned gleaned from previous operations, US civilian and military leaders develop ad hoc approaches in response to each new complex contingency operation, prompting officials to again call for better means to improve civil-military cooperation.

B) Research Puzzle

Why does the United States, with its rich history of involvement in post-conflict operations, fail to capitalize on battlefield victories to secure the peace and achieve its political objectives?

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has begun a new post-conflict reconstruction operation every eighteen to twenty-four months on average.[31] More recently, the United States has conducted post-conflict operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both countries, the U.S. invested significant resources, measured in blood and treasure, yet failed to secure the

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44, December 7, 2005, (accessed May 23, 2014); available from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.pdf. U.S., The Department of Defense, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations," *Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05*, November 28, 2005, accessed May 23, 2014); available from https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_05.pdf.

[31] Robert C. Orr, "Preface," in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr, (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004), x. Defense Science Board, *Transition to and from Hostilities*, A Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study, Washington, D.C., December 2004, (accessed April 20, 2011); available from http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA430116.pdf.

peace or achieve its political objectives in either operation despite having boots on the ground in each country for over ten years. Meanwhile, the United States faces new security threats in the Middle East and North Africa as political uncertainty and violence in those regions continues to escalate. Terrorist networks and violent extremism also continues to flourish across the globe, threatening United States security interests and its allies. Given the global security landscape and mounting security threats, the United States will most likely become involved in another post-conflict environment in the near future.

Despite acknowledging the need to improve interagency coordination, the United States continues to struggle to coordinate its civilian and military instruments of national power. As post-conflict reconstruction simultaneously requires the transformation of major aspects of the state, society, and economy, planning for such post-conflict tasks requires significant civil-military coordination at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. There are multiple obstacles to the planning process, such as the role of leaders, bureaucratic rigidities, differing organizational cultures, limited information, and an imbalance in resources and capabilities. Moreover, factors on the ground may create obstacles that no amount of planning could predict might occur or even prevent. For example, in Iraq, foreign jihadists entered the country shortly after the US invasion and began to immediately undermine the reconstruction effort. In August 2003, these jihadists bombed the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad, which forced the UN to remove much of its foreign staff. The United States had

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planned to use United Nations civilian staff to handle post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Without the UN presence, United States and coalition forces were without civilian counterparts to manage reconstruction efforts. Could better planning have prevented this unfortunate outcome?

Of course, there are always multiple factors influencing the United States planning process, but one variable rarely considered is the impact of civil-military relations at the strategic level on the planning process. This dissertation investigates how relations between civilian and military leaders at the apex of national decision-making impact the planning process. What is the impact of the civil-military relationship on strategy? Does the civil-military relationship affect how the war strategy is debated, whether assumptions are tested, and if alternative courses of action are reviewed?

C) Research Question and Hypotheses

This dissertation addresses the following research question and hypotheses:

Q: How do civil-military relations impact the policy planning process for post-conflict environments?

H_1: Civil-military relations characterized by a high degree of deliberative discourse are *a necessary but not sufficient condition* for a successful political and military outcome.

H_2: Civil-military relations characterized by limited deliberative discourse are *a sufficient condition* for an unsuccessful political and military outcome.

For the most part, civil-military relations theory (discussed in greater detail in the following chapter) has largely focused on the issue of civilian control. Though recent scholarship increasingly addresses the need for greater equality in strategic decision-making, particularly in times of war, the issue of control continues to co-opt the discussion of how to structure civil-military relations in the national security decision-making process.[32] The dissertation aims to shift the focus of civil-military relations theory from issues of control to understanding how civil-military relations, that is, the interaction of the civilian and military leadership, affect policy outcomes. How do relations between the civilian and military leadership affect the policy planning process, and therefore, influence the political and military outcome? How should civilian and military leaders interact in the decision-making process?

[32] Richard K. Betts, *American Force*; Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*; Frank G. Hoffman, "Dereliction of Duty *Redux?*; Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*. Richard K. Betts, "Are American Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem," 11-41; Richard K. Betts, *American Force*; Frank G. Hoffman, "Dereliction of Duty *Redux?*" 217-235; Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," 7-26; Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*; Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*. Peter D. Feaver, "The Right to be Right" 87-125.

Drawing on the literature of deliberative democracy, this dissertation introduces the concept of deliberative discourse to civil-military relations theory. The dissertation will show that when civilian and military leaders engage in deliberative discourse, the planning process will more likely include multiple perspectives and viewpoints, a critical analysis of all assumptions and policy options, and an exploration of alternative courses of action. More importantly, the civilian and military leaders involved in the planning process will seek a reasoned consensus of the policy.

Deliberative discourse amongst civilian and military leaders is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for successful policy outcomes. Of course, there are always unanticipated outcomes to any policy as well as other factors beyond how civilian and military actors interact that could affect policy outcomes. For example, the degree of bureaucratic resistance from other US government department and agencies, an overestimation of the state's military capabilities, the extent of domestic and international support for the continued war effort, the rules of engagement for international troops, the diplomatic and other constraints posed by the international and regional environment, the amount of domestic and international resources committed to the war effort, the legitimacy of the indigenous government, and unforeseen contingencies such as the use of nuclear weapons, humanitarian disaster, or an outbreak of regional warfare.[33] However, the point of a deliberative discourse is to match political objectives to military capabilities, confirm domestic and international commitments and/or constraints,

[33] Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*, 10.

and explore all possible contingencies.

Finally, as post-conflict operations simultaneously require the transformation of major aspects of the state, society, and economy, planning for such tasks requires significant civil-military coordination at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. The theoretical focus of civil-military relations must shift from issues of control to how relations between the civilian and military leadership impact the planning process. Civil-military relations theory requires a new normative framework that insists on a deliberative discourse between civilian and military leaders.

D) Methodology

1. Research Project Overview

This research explores the impact of civil-military relations on the planning process for post-conflict environments. The method of within-case comparison is used as the methodological framework for this dissertation. The method of process-tracing was used to carry out the within-case analysis.

Two distinct planning processes during Operation Iraqi Freedom – the 2003 Iraq War decision and the 2007 Iraq Surge decision – are examined to better understand how the nature of civil-military relations at the highest levels of

government impacts the policy planning process. Specific evidence to identify the nature of civil-military relations includes the pattern of civil-military relations (objective versus subjective), the presence of coordination mechanisms (advisory processes, established forums for interaction, etc.), the degree of information sharing (briefings, reports, verbal communications), and the decision-making process (consensus-based or non-collaborative).

As I hypothesize that that the nature of civil-military relations affects the planning process and argue that a deliberative process amongst civilian and military leaders is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for successful policy outcomes, I look for evidence of deliberative discourse during the planning process of the Iraq War and Iraq Surge. Specifically, I look for evidence of divergent perspectives, strategic assessment, and a policy choice based on a reasoned consensus. For example, how frequently did senior and military leaders interact, to what degree, and at what level? Were planning meetings inclusive or held between few individuals? Did military leaders freely participate in these meetings? Were opposing views heard? Were military leaders able to voice their dissent? How was information exchanged – through briefings and reports, informal dialogue, formal meetings? Who controlled the flow of information and operational planning? Were other courses of action explored? Were assumptions tested? Did political objectives match military capabilities? Finally, did the policy plan reflect the consensus of the civilian and military leadership?

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For the purpose of this research project, I consider the role of the civilian and military actors directly involved in the policy planning process for the Iraq War and Surge. I limit my research to the strategic planning process in order to capture the interactions of the senior civilians and military leaders. My focus is on the deliberations between the senior civilian and military leadership regarding the policy agenda and planning process for the Iraq War and Surge. I focus on this particular group as they are the core civilians and military advisors, who offer strategic analysis, test alternatives, develop options, and convey recommendations to the President and Congress.

Although I include when necessary the views of the President in my discussion, I do not include members of Congress as part of the deliberating group. Although Congress may approve or disapprove of the President's proposals, and therefore, exercise authority over policy, their role is minimal in the day-to-day discussions and deliberations.

On the civilian side, the senior leaders reviewed in the cases include the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, the President, and the Vice President. In addition to these officials, I acknowledge officials who are the National Security Council Deputies Committee members, along with their respective staffs, also serve as an interagency forum for national security issues. These individuals also play a role in the planning process for the Iraq War and Surge.

On the military side, the dissertation reviews the views and interests of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs, the CENTCOM Combatant Commander, the Commanding General in Iraq, and respective staff.

My research focuses on these individuals and offices as they were directly involved in the policy planning process for the Iraq War and Surge. Although at times other individuals and officers were involved, such as members of Congress, the day-to-day planning centered on the individuals and offices identified above. This dissertation does not analyze the whole-of-government approach to policy planning, but rather it investigates the role of the senior civilian and military leaders involved in the strategic decision-making of the Iraq War and Iraq Surge.

Moreover, unlike most civil-military literature, this dissertation does not treat civilian and military actors as unitary agents. I recognize that there are multiple players that make-up both the civilian and military leadership, each with their own interests and perspectives. Moreover, I recognize that the multiple points of view, both within and between the civilian and military spheres, may be in conflict. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman, and the combatant commander may disagree on any given military operation and offer different and conflicting advice. The same holds for the civilian leadership. The departments of Defense and State, for example, may disagree on the policy

agenda. As such, there may not be a unified military or civilian view. The multiple civilian and military players, however, makes it all the more urgent to engage in deliberative discourse in order to hear, probe, and analyze the differences in perspectives and generate new knowledge.

2. The Methods Applied

A case study analysis is an effective way in which to understand civil-military relations in times of war. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett describe the case study method as "the detailed explanation of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events."[34] Robert K. Yin defines the case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth, relies on multiple sources of evidence, and benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.[35] Yin advocates the use of the case study method when the research questions require an extensive and in-depth description of some social phenomenon. Case studies are much stronger at assessing *whether* and *how* a variable mattered to the outcome than at

[34] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005): 5.
[35] Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 4th ed., (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2009): 18.

assessing *how much* it mattered.[36] Finally, case studies are the preferred method to infer or test explanatory hypotheses, according to Stephen Van Evera.[37]

There are several prejudices against the case study method. One strong objection to the use of case studies is that they provide little basis for scientific generalization. However, case study researchers often choose to sacrifice the broad applicability of their theories in order to research the conditions under which specified outcomes occur, and the mechanisms through which they occur.[38] Yin argues that case studies, like experiments, "are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes." In other words, the purpose of the case study is to expand and generalize theories, which he refers to as analytic generalization. With analytic generalization, the researcher first shows how the study's findings are likely to inform a particular set of concepts, theoretical constructs, or hypothesized sequence of events.[39] Then, the researcher applies the same theory to implicate other situations where similar concepts might be relevant. In short, the single-case study seeks to develop and then discuss how its findings might have implications for an improved understanding of a particular concept – in the case of this dissertation, civil-military relations theory.

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[36] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 25.
[37] Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997): 55.
[38] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 31.
[39] Robert K. Yin, *Qualitative Research from Start to Finish*, (New York: The Guilford Press, 2011): 100.

Another objection to the use of case studies is that they are prone to selection bias. Practitioners of case study methods argue that selection on the dependent variable should not be necessarily rejected. According to George and Bennett, "cases selected on the dependent variable, including single-case studies, can help identify which variables are not necessary or sufficient conditions for the selected outcome."[40] Van Evera also acknowledges that selection on the dependent variable is appropriate under any of three conditions: 1) comparing conditions in selected cases to a known average situation, 2) the cases have large within-case variance on the study variable, permitting multiple within-case congruence procedures, or 3) the cases are sufficiently data-rich to permit process-tracing.[41] The Iraq case study is data-rich to permit process-tracing.

There also is strong skepticism against the value of single-case studies, the greatest concern being that that studies involving a single observation may lead to incorrect inferences. However, several influential works have used single-case research designs to good effect, such as Graham Allison's study of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Yin identifies five rationales for the use of single-case study.[42] First, it represents the *critical case* in determining whether the propositions of a well-formulated theory are correct or whether an alternative set of explanations might be more relevant. Second, the case represents an *extreme* or a *unique* case. In other words, the case may be so rare that it is worth

[40] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 23.
[41] Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 47.
[42] Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 57-50.

documenting and analyzing. Conversely, the case may be a *representative* or *typical* case. Fourth, the case is *revelatory*. Information previously inaccessible to social science inquiry becomes available. Finally, a fifth rationale for a single-case study is the *longitudinal* case. That is, the study of a single case at two or more different points in time. Van Evera also identifies eleven possible criteria that can be used (alone or in some combination) for the case selection process.[43] The research project applies three of his criteria – data richness, resemblance of case to current policy concerns, and intrinsic importance – in the selection of the Iraq case.

The Iraq case meets the criterion of data richness. There is an abundant amount of data available on the Iraq case. Much has been written on the war in Iraq and many of the individuals involved in the planning processes of the war and surge decisions are alive and available for interviews. The Iraq case also meets the criterion of resemblance to current policy concerns. Several prominent organizations, scholars and public officials have underscored the need for greater civil-military planning as the result of problems that arose in the Iraq War. Policy prescriptions deduced from the Iraq case can be applied to other cases. Finally, the Iraq case is of intrinsic importance.

The intrinsic importance of the Iraq case cannot be stressed enough. The Iraq War was one of the longest wars in history, with total war costs to the United States having reached $815 billion, not including war-related social, political and

[43] Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 77-88.

environmental costs.[44] Moreover, there have been several shifts in policy during the course of the Iraq War. First, during the preparation for the Iraq War, the Department of Defense hijacked the planning process. On January 20, 2003, President Bush released National Security Presidential Directive 24 (NSPD-24), which essentially crystallized the Defense Department's authority for post-war Iraq. Naturally, the Department of State objected, prompting The White House to release NSPD-44 in 2005, which designated State as the lead agency for coordinating and planning reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Second, in response to problems that arose during the Iraq War, the military made several doctrinal changes in how it prepares for post-conflict environments, such as the introduction of a counterinsurgency strategy in 2006 (and publication of *Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24*). The Department of State also has tried to improve its capacities to take on post-conflict tasks. For example, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (reorganized in 2011 as the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations) at State was created to institutionalize the United States Government's civilian capacity to respond to crises involving failing, failed, and post-conflict states and complex emergencies. Finally, there has been a renewed emphasis to improve the interagency process among government officials, military officers, think tanks, and scholars.

For the research project, the method of process-tracing was used to carry out the within-case analysis. In process-tracing, "the researcher examines

[44] Amy Belasco, "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11." *Congressional Research Service*, RL33110, September 2, 2010, (accessed April 18, 2011); available from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL3311 0.pdf.

histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case," according to George and Bennet.[45] Process-tracing can take a variety of forms – detailed narrative, use of hypotheses and generalizations, analytical explanation, and more general explanation.[46] This research project relies on a narrative account to suggest enough about "the possible causal processes" in the cases.[47] Moreover, the dissertation uses the method of process-tracing to construct a general explanation rather than a detailed tracing of a causal process.

Applying process-tracing to test for causal inference may be summarized in terms of four empirical tests: straw-in-the wind, hoop, smoking-gun, and doubly-decisive.[48] The tests are classified according to whether there is a necessary and/or sufficient condition for accepting the causal inference. Straw-in-the wind tests can increase the plausibility of a given hypothesis, but they are not decisive. Therefore, they provide neither necessary nor a sufficient criterion for accepting or rejecting the research hypothesis. Hoop tests establish a necessary criterion, but do not yield a sufficient criterion for accepting the explanation. Smoking-gun tests provide a sufficient but not necessary criterion for accepting the causal inference. Finally, doubly-decisive tests provide strong inferential

[45] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 6-7.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid, 210-211.
[48] David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," *Political Science and Politics*, vol. 44. no. 4 (2011): 823-830, (accessed May 18, 2014); available from http://www.ukcds.org.uk/sites/default/files/uploads/Understanding-Process-Tracing.pdf, 825-827.

leverage as the tests meet both the necessary and sufficient standard for establishing causation.

Although process-tracing is a valuable approach to determine causal inference, it is not necessarily easy to apply.[49] The research project relies on a narrative account to explore causal ideas, but data limitations, such as classified documents, inhibit the full exploration of causal inference. Nevertheless, research findings for H_1 yield necessary, but not sufficient criterion for accepting the causal inference. That is, the hypothesis "jumps through the hoop" and remains under consideration.[50] Civil-military relations characterized by a high degree of deliberative discourse are a *necessary but not sufficient condition* for a successful political and military outcome. Research findings for H_2 yield a sufficient criterion for accepting the causal inference. Civil-military relations characterized by limited deliberative discourse are *a sufficient condition* for an unsuccessful political and military outcome.

Despite data collection restrictions, the research project relied on qualitative data from primary and secondary sources, including official documents, memoirs, biographies, and interviews. Archival research was conducted to review media reports of the events at the time a well as transcripts of public hearings and speeches, academic papers, memoirs, journal articles, books,

[49] Ibid, 828.
[50] Ibid, 826.

and analyses by various think tanks. Additionally, manuscripts by policy advisors and military personnel were reviewed for research purposes.

Interviews included in-depth and focused interviews, as well as informal discussions. In-depth interviews ask the respondents about the facts of a case, as well as their opinion. These interviews are open-ended and assume a conversational manner. Focused interviews, on the other hand, are meant to corroborate certain facts and test the sequence of events.

Many of the interviews were face-to-face, while others were done over the phone due to travel and financial restrictions. Interview subjects included a former Ambassador, individuals from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and former staff from the National Security Council. Retired military officers that had served in Iraq were also interviewed, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Commander of the United States Central Command, and the Commander of Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF-I). Policy analysts at think tanks, academics, and journalists were interviewed as well.

E) Study Limitations

This study questions the impact of civil-military relations on the planning process. I hypothesize that the nature of civil-military relations (characterized by a high degree or limited deliberative discourse) influences the political and

military outcome. A significant limitation to the research study is the inability to rule out alternative explanations that either influenced the planning processes or the political and military outcome of the cases. Other factors also affected the planning process and/or policy outcome of the 2003 Iraq War and Iraq Surge, such as bureaucratic politics, personalities, the condition of the Iraqi state, and other political and security events on the ground. As such, civil-military relations were not the only variable influencing the planning process. Other factors were at play and rival explanations cannot be eliminated and remain relevant.

Another limitation to this study is its reliance on a single case study – the Iraq War – to evaluate the impact of civil-military relations on the planning process. Although several influential works have used single-case research designs to good effect, findings from a single case provide little basis for scientific generalization. As such, the findings from this study help to better inform existing civil-military relations theory. An investigation of the interaction of civilian and military leaders in other conflict or post-conflict situations should be studied to validate this study's findings and build a new normative framework.

Finally, the definitive history of the planning process for the 2003 Iraq War and Iraq Surge will not be known until the official minutes from the Presidency of George W. Bush, namely minutes from the National Security Council, Department of Defense, Joint Staff, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and other critical national security decision-making meetings, are

declassified and made available to historians and scholars. Although official minutes are not presently available, some revealing insights as to these key deliberations are accessible in published nonfiction works, including biographies, memoirs, and journal and newspaper articles, that quote senior participants at these meetings.

In addition to the information available in these sources, the dissertation relies on interviews with public officials. Although interviews are an important source of information, the interviewees' responses are subject to bias, poor recall, and sometimes, inaccurate information. It was important therefore to corroborate interview data with multiple sources of evidence, such as available government documents, archival records, and published nonfiction works.

F) Significance of the Findings

The United States faces a variety of security threats.[51] Frequently referenced traditional threats include wars between nations, civil wars, state failures, rising powers, weapons proliferation, transnational crime, and general unrest. As in the past, the potential for traditional wars between nations remains. Foreign powers that continue to pose a strategic threat to United States interests include a nuclear Iran and North Korea, and more assertive China. Russia also

[51] James R. Clapper, "Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community," *Senate Select Committee on National Intelligence*, January 29, 2014, (accessed May 10, 2014); available from http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2014%20WWTA%20%20SFR_SSCI_29_Jan.pdf.

poses a challenge to national and international security given its recent military intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea.

In addition to the strategic threats from state actors, new challenges have arisen in the twenty-first century security environment from a more diverse and non-traditional array of actors, such as non-state armed groups, terrorist organizations, homegrown violent extremists, and ad hoc, foreign-based actors. Further complicating the threat environment is the growing use of cyber-terrorism in order to cripple government industry, commerce, and other critical infrastructure.

Fortunately, the threat of large-scale attacks from terrorist networks, such as al-Qaeda, against the United States homeland has significantly degraded with sustained counterterrorism measures. However, the United States continues to faces enduring threats to its interests abroad from non-state actors or extremists groups. For example, Syria has become a significant location for al-Qaeda-aligned groups to recruit, train, and equip extremists.

Additional threats against United States interests may arise elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa as political uncertainty and violence in those regions continues to escalate. Ongoing struggles in Libya and Egypt, as well as the worsening internal conflict in Syria, have created opportunities for extremists groups to find ungoverned spaces. Moreover, political uncertainty in these

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regions may spark violent ethnic and sectarian warfare. The United States and its allies therefore may soon become involved in stabilization and post-conflict efforts.

How the United States chooses to deal with these security threats remains uncertain. However, the complexity, variety, and potential lethality of these threats will require the United States to use its full arsenal of national power. That is, whether the United States chooses to use political, economic, military means, or a combination thereof, to respond to potential threats, the planning process will necessitate the close coordination of civilian and military instruments of national power.

The findings from this research project provide a new way to improve the planning process for these environments. Research findings highlight the need for civilian and military actors at the apex of national decision-making to engage in a deliberative discourse to better examine divergent perspectives, question planning assumptions, explore alternative policy options, and integrate political and military considerations.

G) Roadmap of Dissertation

The following chapters address the impact of civil-military relations in the planning process for post-conflict operations. Chapter II introduces the literature

review on civil-military relations, beginning with an overview of the classic model of civil-military relations theory – the objective control model – as well as its rival framework – the subjective control model. Both frameworks address how civilian authorities control the military.

The chapter then reviews alternative normative models developed in the post-Vietnam and post-Cold War era. Frameworks developed during these periods also define civil-military relations in terms of control and focus on the struggle for power between the civilian and military leadership. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the current debate in civil-military relations regarding the proper division of labor for national security decision-making during times of war and recent scholarship addressing a civil-military dialogue.

Chapter III introduces the concept of deliberative discourse to better understand how civil-military relations impact the political and military outcomes of a policy decision. The chapter draws on the literature of deliberative democracy to support the dissertation's main argument that when civilian and military leaders engage in deliberative discourse, the planning process more likely includes multiple perspectives and viewpoints, a critical analysis of all assumptions and policy options, an exploration of alternative courses of action, and a reasoned consensus of the policy agenda.

The chapter on deliberative discourse also addresses its limits, namely

group polarization and groupthink. As a counterargument, the chapter also references the theory of cognitive diversity to support the claim that civilian and military actors produce better policy choices when working as a group. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the potential drawbacks of deliberative discourse, why deliberative discourse matters, who deliberates, and the characteristics of the deliberative discourse model – divergent perspectives, strategic assessment, and reasoned consensus.

Chapter IV presents the case study on the 2003 Iraq War decision to evaluate the dissertation's hypothesis about how civil-military relations characterized by limited deliberative discourse affect the policy planning process, and therefore, the political and military outcome. The chapter demonstrates how prior civil-military tensions and the methods that Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld used to influence and manage the military undermined the comprehensiveness of debate at the civil-military nexus. As a result, the uniformed military abdicated its responsibility to present its best advice and even question and challenge the administration's policy, and the civilian leadership failed to force a thorough review of the military strategy and instead pushed through their own agenda for Iraq.

The Iraq War case study begins with a review of Secretary Rumsfeld's defense transformation agenda and its subsequent impact on civil-military relations. Included is a discussion on his efforts to assert civilian authority over

the Pentagon using subjective control methods, such as selecting senior military officers who shared the administration's worldviews and micromanaging the war planning process. In reviewing the planning process for the war and post-invasion phase of the Iraq mission, the chapter demonstrates how a lack of deliberation and exchange of candid views and perspectives amongst the civilian and military leadership led to a flawed post-conflict plan.

Chapter V presents the case study on the Iraq Surge to evaluate how civil-military relations characterized by a high degree of deliberative discourse affect the policy planning process, and therefore, the political and military outcome. The chapter begins with a brief background on the security situation in Iraq in 2006, a review of the war strategy executed by General George W. Casey, and a discussion on the state of civil-military relations at that time. The chapter then examines the multiple strategy reviews that led to the development of the surge strategy, including the formal processes, such as the Iraq Study Group (a bipartisan panel appointed by the United States Congress to assess the situation in Iraq), the Council of Colonels (a working group organized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and the White House strategy review. The chapter also reviews informal advisory processes, including the recommendations of retired military, commanders outside the chain of command, and outside experts from the academic community. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the initial impact of the surge strategy.

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Chapter VI provides a cross-case synthesis of the research. To assess whether the civilian and military leadership engaged in a deliberative discourse during the planning process for the Iraq War and Iraq Surge, the chapter analyzes evidence of divergent perspectives, strategic assessment, and reasoned consensus for each case. The chapter concludes with a discussion on alternative explanations that may have influenced the planning process or outcome of the two cases.

Chapter VII summarizes the research question and findings and discusses future research opportunities and policy implications of the dissertation.

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II) CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: EXPLAINING OLD MODELS AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW APPROACH

A) Introduction

The United States failed to evaluate adequately the post-conflict environment and prepare accordingly for the Iraq War in 2003. More than ten years on, the invasion and its aftermath remain prominent in foreign policy debates. The war cost the United States over $800 billion, not including war-related social, political and environmental costs.[52] The total human cost of the Iraq War exceeded 175,000, including over 4,500 United States servicemen.[53] Despite the immense resources devoted to the Iraq War, the United States withdrew in December 2011 without any assurances that it had achieved its political objectives – regime change, the removal of weapons of mass destruction, and the establishment of a democratic Iraq.

[52] Amy Belasco, "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11."

[53] "Human Costs of War: Direct War Death in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan: October 2001-Septebmer 2012," *Costs of War* (accessed March 10, 2013); available from http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/HMCHART_1.pdf. For more estimates on the total costs of the war on terror, see *Costs of War* (accessed March 10, 2013); available from http://costsofwar.org/; "Faces of the Fallen," *Washington Post*, (accessed March 15, 2013); available from http://apps.washingtonpost.com/national/fallen/; "Operation Iraqi Freedom." *Iraq Coalition Casualty Count.* icasualties.org, (accessed March 15, 2013); available from http://icasualties.org/Iraq/index.aspx.

Over the years writers have attempted to understand why postwar plans failed to anticipate the complete breakdown in security after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime and ensuing insurgency.[54] Many point to rivalries between the Department of State and Pentagon to explain the poor planning process and inadequate coordination. Others attribute it to the then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's combative personality, micromanagement, and insistence on a close-hold evaluative planning process. Others blame the administration's flawed and untested assumptions about the postwar environment. While others focus on the military leaderships' inability to voice dissent about operational plans and prepare an alternative strategy.

Less understood are how civil-military relations between senior civilian and military leaders affected the planning process for the Iraq War. What is the most effective role of civilian and military leaders in the national security decision-making process? What is the impact of the civil-military relationship on strategy? Does the relationship determine if the military activity falls in line with political objectives and constraints? Does the civil-military strategy affect how the war strategy is debated, whether assumptions are tested, and if alternative courses of action are reviewed?

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[54] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, (New York: Pantheon, 2006); Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2006); Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004); Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008); Charles A. Stevenson, *SECDEF: The Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense*, (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books Inc., 2007); Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, (Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 2008); James Fallows, *Blind into Baghdad: America's War in Iraq*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006); David L. Phillips, *Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2005).

In this chapter, I will introduce the literature on civil-military relations. I will begin with an overview of the classic model of civil-military relations theory – the objective control model – as well as its rival framework – the subjective control model. Then, I will introduce alternative normative frameworks that have been developed in the post-Vietnam and post-Cold War eras. I conclude the chapter with a discussion on the current debate in civil-military relations on the proper division of labor for national security decision-making during times of war. In the following chapter, I will present my thoughts on how the nature of civil-military relations affects the planning process in post-conflict environments.

B) Civil-Military Relations Theory

Civil-military relations theory describes the relationship between civil society and the military organization established to protect it. More narrowly, it illustrates the relationship between the civil authority of the state and its military institution with regard to issues of national security policy.[55] How the United States manages national defense affairs and prepares for conflict are questions of civil-military relations, the foundation for which comes from the Constitution, which provides clear provisions articulating that elected leaders control the armed forces. Article II bestows upon the President the powers of Commander-in-

[55] Christopher P. Gibson defines civil-military relations as the "delineation of duties among top-level civilian and military leaders as found in existing US legal *structure* (provisions in the US Constitution and US statutes) and in the *norms* that guide behavior in view of how these leaders contribute individually and collectively to the national security decision-making process, and in all efforts to provide for the common defense." Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*, 5.

Chief.[56] As such, the President directs military forces and presides at the top of the chain of command. Article I provides Congress with the power to declare war, as well as the responsibility "to raise and support armies, maintain a navy," and "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining" the armed forces.[57]

Although important decisions on matters of war and peace rests with the elected civilian leadership, not all national security issues, including the planning, preparation, and execution of military operations, falls exclusively into civilian hands. National security decisions include questions of policy, programs, budgets, and operations that require the strategic analysis, advice and recommendation of both the civilian and military leadership. There are few national security decisions that rest purely within the civilian or military sphere of influence. Instead, national security decisions necessitate constant civil-military interaction. It is this overlapping domain and civil and military spheres of influence that muddles what is meant by "civilian control" of the military.

Civil-military relations is a very broad subject, but for the most part, the literature on civil-military relations has focused on how civil authorities control the military, what policies and structures lead to civilian control, and what kind of civil-military relations best serve the interests of the state in the long term.[58] The

[56] US Constitution, Article II. To view the US Constitution in its entirety, see *Constitution of the United States*, (accessed January 20, 2014); available from http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution.html.
[57] US Constitution, Article I, Section 8.
[58] Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," 7-26; Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 149-180.

civil-military challenge is to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything civilians ask with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize.[59] In short, how do civilians control the military? To answer this, scholars have sought to develop normative models to understand how civil-military relations play out on a day-to-day basis, particularly in times of war when civilian leaders tend to lean more heavily on the military perspective. Allowing security concerns to trump political decisions risks adopting measures that compromise democratic values. For example, shortly after September 11, the United States Congress passed legislation to strengthen security controls. The Patriot Act was the first of many changes to surveillance laws that authorizes federal law enforcement agencies to conduct surveillance on individuals suspected of terrorist-related activities, such as monitoring phone and e-mail communications, collecting bank and credit card reporting records, and tracking Internet activity.

C) The Cold War Pattern

How exactly the civil-military relationship should be arranged to ensure civilian control of the military has been the main focus of the civil-military literature in the United States since the end of World War II.[60] The previous

[59] Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005): 2.
[60] Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*, 67; Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 2, (June 1999): 211-241. Feaver explains how much that was written in the early Cold War period on how America should reconcile the need for a large standing army given its suspicions of the threats to liberty posed by a large standing army.

method of civilian control practiced in the United States during peacetime was by a policy of extirpation – essentially checking the military's power by keeping the armed forces small.[61] During times of crisis or war when US armed forces needed to expand, an intrusive method of civilian control was practiced to maximize civilian control. Essentially, the armed forces were civilianized and forced to reflect administration positions and direction through a widespread draft, direct commissioning, the screening of senior military leaders to match political preferences, and placing presidential appointees within the War and Navy Departments.[62]

America's founding fathers objected to the use of a standing army to control the civilian populace. Among the grievances against Great Britain listed in the Declaration of Independence was that the King had "kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the consent of our legislatures," and had "affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the civil power."[63] The Articles of the Confederation also addressed the threat of military intrusion into civilian affairs by restricting the size of the armed forces during peacetime to no more than absolutely necessary for the common defense (i.e., the policy of extirpation); by entrusting control to civil authorities; and by preferring the use of a militia over a standing professional army.[64]

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[61] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 155.
[62] Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*, 68.
[63] Charles Doyle and Jennifer K. Elsea, "The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: the Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law," *Congressional Research Service*, R42659, August 16, 2012 (accessed January 20, 2014); available from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42659.pdf, 4.
[64] Ibid.

Notwithstanding the founders' aversion to the use of a standing army to control the civilian populace, the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit it.[65] Soon after Congress was first assembled under the Constitution, it established a law enforcement capability in the federal government, which empowered federal marshals to call upon a posse comitatus,[66] including for military assistance.[67] Thus, federal government had the authority to call upon a militia (and later the Armed Forces) to operate either as an arm of the government or to support the federal marshal.[68]

From time to time, Congress authorized the use of federal troops for riot control, to ensure the execution of federal law, or to aid civil authorities.[69] At the end of the Civil War, federal troops were used to execute the laws in the states that had been part of the Confederacy. By 1877, it was evident that some Republican state governments in the south owed their continued political existence to the presence of the military. Federal troops also may have influenced the outcome of the Hayes-Tilden presidential election.[70] In response, the House of Representatives, controlled by a Democratic majority, passed the Posse

[65] Ibid.
[66] The Latin phrase means "power of the community." The term refers to a group of citizens assembled by the authorities to deal with an emergency or law enforcement activities, such a suppressing a riot or pursuing felons.
[67] Ibid, 5.
[68] Ibid.
[69] For example, to counter the Burr Conspiracy in 1806, President Thomas Jefferson issued a proclamation requiring all officers, civil and military, to search out and bring to punishment all persons engaged in a military expedition against Spanish territory. As a result, President Jefferson had his former Vice President Aaron Burr arrested and indicted for treason for allegedly attempting to create an independent nation. Charles Doyle and Jennifer K. Elsea, "The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters," 6, note 23.
[70] Ibid, 19.

Comitatus Act, which strictly forbids the employment of "any part of the Army of the United States as a posse comitatus or otherwise under the pretext or for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said forces may be expressly authorized by act of Congress."[71]

When the United States emerged from World War II, the Soviet threat forced the United States to engage in an arms race and maintain a large standing army and sizeable defense budget. How would the United States confront the communist threat, protect the liberal democratic way of life, and ensure civilian control of the armed forces all while in a state of perpetual military preparedness? In 1957, Huntington published *The Soldier and the State* and introduced a new normative framework to guide the national security establishment to ensure national survival, maintain civilian control of the armed forces, and safeguard American values.[72]

According to Huntington, the need to maintain a large-scale army during the Cold War period meant that the traditional form of civilian control practiced between wars (the policy of extirpation) was out of the question. Similarly, the method of *subjective control* (which he defined as the "maximizing of the power of civilian groups in relation to the military")[73] risked politicizing the officer

[71] Ibid, 26, note 157.
[72] Although the US Constitution and 1947 National Security Act provided some guidance for the civil-military relationship, there was no normative theory to arrange civil-military relations.
[73] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 80.

corps and jeopardized the development of professional armed forces.[74] As such, the United States had no way to organize the national security establishment to meet the Soviet thereat in a way that preserved civilian control of the military and the liberal democratic way of life.

Huntington's answer to this dilemma was to develop a new normative framework – the *objective control* model, which favored the separation of the civilian and military spheres of influence. "Civilian control in the objective sense is the maximizing of military professionalism," wrote Huntington.[75] The precepts of the objective control model are summarized below:

1. A high-level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of the limits of their professional competence;

2. The effective subordination of the military to the civilian political leaders who make the decisions on foreign and military policy;

[74] Ibid, 7-18. The distinguishing characteristics of the military profession are expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. The professional man is an expert with specialized knowledge and skill, acquired by prolonged education and experience. His expertise is in the management of violence, and his duties include the organizing, equipping and training of his force, the planning of its activities, and the direction of its operation in and out of combat. His expertise is learned through formal schooling and from practice. Moreover, education is not limited to military knowledge, but includes general education in other fields of study. The military officer is also responsible, because he performs his service when required by society. His motivation for the vocation is not economic, but a social obligation to utilize his craft for the benefit of society. Finally, the corporate character of officership refers to the official bureaucracy of the profession, as well as the associations, schools, customs and traditions. The officer lives and works apart from the rest of society. The officer corps is an autonomous social unit.
[75] Ibid, 83.

3. The recognition and acceptance by the civilian leadership of the professional competence and autonomy of the military; and

4. The minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military.[76]

Under Huntington's objective control model, the military is an autonomous tool of the state, which stands ready to carry out the wishes of the legitimate authority of the state. Objective control exists when civilian officials outside the professional armed forces make all policy decisions on foreign and defense matters, including decisions to wage war and the use of force. No decision or responsibility falls to the military unless specifically delegated to it by civilian leaders. The final authority over military policy rests with the political elite.

While Huntington's objective control model emphasizes the minimization of military intervention, it also stresses the professional competence and autonomy of the military. "The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism."[77] Military professionals possess expert knowledge on the management of violence, and as such, civilian leaders should defer operational and tactical decisions to the military rather than micro-mange military affairs. Huntington of course recognized that ideological obstacles, namely "the American attitude of mind which sought to impose liberal

[76] Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 6, no. 4, (October 1995), 9.
[77] Ibid.

solutions in military affairs," prevented the United States from achieving military professionalism and objective civilian control.[78] In fact, Huntington warned that a high level of objective civilian control was indeed a rare phenomenon even among modern western societies. The "achievement of objective control…has been hampered by the tendency of many civilian groups to still conceive of civilian control in subjective terms."[79]

Indeed, Huntington warned against the use of subjective civilian control. Although the simplest way to minimize military power is to maximize the power of civilian power, the large number, varied character, and conflicting interests of civilian groups make it impossible to maximize their power as a whole with respect to the military.[80] As such, maximizing civilian control actually means maximizing the civilian power of a particular civilian group. This is what Huntington refers to as *subjective civilian control* – the maximization of the civilian power of a particular civilian group. "Consequently, the maximizing of civilian power always means the maximizing of the power of some particular civilian group or groups," he wrote. That is, subjective civilian control involves the power relations among civilian groups.[81]

[78] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 90-91. Huntington recognized that the demands of military security were at odds with American liberalism, which opposes the use of large standing armies and embraces the use of institutional devices such as international law, international courts, and international organizations as the way to peace.
[79] Ibid, 85.
[80] Ibid, 80.
[81] Ibid, 80.

Why is it impossible to maximize civilian power as a whole with respect to the military? Huntington notes several reasons. First, the civilian control of the day-to-day affairs of the military is divided between the legislative and executive branches of government. As such, it is expected for these two branches of government to counteract one another and disagree on a variety of topics, including issues of funding, regulation, and the use of military forces. Second, in addition to having conflicting guidance and supervision of the military come from the congressional and executive branches of government, it can come from within the same political party or from opposite political parties. Finally, the minority political party also can attempt to influence the military in order to alter the balance of power in their favor to prevail on a particular issue.[82] When civilian groups distinguished by characteristics such as ideology or partisan identification, social class, or branch of government seek to influence or control the military to serve its particular interests, it minimizes military power by civilianizing the military.[83] In short, subjective civilian control involves the maximization of the power of a particular civilian group, and therefore, risks drawing the military into the political sphere.

To escape this dilemma, Huntington advocated for the maximization of military professionalism. Military institutions, Huntington noted, are shaped by two phenomena: *a societal imperative* that arises from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the state, and a *functional imperative*

[82] Ibid, 83.
[83] Ibid, 80-83.

that calls on the state's armed forces to develop doctrine and organize military capabilities to defend the state against aggression. When competing civilian groups struggle for power and draw in the military to serve their particular interest, the societal imperative dominates the functional imperative, and therefore, limits military effectiveness and threatens national security interests. Military institutions that reflect only the social values of the state are incapable of effectively performing their military function.[84] For this reason, Huntington argued in favor of a professional officer corps. On the other hand, it may not be possible to control military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives. When the functional imperative dominates the societal imperative, the military becomes too powerful for civilian authorities to assert any control. Huntington considers the interaction of these two imperatives to be "the nub of the problem of civil-military relations."[85] The degree to which the two imperatives conflict depends upon the security needs of the state, and the pattern of civil-military relations present in society.

Huntington's theory on how to protect the democratic state presumes a clearly delineated military sphere defined by war fighting and independent of the political sphere.[86] However, this strict separation between the policy decisions of political leaders and the operational decisions of military leaders was not practical during the Cold War where any form of war, from revolutionary uprisings to

[84] Ibid, 2.
[85] Ibid.
[86] James Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 29, no. 7 (Fall 2002): 7-29.

limited warfare, if left unchecked, could easily escalate and risk the potential use of weapons of mass destruction.[87] How could there be a clear distinction between the two spheres when the policy options and decisions (the ends of war) depend on the operational and tactical decisions (the means of war)? For Morris Janowitz, there cannot. Such a proposition is impossible given the blurring of responsibilities between civilian and military authorities in national security policy during the Cold War.[88]

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[87] Ibid.

[88] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*. Janowitz challenged Huntington's strict separation of the political and military spheres of influence as the roles and responsibilities of civilian and military authorities in national security policy became increasingly intertwined during the Cold War period. As was the case during the Cold War, twenty-first century security challenges have placed the military instrument of power in a central role in United States national security policy. As such, the professional soldier has had to perform a major role in national life. Controversies once again have arisen over the role and responsibilities of civilian and military authorities in United States strategic decisions and the decision-making process, interpersonal relations at the nexus of defense policy-making, the quality of military advice rendered to civilian leaders, and the appropriateness of public dissent by retired general officers.

In *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, Suzanne C. Nielson and Don M. Snider brought together a group of scholars to assess the current state of civil-military relations and review, test, and critique many of Huntington's original concepts. The central premise of the book is that Huntington's work remains a useful starting point for a review of American civil-military relations.

Some of the analyses of the research project relevant to this dissertation project include Richard K Betts' assessment of the state of civil-military relations in America after 9/11. Betts does not deny that at some level of high politics, soldiers should be silent, and at some level of tactical specificity, civilians should keep their hands off. However, with regard to strategic discussions, Betts urges for equal dialogue. Richard K. Betts, "Are American Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem," 11-41.

Matthew Moten reviews civil-military tensions under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and discusses how to structure civil-military relations to foster effective policy and strategy outcomes. He argues that soldiers and civilians can and should maintain a shared responsibility, but concludes that civil-military relations at the politico-military nexus are never as simple as a dialogue between a general and his civilian superior in the Pentagon. Moten, Matthew, "A Broken Dialogue: Rumsfeld, Shinseki, and Civil-Military Tension." in *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, eds. Suzanne C. Nielson and Don M. Snider (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009): 42-71.

Nadia Schadlow and Richard A. Lacquement Jr. also critique Huntington's definition of the military profession as too narrow in the post-Cold War era, particularly as post-conflict operations require judgments in realms of activity not easily separable into military and civilian components. Nadia Schadlow and Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., "Winning Wars, Not Just Battles: Expanding the Military Profession to Incorporate Stability Operations," in *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, eds. Suzanne C. Nielson and Don M. Snider (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009): 112-132.

The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, by Morris Janowitz, was a study of the professional life, organization, and leadership of the American military profession.[89] It was a sociologically oriented examination of the military as it had evolved during the first half of the twentieth century.[90] Janowitz studied the relationship between the armed forces and society to demonstrate how the basic organizational trend of the military profession had shifted "away from a mobilization force to a military force 'in being'."[91] Specifically, he pointed to the introduction of nuclear weapons, the use of the draft system under the Eisenhower administration, the wars of national liberation in the 1960s, and the combined strategy of flexible response and large-scale

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Christopher P. Gibson proposes an alternative to the objective and subjective control models, what he calls a Madisonian approach. In his model, civilian and military experts within the Department of Defense should develop competing plans and proposals for executive deliberation. Christopher P. Gibson, "Enhancing National Security and Civilian Control of the Military," in *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, eds. Suzanne C. Nielson and Don M. Snider (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009): 239-263.

Finally, Richard H. Kohn examines the role of personalities in civil-military relations and proposes a set of behavioral norms to foster cooperative civil-military relations that would result in improved civilian control as well as wise policymaking informed by military expertise. Richard H. Kohn, "Building Trust: Civil-Military Behaviors for Effective National Security." in *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, eds. Suzanne C. Nielson and Don M. Snider (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009): 264-289.

[89] Janowitz also describes the ideological struggle in the military as it emerged from the Vietnam experience, which he termed as the "absolutist" versus "pragmatic" debate. Absolutists were military officers who thought of war in terms of conventional definitions of victory, unalloyed by political considerations. Pragmatists see the necessity for limited warfare and the need to modify military objectives in consideration of political implications.

[90] Janowitz's work led follow-on studies that explored the relationship between society and the armed forces, including studies on post-colonial civil-military relations in developing countries, in communist regimes, in ethnically divided polities, and in authoritarian and post-authoritarian regimes. Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," 213.

[91] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, ix. Methodologically, Janowitz relied on historical documents, biographical and autobiographical sources, a historical sample of 760 generals and admirals, an analysis of 576 responses to a questionnaire administered to officers on duty at the Pentagon, and 113 interviews with selected officers. John W. Masland, review of *The Professional Soldier*, by Morris Janowitz, in *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 54, no. 4 (December 1960): 995-997.

ground and air formations in Vietnam to explain the transformation of the military organization away from a highly self-contained and socially distinct military force. Janowitz also pointed to the narrowing skill differential between military and civilian elites, as well as the shift in military recruitment trends wherein military demographics began to more closely resemble the American people. The outcome of this military transformation was the "convergence of military and civilian organization; the interpenetration of the civilian and the military."[92] That is, the military culture and civil society had converged.

In *The Professional Soldier*, Janowitz rejected the ideal-type division of labor that Huntington claims is essential to the professionalization of the military.[93] Instead, he advised military leaders to assist in estimating the consequences of the threat or use of force against the potentials for conflict resolution.[94] The professional soldier, Janowitz urged, "must develop more and more skills and orientations common to civilian administrators."[95] Military leaders should be educated in political-military affairs, rotate their military assignments through civilian agencies, and develop geographical and language expertise. The effective subordination of the military to civilian political leaders, however, does not "deprive the military of an active policy-recommending role."[96] Military leaders should become increasingly conscious of their political

[92] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, viii.
[93] Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 159.
[94] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 417.
[95] Ibid, 424.
[96] Ibid, 438.

preferences and loyalties,[97] and contribute in the political sphere, both in the national debate over the commitment of forces and in critiquing the effectiveness of ongoing operations.[98]

To this end, Janowitz proposed the military establishment adapt from a military force to a constabulary force. "The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory..."[99] Moreover, the distinction between a peacetime and wartime military is eliminated under the constabulary force concept, and the military draws inspiration from the police officer rather than the warrior.[100]

Janowitz's recommendations came at a time when the United States became increasingly involved in limited warfare, which required the involvement of the military establishment in many quasi-military operations, including political administration, political propaganda, and police functions. In such environments, the military establishment must be coordinated with political policy. The National Security Council, Janowitz argued, was ineffective in coordinating military and diplomatic policy. Political objectives did not reflect available military resources or attainable battlefield goals. The military establishment, therefore, needed to become an active part of the national security

[97] Ibid, 235.
[98] Ibid, 245.
[99] Ibid, 418.
[100] Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 164.

decision-making process.[101]

By promoting the involvement the military establishment in the decision-making process, Janowitz essentially rejected Huntington's objective control model as the only means to ensure civilian control of the military. Instead, Janowitz embraced the subjective civilian control paradigm, and with it, the "civilianization" of the military profession, which requires the military to reflect the values of society that they are meant to protect and be sensitized to the political and social consequences of military action.[102] It is through this process of "civilianization" (in terms of bureaucratization, assimilation of non-combat functions, ascendancy of a managerial ethos, and reduced isolation from the rest of society) that the civilian leadership will be able to exercise control over the military and ensure that it serves the interests of the state.[103]

Although Janowitz recognized that the politicization of the military risks challenging civilian supremacy, he believed that greater civilian penetration of the military culture could tame the military, and therefore, ensure its compliance with

[101] Of course, Janowitz also insisted that a proper balance between military technologists, heroic leaders (who support the absolutist position), and military managers (who support the pragmatist position) is needed. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 424.
[102] It is important to note that when Janowitz speaks of the civilianization of the military profession, although often referred to as a subjective method of civilian control, it is a very different from the method of subjective control that Huntington describes in his work. Huntington defines subjective control as the maximization of civilian power of a particular civilian group relative to the military. Janowitz is advocating for the transformation of the military into a social organization.
[103] Richard K. Betts, "Are American Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem," 11-41.

civilian direction.[104] For Janowitz, a requisite for civilian control was the ability to judge the state of readiness and effectiveness of the military establishment. In this respect, civilian leaders would be expected to get into the details of military organization, doctrine, leader development and selection, and ongoing military operations, in part because limited warfare required constant oversight to restrain military leaders from pursuing victory at all costs.[105] In short, Janowitz's fusionist approach favored both greater military involvement in national security matters, as well as greater civilian involvement in military affairs.

There are a few limitations to Janowitz's fusionist method of civilian control. First, Janowitz offers but a brief laundry list of civilian control measures and ultimately falls back on the professional-equals-civilian control theory proposed by Huntington.[106] Second, Janowitz assumes that greater civilian penetration into military affairs produces better national security policy. History has shown otherwise. Both Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Donald H. Rumsfeld employed subjective control methods during their tenures, such as excluding military advisors from strategic discussions or involving themselves in the choice of tactics in combat operations. Neither the Vietnam War nor the Iraq War benefited from such management practices.[107] Finally, Janowitz's

[104] Christopher P. Gibson, "Enhancing National Security and Civilian Control of the Military," 245.
[105] Ibid, 244. This approach is what Huntington describes as subjective control of the military.
[106] Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 166.
[107] Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*, 71. Disputes of where to draw the line between the legitimate spheres of authority of civilian policymakers and professional soldiers arose in the 1960s and in 2001-2006. I do not argue that civilian management practices were the primary reason for the Vietnam War and Iraq War failures, but high civilian interference in tactical decisions, as well as the dismissal of military advice (discussed in greater detail in the post-

prescription to involve the military into the national security decision-making process is nothing more than a recommendation. He does not develop any normative framework to guide how to structure the civil-military relationship to ensure greater military participation in the policy debate, and at the same time, maintain civilian control of the decision-making process.

D) The Post-Vietnam War Pattern

The Vietnam War trauma produced numerous civil-military studies, yet none directly challenged the dominant theoretical paradigms of Huntington or Janowitz. Nevertheless, the lessons drawn from the war greatly influenced a generation of civilian and military leaders on the appropriate division of labor in the political-military decision-making process.[108] Although the real source of the failure of the Vietnam War had much to do with the unwillingness of the civilian and military leadership to honestly confront the nature of the conflict and devise a viable strategy for waging it, the post-Vietnam view dominant within the military was that only professional soldiers could be trusted to decide how its operations would be conducted, that military support for the use of force was contingent on the presence of clear political and military objectives, and that military commanders should be given the freedom to do what they believe is necessary to

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Vietnam section and in the Iraq War case study) certainly limited military effectiveness. At the same time, I recognize that the military are duty-bound to express their military judgment and advice to the President and Congress irrespective of the management practices of the civilian leadership.

[108] In this section, I do not address the reason for United States defeat in Vietnam. I focus the discussion on the role and responsibility of the civilian and military leadership in the decision-making process to explain the post-Vietnam pattern of civil-military relations.

achieve military victory.[109]`

To many within the officer corps, the Vietnam War demonstrated the danger of what happens when civilian groups overstep their authority and military leaders blindly acquiesce to civilian leadership.[110] In *Supreme Command: Soldiers,*

[109] Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Rumsfeld, The Generals, and the State of U.S. Civil-Military Relations." *National War College Review*, vol. 59, no. 4 (Autumn 2006). David H. Petraeus, "Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam," *Parameters*, August 1986, reprinted Winter 2010-11. Russell F. Weigley, "The American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present," *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001): 215-246.

[110] The Triangle Institute for Security Studies organized a project to understand whether a civil-military "gap" existed, and if so, what factors shape it and whether it mattered for military effectiveness and civil-military effectiveness. The book, *Soldiers and Civilians*, is based on the results of a survey of military officers, civilian leaders, and members of the general public. The study found that military officers believed "that it is their role to insist rather than merely advise or advocate in private, on key decisions, particularly those involving the use of force." The project editors, Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, speculated that those views came about as a result of the Vietnam failure, which "the military blames on civilian micromanagement, failed strategies, and acquiescent military leaders." However, senior military officers disagreed with this finding when discussing the research project with the book editor. Nonetheless, they did refer to H.R. McMaster's analysis of civil-military relations under President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in *Dereliction of Duty* "to justify the norm that military officers ought to insist, and to resign in protest if unsuccessful, in cases where the civilian leadership is pursuing a reckless policy." Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), 465. Feaver and Kohn write that though McMaster argues that the civilians (and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor) lied to the service Chiefs and misrepresented their views to Congress and in public – and that the chiefs remained silent about it – thus contributing to the Vietnam disaster. Many in the military interpret the book to say that the Chiefs should have resisted the strategy, and if needed, resigned in protest.

McMaster does not say this. He faults the Joint Chiefs of Staff for not giving their best military advice to the civilian leadership. H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam*, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), 300-322. In addition to McMaster, Robert Buzzanco also faults civilian meddling and indicts the military leadership for a variety of shortcomings. Robert Buzzanco, *Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). James Burk also criticizes the "blind obedience" of the military leadership during the Vietnam War period. James Burk, "Responsible Obedience by Military Professionals," in *American Civil-Military Relations: the Soldier and the State in a New Era*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009): 149-171. Although these scholars are critical of civilian leadership during the Vietnam War, they do not argue that civilian meddling as a reason for the failure of the Vietnam War. Jonathan D. Caverley, however, does blame the Lyndon B. Johnson administration for rejecting a more labor-intensive counterinsurgency approach in favor of a capital-intensive strategy that it understood to be less effective but more reflective of the cost preferences of the average voter. Jonathan D. Caverley, "The Myth of Military Myopia," *International Security*, vol. 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10): 119-157.

Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, Eliot Cohen notes that one of the Vietnam War's legacies is the pervasive belief that the United States failed to achieve victory because civilian leaders "made the military fight with a hand tied behind its back," and that the key to success in the future is to allow the military to manage war operations without civilian interference.[111] True, President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara exercised close supervision of some elements of the war (such as selecting bombing targets and imposing limits on the numbers of sorties), but as Cohen notes, Vietnam was not lost due to overweening civilian control. In fact, the generally accepted view is that the operational strategy of General William Westmoreland (commander of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)), which heavily emphasized overwhelming firepower and conventional uses of force, coupled with the poor performance of the Government of (South) Vietnam (GVN) and Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam (ARVN) and weak popular support, best explains United States defeat.[112] Nonetheless, "the standard account of the Vietnam conflict treats it as a prime example of civilian micromanagement of military operations."[113]

Prior to the Vietnam War, the National Security Act of 1947, which created and then strengthened the position of the Secretary of Defense, simultaneously

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Scholars have not reached a consensus as to why the United States failed in Vietnam. Some point to the army concept of war – the use of conventional force rather than counterinsurgency warfare – whereas others are critical of the role of President Johnson and his civilian advisors. James McAllister, "Who Lost Vietnam?" *International Security*, vol. 35, no. 3 (Winter 2010/11): 100-101.

[111] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 175.

[112] James McAllister, "Who Lost Vietnam?" 95-123.

[113] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 175.

handicapped the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).[114] The law required unanimity among the Chiefs prior to conveying opinions to the National Security Council and other senior civilian leadership.[115] At the same time, the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and his coterie of "Whiz Kids" introduced a series of changes at the Pentagon that replaced the medium of analysis from one that relied on the judgment of top military commanders to one that used the latest statistical designs and methods.[116] McNamara implemented these changes to bring about more civilian control of the military and enhance efficiencies in defense spending.

Unfortunately, quantitative methods soon informed policy discussions. As the civilian leadership pondered on how best to deal with the increased communist activity in Vietnam, top military officers were not in a position to challenge McNamara's quantitative analysis. Few officers understood the methodological approach embraced by the Pentagon. Moreover, since the JCS were required to vote as a whole on military matters, they were unable to provide immediate input until a unanimous decision was reached. By the time the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Earle Wheeler, had a chance to react to the work of the planning committee, the President had already been briefed by the civilian leadership at the Pentagon on a strategy of graduated escalation. Although the JCS did not believe the strategy would produce victory, they willingly acquiesced and even remained

[114] U.S. Congress, House, *National Security Act of 1947*, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., July 26, 1947, P.L. 80-253, 61 Stat 496 (accessed June 20, 2014); available from http://global.oup.com/us/companion.websites/9780195385168/resources/chapter10/nsa/nsa.pdf.
[115] Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*, 43.
[116] Ibid, 18.

silent when questioned by members of Congress.[117] H.R. McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty*: *Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* describes the collective absence of the Joint Chiefs' military judgment in the decision-making process as the work of "five silent men."[118]

Why did the JCS refrain from challenging the President's civilian advisors on how to proceed in Vietnam? McMaster points to the military officer's professional code, which prohibits military involvement in politics, as the primary cause.[119] This code, along with the JCS' loyalty to their commander-in-chief, trumped their legal obligation under the Constitution, which obligates the military to present their best military advice even if it directly challenges the administration's policy. Other factors include the institutional structure of the JCS at the time, which was designed to force military unity prior to providing military advice to the President, the military's inter-service rivalries, and finally, the military's inability to compete with the quantitative analysis produced by McNamara and his team and offer their analysis and advice.[120]

While the military leadership failed to present its views to its civilian

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[117] Ibid, 46.
[118] H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, 300-322. It is important to draw a distinction here between the role of JCS and that of General Westmoreland. The JCS provided little strategic input and were excluded from deliberations. General Westmoreland, however, pursued his own concept of war. He was not directed to fight in the manner he did within the borders of South Vietnam by President Johnson or his top civilian advisors. James McAllister, "Who Lost Vietnam?" 104. Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 182.
[119] H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, 330.
[120] Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*, 46-49. H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, 330.

superiors, the President and his senior civilian advisors also failed to press for the military view over operational issues. The civilian leadership "did not attempt to force a discussion of the essential strategic problem of ends and means," writes Cohen.[121] In fact, the JCS had no substantive role in the decision-making process. McNamara barely met with the Joint Chiefs as American military involvement in Vietnam deepened.[122] On one occasion, McNamara asked the Joint Staff to develop a list of military actions that could be taken in Vietnam, but did not allow the JCS themselves to participate in higher-level discussions concerning policy or strategic options.[123] There was no meaningful structure through which the JCS could present their views. "Even the chairman was not a reliable conduit," wrote McMaster.[124] Cohen notes that the Chairman (first General Maxwell Taylor, and later, General Earle Wheeler) was too close to the civilian leadership to offer it real alternatives.[125]

President Lyndon B. Johnson also alienated the Chiefs. The President made his most important decisions at the Tuesday Lunch meetings in which a small group of advisors (Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, and McNamara) were the only participants.[126] "The relationship between the president, the secretary of defense, and the Joint Chiefs led to the curious situation in which the nation when to war without the benefit of

[121] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 181.
[122] Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*, 47.
[123] H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, 301.
[124] Ibid, 329.
[125] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 180.
[126] Ibid, 181. It was not until October 1967 that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff joined the Tuesday lunches.

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effective military advice from the organization having the statutory responsibility to be the nation's 'principal military advisors,'" wrote McMaster.[127] Of course, the President is not obligated to take and implement military advice. In fact, Cohen notes that the Chiefs' recommendations for an all-out effort rather than graduated escalation "seemed so inappropriate to the nature of the enemy and the international political circumstances that the civilian leaders decided to make war their way, without their military advisers' counsel."[128] In short, the JCS did not have a better idea of how to fight the war. Some have argued that in this regard, even though the foreign policy failed, the domestic decision-making system worked as intended.[129]

In 1995, McNamara released his memoir, *In Retrospect: the Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*, in which he shared some of the critical lessons of Vietnam. Like McMaster, McNamara faults the JCS for not voicing their concerns to the President about the military strategy for escalation in Vietnam.[130] However, for this failure, he also blames the President, his advisers, and himself for not forcing a thorough review of the military strategy.[131] "Looking back," he writes, "I

[127] H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, 329. Again, while the JCS provided little strategic input and were excluded from deliberations, General Westmoreland was not directed to fight in the manner he did within the borders of South Vietnam by President Johnson or his top civilian advisors. James McAllister, "Who Lost Vietnam?" 104. R. W. Komer, "Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam," A Report prepared for *Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency*, R-967-ARPA, RAND Corporation, August 1972 (accessed January 12, 2014); available from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R967.pdf, 92.
[128] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 180.
[129] Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979).
[130] Robert S. McNamara, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 108.
[131] Ibid.

clearly erred by not forcing…a knock-down, drag-out debate over the loose assumptions, unasked questions, and thin analyses underlying our military strategy in Vietnam. I had spent twenty years as a manager identifying problems and forcing organizations…to think deeply and realistically about alternative courses of action and their consequences. I doubt I will ever fully understand why I did not do so here."[132] Cohen also faults the civilian leadership for not forcing greater dialogue with the military over the strategy and operations of the war. "The fault in Vietnam was a deadly combination of inept strategy and excessively *weak* civilian control. It was a failure to understand its tasks, not its desire to micromanage, that constituted the fatal flaw of civilian leadership during the war."[133]

McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, also reached a similar conclusion. In *Lessons in Disaster*, Gordon Goldstein shares some of Bundy's thoughts regarding the thin review of the military strategy for the Vietnam War.[134] "What are my worse mistakes?...Not to press the study of the prospects of success, of one side's strength and one side's weakness," admitted Bundy in his notes that he shared with Goldstein.[135]

McNamara and Bundy's reflections reveal a shared vision of the need for

[132] Ibid, 203.
[133] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 185.
[134] Gordon Goldstein, *Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam*, (New York: Times Books, 2008).
[135] Ibid, 178.

an intense debate and analysis between the civilian and military leadership of the ends and means of the war strategy. The two men conclude that the President must confront his advisers; the advisers must confront the President; and the military's and government's war strategy must be examined, deconstructed and, if necessary, directly challenged.[136] Cohen agrees. He faults the President and his advisors for "their inability to pick the right generals, to conduct a strategic (and, for that matter, operational and tactical) dialogue with them, to set priorities and maintain proportion in a secondary conflict."[137]

R. W. Komer's 1972 report, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on the U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam*, reached a similar conclusion. In an attempt to understand the failure of the United States intervention in Vietnam, Komer studied the impact of institutional factors on the United States and South Vietnam counterinsurgency response. He concluded that institutional constraints, such as "bureaucratic inertia, agency reluctance to violate conventional dividing lines between their responsibilities, and hesitation to change the traditional relationship of civilian and military leadership,"[138] rendered the United States response "unduly conventional, expensive, and slow to adapt."[139]

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[136] Bob Woodward and Gordon M. Goldstein, "Lessons on War From McNamara and Bundy," *Washington Post Opinions*, October 18, 2009, (accessed January 10, 2014); available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/15/AR2009101503475.html?sid=ST2009102303479.
[137] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 184.
[138] R. W. Komer, "Bureaucracy Does Its Thing," x.
[139] Ibid, vi.

One of the institutional constraints was the lack of a systematic attempt to bring together civil and military structures in Washington and in the field. "The war management process was basically one of ad hoc interaction between the key agencies, with little formal machinery created, especially for systematic planning, programming, and follow-through," writes Komer. An informal war cabinet finally developed after 1965, known as the Tuesday Lunch.[140] Although it was an invaluable forum for intimate top-level discussion and decision on key issues, there was no official machinery to support it and coordinate political and military efforts involved in Vietnam.[141]

Komer also points to the Unites States government's reluctance to change the traditional relationship of civilian versus military leadership as another powerful institutional constraint. "By and large, the civilian agencies steered clear of the military's business and did not exert much influence on the conduct of military operations," Komer explains.[142] Although the President and Secretary of Defense made the final decisions on the political constraints within which the military should operate outside South Vietnam (such as choosing eligible bombing targets in North Vietnam or deciding to stop bombing in the North), they did not infringe on the traditional military control over the conduct of the war inside South Vietnam.[143] At the same time, the military leadership tended to

[140] As mentioned earlier, the Tuesday Lunch meetings included the President and his closest advisors (Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara). It was later expanded to include the CIA Director, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and others.
[141] R. W. Komer, "Bureaucracy Does Its Thing," 81.
[142] Ibid, 92.
[143] Ibid.

present a unified front to senior civilian officials. Like McMaster, Komer faults the JCS for not challenging the field commander (General Westmoreland) on operational matters even when some JCS members had reservations.

At the conclusion of his study, Komer writes on the lessons drawn from the Vietnam War. To overcome the strict division of civilian and military structures and improve civil-military coordination, he recommends the creation of "adequate machinery at all levels for effective follow-through to see that the policy is effectively carried out, and to force adaptation where essential."[144] McNamara reached a similar conclusion when he wrote on the need "to organize the top echelons of the executive branch to deal effectively with the extraordinary complex range of political and military issues."[145] Komer also points to the need for thorough civil-military analysis of the strategy and operations. "A corollary lesson is the need to place a higher premium on thorough evaluation and analysis of performance," he urges. "The relative lack of such analysis was a critical flaw in Vietnam. By its very nature, this uniquely fragmented politico-insurgency conflict made quantitative as well as qualitative analysis indispensable to understanding."[146]

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the United States government made significant institutional changes to "strengthen civilian authority in the Department of Defense, to improve the military advice provided to the President,

[144] Ibid, 154.
[145] Robert S. McNamara, *In Retrospect*, 323.
[146] R. W. Komer, "Bureaucracy Does Its Thing," 158.

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the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified an specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions…to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning…"[147] The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 made sweeping changes to the Department of Defense since it was established in the National Security Act of 1947.[148] Most importantly, the Act strengthened the role of the Chairman by making him the principal military adviser to the President and Secretary of Defense. The Act no longer requires the Chiefs unanimous vote on issues or composite advice to civilian officials. Instead, the Chairman can act on his own, present his own views, and serve as the single point of advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President, unless either specifically asks for the views of the other members of the JCS. The Act also established the position of the Vice Chairman of the JCS and streamlined the military chain of command. Although it increased the ability of the Chairman to direct overall strategy, he does not have command authority over the JCS or any of the armed forces by designated the chain of command from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commander.

The military also made sweeping changes. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the military was eager to prevent future military leaders from

[147] U.S. Congress, House, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, 99th Cong., Oct. 1, 1986, H.R. 3622 (accessed January 12, 2014); available from http://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic_heritage/60th/interactive_timeline/Content/1980s/documents/19861001_1980_Doc_NDU.pdf.
[148] Ibid.

acquiescing to civilian leaders. As such, a new generation of military officers aggressively pursued measures to advance their political-military skills through increased education in international affairs, political science, and strategic studies.[149] They also embraced repetitive assignments in civilian departments, such as the Pentagon and National Security Council. Such steps were taken to groom future senior leadership to better represent the military in the decision-making process, as well as to provide civilian leaders with sound strategic analysis, options, and advice. No longer was the military embracing the notion that separate political and military spheres existed.[150]

Through increased education and repetitive assignments in political-military positions, the military's political power grew considerably over time. Politicians accepted the military's (incorrect) reading of the Vietnam War – that the military had fought "with a hand tied behind its back," civilians had interfered and micromanaged, and political objectives were unclear.[151] Its views were soon

[149] Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*, 71. According to Gibson, the military seemed to reject, or at the very least, re-define the objective control model in reaction to the Vietnam War experience. The military questioned the central tenet of the objective control model that separate spheres exist, and so aggressively pursued competencies in political-military skills. But Huntington never dismissed the role of increased education. In fact, Huntington was a strong advocate of advancing the expertise and skill of the military officer. He insisted the military officer advance his intellectual skill with comprehensive study and training in a variety of disciplines (e.g., such as law, medicine, communications, engineering) in addition to the management of violence. "The military skill requires a broad background of general culture for its mastery…To understand his trade properly, the officer must have some idea of its relation to these other fields and the way in which these other areas of knowledge may contribute to his own purposes. In addition, he cannot really develop his analytical skill, insight, imagination, and judgment if he is trained simply in vocational studies." Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*, 14. Janowitz also advocated military officers be educated in political-military affairs. However, unlike Huntington, he also advocated military officers rotate "develop more and more skills and orientations common to civilian administrators." Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 424.

[150] Although Huntington recognized that there would be times when civilian and military roles would overlap, he believed there was a distinction between the political and military sphere.

[151] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 186.

solidified in the Weinberger doctrine, which outlined new criteria for which to weigh decisions pertaining to the use of force.[152] Specifically, the doctrine recommended the United States refrain from committing forces to combat unless vital national interests were involved, political and military objectives were clearly defined, a plausible exit strategy existed, and all other non-violent policy means had been fully exhausted. Within the military, the Weinberger doctrine was widely celebrated, and even appeared in the syllabi of staff colleges.[153]

Scholars during this period agreed with the military's growing influence in the national decision-making process. They considered the unquestioning obedience by the military as an improper measure of good civil-military relations. For these scholars, when civilian control is exerted irresponsibly, it is as much of a problem as when the military has excessive influence.[154]

Richard K. Betts' seminal work, *Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises,*

[152] The clearest articulation of the military's views came from a civilian. In a milestone speech delivered before the National Press Club on November 28, 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger outlined six conditions that had to be met before the country should commit its forces to combat: (1) armed force would be used only to protect vital interests of the US or its allies; (2) when the US commits itself to the use of force it must do so wholeheartedly, with the clear intention of winning; (3) troops should be committed only in pursuit of clearly defined political and military objectives; (4) the relationship between the forces committed (their size, composition, etc.) and the objectives must continually be reassessed and adjusted if necessary; (5) there must be some reasonable assurance that troops have the support of the American people and their representatives in Congress; and (6) the commitment of US armed force should be the last resort. For the full text of the speech, see "Excerpts from Address of Weinberger," *New York Times*, November 29, 1984, Section A, Page 5. The Weinberger Doctrine was reinforced and became known as the Powell Doctrine after then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, announced his commitment to a doctrine of overwhelming force. The Powell Doctrine outlined a list of questions that have to be answered affirmatively before military action is taken. Colin Powell, "US Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 5 (Winter 1992): 32-45.

[153] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 188.

[154] Richard K. Betts, *American Force*, 214. Richard K. Betts, "Are American Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem," 11-41.

first published in 1977, analyzes the role of American military advice and influence on the use of force. The study examines the proportion of military influence, relative to that of civilian advisers, since World War II to determine whether the military exerts too much influence in the decision-making process on the use of force.[155] According to Betts, critics on the "left," who see the United States interventions abroad as mistaken or immoral, consider the problem as too much military influence. Critics on the "right," however, who believe the United States backed down too often, think there was not enough military influence. The answer that emerges from Betts' investigation of several crisis situations since 1945 (such as the Berlin Blockade, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam War, and American intervention in Lebanon, to name a few) reveals that "the military have had neither more nor less influence than they should have, and that they have erred – albeit in different ways – neither more nor less than their civilian colleagues."[156]

To understand how the military influences civilian decision-makers on the use of force, Betts examines two forms of military influence – indirect influence and direct influence. "Indirect influence flows from ways in which the soldiers control the premises of civilian decisions through monopoly of information or

[155] Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, 1st ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 2.
[156] Ibid, vii. The evidence underlying the conclusions of Betts' study were pieced together from executive documents, congressional hearings, memoirs, secondary studies, journalistic accounts, and personal interviews. Betts provides tabulations in the appendix on the relative aggressiveness of military advisors versus that of dominant civilian advisors on intervention decisions and on tactical escalation decisions after intervention.

control of options," explains Betts.[157] Military intelligence reports or military evaluation of strategy and tactics, for example, may influence civilian decisions or limit the range of options. Direct influence, on the other hand, flows from formal recommendations or control of operations. For Betts, this type of military influence is not the problem as there are simple organizational solutions for dealing with it. For example, a President can seek individuals who will provide a broad range of perspectives and choices in the JCS and unified commands, or as commander-in-chief, the President can simply choose to accept or reject military advice.

The real problem is indirect military influence, and the extent to which it may condition the decision-makers' frame of reference. Betts offers some solutions to overcome this problem. A President should question the military's evaluations of strategy and tactics, recognize the impulse to positive assessments of ongoing operations, be conscious of where there is ambivalence, and "trust the military to be themselves, to see issues in their terms rather than his."[158]

Whatever the type of military influence, Betts' review of several Cold War crises reveals that while some soldiers were vocal in urging the use of force, others were more cautious than their civilian counterparts. His survey of incidents in which the President considered committing American forces to combat (beginning with the Berlin Blockade of 1948 and ending with the 1972

[157] Ibid, 5.
[158] Ibid, 210.

Christmas bombing of Hanoi) reveals diversity in the aggressiveness of military recommendations among the services and between personnel in the field and in Washington. Military officials gave recommendations that were more, equally, or less aggressive than the recommendations of principal civilian advisors. However, once a decision to commit forces had been made, the military preferred using force "quickly, massively, and decisively rather than rationing it gradually to coax the enemy to change his intentions."[159]

Overall, disagreements with civilians were greater on issues on the amount of force and the mode of implementation than on whether to commit forces. Betts concludes that the diversity of military recommendations in the cases indicates that "military professionals rarely have dominated decisions on the use of force," and in all cases, the civilian leadership never caved into military demands.[160]

Betts updated these findings in the 1991 edition of his book and in later writings, but his core conclusions remain consistent with his earlier work.[161] In *American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National*, Betts goes further in arguing that civilian and military leaders share responsibility in decisions on the use of force. Moreover, he does not consider military influence on decisions on the use of force as a threat to civilian control. "Equality in strategic discussion does not compromise the civilians' ultimate primacy," he

[159] Ibid, 5.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Richard K. Betts, *American Force*. Richard K. Betts, "Are American Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem," 11-41.

writes, "Presidents have the right to be wrong in the end, but generals should have every chance to prevent error before that end."[162]

E) The Post-Cold War Pattern

In contrast to what occurred during the Vietnam War, in which the primacy of civilian authority meant the silencing of military advice once a policy decision was made, the military's autonomy and competence over military matters grew substantially over the next two decades. The end result was the considerable growth of the military's political power.

The military embraced the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, and with it, grew its strength in foreign policy debates. For example, prior to the start of the Gulf War, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell, urged caution and argued that time was needed to allow sanctions to work.[163] Powell also wielded significant influence in developing the war strategy. He convinced President George H. Bush to delay the start of the Gulf war, keep political objectives limited, and use an overwhelming amount of force.[164] In addition to the Chairman's growing influence in the decision-making process (thanks in part to the Goldwater-Nichols Act), Powell went so far as to publically warn against the dangers of intervening in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia and Iraq in several articles in

[162] Richard K. Betts, *American Force*, 230.
[163] Colin L. Powell, *My American Journey*, (New York: Random House, 1995), 467.
[164] Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*. Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," *National Interest*, vol. 35 (March 1, 1994): 3-18.

Foreign Affairs and the *New York Times*.[165] He insisted the plans for U.S. interventions reflect the military's preference for overwhelming force.[166] Disagreements on the social composition of the armed forces, specifically the inclusion of homosexuals in the military or the role of women in combat, only heightened civil-military tensions throughout the 1990s. Scholars criticized Powell's actions as an illegitimate attempt by a senior military officer to preempt the foreign policy agenda and expand the military's influence in the political decision-making process.[167]

The end of the Cold War, and Powell's growing influence as Chairman, and President William J. Clinton's perceived weakness to act as commander-in-chief, sparked a flurry of writings on civil-military relations in the United States.[168] In an article published in the *National Interest* in 1994, Richard H. Kohn believed that the dysfunctional nature of civil-military relations was an emerging crisis in American politics. He identified the growth in size of the military since World War II, the military's reaction to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's micromanagement style, the fear of another Vietnam quagmire, the unusual political power and weight of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,

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[165] Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," *New York Times*, October 8, 1992, Section A, (accessed November 1, 2013); available from http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/08/opinion/why-generals-get-nervous.html. Colin Powell, "US Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 5 (Winter 1992): 32-45.
[166] Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Rumsfeld, The Generals, and the State of U.S. Civil-Military Relations," 68-80.
[167] Ibid.
[168] Kurt M. Campbell, "All Rise for Chairman Powell," *National Interest*, vol. 23 (March 1, 1991): 51-60; Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," *Journal of Military History*, vol. 57, no. 5 (October 1993): 27-58; Andrew J. Bacevich, "Clinton's Military Problem – and Ours," *The National Review*, vol. 45, no. 24 (December 13, 1993): 36-40; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control."

General Colin Powell, and the inexperience of President William J. Clinton, as factors that contributed to the increased growth of military's political power.[169] Kohn charged the military with meddling in politics and the policy process, openly favoring the Republican Party, and acting hostile to civilian control.

Although Kohn recognizes that civilian control is a "process, measured across a spectrum – something *situational*, dependent on the people, issues, and the political and military forces involved," he offers no further explanation on how to control this process to ensure civilian control.[170] Instead, his only prescription is to remind the military of their role within the civil-military relationship and offer a few recommendations to rein in their growing political power. First, he recommends the military accept that the principle of civilian control includes "the right of civilians to be wrong, to make mistakes – indeed, to insist on making mistakes," and at the same time, acknowledge that the military can also be wrong about military affairs.[171] Second, to consider that if civilian control is to function effectively, not only should the military abstain from certain political behavior, but also encourage civilians to exercise their authority and make policy decisions. Third, whenever necessary, educate civilian leaders in military affairs by working with them rather than taking advantage of them. Finally, to remember that civilian control is as much about keeping the military out of civilian politics as it is about making certain that civilians control military

[169] Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*, 83; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control."
[170] Richard H. Kohn, "The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today," *Naval War College Review*, vol. 4, no. 3 (Summer 2002), 36.
[171] Richard H. Kohn, "The Erosion of Civilian Control," 35; Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 149-178.

affairs.

Like Huntington's objective control model, Kohn does not acknowledge the role that the military must play in the national security decision-making process.[172] True, the military must provide strategic analysis, options, and advice to senior civilian leaders, but when does this advice turn into meddling? Neither Huntington's objective control model nor Kohn's insistence that civilians frame, control and shape the policy outcome provide an adequate answer as to what is the appropriate civil-military relationship.[173]

Frustrated with the old theoretical frameworks of Huntington and Janowitz, a new generation of scholars emerged with innovative empirical work on the subject of civil-military relations. Peter D. Feaver drew on the principal-agent literature to develop a model of civil-military relations as a game of strategic interaction between civilian principals, who must decide how intrusively to monitor the military, and military agents, who decide whether or not to obey civilian direction and preferences.

According to Feaver's agency theory, civilians control the military by making choices on management styles, ranging from minimum civilian interference and oversight to intrusive monitoring and control. In response, the military chooses to do what civilians ask or disregard civilian direction all

[172] Richard H. Kohn, "The Erosion of Civilian Control."
[173] Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*, 87, note 36.

together (that is, to "work" or to "shirk" using Feaver's terminology).[174] Put another way, "working," in the broadest sense, means doing something to the principal's satisfaction, whereas "shirking" means not doing it to the principal's satisfaction.

According to Feaver, civilian control is preserved when civilian leaders monitor the behavior of military subordinates. At the principal's disposal are several monitoring techniques to ensure military obedience to civilian direction: (1) *contract incentives*, such as promotions for loyal officers; (2) *screening and selection*, such as selecting senior officers who share administration's worldview (a technique employed in the subjective control model); (3) *fire alarms*, such as relying on the media or defense-oriented think tanks to expose military shirking; (4) *institutional checks*, that is relying on inter-service rivalry to report shirking; (5) *police patrols* or overt monitoring, such as micromanaging, restricting rules of engagement, limiting delegated authority, and controlling the budget process (a technique featured in the subjective control model); and (6) *revising delegation decision*, such as threats to monitor specific issues more closely or to micromanage specific issues where shirking has occurred in the past, or conversely, loosening control to entice compliance (a technique aligned with the objective control model).[175]

[174] Feaver makes it a point to explain that the working and shirking typology comes from the jargon of the principal-agent literature. The term, shirking, does not imply idleness. Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 59.
[175] Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 75-86; Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*, 78.

Punishment is another tool in enforcing compliance across the civil-military divide.[176] Feaver groups these punishment tools into five categories: (1) *restrictive monitoring*, such as audits, mandatory training (e.g., sexual harassment training); (2) *current material disincentives*, such as budget cuts or holding up promotions; (3) *future material disincentives*, such as firing an officer or forcing retirement either at the current or at a lower rank; (4) *military justice system*; and (5) *extralegal action* against specific military personnel, such as private or public oral rebukes.[177]

Whether or not the military agrees to obey civilian direction depends in large part on their respective preferences. The military agent and civilian principal may not share identical preferences on all policy questions. In such cases, the military agent may seek to manipulate the relationship so as to prevail in policy disputes – in the jargon of principal-agency, to "shirk" rather than "work."[178] For example, Powell consistently maneuvered to delay the start of the Gulf War (or "shirked") to mount an overwhelming amount of force and keep political objectives limited.[179] Of course, the civilian principal always retains the right to punish any form of noncompliance. When Rumsfeld and Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki disagreed over how to pursue defense transformation,

[176] Feaver notes that punishment as a tool only exists in the United States and other advanced democracies where the military recognizes the civilian leadership's right to sanction.
[177] Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 87-94.
[178] Ibid, 57.
[179] As to whether the military shirked, Feaver writes that Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney felt that "military resistance was so great that the JCS was dragging its heels in preparing viable military options in the immediate aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait." Feaver also reports that the White House was "struck by the size of the force that Powell was requesting." Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 235-239; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control," 11.

the Army came under sharp criticism and punishment. Not only did Rumsfeld cancel the Army's Crusader artillery program, but his office also leaked Shinseki's successor's name fourteen months prior to the end of his tour as Army Chief of Staff.[180]

Of course, as Feaver notes, the military's advisory role complicates the concept of "shirking" in the civil-military context. Obeying civilian orders does not necessarily mean that the military immediately acquiesces to every policy decision. And disagreeing with civilian orders does not necessarily imply disobedience. Feaver acknowledges that there exists a blurry line between advising against a course of action and resisting civilian efforts to pursue a course of action.[181] In some cases, it is very clear. For example, a coup is a clear case of military officers ignoring civilian authority. In other cases, to evaluate whether "shirking" has occurred involves judgments about the military's advice and the conditions under which civilians changed their mind. Feaver identifies three forms of "shirking" that attempt to determine the outcome of a policy calculus or assure that an undesired policy is never implemented: (1) inflated estimates of risk and cost (2) unauthorized public protest, media leaks, or appeals to other actors; and (3) bureaucratic foot-dragging or slow-rolling.[182]

One final point to Feaver's agency theory, "civilians and the military are

[180] Charles A. Stevenson, *SECDEF: The Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense*, 176; Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, 32. Secretary Rumsfeld denies leaking the name of Shinseki's replacement. Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 455.
[181] Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 62.
[182] Ibid, 68.

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both imperfect judges of what is needed for national security." Nevertheless, civilians dominate the national security decision-making process. "Regardless of how strong the military is, civilians are supposed to remain the political masters," he writes.[183] Moreover, that civilian dominance should extend to domains that are beyond the core competencies of civilian officials. For example, although the military possesses greater technical competence in military matters, and therefore, be better able to assess the probability of success or failure for a given course of action, only civilian leaders have the authority to calculate the level of acceptable risk for society.[184] "Even when civilians are less expert, they are still rightfully in charge."[185] That is, civilians have the right to be wrong. The military may advice against certain policies, but it cannot prevent those policies from being implemented.

Feaver's normative approach to civil-military relations absorbs many of the precepts of the objective and subjective control model, but also injects flexibility into the civil-military relationship. Both the military agent and civilian principal have choices. The military agent may choose to "work" or "shirk," and the civilian principal may choose to employ any number of monitoring techniques and punishment tools to ensure compliance. Moreover, Feaver's discussion on preferences, as well as his appreciation for the military's advisory functions, recognizes the duties and responsibilities of the civilian leadership and military leadership in the national security decision-making process.

[183] Ibid, 5.
[184] Ibid, 6.
[185] Ibid.

On the other hand, Feaver's agency theory is not without some flaws. First, he adopts a rationalist method as his point of departure. Rational choice theory argues individuals choose one alternative, out of all those available, that maximizes expected utility.[186] The rational actor model, however, has its own limitations. As the bounded rationality model suggests, decision-makers operate under constraints (such as time, resource, information and cognitive limitations) that undercut optimal decision-making.[187] Feaver's model assumes that the civilian principals and military agents are "aware of costs and benefits arising from their actions…rank order outcomes according to some subjective estimate of the benefits minus the costs… adopt courses of action that they believe will (so far as possible) produce outcomes in which the benefits exceed the costs, or at least exceed the payoffs from alternative courses of action."[188]

Second, Feaver's two-person model has been criticized for oversimplifying bargaining dynamics.[189] Feaver assumes civilian principals and military agents are unitary actors.[190] In practice, there are multiple players that make-up both the civilian and military spheres, each with its own interests and perspectives. For example, the Chairman, service chiefs, and the combatant commander may disagree on any given military operation and offer different and

[186] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, 5th ed., (New York: Longman, 2001): 560-561.
[187] Ibid.
[188] Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 97.
[189] James Burk, ''The Logic of Crisis and Civil-Military Relations Theory: A Comment on Desch, Feaver, and Dauber," Armed Forces & Society, vol. 24, no. 3 (Spring 1998): 455-462.
[190] To be fair, Feaver himself acknowledges the idea of dual principals, as well as the fact that civilian and military preferences are multidimensional. Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 97-99.

conflicting advice. Similarly, Feaver's model does not take into account that the executive and legislative branches are dual principals and may have conflicting perspectives, views, and interests. Moreover, the executive and legislative branches may employ different methods of civilian control – something that Huntington observed when explaining the subjective control model.[191]

A final critique is Feaver's declaration that "civilians have the right to be wrong,"[192] says little about the military's role to offer military advice or prevent unwise policy choices (e.g., appeals to members of Congress). Feaver also says little of the civilian's obligation to seek military advice, even when that advice does not support the administration's view.

Drawing from Feaver's agency theory, Risa A. Brooks investigates why some leaders (from both democratic and autocratic regimes)[193] are able to assess their capabilities and reconcile their political and military objectives while others are prone to poor estimates and disintegrated policies.[194] Whereas Feaver's agency theory assumes a hierarchy of power (i.e., civilian dominance) and seeks to explain how the act of delegation to constrain military agents affects the civil-military relationship, Brooks allows for variation in the military's political power

[191] Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*, 80.
[192] Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," 216.
[193] Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*. Unlike the other theorists referenced in this chapter, Brooks considers United States and foreign cases. Brooks' case studies include two case studies on Egypt (the period under Gamal Agdel Nasser in the early and mid-1960s, before the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and the period under Anwar Sadat in the 1970s); a study on Britain and Germany (before World War I and during the war) two studies of Pakistan and Turkey in the latter 1990s; and the United States' war planning for the 2003 Iraq War.
[194] Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*, 4.

and its impact on governmental processes. She does not treat the military as a bureaucratic actor subject to civilian control, but as an independent political agent capable of challenging civilian prerogatives.[195]

Brooks hypothesizes that the underlying structure and preferences in civil-military relations affects strategic assessment. That is, the balance of power between civilian and military leaders "affects the routines through which they share and analyze information, consult with one another, and make decisions…."[196] To explain this, she looks at two causal variables – preference divergence and the balance of civil-military power. She further disaggregates strategic assessment into four constituent attributes: routines for *information sharing* between political and military leaders about military capabilities and plans; *strategic coordination* (or the structures in place for assessing alternative political-military strategies, and whether or not they promote debate about costs and risks or help to coordinate military activity with political objectives and constraints); the military's *structural competence* (or the internal procedures for evaluating foreign militaries and its own capabilities); and the *authorization process* (the mechanisms for approving and vetoing the political-military strategy and activity).[197]

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[195] Samuel E. Finer also recognized the importance of variation in the military's power in policymaking. Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 4th American ed., (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006). Similarly, Michael C. Desch also treats the military as a political actor. Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*: The Changing Security Environment, (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999).
[196] Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*, 3.
[197] Ibid, 4.

Brooks demonstrates how various configurations of power and preference divergence affect the four attributes of strategic assessment, and therefore, the overall quality of strategic assessment. Her study demonstrates how states can vary in strategic assessment independent of their regime type and of a leader's personal proclivities in managing his subordinates. Instead, she finds that power and preferences impact strategic assessment. When political dominance is high and preference divergence is low, then strategic assessment is good according to Brooks. In contrast, when civilian and military leaders share power and preference divergence is high, then strategic assessment is highly dysfunctional. In other words, intense political-military competition undermines all four attributes of strategic assessment. Strategic assessment is fair, mixed, or poor in the following cases: when there is political dominance and high preference divergence; when there is military dominance and high preference divergence, and when there is military dominance and low preference divergence.[198]

Brooks' overall findings are compelling – that the nature of the civil-military relationship (which she defines in terms of power and preferences) affects strategic assessment. However, I disagree that high preference divergence undermines strategic assessment.[199] As I will demonstrate in the following chapters, civil-military dialogue may highlight differences that improve the overall strategy, decision-making, and planning process. For now, I defer to

[198] Ibid, 7.
[199] I disagree with parts of her analysis of the attributes of strategic assessment in the 2003 Iraq case. Brooks considered the authorization process clear, information sharing fluid, and strategic coordination poor. She did not have a definitive finding on the military's structural competence.

Betts' argument that conflict between civilian and military leaders can be constructive if it is well managed. It only becomes destructive when either camp denies the other a voice in strategic discussions. According to Betts, for the "ideal integration of objectives, strategy, operations, and tactics, civilians and military should be equally conversant in each others' terms of reference and should participate equally at all stages."[200]

F) Searching for a New Normative Framework

Another evaluation of the proper role of civilian and military leaders in the national security decision-making process began with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's efforts to transform the military from a conventional, industrial-age force designed to fight the Soviet Union to a leaner and more agile, information-age force capable of defeating future adversaries. Civil-military tensions heightened after September 11 as the military began fighting protracted, irregular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of Rumsfeld's critics, including retired generals, invoked McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty* to support their public attack of the Secretary's policies.[201]

In *Supreme Command*, Eliot A. Cohen revisits, and ultimately rejects, the "normal theory" of civil-military relations – the belief that there is clear division

[200] Richard K. Betts, *American Force*, 226.
[201] Mackubin Thomas Owens, "A Dereliction of Duty: Military Officers Shouldn't Try to be Policymakers," *National Review*, April 27, 2006, (accessed May 4, 2014); available from http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/217470/dereliction-duty/mackubin-thomas-owens.

of labor between civilians who determine the goals of the war and the uniformed military who then execute the war strategy.[202] Maximizing military professionalism, he argues, essentially isolates the military from politics and gives them a free hand in military matters. As such, Cohen insists on greater civilian involvement in military affairs, particularly during times of war, and with it, the acceptance by the officer corps of the legitimacy of civilian dominance. He disagrees that civilian leaders should refrain from asking too many questions about tactics, the design of a campaign, measures of success, or to press on the promotion or dismissal of senior military officers.

Cohen doesn't necessarily embrace the subjective control model or endorse civilian methods of control, such as carefully selecting officers who share the civilian leaderships' worldview or flooding the department of defense with more civilians relative to their military counter-parts. Instead, Cohen urges civilian leaders to engage military officers in dialogue, challenge military analysis, learn about new technologies and logistical problems, follow debates on tactics, read intelligence reports, and reflect on past military experience.

Cohen's point of departure from his predecessors is his focus on the need for a dialogue between statesmen and generals. His work has sparked scholarly discussions and debate of the role and responsibility of civilian and military leaders in the decision-making process, particularly with regard to the use of

[202] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*.

force.[203] He characterizes civil-military relations during war as an "unequal dialogue" between politician and soldier.[204] War, he writes, includes a tense and exhaustive interaction over matters of detail and not the broad outlines of strategy and policy. Civilian leaders therefore must always hold the upper hand and prepare to engage far more actively with their military subordinates than the normal theory on civil-military relations suggests. In fact, civilian leaders must constantly prod and intensely manage the military, particularly since military officers are generally reluctant to recommend the use of force. A "great war statesman" should ask questions about tactics, press for details over the design of a campaign, and interject in every aspect of war making. What occurs between the statesman and the general is an "unequal dialogue" – a dialogue, in that both sides express their views bluntly, at times offensively, and repeatedly – and unequal, in that the final authority of the statesman is unambiguous and unquestioned.[205]

To illustrate his point, Cohen chronicled four civilian leaders during times of war – Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion. In each case, Cohen attributed their success in war to their invasive

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[203] Richard K. Betts, "Are Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem?" 11-41; Frank G. Hoffman, "Dereliction of Duty *Redux?*, 217-235; Michael C. Desch "Hartz, Huntington, and the Liberal Tradition in America," in *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era,* eds. Suzanne C. Nielson and Don M. Snider, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009): 91-111; Matthew Moten, "A Broken Dialogue: Rumsfeld, Shinseki, and Civil-Military Tension," 42-71; Richard H. Kohn, "Building Trust: Civil-Military Behaviors for Effective National Security," 264-289.

[204] Cohen introduced the concept of an "unequal dialogue" in his earlier works. Eliot A. Cohen, "Are US Forces Overstretched? Civil-Military Relations," *Orbis*, vol. 41, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 177-186; Eliot A. Cohen, "The Unequal Dialogue: The Theory and Reality of Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security,* eds. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001): 429-458.

[205] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 209.

management style and close supervision of the military's prosecution of the war. These four statesmen probed, tested, harangued, and manipulated their military subordinates about technical and strategic matters.[206] Moreover, they shared several essential elements of war-craft: an eye for detail; an understanding of the business of war; a willingness to accept military losses; a readiness to select, dismiss and restrain their military leaders; and an ability to communicate their wishes, and when necessary, act in moderation.

Interestingly, Cohen does not consider the role of military leaders or the military's execution of the war as a determinate factor. In fact, he cites Vietnam as an example when the lack of civilian involvement contributed to defeat.[207] According to Cohen, political leaders were unsuccessful in Vietnam not because they micromanaged the war, but because they failed to manage it properly. "They did not cross-examine, test, probe their subordinates, and they did not force them into debates with other professionals who took a different view."[208] An observation shared by McNamara and Bundy.

Not all scholars would agree with Cohen's characterization of civil-military relations as "unequal dialogue." As mentioned earlier, Betts considers the civil-military relationship as one of "equal dialogue and unequal authority."[209] He favors an "equal dialogue" between civilians and military in strategic discussions,

[206] Eliot A. Cohen, "The Unequal Dialogue," 439.
[207] Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*, 96.
[208] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 212.
[209] Richard K. Betts, *American Force*, 224. Richard K. Betts, "Are Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem?" 35.

especially given the inequality of authority between the two camps. That is, for the ideal integration of objectives, strategy, and operations, Betts argues, civilians and military should be "equally conversant in each others' terms of reference and should participate equally at all stages.[210] He acknowledges, however, that there is some "level of high politics at which soldiers should be silent, and some level of tactical specificity or micromanagement where civilians should kept their hands off."[211] But where exactly should the lines be drawn? Betts provides no answer (and neither did Huntington for that matter). Nonetheless, Betts argues that objective control should never extend to an absolute separation of the two spheres of influence. He also warns against subjective control because of its potential to politicize the military. For example, employing oversight methods to ensure civilian control, such as appointing officers that share the administration's worldview, undermines the comprehensiveness of debate. A better way to balance the equation is to have equality in strategic discussion. "Equality in strategic discussion does not compromise the civilians' ultimate primacy," he writes, adding, "Presidents have the right to be wrong in the end, but generals should have every chance to prevent error before that end."[212]

Similarly, Douglas L. Bland favors a theory of shared responsibility.[213] He sees civil-military relations not as a power struggle between irreconcilable

[210] Richard K. Betts, "Are Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem?" 36.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Ibid, 40; Richard K. Betts, *American Force*, 230.
[213] Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations." Bland argues that civilian control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility of control between civilian leaders and military officers.

adversaries, but as an exchange between friendly adversaries.[214] Rather than civilian control, Bland favors civilian direction. That is, civilian leaders maintain direction of the military by controlling policies dealing with national goals, the allocation of resources, and the use of force, but the military has authority over military doctrine, internal organization, operational planning, and the tactical direction of units in operations. Bland's theory of shared responsibility is an attempt to overcome the limitations inherent in current theory (i.e., the emphasis on civilian control of the military) and make room for military officers in the national security decision-making process.

Frank G. Hoffman also emphasizes the equal exchange of civilian and military views in policy debates. Included within a his broad definition of civil-military relations is the "exchange of candid views and perspectives in the decision-making process. It is not about dictation from policy master to supplicants and servants. It is about the tenor of the dialogue and the quality of the resulting policy decisions and strategic plans."[215] He faults the Vietnam and Iraq Wars for failing to engage in debate over assumptions, goals and priorities. During the Vietnam War, the "loose assumptions, unasked questions, and thin analyses of the Johnson administration were not challenged."[216] With regard to the Iraq War, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld engaged in intense discussions over "the amount of means being used, but rarely on the way in which

[214] Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," 10-11.
[215] Frank G. Hoffman, "Dereliction of Duty *Redux*?" 219.
[216] Ibid, 226

those forces were to be applied."[217]

Hoffman proposes replacing the flawed theory of civil-military relations with a model that accounts for the interplay of ends, means, and strategy, and encourages the rigorous exchange of views. "Arriving at sound policy requires discipline, deliberative process, and continuous discourse. Ultimately, it is about the interchange of viewpoints and the production of effective strategies for the use of the military instrument."[218] Hoffman agrees with Cohen's proposal that civilian leaders immerse themselves in the conduct of their wars, ask hard questions about military proposals, and occasionally, overrule their military advisors. However, at the same time, he stresses the need to have military leaders to ask hard questions about the ends of policy. In short, Hoffman argues in favor of a continuous dialogue. "The melding of ends and means is a two-sided and interactive process."[219]

Recent scholarship supports a running dialogue between civilian leaders and military professionals, but few scholars have put forth a normative framework to guide the interaction of civilian leaders and military officers at the civil-military apex of national security decision-making. Christopher P. Gibson developed a new model to conceptualize civil-military relations with the Department of Defense. His Madisonian approach to civil-military relations recasts the relationship between civilian and military authorities from one that is

[217] Ibid.
[218] Ibid, 218
[219] Ibid, 226.

hierarchical to one that is between equals.[220] Gibson does not challenge the overall primacy of civilian authority in his model however. The top military brass still reports to the Secretary of Defense. His model simply calls for a more collaborative approach to national security decision-making between the elected leaders, appointed officials, and military officers in order to produce more effective policies and outcomes.

Drawing from Feaver's earlier work on agency theory, Gibson redefines the term "agent" to include both military and top-level political appointees at the Pentagon. The "principal" includes the President and Congress. However, like Feaver, Gibson does not address how to reconcile the conflicting views and interests of either the dual principals or the multiple agents in his model.

Despite the model's weaknesses, Gibson argues that the United States government lacks sufficient institutional structures and norms to ensure that the civil-military nexus functions efficiently and effectively. Instead, decision-making swings between periods where the civilian leadership dominates the civil-military nexus to periods where the military leadership has greater influence and control of the decision-making process.[221] The problem, Gibson argues, is not the influence of one particular civilian or military leader, but the institutions and

[220] Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*. Gibson invokes Madison's name because his model for civil-military relations draws its inspiration from Founding-era principles that countervailing forces can be employed to maximize effectiveness and accountability.
[221] Gibson points to the tenures of Secretary McNamara and Rumsfeld as examples of periods where the civilian leadership dominated the civil-military nexus. He cites the role of Chairman General Colin Powell during the Clinton administration as a period in which the military possessed greater independence.

norms that govern civil-military relations.[222]

Gibson proposes the Madisonian approach to civil-military relations. This approach calls on the top civilian and military leaders at the Pentagon "to form a partnership to assist and advise the nation's elected leaders as they execute their constitutional responsibilities to direct and control the military in pursuit of national security objectives and the common defense."[223] Gibson focuses on this particular group because they form the nexus of civilian and military advisors, who offer strategic analysis and convey recommendations to the President and Congress. Gibson argues that a more balanced approach to civil-military relations at this level ensures that the President and Congress have access to "strategic analysis, options, and advice from both political appointees and the top general officers…prior to making weighty decisions in national security-related matters."[224]

Gibson acknowledges the futility of the strict separation of the roles and responsibilities of civilian and military leaders. Few actions regarding national security fall neatly into the categories of purely civilian or military actions. As such, Gibson rejects Huntington's objective control model because it fails to provide any insight on the preponderance of civil-military interaction in national security matters. Likewise, Gibson discards the subjective control model as

[222] Gary John Schaub, Jr., review of, *Securing the State: Reforming the National Security Decision-making Process at the Civil-Military Nexus*, by Christopher P. Gibson, in *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 29, no. 3 (December 2008): 589-591.
[223] Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*, 1.
[224] Ibid, 2.

impractical. Political appointees at the Pentagon, he argues, generally have less practical experience than top generals and therefore should not micromanage operational planning.[225] The end result reduces policy effectiveness. Moreover, the subjective control model relies on monitoring techniques and oversight methods that could breed mistrust, or in some cases, alienate military officers from the advisory process.

With neither model no longer practical, Gibson proposes a new method to organize civil-military relations. The Madisonian approach provides a different way for conceptualizing the relationship between senior civilian and military leaders at the civil-military nexus. These leaders forge a partnership to provide the President and Congress with the best military advice and information to guide national security decisions. Gibson's model pertains specifically to interactions within the Department of Defense. Moreover, it acknowledges that a balanced civil-military nexus is necessary for successful outcomes, but not sufficient. Gibson also recognizes that other factors at play, such as the extent of domestic and international support for the continued war effort or the degree of domestic and international legitimacy of the indigenous government the United States is trying to help, affect policy outcomes. As such, functional civil-military relations do not guarantee successful policy outcomes.

[225] Not all military leaders have practical experience in all types of warfare. The United States armed forces had not fought an insurgency since the Vietnam War. Unfortunately, since that time, the US armed forces continued to prepare for conventional war. As such, the United States was ill prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Under the Madisonian approach, and after receiving direction from the President (which is shared over the long-run with Congress), the civilian and military leadership within the Pentagon would develop competing plans to meet national security objectives. The individuals at the civil-military nexus would critique each other's ideas and provide analysis to the President and Congress for review and decision. There is no requirement for consensus. Separate proposals are encouraged, and as such, the elected leadership is presented with more options under the Madisonian approach.

To put the Madisonian approach into practice, Gibson proposes changes in both existing legal structures and in the norms that guide behavior. Structural changes include revisions to the Goldwater-Nichols legislation to ensure members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are included in a more meaningful way in the deliberations and drafting of war plans, as well as all facets of military preparedness. Doing so, however, could exacerbate inter-service rivalry, which Gibson does not address.

Gibson also proposes the combatant commands fall under the command of a top military officer – the Commanding General of the United States Armed Forces. The Commanding General would replace the existing billet of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs would report to the Commanding General, who would in turn advise the President and Congress. However, the Joint Chiefs also retain their advisory role under this

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scheme as well.

Finally, the Secretary of Defense, while senior to the Commanding General, would still offer his own advice and independent analysis, which would include estimates from his civilian staff. However, the combatant commanders would not report to or through the Secretary. Instead, they would work for the Commanding General, who would speak directly to the President. Under this structure, Gibson argues, the President and Congress would receive multiple sets of advice and analysis – from the Commanding General, the service chiefs, and the Secretary of Defense.[226]

Beyond these structural changes, many of which are fraught with political problems, the Madisonian approach suggests new norms are needed to enable a more collaborative approach at the civil-military nexus. Some of the suggested changes in behavior for military officers include: develop expert knowledge across the spectrum of conflict; put forward candid assessments in meetings designed to review operations; help facilitate civilian national security professional expertise; and avoid partisan struggles or undermining ongoing operations in public statements or appeals to the media.[227]

Interestingly, Gibson does not suggest changes in behavior for civilian leaders in the Pentagon. This is one of the limits of the Madisonian approach.

[226] Ibid, 109.
[227] Ibid, 121-126.

Oversight methods and monitoring techniques sometimes silence military advice. During the tenure of Secretary Rumsfeld, for example, the top military leadership embraced notions that disagreement equaled disloyalty and that the role of the soldier should be restrained.[228] Gibson's model does nothing to force civilian leaders at the Pentagon to engage military officers.

Another limitation to the Madisonian approach is its proposed structural changes. In recent years, many scholars have suggested revising Goldwater-Nichols,[229] but Gibson's proposition for placing a Commanding General in command of the combatant commanders and Joint Chiefs seems unlikely.

Finally, the Madisonian approach, while attempting to strengthen the military voice, pits the entire military establishment against the civilian appointees in the Department of Defense. The model also allows the military and civilian leadership, if necessary, to offer competing advice. Gibson does not suggest how the President and Congress should reconcile competing and alternative views. Are competing views presented at the National Security Council in order to be reconciled? Who decides which recommendations to take? Gibson does not say.

[228] Ibid, 128. See the dissertation's case study on the Iraq War decision for more details on the relationship between Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Richard Myers.
[229] Clark A. Murdock and Michèle Flournoy. *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era*, Phase 2 Report, (Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2005).

In short, Gibson proposes changes in the organizational process in order to improve strategic analysis, and thus, the decision-making process, at the civil-military nexus. However, legislative changes alone are not the solution. The actual process of how decisions are made, how civilian and military leaders jointly test assumptions, debate issues, and offer strategic analysis requires developing means for greater discourse.

G) Conclusion

Feaver summarizes this ongoing normative debate as one between "professional supremacists" and "civilian supremacists."[230] The "professional supremacists" argue that the primary problem for civil-military relations during war is ensuring the military an adequate voice, and therefore, keeping civilians from micromanaging and mismanaging matters.[231] "Professional supremacists" thus favor the maximization of military professionalism and minimization of civilian intervention in military affairs. Scholars here agree that military professionals possess expert knowledge, and civilian leaders ought to defer decisions on operations during war to military professionals. The solution to the civil-military problem is to give the military adequate space and voice in the

[230] Peter D. Feaver, "The Right to be Right," 87-125. Feaver places several civil-military scholars within the "professional supremacist" camp, including Samuel P. Huntington, Michael C. Desch, Christopher P. Gibson, and Dale R. Herspring. Included in the "civilian supremacist" camp are Feaver, Eliot A. Cohen, Richard H. Kohn, Suzanne C. Nielson, Mackubin Thomas Owens, and Frank G. Hoffman.
[231] Ibid, 89.

policy-making process.[232] The military must be vigilant in pressing its case when civilian leaders ignore their advice. In fact, "professional supremacists" go so far as to favor "carving out large zones of professional autonomy where the presumption is that military preferences should trump civilian preferences."[233]

In contrast, "civilian supremacists" argue that the primary problem for civil-military relations theory is ensuring that civilian leaders direct key decisions, even when the military disagrees with that direction.[234] Scholars here prefer to see greater civilian intervention in military affairs and insist that the final authority over strategy, operations and tactics during war remains unquestionably and undeniably with civilian leaders. Moreover, "civilian supremacists" believe the bias in the United States tilts toward excessive civilian deference to military professionals during wartime. The solution to the civil-military problem is to ensure that civilian leaders direct key decisions, even when the military disagrees with that direction.[235] As such, these scholars seek to empower civilian leaders to involve themselves more forcefully in decisions regarding the strategy, operations and tactics of war.

Interestingly, each camp identifies as the current problem to civil-military relations – intrusive civilian direction or excessive military autonomy – as the

[232] Ibid, 94.
[233] Ibid, 93.
[234] Ibid, 89.
[235] Ibid.

very thing that the other identifies as a practical solution to the problem.[236] By highlighting the debate on the proper role of civilian and military leaders during war, Feaver raises an important question – what is the proper division of labor for national security decision-making during times of war?[237]

To answer this, Feaver reviews the 2007 Iraq Surge decision.[238] He argues that the surge case demonstrates problems with both the professional supremacist and civilian supremacist camps. Neither camp offers a reasonable solution to the civil-military problem. Instead, the answer to the problem lies in adopting a hybrid compromise that splits the difference between civilian and military viewpoints. With regard to the Iraq Surge decision, the final strategy that emerged was the result of an incremental process of compromise and bargaining.[239] Feaver further acknowledges that the surge case was a civilian-led process since all strategic-level decisions were pushed and made in The White House. In terms of the debate between professional supremacists and civilian supremacists, "the surge case undercuts the former without fully vindicating the latter."[240]

In response to Feaver's article, Thomas E. Ricks questions whether the surge strategy was the result of hybrid compromises. Ricks believes The White

[236] Ibid, 90.
[237] Ibid.
[238] This case will be reviewed in greater detail in the dissertation's chapter on the Iraq Surge.
[239] Ibid, 112.
[240] Peter D. Feaver, "Feaver: Responding to Tom Rick's Critique: Who Decided the Strategic Shift that Led to the Iraq Surge?" *ForeignPolicy.com*, April 6, 2011, (accessed April 18, 2011); available from http://www.rooseveltroom.net/feaver-responding-to-tom-rickss-critique-who-decided-the-strategic-shift-that-led-to-the-iraq-surge/.

House produced the strategy only after getting the right people in place in Baghdad.[241] President George W. Bush did in fact replace General W. Casey Jr., who opposed the surge, with General David H. Petraeus, a strong proponent, as commander in Iraq in January 2007. Replacing senior officers that challenge or disagree with civilian directives is an oversight method often used to ensure civilian control. Of course, resorting to such methods may undermine the comprehensiveness of debate and truncates the civil-military dialogue.

Ricks also highlights another important factor absent in Feaver's assessment – Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's opposition to the surge strategy. According to Ricks, it was only after Rumsfeld's resignation in late 2006 that the White House was able to convince senior civilian and military leaders to support the surge strategy. The absence of the Secretary of Defense in the Iraq Surge decision is an important factor that Feaver does not address. Finally, Ricks also questions whether the surge strategy even originated in the White House, as Feaver contends, or out of Bagdad. Ricks commentary raises important questions as to how the decision-making process at the civil-military nexus unfolded in the Iraq Surge case.

The debate on the role of civilian and military leaders in the decision-making process continues, but there is an alternative to these two conflicting camps that the civil-military literature has yet to address adequately. The

[241] Thomas E. Ricks, "A Feaver-ish Take on the Surge in Iraq," *ForeignPolicy.com,* March 31, 2011, (accessed April 18, 2011); available from http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/31/a_feaver_ish_take_on_the_surge_in_iraq.

following chapter will argue that the solution to the problem of civil-military relations theory is neither in the maximization of military professionalism nor in the maximization of civilian intervention. The solution lies in promoting greater discourse between civilian and military leaders, particularly in post-conflict environments that necessitate both kinetic and non-kinetic action. Limited discourse between civilian and military leaders means important civilian and military concerns are missing from the planning process. Civilian and military leaders must engage in a deliberative discourse to ensure all options and views have been explored and tested.

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III) CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: THE CASE FOR DELIBERATIVE DISCOURSE

A) Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed civil-military relations theory. A major discussion in the literature has been on how civilian authorities control the military. The two frameworks that address the issue of civilian control are the objective and subjective control models. Civilian control in the objective sense is the "recognition of autonomous military professionalism."[242] More precisely, it is respect for an independent military sphere of action that is free from political interference. The antithesis of objective control is subjective control. "The essence of subjective civilian control is the denial of an independent military sphere."[243] Oversight methods, monitoring techniques, and punishment tools are employed to force military compliance with the government's views. In both models, the civil-military relationship is seen as a struggle for power between the civilians and the military. It is cast in terms of a superior-to-subordinate relationship. When viewed as such, civilian control becomes defined as control over and restraint of the military.[244] Excessive civilian penetration of military

[242] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 83.
[243] Ibid, 83.
[244] Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," 18.

culture equals strong civilian control, whereas excessive civilian deference to military professionals equals weak civilian control.

The literature also defines "good" or "bad" civil-military relations in terms of civilian control. Generally, scholars argue that the best indicator of civilian control, and thus, "good" civil-military relations, is political dominance when civilian and military preferences diverge.[245] Civilian control is weak when military preferences prevail and strong when civilian preferences prevail. However, determining whose preferences prevail does not explain how the relationship between civilian and military leaders functions, and therefore, how its function affects policy planning. As a whole, the literature on civil-military relations theory needs to shift from focusing on issues of control to understanding how the civil-military relationship affects policy outcomes. How do civilian leaders arrive at their decisions and are military leaders a part of the decision-making process?

Recent scholarship addresses the role of the civilian and military leadership in the national security decision-making process and supports a running dialogue between the civilian and military leadership. Eliot A. Cohen insists on greater civilian involvement in military affairs, and introduces the idea

[245] Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 4.

of an "unequal dialogue."[246] Frank G. Hoffman and Richard K. Betts also agree civilian and military leaders share equal responsibility in decisions on the use of force, but they disagree with Cohen's strict focus with the role of the civilian leadership. Hoffman and Betts attempt to move the discussion further, and address the role of the military in strategic discussion on the use of force. Rather than an "unequal dialogue," they propose an "interactive process" or "equal dialogue."[247] Finally, Christopher P. Gibson also acknowledges the futility of the strict separation of the roles and responsibilities of civilian and military leaders. He introduces a new normative framework, the Madisonian approach, to civil-military relations, which calls for a more collaborative approach to national security decision-making between the elected leaders, appointed officials, and military officers.

Although recent scholarship stresses the idea of a dialogue – equal or unequal – the focus has remained on whether there is intrusive civilian direction or excessive military autonomy in national security decision-making.[248] Discussions on how to promote greater dialogue have not advanced. Scholars do not address what happens when civilian leaders over-step their authority, fail to integrate military preferences and perspectives into operational plans, and allow

[246] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 209. A dialogue, in that both sides express their views bluntly, at times offensively, and repeatedly, and unequal, in that the final authority of the statesman is unambiguous and unquestioned.
[247] Hoffman uses the term "continuous dialogue" and writes, "The melding of ends and means is a two-sided and interactive process." Frank G. Hoffman, "Dereliction of Duty *Redux?*" 205. Betts refers to civil-military relations as "equal dialogue and unequal authority." Richard K. Betts, "Are Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem?" 35.
[248] As mentioned in the conclusion of the previous chapter, Peter D. Feaver summarizes this debate as one between "professional supremacists" and "civilian supremacists." Peter D. Feaver, "The Right to be Right."

their own motives, ideologies or personal style to dictate the state's military response to a threat. Naturally, the decision-making process should be civilian-led, but that does not mean that the military should be excluded from the process. Nor does it mean that the military should lead the planning process. Post-conflict operations demand the integration of civil and military instruments of power, and as such, civilian and military leaders should engage in a deliberative discourse during the planning process.

In this chapter, I introduce the concept of deliberative discourse. Deliberative discourse involves a distinct process of learning about and considering issues from different perspectives.[249] Through a deliberative process, participants engage in a careful examination of relevant issues and consider alternative views in order to produce reasoned, well-informed, collective decisions or recommendations with policy implications.[250] Deliberation forces the exchange of information. Participants converse with one another, think critically, reflect about the options before them, and enlarge their perspectives, opinions, and understandings. They "do not seek to maximize or to satisfy their given interests and preferences, but to challenge and to justify the validity claims inherent in them – and they are prepared to change their views of the world or even their interests in light of the better argument."[251] In other words, participants not only try to convince each other to change their view, but also are themselves prepared to be persuaded.

[249] Wolfgang Donsbach, ed., *The International Encyclopedia of Communication*.
[250] Ibid.
[251] Thomas Risse, "'Let's Argue!" 7.

I draw on the literature of deliberative democracy to support my claim that when civil and military leaders engage in deliberative discourse, the planning process will more likely include multiple perspectives and viewpoints, a critical analysis of all assumptions and policy options, and an exploration of alternative courses of action. More importantly, the civilian and military leaders involved in the planning process will seek a reasoned consensus of the policy agenda.

I also address in this chapter the limits of deliberative discourse, namely group polarization and groupthink. Both phenomena negatively influence group decision-making by insulating the policy-making group from alternative views and advice. The potential lack of diverse arguments and perspectives due to group cohesiveness only underscore the necessity of having civilian and military actors included in the planning process, particularly for post-conflict operations, which demand the integration of civil and military instruments of power. When civilian and military actors are part of the planning group, the risk of group polarization or groupthink greatly diminishes given that the actors are drawn from two different spheres of influence. Moreover, as I neither treat the civilian and military actors as unitary agents, I recognize that within each respective sphere of influence, there are a multitude of perspectives and interests represented since the leaders involved in the process are drawn from various departments and offices. As such, when these civilian and military actors work together and engage in deliberative discourse, they are more likely to produce a policy that better

integrates political and military strategic considerations. It forces civilian and military leaders to coordinate their activities, strategies, and plans.

To support my claim that civilian and military actors working together as a group produces better policy choices, I draw on the theory of cognitive diversity. Cognitive diversity, defined as the extent to which the group reflects differences in knowledge, including beliefs, preferences, and perspectives, increases the likelihood of creating new group knowledge. Groups that openly deliberate their diverse perspectives are likely to be more creative and generate more alternatives.[252] The presence of diverse perspectives improves the quality of group deliberation, understanding, and problem-solving.

So, what then, could be wrong with deliberative discourse? Despite the potential benefits to deliberative discourse, there are also potential drawbacks. Deliberative discourse is not an unalloyed good. There are high transaction costs. It takes time for all views to be heard, debated, and discussed before, and if, a consensus can be reached. Prolonged debates within a group are another potential drawback to deliberative discourse. Finally, group members may engage in activities to undermine deliberations or determine the outcome of policy calculus, such as media leaks, bureaucratic foot-dragging, or inflating estimates of what a military operation would cost.

[252] Teresa M. Amabile et al., "Assessing the Work Environment for Creativity," *Academy of Management Journal*, vol. 39, no. 5 (1996): 1154-1184.

I conclude the chapter with a discussion on why deliberative discourse matters, an overview of the civilian and military actors reviewed in the case studies that should engage in deliberative discourse, and the measures of deliberative discourse that are used to determine the presence of deliberative discourse in the planning processes of the Iraq War and Surge.

The literature on civil-military relations to date has focused on issues of control. Yet neither the objective nor subjective control model assures effective policy outcomes. Improving civil-military relations is paramount given the United States growing involvement in post-conflict operations, which require all instruments of national power. It is time to address the underlying problem of civil-military relations – the lack of deliberative discourse.

B) Deliberative Discourse and Deliberative Democratic Theory

Deliberative discourse is a type of public discussion rooted in deliberative democracy.[253] The theory of deliberative democracy rests on the principle that for a democratic decision to be legitimate, it must be preceded by authentic deliberation.[254] Voting is not all that matters in well-functioning democracies, as it cannot legitimate collective decisions.[255] Public action should follow a process

[253] Deliberative democrats do not present their theory as an alternative to representative democracy. They only argue that deliberation is an important feature of all democratic societies.
[254] John S. Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*, 2. "The only condition for authentic deliberation," writes John S. Dryzek, "is then the requirement that communication induce reflection upon preferences in a non-coercive fashion.
[255] Ian Johnstone, *The Power of Deliberation*, 4.

in which people exchange information and ideas. For deliberative democrats, deliberation is central to democracy, and the more authentic and inclusive the political deliberation, then the more democratic the political system.

But what is meant by authentic deliberation? Deliberation itself is a kind of communication. Jurgen Habermas argues that there are three forms of communicative behavior: "bargaining based on fixed preferences; strategic argumentation, in which arguments are used to justify positions and persuade others to change their minds; and "true reasoning," in which actors seek a reasoned consensus on the basis of shared understandings." True reasoning is the ideal form of communicative behavior, according to Habermas, as it allows discourse to occur unaffected by power relationships, coercion, or other extraneous factors.[256] Its goal is simply to seek reasoned consensus. Similarly, Thomas Risse claims that the processes of argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion force actors to seek a communicative consensus about their understanding of a situation. "The goal is not to attain one's fixed preferences, but to seek a reasoned consensus," he writes.[257]

Drawing on Habermas' work, deliberative democrats argue that communications are deliberative to the degree they can induce reflection about the preferences that individuals hold. What matters most is the exchange of arguments free from meaningless rhetoric, expressions of self-interest, coercion,

[256] Ian Johnstone, *The Power of Deliberation*, 14.
[257] Thomas Risse, "'Let's Argue!" 7.

manipulation, or deception.[258] In order to legitimate collective decisions, therefore, well functioning democracies should "attempt to combine deliberation and reason-giving with accountability," writes Cass Sunstein.

Jon Elster explains how deliberative democracy, which is rooted in the idea that argumentation matters, is democratic as it involves "collective decision making with the participation of all who will be affected by the decision or their representatives."[259] Moreover, it is deliberative in that it includes "decision making by means of arguments offered *by* and *to* participants who are committed to the values of rationality and impartiality."[260] Similarly, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson explain deliberative democracy "as a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future."[261]

But what is the purpose of deliberative democracy? Gutmann and Thompson's conception of deliberative democracy serves several purposes. First, it promotes the legitimacy of collective decisions. For example, a government decision, even if not agreed to by all citizens, will be considered more acceptable if everyone's claims have been considered. Another purpose of deliberation is to

[258] John S. Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*.
[259] Jon Elster, ed., *Deliberative Democracy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 8.
[260] Ibid.
[261] Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Why Deliberative Democracy?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 7.

encourage participants to take a broader view of issues on questions of common interest. Third, deliberation promotes mutually respectful processes of decision-making. Fourth, the purpose of deliberation is to help correct mistakes. That is, deliberation advances individual and collective understanding. "Through the give-and-take of argument, participants can learn from each other…and develop new views and policies that can more successfully withstand critical scrutiny.

James D. Fearon considers the benefits of deliberation in making political decisions.[262] Like Gutmann and Thompson, he argues deliberation forces participants to justify their position, produces greater consensus, and renders the ultimate choice legitimate in the eyes of the group. Fearon also considers how deliberation may lessen or overcome the problem of bounded rationality, first proposed by Herbert Simon. In decision-making, individuals have limited information, resources, and time to make a decision. Simon argued that decision-makers examine available alternatives sequentially until they reach one that meets their minimum standards of acceptability.[263] That is, decision-makers satisfice rather than choose an optimal solution. Fearon suggests discussion lessens the impact of bounded rationality, because deliberation may be "additively valuable" in that participants may think of some possibility that hadn't occurred before the discussion, and it may be "multiplicatively valuable" in that additional

[262] James D. Fearon, "Deliberation as Discussion," in *Deliberative Democracy*, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Fearon sees six benefits of deliberation: reveals private information, lessens or overcomes bounded rationality, forces a particular mode of justifying demands or claims, helps render the ultimate choice legitimate in the eyes of the group, improves the moral or intellectual qualities of the participants, and is the morally right thing to do.
[263] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, 562.

possibilities or problems may present themselves in the course of discussion.[264] For Fearon, decision-making is not only a process of choosing among a set of alternatives, but it is a process of generating new ones.

Deliberation can be found in state institutions, such as legislatures, cabinets, and constitutional courts. Non-state institutional forums, such as the United Nations or European Union, also have deliberative capacity. These deliberative forums influence and legitimate policy decisions. For example, in *The Power of Deliberation*, Ian Johnstone makes an argument for why and how deliberation influences world politics. He asserts that discursive interaction "among states and non-state actors affects the behavior of those actors and shapes the international order."[265] To test the impact of legal discourse in international affairs, Johnstone reviews a variety of cases of humanitarian intervention, counter-terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, peacekeeping, and trade. He concludes that one measure of legitimacy of the international organization is how well they function as venues for and participants in reasoned deliberation.[266]

C) Limits to Deliberative Discourse

Deliberative discourse requires group members to consider different perspectives, think critically, and reflect upon all options before them. However, the process only works if participants are willing to set aside their fixed

[264] James D. Fearon, "Deliberation as Discussion." 50.
[265] Ian Johnstone, *The Power of Deliberation*, 3.
[266] Ian Johnstone, *The Power of Deliberation*.

preferences and engage in a careful examination of all relevant issues in order to reach a reasoned consensus. That is, group dynamics influence the quality of the group's deliberations. Studies on human behavior, groupthink, and group polarization raise some cautionary notes about deliberative discourse.

Richard Ned Lebow's comparative study of international crises demonstrates the impact of motivation on crisis behavior. His study led him to conclude, "To the extent that leaders perceive the need to act, they become insensitive to the interests and commitments of others that stand in the way of the success of their policy."[267] As a result, once committed to a policy, leaders may disregard information that runs counter to their desired course of action. Moreover, decision-makers may interpret, incorporate or discard information in accordance with their existing assumptions and perceptions.

By the same token, members of a small group of decision-makers may discount warnings or information that runs counter to their own assumptions. They fail to examine alternatives and consequences when they strive for unanimity. Moreover, group members may have a simplified view of the enemy, fail to examine risks and seek new information, and are quick to dismiss viewpoints that do not conform to the dominant assessments of the collective group.[268] Irving L. Janis referred to this phenomenon as groupthink, defined as "a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results

[267] Dougherty, James E. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 588.
[268] Ibid.

from in-group pressures."[269]

In *Groupthink*, Janis hypothesized that "members of any small cohesive group tend to maintain esprit de corps by unconsciously developing a number of shared illusions and related norms that interfere with critical thinking and reality testing."[270] His study identified several factors that cause groupthink: group cohesiveness, insulation of the policy-making group from alternative views and expert advice, lack of leaders that encourage critical examination, lack of procedures for promoting good decision-making, homogenous social backgrounds and ideologies of group members, and conformity pressures.[271]

Janis' review of key policy decisions (or fiascoes), such as President John F. Kennedy's decision to authorize the Bay of Pigs invasion and President Lyndon B. Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam War, revealed several symptoms of groupthink. First, is a sense of "unlimited confidence."[272] A small group of decision-makers share an illusion of invulnerability that encourages them to take greater risks.[273] Janis found this to be true in the Kennedy administration where the President's inner circle saw themselves as some sort of super group, capable of surmounting all risks. He dismissed the idea that Kennedy's policy advisers met hurriedly, failed to deliberate, and hastily made a decision. In fact, he noted

[269] Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink*, 2nd ed., (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982), 9.
[270] Ibid, 35.
[271] Cass R. Sunstein, *Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 87.
[272] Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink*, 35.
[273] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 598.

how "they had the opportunity to meet many times and to think about the decision for almost three months."[274]

In addition to the illusion of invulnerability, another symptom of groupthink is the illusion of unanimity. Unless there are clear-cut disagreements among members, group cohesiveness plays up convergence in thinking at the expense of fully exploring divergences that may disrupt the unity of the group.[275] As such, no strong voice of opposition is raised. This appearance of assumed consensus is achieved at the cost of self-censorship. Group members censor doubts, suppress objections, and fail to raise questions. Janis described the unanimity of Lyndon B. Johnson's principals during six meetings at which major escalation decisions were recommended.[276]

Finally, in order to not disrupt group cohesiveness, group members (which Janis referred to such group members as self-appointed mindguards) put social pressure on any group member who begins to express a view that deviates from the consensus.[277] For example, when Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, questioned the escalation policy, President Johnson labeled him "Mr. Stop-the-Bombing" and "our favorite dove."[278]

To achieve group cohesiveness without groupthink, Janis suggested

[274] Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink*, 33.
[275] Ibid, 38
[276] Ibid, 120
[277] Ibid, 40.
[278] Ibid, 115

promoting diverse views, independent policy planning and evaluation groups, and the use of outside experts that are encouraged to challenge prevailing views. Are there any drawbacks to these prescriptions? Janis noted several. First, the risk for prolonged debates within the group, which can become quite costly when a rapidly growing crisis requires an immediate policy solution.[279] Second, the effectiveness of the group may depend on the background and personality of the members. Janis warned that seldom, if ever, do policy-making groups include only "reasonable people who can be counted on to function as constructive discussants, to take account of their colleagues' point of view, and to make judicious but principled compromises when the time comes for consensus."[280] Third, the use of outside experts, independent policy-planning groups risk security leaks. "Another drawback is that the more organizational units involved in policy formation, the greater is the opportunity for intraorganizational politics to play a determining role," Janis wrote.[281] Finally, Janis warned that when many different planning groups deliberate, no one feels responsible for carefully assessing the policy. No one is in charge.

Drawing from Janis' research on groupthink, Cass Sunstein's research on group polarization sheds light on another phenomenon influencing group decision-making. "When people find themselves in groups of like-minded types, they are especially likely to move to extremes," explains Sunstein.[282] That is,

[279] Ibid, 263.
[280] Ibid, 263.
[281] Ibid, 264.
[282] Cass R. Sunstein, *Going to Extremes*, 2.

members of a deliberating group end up at a more extreme position than before deliberations began. For example, those that approve of the use of force against an adversary, and think that the act of war is justifiable, become still more convinced of the need to use force, and still more certain that there is a justifiable reason for going to war, after they deliberate. Moreover, deliberating groups of like-minded people may discredit or discount the views of those outside the group. That is, group homogeneity amplifies preexisting views and reduces internal diversity.[283] Still worse, when people initially support a strong response, such as an act of war, group discussion produces an even greater shift in the direction of support for a still stronger response. "The shift toward extremism is often larger when the average person starts with a pretty extreme position."[284]

Why do like-minded people go to extremes? Group polarization occurs, explains Sunstein, because group members are telling on another what they know, "and what they know is skewed in a predictable direction."[285] A group of like-minded individuals shares information and hears arguments that reinforce their original position. Therefore, group members will move to unjustified extremes because they fail to elicit new information or discredit arguments that could steer them in a different direction.

Sunstein attributes the many failures that occurred in the Iraq War to the "unfortunate culture that encouraged, rather than combated, group polarization"

[283] Ibid, 8.
[284] Ibid, 19.
[285] Ibid, 21.

of the George W. Bush presidency.[286] The extreme movement to war was fueled by an absence of dissenting views, claims Sunstein. To illustrate this point, he refers to Scott McClellan's memoir in which the former White House Press Secretary writes how Bush "…began falling into the trap of believing his own spin. He failed to spend enough time seeking independent input from a broad range of outside experts…those with differing points of view, including those who disagreed with his policies."

The Bush administration also suffered from a high degree of solidarity. Many administration officials had previously worked together. Sunstein warns that a high degree of solidarity further reduces the number of diverse arguments and affects the extent of polarization. "If members of the group think that they have a shared identity and a high degree of solidarity," writes Sunstein, "there will be heightened polarization."[287] The group moves to further extremes when moderate members leave or exit the group.[288]

In contrast to the Bush presidency, the Lincoln presidency has been described as a team of rivals.[289] Lincoln appointed three of his rivals to his cabinet in order to encourage divergent perspectives and increase the pool of information. Sunstein writes how mixed groups depolarize as they do not hold rigidly to their positions and listen to one another. "The effect of mixing will be

[286] Ibid, 29.
[287] Ibid, 42.
[288] Ibid, 44.
[289] Ibid, 29.

to produce moderation," he writes.[290]

D) Cognitive Diversity and Deliberative Discourse

Although an understanding of group polarization and group cohesiveness raises some cautionary notes about deliberative discourse, it is foolish to think that deliberation or the exchange of information and ideas among group members always breeds extremism or groupthink. A system of deliberation is likely to work well if it includes diverse views, information and positions.[291] In fact, the plurality of perspectives and enough social heterogeneity improves the quality of group deliberation and protects collective decisions against the risk of group polarization.[292]

Cognitive diversity refers to the existence within a group of differences in beliefs and preferences.[293] That is, differences in how individuals see the world, interpret problems in it, and go about working out solutions to these problems. More specifically, cognitive diversity reflects differences in how people represent

[290] Ibid, 48.
[291] Ibid, 142.
[292] Hélène Landemore, "Deliberation, Cognitive Diversity, and Democratic Inclusiveness: An Epistemic Argument for Random Selection of Representatives," *Synthese*, vol. 190, no. 7 (May 2013), 1214.
[293] Chet Miller, Linda M. Burke and William H. Glick, "Cognitive Diversity among Upper-Echelon Executives: Implications for Strategic Decision Processes," *Strategic Management Journal*, vol. 19, no. 1 (January 1998): 39-58. Rebecca Mitchell and Stephen Nicholas, "Knowledge Creation in Groups: The Value of Cognitive Diversity, Transactive Memory and Open-mindedness Norms," *The Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management*, vol. 4, no. 1 (2006): 67-74.

problems and how they go about solving them.[294] Cognitive diversity (or what Lu Hong and Scott E. Page call functional diversity) differs from identity diversity, which refers to differences in a group's demographic characteristics, gender, cultural identities and ethnicity, and training and expertise.[295] Instead, functional or cognitive diversity reflects a diversity of perspectives, interpretations, and preferences concerning how individual group members encode and approach problems.

Recent studies in organization behavior and management have analyzed how differences in ideas, perspectives, knowledge and skills among group members affect their ability to solve problems. In one study, Hong and Page apply a mathematical framework for modeling functionally diverse problem-solving agents. The model allows for differences in perspectives (how individuals encode problems or represent problems internally), and heuristics (the algorithms they use to generate solutions or how they go about trying to solve them). Their analysis supports the role of cognitive diversity in reaching optimal solutions. According to Hong and Page, "in the absence of incentive and communication problems, diverse perspectives and/or heuristics often lead to optimal solutions to difficult problems, despite the fact that each individual agent may not be able to locate a good solution if acting alone."[296] Whereas previous models hold perspectives fixed, Hong and Page allow for differences in perspectives in

[294] Lu Hong and Scott E. Page, "Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers," *PNAS*, vol. 101, no. 46 (November 16, 2004): 16385-16389.
[295] Ibid.
[296] Lu Hong and Scott E. Page, "Problem Solving by Heterogeneous Agents," *Journal of Economic Theory*, vol. 97, no. 1 (2001), 124.

addition to differences in heuristics. When this perspective-heuristic framework is applied to problem solving activities in the economy, such as searching for cures to diseases, developing software, handling legal cases, and constructing social policies, Hong and Page show how "perspectives *truly* enlarge the set of ways of solving a problem as compared to if the perspective is fixed and only heuristics vary."[297] In short, heterogeneous groups (or identity-diverse groups) can outperform homogeneous groups due to their greater functional diversity.

In a later study, Hong and Page again apply the perspective-heuristic framework to study whether a functionally diverse group whose members have less ability can outperform a group of people with high ability.[298] In other words, does diversity trump ability? According to Hong and Page, it does. Their study demonstrates that a random group of diverse problem solvers can outperform a team of the best problem solvers. "…As the pool of problem solvers grows larger, the very best problem solvers must become similar," explains Hong and Page. "In the limit the highest-ability problem solvers cannot be diverse."[299] The general point is that what matters most for problem-solving is how diversely-thinking the group is rather than how smart the individuals in the group are.

Why does cognitive diversity matter? It creates new knowledge. Diversity gives rise to varied ideas, perspectives, and skills that can improve a group's

[297] Ibid, 126.
[298] Lu Hong and Scott E. Page, "Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers can Outperform Groups of High-ability Problem Solvers," 16385.
[299] Ibid, 16389.

ability to solve problems.[300] In one study, Rebecca Mitchell and Stephen Nicholas consider the affect of cognitive diversity on knowledge creating processes, such as accumulation, interaction, analysis, and integration.[301] They conducted a survey study of business professionals, public sector employees, and postgraduate management students to test whether cognitive diversity increases the likelihood of new knowledge emerging in groups.[302] Overall, their findings support this hypothesis. They conclude that, "new knowledge is created through interactive processes based on sharing and integration of previously unshared knowledge. In particular, knowledge is dependent upon the existence of disparate perspectives."[303]

E) What, then, could be wrong with Deliberative Discourse?

Deliberative discourse leads to better, more informed, and rationally grounded decisions on policies.[304] However, the value of a deliberative discourse process must also be weighed against the negative consequences it may produce. Discussed in the earlier sections were the limits to deliberative discourse – groupthink and group polarization – as well as the positive influence of cognitive

[300] Cristina B. Gibson, "From Knowledge Accumulation to Accommodation: Cycles of Collective Cognition in Work Groups," *Journal of Organizational Behavior,* vol. 22 (2001): 121-134.
[301] Rebecca Mitchell and Stephen Nicholas, "Knowledge Creation in Groups." The first knowledge creating process, accumulation, refers to the acquisition of diverse knowledge and information. Interaction is based on the process of communication and reflection. Analysis or examination refers to the process during which group members' debate points of view, assumptions, and alternative solutions. The fourth phase, integration, is the articulation of an agreed position or solution.
[302] Ibid.
[303] Ibid, 74.
[304] A long epistemic tradition, reaching back to Plato, suggests that rational dialogue between two or more individuals improves reasoning. This is a key claim in deliberative democratic theory.

diversity. In this section, I address the potential drawbacks of engaging in deliberative discourse.

For any form of policy to be efficient, its potential benefits should be greater than its costs. The potential benefits of deliberative discourse include increased likelihood that divergent perspectives will be heard, broad consideration of potential contingencies and alternative solutions, and greater probability that the agreement reached reflects the views and consensus of the group. The process, however, has a number of potential costs.

According to the Coase theorem, private parties can bargain without cost over the allocation of resources if they can solve the problem of externalities (the uncompensated impact of one person's actions on the well-being of a bystander) on their own.[305] However, despite the appealing logic of this theorem, private individuals do not always resolve problems or reach an agreement without incurring transaction costs. Some of the transaction costs incurred in creating policy include the cost of analysis (in personnel, resources, and time), information collection, the hiring and training of staff, lobbying, reporting, monitoring, implementation, and enforcement. These costs increase substantially if outside experts or independent parties are included in the policy planning process.

Deliberative discourse can have high transaction costs. First, the cost of

[305] N. Gregory Mankiw, *Principles of Economics*, 6th ed., (South-Western Cengage Learning: 2012), 211.

analysis may be high. Group members must understand the issue under discussion and think through not only their view, but also the positions of the other group members, as well as the political objectives, costs, and feasibility of the policy decision. This may require having staff research the issue, collect information, and prepare position papers in advance. For example, in the months prior to the official launch of the formal White House strategy review for the Iraq War, the National Security Council staffers had numerous informal discussions with military insiders and outside experts to understand how a troop surge might succeed militarily and assess the number of troops needed to execute a surge in Iraq.

Second, deliberative discourse requires time. It takes time for all views to be heard, debated, and discussed before, and if, a consensus can be reached. The longer the process takes to sort through conflicting views, the more expensive the process becomes. Inter-service rivalries, political constraints, and additional information needs may delay deliberations or prevent agreement altogether. Moreover, personalities may influence the quality of debate. "A policy-making group of bristling curmudgeons might waste time on endless reiterations of clashing points of view," warned Janis when discussing the undesirable side effects of his prescriptions to preventing groupthink.[306]

Prolonged debates within a group are another potential drawback to deliberative discourse. Prolonged debates can become costly when a rapidly

[306] Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink*, 263.

growing crisis demands an immediate policy response or solution. On the other hand, a crisis may demand immediate action that curtails the policy planning process. For example, stress placed on group members by an international crisis may limit problem-solving efficiency.[307]

Fourth, group members may engage in activities to undermine deliberations or determine the outcome of policy calculus, such as inflating estimates of what a military operation would cost.[308] Group members also may engage in bureaucratic foot-dragging (by intentionally delaying action) so that the undesired policy will never be implemented. On the other hand, group members may delay making a decision until additional information is obtained or until events force a decision.

Another drawback to deliberative discourse is the potential for media leaks or unauthorized public protest. During the planning process for the 2010 Afghanistan Surge, the debate on whether and how many troops to surge played out on the front pages of the *New York Times* and *Washington Post.* The military used the media to voice dissent and disparage civilian policy, and the White House, believing the military leadership was trying to box in the President to approve more troops, expressed their doubts of a surge strategy with the media.[309]

[307] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 596.
[308] Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 68.
[309] Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014

Henrik Friberg-Fernros and Johan Karlsson Schaffer raise another potential drawback – the consensus paradox. They argue that once a consensual agreement is reached, it is less likely for group members to further discourse or develop new arguments. That is, deliberative activities stagnate.[310] In such cases, group members may hesitate to question the planning assumptions of the agreement or change course of action.

Finally, effective deliberative discourse depends on group dynamics. Since group members are representatives of different departments, with clashing interests, group loyalty may be low. Deliberations may become bitter power struggles at the expense of effective decision-making.[311] On the other hand, if group loyalty is high, the decision may be the outcome of groupthink or group polarization.[312] Moreover, if group loyalty is high, group members may engage in self-censorship and hesitate to raise objections or disagree with the dominant view. A series of experiments in social psychology demonstrate that people are inclined to conform to the prevailing norm or dominant view.[313]

[310] Henrik Friberg-Fernros and Johan Karlsson Schaffer, "The Consensus Paradox: Why Deliberative Agreement Impedes Rational Discourse," a paper prepared for the Oslo-Paris International Workshop on Democracy, Paris, France, 18-20 October 2010, (accessed June 20, 2014); available from http://www.mothugg.se/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/The-consensus-paradox.pdf.
[311] Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink*, 12.
[312] Groupthink may not necessarily be bad thing. The dominant assessment of the situation or dominant view in the group may be correct.
[313] Henrik Friberg-Fernros and Johan Karlsson Schaffer, "The Consensus Paradox."

F) A New Approach to Civil-Military Relations?

How does all this inform the theory of civil-military relations? Deliberative democratic theory reinforces the power of deliberation. Deliberative democrats argue public action should follow a process in which people exchange information, consider alternative solutions, and engage divergent perspectives. Deliberation is central to democracy, and the more authentic and inclusive the political deliberation, then the more democratic the political system. Applying this theory to the national security planning process, particularly discussions regarding the use of force, increases the likelihood that the process includes divergent perspectives, broad consideration of potential contingencies and alternative solutions, and reflects the consensus of the group.

The literature on groupthink and group polarization raises potential arguments against a deliberative discourse process. For example, like-minded group members may move to unjustified extremes, because they fail to elicit new information or discredit arguments that could steer them in a different direction. Group cohesiveness, insulation of the policy-making group from alternative views and expert advice, lack of leaders that encourage critical examination, and homogenous social backgrounds and ideologies of group members may also leads to groupthink. These phenomena influence the quality of a group's deliberations, and therefore, the decision-making process.

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Cognitive diversity minimizes the potential drawbacks of small group deliberations. The theory argues that the inclusion of diverse perspectives not only improves the quality of group deliberation, understanding, and problem-solving, but also increases the likelihood of creating new group knowledge. Groups that openly deliberate their diverse perspectives are likely to be more creative and generate more alternatives.[314] It is the plurality of perspectives and social heterogeneity of the group that will improve the quality of group deliberation and protect collective decisions against the risk of group polarization.

Although cognitive diversity protects collective decisions against the risk of group polarization and groupthink, there are also several potential drawbacks to deliberative discourse. High transaction costs may outweigh the potential benefits of engaging in deliberative discourse. However, decisions on the use of force carry significantly higher costs.

One final point on deliberative discourse: it may not necessarily happen in the arena where the policy decision is actually being made. In *National Security and Double Government*, Michael J. Glennon argues that the United States has become a structure of double government in which the three branches of government exercise little control over the direction of national security policy.[315]

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[314] Teresa M. Amabile et al., "Assessing the Work Environment for Creativity."

[315] Michael J. Glennon applies the dual institutions theory of 19th century scholar, Walter Bagehot, to the United States in order to explain why national security policy has remained largely constant from the George W. Bush administration to the Barack H. Obama administration. Bagehot argued that over the decades a dual set of institutions emerged in Britain. The "dignified" institutions comprise the monarchy and the House of Lords. The "efficient" institutions, that do the real work of governing, comprise the House of Commons, the Cabinet, and the Primer Minister. Together

Rather a network of executive officials who manage the departments and agencies responsible for United States national security define national security policy. Glennon refers to this network as the Trumanite network (in honor of President Harry S. Truman's role, more so than any other President, in creating the nation's national security apparatus). The public continues to believe, however, that the constitutionally established institutions, which Glennon calls the Madisonian network to refer to the three branches of the federal government established by the Constitution to serve as checks on the instruments of national security. That view, however, is mistaken because, "Judicial review is negligible; congressional oversight is dysfunctional; and presidential control is nominal."[316] National security decision-making actually rests with the Trumanite network, according to Glennon.

Who are the Trumanites? They are several hundred high-level military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement officials within the Executive Branch responsible for national security policy-making.[317] Their missions range from intelligence gathering and analysis to war-fighting, cyber-warfare, and weapons development, and the size of their budget and workforces are classified.[318]

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these institutions comprise a "disguised republic." Michael J. Glennon, "National Security and Double Government," *Harvard National Security Journal*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2014): 1-113.

[316] Ibid, 1.

[317] Ibid, 22. Glennon cites a *Washington Post* 2011 study that identified forty-six federal departments and agencies engaged in classified national security work.

[318] Ibid.

If the Trumanites define national security policy, then they influence the discourse within which national security policy is made. According to Glennon, the Trumanites "face no need for hearings or markups or floor debates and afford no occasion for briefs, oral arguments, or appeals."[319] As such, they deliberate privately, efficiently (at least relative to the Madisonians), and independent from executive, congressional, or judicial oversight or public scrutiny.

Glennon outlines several attributes of the Trumanite network. First, they have a propensity to define security in military and intelligence terms rather than political and diplomatic ones.[320] Second, the Trumanites operate in secret and keep information private. Although outside experts are consulted to provide additional insight when needed, they have limited access to information, as they do not hold security clearances. Third, the Trumanites mask the identity of "the decider." There is no leader and no formal structure, and therefore, everyone and no one is responsible for a given policy. Finally, conformism characterizes the Trumanite network. There is little internal disagreement. They are not inclined to stake out new policies. Their ultimate objective is to preserve the status quo. Moreover, they are team players, disinclined to disagree openly. "Dissent shades into disloyalty and risks marginalization, writes Glennon."[321]

To illustrate the power of the Trumanite network and its influence on policy-making, Glennon provides a quotation from Brad Berenson, former

[319] Ibid, 24
[320] Ibid, 26.
[321] Ibid, 36.

associate counsel in the George W. Bush White House. "The dirty little secrete here is that the United States government has enduring institutional interests that carry over from administration to administration and almost always dictate the position the government takes."[322] Yes, to a certain degree, the several hundred officials that comprise the Trumanite network (which includes careerists as well as "in-and-outers" – political appointees, academics, think tank analysts, military offers and other officials seconded from executive agencies) influence national security policy irrespective of the party in power. Glennon argues that this explains why the United States national security policy has remained largely constant from the George W. Bush administration to the Barrack Obama administration.[323]

To a certain degree, Glennon may have overstated his case. He relies too much on the policies of the Bush and Obama administrations to make his case, both of which have had to deal with the post-9/11 security environment, the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, and constant terrorism threat. It would be interesting to see if his thesis holds if non-consecutive administrations that face different security issues and constraints are reviewed.

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[322] Ibid, 34.

[323] Ibid, 72. To further illustrate the staying power and influence of the Trumanites, Glennon notes the several senior officials that are hold-overs from the Bush administration to the Obama administration. For example, the former Director of National Intelligence under President Obama, Dennis C. Blair, served in the Bush Administration as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command and earlier as Director of the Joint Staff in the Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff. John O. Brennan was President Bush's Director of the National Counterterrorism Center and now serves as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Finally, Robert Gates served on the National Security Council under President Nixon, President Ford, and President George H. W. Bush. He later served as Secretary of Defense under George W. Bush and Barrack Obama.

Nonetheless, Glennon raises an interesting argument regarding Trumanite control of the national security policy-making process. According to Glennon, the Trumanites control information, and if they control information, then they influence the policy agenda and frame the set of options from which the President and the Principals may choose. However, Glennon's thesis does not undercut the objective of this dissertation, which is to promote the need for deliberative discourse between the civilian and military leadership for post-conflict operations. Even if the Trumanite network influences the national security decision-making, and to a certain degree, limits Presidential choice, the Trumanites are not the "deciders." The President and senior leadership that sit on top of the government and military structures participate in the national security decision-making process and make final policy choices (even if influenced by the Trumanite network). At this level of decision-making there is a need for greater discourse in order to reach an agreement in which the political objectives political objectives match military capabilities. Moreover, how a policy decision becomes operational depends largely on the Trumanite network. The Trumanite network is a part of the deliberative discourse.

1. Why Deliberative Discourse Matters

Civil-military relations characterized by a high degree of deliberative discourse are *a necessary but not sufficient condition* for a successful political and

military outcome. How? If civilian and military actors do not engage in deliberative discourse, then the planning process lacks opportunities to freely exchange information, solicit multiple perspectives and viewpoints, engage in critical analysis of all policy options, question, test, and expose faulty assumptions, and explore alternative courses of action. A deliberative process allows civilian and military leaders to evaluate operational plans to determine how they support political and military objectives (the ends and means of war), consider likely international consequences of military activity, assess alternative political strategies in a crisis or war, and think through the efficacy and consequences of the use of force. More importantly, deliberation helps integrate political and military considerations in the making of strategy and policy, as well as offset disconnects between the two spheres. It forces civilian and military leaders to coordinate their activities, strategies, and plans, and therefore, lead to an improved policy planning process.

What I see missing from civil-military relations theory is an emphasis on the power of deliberation. Deliberation is the exchange of arguments. The purpose of deliberative discourse is not so much to resolve an issue or settle on a specific course of action, as it is a process to explore different solutions to a problem. As the literature on deliberative democracy shows, the intent of deliberative discourse is to question various courses of action, exchange new ideas and perspectives, listen deeply to other views, search for points of agreement, test unexamined assumptions, and address unresolved questions. Out

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of this deliberative process emerges a common understanding or consensus on an acceptable course of action.

Finally, a deliberative process does not challenge the primacy of civilian control. If anything, it ensures civilian control of the armed forces. Since it facilitates healthy dialogue and debate between civilian and military leaders, it limits the information asymmetries between the two spheres. Neither civilian nor military leaders have good reason to withhold, distort, or omit information. The point of a deliberative process is to explore different courses of action and not force specific policy objectives. Neither civilian nor military leaders have any reason to mistrust one another or fear voicing disagreement. The deliberative process is simply an open dialogue – the free exchange of views. There is no need to resort to oversight methods or monitoring techniques to ensure cooperation. Moreover, engaging military leaders as equals in a deliberative process acknowledges their authority and expertise over military matters.

Of course, as Cohen notes, the process is inherently unequal and soldiers and statesmen find themselves in an uneasy relationship, in which the civilian usually has the upper hand.[324] Yes, civilians should and must involve themselves in the details of military operations, but that final authority rests with the civilian leadership is not lost on the military. Senior military officers are aware that they can easily be replaced if they challenge civilian policy or fail to deliver battlefield victories. Take for example the *Rolling Stone* profile of General Stanley

[324] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 10.

McChrystal, in which the General not only dismissed the administration's views on Afghanistan, but mocked several White House officials, including the President.[325] General McChrystal may have gone too far in his criticism of the Obama administration, but the point is, military leaders walk a fine line when they offer advice that runs counter to civilian preferences.[326]

That being said, the military retains some power of persuasion. Military officers may resign in protest or retired officers may go public with their concerns with civilian policy. For example, frustrated with the mismanagement of the Iraq War by the Pentagon leadership and slow military response to adapt to the changing security environment, retired senior officers went public with their concerns. The "Revolt of the Generals" not only triggered a crisis in civil-military relations, but also brought about a re-evaluation of the Iraq strategy.

2. Who Deliberates?

The civilian and military actors involved in the policy planning process for post-conflict operations are a diverse group. Often, the civilians involved include the Principals and staff from the White House, Department of State, Department of Defense, Agency for International Development, Department of Justice, Department of Treasury, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security

[325] Michael Hastings, "The Runaway General," *Rolling Stone*, June 22, 2010, (accessed May 25, 2014); available from http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-runaway-general-20100622.
[326] A less controversial example is the replacement of General George W. Casey with General David Petraeus, along with the introduction of a new war strategy, to change the course of the Iraq War.

Council. Military actors involved in the planning process often include staff from the Joint Chiefs and the relevant combatant command. During times of war, the commander on the ground also has his own planning staff. Military actors offer a unique perspective to the planning process based on their personal background and experience, but they also represent the preferences of their respective services.

Each civilian and military department or agency involved in the planning process has its own agenda and set of preferences. Individuals from these departments not only represent the positions of their respective organizations, but they also bring to the table their personal beliefs, knowledge and perspectives. As such, there are diverse interests at play. In this sense, the risks of group polarization or groupthink do not apply when one considers the multiple civilian and military actors at the table. Moreover, when this diverse group is brought together to deliberate a policy agenda or strategy, the differences in perspectives produce new knowledge and the exploration of alternative views.

For the purpose of this research project, I consider the role of the civilian and military actors directly involved in the policy planning process for the Iraq War and Surge. I limit my research to the strategic planning process in order to capture the interactions of the senior civilians and military leaders. My focus remains on the deliberations between the senior civilian and military leadership regarding the policy agenda and planning process for the Iraq War and Surge. I

focus on this particular group as they are the core civilians and military advisors, who offer strategic analysis, test alternatives, develop options, and convey recommendations to the President and Congress.

Although I include when necessary the views of the President in my discussion, I do not include members of Congress as part of the deliberating group. Although Congress may approve or disapprove of the President's proposals, and therefore, exercise authority over policy, they are not necessarily involved in the day-to-day discussions and deliberations.

On the civilian side, the senior leaders reviewed in the cases include the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, the President, and the Vice President. In addition to these officials, I acknowledge officials who are the National Security Council Deputies Committee members, along with their respective staffs, also serve as an interagency forum for national security issues. As Glennon notes, this network of executive officials define national security, and therefore, influence the discourse within which national security policy is made.

On the military side, the dissertation reviews the views and interests of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs, the CENTCOM Combatant Commander, the Commanding General in Iraq, and respective staff.

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My research focuses on these individuals and offices as they were directly involved in the policy planning process for the Iraq War and Surge. Although at times other individuals and officers were involved, such as members of Congress, the day-to-day planning centered on the individuals and offices identified above. This dissertation does not analyze the whole-of-government approach to policy planning, but rather it investigates the role of the senior civilian and military leaders involved in the strategic decision-making of the Iraq War and Iraq Surge.

Finally, unlike most civil-military literature, I do not consider civilian and military actors to be unitary actors. I recognize that there are multiple players that make-up both the civilian and military leadership, each with their own interests and perspectives. Moreover, I recognize that the multiple points of view, both within and between the civilian and military spheres, may be in conflict. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman, and the combatant commander may disagree on any given military operation and offer different and conflicting advice. As such, there may not be a unified military or civilian view. The same holds for the civilian leadership. The departments of Defense and State, for example, may disagree on the policy agenda. The multiple civilian and military players, however, makes it all the more urgent to engage in deliberative discourse in order to hear, probe, and analyze the differences in perspectives and generate new knowledge.

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G) The Characteristics of Deliberative Discourse

What are the main characteristics of deliberative discourse? The intent of deliberative discourse is to exchange new ideas and perspectives, listen deeply to other views, test unexamined assumptions, address unresolved questions, question various courses of action, and search for points of agreement. Out of this deliberative process emerges a common understanding or consensus on an acceptable course of action.

To assess whether the civilian and military leadership engaged in a deliberative discourse during the planning process of the Iraq War and Surge, I look for evidence of divergent perspectives, strategic assessment, and a policy choice based on a reasoned consensus.

1. Divergent Perspectives

A deliberative process involves individuals with divergent perspectives. Encouraging the participation of individuals with alternative views and preferences increases the pool of information available to the group. Differences in knowledge, including beliefs, preferences, and perspectives, creates new group knowledge. Groups that openly deliberate their diverse perspectives are likely to

be more creative and generate more alternatives.[327]

How do we measure the presence of divergent perspectives in the planning process? The deliberating group should be socially heterogeneous to ensure the plurality of perspectives. Diversity (within and between groups) gives rise to varied ideas, perspectives, and skills that can improve a group's ability to solve problems.[328] Moreover, mixed groups tend not to hold rigidly to their positions, and therefore, listen to different perspectives and consider alternative views.[329] As such, group members should represent different departments, as well as possess varied backgrounds, knowledge, and ideologies.

The planning process for post-conflict environments should involve individuals from both the civilian and military arms of government. Yes, the civil-military divide invites friction. Civilian and military leaders often disagree on a number of issues, such as security goals, military policy, or the efficacy of a particular weapons system.[330] In times of war, civilian and military leaders are apt to disagree over troop deployment schedules, tactical activity, or the use of force. Disagreements are so common that the civil-military literature assumes a relatively constant degree of preference divergence.[331]

However, preference divergence does not handicap strategic analysis. In

[327] Teresa M. Amabile et al., "Assessing the Work Environment for Creativity."
[328] Cristina B. Gibson, "From Knowledge Accumulation to Accommodation"121-134.
[329] Cass R. Sunstein, *Going to Extremes*, 48.
[330] Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*, 23.
[331] Ibid.

fact, differences over security goals, military strategy and plans, and other issues enhance strategic assessment. When civilian and military leaders deliberate a policy agenda or war strategy, the differences in perspectives produce new knowledge and the exploration of alternative views.

As mentioned earlier, this research does not treat the civilian and military actors as unitary actors. It recognizes that there are multiple players that make-up the civilian and military leadership, each with their own interests and perspectives. The research project also acknowledges that these multiple points of view, both within and between the civilian and military groups, may be in conflict. As each civilian and military department or agency involved in the planning process has its own agenda and set of preferences, in addition to the preferences of the individual actors, there are a diverse set of interests at play. The plurality of divergent perspectives improves the quality of group deliberation, understanding, and problem-solving.

2. Strategic Assessment

The participation of individuals with alternative perspectives in the planning process leads to another characteristic of the deliberative planning process, the presence of strategic assessment. After the accumulation of divergent perspectives, knowledge, and information, group members reflect and debate their differing points of view. As each group member justifies or defends the validity

of their view, the collective group engages in a discussion to analyze the differences in perspectives, question assumptions, and explore alternative solutions. In fact, decision-making is not only a process of choosing among a set of alternatives, but it is a process of generating new alternatives.[332]

Within the civil-military context, strategic assessment is the process through which a state's political and military objectives and strategies are evaluated and decided. It is a process in which civilian and military leaders evaluate operational plans to determine how they support political and military objectives (for example, the ends and means of war), consider likely international consequences of military activity, assess alternative political strategies in a crisis or war, and think through the efficacy and consequences of the use of force.[333] In short, the civil and military leadership debate the political and military objectives and constraints.

How do we measure the presence of strategic assessment? First, strategic assessment involves the exchange of information. Military leaders have information regarding the state's own and its adversaries' capabilities, as well as the costs, risk, and probability of success of alternative military plans.[334] Similarly, civilian leaders have information that affects military assessments, such as intelligence from foreign governments or non-military intelligence agencies.

[332] James D. Fearon, "Deliberation as Discussion," in *Deliberative Democracy*, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
[333] Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*, 35.
[334] Ibid.

When information sharing is good, civilian and military leaders exchange private information through frequent briefings, reports, meetings, and informal dialogue. Moreover, civilian and military leaders do not knowingly omit or alter private information in ways that privilege their preferred policy outcomes. Instead, the civilian and military leadership engage in open exchange of information and conduct a comprehensive survey of alternative policy options.

A second dimension of strategic assessment involves the presence of structures and mechanisms that allow the civilian and military leadership to interact and air out their divergent perspectives, probe assumptions, explore alternative courses of action, and formulate policy. Established structures for interaction include advisory forums, meetings, working groups, drills, and other venues for formal and informal conversation, such as scheduled teleconferences or informal dialogue. The frequency of interaction and the degree of involvement of the civilian and military leadership affects the quality of the review and debate. At the civil-military apex of national security decision-making, there should be a running dialogue where opposing views are heard, debated, and discussed. In fact, multiple perspectives and viewpoints should be solicited. Moreover, the planning process should be iterative and include a critical analysis of other courses of action and planning assumptions to ensure political objectives match military capabilities.

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3. Reasoned Consensus

Within the civil-military context, civilian leaders control decisions on matters of foreign and military policy. However, although important decisions on matters of war and peace rest with the elected civilian leadership, not all security issues, including the planning, preparation, and execution of military operations, falls exclusively into civilian hands. National security decisions include questions of policy, programs, budgets, and operations that require the strategic analysis, advice and recommendation of the military leadership. Few actions regarding national security fall neatly into the categories of purely civilian or military control. Thus, decisions necessitate constant civil-military interaction. Marginalizing military leaders truncates the conversation, reduces critical dialogue, and undermines the debate and rigor of analysis. The result is a less demanding evaluative process, and therefore, potentially flawed policy plan.

Moreover, since the military controls the actual capacity to execute day-to-day military activity, policy decisions on military matters requires the endorsement of the top brass. If a deliberative planning process produces policy decisions that reflect the collective understanding of the civil-military nexus, how do we measure it? How do we measure the presence of a reasoned consensus? Unfortunately, it is not possible to know for sure if a policy decision truly reflects a common understanding of the civilian and military leadership. Although published reports may indicate the views and positions of the civilian and military

participants, it is difficult to know for sure the actual positions of the participants and their respective departments without full disclosure. Nevertheless, there are a few indicators. For example, the announcement of a policy decision may be pushed back in order to garner more support. Civilian leaders may marginalize dissenting officers. Military leaders may even resign in protest or retired officers may go public with their concerns. Similarly, civilian leaders may withdraw their support and lobby Congress to oppose the policy decision. Of course, the most common (and less provocative) mean for civilian and military leaders to express public dissent is with leaks to the media.

H) Conclusion

In the following chapters, I introduce two case studies – the planning process for the 2003 Iraq War and the planning process for the 2007 Iraq Surge. I hypothesize that the nature of civil-military relations affects the planning process and ague that a deliberative process amongst civilian and military leaders is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for successful policy outcomes. For both cases, I plan to assess the nature of civil-military relations during each period to demonstrate how the civil-military relationship affected the planning process, and thus, the overall policy outcome. Specifically, I look for the presence of divergent perspectives, review mechanisms and structures for strategic assessments, and determine the agreement reflected a reasoned consensus. Some of the questions guiding the research include: How frequently did senior and military leaders

interact, to what degree, and at what level? Were opposing views heard? Were planning meetings inclusive or held between few individuals? Did military leaders freely participate in these meetings? Were military leaders able to voice their dissent? How was information exchanged – through briefings and reports, informal dialogue, formal meetings? Who controlled the flow of information and operational planning? Were assumptions tested? Were other courses of action explored? Did political objectives match military capabilities? Did the civilian and military leadership support the policy?

The aim of the research project is to contribute to the civil-military literature and explore the necessity of a new normative framework that insists on a deliberative discourse between civilian and military leaders.

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IV) THE 2003 IRAQ WAR: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE PLANNING PROCESS

A) Introduction

How do relations between the senior civilian and military leadership affect the policy planning process? What is the impact of the civil-military relationship on strategy? Does the civil-military relationship affect how the war strategy is debated, whether assumptions are tested, and if alternative courses of action are reviewed? The answer is yes. Civil-military relations affect the planning process. It is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a successful political and military outcome. As this chapter will show, in the case of the planning process for the post-conflict phase of the 2003 Iraq War, the lack of discourse between the senior civilian and military leaders at the strategic level (i.e., the top echelons of government) led to an ineffective plan that contributed to the breakdown of security after the fall of Saddam Hussein and fueled a nascent insurgency against American forces.

In this chapter, I review the post-conflict planning process (or Phase IV) for the 2003 Iraq War to evaluate the dissertation's hypothesis about how civil-military relations characterized by limited deliberative discourse affect the policy planning process, and therefore, the political and military outcome. Prior to the

Iraq War, underlying disputes between the civilian and military leadership over defense reform created civil-military tensions that induced the Secretary of Defense to employ oversight mechanisms to ensure military compliance, such as limiting the frequency of interactions with those officers who did not share his view or appointing people with similar preferences to key positions. The end result was a truncated civil-military dialogue, which limited the range of perspectives represented during the planning process, and therefore, led to the creation of an underdeveloped post-war plan.

During his second appointment as Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld had a profound impact on United States civil-military relations.[335] At the start of his tenure, his commitment to transforming America's armed forces and his desire to demonstrate clear civilian control of the defense establishment put him at odds with the military leadership. Officers frequently complained that the Secretary was abusive, dismissive and trustful of only a tiny circle of close advisers. So pronounced was the civil-military divide at the Pentagon under Rumsfeld's leadership that many speculated Rumsfeld would be the first to leave the Bush administration.[336]

Civil-military tensions partially submerged after September 11 as the United States prepared for military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact,

[335] Donald H. Rumsfeld served as Secretary of Defense from 1975 to 1977 under President Gerald Ford, and again from 2001-2006 under President George W. Bush.
[336] Jim Rutenberg, "Removal of Rumsfeld Dates Back to Summer," *New York Times*, November 10, 2006 (accessed December 12, 2012); available from http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/10/washington/10rumsfeld.html?_r=0.

Rumsfeld had a healthy and collaborative working relationship with his most senior military officers, namely the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) General Richard Myers, and the Commander of United States Central Command (CENTCOM) General Tommy Franks. The three men worked closely together on the multiple iterations of the Iraq war plan.

Many contended however that Rumsfeld only engaged those whose views generally aligned with his own. In fact, General Franks was seen as a commander who "will do what he's told."[337] Even the selection of General Myers as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was seen as an attempt by Rumsfeld to assert his authority over the uniformed military. Myers was not known for his "independent voice," and many senior officers feared he would not represent the military's interests well, "offer constructive view into the dialogue," or even challenge the civilian leadership's over the war planning and decision-making process.[338]

In addition to surrounding himself with uniformed officers that reportedly failed to question the administration's policy over Iraq, Rumsfeld also limited the frequency and interaction with those he perceived as resistant to change. Especially significant, Rumsfeld marginalized the Joint Chiefs of Staff (except for

[337] Seymour M. Hersch, "Offense and Defense: The Battle between Donald Rumsfeld and the Pentagon," *The New Yorker*, April 7, 2003.
[338] Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012. Lieutenant General Newbold retired in October 2002. He contemplated resigning in protest, but in the end decided against doing so. Nonetheless, he did share his thoughts on the handling of the Iraq War in 2006. He was one of the generals a part of the "Revolt of the Generals." Lieutenant General Greg Newbold (Ret.), "Why Iraq was a Mistake: A Military Insider Sounds Off Against the War and the Zealots Who Pushed It," Time Magazine, April 9. 2006; (accessed June 15, 2012); available from: http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1181629,00.html.

the Chairman).[339] "There was not a single tank session with the service chiefs to discuss war time policy, strategy, and operations," shared Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold, a retired Marine Corps 3-star general who served as Director of Operations (J-3) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from October 2000 to October 2002.[340] "This was a break in protocol and an astounding example of the Joint Chiefs' voice was squelched." Although technically not in the operational chain of command, the service chiefs have a wealth of experience and are important actors to be involved in evaluating war plans. Rumsfeld, however, had poor relations with the service chiefs, especially the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, as a result of prior clashes over defense transformation.[341]

Information sharing under the Secretary also was poor. After one presentation of the plan for the invasion of Iraq in the White House situation room in the fall of 2002, Condoleezza Rice reached for a copy of the slides that were handed out during the briefing. Rumsfeld refused to allow any of the members of the war cabinet to keep copies of the material, including the National Security Advisor![342] The next day, Frank Miller, Senior Director for Defense Policy on the NSC staff, sent one of his military aides to the Pentagon to get a copy of the slides from a friend on the Joint Staff.

[339] Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*, 237.
[340] Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012.
[341] Ibid, 238.
[342] Interview, Frank Miller, December 1, 2011; Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 154; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 148.

Taken together, the planning process for the Iraq War, particularly for the post-conflict phase of the mission, involved few people, and of those involved, few challenged the views of Rumsfeld and his civilian advisors. The end result: the planning process lacked a deliberative discourse. There were few opportunities to debate, explore alternative views, exchange information, and reflect about the available options. As there was no open-ended evaluative and comprehensive consultative process at the civil-military nexus, there were few opportunities to challenge the flawed assumptions put forward by the administration, plan for potential contingencies, and assure the war plan was adequately developed and resourced.

And those who offered different perspectives or challenged Iraq policy faced significant incentives to engage in self-censorship.[343] For example, when the Senate Armed Services Committee asked General Shinseki on February 25, 2003 what were the army force requirements for an occupation of Iraq after the completion of the war, he initially deflected the question. When pressed, Shinseki responded, "something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers, are probably, you know, a figure that would be required…it takes a significant ground force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment."[344] The next day, Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, told the House Budget Committee "…some of the higher end predictions that we have been hearing lately…are

[343] Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*, 253.
[344] General Eric Shinseki, "The Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Budget," *Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee*, February 25, 2003.

wildly off the mark."[345] Wolfowitz's reaction to Shinseki's testimony reveals how dissenting views were being handled and the extent of the depravity of dialogue between the civilian and military leadership.[346]

Indeed, the Secretary's management style, abrasive personality and intimate involvement in the war planning process alienated the military leadership, and thus, heightened civil-military tensions.[347] Many officers up and down the chain of command questioned whether their concerns about the Iraq War were being sufficiently weighed.[348] The Secretary's fixation on defense transformation meant his focus remained on the operational and tactical elements of the war plan. He devoted little attention to the post-invasion phase of the war. Nor did Rumsfeld and his civilian aides press CENTCOM planners to address the post-war environment. As a result, the United States military was ill prepared to execute its core task in Iraq – to provide security after Saddam's regime had toppled.

Of course, the Secretary disagrees with his critics that he ignored military advice. In his memoir, *Known and Unknown*, he writes that he insisted subordinates speak up and share different views and express dissent. "As I believe in being challenged, I also made a practice of challenging my challengers.

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[345] Paul Wolfowitz, Hearing Before the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 1st session, February 27, 2003.
[346] Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*, 250.
[347] Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, (Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 2008), 280.
[348] Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks, "Rumsfeld's Style, Goals Strain Ties in Pentagon," *The Washington Post*, October 16, 2002, A1.

I wanted to make sure people disagreeing knew what they were talking about."[349] On whether military officers were bullied into silence, Rumsfeld writes, "When a challenger failed to support his views, I did not pretend to be impressed. But, in my view, no professional, let alone a three- or four-star military officer, should be intimidated into silence by a boss who asks questions and expects sensible answers, even honest answers as simple as an 'I don't know, but I'll get back to you'."[350]

Nonetheless, the Defense Department released a one-page memorandum by e-mail in 2006 to a group of military commanders and civilian analysts to rebut the claim that Rumsfeld ignored military advice. "U.S. senior military leaders are involved to an unprecedented degree in every decision-making process in the Department of Defense," began the memorandum.[351] The memorandum also noted the Secretary had had 139 meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the start of 2005, and 208 meetings with the senior field commander. That Rumsfeld even felt the need to even send the memorandum signals just how poor relations were between the Secretary and the uniformed military.

While much blame can be placed on the failure of Rumsfeld and the rest of the administration to prepare for the post-invasion phase of the Iraq War, the

[349] Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown: A Memoir*, (New York: Sentinel, Penguin Group, 2011), 456.
[350] Ibid.
[351] Mark Mazetti, "Pentagon Memo Aims to Counter Rumsfeld Critics," *The New York Times*, April 16, 2006, (accessed July 1, 2014); available from http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/washington/16rumsfeld.html?pagewanted=all.

uniformed military is equally culpable. Senior military officers quietly and subserviently deferred to the civilian leadership. The Chairman and the rest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to voice their concerns to the President about the military strategy in Iraq. Even General Franks, who was tasked as CENTCOM Commander to execute the war in Iraq, paid little attention to the most demanding task of the Iraq War – the rehabilitation and security of the new Iraq.[352] Since CENTCOM planners were not getting pressure from above to pay attention to the post-war environment, the final phase of the war was poorly developed, with too few troops deployed to handle the post-conflict tasks.

In the end, both the civilian and military leadership bear full responsibility for the debacle in Iraq. Both failed to plan adequately for the post-conflict phase of the Iraq War. Why did Franks and CENTCOM planners not invest more time in developing the war plan's final phase, especially given the military's experience in post-conflict operations? Why did Rumsfeld and his civilian aides marginalize the military or ignore commentary that suggested the post-war environment would face significant security challenges?

In this chapter, I will demonstrate how prior civil-military tensions and the methods Rumsfeld used to influence and manage the military undermined the comprehensiveness of debate at the civil-military nexus. As a result, the uniformed military abdicated its responsibility to present its best advice and even question and challenge the administration's policy, and the civilian leadership

[352] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II,* 503-504.

failed to force a thorough review of the military strategy and instead pushed through their own agenda for Iraq.

I begin with a review of Secretary Rumsfeld's defense transformation agenda and its subsequent impact on civil-military relations. I will then discuss his efforts to assert civilian authority over the Pentagon using subjective control methods, such as selecting senior military officers who shared the administration's worldviews and micromanaging the war planning process. In reviewing the planning process for the war and post-invasion phase of the Iraq mission, I will show how the lack of deliberation and open exchange of candid views and perspectives amongst the civilian and military leadership led to a flawed post-conflict plan. This flawed plan embroiled the United States in a conflict that lasted more than a decade and failed to achieve its political objective – regime change, the removal of weapons of mass destruction, and the establishment of a democratic Iraq.[353] A timeline of the Iraq War planning process at the end of the chapter demonstrates how little time was devoted to Phase IV planning.

[353] Generally, few opponents of the United States invasion of Iraq publically expressed doubt prior to the Iraq War as to whether the Saddam Hussein regime possessed weapons of mass destruction. There were some that opposed the Iraq War, such as Senators Barbara Boxer (CA), Edward Kennedy (MA), and Carl Levin (MI), to name a few. Despite some opposition in the Senate and House of Representatives, none of the individuals that opposed the war were later part of planning process for the Iraq War. Ultimately on October 11, 2002, 77 of 100 senators, and on October 10-11, 296 of 435 House members voted to authorize the President to "use armed forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq." United States Senate, "U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 107th Congress-2nd Session," (accessed June 29, 2014); available from https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/107-2002/s237. "Oct. 2002 Congressional Votes Authorizing the President to Use Military Force Against Iraq," (accessed June 29, 2014); available from http://usiraq.procon.org/view.additional-resource.php?resourceID=001987.

B) Defense Transformation

When George W. Bush appointed Donald H. Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, he tasked the Secretary with transforming the military from one organized for industrial age battles to one organized for information age battles.[354] Specifically, the President wanted Rumsfeld to conduct a "comprehensive review of [the] military" that included an assessment of "the structure of its forces, the state of its strategy, [and] the priorities of its procurement" in order to "replace existing programs with new technologies and strategies" that would "skip a generation of technology."[355]

Armed with a broad mandate to "challenge the status quo," Rumsfeld sought to find the technology necessary to leave the United States untouchable in the twenty-first century. From the start of his tenure, he made clear that he would rid the Pentagon of "unneeded organizations and facilities."[356] By February 2001, Rumsfeld had formed working groups of defense experts, industry leaders, and retired officers tasked with assessing the U.S. defense posture.[357] Uninterested in making "marginal improvements" to preexisting weaponry and platforms, Rumsfeld was dedicated to increasing the use of precision weaponry and speed

[354] George W. Bush, "A Period of Consequences," a speech given at The Citadel, September 23, 1999, (accessed January 10, 2013); available from: http://www3.citadel.edu/pao/addresses/pres_bush.html.
[355] Ibid.
[356] Steven Lee Myers, "Bush Candidate for Defense Job Sees Overhaul," *New York Times*, January 12, 2001, A1.
[357] Caitlin Talmadge, "Transforming the Pentagon: McNamara, Rumsfeld and the Politics of Change," *Breakthroughs*, vol. XV, no. 1 (Spring 2006), (accessed February 10, 2013); available from: http://web.mit.edu/ssp/publications/breakthroughs/MIT_SSP_Breakthroughs06.pdf.

and flexibility of action on the battlefield.[358] To the Secretary this meant a greater reliance on advanced technologies, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and precision-guided munitions (PGMs), than on existing platforms and boots on the ground. Proposals included cutting down the number of Army divisions and Navy carrier battle groups, reducing the use of the B-1 bombers, and cancelling the Marines' V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, the Air Force's F-22 Raptor, and the Navy's DD-21 destroyer in order to free up resources to invest in "skip a generation" technologies.[359]

Rumsfeld's commitment to defense transformation strained his relations with many senior generals. Monitoring mechanisms, such as the use of study groups to review weapons programs, were not without controversy. The uniformed services disagreed with many of Rumsfeld's proposals to cut back on much-loved weapons and equipment, such as cancelling the Air Force's F-22 Raptor, as well as the pace of change. Tensions were especially acute within the Army as Rumsfeld's vision for lighter forces more reliant on technology than boots on the ground challenged the Army's heavy reliance on armored, conventional ground forces.[360]

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[358] David E. Sanger, "Bush Details Plan to Focus Military on New Weaponry," *New York Times*, February 14, 2001, (accessed February 10, 2013); available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/14/us/bush-details-plan-to-focus-military-on-new-weaponry.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
[359] Caitlin Talmadge, "Transforming the Pentagon."
[360] Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*, 234.

The defense secretary often complained that the Army was too resistant to change.[361] On the contrary, senior army leadership was eager to transform the armed forces. When General Eric K. Shinseki became Army Chief of Staff in 1999, he pledged to create "lighter and more mobile brigades and divisions"[362] ready to perform peacekeeping missions or all-out war against a country like North Korea or Iran.[363] The problem with Shinseki's plan was that it clashed with Rumsfeld's interest in investing in advanced technologies. For Rumsfeld, future wars would rely on weapons from space and the overwhelming use of air power, and not on lighter, more mobile brigades.[364] Unfortunately, rather than work together to reach a consensus on what defense transformation meant for the Army, Rumsfeld and Shinseki remained at odds. Their strained relationship would later interfere with the post-conflict planning process for the Iraq War.

Disagreement over how to tackle defense transformation was not the only source of heightened civil-military tensions. Senior military leaders were offended with how the defense secretary ignored their advice and completely cut them out of the review process. For example, the study groups Rumsfeld organized to conduct a comprehensive review of the military included defense experts, industry leaders, and retired officers.[365] Initially, the study groups did not include the service chiefs. Understandably, they were upset, "and after a few

[361] Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks, "Rumsfeld's Style, Goals Strain Ties in Pentagon."
[362] Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 30.
[363] Peter J. Boyer, "A Different War," *The New Yorker*, July 1, 2002.
[364] Frank Gibney, "The General Who Got it Right on Iraq," *Los Angeles Times*, December 26, 2004 (accessed February 10, 2013); available from http://articles.latimes.com/2004/dec/26/opinion/op-shinseki26.
[365] Caitlin Talmadge, "Transforming the Pentagon."

protests, the Secretary eventually worked with the chiefs."[366] When Shinseki requested to meet with the defense secretary in early 2001 to discuss the possible reorganization of the armed forces, Rumsfeld told him to wait. So Shinseki waited, and according to his aides, he was still waiting as of May 2001.[367] The antagonism between the Army and the defense secretary became so pronounced that some officers referred to Rumsfeld and his team as "the enemy."[368] In May 2001, the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a closed-door meeting in the Tank (a secure conference room at the Pentagon) where they "posed scathing questions about Rumsfeld's intentions on strategy and possible cuts to the Army."[369] Many even complained that talking to Rumsfeld was "a waste of time."[370] Senior officers soon began to vocalize their frustration with the defense secretary to members of Congress and through leaks to the media.

Rumsfeld met with Congress and denied that he kept the uniformed military out of the review process. To prove the review process on defense transformation was indeed inclusive and that he communicated with the uniformed military, Rumsfeld had his staff tally the numbers and boasted of holding "170 meetings with 44 different generals and flag officers in his first four

[366] Interview, General Richard Myers (Ret.), June 8, 2012.
[367] Paul Richter, "Bush's Defense Secretary Goes on the Offense," *Los Angeles Times*, May 22, 2001, (accessed February 20, 2013), available from: http://articles.latimes.com/2001/may/22/news/mn-1005.
[368] Peter J. Boyer, "A Different War."
[369] Thomas E. Ricks, "Rumsfeld on High Wire of Defense Reform," *Washington Post*, May 20, 2001, A1 (accessed February 10, 2013) available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45657-2001May18.html.
[370] Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 34.

months of office, as well as 70 meetings with 115 members of Congress."[371] Rumsfeld also told *Washington Post* reporter Thomas E. Ricks that he met with Chairman General Hugh Shelton "about 1.3 times per day…Why would I meet with someone 92 times in 115 days if I didn't respect his judgment?"[372]

A rift between the defense secretary and the uniformed military continued to grow as the September 30 deadline to complete the Quadrennial Defense Review approached. Under Rumsfeld's proposed strategy, the United States would abandon requirements that the military be prepared to fight two major wars simultaneously. Instead, it called for the armed forces to win decisively in one major conflict, defend American territory against new threats, and the same time, deter hostile actions and conduct small-scale operations around the world.[373] Such a strategy required significant changes to current force structures and weapons systems that the services were not prepared to do.

Both civilian and military officials were at a deadlock on how to execute the new military strategy. Left with this political standoff, Rumsfeld decided to limit himself to describing "missions, military requirements and budget limits, and leave to the services the hard and contentious task of deciding how many

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[371] Ibid.
[372] Thomas E. Ricks, "Post Interview With Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld," *The Washington Post*, May 20, 2001, (accessed June 26, 2014); available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/transcripts/rumsfeldtext051701.html.
[373] Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 37; Tom Shanker, "Military Scuttles Secretary Requiring '2-War' Capability," *The New York Times*, July 13, 2001 (accessed February 15, 2013), available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/13/world/military-scuttles-strategy-requiring-2-war-capability.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.

people to put in uniform, how many weapons to field and what kind of weapons those should be."[374]

To overcome the military's resistance to his initiatives, Rumsfeld resorted to a variety of oversight methods to manage his military leaders and promote their compliance to his directives. Many of these tactics however would affect the process of planning and evaluating the operational plans for the Iraq War at the civil-military nexus. These tactics undermined the comprehensiveness of debate and compromised the military strategy.

C) Asserting Civilian Control over the Pentagon

In the midst of his war with the service chiefs over defense strategy, Rumsfeld engaged in another battle; a battle in which the new secretary sought to decisively reassert civilian control over the armed forces. Rumsfeld understood that in order to transform the defense establishment, he would first have to assert authority over the Pentagon. He believed the military had become too independent and risk-averse under President William J. Clinton. More specifically, Rumsfeld wanted to rein in the Joint Staff, which he saw as "too

[374] Tom Shanker, "Defense Chief May Leave Size of Field Forces Up to Services," *The New York Times*, August 17, 2001 (accessed February 15, 2013); available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/17/us/defense-chief-may-leave-size-of-field-forces-up-to-services.html.

powerful and independent of civilian control, with officers acting at times as though they were not subordinate to their civilian bosses."[375]

Since primary responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the personnel readiness, policy, planning and training of their respective military services, Rumsfeld faced strong resistance from the service chiefs as he pushed his defense transformation agenda forward. A strong advocate of investing in advanced and unconventional technologies, Rumsfeld believed defense transformation hinged on developing a leadership and organization that promoted human innovation and creativity.[376] To do so, he felt it necessary to review the military personnel system to ensure the Joint Staff included individuals that would not put their respective service interests above those of the Department of Defense. Sensing that service parochialism remained high, Rumsfeld looked to attract individuals devoted to innovation and flexibility, and above all, jointness.

Rumsfeld turned to his former senior military assistant from his first tour as Secretary, Staser Holcomb, a retired Vice Admiral, to review the current crop of generals and admirals. Holcomb worked with the service chiefs to put together dossiers of candidates for key service positions. Part of his work was to identify bright two- and three-star officers who "thought the right way on

[375] Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks, "Rumsfeld's Style, Goals Strain Ties in Pentagon." The Joint Staff is an umbrella organization that draws from all four services and oversees the daily activities of the military, including personnel readiness, policy, planning and training. Each service has a military chief – the Army Chief of Staff, the Air Force Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marines. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 added the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The service chiefs, together with the Chairman and Vice Chairman, make up the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[376] Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 295.

transformation."[377] To help with this review process, Rumsfeld put together a four-person committee that included himself, the deputy secretary of defense, and the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to considering the recommendations of the services, secretaries and chiefs, the committee also reviewed the job functions of specific positions, as well as the qualities and experiences that would best qualify an individual for those positions. The committee met with the top candidates of each soon to be vacant post before making its recommendation to the President.

Despite having received hints from senior uniformed officers that he should steer clear of the promotion process, Rumsfeld felt it was his responsibility as Secretary to be involved in the process. In the end, it is the secretary of defense who makes the recommendations to the President, who in turn makes the nominations to the U.S. Senate.[378] Relying solely on the recommendations of the service chiefs or Chairman could result in a "good old boy network," and to avoid this, Rumsfeld was keen on reviewing the job descriptions and vetting all candidates.[379]

Rumsfeld's involvement in the senior promotion process received harsh criticism, and rightly so. His decision to bring in a long retired military officer to interview and review candidates offended uniformed officers and service chiefs

[377] Bob Woodward, *State of Denial*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 54.
[378] Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 301.
[379] Interview, General Richard Myers (Ret.), June 8, 2012.

alike.[380] The recommendations of the services are filtered through years of observation, and therefore, should not be summarily ignored.[381] Moreover, if and when an outside body is brought in to offer a different perspective, there should remain an opportunity to discuss any findings or recommendations with the service chiefs. Many saw Rumsfeld's review of the military personnel system as yet another lost opportunity to engage the service chiefs and develop close relations.[382]

Critics also argued that Rumsfeld's involvement in the promotion process was a means to replace those senior officers who challenged his view with individuals more likely to support his decisions without question. "The promotion process was carefully crafted so that Secretary Rumsfeld found people to fit his mold."[383] For example, when General Henry Hugh Shelton's tour as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was up, the secretary had no intention of reappointing him. The two men were at odds over the defense transformation agenda, and later on the Iraq War. The general never hesitated to stand up to Rumsfeld when he disagreed with the secretary's ideas.[384] He often voiced concern that the secretary ignored military advice. General Shelton even characterized Secretary Rumsfeld's management style as one "based on deception, deceit, working political agendas, and trying to get the Joint Chiefs to

[380] Interview, Lieutenant Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012.
[381] Ibid.
[382] Ibid.
[383] Ibid. Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*, 238.
[384] Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 40.

support an action that might not be the right thing to do for the country but would work well for the President from a political standpoint."[385]

In Rumsfeld's view, he wanted to transform the armed forces. The main threat to a more efficient and innovative defense structure, according to Rumsfeld, was internal.[386] In his memoir, *Known and Unknown*, Rumsfeld writes, "The key to transforming the Department, as I saw it, was through encouraging its civilian and military leaders to be more forward-looking, and to think freely, not conventionally. In my view, transformation hinged more on leadership and organization than it did on technology."[387] For Rumsfeld, transforming the defense establishment meant stacking the military leadership with innovative and flexible individuals. Thus, replacing officers in key positions would be a powerful means to affect change within a military organization.

However to many it seemed that Rumsfeld was looking for individuals to carry out his initiatives and support his policy priorities. Take, for example what happened when General Shelton's four-year term as Chairman came to an end in the fall of 2001. Rumsfeld had Holcomb comb through an initial list of 150 possible candidates included retired officers and several three-stars. The prospect of a retired officer or three-star tapped to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs shocked

[385] Hugh Shelton, *Without Hesitation: The Odyssey of an American Warrior*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010), 401.
[386] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 9.
[387] Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 295.

and again offended many senior, four-star ranking officers.[388] When Holcomb asked Marine Commandment General James L. Jones to interview with Rumsfeld for the JCS Chairmanship, Jones declined. As one of the service chiefs, his interactions with Rumsfeld up to that point had led him to question why anyone would want to become Chairman and senior military advisor when it was evident Rumsfeld really didn't want any military advice.[389] Other four-star officers who were interviewed for the job also commented that Rumsfeld was not interested in an independent chairman.[390]

Eventually, Rumsfeld narrowed the selection to two candidates – the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Air Force General Richard Myers, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark. General Shelton had recommended Admiral Clark for the job. In Shelton's view, Clark was straightforward, non-threatening, and fiercely independent. [391] As such, Clark might be able to work with Rumsfeld while still preserving "some sense of dignity and independence for the uniformed military."[392] When interviewed, Clark told President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and Rumsfeld that the Chairman had to have a close relationship with the Secretary, but also be independent-minded, a model he had observed between Colin Powell and Dick Cheney during the Gulf War.[393] He also stressed that the Chairman, in addition to serving as the principal military

[388] Bob Woodward, *State of Denial*, 53.
[389] Ibid, 54.
[390] Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 221.
[391] Bob Woodward, *State of Denial*, 55.
[392] Ibid, 55.
[393] Ibid, 62.

advisor the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, was required to represent the views and opinions of the other chiefs. Moreover, any disagreements between the Chairman and the Secretary should not be kept private, but "made known."[394] Sensing Rumsfeld did not agree, Clark understood that he would never become Chairman while Rumsfeld was Secretary of Defense.

Like Clark, Myers saw the role of the Chairman as an independent, military advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council. But unlike Clark, he did not think disagreements between the Chairman and the Secretary should be made known. Although Myers believed the Chairman had a right to voice his dissent, he believed that it should be done so in private, and that any differences in opinion should be sorted out before going to the President. Myers believed that "once a decision was made, the military's job was to implement."[395] To some observers, whenever Rumsfeld disagreed with the Chairman's advice, Myers would withdraw and acquiesce rather than share his opinion with the President and National Security Council.[396]

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[394] Ibid, 68.

[395] Interview, General Richard Myers (Ret.), June 8, 2012. The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 identifies the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the senior ranking member of the armed forces. As such, the Chairman is the *principal military advisor* to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council on military matters. The Chairman does not have executive authority over combatant forces. For this, the chain of command goes from the President to the Secretary of Defense, and from the Secretary of Defense to the Commanders of the Combatant Commands

[396] Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*; Bob Woodward, *State of Denial*.

On August 24, 2001, President Bush announced his selection of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs – General Richard Myers. The Vice Chairmanship went to Marine General Peter Pace, who was also viewed within the military as a Rumsfeld "yes-man."[397] Reportedly, Shelton was disappointed. "The selection meant that when it came to the hardest decisions there would be no one in the uniformed military positioned and supported by law to provide alternative advice to the president and stand up to Rumsfeld."[398] Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold, former Director of Operations (J-3) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also confirmed that Myers and Pace "…were not known for their independent voice."[399]

When asked about rumors that Rumsfeld repeatedly ignored military input or that the Chairman could not provide independent advice, Myers responded, "those accounts are not true. I always felt free to dissent. If you ask me, the Vice Chairman Peter Pace, any of the service chiefs or the combatant commanders, 'were you free to provide your opinions and debate the issues open and freely?' they would all say yes. You won't find someone saying that they were constrained by Rumsfeld. The people who say that never worked with him."[400]

[397] Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars,* 41; Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012.
[398] Andrew Cockburn, *Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy*, 111.
[399] Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012.
[400] Interview, General Richard Myers (Ret.), June 8, 2012.

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Of course, others disagreed.[401] Although Rumsfeld regularly interacted with senior uniformed officers, including Myers, Pace and Franks, interaction with officers outside this circle was limited. "There is a nearly universal feeling among the officer corps that the inner circle is closed, not tolerant of ideas it doesn't already share, and determined to impose its ideas, regardless of military doubts," observed one officer.[402]

The oversight methods Rumsfeld used to ensure military compliance, such as replacing senior officers, may have served his goals but it had a devastating effect on the scope of debate about military activity. By restricting consultations to a small group and marginalizing dissenters, the range of perspectives represented in the civil-military nexus was limited. With the exception of a few senior officers, namely Franks and Myers, Rumsfeld and his staff were not engaging the military. The defense transformation agenda and the oversight methods Rumsfeld employed to assert civilian control had compromised civil-military relations, and as the following sections demonstrate, the overall quality of the planning process for the Iraq War.

[401] Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012; Interview, General David D. McKiernan (Ret.), July 2, 2012; Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*; Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*; Bob Woodward, *State of Denial*.
[402] Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks, "Rumsfeld's Style, Goals Strain Ties in Pentagon."

D) Planning for the Iraq War

Civil-military differences were momentarily cast aside when the September 11 terrorist attacks occurred. Proposals to cut the number of armed forces and abandon the two-war concept receded into the background as the nation prepared for war. However, the general state of civil-military relations prior to 9/11 had a profound impact on the planning process for the Iraq War. Specifically, civil-military relations characterized by poor dialogue and the marginalization of dissenters contributed to major weaknesses particularly in the plans for the post-conflict phase of the war. Individuals withheld their opinions and did not force open debate.[403] Moreover, as the Iraq war plan became part of Rumsfeld's broader goal to transform the military for the twenty-first century into a different kind of fighting force. Iraq was a "laboratory" for military transformation.[404] As a result, alternative ways of conceptualizing how the war should be fought were ignored.

In response to the 9/11, the U.S. government drew plans to invade Afghanistan to root out al-Qaeda. Rumsfeld and his top aides however did not agree striking the Taliban was sufficient enough to head off future attacks and prevent terrorists from acquiring biological, chemical and nuclear materials. "Rumsfeld wanted some way to organize the military action so that it signaled

[403] Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), "Why Iraq was a Mistake: A Military Insider Sounds Off Against the War and the Zealots Who Pushed It," *Time Magazine,* April 9. 2006, (accessed June 15, 2012); available from: http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1181629,00.html.
[404] Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*, 242.

that the global conflict would not be over if we struck one good blow in Afghanistan."[405] On the afternoon of September 11, Rumsfeld instructed General Myers to consider a wide range or options, including a possible strike on Iraq.[406]

Meanwhile, President Bush summoned Rumsfeld, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretaries of the army, navy, air force, and the Under Secretaries of Defense, to the Pentagon. His message was clear. The Defense Department and military leadership were to prepare military options that would deliver a decisive victory for the United States.[407] On September 15, the President gathered his top aides at Camp David for a two-day meeting to decide how to respond to the 9/11 attacks. Although the focus was on Al Qaeda, Iraq continued to weigh on his mind. On September 17, Bush convened the NSC and requested contingency plans be drawn up for Iraq should the United States decide to take some future action.[408] Interestingly, Rumsfeld had sent a memo to the Third Army headquarters at Fort McPherson on September 13, several days before the NSC meeting, requesting that plans be drawn up to seize and hold Iraq's southern oilfields.[409]

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[405] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 10.
[406] U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, July 22, 2004), 335. General Richard Myers served as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from March 2000 to September 2001. He was the acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 11 because the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton, was not in the United States.
[407] Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon as the Dawn of the War on Terrorism*, (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 12.
[408] U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 335.
[409] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 19. The Third Army headquarters at Fort McPherson served as the major command for land warfare in the event of a conflagration in Central Asia, the Horn of Africa, or the Middle East.

On November 26, Rumsfeld flew to Tampa, Florida to meet with General Tommy Franks, Commander of United States Central Command (CENTCOM), to discuss an Iraq war plan. Rumsfeld had drafted a set of talking points to guide the campaign plan. It would be marked by "surprise, speed, shock, and risk," and include the decapitation of the Iraqi government.[410] The objective would be regime change and the elimination of the threat of any possible weapons of mass destruction. Along with a new war plan, a political solution for post-war Iraq would be needed as well.[411] In *American Soldier*, Franks writes Phase IV discussions with the Principals took place via video-teleconference while he was meeting the President in Crawford, Texas on December 28, 2001. The General only writes that it was understood Phase IV would take "years, not months" and that the end-state included "the establishment of a representative form of government in a country capable of defending its territorial borders and maintaining internal security, without weapons of mass destruction." Franks does not provide further details regarding the Phase IV discussions other than the need to secure support from the international community.[412]

During the meeting, Rumsfeld stressed his desire to develop a war plan through constant interaction with Franks and his CENTCOM planners rather than wait for a finished product. Early on it became clear that the Secretary intended to be intimately involved in the planning process. In fact, over the next two years,

[410] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 22.
[411] Ibid.
[412] Tommy R. Franks (Ret.), *American Soldier* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 351-352.

Rumsfeld would micromanage the war effort through an iterative planning process in order to monitor and exercise his influence in decision-making.

On the shelf was the existing Iraq war plan, OPLAN 1003-98, which outlined an attack and invasion of Iraq designed to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime.[413] The plan called for three corps – the XVIII Airborne Corps, the V Corps, and a Marine Expeditionary Force, some 450,000 troops in all, to secure northern and southern Iraq, isolate Saddam's Republican Guard, and prevent Iranian- and Syrian-sponsored groups from sneaking into the country to stir up trouble.[414] OPLAN 1003-98 did not include a plan for the reconstruction of Iraq, including the restoration of basic services, training of police or army, or the establishment of a new political administration. However, Rumsfeld's issue with the plan was not that it did not address post-war issues, but that it relied on too many boots on the ground and lacked "surprise, speed, shock, and risk."[415]

In the midst of organizing and monitoring military movements and attacks in Afghanistan, Franks began drafting a new plan for a possible invasion of Iraq. On December 4, via secure video teleconference, Franks presented the first iteration of his Commander's Concept to Rumsfeld, Myers, Pace, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith. To defeat the Republican Guard, topple Saddam, and remove the WMD threat, Franks' initial estimate included a

[413] OPLAN 1003-98 was approved in 1996 and last updated in 1998.
[414] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 26; Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 438.
[415] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 22.

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large force structure, around 380,000 troops. Franks presented three different options (Robust, Reduced and Unilateral) for a plan of attack. The options differed in the expected amount of coalition support, such as basing, staging, over-flight, financial assistance and troops. As Rumsfeld wanted to see a leaner force structure that utilized technological advances in precision-guided munitions and improvements in intelligence and surveillance systems, Franks began to work on another iteration of the war plan with his planning team in Tampa.[416]

Franks spoke again to Rumsfeld on December 12, 19 and 27, presenting each time another iteration of the war plan. When Franks met with Rumsfeld in Washington on December 19, he had trimmed the number of troops from 380,000 troops to 145,000 over 90 days, with an additional 130,000 reinforcements, for a total of 275,000 troops.[417] According to Franks' estimates, the United States would topple Saddam's regime after 135 days of fighting and then transition into reconstruction. Though Rumsfeld thought the plan had improved, he was still eager to see a smaller and faster force take down Saddam. Rumsfeld's commitment to reshape the military into a lighter, more agile information-age force capable of defeating more elusive adversaries anywhere on the globe permeated every aspect of the war planning process.

At the December 19 meeting, Franks also asked to bring in individuals from the State Department and intelligence community to "refine [the]

[416] Ibid, 29. Tommy R. Franks (Ret.), *American Soldier* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 339.
[417] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 29.

assumptions and analyze the elements" identified to execute the war plan.[418] At this stage, Rumsfeld was eager to limit the number of people involved in the planning process. "I want this to be worked by a small group," he insisted.[419] Even the JCS was poorly engaged and "had been pushed to the margins of the war planning."[420] What this meant was that the full range of perspectives about the operational plans and what could occur in the post-war environment was not fully represented.

Traditionally, the military presents its war plan and findings in "the tank" – a place where military commanders can meet without note-takers to discuss complex strategic problems, review objectives and resources, and report on the military's process and progress. That ended when planning for the Iraq War began. There was not a single tank session with the service chiefs to discuss wartime policy and strategy before and after the Iraq War began – an astounding example of how tightly controlled the planning process was leading up to the Iraq War, as well as the degree to which the service chiefs were excluded and censored by both the Defense Department and CENTCOM leadership.[421]

On December 28, Franks flew to Crawford, Texas with Air Force Major General Victor "Gene" Renuart, Director of Operations (J-3), to present another iteration of the war plan to President Bush. On video teleconference were Rice,

[418] Tommy R. Franks (Ret.), *American Soldier*, 344.
[419] Ibid.
[420] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 140.
[421] Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012.

Secretary of State Colin Powell, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Vice President Dick Cheney, and Rumsfeld. Franks presented his Commander's Concept, noting that the overarching objective guiding the war plan was regime change and the removal of WMD.[422] Everyone was in agreement with the plan's political objectives. When Franks proposed 275,000 ground forces were needed to complete the mission, Rumsfeld intervened. "Mr. President," he said, "We are still working through the number. The number [Franks] is giving you is soft."[423]

Eager to see a lighter and faster force a part of the battle plan, Rumsfeld sent a note to Franks suggesting the commander and his planners review *Shock and Awe*, a study co-authored by Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, which extolled the use of precision weaponry to isolate the enemy and dominate the battlefield. On another occasion, Rumsfeld sent Doug Macgregor to Tampa to present his thoughts on the ability of a lighter force structure to take down Saddam's regime. Macgregor, a retired Navy admiral tasked by Rumsfeld to come up with ideas on the military's transformation, argued that the Army, properly restructured, could attack Baghdad with 50,000 troops and win within

[422] The Commander's Concept identified four phases: Phase I–Preparation, Phase II–Shape the Battlespace, Phase III–Decisive Operations, and Phase IV–Post-Hostility Operations. Each phase moved along a continuum starting with N-DAY, the moment when President Bush authorized military build-up in the region. The continuum then ran from C-DAY, indicated when the flow of forces would begin, to A-DAY, the beginning of air campaign, to G-DAY, the commencement of ground operations, to the end of major combat operations and the launch of Phase IV. The anticipated duration of each phase was marked X DAYS to indicate that actual time had not been determined. Since the duration of Phase IV would be years, not months, Franks marked its duration as UNKNOWN. Tommy R. Franks (Ret.), *American Soldier*, 351.
[423] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 32.

two weeks.[424] Franks and CENTCOM planners understood Rumsfeld would not be satisfied until he saw a plan consisting of fewer troops and a shorter deployment schedule.

Franks continued to refine the military plan, now dubbed Generated Start. Though Franks expanded the number of military officers involved in the planning process, only a handful of people at CENTCOM were aware of a possible military intervention in Iraq in January 2002.[425] The countless iterations, tight schedules, and endless questions from Secretary Rumsfeld and his staff, however, began to wear on the military planners. In his memoir, *American Soldier*, Franks wrote that the daily barrage of tasks and questions bordered on harassment.[426]

To assist in the planning effort, Rumsfeld sent two civilian officials from Feith's office down to Tampa. In time, CENTCOM planners referred to the two civilians, Abram Shulsky, a policy official, and Bill Bruner, an Air Force colonel, as "Feith's spies."[427] CENTCOM planners knew Franks wanted information on the war plan kept private until he was ready to present it to the Secretary in order to limit the barrage of questions. Often times, Shulsky and Bruner would share information before Franks had reviewed, shaped, and approved it for his discussion with Rumsfeld.[428] Soon, the friction between CENTCOM planners and the two civilian officials became palpable. By March 2002, the two defense aides

[424] Ibid, 33.
[425] Interview, Colonel John Agoglia (Ret.), November 17, 2011.
[426] Tommy R. Franks (Ret.), *American Soldier*, 362.
[427] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 32.
[428] Interview, Colonel Michael Fitzgerald (Ret.), June 15, 2012.

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were told they were no longer welcome. Evident here is the poor state of civil-military relations that reached further down the chain the command.

Over the next few months, Franks and Renuart shuttled between CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa and the Pentagon. Each time, Franks presented another iteration of the war plan that would suit Rumsfeld's desire for lighter, faster forces. When Franks met again with Rumsfeld on February 1, 2002, he presented an alternative to Generated Start. The new plan, dubbed Running Start, compressed the air campaign to the point that the air and ground assault would be simultaneous. Moreover, the campaign would launch while follow-on forces were deploying in order to compress the total deployment schedule. Franks briefed the new plan to the President and NSC on February 7. This time, Franks presented a timetable. Phases I-III would last 225 days, which included a three-month timeframe to build-up forces in the region and six-week combined air and ground campaign.[429] Franks also warned that forces would continue to grow as Phase IV operations proceed, "perhaps to as many as two hundred and fifty thousand troops," or until "endstate objectives" have been met.[430] CENTCOM planners had put this plan together with the understanding that an invasion of Iraq could take place as early as Spring 2002.[431]

By the summer, Franks and his staff had developed and refined two war plans: Generated Start, which gave the military 90 days to prepare an attack, and

[429] Tommy R. Franks (Ret.), *American Soldier*, 370.
[430] Ibid, 366.
[431] Interview, Colonel John Agoglia (Ret.), November 17, 2011.

Running Start, which compressed the deployment schedule and stipulated that units reaching the theater would not wait for follow-on forces to arrive before proceeding directly toward their objectives. Rumsfeld did not favor the Generated Start plan because it required a large buildup of forces and lengthy deployment schedule. The compressed timetable of the Running Start, however, made many CENTCOM planners uneasy. Struggling to find a middle ground, CENTCOM planners began working on an alternative plan, the Hybrid plan.

Under the Hybrid plan (also referred to as the 5-11-16-125 Plan),[432] CENTCOM had five days to mobilize and eleven days to flow in troops, aircraft and other war materials into the region. A sixteen-day air campaign would then commence, followed by the start of the start of a ground war with 20,000 Army and Marine troops stationed in Kuwait. Reinforcements would continue to flow to Kuwait for up to 125 days.

As for what would happen after Saddam's region had been toppled, Franks had told his planners that the Department of State would lead the effort to rebuild Iraq's political institutions and infrastructure.[433] "We were told to told to focus on Phases I-III and that State would take the lead on planning for Phase IV activities," shared retired Colonel Michael Fitzgerald, who at the time served as

[432] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 68.
[433] Interview, Colonel John Agoglia (Ret.), November 17, 2011.

the Chief of Plans Division, Strategy, Plans and Policy (J5) at CENTCOM.[434] "Our assumption was that State was working in parallel," added Agoglia.[435]

In August 2002, Franks again briefed the President and the NSC members on the Hybrid concept. Within three weeks, troops and equipment would arrive into the region. In Phase II, the United States would launch an air campaign and send in Special Operations Forces to set the conditions for heavy units to arrive. Two weeks later, Phase III would commence with heavy units launching their operations, which could last up to ninety days, to complete the destruction of the Iraqi military. Phase IV would then commence, though the details of what conditions would need to be met for reconstruction to begin had not yet been discussed in any detail.

Over the next weeks, Franks and his staff continued to work with Rumsfeld on refining the Hybrid plan. Franks briefed the NSC on September 6, the President on September 7, and the JCS on September 9. Nearly a year had passed since the President and Rumsfeld had asked CENTCOM to put together a plan for a military intervention in Iraq; Phase IV remained absent from the discussion.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant General David McKiernan, who had assumed command of Third U.S. Army and the Coalition Forces Land Component

[434] Interview, Colonel Michael Fitzgerald (Ret.), June 15, 2012.
[435] Interview, Colonel John Agoglia (Ret.), November 17, 2011.

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Command (CFLC) on September 4, moved into Camp Doha in Kuwait, where small deployments and improvements to military infrastructure had been quietly put in place. As the new Commanding General of the land command, McKiernan began reviewing the Hybrid plan. Finding it sorely deficient and short on combat power, McKiernan and his staff began rethinking the war plan.[436]

McKiernan attempted to reconcile Rumsfeld's desire to promote his principles of transformation by beginning an attack with a lean force with the administration's desire to topple Saddam, disarm Iraq, and prevent WMD from falling into the wrong hands.[437] McKiernan felt the Hybrid force was too small to seize control of the country, secure Iraq's porous borders, and control suspected WMD sites.[438] Moreover, if Saddam's regime were toppled quickly, CENTCOM forces would have to manage the chaos in Iraq, which the Hybrid plan did not account for. Additional ground forces available at the start of the attack would better position CENTCOM to deal with the aftermath. McKiernan realized that plans for the post-war phase were sorely underdeveloped. "Frankly, there wasn't a lot of energy at the Department of Defense and CENTCOM to conduct Phase IV planning. There was inadequate planning and inadequate resourcing for what to do post-Saddam."[439]

[436] Interview, General David D. McKiernan (Ret.), July 2, 2012.
[437] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 82.
[438] Interview, General David D. McKiernan (Ret.), July 2, 2012.
[439] Ibid.

On December 12, Rumsfeld joined McKiernan and Franks in Qatar to hear McKiernan's pitch to cast aside the Hybrid plan in favor of Cobra II, which presumed a larger force.[440] A few weeks later, Rumsfeld accepted the Cobra II plan. The Hybrid Plan had been devised to address Rumsfeld's insistence that the US invasion begin quickly and without a large troop build-up. Cobra II was closest to Franks' Generated Start with regard to troop levels. That plan had drawn objections from Rumsfeld a year earlier. In his memoir, Franks writes that CENTCOM went to war with the Hybrid Plan, specifically he writes, "We finally had a name for our plan: The Hybrid 1003V OPLAN had officially been dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom. He does not mention McKiernan's pitch for Cobra II.[441]

However, the Secretary delayed authorizing the troop requests. The initial request for forces to be deployed for Cobra II was 86,000 troops, including 17,000 reservists responsible for operating the port and airfields, setting up communications and logistics.[442] As of January 2003, Rumsfeld had not approved the deployment requests. Without sufficient forces and logistics flowing into the region, there was no guarantee the invasion force would not be short of combat power.[443]

[440] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 93-94.
[441] Tommy R. Franks (Ret.), *American Soldier*, 433.
[442] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 97.
[443] Interview, General David D. McKiernan (Ret.), July 2, 2012.

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Rumsfeld was micromanaging the deployment requests "with the ruthless efficiency of a businessman for whom excess inventory was to be avoided at all costs."[444] Rather than use established deployment plans for the units, referred to as Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL), Rumsfeld and his staff reviewed each individual request for forces and personally decided which units would deploy and when. Rumsfeld did not trust the generals to send the minimum force necessary to win the Iraq War, and therefore, he insisted CENTCOM explain each deployment request.[445] This tenacious insistence on oversight delayed the transport of troops and much-needed materials to the field. As a result, the Theater Support Command, which was to manage the logistics for the ground forces, was not in place as the troops and equipment started to flow in. Still worse, at the start of the Iraq War, Rumsfeld cancelled the deployment of the 1st Cavalry Division, a 17,000-strong force scheduled to arrive as a follow-on reinforcement. The Secretary questioned whether the force was needed. McKiernan had planned to use the 1st Cavalry to help secure Baghdad, as well as Fallujah and Ramadi, two cities in the Al Anbar province of Iraq that would later serve as the focal points of the Iraqi insurgency.[446]

Rumsfeld's micromanagement of the deployment schedule was another example of how the Iraq War would be used as a proving ground for his concept of warfare. As the former Secretary of the Army, Thomas White, put it, "the type

[444] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 95.
[445] Ibid, 97.
[446] Interview, General David D. McKiernan (Ret.), July 2, 2012.

of operation a stability operation is…is boots on the ground and it is very untransformational."[447]

E) A Little Post-Conflict Planning

A large-scale post-conflict operation went against the Secretary's defense transformation agenda. Consequently, Rumsfeld had little incentive to invest in analysis about the requirements of the post-combat phase of the war.[448] Moreover, as prevailing assumptions – sustained by the failure to engage those who had alternative perspectives on the post-war environment – suggested there would be no post-war security problem. Many in the U.S. government believed American forces would be greeted as "liberators."

The Pentagon betted on Iraqi expatriates, many living in the United States and London, to manage post-war Iraq. Ahmed Chalabi, a secular Shiite and director for the Iraqi National Congress, the umbrella organizer of anti-Saddam exiles, had worked with the CIA in the 1990s to promote resistance to the Iraqi regime. Chalabi argued Saddam acted like an occupying power and could be toppled by Iraqi insurgents with United States airpower. The Pentagon considered Chalabi a potential candidate for taking the lead in Iraq. The Department of State and CIA strongly opposed the idea, and viewed many of the

[447] Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*, 243; George Packer, *The Assassins' Gate: American in Iraq*, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005), 117.
[448] Ibid.

Iraqi exiles, including Chalabi, as "untrustworthy."[449] Pentagon officials, however, saw him "as a talented and dedicated organizer," and many critics charged the Pentagon was trying to "anoint" Chalabi as leader of Iraq after Saddam.[450] Feith disputes these charges. He writes that neither he, nor Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, advocated that the United States should select Iraq's leader. "Even in informal meetings and conversation, I never heard anyone at the Defense Department make an argument or suggest a plan for putting Chalabi into power in Iraq."[451] The Department of State, however, wrote papers, one of which was distributed at the Deputies Lunch on June 6, 2002, warning against the use of plans to impose "external players" on Iraq.[452]

With little concern that post-war Iraq would be an issue, there was little reason to exert pressure on Franks and his CENTCOM planners to plan for such a contingency. Meanwhile, Franks had been busy developing one invasion plan after another and answering an endless stream of questions from Rumsfeld on strategy and the minimum use of force necessary to topple Saddam. He was not highly focused on the post-conflict environment, and was content to leaving the lion share of Phase IV planning to others in the government.[453] On March 17, 2003, Franks faxed a "letter of concern" to Wolfowitz, in which he "put the Pentagon on notice," warning, "*You pay attention to the day after* and *I'll pay*

[449] Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 489. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 18.
[450] Ibid. Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision*, 254.
[451] Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision*, 255.
[452] Ibid, 256.
[453] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 138; Interview, Colonel John Agoglia (Ret.), November 17, 2011.

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attention to the day of."[454] Why Franks waited until right before the invasion to raise his concerns is unclear.

For over eighteen months, Rumsfeld and his staff poured over every detail of the plan for major combat operations in Iraq. Franks met frequently with the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to discuss troop levels, deployment schedules, and potential contingencies, such as an early regime collapse, the use of WMD, a humanitarian disaster or mass civilian exodus, and the possibility that the Republican Guard could withdraw into the capital and lure United States forces into an urban fight.[455] Phase IV plans however were left unaddressed and referred to as "open items."[456] When CENTCOM planners began to seriously consider the post-war environment in February 2003, there was little time to fully develop a plan that addressed potential contingencies (such as a massive breakdown in security following Saddam Hussein's ouster) and ensured American forces were well-positioned and adequately resourced to manage post-war Iraq. The United States invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003; the post-war plan was completed a month later.

The highest levels in Washington and CENTCOM neglected to prepare for and plan the post-war operations in Iraq. Phase IV was launched recklessly and

[454] Tommy R. Franks (Ret.), *American Soldier*, 441.
[455] Planners prepared for a worst-case scenario, called "Fortress Baghdad," in which Saddam Hussein and his elite forces would withdraw into Baghdad and force United States troops to engage in urban warfare that could involve chemical and biological weapons. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 74.
[456] George Packer, *The Assassins' Gate*, 119.

according to a flawed, incomplete, and hurried plan. Herein lies a central puzzle to the Iraq War: Why did the United States, with all its experience in post-conflict operations, fail to fully develop a post-war plan for Iraq?

When it came to the planning process for the Iraq War, there was no deliberative process to carefully examine the relevant issues, consider alternative perspectives, exchange information, test planning assumptions, and consider likely consequences. Instead, the planning process was insulated and close-hold. Few people outside a small group (namely Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith, Franks, Myers, and Pace) participated in the discussions, and those outsiders that did participate from time to time, understood well that the agenda was set and objections were unwelcome.[457] Without opportunities for open, honest and comprehensive debates, important details were left unaddressed, mistaken planning assumptions were not exposed, and contingency plans were never fully developed.

The plan was built on wrong assumptions. First, administration officials assumed American troops would be greeted as liberators. Three days before the start of the war, Vice President Cheney articulated this view when he said, "My belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators."[458] Iraqi exiles reinforced this view by emphasizing that American forces would be greeted with "sweets and

[457] Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012.
[458] Vice President Richard Cheney, remarks to *Meet the Press*, March 16, 2003.

flowers."[459] Second, officials assumed the military campaign would have a decisive end, and would produce a stable and secure environment.[460] Wolfowitz expressed this assumption when he testified to Congress on February 27, 2003 and said, "It's hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his army."[461] The military plan, therefore, assumed coalition forces would be able to conduct operations without interference once major combat operations had ended. For example, planners assumed local Iraqi police and the regular army would be capable of providing law and order. When the looting and criminal activity occurred in the wake of the invasion, the military was not prepared to respond.[462] Third, officials also assumed the Iraqi government would continue to function after Saddam Hussein and his loyalists were removed from power.[463] Fourth, officials assumed humanitarian relief requirements would be extensive, and planned for the possibility that Saddam Hussein might use weapons of mass destruction during the military campaign. Finally, the military campaign assumed Iraq's infrastructure would remain largely in tact. These flawed assumptions permeated the interagency planning process, into a focus that reconstruction and stabilization

[459] Nora Bensahel et. al., "After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq," (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2008); (accessed June 26, 2014); available from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG642.pdf.
[460] Ibid.
[461] Paul Wolfowitz, Hearing Before the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives.
[462] Richard R. Brennan, Jr. et. al., "Ending the U.S. War in Iraq," (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2013); (accessed June 26, 2014); available from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR232/RAND_RR232.pdf.
[463] Ibid.

would not be required.[464] Had there been an interagency discourse on the post-war environment, these flawed assumptions may have been more thoroughly challenged.

From the start, Phase IV should have been a part of the planning process. To be fair, CENTCOM planners asked to meet their counterparts at the Department of State in early 2002 to discuss Phase IV knowing full well that the military would be a supporting element of the post-war environment.[465] They did not receive an answer from General Franks or the Pentagon, and in June, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) told them that State was not ready to meet.[466] Thus, CENTCOM planners continued to focus on Phases I-III and waited, leaving a void in their ability to deal with Phase IV.

Meanwhile, Myers began to press the Secretary to enlarge the planning circle for the Iraq War. In summer 2002, Rumsfeld finally authorized Myers to bring in the services and appropriate combatant commanders into the planning process.[467] After reviewing the latest iteration of the war plan, Myers was alarmed over the lack of Phase IV planning.[468] In September, the JS sent an

[464] Nora Bensahel et. al., "After Saddam."
[465] Interview, Colonel John Agoglia (Ret.), November 17, 2011.
[466] Ibid.
[467] Richard B. Myers (Ret.), *Eyes on the Horizon: Serving the Front Lines of National Security*, (New York: Threshold Editions, 2009), 228. In order to coordinate the airlift and shipments of troops and cargo into Kuwait, Myers needed to alert the other combatant commands. Transportation Command, Pacific Command, European Command, Special Operations Command, Space Command, and Joint Forces Command would be providing the forces and equipment, and thus, would need to secure over-flight and arrange for basing in transit.
[468] Interview, General Richard B. Myers (Ret.), June 8, 2012.

internal memorandum to CENTCOM expressing their concern.[469] By then, CENTCOM planners were so consumed with planning the tactical piece of the war and preparing Franks for his meetings with Rumsfeld, the President, and the members of the NSC, while also writing point papers for Congress and the United Nations that there was little time to develop a strategy for Phase IV.

Concerned, Myers placed numerous calls and sent messages to Franks requesting a Phase IV plan.[470] Franks promised to include a Phase IV plan in the

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[469] Interview, Douglas J. Feith, June 12, 2012.

[470] General Richard B. Myers (Ret.), *Eyes on the Horizon*, 225.

Except for weekly strategy sessions of the deputies committee that began in early 2002, no interagency planning for possible combat operations in Iraq occurred in the first-half of 2002. In mid-2002, the Joint Staff began an internal exercise to identify tasks that the interagency would need to address. The effort was given the title, the Executive Steering Group (ESG), and met at the Joint Staff area of the Pentagon. Chaired by the NSC staff, participants included civilians and military officials at the assistant-secretary level from the Joint Staff, the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary for Defense for Policy, Office of the Vice President, and CIA. The group did not debate fundamental decisions, but addressed necessary tasks that would need to be implemented should an invasion of Iraq occur, such as coalition support, over-flight access, securing basing, etc. Whenever the group could not agree, the issue would be passed up to the deputies committee for resolution. Each time the group met (roughly three times per week from when it was formed until March 2003), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) did not attend every meeting or send the same representative. The CIA also missed several meetings. At the direction of the President, through the National Security Advisor, the ESG began to examine post-conflict issues in late 2002. After the President issued NSPD-24 in January 2003, OSD made clear that the ESG's assistance was no longer necessary or desired. The ESG dissolved in March 2003, and was reconstituted in July 2003 at the request of National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to help improve conditions on the ground in Iraq. Frederick C. Smith and Franklin C. Miller, "The Office of the Secretary of Defense: Civilian Masters?" in *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth*, eds. Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011): 97-116.

The Joint Staff's Strategic Plans and Policy directorate (J-5), headed by then Lieutenant General George Asey, created the Iraq Political Military Cell (IPMC) in July 2002 to help with the work of the ESG. The IPMC was not intended as an independent planning group, but rather to support the work of the ESG. The IMPC included individuals from OSD, State, the CIA, and the Office of the Vice President. Several working groups were created, such as the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction group, created in November 2002 and co-chaired by Elliot Abrams and Robin Cleveland, to focus on humanitarian relief issues in the immediate post-war period. Other interagency working groups focused on energy infrastructure and coalition coordination. Nora Bensahel et. al., "After Saddam," 22. Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision*, 360.

OSD also created the Office of Special Plans in August 2002 to handle the increased workload associated with potential military operations in Iraq. As Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Feith directed this office to develop policy recommendations on a wide range of issues,

next iteration of the war plan, but he never did.[471] In an interview with Feith, he acknowledged that "Phase IV discussions did not run that deep," but was not aware of the Joint Staff's concerns with CENTCOM Phase IV planning until Myers raised the issue in December 2002.[472] Meanwhile, Franks also brushed off Feith's repeated attempts to understand the status of the Phase IV plan. The exact timeline of when Phase IV plans began to develop, and who was ultimately in charge, remains unclear. Many point to Franks for not fully developing a Phase IV plan, however, ultimate responsibility rests with the civilian leadership. There was never any pressure put on Franks to present a Phase IV plan, at least not from Rumsfeld.[473] Feith writes in his memoir that Rumsfeld did not turn his attention to Phase IV until October 2002.[474] "Yes, Rumsfeld did not push for Phase IV," conceded Feith.[475]

In his memoir, *Known and Unknown*, Secretary Rumsfeld writes that Myers expressed concern that CENTCOM might not be paying sufficient attention to Phase IV. The Secretary goes on to note that Myers informed him

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including coalition building, troop deployments, government reorganization, de-Baathification, maintaining the oil sector, training the police, and war crimes prosecution. Nora Bensahel et. al., "After Saddam," 24.

Lastly, the Department of State participated in the interagency working groups described above, and also conducted the Future of Iraq project, a process that correctly identified the many reconstruction and governance problems that would be faced after the war ended. Unfortunately, the insights and information generated were not well integrated into other US government planning efforts. First, the output of the various working groups of the Future of Iraq project encompassed 2,000 pages in 13 volumes. It could not be easily digested. Second, it was not a post-war plan for the reconstruction of Iraq. That being said, the State Department nevertheless had been marginalized and was not seen as having a supporting role in a possible war in Iraq. Nora Bensahel et. al., "After Saddam," 29.

[471] Interview, General Richard B. Myers (Ret.), June 8, 2012.

[472] Interview, Douglas J. Feith, June 12, 2012.

[473] Ibid.

[474] Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision*, 316.

[475] Interview, Douglas J. Feith, June 12, 2012.

that he would establish a new group to help CENTCOM plan for post-conflict operations. However, the Secretary does not explain in his memoir whether he had any concerns of his own with Phase IV plans. He only says that, "Postwar planning for Iraq lacked effective interagency coordination, clear lines of responsibility, and the deadlines and accountability associated with a rigorous process." Moreover, he blames the "failure to fashion a deliberate, systematic approach" on the tension between two different "strategic approaches" to post-war Iraq that were never "hashed out at the NSC and fully resolved. The debate was between "speed–how quickly we could turn over authority–and what was called legitimacy– exactly what political and constitutional processes needed to be in place prior to turning the reins over. The Pentagon leaned to the former, the State Department to the latter."[476] Others disagree with the Secretary's assessment. According to Frank Miller, "The Office of the Secretary of Defense was not interested in cooperating with other parts of the U.S. government. OSD thought Phase IV could be done without the other branches of government. Their intent was to assert control over post-war Iraq and force other agencies to the sideline."[477]

Uneasiness with CENTCOM over the lack of Phase IV planning prompted the JS to draft a plan in October 2002.[478] To manage post-war Iraq, the JS

[476] Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 486-487.
[477] Interview, Frank Miller, December 1, 2011.
[478] Interview, Douglas J. Feith, June 12, 2012. In his memoir, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote that Myers expressed concern that CENTCOM was not paying sufficient detail to Phase IV. Rumsfeld goes on to note that Myers informed him that he would establish a new group to help CENTCOM plan for post-conflict operations. Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 485.

proposed establishing a headquarters, overseen by a three-star general and staffed by experts drawn from throughout the U.S. government. General John Abizaid, who at the time served as Director of the Joint Staff (and would later become Frank's deputy commander and then CENTCOM Commander), proposed an Army corps not tied to the invasion direct post-war planning and initially administer the country once Saddam was removed from power.[479] Specifically, the headquarters would plan for the rehabilitation of the Iraqi army, repair and upgrade Iraqi's electrical grid and decaying economic infrastructure.[480] A civilian administrator or interim Iraqi government would replace the headquarters once the U.S. military established security.

Rumsfeld was not persuaded, and so made some important changes to the JS plan. First, the Department of Defense would lead all post-war efforts. For the first time since the end of the World War II, the Pentagon would have the lead for the administration and reconstruction of an occupied country. Second, references to other U.S. government departments and agencies, particularly the Department of State and the CIA, were dropped. In fact, OSD instructed the Joint Staff to "not include them in the planning process."[481] The final important change: there would be two heads managing the headquarters – a civilian administrator to oversee the reconstruction and governance of Iraq, and a military commander

[479] Interview, General David Abizaid (Ret.), June 22, 2012.
[480] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 140.
[481] Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012.

responsible for security and retraining the Iraqi military.[482] Each would report to CENTCOM, and ultimately, to Rumsfeld himself.

By December, the Pentagon had done little to move Phase IV planning forward despite its insistence to have primary responsibility for the post-war effort. With the war fast approaching, Myers instructed his staff to develop plans for the military-arm of the post-war headquarters. As a first step, Lieutenant General George Casey, then Director of Strategic Plans and Policy (J5), summoned Brigadier General Steve Hawkins, Commander of the Great Lakes and Ohio Division of the Army Corps of Engineers, to the Pentagon on December 18. Casey assigned Hawkins to oversee Joint Task Force 4 (JTF-4) to serve as the nucleus for the follow-on headquarters that would be called Combined Joint Task Force-Iraq (CJTF-I). Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, would staff Hawkins' task force. When Hawkins arrived at JFCOM, he found that the task force was more of a concept than a real capability. Many members of the task force were civilian contractors unwilling to deploy to Iraq or officers unavailable for reassignment. With no other options available, Hawkins recruited fifty-eight people, who had never worked together, to staff JTF-4.

In Tampa, CENTCOM did not know what to make of Hawkins and his small team. Frankly, CENTCOM planners didn't have the time to bring up to

[482] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 141.

speed a "pickup team" and prepare them to serve as the main workhorse.[483] "Here is this one-star commander coming in with an ad hoc staff asking who we work for and what the plan is for Iraq. We pushed them off to [McKiernan] in Kuwait," admitted Colonel Michael Fitzgerald, one of Frank's chief war planners. "Frankly, Hawkins arrived with 60-person staff who had never worked together and could not function as a team. There was no value-added to having them around," added retired Colonel John Agoglia, another CENTCOM planner.[484]

Meanwhile, McKiernan, commanding general of Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), figuring that he might end up as the temporary custodian of Iraq, had began to sketch out his own plan for Phase IV.[485] He put Major General Albert Whitley, the senior British representative, and Colonel Kevin Benson, chief planning officer, in charge of the planning effort.[486] When Hawkins and his team arrived, McKiernan placed them under CFLCC's jurisdiction. Eclipse II, named after the post-World War II reconstruction plan for Germany, assumed military elements would remain in Iraq to support a civilian administrator or incoming transitional military headquarters. The plan instructed forces to "control as we go" and there would be a "rolling transition" to stability operations.[487] Forces were to begin post-conflict operations in secure areas as combat operations were underway elsewhere.

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[483] Interview, Colonel John Agoglia (Ret.), November 17, 2011.
[484] Ibid.
[485] Interview, General David D. McKiernan (Ret.), July 2, 2012.
[486] Planning efforts included Lieutenant General Jay Garner's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), Joint Task Force-4, V Corps, and the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF).
[487] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 145.

Eclipse II would rely on the Iraqi police, the existing legal system, provincial governments, and Iraqi ministries to maintain law and order after the collapse of the regime. In the first sixty days of fighting, coalition forces would "secure key infrastructure, support the maintenance of public order and safety, support the restoration of critical utilities/basic services, "empower" selected Iraqi officials, and begin reintegration of the Iraqi military."[488] Unfortunately, the plan was informed by untested assumptions: that Iraqi institutions would remain more or less in tact and that other U.S. government departments and agencies would step in to handle and fund Iraqi reconstruction. Here is yet another example of where the lack of discourse and the failure to engage those who had alternative perspectives about the post-war environment helped sustain flawed assumptions.

With regard to the Iraqi military, McKiernan and his staff planned to bring back into garrison soldiers from the Regular Army after the Saddam regime collapsed. A brigade would be placed in Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra.[489] Once assembled, these soldiers would be put into uniform, paid a salary, and assigned to low-risk missions, such as securing infrastructure and border checkpoints.[490] It was not until after Baghdad fell that Walter Slocombe, the senior advisor for Defense and Security Affairs with the Coalition Provisional Authority, and not

[488] Ibid.
[489] Interview, General David D. McKiernan (Ret.), July 2, 2012.
[490] Suggesting McKiernan did not push for his plan on how to keep the Iraqi army intact, Rumsfeld writes, "If McKiernan had been acting as the senior commander in Iraq on the ground, as I believed he was supposed to be, his view might have prevailed." Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown,* 517.

CENTCOM, informed McKiernan and his staff that the Iraqi military would be disbanded and built from the ground up.[491] "It was horrible decision made in

[491] Ibid. In his memoir, Rumsfeld writes that he thought it wise to keep the Iraqi army as a reconstruction corps. In January 2003, Feith and his staff began working on a briefing called "Rebuilding the Iraqi Military" that recommended retaining the regular army. On February 26, Pentagon representatives briefed the NSC principals on the "reintegration of the regular army." Under that plan, the structures of the military "tainted with the crimes of the Baath regime" would be dissolved, but the regular army would be retrained to assist in keeping security and be used "as a national reconstruction force during the transitional phase." Rumsfeld writes that the brief was updated again in March with the recommendation that following combat operations in Iraq, the army "should 'maintain its current status in assembly areas and permanent garrisons." Rumsfeld also writes that, "In short, the Iraqi army would be retrained and used as an instrument of defense of the new Iraqi state." After the invasion of Iraq, coalition forces reported that many of the Iraqi army removed their uniforms and deserted. The Iraqi army had, in Bremer's words, according to Rumsfeld, "disbanded itself." At this point it was Bremer, writes Rumsfeld, who made the decision in close coordination with his senior advisor on defense issues, Walter Slocombe, to change course and create an entirely new Iraqi army. Bremer briefed Rumsfeld on the details of the plan on May 19, and then the other members of the NSC three days later. Rumsfeld acknowledges that Bremer's decision, and its specifics, did not receive the full interagency discussion it merited.

In *American Soldier*, Franks writes that in a memo to Wolfowitz that he expressed concern with whether Washington had been focusing on "policy-level issues." Specifically, he was concerned about "a functional plan and policy to pay Iraqi military units so they can be immediately co-opted and put to work for the Coalition on reconstruction. Tommy R. Franks (Ret.), *American Soldier*, 441.

In *My Year in Iraq*, Bremer writes that General Abizaid had said during a high-level teleconference on April 17 that not a "single Iraqi military unit remained in tact." For Bremer, the issue was not whether to use an existing force, but whether to recall units of the old army. Bremer leaned on Slocombe, who had in early May held discussions with Pentagon officials, including Wolfowitz about the policy implications of Saddam's army having melted away. On May 9, Bremer sent a memo to Rumsfeld, copied to Wolfowitz, Feith, and the General Counsel, recommending the dissolution of Saddam's army as well as the security and intelligence services as a prelude to establishing Iraq's new security services. On May 19, Bremer sent a memo to Rumsfeld detailing his recommendations for the dissolution of the Iraqi Defense Ministry and related entities. The memo also proposed offering severance payments to former soldiers, excluding only the most senior Baathists and intelligence and internal security types. Bremer and Slocombe discussed the plans with McKiernan. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 53-57.

In an interview with Bremer, he indicated that everyone had been briefed before the order was announced, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, McKiernan, and Rumsfeld. The only question was how many of the old army high-ranking officers could re-enlist. They decided not to allow anyone above the rank of Colonel to re-enlist. The Iraqi army had approximately 12,000 generals! Interview, Ambassador Lewis Paul Bremer III, June 15, 2012.

In *War and Decision*, Feith wrote that on May 9, "Bremer and Slocombe told me of their plan to dissolve the Iraq army." Before the war, Feith had presented a plan at a March 10, 2003 briefing to the President to use the Iraqi army for reconstruction and then to reform and downsize it. Garner would later develop that plan. By May, however, Feith agreed, "the key reasons to *preserve* the army no longer applied, while the arguments for *dissolving* it were still relevant." He then writes of Rumsfeld's support to Bremer's May 19 memo on dissolution, but does not recall any details of the communications at that time. He also states in his memoir that he cannot recall bringing up the matter to the Deputies Committee, perhaps because "Rumsfeld instructed me to

Washington. It was [Ambassador Lewis Paul Bremer's] line that the Iraq army had already disbanded.[492] No. You can say that the army had been defeated and had gone home, but that doesn't mean that they are out of work. To say it had disappeared is wrong," shared McKiernan in an interview.

The decision to formally dissolve the army would later ignite the insurgency and prolong the war. In an interview, Bremer acknowledges that it took too long to pay out severances and pensions to former soldiers.[493] Had Phase IV been a priority, contingencies on the status of the Iraqi army would have been addressed. Military Planners worked on the assumption that the Iraqi army would be available for reconstruction efforts and low-risk missions.

Meanwhile, Rumsfeld directed Feith to draft the charter for a new office to handle post-conflict operations in Iraq. Feith worked with Stephen Hadley, Deputy National Security Advisor, to develop plans for a new civilian administration in Iraq that would report to the Defense Department and oversee the civilian administrators and military commanders in Iraq to ensure unity of command. On January 17, 2003, Rumsfeld tapped retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner to create and head the new post-war planning office.[494] He was told the American objective was the liberation of Iraq with political control to

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keep the matter within the Department of Defense." He concedes the decision was not well debated throughout the government. Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision*, 427-434.

[491] Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco*, 433.

[492] In May, Ambassador Lewis Paul Bremer III began serving as the lead civil administrator of post-war Iraq.

[493] Interview, Ambassador Lewis Paul Bremer III, June 15, 2012.

[494] Gordon W. Rudd, "Reconstructing Iraq: Regime Change, Jay Garner, and the ORHA Story," (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 381.

be handed off to the Iraqis as soon as possible. Garner reflected on the World War II reconstruction experience, and commented, "Marshall had two years – you are giving me two months."[495] On January 20, President Bush released National Security Presidential Directive 24 (NSPD-24), which established the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and crystallized the Defense Department's authority for post-war Iraq.

According to NSPD-24, ORHA would conduct detailed planning duties on such issues as "humanitarian relief, dismantling WMD, defeating and exploiting terrorist networks, protecting natural resources, reconstruction, key civil services such as food, water, electricity, and health care, reshaping the Iraqi military and other security institutions, and supporting the transition to Iraqi-led authority over time."[496] Moreover, ORHA would form the nucleus of the administrative apparatus that would eventually take over the reins in creating new governmental institutions. The directive also instructed ORHA to coordinate its efforts with the United Nations, nongovernmental relief organizations, and Iraqi exiles. ORHA staff would include officials from various agencies to serve as a team of expert assistants to Franks.

Initially, Garner and his team worked out of the Pentagon between late January and early March before deploying to Kuwait. While at the Pentagon, Garner had little time to set up shop, recruit staff, and prepare draft plans to

[495] Ibid.
[496] Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision*, 616-617.

deliver food and other emergency assistance, reestablish the provision of electricity and other basic services, reshape the Iraqi military, safeguard Iraqi infrastructure, and dismantle WMD.

On February 21-22, Garner convened closed-door meetings at the National Defense University to discuss post-war Iraq. Participants included representatives from the Pentagon, Department of State, CENTCOM, the Office of the Vice President, CIA, Treasury, Department of Justice, CFLCC, and the British and Australian governments. Immediately, major problems became evident. ORHA had been set up "far too late" and without sufficient resources given its mandate.[497] Meeting participants quickly realized that without enough troops to secure major urban areas to allow for reconstruction, the country could descend into chaos, jeopardizing the safety of coalition forces and risking the defeat of a stable, new Iraq.[498]

Before leaving for Kuwait, Garner met with Rumsfeld on March 15 to report on the state of his planning. Like McKiernan, Garner concluded that it would be necessary to keep the Iraqi army intact.[499] While McKiernan needed the Iraqi troops to help with security, Garner saw them as a resource pool for labor-intensive civil works projects before they would be retrained to serve in a newly created Iraqi army. Garner headed out to Kuwait, unaware that the Iraqi military would eventually be disbanded. He also would later realize that there wasn't

[497] Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco*, 101.
[498] Ibid.
[499] Ibid, 103; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 153.

much room for him in Kuwait. The military did not know what to make of ORHA. "ORHA was a pick-up group of retired general officers and ad hoc staff. There was no clarification of who worked for whom. Did work for them or did they work for us? It was not helpful to add another organization without clear lines of responsibility," commented retired Colonel Michael Fitzgerald.[500]

On Wednesday, March 19, President Bush gave the order to execute Operation Iraqi Freedom. The United States went to war without a fully developed post-war plan. Four weeks later, on April 16, Franks distributed a "Freedom Message to the Iraqi People," which proclaimed coalition forces in Iraq as liberators, not as conquerors, committed to helping the people of Iraq rebuild their government.[501]

Meanwhile, back in Washington in mid-April, President Bush met with Ambassador Lewis Paul Bremer III to discuss the Ambassador serving as the lead civil administrator of post-war Iraq. Paul Wolfowitz and Scooter Libbey, Vice President Dick Cheney's Chief of Staff, had contacted Bremer a few weeks prior to run "the occupation of Iraq" since ORHA "lacked expertise in high-level diplomatic negotiations and politics."[502] Over the course of two weeks at the Pentagon, officials from the Defense Department, State, and the CIA read Bremer in on the situation in Iraq. In meetings with the President and members of the NSC, Bremer had made clear that the establishment of a representative

[500] Interview, Colonel Michael Fitzgerald (Ret.), June 15, 2012.
[501] Tommy R. Franks (Ret.), *American Soldier*, 532.
[502] Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, *My Year in Iraq*, 7.

government in Iraq would take time. In a private meeting with the President four days before Bremer's departure for Baghdad, the President agreed the Ambassador would have the time he needed.[503] "This is going to be long and hard," Bremer told the President, "a marathon, not a sprint. And I'll need your support to buy time to do a decent job." To this the President responded, "I understand, and I'm fully committed to bringing a representative government to the Iraqi people. We're not going to abandon Iraq. We'll stay until the job is done. You can count on my support irrespective of the political calendar or what the media might say."[504]

Meanwhile, Garner was in Baghdad announcing his intention to appoint an Iraqi government by May 15, and American and coalition forces were planning on drawing down its troop levels from 180,000 to 30,000 by September.[505] Bremer immediately sensed disconnect between what was unfolding in Iraq, and his orders to establish a representative government in Iraq.[506]

On May 9, the President appointed Bremer as Presidential Envoy to Iraq with full authority over all U.S. government personnel, activities, and funds.[507] Rumsfeld also designated Bremer the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), empowered with "all executive, legislative, and judicial

[503] Interview, Ambassador Lewis Paul Bremer III, June 15, 2012.
[504] Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, *My Year in Iraq*, 12.
[505] Interview, Ambassador Lewis Paul Bremer III, June 15, 2012
[506] Ibid.
[507] Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, *My Year in Iraq*, 12.

functions" in Iraq.[508] Before leaving for Baghdad, Rumsfeld gave Bremer his marching orders. The memorandum emphasized that "The Coalition will oppose Saddam Hussein's old enforcers – the Ba'ath Party, the Fedayeen Saddam…make clear that the Coalition will eliminate the remnants of Saddam's regime."[509] Earlier that morning, Feith had shown Bremer a draft order for the "De-Baathification of Iraqi Society," which had been discussed at an NSC meeting back in March. Like Rumsfeld, Feith underscored that Saddam's instruments of repression would have no role in a new Iraq. Bremer also knew that Walt Slocombe, the Coalition's senior advisor for Defense and Security Affairs, was discussing with Feith the future of Iraq's regular army.

Once Bremer arrived in Baghdad, he nullified the commitment by Garner to convene a meeting in Baghdad by the end of May to set up an interim Iraqi government, opting instead to draft a constitution and hold elections within a year. On May 16, Bremer issued Order No. 1: "De-Baathification of Iraqi Society." Together with senior party members, Ba'ath Party holding the ranks Regional Command Member, Branch Member, Section Member, and Group Member, were removed from their positions and banned from future employment in the public sector.[510] The order went on to state that the top three layers of management in every national government ministry and other government institutions, including

[508] Ibid, 13.
[509] Ibid, 39.
[510] U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority, "Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1: De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society," May 16, 2003, (accessed March 10, 2013); available from http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_1_De-Ba_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_.pdf.

universities and hospitals, would be reviewed for possible affiliation with the Ba'ath Party and subject to criminal investigation.[511]

On May 23, Bremer issued Order No. 2: "Dissolution of Entities," which dissolved the military and terminated the payment of salaries and pensions.[512] Order No. 2 has been considered the most controversial decision during the Iraq War, and cited by many as the spark to the Iraqi insurgency. Before Bremer issued the order, however, the President, Rumsfeld, NSC, and JCS had discussed it. The military, on the other hand, objected. CFLCC had been working on a plan to call the soldiers back, put them in uniform, and assign vetted soldiers to guard borders and quickly establish a military presence throughout the country. McKiernan and his staff argued the decision to build a new army from the ground up would take too long. McKiernan thought it was a horrible decision, and he voiced his concern up the CENTCOM chain of command.[513] He knew the decision to abolish the military alienated over 300,000 troops and basically overturned the Eclipse II plan.[514] Between Rumsfeld's decision to limit the troop levels in Iraq, and Bremer's announcement to disband the Iraqi army, there was a huge security vacuum left in Iraq.

The lack of visible forces securing key areas after the fall of Baghdad on

[511] Ibid.
[512] U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority, "Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities," May 23, 2003, (accessed June 28, 2014); available from "http://www.casi.org.uk/info/cpa/030523-CPA-Order2.pdf.
[513] Interview, General David D. McKiernan (Ret.), July 2, 2012.
[514] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 484.

April 9, 2003 had a devastating effect. Iraqis were left without a government to regulate and protect them, and too few American forces to the post-war environment. With no one in charge, isolated incidents of looting escalated into a massive effort within weeks. Iraqi citizens pillaged the National Museum of Iraq, burned down the Iraq National Library, and ransacked the University of Baghdad and local hotels, embassies, and factories. Ultimately, the looting affected vital sectors of the state and economy as looters destroyed the electrical grid and other crucial infrastructure, including government offices and ministries.

The security environment also sent a signal to would-be rebels and insurgents that no one was in charge. And with too few troops to patrol local neighborhoods and gather intelligence, the United States quickly lost the momentum in pursuing rebels and stopping the nascent insurgency. The security situation continued to deteriorate, and American forces soon found themselves enmeshed in a guerrilla war for the first time since the Vietnam War. It would take another four years of fighting before the United States could come up with a strategy to stop the chaotic combination of insurgency, sectarian violence, terrorism, criminality, and factional fighting.

F) Conclusion

Unfortunately, some of the flames that fueled the insurgency might have been dampened had there been a fully developed post-conflict plan in place. But

why was the plan for the post-conflict environment so under-developed? Whereas Rumsfeld and Franks spent nearly eighteen months planning for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his regime, the post-war planning process did not begin in earnest until only a few months before the start of the war. In fact, the first time President Bush received a comprehensive briefing on the post-war plans for Iraq was on March 10-12, 2003, barely a week before the start of the war.[515] Bottom line, the most demanding task of the Iraq War – the reconstruction of and security for the new Iraq – was not a priority.

There are a few explanations as to why Phase IV was not prioritized. First, the administration, and Rumsfeld in particular, put far too much confidence in American military technology. Iraq would be used as a proving ground for defense transformation, and thus, the war plan focused on the use of unconventional technologies, high-tech reconnaissance systems, precision weapons, advanced communications, and small units. The requirements of a large-scale post-conflict operation, namely mass boots on the ground, went against Rumsfeld's concept of twenty-first century warfare. Instead, Rumsfeld invested in speed and flexibility of action on the battlefield. He insisted on a lean force and often questioned the size and mix of forces necessary for victory against Saddam Hussein's military. Rumsfeld even cancelled deployment requests. The possibility that Phase IV activities would require more resources or a different

[515] Ibid, 503.

mix of resources than earlier combat phases was not contemplated.[516]

Second, the Bush administration made clear its disdain for nation-building. In fact, President Bush famously campaigned against the concept of nation-building and deriding the suggestion that the U.S. military should take the lead in building up failed states. In early 2003, Rumsfeld even gave a speech titled "Beyond Nation-Building" in which he indicated that the United States was out of that line of work.[517] Unfortunately, it is precisely what the United States needed to do in Iraq. Instead, the administration felt the United States could get into Iraq and swiftly get out. By ignoring the nation-building lessons drawn from the Balkans and other crises, the Bush administration unrealistically sought to shift the burden of reconstructing the Iraqi state to a divided and ethnically diverse population.

Third, the Pentagon had a particular vision for how the war would unfold, and so, no planning was undertaken to provide for the security of the Iraqi people. The working concept for the aftermath of the combat phase was that once Saddam Hussein was removed from power, the Iraqi government would remain largely intact, the Iraqi people would greet the U.S. military as liberators and rally to the cause of a newly configured Iraqi state, and the local police and military would maintain law and order. There would be no breakdown in security for which to

[516] "Iraq: Translating Lessons into Future DoD Policies," (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, February 7, 2005).
[517] Richard Cohen, "Let Rumsfeld Go," *The Washington Post*, December 6, 2005, (accessed March 1, 2013); available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/05/AR2005120501575.html.

plan. Unfortunately, the war plan was informed by untested assumptions. Alternative views, particularly from the Department of State, civilian think tanks and some military officers, about the post-war environment were discounted.

The above reasons help explain why Phase IV was not prioritized, but they do not explain why civilian and military planners did not rigorously engage in a deliberative discourse over the post-war plans. Had they done so, they may have tested planning assumptions and considered alternative conceptions of how the war should be prosecuted. However, underlying disputes over defense reform had heightened civil-military tensions. The Secretary of Defense had employed oversight mechanisms to ensure military compliance with defense policy. Rumsfeld limited the frequency of interactions with those officers who did not share his view. The Joint Staff were pushed to the margins and not involved in the planning process – a role they largely accepted as it was made clear any objections to the war plan were not welcomed.[518] Rumsfeld also appointed people with similar preferences to key positions. For example, General Myers was chosen as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs because of his track record as a team player,[519] and Franks' views on nation-building matched Rumsfeld's.

In the end, the civilian leadership over-stepped its authority, failed to integrate military preferences and perspectives into operational plans, and allowed their own motives and ideologies to dictate the war strategy in Iraq. At the same

[518] Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012.
[519] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 502.

time, the military leadership failed to prepare for the immediate, post-war environment and question the planning assumptions. The military was in charge of planning and executing the war in Iraq, and as such, they should have invested more resources in developing Phase IV, especially given the lessons learned from the Balkans. Bottom line, General Franks should not have taken his commanders into war without a Phase IV plan, General Myers should have offered independent military advice, and Joint Staff should not have remained silent.

Unfortunately, the civilian and military leadership did not engage in deliberative discourse prior to the 2003 Iraq War. They did not consider multiple perspectives or viewpoints, engage in a critical analysis of all planning assumptions and policy options, and explore alternative courses of action. In short, the nature of civil-military relations characterized by limited discourse led to an ineffective policy planning process, and therefore, a poor political and military outcome.

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G) Figure 1: Timeline of the Iraq War Planning Process

(References to post-conflict planning shaded in gray)
September 15: Bush and war cabinet discuss the US response to 9/11 attacks
September 17: NSC Principals discuss potential contingency plans on Iraq
November 21: Bush directs Rumsfeld to initiate planning for possible Iraq War
November 26: Rumsfeld meets with Franks at CENTCOM to discuss Iraq. They review the existing plan, OPLAN 1003, which outlines an air attack and invasion of Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein with as much as 450,000 US troops
December 1: Rumsfeld asks Franks to develop a new war plan for Iraq that is marked by "surprise, speed, shock, and risk," with the objective of regime change, elimination of WMD, and political solution for post-war Iraq
December 4: Franks presents the first iteration of the war plan. The force structure required to execute the plan is 380,000 troops
December 19: Franks meets with Rumsfeld and presents another iteration of the war plan, named Generated Start. The number of troops has been trimmed down to 275,000. The US would topple Saddam's regime after 135 days of fighting and then transition to reconstruction, the duration of which was marked as unknown. Franks asks to consult with State to "refine assumptions." To this Rumsfeld replies, "I want this to be worked by a small group."
December 28: Franks briefs Bush on Generated Start. Regarding the 275,000 troops envisioned in the plan), Rumsfeld intervenes, "Mr. President, we are still working through the number. The number [Franks] is giving you is soft."
January 29, 2002: In the State of the Union address, Bush describes Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an "axis of evil"
February 1: Franks presents an alternative plan to Rumsfeld, dubbed Running Start. The new plan envisions an almost simultaneous air and ground assault after a 45-day deployment schedule. There is pressure to reduce the number of troops
February 7: Franks presents Running Start to the President and NSC. Phase I-III will last 225 days. The duration of Phase IV is marked as unknown.
Spring 2002: The war plan continues to be modified. There is continued pressure by Rumsfeld to reduce force levels. Again, the duration of Phase IV is unknown, but estimates are as high as more than 2 years. Some Phase IV tasks identified include: establishment of Iraqi Self-Defense forces, and transition civil-military activities to international organization, NGOs, and Iraqi government
June: CENTCOM planners ask to meet with their counterparts at State to discuss Phase IV plans. OSD informs CENTCOM that State is not ready to meet
August 5: Franks briefs the President and NSC on war plan. The plan, now referred to as the Hybrid Plan envisions 5 days to mobilize, 11 days to deploy, a 16-day air campaign, followed by a ground campaign, with reinforcements flowing in for up to 125 days. Again, the duration of Phase IV is unknown.
August: Franks tells his planners that State has the lead in Phase IV planning
August: Myers presses Rumsfeld to enlarge the planning circle for the Iraq War. The Secretary authorizes Myers to bring in the service chiefs and appropriate combatant commanders into the planning process.

September 6-9: Franks briefs Hybrid Plan to Rumsfeld, Bush, NSC, and JCS
September: The Joint Staff send an internal memorandum to CENTCOM expressing concern over the lack of Phase IV planning.
September: McKiernan arrives in Kuwait and assumes command of Coalition Forces Land Component. As the new Commanding General, he reviews the Hybrid Plan and finds it short on combat power.
October: The JCS draft a Phase IV plan. They propose a HQ, overseen by a 3-star General and staffed by experts throughout the government. An army corps would direct post-war planning and administer the country once Saddam removed. A civilian head would replace the military once security established
November 28: Rumsfeld rejects the JCS plan. Insists DoD lead all post-war efforts and issues DoDD 3000.05: stability operations a core US military mission
December: JCS instructs Hawkins to oversee JTF-4. Hawkins assembles ad hoc staff to go to CENTCOM and work on Phase IV planning
December: CENTCOM does not know what to make of Hawkins and his "pick-up team" and pushes them off to McKiernan in Kuwait
December: McKiernan begins to sketch out his own Phase IV plan, Eclipse II
December 12: Rumsfeld meets with Franks and McKiernan, who favors Cobra II over Hybrid. Cobra II envisions 86,000 troops and 17,000 reservists for invasion
January 20, 2003: NSPD-24 creates ORHA, headed by Garner
February 21-22: Garner convenes conference at NDU to discuss post-war Iraq
March 15: Garner meets with Rumsfeld before leaving for Kuwait
March 19: The start of Operation Iraqi Freedom
April 9: Liberation of Baghdad
April 16: Freedom Message by Franks, which establishes the Coalition Provisional Authority, initially headed by Franks
April: Bush ask Bremer to serve as the lead civil administrator in Iraq
May 9: Presidential appointment of Bremer as Special Envoy to Iraq
May 12: Bremer arrives in Iraq
May 13: Letter from Rumsfeld naming Bremer the head of CPA
May 16: CPA Order 1: De-Baathification issued
May 23: CPA Order 2: Dissolution of the Iraqi Army issued

V) THE IRAQ SURGE: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE PLANNING PROCESS

A) Introduction

In this chapter, I review the planning process for the 2007 Iraq Surge to evaluate how civil-military relations characterized by a high degree of deliberative discourse affect the policy planning process, and therefore, the political and military outcome. Unlike the planning process for the 2003 Iraq War, which lacked a deliberative discourse process at the civil-military nexus, the planning process for the Iraq Surge was extensive, inclusive, and collaborative. A high degree of deliberative discourse characterized civil-military relations. In fact, the amount of back-and-forth and thorough reflection was quite extraordinary. Not only did the strategy review process include multiple perspectives on how to move forward in Iraq, there was a concerted effort to reconsider existing assumptions, examine a range of alternative strategies, and reach a civil-military consensus. As this chapter will show, the deliberative review process led to a successful political and military outcome. In less than a year, the United States achieved tactical success in Iraq that changed the course of the war and pulled the country back from the brink of civil war.

Interestingly, the strategy for the Iraq Surge was developed in the midst of a

civil-military crisis. In early 2006, several retired senior military officers, some of whom had recently served in Iraq, went public with their concerns over the mismanagement of the war by the leadership in the Pentagon. They criticized the Bush administration for distorting intelligence, micromanaging the war, alienating allies, failing to retain the Iraqi army, and denying that an insurgency existed. Their prescription was to replace Secretary Rumsfeld and others unwilling to fundamentally change their approach in Iraq.[520] Such intense public criticism from retired officers following their service is without precedent in American history.[521]

In addition to the "Revolt of the Generals," public support for the war in the United States dropped significantly, with over 50% of Americans supporting a troop pullout.[522] Members of Congress also publically chastised the administration's handling of the Iraq War. In an open letter to President Bush, top congressional leaders of the Democratic Party called for the withdrawal of an unspecified number of US troops from Iraq to bases nearby, with the first withdrawal by the end of the year.[523] Specifically, the letter condemned the Bush

[520] Paul D. Eaton, "A Top-Down Review for the Pentagon," The New York Times, March 19, 2006, (accessed October 10, 2013); available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/opinion/19eaton.html?pagewanted=print.
[521] Martin L. Cook, "Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in Professional Ethics," *Parameters*, US Army War College Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 4-15.
[522] "Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq: 2003-2008," Pew Research Center, March 18, 2008, (accessed October 10, 2013); available from: http://www.pewresearch.org/2008/03/19/public-attitudes-toward-the-war-in-iraq-20032008/.
[523] The letter was signed by the Senate and House minority leaders, Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi, by their deputies, Richard Durbin and Steny Hoyer, and by the senior Democrats on the Senate and House committees with responsibility for the Pentagon, foreign policy, intelligence and the military appropriations. "United House and Senate Democratic Leadership Put Forward Concrete Plan for Change of Course in Iraq," July 31, 2006, (accessed March 26, 2014); available from

administration for lacking a "coherent strategy to stabilize Iraq and achieve victory," and for its failed attempt "to revive a struggling reconstruction effort."[524]

Despite the public criticism over the Iraq strategy by members of Congress and by retired generals, the Department of Defense, and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld in particular, remained committed to the current strategy of building up the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to take the lead in maintaining security in Iraq. The senior military officers responsible for the Iraq War also supported this strategy. The Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF-I) Commander, General George W. Casey, and his boss, Central Command (CENTCOM) Combatant Commander General John Abizaid, believed the way forward was to reduce the size and visibility of the coalition forces and allow Iraqi forces to take on greater responsibility.[525]

The President's doubts over the Iraq strategy however intensified throughout the summer of 2006. Frustrated that he did not see any new thinking coming out of the Defense Department or from his senior military officers, Bush authorized his National Security Advisor, Stephen J. Hadley, to quietly conduct a

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http://democrats.senate.gov/2006/07/31/united-house-and-senate-democratic-leadership-put-forward-concrete-plan-for-change-of-course-in-iraq/#.U0R0_Bzgd_U.

[524] Ibid.

[525] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, From George W. Bush to Barack Obama*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2012); Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in* Iraq, (New York: Penguin Books, 2009); Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008); Bing West, *The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq*, (New York: Random House, 2008); Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends: General Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq*, (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008); John R. Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom: America's Long War with Iraq*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010).

White House strategy review.[526] Policy discussions on the Iraq War and any recommendations for personnel changes were to be kept confidential, however, as the President did not want to formally announce any changes until after the congressional elections in November.[527]

And so in the summer of 2006, the White House quietly began studying alternative strategies for the Iraq campaign. Initially, the White House relied on informal advisory processes and back channel discussions with White House insiders, junior-level commanders, retired military officers, and academic and think tank specialists to develop a new strategy for the Iraq rather than turn to Rumsfeld, Casey and Abizaid. In fact, Casey was neither consulted nor even aware of the discussions for a new strategy in Iraq until a few months before the President's announcement. And while Rumsfeld was aware of the strategy review, he played a minimal role during the process and continued to insist on staying the course.[528] The Secretary was completely "disengaged" from the Iraq War in 2006.[529]

Despite the absence of the Secretary of Defense and the senior military leadership, namely Generals Casey and Abizaid, in the strategy review process, the planning process for the Iraq Surge relied on the input of several key military officers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were involved in developing alternative

[526] George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 371.
[527] Ibid., 372.
[528] Secretary Rumsfeld devoted less than 3 pages in his memoir on the strategy review. Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 713-717.
[529] Interview, Major General H.R. McMaster, April 3, 2014.

strategies for the Iraq War in 2006. The Joint Staff convened a group of sixteen colonels who had served in Iraq or Afghanistan to examine the United States' global challenges and review the Iraq strategy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, regularly briefed the President on their progress. The White House also spoke frequently with retired General Jack Keane, who was the former Army Vice Chief of Staff in the lead up to the Iraq War. Through back channel discussion, the National Security Council (NSC) Iraq Team staff also consulted regularly with General Raymond Odierno, who returned to Baghdad as the new commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) in December 2006, and with General David Petraeus, who eventually replaced General Casey as MNF-I Commander in February 2007.

Before developing this argument, I begin with some background on the security situation in Iraq. I then review the war strategy executed by General Casey between 2004 and 2006, followed by a brief discussion on the revolt of the generals and the state of civil-military relations. Finally, I examine the multiple strategy reviews that led to the development of the surge strategy, including the formal processes, such as the Iraq Study Group (a bipartisan panel appointed by the United States Congress to assess the situation in Iraq) and the Council of Colonels (a working group organized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff), as well as the advice and recommendations from retired General Jack Keane, commanders outside the chain of command, such as General Raymond Odierno, and experts from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and academic community. The

chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the initial impact of the surge strategy. A summary table of the multiple planning groups for the Iraq Surge is included at the end of the chapter.

B) Descent into Chaos

After Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) removed Saddam Hussein from power in April 2003, the Bush Administration linked the end of the U.S. military occupation to the adoption of a new constitution and national elections – tasks expected to take two years.[530] On January 30, 2005, Iraqi citizens elected representatives for the newly formed 275-member Iraqi National Assembly. The election marked an important step in the transition from the interim structures established under the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) to an independent, sovereign Iraq.[531] The newly formed Assembly drafted a constitution that was put to a referendum on October 15, followed by a general election on December 15 to select a new government.

The success of the December 2005 elections in Iraq generated a great deal of optimism in the White House. President Bush pointed to the election as a sign

[530] Kenneth Katzman, "Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution," *CRS Report to Congress*, RS21968, June 15, 2006 (accessed October 3, 2013); available from http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/68287.pdf.
[531] An appointed government was given sovereignty on June 28, 2004, with a government and a permanent constitution to be voted on thereafter, as stipulated in a Transitional Administrative Law that was signed March 8, 2004. The results of the January 30, 2005 elections showed an overwhelming victory by the Shia United Iraqi Alliance party, largely because Sunnis in Iraq, perceiving electoral defeat and insurgent intimidation, boycotted the general elections. Kenneth Katzman, "Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution."

of progress in rebuilding Iraq. "In January 2006, the mission is to continue to hand over more and more territory and more and more responsibility to Iraqi forces," said Bush to reporters at the Pentagon. He added, "As we see more of these Iraqi forces in the lead, we will be able to continue with our stated strategy that says as Iraqi forces stand up, we will stand down."[532] In addition to achieving political progress in Iraq, US forces seemed to be making a difference in restoring security in Iraq, particularly in several key towns and cities, such as Fallujah, Basra, Tal Afar and Mosul. Many expected that the new government would contribute still more to stability, allowing for a reduction in US forces as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continued to grow in number and capability. Indeed, 2006 began as a year with much promise.

Tragically, a series of events quickly shattered all expectations for an end to US involvement in Iraq. On February 22, 2006, Sunni insurgents dressed as Iraqi police officers entered the Golden (al-Askari) Mosque in Samarra, one of the holiest sites in Shia Islam, and detonated two bombs. Within hours of the bombing, Shia militias (particularly those associated with Moqtada al-Sadr) began attacking Sunni mosques in Baghdad.[533] The bombing unleashed fierce sectarian fighting in Iraq, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths. Shia militias attacked dozens of Sunni mosques and other gatherings, and in response, Sunni insurgents

[532] *Bush: Iraqi forces will take more control in 2006* (accessed September 10, 2013); available from http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/01/04/bush.iraq/.
[533] The Shiite militias posed the most immediate threat to long-term stability in Iraq. The militias were diverse. Some were affiliated with the government, others targeted government ministries and undermined the Iraqi government, while others attacked Sunni civilians or operated wholly outside the law. One of the largest Shia militias was the Mahdi Army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr.

attacked Shiite neighborhoods. The sectarian violence was focused in Baghdad and in the southwest Diyala province.[534]

After the Samarra bombing, the nature of the Iraqi conflict began to change, moving away from an insurgency against the coalition to a struggle for the political and economic power of Iraq.[535] In fact, the sectarian violence that followed the bombing put Iraq on the brink of civil war.[536] According to Department of Defense estimates, the number of ethno-sectarian incidents and deaths by execution between February and July 2006 alone numbered over 4,500 civilians lives lost.[537]

Unfortunately, the United States was slow to respond to the changing nature of the Iraqi conflict. Rather than change tactics, the US military launched a series of operations that was in line with the existing strategy of encouraging Iraqis to take ownership for their security. To tamp down the spiraling violence, prevent further reprisal killings, and increase security in Baghdad, US and Iraqi forces launched Operation Scales of Justice in March, Operations Together

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[534] The violence across the rest of the country remained relatively low, with the exception of Anbar. Violence there was directed against coalition forces.

[535] Interview, General George W. Casey, Jr. (Ret.), October 18, 2013. George W. Casey, Jr., *Strategic Reflections: Operation Iraqi Freedom, July 2004-February 2007*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2012), 92.

[536] Initially many observers considered the mosque bombing to have sparked the Sunni-Shiite conflict that approached a civil war from 2006 to 2007. Later evidence did not support this view. Looking back at the months preceding the February 22 bombing, the sectarian conflict had already been under way since 2005. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 195. Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 33.

[537] The Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: November 2006 Report to Congress in accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)*, November 30, 2006, (accessed October 10, 2013); available from http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/9010Quarterly-Report-20061216.pdf.

Forward I in June, and Operations Together Forward II in August.[538] For each operation, the plan was for US forces to move in and clear neighborhoods of security threats, and for the ISF and Iraqi National Police to follow to secure the population. Unfortunately, this strategy, also referred to as "clear, hold, and build," failed to make any dent in overall violence.[539]

A number of factors hampered the success of the operations. First, there were insufficient forces to hold cleared neighborhoods. For example, during Operation Together Forward I, US forces committed inadequate combat power (only 15,000 US troops in Baghdad) to hold cleared areas, relying on Iraqi security forces and police to maintain security.[540] Once coalition forces cleared neighborhoods of suspected insurgents, however, ISF was unable to keep the

[538] For Operation Scales of Justice, General George Casey committed three US brigades to bolster the over 30,000 Iraqi police forces. Bing West, *The Strongest Tribe*, 117. Operation Together Forward I was from June 14 to July 24, 2006. Operation Together Forward II was from August 1 to October 24, 2006. For these operations, coalition forces would fully integrate Iraqi Security Forces and Iraqi National Police. Over 48 battalions (roughly 50,000 personnel) were committed to Operation Together Forward – 13 Iraqi army battalions, 25 Iraqi national police battalions, and 10 coalition forces battalions. Institute for the Study of War, *Operation Together Forward I*, (accessed September 20, 2013); available from http://www.understandingwar.org/operation/operation-together-forward-i. Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 49.

[539] In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 19, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice outlined the administration's strategy in Iraq. "Our political-military strategy has to be to clear, hold, and build: to clear areas from insurgent control, to hold them securely, and to build durable, national Iraqi institutions," she said. "As I have said, our strategy is to clear, hold, and build." Secretary Condoleezza Rice, "Iraq and U.S. Policy," Opening Remarks Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., October 19, 2005, (accessed September 22, 2013); available from: http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/55303.htm.

The *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, (or FM 3-24), was released in December 2006 and detailed the objections of clear-hold-build operations: "create a secure physical and psychological environment, establish firm government control of the populace and area, and gain the populace's support." *Clear* is a tactical mission that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance. *Hold* requires securing key infrastructure and separating the people from the insurgents. *Build* refers to actions that build support and protect the population, such as foot patrols, improving infrastructure, etc. United States Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 151-197.

[540] *The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward – A New Approach*, (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 15.

insurgents and militias from filtering back. Still worse, ISF lacked sufficient manpower. Only two of the planned six Iraqi battalions participated in the operation.[541] The *Iraq Study Group Report*, published in December 2006, later concluded that further security efforts in Baghdad would continue to fail "unless the Iraqis have both the capability to hold areas that have been cleared and the will to clear neighborhoods that are home to Shiite militias."[542]

Second, the violence in Iraq was increasing in scope, complexity and lethality.[543] The multiple sources of violence included Sunni insurgents, Shiite militias, al Qaeda and affiliated jihadists, and vigilantes and organized criminals. Whereas coalition forces faced significant pressure from Sunni insurgents (from 2003-2007), the principal challenge to Iraq's stability in 2006, particularly in and around Baghdad, was sectarian violence. To this end, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I), led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, issued a declaration of war against "Shia infidels" on September 14, 2005.[544] AQ-I's ultimate goal was to instigate a sectarian war between Iraq's Sunni and Shia in order to drive out the United States from Iraq.

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[541] John R. Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 196.

[542] *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 15. Discussed later in the chapter, the Iraq Study Group was a bipartisan panel appointed to assess the situation in Iraq, review the US strategy, and chart a new and politically acceptable path forward. The Iraq Study Group was a part of the deliberative discourse.

[543] Only four of Iraq's eighteen provinces were highly insecure – Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. These four provinces accounted for 40 percent of Iraq's population of 26 million. Frederick W. Kagan, "Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq – Phase I Report," *American Enterprise Institute*, A Report of the Iraq Planning Group, January 5, 2007, (accessed September 20, 2013); available from http://www.aei.org/papers/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/middle-east-and-north-africa/choosing-victory-a-plan-for-success-in-iraq-paper/.

[544] AQ-I was responsible for some of the most spectacular acts of violence: suicide attacks, large truck bombs, and attacks on religious or political targets. AQ-I included many disenfranchised Sunnis and affiliated Iraqi Islamists, and relied on foreign fighters (approximately 1,300) filtering into Iraq through Syria to carry out many suicide operations. *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 10. George W. Casey, Jr., *Strategic Reflections*, 14.

AQ-I orchestrated the Samarra mosque bombing in February 2006, which instigated widespread sectarian attacks and revenge killings. Over 3,000 Iraqi civilians were killed each month in sectarian fighting following the Samarra mosque bombing.[545]

Shiite militias also instigated widespread sectarian fighting in order to challenge US and Iraqi security forces. In fact, the Shiite militias posed the most immediate threat to long-term stability in Iraq. The militias were diverse. Some were affiliated with the government, others targeted government ministries and undermined the Iraqi government, and others attacked Sunni civilians or operated wholly outside the law. One of the largest Shia militias, the Mahdi Army led by Moqtada al-Sadr, included over 60,000 fighters and regularly engaged in revenge killings of Sunnis in order to pressure the withdrawal of coalition forces.[546] Ultimately, the Mahdi Army sought to control the Iraqi government.

A third factor that hindered the success of Operations Scales of Justice and Together Forward I and II was the active participation of the Iraqi National Police in the sectarian war.[547] The Badr Brigade, a Shiite militia with strong ties with

[545] The Sunni insurgency included former Baathist elements of the Saddam Hussein regime, disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis, and common criminals. The insurgency had no single leadership or common goal. Instead, it was a diverse conglomeration of groups, with some focused on restoring local rule and power, with others aspiring to return to Sunni dominance of Iraq, and some elements wanting to simply drive out Shia civilians from mixed neighborhoods. All insurgents opposed the presence of US forces in Iraq, and therefore, most attacks against US forces came from Sunni insurgents. Sunni insurgents operated mainly in Anbar and Baghdad. *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 10.
[546] *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 11.
[547] Interview, General George W. Casey, Jr. (Ret.), October 18, 2013, George W. Casey, Jr., *Strategic Reflections*, 91.

the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, had integrated many of its members into the Iraqi police force.[548] Some reports indicated that many Iraqi police officers had only enlisted in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, and ammunition for use in the sectarian conflict.[549]

A final factor was the uneven commitment of the Iraqi government to partner with US and coalition forces to maintain security and clear areas of insurgents, militias, and terrorists. For example, after the Samarra mosque bombing, the Iraqi government was reluctant to impose weapons and militia bans. Still worse, the Iraqi government prohibited US operations in Sadr City, a predominately Shia neighborhood northeast of Baghdad and home to the Mahdi Army. Such moves fueled Sunni suspicions that the Iraqi government was not truly representative. Making matters worse, many key players within the government continued to act in their sectarian interest. As a result, the new government struggled to resolve many political issues (e.g., national reconciliation, security, and governance) and win Iraqi confidence. Though the new Iraqi government had been elected in December 2005, the Iraqi Council of Representatives was slow to form. It took over six months of negotiations between the parties receiving the majority of votes to form a "government of national unity" under the leadership of the new prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki.[550]

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[548] Frederick W. Kagan, "Choosing Victory," 14.
[549] *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 13.
[550] The parties receiving the majority of votes in the December 2005 elections were the United Iraqi Alliance (a coalition dominated by Shiite parties), the Iraqi Accord Front (the main Sunni

C) The Casey Strategy: A Strategy Built on Flawed Assumptions

After the failure of Operations Scales of Justice, Together Forward I and Together Forward II, it became increasingly evident that a change in strategy was needed. The United States was slow to adapt. Why? General Casey's view of nation building and of how to conduct the counterinsurgency (discussed below) was partly to blame. However, the real problem was that the United States strategy was built on weak assumptions. Assumptions that had not been tested, probed, discussed, or reviewed in a deliberative process.

When General George Casey assumed command in Iraq from Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez on June 1, 2004, his instructions were to finish off Al-Qaeda-linked insurgents in Iraq, safeguard Iraq's borders, and allow Iraqi troops to "take the lead in capturing or killing former regime elements."[551] A strategy that encouraged Iraqis to take ownership and accept responsibility for their security was in line with Casey's own view of nation building. His own experience in Bosnia had taught him that, by assuming too heavy a burden for security and national reconstruction, the US military had merely prevented the host nations from taking responsibility for maintaining security.[552] Unfortunately, this view of national building not only colored Casey's view on how to fight in

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bloc), the Kurdistani Alliance, and the Iraqi National List (established by Iyad Allawi, who served as the interim Prime Minister before the January 2005 elections). Kenneth Katzman, "Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution."; John R. Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 193.

[551] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 90-92.

[552] George W. Casey, Jr., *Strategic Reflections*, 13.

Iraq; it also hindered his ability to adapt US tactics to the changing conflict in 2006.

In addition to his view of nation building, Casey disagreed with his planners on how to conduct counterinsurgency. As with all counterinsurgency operations, the General knew that the center of gravity was the population. However, he disagreed with his planners on who could "deliver" the population – the coalition or the Iraqi government. Casey believed that since the United States goal was the formation of a representative government in Iraq, US forces would have to work to help build the legitimacy of the Iraqi government.[553] It was a top-down approach that focused on building up the Iraqi government and its security institutions, rather than on securing the population. Again, the General's own views impeded his ability to adapt US strategy.

What was General Casey's strategy for Iraq? When the General issued his campaign plan on August 5, 2004, it reflected the *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*. The strategy emphasized efforts to establish a representative Iraqi government, train and equip Iraqi security forces, and conduct counterinsurgency operations in partnership with the Iraqi government.[554] White House officials used two slogans to explain the military campaign in Iraq. The first was "clear, hold, and build": clear areas of enemy control, insurgents and death squads; hold

[553] Interview, General George W. Casey, Jr. (Ret.), October 18, 2013.
[554] Interview, General George W. Casey, Jr. (Ret.), October 18, 2013. National Security Council, "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," November 2005, (accessed August 5, 2013), available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/Iraqnationalstrategy11-30-05.pdf.

cleared territory with Iraqi security forces from enemy influence; and build areas with quick-impact reconstruction projects.[555] The second was "as the Iraqi forces stand up, we will stand down": the creation of Iraqi security forces capable of maintaining security would allow US forces to come home.[556]

The strategy of building up Iraqi Security Forces (and of "clear, hold and build") to expedite the eventual withdrawal of US forces rested on several weak assumptions – that host nation security forces could be developed and trained for combat in a relatively short time and that elections would produce a representative and legitimate government to end Iraq's political vacuum.[557] Again, had there been a deliberative process to test these assumptions either prior to the start of the Iraq War, or at any point thereafter, it would have been evident that the strategy rested on flawed assumptions.

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[555] *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 12. National Security Council, "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," 2. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 19, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice outlined the administration's strategy in Iraq. "Our political-military strategy has to be to clear, hold, and build: to clear areas from insurgent control, to hold them securely, and to build durable, national Iraqi institutions," she said. "As I have said, our strategy is to clear, hold, and build." Secretary Condoleezza Rice, "Iraq and U.S. Policy," Opening Remarks Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., October 19, 2005, (accessed September 22, 2013); available from: http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/55303.htm.

[556] On June 28, 2005, in a televised speech, President Bush cited progress in Iraq and emphasized that "the best way to complete the mission in Iraq is to help the Iraqi people build a nation they can govern and defend themselves. The principal task of our military is to find and defeat the terrorists," he said. "And as we pursue the terrorists, our military is helping to train Iraqi security forces so that they can defend their people and fight the enemy on their own. Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." John D. Banusiewicz, "As Iraqis Stand Up, We Will Stand Down," American Forces Press Service, Washington, D.C., June 28, 2005, (accessed September 24, 2013); available from: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=16277. The initial plan was for the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq to have trained and equipped approximately 326,000 Iraqi security service members (138,000 members of the Iraqi Army and 188,000 Iraqi police) by the end of 2006. *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 12.

[557] John R. Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 197; Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This End*, 19.

First, the US government wrongly assumed that the Iraqi police were relatively professional.[558] In fact, the Iraqi police under Saddam Hussein were poorly trained and held in low regard by the population.[559] Their reputation did not improve during the American occupation. In 2005, the Ministry of Interior (under Bayan Jabr, a Shiite) enlisted a disproportionate number of Shiite officers, even incorporating members of Shiite militias into the force.[560] The police routinely engaged in sectarian violence and officers often employed brutal tactics against Sunni suspects and civilians.[561] In November 2005, coalition forces discovered a police detention facility in which Sunni detainees were tortured.[562] Later evidence revealed police involvement in the sectarian killings after the Samarra bombing.

Another misconception was that the Iraqi army was available for recall to help with both the maintenance of order and the reconstruction of Iraq.[563] When the United States disbanded the Iraqi army in May 2003, officials assumed that the Iraq army could be easily recalled, and that once recalled, it would consist of cohesive units independent of government influence. Unfortunately, the Iraqi army simply melted away when Baghdad fell. Officers went home, bases were looted, and records were lost. The Iraqi army would have to be built from scratch.

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[558] In *War and Decision*, Feith writes of the CIA assessment that the Iraqi police fore would continue to function after Saddam's ouster. The CIA projected most of the policemen would remain on the job, because "they were professional and not viewed by Iraqis as an instrument of Baathist repression." Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision*, 363.
[559] John R. Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 198.
[560] *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 12.
[561] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 146.
[562] George W. Casey, Jr., *Strategic Reflections*, 79.
[563] Refer to the previous case study, specifically to footnote 488, for details on the dissolution of the Iraqi army.

Although the Iraqi army was one of the more professional Iraqi institutions, it faced significant challenges when recalled. Units lacked leadership, equipment, personnel, and logistics. The ISF was not strong enough in 2006 to handle the sectarian fighting without significant US assistance.

The third weak assumption – that elections would produce a representative government – underestimated the polarizing effect elections would have across the country. The January 2005 elections produced a Shia government, largely because Sunnis in Iraq, perceiving electoral defeat and insurgent intimidation, had boycotted the general elections. As a result of the election outcome and subsequent constitutional referendum, the Sunni population felt disenfranchised. They also perceived increased Iranian influence on the largely Shia government. The involvement of the National Police in sectarian killings only confirmed Sunni suspicions. In short, the Sunni population did not view the Iraqi government as the legitimate representative of the people.[564]

The United States government also failed to anticipate the debilitating effect that three government transitions in two years would have on coalition efforts to increase the capacity of Iraqi institutions and provide consistent Iraqi leadership to the Iraqi people.[565] After each election, there would be a loss of momentum as the government (including ministers and other key personnel) was selected, formed, and transitioned into the job. There also was a loss in strategic

[564] Kenneth Katzman, "Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution."
[565] Interview, General George W. Casey, Jr. (Ret.), October 18, 2013.

momentum with changes in United States armed forces and Embassy staff. The MNC-I, and its subordinate units, would change in February, while key leaders in the Embassy would turnover in the summer.[566] With each departure or transition, there was a loss in knowledge and relationships had to be rebuilt.

D) A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations – The Revolt of the Generals

Frustrated with the mismanagement of the war by the Pentagon leadership and slow military response to adapt to the changing security environment, retired senior officers went public with their concerns, triggering a crisis in civil-military relations. The "Revolt of the Generals"[567] began on March 19 when retired General Paul D. Eaton, who had been the first to oversee the Iraqi military training effort and commanded the Coalition Military Assistance Training Teams in Iraq from 2003 to 2004, wrote an opinion piece for the *New York Times* that questioned Secretary Rumsfeld's ability to lead the United States armed forces. Eaton even called for the secretary's resignation. "He has shown himself incompetent strategically, operationally and tactically, and is far more than anyone else responsible for what has happened to our important mission in Iraq. Mr. Rumsfeld must step down."[568]

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[566] George W. Casey, Jr., *Strategic Reflections*, 68.
[567] John R. Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 290.
[568] Paul D. Eaton, "A Top-Down Review for the Pentagon," The New York Times, March 19, 2006, (accessed October 10, 2013); available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/opinion/19eaton.html?pagewanted=print.

Next, retired Lieutenant General Gregory Newbold, who had served as the director of operations on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, went public with a similar critique in *Times* magazine. Like Eaton, he blamed the Bush administration for distorting intelligence, micromanaging the war, alienating allies, failing to retain the Iraqi army, and denying that an insurgency existed.[569] His prescription? "We need fresh ideas and fresh faces," he wrote. "That means, as a first step, replacing Rumsfeld and many others unwilling to fundamentally change their approach."[570]

Other retired generals began to speak out and criticize the administration. Retired Major General John Batiste, who had been the senior military assistant to Wolfowitz and Commander of the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq in 2004-2005, retired Major General Charles Swannack, who commanded the 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq, retired General Anthony C. Zinni, who commanded CENTCOM from 1997-2000, and retired Major General John Riggs all called for the resignation of Secretary Rumsfeld.[571]

Although such intense public criticism from retired officers following their service is without precedent in American history, their concerns over the ability of Secretary Rumsfeld to lead the Iraq War were not unfounded.[572] After it

[569] Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012.
[570] Lieutenant General Greg Newbold (Ret.), "Why Iraq was a Mistake: A Military Insider Sounds Off Against the War and the Zealots Who Pushed It," Time Magazine, April 9. 2006; (accessed June 15, 2012); available from: http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1181629,00.html.
[571] John R. Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 193. Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 39.
[572] Martin L. Cook, "Revolt of the Generals," 7.

had become clear in 2004 that the assumptions of how the Iraq War would unfold were widely off base, Secretary Rumsfeld's stock began to steadily decline. In the lead up to the invasion of Iraq, Rumsfeld yielded significant power and influence in the Bush administration. He essentially dictated Iraq policy in 2003. That was no longer the case in 2006. His influence over Iraq policy had waned, even though he was still the Secretary of Defense.[573]

With Iraq on the brink of civil war, and in response to military failures in stopping the escalating sectarian conflict, the ineffectiveness of the Iraqi security forces and political leadership in Iraq, as well as the growing criticism of the administration's handling of the Iraq War, the White House finally acknowledged the need for a new US strategy in Iraq. Rather than turn to the individuals responsible for handling the Iraq War – Secretary Rumsfeld, General Casey, and General Abizaid – the White House, particularly staff on the NSC Iraq Team, reached out to individuals that could present new thinking to the White House.

E) The Search for a New Way Forward

Prior to the launch of a formal White House strategy review for the Iraq War in November 2006, a number of review processes had been underway since

[573] This statement is based on interview notes. Interview, Peter D. Feaver, January 10, 2014. Interview, Major General H.R. McMaster, April 3, 2014. However, a review of articles, books, and memoirs addressing this period, including Secretary Rumsfeld's own memoir, suggest the Secretary played a minimal role in strategy discussions. President Bush does not reference the Secretary very much in his account of this period either. Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*; George W. Bush, *Decision Points*; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*; Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble;* Bob Woodward, *The War Within*.

earlier in the year. In March, the United States Congress appointed the Iraq Study Group (ISG) to assess the situation in Iraq, review the US strategy, and chart a new and politically acceptable path forward. In June, the White House invited a group of outside experts to Camp David to brief the President and offer their perspective on the way forward in Iraq. Meanwhile, the National Security Council, Department of State, and Office of the Vice President, held informal review sessions to sort out their multiple perspectives.

Interestingly, a cursory review of the planning process for the Iraq Surge falsely leads one to assume that the military played a minimal role in the strategy review since the most senior military leaders responsible for handling the Iraq War, Generals Casey and Abizaid, were not involved. However, unlike the planning process for the Iraq War, the military played a prominent role in developing the Iraq Surge strategy. Military input came from formal channels, such as through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, launched a strategy review, dubbed the Council of Colonels, in September to examine the United States' global challenges and review the Iraq strategy.

The NSC Iraq Team also embraced many junior-level commanders and retired military officers in its strategy reviews. For example, one of the NSC Iraq Team staffers involved in the Iraq strategy review was Brigadier General Kevin Bergner. Prior to his NSC appointment in December 2005 as the Special

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Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Iraq, Bergner served in Iraq as Deputy Commander, Multi-National Force-Northwest. As a military insider, Bergner provided a unique perspective to the formal and informal White House strategy reviews.[574] The NSC Iraq Team also reached out to General David Petraeus, who at the time served as the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and oversaw the publication of Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. The Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq, Meghan L. O'Sullivan, had numerous informal discussions with Petraeus on what a troop surge might accomplish militarily in Iraq.[575] Petraeus and Bergner helped the NSC Iraq Team understand how a troop surge might succeed militarily.

In assessing how many troops were needed for a surge in Iraq, the NSC Iraq Team also relied on the work of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a conservative think-tank that was working with retired and active military officers on a plan for a troop surge. AEI had teamed up with retired Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Jack Keane, to develop a surge strategy. Moreover, many of the active and retired officers ironing out the details of a surge had recently returned from Iraq and were working with AEI.

Finally, aware a formal strategy review could not move forward without the support of the Department of Defense, the NSC Iraq Team reached out to William

[574] Ibid.
[575] Ibid.

J. Luti, a former Navy pilot who had gone to work for Rumsfeld after retiring from the military. In the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War, Luti was an aide to Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, Douglas J. Feith, and helped oversee the work of the Office of Special Plans.[576] In 2006, he served as the Senior Director for Defense on the NSC. Hadley asked Luti to consider how a troop surge might work.[577] Luti submitted his confidential briefing, "Changing the Dynamics in Iraq: Surge and Fight, Create Breathing Space, and then Accelerate the Transition," which recommended a surge in US forces to "secure and hold" and "to provide enhanced security in Baghdad and other insurgent" hotspots.[578] It was clear that the Casey strategy was failing, Luti argued, and in order for the United States to prevail it would have to commit more forces.[579] Hadley passed on Luti's briefing to General Pace to share with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "All I'd ask is to consider this in your process," Hadley said, hoping the military would propose a surge as well.[580]

When President George W. Bush announced a dramatic shift in United States policy in Iraq on January 10, 2007, the plan reflected months of deliberations between the civilian and military leadership. Rather than continue with the strategy of accelerating primary responsibility for the transition of

[576] The Office of Special Plans, which existed from September 2002 to June 2003, was a controversial Pentagon policy outfit that was accused of providing the Bush administration with skewed intelligence linking Iraq and al-Qaeda in an effort to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
[577] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 288; Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 161; Bing West, *The Strongest Tribe*, 197.
[578] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 288; Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 170; Bing West, *The Strongest Tribe*, 198.
[579] Bing West, *The Strongest Tribe*, 198.
[580] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 171.

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security in Iraq to Iraqis, the President proposed a troop surge. Along with the new strategy, the President made significant changes to his national security team for Iraq. Robert Gates replaced Donald H. Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense in December, after the congressional elections in which the Democrats secured control of both houses of Congress.[581] General George Casey moved to the Pentagon to serve as the Army Chief of Staff. General David Petraeus succeeded Casey as the new MNF-I Commander. The President also appointed Admiral William J. Fallon to replace General John Abizaid as CENTCOM Commander.

President Bush had a new strategy and new team in place to run the Iraq War. The strategy reflected months of intense deliberations that included multiple perspectives and viewpoints, a critical analysis of all assumptions and policy options, and an exploration of alternative courses of action. More importantly, it reflected the consensus of the civilian and military leadership.

The plan was to surge five army brigades and two marine battalions into Baghdad to secure the capital and bring an end to the rising and violent sectarian

[581] The President did not formally launch the White House strategy review or announce any changes in leadership until after the congressional elections in November. In his memoir, Rumsfeld writes that he would resign if the Democrats took control of either house of Congress during the mid-term congressional elections on November 7, 2006. He suspected Democrats who were campaigning against the war would use their positions on congressional committees to reconsider old questions such as pre-war intelligence on Iraq. Rumsfeld also writes that it did not appear to him at the time that the President was considering a wholesale change in strategy. For him to write this demonstrates that he was not involved in any of the informal or formal discussions, or at least did not take seriously, the efforts of Hadley and others (discussed in further detail in the coming pages) to change the Iraq strategy. Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 705-707.

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violence.[582] In some areas of Baghdad, there was an immediate decline in sectarian violence, while in others the violence worsened with the influx of American and Iraqi troops.[583] Nevertheless, the monthly average of civilian deaths was down dramatically to less than 500 per month by the end of the year.[584] Forces also deployed into the belts surrounding the capital to disrupt the al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I) network. United States and Iraqi forces also targeted Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, something the Iraqi government had previously prohibited.[585]

In less than a year, the United States had changed the course of the Iraq War. Militarily, the surge succeeded in tamping down the sectarian violence in Baghdad, disrupting AQ-I, and sidelining the Mahdi Army. Of course, other factors also helped reduce the level of violence in Iraq. In August 2007, al-Sadr declared a ceasefire and ordered the Mahdi Army to stand down. American military and Iraqi civilian deaths steadily declined following the cease-fire.[586] Another important factor was the role of the Anbar Awakening (also known as the Sunni Awakening). Beginning in 2006, groups of concerned local citizens began to revolt against the draconian tactics of AQ-I. The movement spread across

[582] The initial surge of roughly 20,000 troops quietly rose to over 30,000 troops after General David Petraeus requested additional force enablers such as a combat aviation brigades. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 345; Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends*, 89.
[583] In the period between August 2006 to January 2007, there were as many as 2,000 to 3,800 civilians killed per month. The Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: March 2008 Report to Congress in accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)*, March 7, 2008, (accessed October 20, 2013); available from http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/master%20%20mar08%20-%20final%20signed.pdf, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 345.
[584] The Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, 19.
[585] *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 11.
[586] The Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, 19.

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much of the country in 2007 and 2008. Although the strategy review for the Iraq Surge had not foreseen the potential impact of the Awakening, commanders on the ground seized the opportunity to support the Sunni revolt.[587]

In the following sections, I review each of the strategy reviews to demonstrate how the combined efforts of the civilian and military leadership led to the success of the Iraq Surge. Civilian-led strategy reviews involved the military, and the military regularly consulted with the civilian leadership in its review process. Indeed, the strategy review was an open-ended evaluative and comprehensive consultative process at the civil-military nexus. These reviews were concurrent and began in earnest during the summer of 2006. A summary chart of the multiple planning groups, along with a timeline, is included at the end of the chapter.

F) The Iraq Strategy Review: The Civilians Weigh Their Options

This section reviews the work of the Iraq Study Group, discusses the informal White House strategy review, and assesses the influence of outside experts on the planning process.

[587] Those involved in the movement, who later came to be known as the Sons of Iraq, coordinated operations with coalition and Iraqi combat commanders. Greg Bruno, "The Role of the 'Sons of Iraq' in Improving Security," *Washington Post*, April 28, 2008 (accessed October 18, 2013); available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/28/AR2008042801120.html. Richard H. Shultz, *The Marines Take Anbar: the Four-year Fight Against al-Qaeda*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013).

1. The Iraq Study Group

On March 15, 2006, the United States Congress appointed the Iraq Study Group to assess the situation in Iraq, review the US strategy, and chart a new and politically acceptable path forward. With such well-connected Washington insiders from both parties leading the review, the theory was that the recommendations reached by the panel would carry enormous weight with both the Bush administration and Congress.[588]

Over the next eight months, the Iraq Study Group consulted with Iraqi officials and representatives, senior administration officials (including President Bush and National Security Advisor Hadley), officials from the Department of Defense (such as Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Casey), the State Department, intelligence community and members of Congress.[589]

In August 2006, the Iraq Study Group traveled to Iraq to hear the ground commanders' assessment of the security situation. Casey stressed that the Iraqi army needed another twelve to eighteen months before it was strong enough to

[588] Leading the ten-person bipartisan panel was James A. Baker, former Secretary of State, and Lee H. Hamilton, former US representative. In addition to Baker, other republican members were Sandra Day O'Conner, former Supreme Court Justice, Alan K. Simpson, former US Senator from Wyoming, Edwin Meese III, former US Attorney General, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, former Secretary of State. For the democrats, Hamilton selected William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, former White House Chief of Staff, Charles S. Robb, former Governor and US Senator from Virginia, and Vernon Jordan, Jr., an attorney and Democratic Party insider. *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 74-83.

[589] ISG Plenary Sessions: March 15, 2006, April 11-12, 2006, May 18-19, 2005, June 13-14, 2006, August 2-3, 2006, August 30-September 4, 2006 (Trip to Baghdad), September 18-19, 2006, November 13-14, 2006, and November 27-29, 2006. *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 65.

confront Iraq's security issues.[590] When asked if additional troops over a three to six month period would help forces gain control and bring order to Baghdad, the general opposed the idea. Casey did not think additional US forces would do any good unless the Iraqi government or Prime Minister Maliki was prepared to overcome sectarian biases.[591]

While members of the Iraq Study Group met with senior ranking officers, Charles Robb ventured outside of the Green Zone to get a clearer view of the country. After meeting with several lower-ranking military officers, Robb was surprised that the senior military leadership was not insisting on more troops. The accounts of sectarian violence and mayhem contradicted what the senior military leaders and Iraqi officials, safe inside the Green Zone, had told him.[592]

After the Iraq Study Group's trip to Baghdad, Robb proposed the United States carry out a temporary surge in Iraq. Other Iraq Study Group members disagreed, favoring instead accelerating Casey's transition plan and having a clear deadline for US withdrawal. When the ISG released the final report on December 6, 2006, its seventy-nine recommendations focused on transitioning the United States military mission from direct combat to training the Iraqi forces, pressing the Iraqi government to achieve political development and assume responsibility for Iraqi security, and initiating diplomatic efforts with Iran and Syria. How the United States would achieve this was left unanswered. Sadly, the core military

[590] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 273.
[591] Ibid, 274.
[592] Ibid.

recommendation – handing over security responsibility to Iraqis and a drawdown of American forces – essentially favored the status quo.

Truth be told, the Iraq Study Group was designed to validate the White House strategy of transitioning to Iraqi self-reliance.[593] The problem was that by the time the Iraq Study Group released its recommendations in December, the President had changed his mind on how to move forward in Iraq based on unfolding events on the ground. Therefore, to signal to Congress and the American people where the administration might end up, the NSC Iraq Team asked the Iraq Study Group to insert some language on a short-term surge.[594] A surge clause was buried in the middle of the report.

> Because of the importance of Iraq to our regional security goals and to our ongoing fight against al Qaeda, we considered proposals to make a substantial increase (100,000 to 200,000) in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. We rejected this course because we do not believe that the needed levels are available for a sustained deployment. Further, adding more American troops could conceivably worsen those aspects of the security problem that are fed by the view that the U.S. presence is intended to be a long-term "occupation." We could, however, support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission, if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective.[595]

Despite the report's soft language on a surge of American forces, Robb continued to push for a short-term troop increase. When the Iraq Study Group

[593] Interview Peter D. Feaver, January 10, 2014.
[594] Ibid.
[595] *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 50.

presented its report at the White House on December 6, Robb advised the President to "take a look at that surge concept."[596]

2. The NSC Iraq Team

For two and half years, President Bush supported the strategy of withdrawing American forces as the Iraqis stepped forward. And although the Iraq Study Group was preparing to release a report that essentially validated the current strategy, the President began to question that approach.[597] Stephen Hadley, his National Security Advisor, urged the President to consider an alternative strategy to address the sectarian conflict and overall deteriorating situation in Iraq.[598]

To jump-start a strategy review that would not trigger an interagency fight or invite significant push back from Rumsfeld, Hadley and his NSC staff invited a group of outside experts to Camp David on June 12, 2006 to offer their perspectives on how to move forward in Iraq.[599] The hope was that the views of the outside experts on alternative strategies in Iraq would help launch an

[596] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 302.
[597] George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, 363.
[598] George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, 363; Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 9.
[599] The outside experts were Fred Kagan, Robert Kaplan, Michael Vickers, and Eliot Cohen. Fred Kagan, an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, urged the President to consider a troop surge. Robert Kaplan, an author who had written on the Balkans and other failed states, advised the President to adopt counterinsurgency practices. On whether to send additional troops to Iraq, Kaplan did not necessarily disagree, but thought that the troops already in Iraq were being used incorrectly. Michael Vickers, a former CIA officer, suggested the President drawdown conventional forces and rely more on special operations forces. Finally, Eliot Cohen, the author of *Supreme Command*, which argued that it was the responsibility of the civilians to question the generals, pushed for a different approach and different commanders. Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 43; Interview, Peter D. Feaver, January 10, 2014.

interagency discussion and strategy review. Rumsfeld and Casey were not receptive to Hadley's attempts to trigger a strategy review.[600]

Unfortunately, the meeting did not generate any follow-up. News flowing out of Iraq had reenergized the President's commitment to the existing strategy.[601] In May, after six months of negotiations, the 275-member Iraqi Council of Representatives had finally selected a new prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki. President Bush was planning to fly to Baghdad the following day to meet with Maliki. News had also just arrived from General Stanley McChrystal, the Joint Special Operations commander, that Zarqawi had been found and killed.

Nevertheless, Hadley and his NSC Iraq team continued to discuss possible alternative strategies. To ensure a wide array of perspectives were included in the process, the strategy review team included active and retired military, defense experts, and academics.[602] One of the staffers was Meghan L. O'Sullivan.[603] As the Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq, O'Sullivan wrote a daily highly classified Iraq Note that covered casualties, bombings, military operations and intelligence. The note went directly to Hadley, the President, the Vice President,

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[600] Interview, General George W. Casey, Jr., October 18, 2013.
[601] Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 44.
[602] NSC staffers involved in the Iraq strategy review were Meghan L. O'Sullivan, Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq, Brigadier General Kevin Bergner, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Iraq; Peter D. Feaver, Special Advisor for Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform; Brett McGurk, Director for Iraq; and William J. Luti, Senior Director for Defense.
[603] O'Sullivan previously worked for Lieutenant General Jay Garner, who had overseen the post-war reconstruction effort under the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). She later worked for Ambassador Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

and the White House Chief of Staff, Josh Bolten.[604] Bush would later tell Bob Woodward, author of *The War Within*, that O'Sullivan's reports contradicted what he was hearing from Rumsfeld, Casey, and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.[605]

Like Hadley, O'Sullivan felt that the White House policy and approach in Iraq was off track. She sent a SECRET memo to Hadley and his deputy, J.D. Crouch, titled, "Adjusting Our Security Strategy to the New Realities in Iraq" on July 19.[606] The memo questioned the current focus on drawing down US forces and urged the security strategy be reevaluated before withdrawing any further troops. "We are executing a plan based on assumptions that are no longer valid," she wrote.[607] The memo went on to recommend a strategy review that considered the sectarian violence, whether the United States has the right approach in Baghdad, and the role of the Iraqi police in fueling the Sunni insurgency.

Hadley agreed, and since the Camp David meeting had failed to trigger a widespread strategy review, he convened a secure video teleconference on July 22 with Rumsfeld, Pace, Abizaid, Khalilzad, and Casey as a second attempt to open discussions with those responsible for handling the Iraq War.[608] Prior to the meeting, Hadley had forwarded a series of questions for the group to address. The questions covered the current Iraq strategy, the sectarian violence in Iraq, the

[604] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 60; Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends*, 21.
[605] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 101.
[606] Ibid, 68.
[607] Ibid, 69.
[608] O'Sullivan and observers from State, Defense, and Cheney's office also were present. Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 73; Interview Peter D. Feaver, January 10, 2014.

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role of the Maliki government, the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, and the available resources of the US armed forces. Specifically, there were a total of fourteen questions and a series of sub-questions that totaled over fifty.[609] Neither Rumsfeld nor Casey were pleased with the session.[610]

Bush's doubts over the Iraq strategy however intensified. Frustrated that he did not see any new thinking coming out of the Defense Department, and convinced a change in strategy was needed, the President authorized Hadley and his team to formalize their strategy review in the fall.[611] The NSC Iraq team reconsidered all options for how to move forward in Iraq; three emerged as the front-runners.[612] The first option called for an acceleration of the existing strategy of training Iraqi forces while drawing down American forces. Rumsfeld, Casey, and Abizaid were strong advocates of this approach. Iraqi security forces would focus on controlling the violence in Iraq while US forces continued to hunt al Qaeda operatives. The second option was to pull American forces out of Baghdad until the sectarian violence burned out. Frustrated with the weak commitment of the Maliki government and the Iraqi security forces to control the violence, the Department of State had been pushing for this approach. Finally, the third option was a troop surge. This was the preferred option for O'Sullivan and Hadley.

[609] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 73.
[610] Interview Peter D. Feaver, January 10, 2014.
[611] Bush, *Decision Points*, 372
[612] Ibid.

3. The Department of State

During Summer 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had asked Philip Zelikow, Counselor to the Secretary of State, and the senior Iraq advisor, James Jeffrey (and later his successor David Satterfield), to "think outside the box," to question all assumptions, and develop new options.[613] According to her memoir, *No Higher Honor*, Rice ordered the independent, "no-holds-barred assessment" for three reasons. First, she was haunted by her failure as National Security Advisor in the lead up to the Iraq War to thoroughly question the Pentagon's assumptions about what it could achieve in Iraq. [614] She did not want to make that mistake again as Secretary of State. Second, she was skeptical about whether a troop surge would work, so she questioned the Iraq strategy all together and did not want to send additional troops to pursue the same flawed strategy.[615] Finally, Rice did not trust that the Iraqis would do what needed to be done to bring an end to the sectarian fighting.[616]

In June, Rice passed along a proposal to Hadley that Zelikow and Jeffrey had developed. The memo titled "Possible Political-Military Strategy for Summer 2006" recommended a "selective counterinsurgency" option that called for a temporary infusion of additional American forces in the short term in key regions of the country to produce a better climate for withdrawal of forces later in

[613] Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor*, (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011), 506.
[614] Ibid, 507.
[615] Ibid.
[616] Ibid.

the year or next.[617] The proposal also offered two other options, neither of which were recommended. The first was a "full counterinsurgency" approach to all major trouble spots, starting with Baghdad.[618] The other option was described as a reactive approach to the security situation on the ground.[619] Although Rice and her staff preferred a "selective counterinsurgency" approach, Rice was not convinced the Pentagon leadership was prepared to implement it or that the Iraqis had the capability or will to do their part to quell the sectarian violence.[620] She remained skeptical that a surge of any kind would work.

4. The (Informal) White House Strategy Review

In October, Rice and Hadley pulled their respective teams together to conduct an informal White House review of the Iraq strategy. A small group of NSC staffers and Rice's Coordinator for Iraq, David Satterfield, would operate under the radar, at least until the congressional elections were over in November.

On October 21, O'Sullivan and Satterfield gathered a few staffers for the first informal White House strategy review meeting. All options were on the table, from a significant drawdown of forces to a significant troop surge. After a few meetings, O'Sullivan presented the initial findings of the informal review group to the war cabinet. "The Way Forward: Four Organizing Constructs"

[617] Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor*, 539; Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 55.
[618] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 56.
[619] Ibid.
[620] Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor*, 539-540.

outlined four basic options for how to proceed in Iraq.[621]

The first option, "adjusting at the margins," was essentially a continuation of the current approach, which focused on transitioning security responsibilities to the Iraqis as quickly as possible. This approach assumed that an additional influx of resources were not necessary as the Iraqi army would reach a point where they could conduct a counterinsurgency campaign with limited US support. "Target efforts," the second option, suggested American forces stay out of the sectarian fight and focus its forces on al Qaeda in Iraq. The third option, "double down," proposed a substantial infusion in military and political resources to end the sectarian conflict, protect the borders, clear and hold neighborhoods, speed up reconstruction efforts, and target al Qaeda operatives. To accomplish this, the United States would have to commit an additional 30,000 troops, change the rotation schedules of the armed forces, and deploy more civilians to the field.[622] The final option, "bet on Maliki," proposed increasing the political and security resources available to the Iraqi leadership so that they could dampen the growing violence. Unlike the "double down" approach that proposed investing additional resources in a number of activities, this last option would commit resources exclusively to Maliki and his government.

The group also reviewed the assumptions of the war strategy and asked:

[621] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 191; Steven Metz, "Decision-making in Operation Iraqi Freedom: the Strategic Shift of 2007," *Operation Iraqi Freedom Key Decisions Monograph Series*, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2010, (accessed September 29, 2013); available from: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=985, 46.
[622] Steven Metz, "Decision-making in Operation Iraqi Freedom: the Strategic Shift of 2007."

What are the problems? What don't we know? If a surge is possible, how many troops will it take to make a difference? The group realized that they were asking questions about military capabilities without military input.[623] Their strategy review could only go so far without consultations with the military.

At the end of October, Hadley and his aides (O'Sullivan, Bergner, and Feaver) visited Iraq where they met with battalion commanders who best understood what it was like to operate on Baghdad's streets. "I should have come here before," said Hadley.[624] It became clear to him that the Iraqi government was not well respected or trusted. In fact, the Iraqi government was "tolerant of, if not complicit in, the violence engulfing the country."[625]

5. *American Enterprise Institute*

While the White House debated what the next step in Iraq might be, a former professor of military history at West Point and policy analyst at the American Enterprise Institute was working on an alternative military approach for Iraq. Fred Kagan had grown increasingly concerned over the United States capability to tackle the security problems in Iraq. When he met with the Iraq Study Group, he had argued that Casey's transition strategy was failing. He believed additional troops, perhaps as many as ten combat brigades, would be

[623] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 179.
[624] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 290.
[625] Ibid.

needed to reverse the sectarian war and defeat the insurgency.[626]

Kagan was one of the outside experts present at Camp David in June. He favored of a troop surge. After the meeting, Kagan, with the help of some recently retired army officers who had served with H.R. McMaster in Tal Afar, continued to refine his plan for a surge.[627] Since the heart of the sectarian war was in Baghdad, the team agreed a troop surge should focus in and around the Iraqi capital. After accessing the Army's Force General model online and from other open sources, they concluded five additional army brigades and two marine battalions were enough to secure Baghdad, as well as its surrounding neighborhoods, without straining the US military.[628]

Meanwhile, news spread that retired General Jack Keane was advocating for a troop surge at the Pentagon. Chris DeMuth, the head of AEI, asked Keane to

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[626] Ibid, 282.

[627] In the spring of 2005, Colonel H.R. McMaster arrived in Tal Afar with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3rd ACR). Initially, the 3rd ACR approached their tour of duty in Tal Afar with a typical, mostly kinetic mindset. They launched aggressive offensive operations and reconnaissance operations in the city. The enemy responded with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), roadside bombs, mortar attacks, and sniper attacks aimed first at US forces, and then against innocent civilians. Having made little progress relying on a heavy-handed approach, McMaster and the 3rd ACR adapted and began to focus on building security in Tal Afar by separating the population from the terrorists that had infiltrated the city and established a safe haven there. They began talking to local leaders, both Shiite and Sunni sheikhs and clerics, and focused on economic and political improvements, including providing basic public services. McMaster even moved his regiment into Tal Afar, established twenty-nine outposts, and patrolled its neighborhoods along side Iraqi security forces. Having won over the population's trust, the 3rd ACR was able to launch an offensive operation and hold its combat gains. McMaster would later explain that his approach was "to clear out insurgents, hold the terrain, and then begin to build up the city." Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, "Press Briefing on Overview of Operations Restoring Rights in Tall Afar, Iraq." Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 36; John R. Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 183.

[628] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 283; Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 77.

meet with Kagan.[629] When the two met, Keane was stunned at the depth of information Kagan and his team had collected from open sources.[630] Keane suspected an additional eight to ten combat brigades additional forces might be needed, but after conferring with Dick Cody, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, he concluded that Kagan was right and that five additional army brigades and two marine battalions would be enough.[631] In addition to a troop surge, they agreed US troops should focus on Baghdad, avoid entering Sadr City at first, and establish combat outposts at the platoon level rather than operate out of Forward Operating Bases.[632]

On December 8, two days after the release of the Iraq Study Group report, Kagan gathered a handful of military analysts and planners for a three-day exercise to debate the conduct of the war, and if possible, develop a new strategy. Keane was invited to the conference, as well as several active-duty army officers. Participants at the AEI conference discussed counterinsurgency practices in order to protect the population and isolate the insurgents, such as establishing outposts, conducting foot patrols, and deploying American troops into neighborhoods.[633]

On December 13, AEI released its report, "Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq." The study called for a surge of American forces to secure and protect critical areas of Baghdad and al Anbar. "The United States has the

[629] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 282.
[630] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 277; Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 97.
[631] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 283.
[632] Ibid.
[633] Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 97.

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military power necessary to control the violence in Iraq," the report read.[634] "If this war were the vital the national priority that it should be, however, the United States could commit many more soldiers to the fight."[635] The report recommended "a significant increase in the size of the ground forces," and "significantly more resources" to help reconstruction and economic development in Iraq."[636] Specifically, the report proposed a surge of five Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and two Marine Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs) to support the existing thirteen Army BCTs and two Marine RCTs, warning that a "lesser force will entail a much greater risk of failure."[637]

The AEI strategy review and final report had a profound impact on the NSC Iraq Team. The NSC Iraq Team favored a troop surge, but the team had to address two critical questions. How could a surge succeed militarily? Did the United States have additional troops to surge in Iraq, and if so, how many? Only the military could answer these questions, but neither MNF-I nor the Joint Staff favored a troop surge at that time. Casey supported the strategy of transitioning security responsibility to the Iraqis, and although the Joint Staff was at the time conducting its own review, it had not yet produced a surge option as a way forward in Iraq. The NSC Iraq Team requested multiple briefings and leaned on the AEI study to help evaluate how a troop surge might look.[638]

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[634] Frederick W. Kagan, "Choosing Victory," 4.
[635] Ibid.
[636] Ibid.
[637] Ibid, 40.
[638] Peter D. Feaver, "The Right to be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision," *International Security*, vol. 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 110.

AEI had Keane and other retired and active military to advise on how a troop surge might work. AEI also reached out to military insiders through back channels to confirm the number of available US troops. The AEI study provided the NSC Iraq Team with the military input it sorely lacked. Moreover, AEI and Keane met with Pentagon officials, specifically General Pace. These meetings helped persuade Pace to consider a troop surge strategy. Had members of the NSC pushed the military to accept a surge strategy, it might have provoked a bureaucratic fight and civil-military crisis. Instead, the Joint Chiefs of Staff arrived at that decision organically.[639] AEI helped "goose the system."[640] Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor wrote in *Endgame* that Abizaid was not amused with the deliberations in Washington. "I guess a think tank is now designing our Iraq strategy," Abizaid said, referring to the effort of Keane and Kagan at AEI.[641]

G) The Iraq Strategy Review: The Pentagon Weighs Its Options

Initially, the Pentagon did not support a surge strategy. Secretary Rumsfeld opposed it, and devoted little time to evaluating what a surge might look like. When Bush convened his national security team on August 17, with General Casey, General Abizaid, and Ambassador Khalilzad on secure video, he

[639] Generals Casey and Abizaid did not support a troop surge. When the troop strategy was announced, President Bush also announced their replacements. "It was time for fresh eyes in their posts," writes Bush. George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, 371.
[640] Interview, Peter D. Feaver, January 10, 2014.
[641] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 305.

asked, "Can America succeed?"[642] Casey told the President that America could succeed in Iraq by transferring security responsibility to the Iraqis faster. Recognizing that "in the aftermath of the Samarra bombing, the fundamental nature of the conflict had changed from an insurgency against the coalition to a struggle among Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups for political and economic power in Iraq," Casey argued that the new Iraqi government had to have a stake in improving Iraq's security and reconciling the divergent interests of its ethnic and sectarian groups in order to develop the government's credibility and win over the population.[643] Clearly, the White House and military leadership were at odds on how to move forward in Iraq.

1. The Department of Defense

Rumsfeld advocated an acceleration of the transition to Iraqi self-reliance and reduction in United States footprint. Aware Bush was interested in a strategy review, the Secretary began to re-examine the Iraq strategy in the fall. However, none of the proposals developed over the next few months were any different from the current "as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down" strategy. On October 10, the Secretary of Defense sent a SECRET snowflake to Eric Edelman, his Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, titled "New Construct for Iraq."[644] The memorandum proposed establishing benchmarks to turn over responsibility for

[642] Ibid, 370.
[643] George W. Casey, Jr., *Strategic Reflections*, 104.
[644] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 169.

governance and security to the Iraqis, followed by a reduction in coalition.[645] In a memorandum to President Bush in early November, Rumsfeld offered some "illustrative new courses of action," such as an accelerated draw-down, a withdrawal of US forces from vulnerable positions, and providing money to key political and religious leaders.[646] A less attractive option was to increase US forces in Iraq.[647] Finally, Rumsfeld presented a working paper in December that summarized US options in Iraq. Again, no surprise. He proposed, "further accelerating the buildup of Iraqi Security Forces."[648]

Despite these proposals, Secretary Rumsfeld did not seriously consider an alternative strategy for the Iraq War. In fact, he insisted the United States stay the course.[649] To some, Rumsfeld was completely "disengaged" from the Iraq War in 2006.[650] The Secretary's writing of this period supports this view. In his memoir, *Known and Unknown*, Secretary Rumsfeld does not share his thoughts on any of the discussions regarding the Iraq strategy review. In fact, he devotes less than three pages to the surge strategy.[651] He does not mention the informal White House discussions that began after the June 2006 Camp David meeting, and he only briefly references the official White House review that began in November. Moreover, he does not discuss the role of AEI and the Joint Chiefs in the strategy review process. Finally, Rumsfeld only describes that General Keane's thoughts

[645] Ibid.
[646] Ibid, 204.
[647] Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 714.
[648] Ibid.
[649] Interview, Major General H.R. McMaster, April 3, 2014.
[650] Ibid.
[651] Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 713-717.

on the Iraq War "largely dovetailed" with his own.[652] As such, it is difficult to know what exactly Rumsfeld thought of the multiple proposals on the table. Buried at the end of his memoir, the Secretary references a memorandum he wrote in October that described a troop surge as a less favored option since it "lacked support among military leaders."[653]

2. Retired General Jack Keane

After retiring in 2003, former Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Jack Keane, he kept active in Washington politics. As a member of the Defense Policy Board, an advisory group to the Department of Defense, he was involved in military and national security affairs. He stayed in touch with the situation in Iraq, continued to visit the country, and provided advice to the commanders on the ground and officials in Washington.[654]

On August 3, 2006, Keane was home watching C-SPAN, which was carrying a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the Iraq War that had been held earlier that day.[655] After listening to the testimony of Rumsfeld, Pace, and Abizaid on the progress in Iraq, Keane concluded that the United States strategy in Iraq was failing. It was time to speak out. Over the next few months,

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[652] Ibid, 702.
[653] Ibid, 714.
[654] Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 79. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 280.
[655] Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., August 3; November 15, 2006, (accessed October 27, 2013); available from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg35223/html/CHRG-109shrg35223.htm.

Keane helped redirect the United States strategy in Iraq. He met frequently with White House and Pentagon officials, including the President, spoke to commanders on the ground in Iraq, collaborated with outside civilian experts, and even had a hand in choosing the new commanders that would lead the Iraq War.

Keane's involvement in remaking the war strategy in Iraq began on September 19 when he went to the Pentagon to see the Secretary of Defense. "We're edging toward strategic failure," Keane warned.[656] The lack of security and stability was threatening "the survival of the Iraqi government and the success of our mission," he warned.[657] The General went on to explain that the current strategy in Iraq was a "short-war strategy."[658] It was a defensive strategy designed to get US armed forces out of Iraq as soon as possible. It relied on establishing an effective government, isolating the insurgents, and turning security over to the Iraqi security forces as quickly as possible. It was not a strategy that would lead to victory.

Keane urged for a comprehensive change in strategy. He advised Rumsfeld that the new mission in Iraq should focus on defeating the insurgency, which could not be done by simply destroying insurgents or transitioning to Iraqi security forces. In order to defeat the insurgency, the United States would have to "use proven COIN [counterinsurgency] practices–and that is by protecting the

[656] Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 88. Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 130.
[657] Ibid.
[658] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 282; Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 89; Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 130; Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends*, 31.

people and permanently isolating insurgents from the population."[659] Using proven counterinsurgency practices meant that the United States would have to stop conducting vehicle-borne patrols out of large forward-operating bases (FOBs). Instead, forces should patrol areas on foot and live with and among the people. To isolate the population from insurgents and track their movement, forces should set up traffic-control checkpoints, issue identification cards, and conduct a census. Eventually, forces would need to set up local elections and empower the local officials.

A change in strategy also required a change in leadership. Keane recommended Rumsfeld consider replacing Casey and Abizaid. "It's much too much for them to make a dramatic change and reject their policies from the past," he explained.[660] He also instructed the Secretary to send additional forces to Iraq in order to secure key areas like Baghdad. He reminded Rumsfeld that Operations Together Forward I and II had failed because the United States lacked the necessary troops to hold the cleared areas. Keane suggested an additional eight to ten combat brigades (that is, between 24,000 and 50,000 troops) were needed in Iraq to defeat the insurgency.[661]

Before leaving, Keane advised Rumsfeld to read David Galula's book, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, which argued that insurgencies are revolutionary wars that are won or lost based on who wins the support of the

[659] Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 89.
[660] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 135.
[661] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 282.

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local population.[662] "It's only about 100 pages, and if you don't want to read the whole hundred pages, read the foreword and the introduction, and then read chapters four through seven, which is really execution."[663]

As always, the Secretary took notes and asked many questions.[664] Keane could tell that Rumsfeld opposed increasing the troop levels and did not support his recommendation for a counterinsurgency strategy.[665] Despite the Secretary's cold reception, Keane continued to advocate for a troop surge. He would later team up with AEI and continued to push the White House, the Pentagon, and the Joint Chiefs to consider a troop surge.

Keane also reached out to General Odierno, who had just returned to Baghdad as the new commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I).[666] Keane shared the AEI report on a troop surge. Like Keane, Odierno had some ideas on how to fix Baghdad, but he needed more troops. He wanted to send additional troops into Baghdad as well as into the areas surrounding the capital that served as safe havens for insurgents.[667] Also, it was unclear if the two extra brigades proposed in Casey's revised Baghdad Security Plan would come from elsewhere

[662] David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006).
[663] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 137.
[664] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 138; Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends*, 31.
[665] Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 89; Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 133; Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends*, 31.
[666] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 296.
[667] Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends*, 104.

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in Iraq or from the United States.[668] Through an unofficial back channel, Odierno learned that the Army could send at most five new brigades to Iraq.[669] Knowing Casey would not support a five-brigade troop surge, Odierno needed an ally that yielded significant influence in Washington.[670] He worked with Keane to win support in Washington for a five-brigade troop surge. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor described in their book, *The Endgame*, how on one occasion Keane had gone to the Pentagon and insisted on speaking with Odierno on a secure line. Pace was out of town and Keane was led to his office. "On this occasion he was literally operating from the chairman's office," they wrote.[671]

3. The Council of Colonels

Aware that the White House wanted to see an alternative strategy, General Pace launched a strategy review within the Joint Staff to help the military move to where the civilian leadership might be heading, toward a troop surge. If the President was going to announce a change in military strategy, Pace wanted the military behind him.

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[668] The Baghdad Security Plan called for five additional brigades to deploy into Baghdad (three Iraq and two coalition brigades) and operate out of joint outposts. While the outposts were being constructed, coalition and Iraqi troops would continue security efforts to sustain pressure on the extremist elements. As areas would be cleared, joint forces would hold the areas. Once the violence lessened, the Iraqi security forces would assume full responsibility for Bagdad's security. George W. Casey, *Strategic Reflections*, 132.
[669] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 301.
[670] By this point, Casey had proposed a two-brigade surge to meet the needs of the Baghdad Security Plan, as well as moving two Marine battalions into Anbar province to maintain security efforts there. It was not clear if the two-brigade surge would come from elsewhere in Iraq or if the additional US troops would arrive from outside the country.
[671] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 301; Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 79.

The Chairman convened a task force of sixteen colonels who had served in Iraq or Afghanistan to examine the United States' global challenges and review the Iraq strategy. The panel, dubbed the "Council of Colonels," was to remain highly confidential. They first met on September 27 in the crisis action room of the National Military Command Center. Over the next three months, they would review the Iraq strategy and report directly to Pace and the service chiefs every Friday afternoon.

As Chairman, Pace served as an independent military advisor to the President. As such, he wanted to offer the President a series of options for Iraq. Pace kept the Council review separate from the White House review. He wanted the Council to develop an alternative strategy that was free from any political pressure and interference.[672] At the same time, Pace had to represent to the President the views of Casey and the Joint Chiefs. The three functions of the Chairman were in conflict. The recommendations coming out of the Council of Colonels often clashed with the views of the service chiefs and of Casey.[673] Over the next few months, Pace would attempt to reconcile these conflicting views.

On October 6, the Council of Colonels sat down with the Joint Chiefs in a secure conference room. The focus of the first session was the global war on terror. The group discussed a range of topics, including spreading democracy in the Middle East, America's strategic vulnerabilities, non-military elements of

[672] Interview, Peter D. Feaver, January 10, 2014.
[673] Interview, Peter D. Feaver, January 10, 2014. Interview, Major General H.R. McMaster, April 3, 2014.

national power, Israel, Iran, and the armed forces' military readiness to meet other global commitments and contingencies. Some of the colonels were disappointed and found the discussion aimless.[674] Nevertheless, the group continued to tackle these questions daily and met with the Joint Chiefs weekly for freewheeling discussions.

A strategy review of the Iraq War remained the Council's top priority. In early November, the group presented to the Joint Chiefs six possible courses of action in Iraq: go big, go long, go home, enclave strategy, partitioning, gradual withdrawal, and a combination of the above strategies.[675] The group could not agree on the way forward, but the range of options clearly indicated that the colonels did agree that the current strategy was not working. It was time for the United States to change its course.

The first option, *Go Big*, envisioned a large increase in troops to overpower the enemy and end the sectarian conflict and insurgency. This option required a massive surge of reinforcements and extending the deployment of the troops already there. Despite strong backing from some of the colonels, the group concluded that this option was not feasible because the United States lacked resources and manpower. *Go Long* committed the United States to shifting to a long-term advisory presence at lower troop levels. The group rejected the third option, *Go Home*, or total withdrawal, as it would likely leave Iraq with a full-

[674] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 169.
[675] Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 103; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 285.

blown civil war. Similarly, the group did not support creating enclaves in Iraq or splitting the country along ethnic lines.

On November 10, Pace shared with the President the Council's findings. The recommendation was a combination of the *Go Big* and *Go Long* strategies. This option envisioned a short-term increase in troops to try to get the sectarian conflict under control, followed by a drawdown to some 60,000 troops from roughly 140,000.[676] Not all of the service chiefs however agreed with this strategy. Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker told the President that he opposed the surge. He doubted a troop increase would have a "measurable purpose."[677] The military leadership was not yet in favor of a troop surge. Knowing the White House wanted a change in strategy, Pace would continue to work with the Joint Staff to move the military leadership to support an alternative strategy.[678]

H) Reaching A Consensus: The Iraq Strategy Review Team

On November 10, President Bush held an NSC meeting to launch a formal deputy-level Iraq strategy review led by Deputy National Security Advisor J.D. Crouch. The behind-the-scenes White House review came into public view after the Congressional elections and on the heels of Rumsfeld's departure as Secretary

[676] Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends*, 27.
[677] Ibid.
[678] Interview, Peter D. Feaver, January 10, 2014.

of Defense.[679] After months of independent and informal strategy reviews, an official review of the Iraq War to search for a new way forward was finally under way.

Unlike the previous informal and separate review sessions, the formal White House strategy review involved senior participants from all key departments and agencies, including the Department of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Treasury, the Vice President's Office, and the NSC staff. MNF-I was not part of the review. Instead, Joint Staff representatives conveyed MNF-I views.

The Iraq Strategy Review Team was to determine whether the current strategy was working, and if not, devise an alternative strategy that would work better. Almost immediately, the group reached a consensus that the current strategy was broken, but a debate emerged on how to move forward in Iraq. The Iraq Strategy Review team developed and debated a range of options.[680] The Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs and MNF-I favored accelerating the train-and-transition strategy even faster. The NSC staff and Vice President's Office championed surging additional forces and shifting to a fully resourced counterinsurgency strategy. State preferred to downscale US involvement by conducting triage, pulling back from the cities, and focusing on counterterrorism

[679] Feaver, "The Right to be Right," 104.
[680] Steven Metz, "Decision-making in Operation Iraqi Freedom: the Strategic Shift of 2007."

missions.[681]

Initially, the Department of Defense and military leadership remained committed to the train-and-transition strategy. However, two things occurred that helped shift the Pentagon position and open deliberations for a surge strategy.[682] First, after Secretary Rumsfeld left the Department of Defense, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman replaced Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone as the lead representative of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).[683] With Rumsfeld gone, OSD adopted a more pro-surge position. Second, whereas the Joint Chiefs supported the MNF-I position, General Pace believed the Joint Chiefs as a whole were more sympathetic to a surge strategy. As the review continued, Pace had to balance his independent military advice, the position of the Joint Chiefs, and the views of MNF-I.

Over the next two months, the interagency hammered out the details for a new way forward in Iraq. The new strategy recommitted the US to supporting the Iraqi government's efforts to forge a functioning political system. However, in lieu of an emphasis on top-down reconciliation, the new strategy would focus on a

[681] Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends*, 25; Feaver, "The Right to be Right,"104.
[682] Feaver, "The Right to be Right," 104.
[683] Until Rumsfeld's resignation after the Congressional elections, the Department of Defense did not seriously consider a possible troop surge. Moreover, Rumsfeld writes in his memoir that it did not appear to him at the time of his resignation that the President was considering a wholesale change in strategy. For him to write that demonstrates that he was not involved in any of the informal or formal discussions, or at least did not take seriously, the efforts of Hadley and others to change the Iraq strategy. Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 705-707. Meanwhile, President Bush concedes that after meeting with his national security team on August 17, 2006 that "a change in strategy was needed." He goes on to say that "It was time for fresh eyes in their posts." George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, 371.

bottom-up approach to ensure population security. In order to accommodate military concerns regarding an already stretched military and the absence of adequate contributions from non-military sectors, the proposed strategy involved expanding civilian efforts and improving the use of provincial reconstruction teams. The new strategy represented a "more for more" bargain between the civilian and military leadership.[684] Civilian agencies would do more if the military did more, the military would do more if civilian agencies did more.

By December, the President had approved most aspects of the new strategy, except for whether to surge additional troops. Casey did not favor a troop surge, particularly a five-brigade surge. He questioned the impact that the additional forces would have on the Iraqis' incentives to reconcile the divergent interests of Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups.[685] He felt it was important for Iraqis to take ownership and accept responsibility for their own security. The United States would not "be successful until there was Iraqi ownership," believed Casey.[686]

The General also was under significant political constraints from Maliki on how to employ US forces. For example, the Prime Minister restricted American forces from operating in certain areas, such as Sadr city. "I did not want to bring in new troops into a highly sectarian and confusing environment, and one in which there were significant political constraints.

[684] Feaver, "The Right to be Right," 107.
[685] General George Casey, *Strategic Reflections*, 138.
[686] Interview, General George W. Casey, Jr., October 18, 2013.

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If a troop surge were to happen, Casey argued for a scaled-down version. He favored at most sending only two brigade combat teams to Baghdad and two Marine battalions to support operations in Anbar province.[687] On this position, Casey would later write:

> I was recommending – to accelerate the transition of security to capable Iraqis in exchange for their action to solve the core problem in Iraq, that is, reconciling the interests of the different ethnic and sectarian groups – offered the most effective way to accomplish our strategic objectives in Iraq. I believed that I had asked for the troops that I needed to accomplish our operational objectives, and that, if the prime minister delivered on his pledges to the President to allow our forces and the ISF to operate freely without political interference, we would bring security to Baghdad by the summer. I felt that additional troops beyond that would risk introducing them into a very confusing and difficult operational environment without a plan for how their introduction would contribute to the accomplishment of our strategic objectives. I remained adamantly opposed to that.[688]

When the President visited Maliki in Jordan on November 30, he told the Prime Minister that the United States would commit tens of thousands of additional American troops to help him retake Baghdad. "But you need to give me certain assurances," Bush told Maliki.[689] The Prime Minister had to commit additional Iraqi forces, and unlike in previous operations, they would have to show up. Moreover, there could be no political interference. No longer would

[687] Interview, General George W. Casey, Jr., October 18, 2013; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 302.
[688] George W. Casey, *Strategic Reflections*, 143-144. At that time of this meeting, there were no operational plans in place for the additional three brigades. They were developed in February and March 2007 before the forces arrived into Iraq.
[689] George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, 374.

Shia neighborhoods be off limits, including Sadr city. Finally, as security improved, Maliki would have to make progress on national reconciliation among Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds. Maliki agreed to meet the United States' requirements.[690] When the President returned to Washington, he decided that the United States could no longer allow for the sectarian violence in Iraq to continue. In his memoir, *Decision Points*, he writes, "The surge was our best chance, maybe our last chance, to accomplish our objectives in Iraq."[691]

Written accounts of this period, including the President's memoir, suggest that Bush was leaning toward a troop surge after his visit with Maliki in November. However, at that time the interagency was not aware that the President favored a troop surge.[692] Therefore, the White House continued to weigh its options, and over the next few weeks, the debate on how to proceed in Iraq intensified. Although the NSC Iraq Team favored a troop surge, the Department of State, Casey and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not on board.

Like Casey, the Department of State continued to doubt an additional 20,000 forces could help achieve what the 150,000 troops already on the ground had not been able to do.[693] At a December 8 NSC meeting, Rice argued in favor of limiting the United States' involvement in the sectarian conflict.[694] She was not convinced of the Iraqi government's commitment to rein in the Shiite extremists

[690] Ibid.
[691] Ibid, 375.
[692] Interview, Peter D. Feaver, January 10, 2014.
[693] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 246.
[694] Ibid, 267.

and stop the sectarian fight. Without a commitment from Maliki and the Iraqi government, she argued, a surge would not work.[695] "We just can't win by putting our forces in the middle of their blood feud. If they want to have a civil war we're going to have to let them," she told the President.[696] Rice wanted the Iraqi government to play a more decisive role in their security and commit to winning in Iraq.[697]

On December 11, the White House again turned to a group of outside experts for an independent view. Hadley invited Keane and other military experts, including Barry McCaffrey, a retired Army General and former commander of United States Central Command; Wayne Downing, a retired Army General and former commander of Joint Special Operations Command; Eliot Cohen, a member of the Defense Policy Board and professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University; and Stephen Biddle, an analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations.[698]

Cohen, who had been present at the Camp David meeting in June 2006, urged the President to hold his generals accountable. If they were not accomplishing the mission in Iraq, Cohen said, then it was time to get a new team and new strategy. He went on to talk about how presidents need to push their

[695] Rice, *No Higher Honor*, 544; Steven Metz, "Decision-making in Operation Iraqi Freedom," 35.
[696] Rice, *No Higher Honor*, 544.
[697] Ibid.
[698] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 303; Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 98; Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 279.

military advisors and force serious strategic debate.[699] Cohen suggested President Bush consider replacing Casey. When Bush asked who Casey's successor should be if he were to be replaced, the general consensus was David Petraeus.[700]

With regard to a troop surge, Keane presented his plan to send five brigades of American forces into Baghdad. Just as he had done back in September when he met with Rumsfeld, Keane explained that the current strategy in Iraq was a "short-war strategy" designed to get US armed forces out of Iraq as soon as possible. It was not a strategy that would lead to victory. Instead, the United States needed to send in more troops to secure the population and defeat the insurgency in Iraq. Cohen and Biddle agreed, but McCaffrey and Downing had their doubts.[701] Rather than a troop surge, McCaffrey favored increasing the number of Iraqi forces, and Downing argued for using Special Forces to train the Iraqi troops.

Peter Feaver, who at the time served as Special Advisor for Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform on the National Security Council, writes that the pivotal moment for the President on whether to surge additional troops in Iraq came in a December 13 meeting at the Pentagon between President Bush and the Joint Chiefs.[702] Although the President was leaning towards a troop surge, he wanted the Chiefs' endorsement before committing additional forces. Of this

[699] Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 99.
[700] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 303.
[701] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 303; Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 98; Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 279.
[702] Peter D. Feaver, "The Right to be Right," 107.

meeting, Bush writes in his memoir, "Coming to their territory was a way to show my respect."[703] The President wanted to include the Chiefs in the discussion and have their support. "On a decision this controversial and important, it was essential to have unity…To reach that consensus, one more group needed to be on board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[704]

The President opened the meeting by telling the Chiefs that he was there to hear their opinions and ask for their advice. The chiefs expressed their concerns: Could the Iraqis operate in a nonsectarian manner? Would the Iraqi government continue to interfere with US operations and restrict troop movement, as it had done with Sadr city? Was it wise for the United States to commit so many resources to a single conflict and be left unprepared for other contingencies? General Peter Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff, also worried a troop surge would impose an unacceptable strain on the ground forces and "break the army".[705] A five-brigade surge meant committing fifteen brigades, with five in theater, five recovering from deployment, and five preparing to deploy.[706] Sustaining that force also required calling up the National Guard and Reserves, as well as extending the twelve-month tours in Iraq to fifteen. A troop surge, the Chiefs feared, would put tremendous strain on the military. Bush disagreed. "The surest way to break the military would be to lose in Iraq," he told them.[707]

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[703] George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, 376.
[704] Ibid, 375.
[705] George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, 375; Peter D. Feaver, "The Right to be Right," 108; Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 289; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 304.
[706] Peter D. Feaver, "The Right to be Right," 108; Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 288.
[707] George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, 378.

Feaver writes that civilian participants at this meeting left believing the Chiefs had not indicated their full support or dissent for a troop surge.[708] According to the President's memoir, however, General Pace met with the President two days prior to the meeting and told him that although the Chiefs had some concerns, they were prepared to support the surge.[709] In *The War Within*, Woodward writes that the President persuaded the Chiefs with "sweeteners" – more budget money and a promise to increase the size of the active duty Army and Marine Corps.[710]

Bush hoped to announce a new Iraq strategy prior to Christmas, but delayed doing so until after Gates, who would be sworn in as Secretary of Defense on December 18, had a chance to visit Iraq and consult with Maliki and US commanders. After returning from Baghdad, Gates met with the President at Camp David. Gates reported that the American commanders agreed to a "highly targeted, modest increase of up to two brigades in support of operations in Baghdad, contingent on commensurate political and economic increase."[711] Gates also confirmed Maliki would deploy three additional Iraqi brigades to Baghdad, instruct commanders to go after extremists of any sectarian background, and

[708] Feaver also writes that one senior military official with firsthand knowledge recalls the Chiefs endorsing a five-brigade surge in their discussions with the President. Peter D. Feaver, "The Right to be Right," 108.
[709] George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, 376.
[710] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 286.
[711] Ibid, 306.

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partner Iraqi army and police with US troops.[712] Gates' recommendation was to "transfer leadership and primary responsibility for security in Iraq to Iraqis, with the United States in a support role," he wrote in his talking points for the meeting with the President. "As they gain confidence and show success, we can begin to stand down."[713] In the end, Gates agreed with Casey and Abizaid – a modest surge to ultimately support the transfer of security responsibility to the Iraqis.

On December 28, 2006, President Bush met with the National Security Council in Crawford, Texas to review the Iraq strategy one last time. By then, Bush had decided on a troop surge. The final question to resolve was the size of the surge.

In *The War Within*, Woodward reports that prior to this meeting, Hadley recommended a five-brigade surge to the President based on his discussions with "people who I trust and you trust." Woodward writes that Hadley's recommendation came from back-channel discussions: Odierno telling Petraeus he needed five brigades, Petraeus telling O'Sullivan he wanted a five-brigade force, and Keane telling Hadley that a minimum of five brigades were necessary.[714] In an interview with Woodward, Hadley maintained that his recommendation came out of discussions with Pace.[715]

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[712] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 306; George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, 377.
[713] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 307.
[714] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 301.
[715] Ibid.

Pace reported that Casey and Abizaid recommended sending two brigades to Baghdad and two Marine battalions to Anbar province, with the possibility of sending up to three more brigades later.[716] However, General Petraeus, who would soon replace General Casey as the Commander in Iraq, and General Odierno, the number-two in Iraq, wanted all five brigades. "If our commanders on the ground wanted the full force, they would get it. I decided to send five brigades to Baghdad, plus two additional Marine battalions to Anbar Province," Bush writes in his memoir.[717]

On January 10, 2007, President Bush addressed the nation and outlined the new American strategy for Iraq. He warned how "failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the United States." To increase security in Iraq, and especially in Baghdad, the President announced plans to increase American force levels. "I have committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq," Bush said. "The vast majority of them – five brigades – will be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their formations."[718] The President also outlined the troop mission: help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, help them protect the local population, and help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs.[719]

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[716] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 308; George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, 377.
[717] George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, 377.
[718] "Full Transcript of Bush's Iraq Speech," January 10, 2007, (accessed November 5, 2013); available from: http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500257_162-2349882.html.
[719] Ibid.

I) The Surge

On February 10, Petraeus took command in Iraq. Shortly after his arrival, the first of the five surge brigades arrived – the 82nd Airborne Division's 2nd Brigade.[720] In March, the second surge brigade arrived – the 1st Infantry Division's 4th Brigade.[721] The rest of the brigades rolled into Iraq one at a time in the following months. In support of the five brigades, Petraeus requested military police to guard enemy forces that US surge forces rounded up. He also requested a combat aviation brigade. Petraeus received these additional force enablers, and with them, the final surge force rose from twenty to over thirty thousand.[722]

Before Petraeus' arrival, American troops had begun building the thirty-five outposts proposed in the Baghdad Security Plan that had been approved by Casey. Petraeus doubled the number of planned bases. By the time the second surge brigade had arrived, almost half of the planned outposts for Baghdad were in place, thirty-two out of sixty-eight.[723] In theory, the outposts were a means for US troops to live among the population they were supposed to be protecting. In practice, they were not easily accessible to the local residents. The high threat of car bombs necessitated the outposts to include concrete blast barriers, bulletproof glass, sniper screens, and mazes of sand-filled barrier walls.[724] Despite the

[720] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 335.
[721] Ibid, 336.
[722] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 345; Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends*, 89.
[723] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 336.
[724] Ibid, 338.

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extensive fortifications, the outposts demonstrated that American troops were committed to improving the security situation in Baghdad. In addition to the outposts, US forces also walled off markets or whole neighborhoods with concrete barriers to make them inaccessible to vehicles, and therefore, safe from car bombs or VBIEDs (vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices).[725]

Another essential element to the Baghdad Security Plan (also named Operation Fardh al-Qanun or Enforcing the Law) was the participation of the Iraqi security forces. Operations to clean out pockets of insurgent activity, establish security for the local populace, and protect key infrastructure involved combined Iraqi and coalition forces. Troops lived in the neighborhoods, interacted with residents, and gained human intelligence. Coalition forces and Iraqi police and army units shared the same living conditions and worked side-by-side in combat outposts and joint security stations.[726] Once neighborhoods were cleared, Iraqi forces would maintain security with the help of embedded American advisory teams.[727]

By spring, there was a decline in sectarian violence in some areas of Baghdad, while in others the violence had worsened with the influx of American and Iraqi troops.[728] The upsurge in car bombs and other insurgent attacks persuaded Petraeus and Odierno to dedicate sufficient manpower (roughly

[725] Ibid, 339.
[726] John R. Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 215; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 340.
[727] John R. Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 215.
[728] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 345.

twenty-six battalions) to root out insurgent safe havens in the areas surrounding Baghdad.[729]

The surge also added two Marine battalions to the fight in Anbar Province.[730] While conducting operations in the province, commanders worked to improve relations with Sunni tribal sheikhs and chieftains. In 2006, groups of concerned local citizens had begun to form local security forces and revolt against the draconian tactics of AQ-I. By the end of 2006, fourteen tribes had joined the growing Anbar Awakening movement.[731] The Awakening began to spread across much of the country in 2007 and 2008. Many who took part in the movement included former Sunni insurgents who had rejected AQ-I and decided to support the new Iraqi government. As the movement grew, the US military lobbied the Iraqi government to accept Awakening members and to put them on the payroll.[732] Tribal leaders entered into security contracts with coalition forces. American and Iraqi officials vetted Awakening members, entering their biometric details in an intelligence database.[733] These groups, who later came to be known as the Sons of Iraq, coordinated operations with coalition and Iraqi combat commanders.[734] There were some 75,000 Sons of Iraq throughout the country in 2008.[735] They had a strategic effect on the war in Baghdad and in the belts.

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[729] Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends*, 105.
[730] Richard H. Shultz, *The Marines Take Anbar*.
[731] Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends*, 106.
[732] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 692; John R. Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 220.
[733] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 692.
[734] Greg Bruno, "The Role of the 'Sons of Iraq' in Improving Security."
[735] John R. Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 220.

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When Petraeus testified before Congress in September 2007, the surge had expanded on the Sunni Awakening movement. American forces had taken away many of Al-Qaeda's sanctuaries in the belts around Baghdad, and along with Iraqi security forces, finally confronted the long-ignored Mahdi Army. On August 29, following major clashes between Iraqi security forces and the Mahdi Army, Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his militia to stand down for six months. In his testimony, Petraeus reported that the number of civilian deaths across Iraq had declined by over 45% since December 2006, and the number of ethno-sectarian deaths was down 55% across Iraq and down 80% in Baghdad alone.[736]

J) Conclusion

So what does the surge case say about the impact of civil-military relations characterized by a high degree of deliberative discourse on the planning process? When President Bush announced a dramatic shift in United States policy in Iraq on January 10, 2007, the plan reflected months of deliberations between the civilian and military leadership. Formal and informal discussions with scholars, retired officers, military insiders, and the wider policy community created opportunities for the White House to solicit multiple perspectives and viewpoints, engage in a critical analysis of planning assumptions, and explore alternative courses of action. More importantly, deliberative discourse helped the civilian and military leadership reach a consensus on the surge strategy. Unlike the war

[736] General David H. Petraeus, "Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq," September 10-11, 2007, (accessed November 10, 2013); available from: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/petraeus-testimony20070910.pdf

plan for the invasion of Iraq, the surge had been debated, discussed, and approved by the civilian and military leadership.

K) Figure 2: The Planning Groups for the Iraq Surge

	Iraq Study Group
March 15, 2006	− Congress appoints a 10-person bipartisan panel to assess the Iraq War and review strategy
December 6	− 79 recommendations, most of which focus on transitioning the US military mission from combat to training Iraqi forces and pressing the Iraqi government to achieve political objectives. A surge clause inserted at the request of the NSC
	NSA Stephen J. Hadley and the NSC Iraq Team
Summer 2006	− Urges the President to consider an alternative strategy in Iraq to address the sectarian conflict and overall deteriorating situation in Iraq
June 12-13	− To trigger an interagency review, invites a group of outside experts to Camp David
July 19	− NSC Iraq Team issues a memorandum, "Adjusting Our Security Strategy to the New Realities in Iraq," which questions the current focus on drawing down US forces and urges a strategy review that considers the sectarian violence in Iraq, whether the United States has the right approach in Baghdad, and the role of the Iraqi police in fueling the Sunni insurgency
July 22	− Hadley convenes a secure video teleconference with Rumsfeld, Abizaid, Khalilzad, and Casey to trigger a second attempt at an Iraq strategy review
Fall 2006	− NSC Iraq Team considers possible options for Iraq going forward: 1) Accelerate existing transition strategy (preferred option of Defense) 2) Pull American forces out of Bagdad until sectarian violence burns out (preferred option of State) 3) Troop surge (preferred option of NSC Iraq Team)
	− Relies on the work of American Enterprise Institute to understand what a troop surge

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	might accomplish militarily, and to identify how many troops would be available and needed to surge – Consults with Petraeus, who is overseeing the publication of Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency
June 2006	**Department of State** – Recommends a "selective counterinsurgency" option that calls for an infusion of American troops in Baghdad to produce a better climate for withdrawal of US forces
October 21	**Informal White House Strategy Review** – Rice and Hadley pull their respective teams together to conduct a strategy review – Four options considered 1) Adjust on the margins: continue existing strategy; no additional resources 2) Target efforts: US forces stay out of sectarian fighting and focus on counterterrorism activities against al Qaeda in Iraq 3) Double down: infusion of military and political resources to end the sectarian conflict, protect borders, conduct COIN and counterterrorism activities 4) Bet on Maliki: increase political and military resources to the Iraqi government – A visit to Iraq at the end of October convinces Hadley and his staff that the Iraqi government is not a reliable partner in ending the sectarian violence
October 10	**The Department of Defense** – Rumsfeld sends snowflake to his staff, "New Construct for Iraq," which suggests reducing coalition forces and establishing benchmarks to turn over responsibility to Iraqi government – In a memorandum to Bush, Rumsfeld proposes new courses, such as an accelerated drawdown of forces, a withdrawal of US forces from vulnerable areas, and an influx of resources to key political and religious leaders. A less attractive option is a troop surge

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November	– After the November 8 Congressional elections, Rumsfeld resigns (but stays on as Secretary of Defense until Robert Gates' confirmation in December)
	American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
Summer 2006	– Fred Kagan (one of the outside experts at the Camp David meeting in June) and AEI begin work on an alternative strategy for Iraq – Through open online sources AEI determines the military can send an additional five army brigades and two marine battalions to Iraq
Fall 2006	– AEI hears of Keane's efforts to convince the Pentagon to consider a troop surge and requests that he teams up with AEI on developing an alternative strategy
December 8	– AEI holds a 3-day exercise to debate the conduct of the war and a possible troop surge
December 13	– Report, "Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq," recommends a troop surge
	Retired General Jack Keane
September 19	– Visits Rumsfeld at the Pentagon and urges for a new strategy in Iraq, telling the Secretary that the current strategy is a "short-war strategy" that will not lead to victory. He urges for a new strategy focused on population security
September 20	– Keane meets with Pace and urges him to become more involved in the Iraq War
Fall 2006	– Keane teams up with AEI and works with the new MNC-I Commander, Odierno, on pushing for additional troops in Baghdad
	The Council of Colonels
September 27	– Pace assembles a group of 16 colonels to assess the Iraq strategy. The group works through the fall, presenting preliminary findings to the service chiefs every Friday – Considers a range of options: 1) Go Big: envisions a troop surge 2) Go Long: commits US to a long-term advisory presence at lower troop levels 3) Go Home: suggests a total withdrawal

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November 10 December 13	– Pace presents the Council's preliminary findings to the President, which includes a combination of the Go Big and Go Long options: – The proposal is a short-term increase of troops to try to get the sectarian violence under control, followed by a drawdown to 60,000 troops from the existing 140,000 US troops – Not all Chiefs agree on a troops surge, so Bush meets with them to discuss their concerns – Bush strikes a deal: their support for a troop surge in return for additional budget money and a promise to increase the size of active duty army and marine corps
	The Formal White House Iraq Strategy Review
November 10 November 30 December 11 December 28 January 10, 2007	– Bush holds a NSC meeting and launches a formal deputy-level Iraq strategy review – Strategy review includes the NSC Iraq Team, State, Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Treasury, and the Vice President's Office – The group recommends a new strategy focused on population security (rather than a top-down approach of supporting the Iraqi government) and a troop and civilian surge – Casey and Abizaid resist a troop surge, particularly without assurances that the Iraqi government will commit troops and allow US forces to operate in Iraq without restrictions, including Sadr city – The White House invites a group of outside experts (including Keane) to discuss options for Iraq – The President meets with the NSC in Crawford, Texas to review the Iraq strategy. Bush decides on a troop surge, but needs to resolve the size of the surge: – Hadley reports that Odierno (MNC-I Commander) wants five brigades and Petraeus (the next MNF-I commander) and Keane also recommend a five-brigade surge – Pace confirms Casey and Abizaid continue to support a two-brigade surge – The President announces his commitment to send additional troops into Iraq to clear and secure neighborhoods and protect the local population

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VI) FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

A) Introduction

The dissertation reviews the post-conflict planning process of the 2003 Iraq War and the Iraq Surge to evaluate how civil-military relations impact the planning process, and therefore, the political and military outcome. In this chapter, I provide a cross-case synthesis of the research. I review evidence of divergent perspectives, strategic assessment, and reasoned consensus to assess whether the civilian and military leadership engaged in deliberative discourse during the planning process for the Iraq War and Iraq Surge, and how the presence or lack thereof impacted the policy outcome. I conclude the chapter with a discussion on alternative explanations that may have either influenced the overall planning process or the outcome of the cases.

B) Answering the Research Question

Q: How do civil-military relations impact the planning process for post-conflict environments?

1. Analysis of the 2003 Iraq War Case Study

The case study on the 2003 Iraq War demonstrates how civil-military relations characterized by limited deliberative discourse led to a truncated civil-military dialogue during the planning process. In the months prior to the United States invasion into Iraq, there were few opportunities to debate alternative courses of action, exchange information, test planning assumptions, or prepare for possible contingences. In short, there were few divergent perspectives included in the planning process, strategic assessment was poor, and the final post-war plan did not reflect the consensus of the senior civilian and military leadership. The political and military outcome was disastrous. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, there was a complete breakdown in security, which quickly fueled an insurgency against American forces that entangled the United States into a decade-long commitment in Iraq.

a. Divergent Perspectives

To overcome the military's resistance to defense transformation initiatives and reassert civilian control over the armed forces, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld put in place a variety of oversight methods at the start of his tenure. Unfortunately, these tactics had a devastating effect on the scope of debate during the planning process for the Iraq War.

The Selection of Senior Military Officers: Critics charged that Secretary Rumsfeld only engaged those views that generally aligned with his own. Even his involvement in the promotion process was seen as a means to replace senior officers who challenged administration views with individuals more likely to support decisions without question. In fact, the top brass working with Rumsfeld were not known within the military for providing an independent voice or questioning civilian superiors.[737] General Tommy Franks was seen as a commander who "will do what he's told," and Chairman General Richard Myers and Vice Chairman General Peter Pace were seen as Rumsfeld "yes-men."[738]

Small-Group Consultations with Like-Minded Individuals: Consultations on the Iraq War were also kept between a few trusted individuals. Few people outside a small group (namely Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, and Generals Franks, Myers, and Pace) participated in the planning discussions, and those few outsiders that did participate from time to time, understood well that the agenda was set and objections were unwelcome.[739]

Early on in the war planning process, Franks asked to bring in individuals from the Department of State to "refine [the] assumptions and analyze the elements" identified to execute the war plan, Rumsfeld insisted, "I want this to be

[737] Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012.
[738] Seymour M. Hersch, "Offense and Defense"; Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars,* 41. Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012.
[739] Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012.

worked by a small group."[740] Even the Joint Chiefs were poorly engaged and "had been pushed to the margins of the war planning."[741]

Marginalizing Dissenters: Rumsfeld also limited the frequency and interaction with those he perceived were resistant to change. Especially significant was the Secretary's marginalization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[742] Rumsfeld barely consulted with the Chiefs during the planning process for the Iraq War. Another example is the reaction to General Eric K. Shinseki's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the army force requirements for post-conflict Iraq. Shinseki testified that "something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers" would be needed.[743] Wolfowitz dismissed Shinseki's estimates, testifying they were "wildly off the mark."[744] The Department had already leaked the name of Shinseki's replacement over disagreements on defense transformation, rendering him a lame duck commander for the rest of his tenure as Army Chief of Staff.[745] Not only does this example reveal how dissenting views were being handled, but also the extent of the depravity of dialogue between the civilian and military leadership.[746]

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[740] Tommy R. Franks (Ret.), *American Soldier*, 344.
[741] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 140.
[742] Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*, 237.
[743] General Eric Shinseki, "The Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Budget," *Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee*, February 25, 2003.
[744] Paul Wolfowitz, Hearing Before the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives.
[745] Charles A. Stevenson, *SECDEF*, 176; Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 32. Secretary Rumsfeld denies leaking the name of Shinseki's replacement. Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 455.
[746] Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*, 250.

Engaging like-minded military officers, restricting consultations to a small group, and marginalizing dissenters, severely limited the range of divergent perspectives at the civil-military nexus. War planners lacked alternative ways of conceptualizing how the war should be fought, and therefore, missed opportunities to generate new knowledge.

b. Strategic Assessment

The lack of divergent perspectives also compromised strategic assessment, the process through which a state's political and military objectives and strategies are evaluated and decided. One measure of strategic assessment is the exchange of information, which was poor during the Iraq War planning process. Another dimension of strategic assessment is the presence of structures and mechanisms that allow the civilian and military leadership to interact and air out their perspectives, probe assumptions, explore alternative courses of action, and formulate policy. Here, the case study produced mixed results.

Poor Information Sharing: The Department of Defense declined to share information with its civilian counter-parts in other government departments. Take for example Rumsfeld's refusal to allow the members of the National Security Council, including the National Security Advisor, to keep copies of slides on the Iraq invasion plan.[747] At times, poor information sharing was present further

[747] After one meeting in the White House situation room in the fall of 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice reached for a copy of the slides that were handed out during the

down the chain of command. Early on, Rumsfeld had sent two civilian officials from the Office of Special Plans to CENTCOM.[748] In time, CENTCOM planners referred to them as "Feith's spies," because they would share information with Rumsfeld and Feith before CENTCOM planners had finalized and approved its plans.[749] Soon, the friction became so palpable, and the two defense aides were told they were no longer welcome.

Informal Structures and Mechanisms for Interaction: General Franks met frequently with the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to discuss troop levels, deployment schedules, and potential contingencies.[750] Franks (along with his CENTCOM planners) and Rumsfeld developed the war plan through an iterative planning process. The General presented several war plans to the Secretary in-person or during scheduled teleconferences. However, there was no formal structure in which these meetings took place. In fact, the Chairman was not always a part of the discussion.

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briefing. Rumsfeld refused to allow any of the members of the war cabinet to keep copies of the material, including the National Security Advisor! After this occurred, Frank Miller, Senior Director for Defense Policy on the NSC staff, sent one of his military aides to the Pentagon to get a copy of the slides from a friend on the Joint Staff. Interview, Frank Miller, December 1, 2011; Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 154; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 148.

[748] Under the direction of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, the Office of Special Plans, which existed from September 2002 to June 2003, was a controversial Pentagon policy outfit that was accused of providing the Bush administration with skewed intelligence linking Iraq and al-Qaeda in an effort to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

[749] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 32; Interview, Colonel Michael Fitzgerald (Ret.), June 15, 2012.

[750] Potential contingencies discussed included early regime collapse, the use of WMD, and a humanitarian disaster or mass civilian exodus. Planners prepared for a worst-case scenario, called "Fortress Baghdad," in which Saddam and his elite forces would withdraw into Baghdad and force United States troops to engage in urban warfare that could involve chemical and biological weapons. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*.

No Formal Structures or Mechanisms for Interaction: At the same time, however, there is little evidence to suggest that there were other established forums for interaction (aside from the discussions between Rumsfeld, Franks and Myers) at the civil-military nexus, such as advisory forums, meetings, working groups, and drills. Traditionally, the military presents its war plan and findings in "the tank" – a place where military commanders can meet without note-takers to discuss complex strategic problems, review objectives and resources, and report on the military's process and progress. That ended when planning for the Iraq War began. There was not a single tank session with the service chiefs to discuss wartime policy and strategy before and after the Iraq War began – an astounding example of how tightly controlled the planning process was leading up to the Iraq War, as well as the degree to which the service chiefs were excluded and censored by both the Defense Department and CENTCOM leadership.[751]

No Formal Structures for Phase IV Planning: With regard to the planning process for the post-conflict phase, there were no structures and mechanisms, either formal or informal, in place to plan for Phase IV operations. Unfortunately, the iterative process that characterized the planning process for the combat phase was not repeated during the Phase IV planning. Phase IV plans were left unaddressed and referred to as "open items."[752] In fact, when President Bush gave the order to execute Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19, 2003, the United States marched into war without a fully developed post-war plan, and I would

[751] Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012.
[752] George Packer, *The Assassins' Gate*, 119.

argue, without a reasoned consensus on an acceptable way forward in post-war Iraq.

As there was no consultative process at the civil-military nexus, there were few opportunities to debate, explore alternative views, challenge assumptions, plan for potential contingencies, and assure the war plan was adequately developed and resourced.

c. Reasoned Consensus

If deliberative discourse produces policy decisions that reflect the collective agreement of the civil-military nexus, how do we measure it? How do we measure the presence of a reasoned consensus? Until classified record on the Iraq War is made public, the actual positions of the participants involved in the planning process, as well as their respective departments, remains speculative. Nonetheless, there are several indicators to suggest whether consensus or disagreement. Civilians and military officer may choose to leak their dissent with policy to the media. Resignation in protest of senior military officers is another indicator. Similarly, civilian leaders may withdraw their support and lobby Congress to oppose a policy decision.

Variance over Troop Levels: A large-scale post-conflict operation went against the Rumsfeld's defense transformation agenda, and since the Iraq War

would be used as a proving ground for his concept of warfare, the Secretary wanted to deploy the minimum force necessary to win the war. He did not trust his generals would submit the minimum required troop levels. Moreover, he regarded the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) as a "wasteful anachronism that took decision-making out of his hands."[753] Rumsfeld and his staff, therefore, reviewed all military requisitions and insisted CENTCOM explain all force requirements. This tenacious insistence on oversight delayed the transport of troops and much-needed materials to the field. For example, in January 2003, just a few months before the start of the war, the commanding general on the ground, Lieutenant General David McKiernan, was unsure he would have forces to start the attack.

There was also disagreement on the flow of reinforcements. At the start of the war, Rumsfeld cancelled the deployment of the 1st Cavalry Division, a 17,000-strong force. The Secretary not only questioned whether the force was needed, but he also cancelled the request without informing McKiernan.[754] McKiernan had planned to use the 1st Cavalry to help secure Baghdad, as well as Fallujah and Ramadi, two cities in the Al Anbar province of Iraq that would later serve as the focal points of the Iraqi insurgency.[755]

[753] The military had a computerized system for determining which logistical and auxiliary units should be sent to the support the combat forces earmarked for the war plan. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 97
[754] Interview, General David D. McKiernan (Ret.), July 2, 2012.
[755] Ibid.

Variance over Phase IV Plans: Prior to the start of the Iraq War, it became increasingly clear the senior civilian and military leadership disagreed over how to manage post-war Iraq. While Rumsfeld and Franks poured over the multiple iterations of the war plan, Myers and the Joint Staff grew increasingly concerned over the lack of Phase IV planning.[756] In October 2002, the Joint Staff began to draft a plan to manage post-war Iraq.[757] Rumsfeld was not persuaded by the Joint Staff plan, and so made some important changes. Most importantly, he put the Department of Defense in charge of all post-war efforts. He also excluded all references to other U.S. government departments and agencies, particularly the Department of State and the CIA.[758]

However, despite placing the Department of Defense in charge of all post-war efforts, the Pentagon did little to move Phase IV planning forward. For a second time Myers instructed his staff to develop plans for the military-arm of the post-war headquarters, Joint Task Force 4 (JTF-4).[759] When JTF-4 arrived at Tampa, CENTCOM planners didn't have the time to bring up to speed a "pickup team" and prepare them to serve as the main workhorse. JTF-4 was pushed off to Lieutenant General David McKiernan in Kuwait.[760]

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[756] Interview, General Richard Myers (Ret.), June 8, 2012.
[757] The Joint Staff proposed establishing a headquarters, staffed by experts drawn from throughout the U.S. government, to oversee the rehabilitation of the Iraqi army, repair and upgrade Iraqi's electrical grid and decaying economic infrastructure. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, 140. In his memoir, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote that Myers expressed concern that CENTCOM was not paying sufficient detail to Phase IV. Rumsfeld goes on to note that Myers informed him that he would establish a new group to help CENTCOM plan for post-conflict operations. Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 485.
[758] Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012.
[759] Interview, General Richard Myers (Ret.), June 8, 2012.
[760] Interview, Colonel John Agoglia (Ret.), November 17, 2011.

Meanwhile, McKiernan, figuring that he might end up as the temporary custodian of Iraq, begun to sketch out his own plan for Phase IV, without any civilian guidance.[761] Eclipse II relied on the Iraqi police, the existing legal system, provincial governments, and Iraqi ministries to maintain law and order after the collapse of the regime. What McKiernan did not know was that the Department of Defense intended to disband the Iraqi Army, which would leave him without the Iraqi troops he needed to maintain law and order.[762]

On three different occasions – with the October Joint Staff draft plan, the JTF-4 planning group, and the Eclipse II plan – attempted, and ultimately failed, to move Phase IV planning forward and force the civilian leadership to develop the necessary framework to manage post-war Iraq.

Leaks to the Media: In the months leading up to the Iraq War, hardly a week went by without a story sourced by anonymous officers criticizing Rumsfeld.[763] Many officers up and down the chain of command questioned whether their concerns about the Iraq War were being sufficiently weighed.[764] Critics charged the Secretary with sending too small a force to topple Saddam Hussein and capture Baghdad. Eventually, a civil-military crisis erupted. By

[761] Interview, General David D. McKiernan (Ret.), July 2, 2012.
[762] Ibid.
[763] Mackuben Thomas Owens, "Judging Rumsfeld: The Secretary has Made Mistakes but War is a Messy Thing," *National Review Online*, January 5, 2005, (accessed May 1, 2014); available from http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/213295/judging-rumsfeld/mackubin-thomas-owens.
[764] Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks, "Rumsfeld's Style, Goals Strain Ties in Pentagon."

2006, several retired senior military officers, some of whom had served in Iraq, went public with their concerns over the mismanagement of the war by the leadership in the Pentagon. Their prescription was to replace Secretary Rumsfeld and others unwilling to fundamentally change their approach in Iraq.[765] Such intense public criticism from retired officers following their service is without precedent in American history.[766]

In sum, limited deliberative discourse characterized civil-military relations during the planning process for the 2003 Iraq War. Planners made little effort to engage divergent perspectives. Strategic assessment was poor. Few individuals beyond a small group of insiders were consulted, and formal structures and mechanisms for debate were bypassed. Disagreements on troop levels, the flow of reinforcements, and Phase IV plans played out in the media. The United States invaded Iraq without the consensus of the senior civilian and military leadership on how to manage the post-war environment.

2. Analysis of the Iraq Surge Case Study

A high degree of deliberative discourse characterized civil-military relations during the planning process for the Iraq Surge. At the civil-military nexus, the planning process was open-ended, evaluative and comprehensive. Planners worked hard to include dissenting civilian and military views in the

[765] Paul D. Eaton, "A Top-Down Review for the Pentagon."
[766] Martin L. Cook, "Revolt of the Generals."

planning process. Over the course of six months, the civilian and military leadership discussed and debated a new strategy for Iraq in informal and formal review sessions, as well as through back channel discussions with junior-level commanders, retired military officers, academics, and think tank specialists. The strategy review process reconsidered the administration's assumptions about what it could achieve in Iraq, developed alternative strategies – from complete withdrawal of United States forces to a partition of the country to a large surge of troops – and reached a consensus on the new way forward in Iraq. This deliberative review process led to a successful political and military outcome. In less than a year, the United States achieved tactical success in Iraq that changed the course of the war and pulled the country back from the brink of civil war.

a. Divergent Perspectives

Prior to the launch of a formal White House strategy review for the Iraq War in November 2006, a number of informal review processes had been underway since earlier in the year. The National Security Council, Department of State, and Joint Chiefs of Staff had assigned staff to review the Iraq train-and-transition strategy. Initially, the departments disagreed on how to move forward in Iraq. Each had their perspective.

Multiple Civilian Perspectives: The NSC Iraq Team, Department of State and Department of Defense initially disagreed on the way forward in Iraq. To

address the sectarian conflict and overall deteriorating situation in Iraq, the NSC Iraq team conducted an informal, bottom-to-top review of the current policy and alternative options for the Iraq War. The team reconsidered all options for how to move forward in Iraq. Their preferred strategy was to surge additional forces to Iraq and shift to a fully resourced counterinsurgency strategy.

Frustrated with the weak commitment of the Maliki government and the Iraqi security forces to control the violence, the Department of State preferred instead to pull American forces out of Baghdad until the sectarian violence burned out. However, if the United States were to send additional troops to Iraq, State recommended a "selective counterinsurgency" option that called for a temporary, short-term infusion of additional American forces in key regions of the country to produce a better climate for withdrawal of forces later in the year or next.[767]

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld remained committed to the train-and-transition strategy. With regard to a troop surge, Rumsfeld opposed the idea and devoted little time to evaluating what a surge strategy might look it.

Multiple Military Perspectives: MNF-I Commander, General George W. Casey, and CENTCOM Commander, General John Abizaid recommended accelerating the train-and-transition strategy. Meanwhile, aware the President wanted to see an alternative strategy for Iraq, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Peter Pace, launched the Council of Colonels to help the military move to

[767] Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor*, 55.

where the civilian leadership might be heading – toward a troop surge. Over the next several months, Pace met with the civilian leadership, exchanged information, and debated the military options for Iraq with the service chiefs.

b. Strategic Assessment

The Iraq Surge strategy review included several formal and informal structures and mechanisms for strategic assessment. Initially, information-exchange was poor, but improved once the White House launched a formal review process.

Information Sharing: Since the Department of Defense and senior military leadership initially opposed a troop surge, the NSC Iraq Team reached out to military experts and academics for information. The team consulted with General David Petraeus to advise on what a troop surge might accomplish militarily in Iraq.[768] To assess how many troops would be needed for a surge in Iraq, the NSC Iraq Team relied on the work of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). AEI had accessed the Army's Force General model online and concluded five additional army brigades and two marine battalions were enough to secure Baghdad, as well as its surrounding neighborhoods, without straining the US military.[769]

[768] Interview, Peter D. Feaver, January 10, 2014.
[769] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 283; Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 77.

Information gathered in Washington was sent to Baghdad. When General Raymond T. Odierno was selected to command Multi-National Corps-Iraq, he began drafting operational plans to secure Baghdad. Through an unofficial back channel, Odierno learned the number of troops the Army could afford send.[770] Knowing Casey would not support a five-brigade troop surge, Odierno needed an ally that wielded significant influence in Washington. He reached out to retired Army Vice Chief of Staff General Jack Keane, who had teamed up with AEI, to shore up support for a five-brigade troop surge back in Washington.

Informal Structures and Mechanisms for Interaction: The strategy review relied on the advice and recommendations of outside experts, academics, and retired military officers. The White House invited outside experts to Camp David in June 2006 and to the White House in December 2006 for an independent view of the Iraq strategy. Throughout the fall, retired General Jack Keane had also been had been lobbying Rumsfeld, Cheney, and Pace to support a troop surge.

Formal Structures and Mechanisms for Interaction: Prior to the launch of any of the strategy reviews, informal or formal, the United States Congress had appointed a bipartisan panel to assess the situation in Iraq and chart a new and politically acceptable path forward. Over eight months, the Iraq Study Group consulted with Iraqi officials and representatives, the White House, officials from the Department of Defense (such as Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Casey), the State Department, intelligence community and members of

[770] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame*, 301.

Congress. The group's recommendations were released in December 2006.

After months of internal deliberations, the President authorized a formal deputy-level Iraq strategy review led by Deputy National Security Advisor J.D. Crouch in November 2006. Over the next two months, the group would meet daily to debate their divergent perspectives, question assumptions, explore alternative solutions, and evaluate the political and military objectives of the Iraq War. The strategy review included senior participants from all key departments and agencies, including the Department of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Treasury, the Vice President's Office, and the NSC staff.[771] MNF-I was not part of the review, but Joint Staff representatives conveyed MNF-I positions.

Meanwhile, over a three-month period, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had the Council of Colonels review Iraq strategy and report its findings to Pace and the other service chiefs every Friday afternoon.

c. Reasoned Consensus

Of course, the NSC Iraq Team had long favored a troop surge. After months of deliberations, the Department of State also supported the strategy so long as the plan wasn't to send in more troops under the same old strategy. In the weeks prior to the announcement, however, the Pentagon leadership remained

[771] For a complete list of participants, see Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 230.

opposed. What happened during the strategy review that convinced the rest of the civilian and military leadership to support a five-brigade troop surge?

The Secretary Resigns and the Chiefs Strike a Deal: Initially, the Department of Defense and military leadership remained committed to the train-and-transition strategy. However, two things occurred that helped shift the Pentagon position.[772] First, after Secretary Rumsfeld resigned, the Department of Defense adopted a more pro-surge position. Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strike deal with the President. Chairman Pace believed the Joint Chiefs as a whole were more sympathetic to a surge strategy than MNF-I. The General urged the President to meet with the service chiefs to hear their views. To accommodate the Chiefs' concerns regarding an already stretched military, and the absence of adequate contributions from non-military sectors, the President strikes a deal. Bush offered the Chiefs more budget money and a promise to increase the size of the active duty Army and Marine Corps.[773] With that bargain, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were on board.

To summarize, when the President announced his decision on a troop surge in January 2007, the decision reflected a civil-military consensus. The combined efforts of the civilian and military leadership led to the success of the Iraq Surge. Civilian-led strategy reviews involved the military, and the military regularly consulted with the civilian leadership in its review process. The strategy

[772] Peter D. Feaver, "The Right to be Right," 104.
[773] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 286.

review was an open-ended evaluative and comprehensive consultative process, and it reflected the consensus of the civilian and military leadership.

C) Alternative Explanations

Despite the influence of deliberative discourse on the planning processes of the Iraq War and Surge, there are several important explanations that may have influenced wither the overall planning process or the political and military outcome of the two cases.

1. Personalities Matter

Do personalities matter? Henry Kissinger once remarked, "As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make."[774] Indeed, individuals play a role in international relations. In *Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In*, Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack study the impact of individuals on international relations.[775] The core question of the article is, do personalities matter to the affairs of states? Their conclusion is a resounding

[774] Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," *International Security*, vol. 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 107-146.
[775] In their article, Byman and Pollack identify three reasons why political scientists do not study the role of individuals on international relations. First, many political scientists focus more on impersonal forces as the causes of international events. They argue human nature is a constant whereas the international relations vary. Second, many political scientists posit that although individuals matter, their influence does not lend itself to the theoretical generalizations. That is, theories focused on the influence of individuals on international relations cannot be parsimonious. Third, the study of individual personalities is theoretically hopeless.

"yes." To make their case, the authors examine five historical cases that show that the role of individuals was crucial to the outcome of the case.[776] From the cases, they then tease out thirteen plausible, testable hypotheses on the role of individuals in international relations.

The first set of hypotheses describes the ways in which individuals shape the behavior of nations. For example, individuals set the ultimate and secondary intentions of a state. The second set of hypotheses look at the personality traits of leaders. For example, states led by risk-tolerant leaders are more likely to cause wars. The third set of hypotheses looks at enabling factors. For example, individuals are more important when systemic, domestic, and bureaucratic forces conflict or are ambiguous. The final set considers the indirect influence of the individual on the state, through domestic politics and bureaucratic politics, and on the international system, via the distribution of power.

Byman and Pollack make a compelling argument – international relations cannot be understood if the individual is ignored. In a similar vein, understanding how the planning process for the Iraq War and Iraq Surge unfolded cannot be understood if the role of key individuals is ignored. In each case, certain individuals influenced civil-military relations, and therefore, the planning process.

[776] The five cases are 1) Germany under Hitler; 2) the contrasting impact of Chancellor Otto van Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II on European politics; 3) France under Napoleon Bonaparte; 4) a comparison of Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Syria under Hafiz al-Asad; and 5) the behavior of Iran in its war with Iraq under Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini.

Secretary Rumsfeld came into office thinking he had to establish civilian control over an unruly Pentagon. He believed the military would thwart his access to information and resist any and all attempts to reassert civilian control over the armed forces. This perception led Rumsfeld to micromanage the planning process, only engage those military officers whose views generally aligned with his own, and limit the frequency of and interaction with military officers he perceived as resistant to change. Officers frequently complained that the Secretary was abusive, dismissive, and trustful of only a tiny circle of close advisers. To a certain extent, Rumsfeld contributed to the creation of a hostile work environment, and thus, strained civil-military relations.

Rumsfeld's assertive and abrasive style left the rest of the interagency out of the planning process. However, by 2006, his stock had declined considerably. He no longer yielded as much influence. His "absence" made room for the NSC and the Department of State to influence the debate on a new strategy for the Iraq.

Another example of the impact of personalities on civil-military relations is the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the lead up to the Iraq War, General Richard Myers served as the Chairman. He was not known for his independent voice, and many saw his selection as an attempt by Rumsfeld to assert his authority over the uniformed military. Senior officers feared Myers would not represent the military's interests well or even question or challenge the

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civilian leadership over the war planning and decision-making process.[777]

Indeed, Myers was a weak Chairman. He did not think disagreements between the Chairman and the Secretary should be made known. Moreover, although he believed the Chairman had a right to voice his dissent, he thought that it should be done so in private, and that any differences in opinion should be sorted out before going to the President. As such, Myers failed to provide the President with independent military advice. Instead, whenever Rumsfeld disagreed with the Chairman's advice, Myers would withdraw and acquiesce rather than share his opinion with the President and National Security Council.[778] Throughout his tenure, Myers was viewed as a Rumsfeld "yes-man."[779]

Another Rumsfeld "yes-man" was then-Vice Chairman Peter Pace. However, as Chairman during the planning process for the Iraq Surge, Pace played a significant role in providing independent military advice to the President and in representing the views of both the Joint Chiefs and General Casey, which were at times in conflict.[780] Although Pace did not oppose the surge in the same ways the Joint Chiefs and General Casey did, he nevertheless made sure their views and concerns were heard. To bring the military along with the evolving views of the President, Pace devised a decision-making process for the Joint Chiefs, known as the Council of Colonels. At one point, he also asked the

[777] Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012.
[778] Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*; Bob Woodward, *State of Denial*.
[779] Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars,* 41; Interview, Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold (Ret.), June 18, 2012.
[780] Peter D. Feaver, "The Right to be Right," 113.

President to meet with the Joint Chiefs to hear their perspectives on a troop surge. Unlike his predecessor, Pace worked hard to ensure the military had a voice in the debate and discussion on alternative strategies for Iraq, and that their concerns regarding the surge was brought to the attention of the President and the rest of the civilian leadership.

Like the Joint Staff, the role of the National Security Council in managing the interagency varied with the National Security Advisor. For example, whereas Stephen J. Hadley was intimately involved in the planning process for the Iraq Surge, Condoleezza had a minimal role in the planning process for the Iraq War. Rice's limited role had much to do with her personality and leadership, as it did with Rumsfeld's.

Finally, considering the influence of personalities on civil-military relations unveils another potential alternative explanation – the role of leaders. President George W. Bush left much of the planning for the Iraq War to Rumsfeld and General Franks. In contrast, during the Iraq Surge review, the President played a larger role in shaping the strategy.

2. Different People in Different Chairs Matters

In addition to considering how personalities shape state intentions, where individuals sit matters. In 2001, Senator Daniel Coats was reportedly George W.

Bush's top choice to be Secretary of Defense. Had the President chosen him as Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld would have been Director of the CIA, and Paul Wolfowitz would have served as Deputy Secretary of State.[781] Under this scenario, a war skeptic would have headed Defense, a war supporter would be in State, and Rumsfeld would have had a less prominent role in dictating military policy. Perhaps under this scenario, the United States might not have invaded Iraq in 2003.

Another example is the influence of Condoleezza Rice as National Security Advisor during the lead up to the Iraq War versus her influence as Secretary of State prior to the Iraq Surge. As National Security Advisor, Rice did not have the influence over Iraq policy that she would later have as Secretary of State. Arguably, the Department of State played a greater role in the Iraq War under Rice for several reasons. First, she had a better personal relationship with the President than Colin Powell had when he was Secretary of State. Second, her influence as Secretary of State, and the role she played in the planning process for the Iraq Surge, was party due to the declining influence of Rumsfeld, and thus, the Defense Department. Third, from November 2004 to May 2006, Rice's primary military advisor was General Odierno. Shortly after his assignment with Rice, Odierno became the Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq. Rice now had an in with the military leadership in Iraq.[782] Not to mention, Odierno's time as military advisor to Rice while she was National Security Advisor surely

[781] Interview, Peter D. Feaver, January 10, 2014.
[782] Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*.

influenced his view on how to plan for the Iraq Surge. Finally, Rice was haunted by her failure as National Security Advisor in the lead up to the Iraq War.[783] As such, she made sure to thoroughly question all assumptions about what the military could achieve in Iraq with additional troops, as well as develop new options for the Iraq War. Whatever the reason for why Rice yielded more power as Secretary of State, the dynamic in the White House was surely different when she moved from the NSC to State.

3. Bureaucratic Politics

One alternative explanation is the influence of bureaucratic politics on the planning process. The bureaucratic politics model explains how government behavior is the outcome of bargaining decisions made by multiple players. The model begins with the assumption that the state is not a unitary actor, but made up of multiple players who act according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals.[784] Each player represents a department or agency along with the interests and constituencies their organization serves. These leaders have competitive operational objectives, priorities and perceptions. Government decisions do not necessarily reflect a shared national security image or foreign policy goal, but different conceptions of national interest.[785] Each player, depending on where they sit, has a different perspective because their

[783] Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor*, 506.
[784] Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Exploring the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed., (New York: Longman, 1999): 255.
[785] Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed., (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006): 9.

perception is influenced by their particular objectives.[786] As a result, government decisions are made "not by a single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics."[787] The chosen course of action results from compromise and conflict between officials with competing preferences, interests, and priorities.

When government officials come together to take action, the end result may be different from what any of them intended before they interacted as a group.[788] Some of characteristics of multi-person, decision-making processes that affect the content of decisions and actions include: competing objectives and asymmetric information, the relative power or skill of the individual bargainers, how a problem is framed and reach's the group's agenda, and groupthink.[789]

One example of how the relative power or skill of the individual bargainers affects a state's choice is the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Secretary of State Colin Powell opposed the US invasion in Iraq. He warned President Bush of the consequences of military action, stating, "You are going to be the proud owner of 25 million people…You will own all their hopes, aspirations, and problems. You'll own it all."[790] Rumsfeld disagreed. He believed Iraqi citizens would greet American forces as liberators and Iraqi institutions would remain in tact once Saddam Hussein was removed from power. President Bush had two opposing recommendations from his top secretaries. In the end, he

[786] Ibid, 15.
[787] Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 255.
[788] Ibid, 258.
[789] Ibid, 280.
[790] Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004),150.

sided with the recommendation of Secretary Rumsfeld. Why? The Department of Defense yielded significantly more power and influence over the decision-making process. Secretary Rumsfeld also had a much closer relationship to the President than Secretary Powell did. He had the President's ear. Powell did not. In fact, Powell was shut out of the early discussions on the Iraq War. He rarely had any one-on-one meetings with the President. On one occasion, Powell had to ask National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to coordinate a meeting with the President so Powell could share his thoughts on the Iraq War with the President.

Another example of the bargaining games involved in policy-making is the December 13 meeting at the Pentagon between President Bush and the Joint Chiefs during the planning process for the Iraq Surge. To gain the Chiefs support for a five-brigade surge, the President persuaded the Chiefs with "sweeteners" – more budget money and a promise to increase the size of the active duty Army and Marine Corps.[791]

Indeed, understanding government behavior as the result of bargaining games among individual players with differing power and competing preferences helps to explain why some decisions are not necessarily rational or in the state's best interest.

[791] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 286.

4. Factors Influencing the Outcome of the 2003 Iraq War

The United States invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003. President Bush prematurely announced the end of major combat operations in the Iraq War on May 1. Visible in the background during the President's speech was a banner stating "Mission Accomplished." Unfortunately, the Iraq War was far from over. American forces would remain in Iraq until December 2011. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, there was a complete breakdown in security. The security vacuum that emerged fueled an insurgency against American forces and the newly formed Iraqi government. In addition to the Sunni insurgents, the sources of violence expanded and now included Shiite militias and death squads, al Qaeda and affiliated jihadists, and vigilantes and organized criminals. In 2006, the nature of the Iraqi conflict began to change, moving away from an insurgency against the coalition to a struggle for the political and economic power of Iraq. A sectarian war erupted that required the United States to surge troops, change tactics, and launch a counterinsurgency campaign. As violence declined, the United States began to drawdown troops. The insurgency, however, continues in Iraq even after the complete withdrawal of American forces. The future of Iraq remains uncertain. How did this happen?

The case study on the 2003 Iraq War demonstrates how civil-military relations characterized by limited deliberative discourse led to a truncated civil-military dialogue during the planning process. As such, there were few

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opportunities to debate alternative courses of action, exchange information, test planning assumptions, or prepare for possible contingences. However, other factors were at play during the planning process for the Iraq War that influenced its outcome. Even if civil-military relations had been characterized by a high degree of deliberative discourse, it would not have guaranteed that the outcome of the Iraq War would have been any different than it was.

One factor to consider is the inevitable collapse of the Iraq state and unavoidable outbreak of an insurgency. Iraq suffered from too many structural problems – a divided society devastated by years of war, sanctions, and misrule – and no amount of civil-military planning could have prevented the complete breakdown of security in Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Yes, the United States made several policy mistakes as the result of inadequate planning – deploying too few troops, lacking a comprehensive political and military plan for the occupation, disbanding the Iraqi military, executing an overly aggressive de-Baathification policy, and failing to establish an Iraqi government quickly – but even if the United States had made the right policy choices, a US-led occupation of Iraq would have still likely been a costly and deadly exercise. Iraq's structural problems were exceptionally challenging and too vast to have enabled the US to succeed in Iraq swiftly even if the United States had made better policy choices.

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In *An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?* Daniel Byman raises the question of whether better planning (or more planning) could have prevented the disastrous framework the United States put in place in Iraq. He reviews some of the inherent challenges of occupying a country like Iraq – the chance of nationalistic backlash, collapse of government, and surge in criminality.[792] Byman concludes that the Iraqi experience suggests that effective military occupation following wars of choice is not theoretically impossible, but that the United States government and military exhibit many features that in practice make serious errors in such an enterprise likely, such as not deploying enough forces, preparing for the onset of an insurgency, planning for worst-case scenarios with regard to popular support and cooperation, recognizing the difficulty of reconstruction, and developing civilian capacity.[793]

5. Factors Influencing the Outcome of the Iraq Surge

In September 2007, General Petraeus testified before Congress that the number of civilian deaths across Iraq had declined by over 45% since December 2006, and the number of ethno-sectarian deaths was down 55% across Iraq and down 80% in Baghdad alone.[794] Was the decline in violence a result of the surge? Did the troop surge in and around Baghdad, coupled with counterinsurgency tactics, help quell the sectarian war? There are a few factors as important as the

[792] Daniel L. Byman, "An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle."
[793] Ibid, 641-642.
[794] General David H. Petraeus, "Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq."

surge that spurred the decline in violence in Iraq, and ultimately, changed the course of the Iraq War.

Bob Woodward reports in *The War Within* that the US military and intelligence agencies launched a series of top-secret operations that enabled them to locate, target and kill key individuals in AQ, the Sunni insurgency, and Shia militias. Woodward writes that US operations incorporated highly classified techniques. He does not disclose what tactics were used, but writes how "these covert activities had a far-reaching effect on the violence and were very possible the biggest factor in reducing it."[795] Although there is no publically available information to support Woodward's claims, the potential role of covert operations in reducing the violence in Iraq deserves mention.

Another factor influencing the outcome of the Iraq Surge was the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a militant Islamist from Jordan. As the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I), Zarqawi was responsible for some of the most spectacular acts of violence in Iraq: suicide attacks, large truck bombs, and attacks on significant religious and political targets. AQ-I's ultimate goal was to instigate a sectarian war between Iraq's Sunni and Shia in order to drive out the United States from Iraq. To this end, Zarqawi issued a declaration of war against "Shia infidels" on September 14, 2005.[796] He also orchestrated the Samarra mosque bombing in February 2006, which instigated widespread sectarian attacks and

[795] Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, 380.
[796] George W. Casey, Jr., *Strategic Reflections*, 14.

revenge killings.

On June 7, 2006, a US airstrike killed Zarqawi while he attended a meeting in an isolated safe house north of Baqubah, a Sunni enclave in Diyala province. Some experts claimed his death had little effect on squelching the insurgency.[797] His death did not address the root causes of the Sunni-led insurgency, which was that Sunnis felt marginalized, disenfranchised, and humiliated.[798] Moreover, his death left the Iraqi insurgency and AQ-I in tact and capable to continue to fight. Others, however, saw the death of Zarqawi as a turning point in the war on terrorism.[799] He was a brutal, ruthless leader who had orchestrated a vicious and successful campaign of intimidation and destruction across Iraq. Moreover, he had given al Qaeda a visible presence in Iraq at a time when its senior leaders had gone into hiding or had been killed. He also achieved a high level of notoriety that helped unite foreign fighters in Iraq under a single command.

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[797] Lionel Beehner, "Iraq's Insurgency After Zarqawi," *Council on Foreign Relations*, June 9, 2014, (accessed May 2, 2014); available from http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraqs-insurgency-after-zarqawi/p10880#p2. Others viewed Zarqawi as a mythic figure and essentially American creation. He became a leading figure of the Iraq insurgency after Colin Powell identified Zarqawi – mistakenly – as the crucial link between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's regime. Mary Ann Weaver, "The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," *The Atlantic*, July 1, 2006, (accessed May 5, 2014); available from http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/.

[798] Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White, "Assessing Iraq's Sunni Arab Insurgency," *Military Review*, May-June 2006, (accessed May 8, 2014); available from *http*://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/eisenstadt-white.pdf.

[799] Nile Gardiner, "The Death of Zarqawi: A Major Victory in the War on Terrorism," *The Heritage Foundation*, WebMemo #118 on Middle East, June 8, 2006, (accessed May 2, 2014); available from http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/06/the-death-of-zarqawi-a-major-victory-in-the-war-on-terrorism. Craig Whitlock, "Death Could Shake al-Qaeda in Iraq and Around the World," *Washington Post*, June 10, 2006, (accessed May 1, 2014); available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060902040.html.

It is not possible to know how Zarqawi's death influenced the outcome of the Iraq War. However, as an important figure in the insurgency, his death boosted coalition morale and reenergized the United States commitment to Iraq at a time when public support for the war was very low.[800]

A third and critical factor was the Sunni Awakening. In late 2005, groups of concerned local citizens in Anbar province began to form local security forces and revolt against the draconian tactics of AQ-I. They also provided intelligence to US and Iraqi forces. By the end of 2006, fourteen tribes made up the growing Anbar Awakening movement.[801] Many who took part in the movement included former Sunni insurgents who had rejected AQ-I and decided to support the new Iraqi government and US forces. The Awakening began to spread across much of the country in 2007 and 2008. As the movement grew, the US military lobbied the Iraqi government to accept Awakening members and to put them on the payroll.[802] Tribal leaders entered into security contracts with coalition forces. American and Iraqi officials vetted Awakening members, entering their biometric details in an intelligence database.[803] These groups, who later came to be known as the Sons of Iraq, coordinated operations with coalition and Iraqi combat commanders.[804] In 2008, there were some 75,000 Sons of Iraq throughout the country in 2008.[805] They had a strategic effect on the war in Baghdad and in the

[800] Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 44.
[801] Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends*, 106.
[802] Gordon and Trainor, *The Endgame*, 692; Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 220.
[803] Gordon and Trainor, *The Endgame*, 692.
[804] Greg Bruno, "The Role of the 'Sons of Iraq."
[805] Ballard, *From Storm to Freedom*, 220.

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belts surrounding the capital.

One final factor was when Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his Mahdi Army to suspend operations, including attacks against US forces. With over 60,000 fighters, the Mahdi Army was one of the largest Shia militias and responsible for much of the Shia sectarian violence.[806] The Mahdi Army challenged both US and Iraqi security forces, regularly engaged in revenge killings of Sunnis, and sought to pressure the withdrawal of coalition forces. Ultimately, it sought to control the Iraqi government. On August 29, 2007, following major clashes between Iraqi security forces and the Mahdi Army, Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his militia to stand down. On August 28, 2008, al-Sadr ordered the Mahdi Army to stand down indefinitely. As the United States no longer faced significant challenges from the Mahdi Army, American forces were able to direct their efforts elsewhere.

These examples explain alternative actions other than the impact of civil-military relations on the planning process that could have influenced the outcome of the Iraq War or Iraq Surge. Each of these alternative explanations warrants consideration in future analyses of this issue. Despite their importance, however, they do not undercut the influence of deliberative discourse in the planning process.

[806] *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 11.

D) Conclusion

When the United States rolled into Iraq in 2003, American forces followed a plan that assumed they would be greeted as liberators, not conquerors. The plan also assumed government institutions and Iraqi society would resume to function without incident. Iraq however suffered from too many structural problems – a divided society devastated by years of war, sanctions, and misrule. As such, once Saddam Hussein was removed from power, American forces faced a complete breakdown in security and political vacuum. Was the failure in Iraq a result of poor policy choices? If civilian and military planners engaged in a deliberative discourse, might the United States have formulated a plan for Iraq that could have prevented an insurgency from developing?

In 2007, the United States executed a surge strategy after months of informal advisory processes, back channel discussions, and formal strategy reviews that included individuals at the civil-military apex, as well as White House insiders, junior-level commanders, retired military officers, and academic and think tank specialists. When the United States executed the plan, American forces achieved tactical success in Iraq that changed the course of the war and pulled the country back from the brink of civil war. Was the success of the Iraq Surge a result of a deliberative planning process that reflected the consensus of the civilian and military leadership?

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Yes, if the civilian and military planners had engaged in a deliberative discourse during the planning process for the Iraq War, the United States might have formulated a better strategy for the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Yes, the success of the Iraq Surge was due in part to the deliberative planning process.

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VII) FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A) Introduction

Post-conflict operations are an inevitable, and ultimately, decisive part of war. Securing the peace at the end of major combat operations simultaneously requires the transformation of major aspects of the state, society, and economy. Yet despite its rich history of involvement in post-conflict operations, the United States failed to absorb the lessons learned from past operations and capitalize on initial battlefield victories in Iraq. Why? Why did the United States fail to develop and resource a strategy for the post-conflict environment? Why did the planning process fail to question political objectives, test assumptions, address potential contingencies, and coordinate civilian and military resources and capabilities? To answer these questions, the dissertation seeks to understand one factor influencing the planning process – the nature of civil-military relations at the apex of national security decision-making.

Civil-military relations theory describes the relationship between civil society and the military organization established to protect it. More narrowly, it illustrates the relationship between the civil authority of the state and its military institution with regard to issues of national security policy. How the United

States manages national defense affairs and prepares for conflict are questions of civil-military relations. For the most part, the literature has focused on how civil authorities control the military, what policies and structures lead to civilian control, and what kind of civil-military relations best serve the interests of the state in the long term.[807]

Recent scholarship has moved civil-military theory forward to question the roles, responsibilities, and function of civilian and military actors in the national security decision-making process. Significant attention has been given to Eliot A. Cohen's argument for an "unequal dialogue."[808] Statesmen must immerse themselves in the conduct of war, ask hard questions about military proposals, and occasionally, overrule their military advisors. He also recognizes military leaders should ask hard questions about the ends of policy. At all times, however, the statesman must dominate the civil-military dialogue.[809]

Not all scholars necessarily agree with Cohen's characterization of civil-military relations as "unequal dialogue" however. Richard K. Betts favors an "equal dialogue," recommending civilians and military be "equally conversant in each others' terms of reference and should participate equally at all stages.[810] Similarly, Frank G. Hoffman emphasizes the equal exchange of civilian and

[807] Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," 7-26; Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 149-180.
[808] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 209. According to Cohen, what occurs between the statesman and the general is an "unequal dialogue" – a dialogue, in that both sides express their views bluntly, at times offensively, and repeatedly – and unequal, in that the final authority of the statesman is unambiguous and unquestioned.
[809] Eliot A. Cohen, "The Unequal Dialogue," 458.
[810] Richard K. Betts, "Are Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem?" 36.

military views in policy debates. Finally, Christopher P. Gibson also promotes a running dialogue between civilian and military leaders with his Madisonian approach to civil-military relations.

Though scholars increasingly address the need for dialogue – equal or unequal – their focus has remained largely on whether such a dialogue translates into intrusive civilian direction or excessive military autonomy in national security decision-making.[811] This dissertation attempts to shift this theoretical debate away from a focusing on issues of control to understanding how relations between civilian and military leaders influence policy outcomes. The dissertation applies the concept of deliberative discourse to civil-military relations theory.

In post-conflict operations, where the political and military spheres of influence intertwine, and the bounds of civilian and military authority are unclear, deliberative discourse ensures civilian and military leaders engage divergent perspectives, probe, question and reconsider planning assumptions, explore possible contingencies and alternative strategies, and produce a reasoned, well-informed, collective decision. Deliberative discourse helps define the roles and responsibilities of civilian and military actors, assigns appropriate tasks and authorities, matches political objectives to military capabilities, and most importantly, links "winning the war" to "securing the peace."

[811] Richard K. Betts, "Are American Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem," 11-41; Richard K. Betts, *American Force*; Frank G. Hoffman, "Dereliction of Duty *Redux?*" 217-235; Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," 7-26; Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*; Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State*. Peter D. Feaver, "The Right to be Right," 87-125.

B) Summary of Research Findings

The dissertation reviews the planning process of the 2003 Iraq War and 2007 Iraq Surge. To understand how the nature of civil-military relations, defined as having a limited or high degree of deliberative discourse, I review evidence of divergent perspectives, mechanisms and structures for strategic assessments, and reasoned consensus in the planning processes. Case study findings confirm the research hypotheses. Civil-military relations characterized by a high degree of deliberative discourse are *a necessary but not sufficient condition* for a successful political and military outcome. Civil-military relations characterized by limited deliberative discourse are *a sufficient condition* for an unsuccessful political and military outcome.

During the planning process for the 2003 Iraq War, limited deliberative discourse characterized civil-military relations. In the months prior to the United States invasion into Iraq, there were few opportunities to debate alternative courses of action, exchange information, test planning assumptions, or prepare for possible contingences. In short, planners made little effort to engage divergent perspectives. Strategic assessment was also poor. Information was kept private, few individuals beyond a small group of insiders were consulted, and formal structures and mechanisms for debate were bypassed. Disagreements on troop levels, the flow of reinforcements, and Phase IV plans played out in the media

rather than in structured forums. The United States invaded Iraq without the consensus of the civilian and military leadership on how to manage the post-conflict environment. The political and military outcome of the Iraq policy was disastrous. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, there was a complete breakdown in security, which quickly fueled an insurgency against American forces that entangled the United States into a decade-long commitment in Iraq.

Fortunately, a high degree of deliberative discourse characterized civil-military relations during the planning process for the Iraq Surge. Planners worked hard to include dissenting civilian and military views. Over the course of six months, civilian and military leaders debated a new strategy for Iraq in informal and formal review sessions, as well as through back channel discussions with junior-level commanders, retired military officers, academics, and think tank policy analysts. The strategy review process reconsidered the administration's assumptions about what it could achieve in Iraq and developed alternative strategies – from complete withdrawal of United States forces to a partition of the country to a large surge of troops. When President George W. Bush announced his decision on a troop surge in January 2007, the decision reflected a civil-military consensus on the new way forward in Iraq. This deliberative review process led to a successful political and military outcome. In less than a year, the United States achieved tactical success in Iraq that changed the course of the war and pulled the country back from the brink of civil war.

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C) Future Research Opportunities

The goal of the dissertation is to contribute to the literature on civil-military relations theory, explore how civil-military relations influence the policy planning process, and address the need for a model of deliberative discourse. A normative framework for deliberative discourse in civil-military relations requires additional research to fully demonstrate the causal link between the nature of civil-military relations (characterized by a limited of high degree of deliberative discourse) and the planning process. A second review of the two case studies is warranted once documents related to the Iraq War become declassified. Official meeting notes will provide new information, as well as confirm or disconfirm the interview and research data.

One significant research need that arises from this dissertation concerns issues of measurement. If deliberative discourse produces policy that reflects a reasoned consensus, how is it measured? There are a few indicators. The announcement of a policy decision may be pushed back in order to gather more political support. Civilian leaders may marginalize dissenting officers. Military leaders may resign in protest or retired officers may go public with their concerns. Similarly, civilian leaders may withdraw their support for a policy and lobby Congress to oppose the policy decision. Of course, civilian and military leaders may express public dissent is with leaks to the media. Until the public record becomes available, the views and positions of the civilian and military leaders

involved the planning processes of the Iraq War and Surge remains suspect.

Additional case study research is needed to better understand how civil-military relations influence the planning process. Will additional cases replicate the dissertation results? Other potential case studies include past United States interventions in Panama, Somalia, and Haiti, as well as the federal response to Hurricane Katrina. The 2010 Afghanistan Surge is another fascinating case that will inform the theoretical argument for deliberative discourse in civil-military relations.

The strategy review for the Afghanistan Surge is a case in civil-military friction. In *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates writes, "All too early in the administration, suspicion and distrust of senior military officers by senior White House officials – including the president and vice president – became a big problem for me as I tried to manage the relationship between the commander in chief and his military leaders."[812] Did personal feelings and distrust interfere with the strategy review?

Within days of President Barrack Obama's inauguration, the civilian and military leadership discussed whether to send additional troops into Afghanistan at a National Security Council meeting. The new administration hesitated to send more troops before they had figured out their strategy for Afghanistan. Nonetheless, on February 17, 2009, less than 30 days in office, Obama authorized

[812] Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014).

the deployment of 17,000 troops.[813] Did the pressure for an early decision on a troop surge have the unfortunate effect of heightening civil-military tensions?

Then, when General Stanley A. McChrystal became Commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan in June, he found the situation in Afghanistan much worse than he expected. With his appointment began the strategy review for an Afghanistan Surge, and with it, growing civil-military tensions. The White House felt the military was trying to box in the President and force him to make a decision prematurely.[814] The military suspected the White House of leaking information to the press to undercut their case for more troops.[815]

Did the planning process for the Afghanistan Surge produce the right strategy? Even after the surge was announced, and before soldiers arrived in Afghanistan, civil-military friction over policy continued. According to Gates, members of the White House, who had opposed the surge decision, shared any negative news coming out of Afghanistan with the President to convince him that the military had been wrong.[816] Were civil-military tensions too high during the strategy review to allow civilian and military leaders to engage in deliberative

[813] The initial approval was for 17,000, but in March 2009 the White House approved the deployment of another 4,000 trainers for the Afghan security forces, bringing the final force to 68,000. Michael Gerson, "U.S. Has Reasons to Hope in Afghanistan," *The Washington Post*, September 4, 2009, (accessed May 29, 2014); available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/03/AR2009090302862.html.
[814] Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014): 338.
[815] Peter Baker, "How Obama Came to Plan for 'Surge' in Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, December 5, 2009, (accessed May 30, 2014); available from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/world/asia/06reconstruct.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0."
[816] Robert M. Gates, *Duty*, 385.

discourse?

The role of personalities in the policy planning process is another research need in order to assess the explanatory power of a theory of deliberative discourse. If personalities matter, how then do individuals influence civil-military relations, and thus, the planning process? Do certain personalities influence whether civilian and military leaders engage in deliberative discourse? Do certain personalities prevent deliberative discourse from occurring?

Secretary Rumsfeld came into office thinking he had to establish civilian control over an unruly Pentagon. He believed the military would thwart his access to information and resist any and all attempts to reassert civilian control over the armed forces. This perception led the Secretary to micromanage the planning process for the Iraq War, engage those military officers whose views generally aligned with his own, and limit the frequency of and interaction with military officers he perceived as resistant to change. Did Rumsfeld's management style strain civil-military relations? Did his "absence" and declining influence during the planning process for the Iraq Surge make room for the National Security Council and Department of State to control the debate?

Of course, a dominant personality does not necessarily hinder deliberative discourse. In *Supreme Command*, Eliot A. Cohen attributed the success of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben on

their invasive management style, relentless questioning, and involvement in military matters.[817] Such practices may make for better deliberative discourse since participants are forced to defend and justify the validity of their position. To this end, Rumsfeld writes in his memoir that he insisted subordinates speak up. "As I believe in being challenged, I also made a practice of challenging my challengers," he wrote. "When a challenger failed to support his views, I did not pretend to be impressed. But, in my view, no professional, let alone a three- or four-star military officer, should be intimidated into silence by a boss who asks questions and expects sensible answers, even honest answers as simple as an 'I don't know, but I'll get back to you'."[818]

Considering the influence of personalities on civil-military relations unveils another potential research question – how does leadership influence civil-military relations? Should the President guide policy quietly or communicate his vision? In *The Hidden-Hand Presidency,* Fred I. Greenstein argues that President Dwight Eisenhower played politics with a "hidden-hand." He camouflaged his participation in politics, yet in reality, he was very much in control of policy.[819] Or, should the President become intimately involved with the policy process? Does Presidential involvement influence determine whether civilian and military leaders engage in deliberative discourse? President Bush left much of the planning for the Iraq War to Rumsfeld and General Franks. Should he have

[817] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command.*
[818] Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 456.
[819] Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as a Leader*, 2nd ed., (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

demanded to view the post-conflict plan before authorizing the invasion of Iraq? In contrast, during the Iraq Surge review, the President played a larger role in shaping the strategy.

Another potential research area in understanding deliberative discourse and civil-military relations is determining the influence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What type of Chairman best serves the national security decision-making process? How does the Chairman influence civil-military relations? General Myers was known for his independent voice. In contrast, General Pace launched a strategy review with the Joint Staff, regularly briefed the President, and worked with the Joint Staff to move the military leadership to support an alternative strategy.

The influential role of Stephen J. Hadley during the planning process for the Iraq Surge versus the minimal role of Condoleezza Rice had in the planning process for the Iraq War raises another potential research area – the role of the National Security Advisor. One role of the National Security Advisor is to advise the President on national security issues. The other role of the National Security Advisor is to manage the interagency process and integrate the efforts of large government departments and agencies. What role should the National Security Advisor have in the planning process? Should the National Security Advisor serve as a policy coordinator or policy maker? How does the National Security Advisor influence civil-military relations?

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The broader topic of civil-military relations in post-conflict environments also warrants further research. The dissertation investigates how relations between civilian and military leaders at the apex of national decision-making impact the planning process. However, this focus is one piece of a larger puzzle. In addition to the strategic level, post-conflict environments involve civil-military interactions at the operational and tactical levels. Post-conflict environments require a mix of civilian and military skills to address a range of issues, such as public security and the rule of law, rebuilding the economy, improving governance, and revitalizing the economy. Does the United States have a whole-of-government or institutional capacity to integrate the capabilities of the many federal departments and agencies involved in post-conflict environments? Moreover, since different civilian and military agencies play different roles at different stages of an operation, how are civilian and military activities coordinated on the ground? How are activities in the field coordinated to meet the political objectives set out in Washington? How does Washington manage civilian and military activities in the field? All of these issues areas require further investigation.

Finally, the dissertation focuses on civil-military relations in the United States. However, the United States relies on the involvement of foreign governments, as well as multilateral and regional organizations in long-term post-conflict missions. Many of the civil-military challenges facing the United States

also plague the members of the international community. As such, in addition to building institutional capacity to manage post-conflict environments, the United States must also address how best to coordinate activities with the indigenous and foreign governments, militaries, civilian agencies, international institutions, non-governmental organizations, and other local actors on the ground.

D) Policy Implications

A significant policy implication of the research findings is the need to reform the interagency process. The function of the National Security Council is to advise the President on domestic, foreign, and military policies related to national security. This requires coordinating civilian and military actors and capabilities. Much of the strategy review for the Iraq Surge occurred at Principal- and Deputy-level National Security Council meetings. During the planning process for the Iraq War, information was not always shared at these meetings. Does the interagency process determine the civil-military dialogue?

Unfortunately, in its current form, the interagency process has numerous shortcomings, such as stove piped execution, a lack of unity of effort, poor planning, and incoherent implementation structures. What then is an effective interagency process to coordinate the civilian and military instruments of national

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power?[820] How should the National Security Council function, and how does its function influence a process of deliberative discourse?

In 2009, National Security Advisor General James Jones (ret.) issued a memo laying out his vision for adapting the national security bureaucracy architecture to meet current security challenges. The memo urges for "agile, yet deliberative decision-making process" that could cope with multiple issues simultaneously, consider the full range of options, and propose informed decisions.[821] The memo proposes several principles to guide the interagency

[820] One of the first efforts to address interagency coordination was in 1997 when President William J. Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. PDD-56 sought to improve dialogue and decision-making among government agencies in order to achieve unity of effort. PDD-56, however, was never fully implemented due to internal bureaucratic resistance. Soon after taking office, President George W. Bush abandoned PDD-56 and began to develop a National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) to improve the interagency process for post-conflict operations. However that new directive was never signed, and eventually abandoned, as the Bush administration began to prepare for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In December 2005, President Bush formally replaced PDD-56 by issuing NSPD-44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*. The directive established defense policy for planning, training, and preparing for stability operations, such as developing representative government institutions, reviving the private sector, and rebuilding local institutions. At the same time, the Department of Defense issued Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, which embraced reconstruction operations as a core US military mission comparable to combat operations, thereby extending the military's role in civilian relief efforts. NSPD-44 was issued in response to objections from the Department of State over the growing role of military forces in post-conflict operations and the militarization of foreign aid. Michèle Flournoy, "Interagency Strategy and Planning for Post-conflict Reconstruction," 107. U.S., The White House, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," *Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56*, May 1997, (accessed May 23, 2014); available from https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm. U.S., The White House, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," *National Security Policy Directive* (NSPD) 44, December 7, 2005, (accessed May 23, 2014); available from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.pdf. U.S., The Department of Defense, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations," *Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05*, November 28, 2005, accessed May 23, 2014); available from https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_05.pdf.

[821] U.S., The White House, "The 21st Century Interagency Process," March 19, 2009, (accessed July 1, 2014); available from http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/nsc031909.pdf.

process. Among them: transparency, agility, regular communications, trust, formal and informal meeting structures, and monitoring strategic implementation.

Despite this memo, the current list of presidential directives does not include one on the interagency process.[822] Are presidential directives enough to address efforts to improve the interagency process? Is a legislative act required to organize the interagency process? The Center for Strategic and International Studies conducted a four-year study, titled *Beyond Goldwater Nichols*, on the organization of the United States defense and national security apparatus to meet twenty-first century security challenges.[823] The study suggests means to improve interagency operations, such as codifying common terminologies, concepts, and an agreed set of interagency roles and responsibilities in a series of presidential directives, with those to be enduring also embodies in legislation.

On May 28, 2014, President Obama spoke on the post-war outlook for United States foreign policy during his commencement address at West Point. He stressed the importance of non-military options in addressing the world's challenges. "Here's my bottom line: America must always lead," Obama said. "If we don't, no one else will. The military that you have joined is and always will be the backbone of that leadership. But U.S. military action cannot be the only – or

[822] "Presidential Policy Directives [PPDs] Barrack Obama Administration," (accessed July 1, 2014); available from http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/.
[823] Clark A. Murdock et. al., "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era – Phase 2 Report," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, July 2005, (accessed June 30, 2014); available from http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph2_report.pdf.

even the primary – component of our leadership in every instance." In response to global issues that do not pose an immediate threat to national security, the President urged for the use of non-military instruments, such as diplomacy and development, sanctions, and appeals to international law. Calling on the greater use of non-military means of power necessitates greater interagency coordination and continued discourse between the civilian and military leadership.

Applying the concept of deliberative discourse to government-wide decision-making processes should improve interagency deliberations and coordination efforts. But to do so means building relations across civilian and military departments and agencies that rise above partisan politics and ideologies.

A second policy implication is the need to build civilian capacity for post-conflict environments. In order to reach a civil-military consensus on the Iraq Surge, the civilian and military leadership struck a bargain.[824] Civilian agencies would do more if the military did more, the military would do more if civilian agencies did more. A civilian surge never accompanied a troop surge in Iraq. President Obama also promised to increase civilian efforts in Afghanistan. "We need agricultural specialists and educators, engineers and lawyers," the President said, "That's how we can help the Afghan government serve its people and develop an economy that isn't dominated by illicit drugs…I'm ordering a

[824] Feaver, "The Right to be Right," 107.

substantial increase in our civilians on the ground."[825] Unfortunately, the President committed to increasing the civilian effort without having the required number of civilian advisors and experts from the US government agencies willing to go to Afghanistan. Does the lack of civilian resources to complement military efforts influence the planning process, and specifically how the military determines military objectives, the operational end state, and force requirements? Does the lack of civilian resources lesson the influence of the civilian leadership in the planning process for post-conflict environments?

A final policy implication is the role of military dissent. When deliberative discourse characterizes civil-military relations, the free expression of candid military views, including dissenting views, is implied. In order for deliberative discourse to work, the military must and should offer its advice, even if its views conflict with civilian positions. After all, senior commanders have a legal obligation to express their views to Congress and offer honest military advice to the President. However, at the same time, senior officers are aware that they can easily be replaced if they challenge civilian policy or fail to deliver battlefield victories. How should dissenting military views be managed to ensure senior officers offer their candid advice rather than self-censor to avoid finding themselves in retirement or transferred to another position? For example, General Abizaid, a strong opponent of the Iraq Surge, announced his retirement shortly

[825] U.S., The White House, "A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan," *The White House Blog*, March 27, 2009, (accessed May 27, 2014); available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/03/27/A-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan.

before President Bush announced a troop surge, and General Casey, another surge opponent, moved to the Pentagon to serve as the Army Chief of Staff.

Unfortunately, there are no assurances that military officers won't be replaced if they dissent. Of course, retired officers may go public with their concerns over civilian policy. Take for example the 2006 "Revolt of the Generals" over Secretary Rumsfeld's handling of the Iraq War. But should retirement be their only recourse? If the military has a legal obligation to express their views to Congress and offer honest military advice to the President, how is this right protected? When General Shinseki disagreed over how to pursue defense transformation, the Army came under sharp criticism and punishment. Not only did Rumsfeld cancel the Army's Crusader artillery program, but his office also leaked Shinseki's successor's name fourteen months prior to the end of his tour as Army Chief of Staff.[826]

What should not occur is the use of back-channel mechanisms, such as the media, to voice military dissent or disparage civilian policy. "The only thing worse than an overtly dissenting military is a covertly dissenting military," warned one retired general in reference to heightened civil-military tensions over Afghanistan policy under President Obama.[827] If deliberative discourse

[826] Charles A. Stevenson, *SECDEF: The Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense*, 176; Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, 32. Secretary Rumsfeld denies leaking the name of Shinseki's replacement. Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown* 455.
[827] Rosa Brooks, "Obama vs. the Generals," *Politico Magazine*, November 2013, (accessed May 25, 2014); available from http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2013/11/obama-vs-the-generals-99379_Page3.html#.U4fOBBzgd_U.

characterizes civil-military relations, then the military should dissent without consequences. Of course, civilians maintain the right to replace their Generals, but that right should not be abused. Striking the right balance will challenge the development of a deliberative discourse model in civil-military relations theory.

E) Final Thoughts

Civilian and military leaders share responsibility in charting the strategic course for post-conflict operations. Each have a guiding hand in the planning process. Yes, civilian leaders should immerse themselves in military matters and understand operational objectives and constraints, and at the same time, military leaders should ask hard questions about the ends of policy. Deliberative discourse is the means through which to do so. The "lesson" of the Iraq War and Surge is the need for deliberative discourse to characterize civil-military relations during the planning process for post-conflict environments.

Simply put, discourse matters.

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