



South Darfur Profile

South Darfur (SD) is located in the South Western part of the Sudan, and represents the southern part of Greater Darfur. SD is placed between latitudes 8:30-13:30 degrees North and longitudes 22:28- 22 degrees East. It is bordered from the North, by the State of North Darfur; from the North West by the State of West Darfur; from the West by the Republic of Centre Africa; from the South by the States of West and North Bahr Elghazal and from the East by Greater Kordofan. The area of SD is 137.800 km square.

Climate

SD is divided into 3 ecological sectors, characterized by different desert climates. The average temperature ranges between 30-40 degrees from March to September, and between 16-25 degrees from October to November. The prevailing climates are the climate of the flood plains of Jebel Marra on the North Western fringes of the State, the poor Savannah in the North Eastern parts and the rich Savannah in the South of the State.

Terrain

SD contains various agricultural and pastoral lands. Arable areas are estimated at 24 million acres; the equivalent of 74% of the total area. Only 7 million acres are currently being exploited. The soil varies from heavy muddy cracked to sandy fertile, with sedimentary soils, in the valleys and the flood plains, and volcanic soils.

Forests cover 15.7 million acres, the equivalent of 48% of the area. There are 69 reserved forests covering 5.4 million acres. Forests play a major role in the economy of the State particularly through the production of Gum Arabic, timber for construction and carpentry, firewood for domestic use, charcoal production and pastures for grazing.

Water Resources

Water resources consist of rain, seasonal rivers, and surface and under surface water. Annual rainfall rates range between 200-1000 mm, water streams and seasonal rivers carry more than 344 million cubic meters of water. One of the main water resources in the State is the Baggara basin, 80 km South of Nyala. Its storage capacity is about 1000 billion cubic meters and is replenished yearly with 17 to 20 million cubic meters of water. The seasonal consumption of the inhabitants of the State amounts to 110.000 cubic meters/day, which equals 26% of the existing reserve (410.750 cubic meters/day), the internationally recognized actual consumption of one individual being 8 to 20 liters/day. Reserves of water are found in Albbagara basin, sedimentary rivers such as Nyala River, Bulbul River, Kaya River, Ibra River, Sindou River and in basic rocks in cracked and broken areas. There are 353 deep permanent wells, 978 hand pumps, 9 dams and 52 ponds in the State

Population

According to the 2003 census, South Darfur has a population of 3,064,000 persons. Recent population statistics published by the Ministry of Planning show a population of 3,634,000, which indicates a population growth of 18.6% from 2003 census data.

Population Distribution according to Sex (Ministry of Planning)

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Male	1,528,936	1,582,329	1,637,718	1,693,606	1,753,486	1,813,366
Female	1,535,064	1,588,671	1,644,282	1,700,394	1,760,514	1,820,634
Total	3,064,000	3,171,000	2,382,000	3,394,000	3,514,000	3,634,000

The population of South Darfur is concentrated in rural areas with approximately 76% of the inhabitants living in rural areas, while only 24 % live in urban areas of the State. The average of household is 6.2 persons. The demographic density per one km is 24.2 persons making it the 3rd most populated state in the country.

Population Distribution according to rural v. urban lifestyle (Ministry of Planning)


Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Urban	652,938	698,254	746,655	797,929	826,141	872,160
Rural	2,411,062	2,472,746	2,535,345	2,596,071	2,687,859	2,761,840

Note: In early 2008 a census was carried out in Sudan and the results are yet to be released. This census, however, is regarded as highly controversial for reasons which include the lack of IDP participation, exclusion of rebel controlled areas from the administration of the census and the overall inability of census teams to reach all parts of Darfur do to pervasive insecurity.

Government

State Executive Structure

The Executive branch of the state of South Darfur includes the Wali or governor of the State, a Deputy Wali, and nine cabinet ministries overseeing the main sectors of state administration including Finance, Physical Planning & Public Utilities, Local Governance, Education, Culture & Information, Youth & Sports, Agriculture, Health, and Livestock. The executive branch also includes six advisors to the Wali; some of these posts are filled by members of the opposition and movements (signatories to the DPA). Finally the State authority includes four commissions covering Nomads, Women & Children's affairs, Humanitarian affairs and Grievances.



Ministerial Cabinet (9 Ministries)

<i>Finance:</i>	Mr. Adam Mohamed Adam.
<i>Physical Planning & Public Utilities:</i>	Mr. Adam Ibrahim Mufaddal.
<i>Local Governance:</i>	Mr. Abdurahman Alzain.
<i>Education:</i>	Mr. Abdurahim Abourisha.
<i>Culture & Information:</i>	Mr. Mohamed Khair
<i>Youth & Sports:</i>	Mr. Abakar Altoam.
<i>Agriculture:</i>	Mr. Omer Abdurrahman
<i>Health:</i>	Mr. Yahiya Hassan Neel
<i>Livestock:</i>	Mr. Massar Ali Massar

State Legislative Structure

The Legislative Branch of South Darfur is characterized by a senior legislative council consisting of 73 deputies appointed according to provisions and quotas specified in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Darfur Peace Agreement. As all legislative branches, the 73 member council is involved in law making to govern South Darfur.

Local Governing Structure

Each of the 15 localities of South Darfur has an executive and legislative branch working to administer the locality. Each locality is headed by a commissioner who works together with a local legislative council to govern the locality and its administrative units. These structures are complimentary to their overarching State counterparts and do not function contrary to the State constitution.

State Infrastructure

Roads, Bridges, Railways and Airports

Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, is connected by railroad, paved roads and international airport to North and West Darfur as well as neighboring countries. A railroad connects

Nyala in South Darfur to Khartoum, the capital city of Sudan. Nyala has a fully functional international airport supporting international and national carriers. Two paved asphalt roads connect Nyala to El Fasher in North Darfur as well as Nyala to Zalinge in West Darfur respectively. As of 2008 there are 5 bridges to be found in South Darfur, four of which are located in Nyala town.

Health

The infrastructure for health services in South Darfur breaks down into four lines of health care. The first line of health service and the most basic is the *Dressing Unit* which is the first front of State health interaction with the community. The Dressing Unit provides minor services such as first aid, nutrition advice, and conducts general health and hygiene promotion and some awareness raising activities. The second line of health care is the *Primary Health Unit or Basic Health Unit* which is staffed by a medical assistant and or trained community health professional, nurse, midwife, etc. The third line is the *Primary Health Center* which is run by a Doctor and staffed with medical assistant, nurse, midwife, dentist etc. Minor operations are performed at these centers. The fourth line is the rural hospital.

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), there are 12 functioning hospitals in South Darfur. These hospitals are located in Adilla, Buram, El Daein, Gereida, Rehed el Birdi, Ed el Fursan, Kabum, Kass, Nyala (Teaching Hospital and Turkish Hospital), Muhajeria, and Tulus. Three more hospitals are in the process of being built. There are approximately 300 health units found through out the State but there is a move toward creating more basic health centers. There are about 125 basic health centers which are supported directly by UN agencies and NGOs. As of 2008 there are around 1172 hospital beds available in all of South Darfur.

Concerning human resources, the problem is not the lack of qualified health professionals in South Darfur but rather their concentration in Nyala due to pervasive insecurity in rural areas. In South Darfur there are currently 23 specialized doctors [3 pediatricians, 4 surgeons, 6 obstetricians, 1 dermatologist, 1 ENT ear/nose/throat, 1 psychiatrist, 1 pathologist, 5 internal medicine, 1 dentist and 11 pharmacists]. Nineteen of these specialists are practicing in Nyala with only four located in El Daein. In addition to specialists there are approximately 44 general practitioners, 181 medical assistants, and 1226 certified midwives servicing South Darfur which has a population of over 3 million people.

Almost all health institutions in South Darfur lack adequate medical instruments, drugs, human resources and infrastructure. The World Health Organization (WHO) and International NGOs play an important role to help the health system in South Darfur to meet minimum standards where necessary. The WHO subsidizes free access of all IDPs in South Darfur to all health services and drugs.

Education

According to the South Darfur Ministry of Education, 2007 enrollment statistics indicate that 301,769 boys and girls were enrolled in basic education, while 408,743 were out of

school with no chance for receiving an education. The overall enrolment rate was set at 42.5% for the year 2007, with highest rate of enrollment in Nyala locality and lowest in Rehed al Birdi locality. All in all statistics indicate that there is a huge discrepancy between the number of classrooms available and the number of school age children across South Darfur as well as a chronic shortage of teachers. There are approximately 3,000 teachers in South Darfur while the need is about 7,000.

Economy

The South Darfur economy is primarily based on agriculture and animal husbandry. More than 80% of the inhabitants depend on agricultural activity and animal breeding, and play a large role in ensuring the food security of the State. Three pastoral zones exist in South Darfur: the pastoral zones of the northern parts with an area of 26,000 square km, the central pastoral zones with an area of 56,000 square km, and the southern pastures which total 5,600 square km. Crops grown in South Darfur include dura, millet, groundnuts, sesame, watermelon, beans and okra among other products. The number of livestock recorded in South Darfur in 2008 is over 12 million, of this number 4,940,385 are cattle, 113,618 camels, 4,180,694 sheep and 3,514,713 goats, in addition to horses and donkeys which are found throughout the State.

Nyala locality in South Darfur is considered to be the commercial capital of Darfur with railway, asphalt roads and international airport connecting it to Khartoum, North and west Darfur as well as neighboring African countries. Commercial activity plays an important part of daily life in South Darfur providing goods and services, exports and imports of unavailable goods to and from neighboring countries (Chad and the Central African Republic) and other states in the country.

A key import for South Darfur is coffee from neighboring African countries. South Darfur also imports large quantities of electronics, spare parts and clothes from Dubai. Exports to African neighbors for example include cooking oil, salt, onions, millet, and garlic. According to the Ministry of Planning, South Darfur has factories which produce plastic, ice and mineral water, oil, soap and sweets. Most of the factories are located in Nyala locality with two located in Edaen locality.

The Tribes of South Darfur

Historically South Darfur was inhabited by a small number of tribes, however due to fluid boundaries, fluctuating weather patterns and scarce resources throughout Darfur the original tribal composition of the State has changed. South Darfur is inhabited by both African and Arabs tribes. Among the African tribes who have dominated the State, the Fur and Dajo are considered as the native inhabitants of the area. The African tribes are traditionally engaged in agriculture and trade, but also breed animals such as cows, goats, sheep, and donkey as well as produce some handicrafts. The Arab tribes are primarily nomadic herders but some also engage in agricultural activities. Among them, the cattle nomads, also known as the Baggara Arabs, are the Rizaigat, Falata, Tarjam, Habani, Bani Hallba Taisha, Salamat and Messeryia. Fluctuating environmental conditions have also

influenced the tribal composition of the South. The drought which began in the 1970s and intensified during the mid-80s, resulted in massive exodus of the various African tribes from the Northern most part of Darfur to the South; the Zaghawa are an example of this migration of tribes to the South.

Major Tribes of South Darfur:

Tribe	Locality	Hakura	Livelihood
Rizeigat	Ed Daien	Ed Daien	Animal Breeding
Habania	Buram	Buram	Animal Breeding
Benihalba	Ed el Fursan	Ed el Fursan	Animal Breeding and Agriculture
Fur	Kass & Nyala	Kass	Animal Breeding and Agriculture
Dajo	Nyala	Nyala	Animal Breeding and Agriculture
Bergid	Shaeria	Shaeria	Animal Breeding and Agriculture
Ma'alia	Adilla	Adilla	Animal Breeding and Agriculture
Gimmir	Ed el Fursan	Katilla	Agriculture
Fallata	Tulus	Tulus	Animal Breeding
Tarjam	Asalam	Makdumia	Animal Breeding and Agriculture
Taaisha	Rehed el Birdi	Rehed el Birdi	Animal Breeding and Agriculture
Zagawha	Shaeria & Nyala	-	Animal Breeding and Agriculture
Missiriya	Nitega	Nitega	Animal Breeding and Agriculture
Mahria	-	-	Camel herders

Fur

Fur is by far the largest African tribe in Darfur with its Hakura in Kass. Unlike other tribes, however their presence in Darfur is widespread and they have been involved in conflicts with other tribes over the years. The Fur is strongly associated with the rebel movements and they are highly affected by the conflict.

Bergid

Birgid is an African tribe with its Hakura in Shearia. Birgid had in the past allied with the rebel movements, but have lately switched to the GoS side. The Bergid had been involved in conflicts with the Zaghawa and Misseriya, although the latter conflict is now over because both tribes are now allied with the GoS.

Zaghawa

Zaghawa is an African tribe who are scattered between Sudan and Chad and they are indigenous to the Dar Zaghwa area; they mainly occupied the semi-desert northern part

of Darfur. Traditionally, the Zaghwa were all camel herder and merchants, but in the 1970s and 1980s because of deteriorating climate conditions, segments of the tribe lost their herds and began moving to the Southern regions of Darfur to settle as farmers. In the past Zaghawa were involved in conflict with Fur, Rezeighat, Bergid and Gimir. Many of the leaders of the current insurgency are from the Zaghawa tribe. Their community is heavily affected by the conflict which has resulted in heavy displacement and loss of lives.

Tarjam

Tarjum is classified as an Arab tribe sharing a common Hakura in Asalam. It is a tribe which used to live peacefully with Fur in the area of Bulbul Abu Jazu and Bulbul Timbosco west of Nyala for many years. In the past, Tarjum were involved in conflicts with Fur, Birgid and Mahria, although they enjoyed strong inter-marital relationship with the Fur. Both Tarjum and Mahria allied with the government and fully participated in the current civil war. Moreover, both of these tribes were alleged to have been responsible for the mass killing in Hamada village against the Birgid (non-Arab). The Tarjum are settled community and engage in cattle herding and farming.

Habania

Habania is one of the Arab tribes that have a Hakura in South Darfur. Buram is the site of their Hakura. Historically, the Habania claim that their homeland includes Tulus (now Falata homeland), Gereida, and Joghana (Masaliet). However, during the 1990s, the government assigned Falata a separate locality. Habania protested this decision, which divided the area they claim as their homeland with their rivals as equals. However, the government has never demarcated the borders between the two administrative units, the source of their current conflict, nor provided clear leadership on how to solve the problem.

Falata

The position of Falata in Darfur and their association with the different tribes has changed overtime to suit its strategic goals. At times, Falata is considered an African tribe, while at other times it classifies itself as neither an Arab nor African, but Falata. However, during the past decade, Falata chose to ally itself with Arab tribes, although they always try to keep their distance. The eruption of the recent conflict between the GoS and rebel movements has resulted in the Falata tactically choosing to side with the Arab/GoS alliance. Since then, the Falata have identified themselves as an Arab tribe and were involved in conflicts with the Massaliet and Gimir both African tribes in 2005.

Bani Halba

Bani Halba is the majority tribe in Ed al Fursan and this locality is known to be their Hakura (homeland). They are primarily cattle herders but like the non-Arab tribes in their locality they now also engage in farming. They are known to have been in conflict with the Fur tribe at least three times including in 1988, mid-1990s, and 2003-2004.

Ta'aisha

The Ta'aisha represents one of the major tribes in Rehed el Birdi and the locality is known as their homeland. The Ta'aisha tribe was apart of the Arab alliance involved in the 1988 conflict between the Fur and Arab tribes. They were also involved in conflict with the Salamat 1979-1982.

Maaliya –

The Maaliya are cattle herders as well as agriculturalists who migrated to South Darfur years ago from Kordofan. They are originally a clan of the Hamaar tribe in Kordofan.

Misseriya –

The Misseriya are a 'baggara' or cattle herding tribe which now also partakes in agricultural activities. They are mainly concentrated in Nitega in Shearia Locality.

Gimmir –

Antakina, Khor shammam and Katila (administrative units under Id el Fursan locality) are considered to be the homeland of the Gimmir tribe however the area is known to be peacefully inhabited by other tribes as well mainly Masalit, Zaghawa, Fur, Mobi, Tama and Mararit.

Rizeigat –

The Rizeigat of South Darfur are a 'baggara' or cattle herding tribe and they have a Hakura in Ed Daien. They were known to have been involved in Sudan's North-South civil war and are currently supporting the GoS in the conflict in Darfur.

Mahria

Mahria sometimes referred to the "Northern Rezeigat" or "Aballa" is considered by many Darfurians as newcomers to South Darfur. Their permanent presence in South Darfur only dates back as recently as 1989 during the Fur/ Arab conflict in 1988/89 and the GoS/rebel conflict after 2003. The Mahria is an amalgamation of different tribes who are mostly camel herders and as such are always on the move between the north and south. The tribes which makeup the Mahria includes; Awlad Gayid, Awlad Mansour, Hamdaniya, Awlad Hamid, and Nawaiba.

The Mahria are strongly associated with GoS. Many of their tribesmen have been recruited into the different GoS security agencies in Darfur particularly, the most notorious, the Border Guard Units. Many believe that the main aim of the Mahria in the conflict in Darfur is to secure a permanent settlement in South Darfur. The Mahria have already settled in some villages belonging to the Fur and call it the liberated land. These villages include, Rehad al Fariq, Khalwat al Faqi Ibrahim, 12 km west of Nyala (originally a Fur village called Dagaresa, completely burned with all its inhabitants now in Kalma camp). The above villages are now part of the Tarjam homeland, but also claimed by Fur. Furthermore, the government has awarded the Mahria other villages such as Um Dowamban and Rehad al Sahab, south of Nyala.

Table: List of tribal conflicts in South Darfur:

Year	Parties to the conflict	Main reasons for conflict
1968	Rezeighat vs. Maalia	Grazing lands, animal theft
1976	Bani Halba vs. northern Rezeighat.	Access to pasture and water and animal theft
1980	Northern Rezeigat, Umjalul Mahariya, Eriagat and Etiafat vs. Beni Helba, Birgid, Daju, and	Access to pasture, water and animal theft
1980	Taisha vs. Salamt	Access to pasture, water and animal theft.
1984	Misseriya vs. Rezeighat	Access to pasture and water
1987	Gimir and Marareet vs Falata	Access to pasture, water and animal theft.
1990	Gimir vs Zaghawa.	
1992	Zaghawa vs Bergid	Grazing and land
2004	Habania vs Massaliet	Power
2005	Falata vs Gimir and Massaliet	
June 2005	Bergid vs Zaghawa and Misseriya	Power and land
March and July 2006	Habania and Falata	Power and Land
July 2006	Habania vs Zaghawa and Rezeighat	Power
January – March 2007	Mahria vs Tarjum	Land and power
January 2007	Habbania vs. Fallata	Land
January – March 2007	Tarjum vs. Abbala	Power and Land
July 2007	Tarjum vs. Abbala	Power and land
June 2008	Tarjum vs. Beni Halba	Power
July 2008	Fallata vs. Habbania	Land and Power
December 2008	Gimir South vs. Gimir North	Power, Appointment of Nazir
December 2008 and March 2009	Habania vs. Fallata	Power and Land
March 2009	Habania vs. Rezighat	Power and access to natural resources

Tribal Reconciliation in South Darfur

Darfur is by nature a tribal community that is governed primarily by traditions and customs. In Darfur, the reconciliation process has customary roots and is part of the daily

lives of those in the community. It regulates their social, economic and political activities. This century old process has helped resolve disputes and differences among individuals and communities, which could have otherwise degenerated into violence.

Since 2004, the government of South Darfur has sponsored different reconciliation activities with various conflicting parties. In an effort to revive traditional reconciliation processes, all of the stakeholders (disputants, victims, and mediators), the venue and the methodology are dictated by past reconciliations which were supported by the community. Between 2004 and 2008 the South Darfur Reconciliation Fund has succeeded in signing more than 40 reconciliation agreements involving more than 80 tribes. Although tribal disputes and hostilities have had a negative impact on the community, some of these reconciliations have achieved positive results, restoring trust between tribes and promoting forgiveness and tolerance.

Table: Reconciliation attempts in South Darfur

Reconciliation attempts, South Darfur		
Date	Involved tribes	Place of Reconciliation
1967	Bani Halba and Northern Rezeigat	Nyala
1980	Taisha and Salamat	Nyala
1983	Bani Halba and Northern Rezeigat	Nyala
1987	Rezeigat and Messyeria	Nyala
1987	Gemir and Falata	Nyala
22 January 1990	Bergid and Zaghawa	Nyala
20/22/June 1990	Bergid and Rezeighat	Nyala
1991	Zaghawa and Ma'alyia	El Daein
02 July 91	Mima, Zaghawa and Bergid	El Fasher
1991	Fur and Tarjam	Nyala
10- 13 October 1991	Bergid and Zaghawa	Nyala
30 March 1997	Rezeighat and Zaghawa	El Daien
Mar-04	Fur, Messeryia Jabal and Bani Halba	Kass
13 January 2005	Birgid v Rezeigat and Targam(case of hamada) Nyala	Nyala
01 February 2005	Dajo and Messeriya	Nyala
01 February 2005	Marla tribes	Nyala
06 March 2005	Targam and Mahariya	Nyala
01 March 2005	Fur and Arab	Nyala
01 April 2005	Habania and Massalit	Nyala
02 May 2005	Bergid and Rezeigat	Nyala
15 May 2005	Fur,Mahriya,Marareet,Tama,Zaghawa and Mahadi Nyala	Nyala/ Ab Ajura
06 July 2005	Massaliet and Fallata	Nyala
12 September 2005	Bergid and Zaghawa	Nyala
01 October 05	Bani Hallba and Salamat	Ed al Fursan
01 October 2005	Taaisha and Salamat	Rehid El Berdi
03 October 205	Ma'aliya and Rezeigat	Nyala

05 December 2005	Bergid and Zaghawa	Nyala
28 December 2005	Bergid and Rezeigat	Nyala
20 Mar 2006	Zaghawa, Bergid and Messeriya	Nyala
26 July 2006	Habania and Falata	Tulus
27 July 2006	Fur and Beni Halba	Nyala
01 August 2006	Falata and Gimir	Nyala
05 August 2006	Habania and rezeigat	Sunta, Buram
11 December 2007	Birgid, Zaghawa and Misseriya	Nyala
16 February 2007	Zaghwa and Zaghwa Um Kamalti	Nyala
18 February 2007	Tarjam and Aballa (Mahria)	Um Siaafa
February 2008	Gimir and Fallata	Nyala
August 2008	Habaniya and Rizeigat	Alfardos
September 2008	Missiriya and Rizeigat	Alobaied
November 2008	Tarjam and Bani Halba	Nyala
December 2008	Habaniya and Fallata	Nyala

Rebel Movements

SLA/M

In 2003, the **Sudan Liberation Army – Movement** was officially launched by members of the Fur, Zaghawa and Massaleit tribes in response to years of economic and political marginalization by the Government of Sudan. In September 2005, internal power struggles resulted in the splitting of the movement largely along ethnic lines. The factions which emerged were the **SLA/MM** led by Minni Arko Minnawi, whose members are basically from the Zaghawa tribe and **SLA/AW** lead by Abdul Wahid Mohammed Ahmed al-Nur, whose members are predominantly from the Fur tribe. SLA/MM is the only rebel movement to sign the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and Minni Minnawi has accepted a government position, serving as a Special Advisor to the President of Sudan. SLA/AW refused to sign the DPA. Abdul Wahid is in exile in Paris.

SLA/Free Will (SLA/FW)

SLA/Free Will (SLA/FW), a small group previously in the Abdul Wahid SLM/A, was founded by the late Professor Abdel Rahman Musa Abaker (Tunjur). In June 2006 SLA/FW pledged its support for the DPA by signing the Declaration of Commitment (DoC). They are currently present in Sileah and Yassin. At the end of September 2006, local media reported fragmentation within the SLA/FW which was denied by a number of elements within the faction. On 22 January 2007, the military wing of the SLA/FW issued a statement requesting a freeze on the DPA power sharing implementation.

SLA/Peace Wing (SLA/PW)

Ibrahim Musa Madibo (Rezeighat tribe), Abdul Wahid's chief SLA/AW negotiator in the power sharing commission, broke away, also complaining about Abdel Wahid's

hesitancy and became a signatory to the Declaration of Commitment (DoC). He created his own faction known as the SLA/Peace Wing (SLA/PW). Madibo is a descendant of the paramount chief of the large Rezeighat Arab tribe of South Darfur. His presence in the SLA/AW at the head of a strong Arab contingent and as lead negotiator bolstered the faction's claims to include all Darfur people and contributed to the neutrality which the Rezeighat have observed during the conflict. The SLA/PW is mainly a political force with no evidence of military on the ground, although he claimed to control the general area of Wazazin, west of Ed Deain. As of early 2007, his political influence has been on the rise. On 3 February, Madibo was awarded with the position of the Chair of the Reintegration Commission.

A/Abdul Shafi (SLA/AS) (aka SLA/Classic)

Ahmed Abdul Shafi, who was appointed Abdul Wahid's deputy after Khamis Abdullah Abaker left to form the G19, splintered from the SLA/AW because of the tension within the leadership council over his decision to reject the DPA. On 28 July 2006, thirty-two SLM/A leaders – mostly Fur based in Jebel Marra – released a statement calling for the removal of Abdul Wahid as chairman and the appointment of Ahmad Abdul Shafi (Fur) as president and general commander. His group is known as SLA/Abdul Shafi (SLA/AS) but also occasionally described as SLA-Classic. Several Commanders, including Mohamed Adam Naser (aka 'General Tarada') still claim to Support Abdul Wahid. At present, Shafi is based in Asmara and unable to travel to the field. Shafi holds strong links with Eritrea and Chad.

SLA/Ahmed Kubbur (SLA/AK)

Ahmed Kubbur (Reizegat tribe) who left the SLA/MM faction in October 2005 was supposed to have been recruited by Abdul Wahid and the NRF. He controls a small area west of Ed Deain, South Darfur, including the villages of Wazazin, Um Greggio and Sunta.

SLA/Abu Gassim (SLA/AG)

After some field commanders under Abdul Wahid's command in Jebel Marra i.e. Abu Gassim Imam Elhag Adam and Dr. Sanousi signed an agreement with the Government of Sudan through the Wali in South Darfur, Government forces supported by armed militias launched a five-prong offensive against the Fur population in eastern Jebel Marra. In November 2006, Abu Gassim signed a political agreement with the Wali of South Darfur and a Minister on behalf of the Government. On 21 February, President Bashir appointed Abu Gassim as the Wali of West Darfur State.

Justice and Liberation Movement (JLM)

After the JEM left South Darfur for North Darfur following heavy clashes in Gereida Locality at the end of 2005, elements of JEM and SLA/MM formed the Justice and Liberation Movement (JLM) in April 2006, led by the self appointed General ElFargoni Abdullah AlHaran. The JLM who reached a local peace agreement with the Government has a small military presence on the ground and holds influence over the GoS controlled Joghana area, south of Gereida.

Table: Table below on rebel movements

Name of the group	Anti-GoS	Pro-peace/GoS	Leader	Control area
SLA/MM		Pro-peace	Arko Mini Minawi	Greida and Muhajiriya
SLA/AW	Anti – GoS		Abdul Wahid Nour	East Jabal Marra
SLA/PW		Pro-peace	Ibrahim Musa Madibo	west of Ed Deain.
SLA/AG		Pro – GoS	Abu Gasim Imam	Adwa
SLA/AS		Pro-GoS	Ahmed Abdul Shafi	Jawa
SLA/Freewill Group		Pro-GoS	Adam Salih	Seleah and Yassin
JEM/ PW		Pro-GoS	Al Fargoni Abdallah Haran	Sileah and Yassin
SLA/AK			Ahmed Kubbur	Wazazin, Um Greggio and Sunta

Internally Displaced Persons

Ongoing conflict and hostilities throughout Darfur increases the vulnerability of the civilian population in the region. In particular, failure to identify and respect civilians in the conflict continues to result in large scale displacement of the civilian population. In October 2008, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, estimated that there were 2.7 million IDPs in Darfur. Over 1 million of these IDPs are located in South Darfur.

Note: Kalma IDP Camp, located in South Darfur is the second largest, most populous and politically charged IDP camp in the whole of Darfur. The camp is located 15 km east of Nyala and only few kilometers from Nyala international airport. Recent estimates of the Camp population indicate a population of 88,000 individuals from different ethnic groups, majority of whom from Fur, followed by Dajo, Zaghawa, Massaliet, etc.

South Darfur – Internally Displaced Persons		
LOCALITY	SITE	NUMBER
Adilla	Adilla	28,907
Locality Total		28,907
Burram	Buram Town	21,071
	Dito	20,061
	Gereida	129,997
	Joghana	3,100
	Ladob	10,078
	Sanam El Naga	500
Locality Total		184,807
Ed Daein	Abu Jabra	7,722
	Abu Matariq	4,199
	Ed Daein North	1,064
	Ed Daein Town	51,374
	Ed Daien West	19,933
	El Ferdous (Dinka IDF)	20,251
	El Neem Camp	41,655
	Khor Omer	13,798
Locality Total		159,996
Edd Al Fursan	Edd Al Fursan	23,153
	Kubum AU	2,208
	Um Labassa AU	904
Locality Total		26,265
Kass	Dogodoussa	2,621
	Habuba	1,584
	Jemeza Komera	3,285
	Kass East	4,927
	Kass Jebel	0
	Kass North	4,566
	Kass South	11,391
	Kass Town	16,886
Locality Total		139,741
Nyala	Abu Ajura North-Bulbu	14,817
	Al Mallam	13,967
	Al Salam (Nyala)	60,607
	Al Seref	13,758
	Bielel Camp	25,987
	Donki Dreisa	45
	Dreiga	25,696
	Duma	6,696
	East Jebel mara	67,055
	Galdi	5,000
	Hijeer-Um Kunya	33,550
	Kalma Camp	88,036
	Korele	3,140
	Manawashi	12,503
	Marla	9,000

	Mershing	29,103
	Mossai B	3,273
	Nyala South	18,046
	Nyala Town	7,411
	Otash	70,272
	Saleah	24,491
	Sania Afandu	17,572
	Sania Deleba	4,855
	Sekele	8,190
	Yassin	23,870
Locality Total		586,940
Rehed Al Berdi	Rehed Al Berdi	1,412
Locality Total		1,412
Shaeria	Khor Abeche	19,261
	Labado	20,262
	Muhajiria	46,393
	Shaeria	87,057
	Shaeria Rural	42,915
	Taasha	42,770
Locality Total		258,658
Tulus	Tulus	23,978
Locality Total		23,978
State Total		1,410,704

Statistics based on OCHA 3rd quarter humanitarian assessment October 2008

United Nations Agencies

The overwhelming amount of destruction and displacement caused by the ongoing conflict in Darfur has triggered the world's largest humanitarian operation to date. There are at least 10 UN agencies with an active international and national presence on the ground in South Darfur. Their work is focused on coordinating and implementing a range of humanitarian, development and capacity building activities throughout the sector. Most of the agencies operate through implementing partners i.e. international and/or national NGOs. The work of the agencies is broken down by sector and sector leads include:

UN Agencies in South Darfur

Agency	Sector
UNICEF	Education, Water & Sanitation, Child Protection, Nutrition
OCHA	Overall Humanitarian Coordination, Camp Coordination
UNHCR	Refugees, Protection & Camp Coordination (Pending agreement with GoS)
WHO	Health
UNFPA	GBV
WFP	Food & UNHAS coordination
UNIFEM	HIV/AIDS
UNJLC	Logistics
FAO	Agriculture
UNDP	Rule of Law
IOM	Return

Non-Governmental Organizations

Non Governmental Organizations are key partners in the humanitarian operation underway in Darfur. A 2007 Joint Communiqué and General Directory of Procedures govern the operations of NGOs in the Sudan. Two committees at the federal level, a High Level Committee and a Joint Tripartite Joint Technical Committee (TJTC) composed of UN, GoS and NGOs meet regularly to facilitate NGO operations in the country. In September 2008 a TJTC was established at State level for South Darfur and West Darfur. The South Darfur State Commission for Humanitarian Affairs interacts and coordinates humanitarian activities implemented by all national and international NGOs working in South Darfur. According to OCHA statistics for the third quarter of 2008 there were 85 NGOs and Red Cross/ Red Crescent movement working in all Darfur. National staff constitutes the majority of aid workers working on the ground in Darfur.

The recent decision of the Government of Sudan to expel 13 international NGOs from Sudan has had an impact on the delivery of services in South Darfur where services such as access to water and health were previously administered by a number of the expelled NGOs such as Solidarite and MSF Holland. UNAMID is engaging in discussions with the humanitarian community and IDPs in order to find an interim plan to allow for the continuation of services in camps.

Sources:

- **Reasons of Tribal conflict in Darfur. Dr. El Tigani Mustafa Khartoum 1999**
- **History of Darfur. Ahmed Abdul Gadir Arbab**
- **Census Department; Nyala office 2006**
- **Ministry of planning 2008**
- **Strategic Planning for South Darfur State 2005 2011**
- **CAD South Darfur Reports**
- **UNICEF**
- **OCHA**
- **South Darfur Reconciliation Fund**
- **Native Administration – Major Tribes**

ANNEX I: IDP Political Dynamics

Introduction

The conflict in Darfur has fundamentally transformed the social structure of society and left a large segment of the population with a developed political awakening that was not part of their lives prior to the conflict. As the most affected population, IDPs have carried the heaviest burden of loss of lives of family members, property, and livelihood. Their experience and movement to camps resulted in the breakdown of their social structure and confidence in their Native Administration which has largely been viewed as allies of the government and unresponsive during times of crisis.

The breakdown of the traditional system has led to the IDPs' search for trust elsewhere, either in political leaders or amongst themselves through their system of camp sheikhs. It is essentially this new search for leadership that has propelled IDPs to the forefront of the political agenda of the rebel movements who have capitalized on the vacuum left by the government, and traditional leaders who have largely ignored the needs of this vulnerable community, or did not have the capacity to respond and were subject to threats by the government.

The international community has also accorded great importance to the participation of IDPs in the peace process, however, the past experiences of Sirte and other consultations, point to a need to review the status of IDPs and accept that their previous role as merely victims is outdated. Rather, they have now been transformed into dynamic political actors aiming to capitalize on their leverage amongst rebel movements and the international community as both bodies attempt to gain the support of this large mass of the population.

This paper aims to analyze this transformation of IDPs by exploring the social and political networks within their villages prior to the conflict, the disintegration of this system during the conflict as they assembled in camps, and the current situation of politicized community networks within the camps. An additional element is the future of IDPs in the event of a peace agreement and return to their villages. This part detailing possible scenarios of the reintegration of the now politicized IDPs into their former lives is paramount to the implementation of future peace agreements as any settlement must consider the reality of the changed role of Darfurians previously living in villages. The analysis will also consider the influence of the international community in the changing role of IDPs as it has often offered a sympathetic ear to the needs of the IDPs which has encouraged this vulnerable group to find a political voice.

Before the Conflict: Relative harmony among communities

CAD consultations with IDPs on their lives prior to the conflict revealed weak political mobilization within villages. The traditional tribal system and Native Administration provided the social fabric that guided their daily lives which focused mainly on farming,

care of livestock and other activities including seasonal migration as farm laborers and traders. Communication between villages was not a priority as most information and planning passed through tribal leaders. The communities lived in scattered villages attending to their normal daily activities of long hours in the field and occasional social visits and gatherings during marriages, deaths, religious holidays, etc. During these times, political activities were negligible since the country was under one political rule. Military regimes for the past 40 years have dominated the political lives of Sudanese. The military regimes of Numeiri (16 years) and the current administration of president El Bashir (19 years) have discouraged if not an outright ban of all political activities outside their carefully crafted political bodies.

Discussions with IDP representatives from camps such as Kalma, Otash, Kass, el Salam, Derige, Muhajiriya, and Gereida, reveal that the current IDPs in the camps may be categorized into two groups:

1. None Arab communities who lived under the Hakura (homeland) of Arab tribes and whose livelihood and system of local governance fell under the jurisdiction of land owners. For example, IDPs stated that the lives of the Zaghawa and other non Arabs in Goz al Gharbi in the Habania homeland of Buram were very difficult as they faced systematic discrimination. They further mentioned that they were obliged to pay taxes with no corresponding benefits and homage to the local head of the Native Administration. They added that they were not allowed to participate in the decision-making process and were not represented in local courts that administered local justice. Worse, they were called Zurqa (black) or Akalla (usufructs) of the land which does not belong to them, leading constant threat and later reality of violent eviction. In November 06, thousands of Zaghawa and other smaller African tribes were forcefully evicted from their villages in Goz el Gharbi and are now displaced in Otash IDP camp in Nyala.

Moreover, the Hakura owners dominated and monopolized all government departments in Buram locality, resulting in neglecting the socio-economic development needs of non-Arab communities. Zaghawa IDPs from Goz al Gharbi accused the Habania of not accepting them as fellow Sudanese, and have over the years since they first settled in the area in the 1980s, been subjected to the cultural domination of Arabization. The IDPs said that local teachers who were mostly from the Habania were engaged in activities outside their teaching profession, have never finished the curricula and were away from their duties half of the school year. This situation has led to the deterioration of education in their areas with few students joining positions at high schools.

2. Communities living under their own homeland (Hakura), such as Fur, Birgid, Massaliet, etc (all African tribes) enjoyed more freedom in governing themselves and have historically being more receptive to others such as Arabs under their homeland. Because of their majority numbers, key civil administration and non-politically appointed posts were given to the host community. In the case of areas such as Ed al Fursan where the Bani Halba have been hosting Fur tribes in

villages such as Um Labbasa and Kubum, and in East Jebel Marra where the Fur have hosted the communities of nomadic tribes such as the Mahria, the civil administration has largely been composed of the majority host community leaving little upward socio-economic movement for the minority guest communities. In addition, the usual lack of written agreements on the conditions and stay of guest communities often left the terms of conditions of the stay and partnership dictated by the hosting community, leading to possible problems and conflicts in the future.

During the Conflict: Massive displacement

As the attacks against unarmed civilians slowly spread, village after village found itself caught in the conflict. Many villagers were even unaware of what was happening only to be attacked the next day by what they said was an orchestrated and well planned strategy to spread fear amongst the civilian population. The militia's strategy of frightening villagers was aimed to deny support for the rebels and was misused by the militia as they engaged in extensive looting and other acts of violence. It is believed that during 2003-2005, the presence of rebel movements to a few pockets in the North and East Jabal Marra area, rendering the systematic attacks against civilians in many areas unnecessary.

Moreover, the IDPs corroborated that most of the attacks for example in Marla, 53 km southeast of Nyala, Hamda, about 110 km northeast of Nyala, Shattaya and Kailekli, 145 km west of Nyala in South Darfur and many other large villages were orchestrated by the government allied Arab militia. In almost all these attacks, evidence collected by Human Rights, CAD, and other organizations, have indicated that there was no rebel militia presence in close proximity during the attacks. The attacks were organized by the militia whose motivation in the war was to engage in the looting of property, livestock, and eventual claim on land. IDPs further stated that during this period, they moved from one village to the next in search of safety, shelter, and food.

The government at the time denied any attacks against civilians and blocked the movement of IDPs and other civilians to urban centers. People, who for example came to Zalingei, Kutum, Kabkabiya, and Nyala, were turned away only to be attacked again with no place to run and nowhere to turn to for help. During this early stage of the conflict, there were a small number of international organizations present to witness the struggle of IDPs. For example, in Shattaya and Kailekli, hundreds of victims were surrounded and their mobility blocked for more than 40 days until Human Rights and UNOCHA staff from Nyala forced their way behind government check points and negotiated and escorted the IDPs to Kass, 87 km northwest of Nyala.

According to the IDPs, there was no government reaction on what was happening during this time, offering no humanitarian support and protection. During this period, a wide gap of mistrust between the IDPs and their local leaders, the Native Administration became evident. Government authorities were also unable to fill in the vacuum of leadership which created the mistrust and hatred that still exists to date. None of the senior government officials at all levels spoke against what was happening as they

offered little sympathy and support for what has now become a massive displacement of civilians from their villages and homes.

Traditional Leadership Structures

The traditional leadership structures that existed before the conflict remained outside the camps. There is very little contact between them and the IDPs. The leadership vacuum created was filled by the newly established sheikhs in the camps. In many cases such as Gereida, 102 km southeast of Nyala and Muhajeria, 93 km east of Nyala, camps are divided into sectors and each sector is headed by a Sheikh, supported by others including women under his leadership. In the cases of camps such as Kalma, 15 km east of Nyala and Kass, there is a head Sheikh who is the leader of the entire sector Sheikhs. The new sheikh leadership system is not recognized by the government and as such its activities are limited in scope and duration. However, the system has played a positive role in managing the camp population and providing support to aid organizations in the management of the camps and delivery of services.

According to the IDP profiling exercise concluded in June 2007, there are three distinct categories of camps in Darfur.

- a. Camps located in areas under the control of the government. IDPs in these camps remain under the close supervision of HAC and other GoS entities. This control has limited the IDPs freedom to organize and manage freely their affairs. However, security and the provision of services are better in these camps. The leadership structure in these camps is weak compared to other camps and its activities are closely watched by the agents of the government. Despite government presence, sheikhs in these camps have become more vocal in addressing their issues during visits by the UN and other international visitors.
- b. Camps that fall under areas controlled by the rebel movements such as Gereida and Muhajeria. Humanitarian and social activities in these camps are curtailed by the movements who have imposed stiff penalties on violators. Camp leaders fully support the views of the movements and there is little room for expressing different opinions. There are systematic violations of human rights, extrajudicial killing, harassment, gender violence and other criminal activities. IDPs are also required to pay a monthly portion of their ration and money to the movements meant to serve as protection money.
- c. There are a number of camps that fall outside the direct control of either the government or the movements. Kalma, 15 km east of Nyala, and others in West and North Darfur remain off limits for HAC and other government officials. IDPs and their leadership in these camps politically support the non signatories. Abdulwahid draws much of his support from camps such as Kalma in Nyala, Kass, Hasa Hisa in Zalingie, Mornei in el Geneina and Abu Shouk in El Fasher. The leadership in these camps exercises freedom to manage their own internal affairs. It is no wonder, therefore, that these camps have become the hotbed of political activities in support of Abdulwahid's unrealistic and uncompromising demands of putting conditions to the peace talks before it resumes.

The new traditional leadership role played by the sheikhs in the camps is being contested by the old guard of leaders who have customarily played that role for generations. On one hand, sheikhs indicate that their new role as leaders in the camps has benefited the IDP population and helped create a social harmony amongst the IDPs during difficult times. The Native Administration, on the other side, maintains that their role is both historical and in line with customary traditions that bonded the communities together for generations. In this regard, the current leadership structure established in the camps was meant to be temporary and limited in time and scope to help the delivery of humanitarian services.

Finding their political voice within the camps

As the current conflict reached its peak, IDPs throughout Darfur trickled into camps to count their losses and grapple with the realities of the conflict. At the beginning, life in the camps was very difficult. The camps were very crowded, unhygienic, and assistance unevenly distributed. Some families were separated as there were many unaccompanied children and women-led households. Over time, people adjusted to the new realities and soon started organizing themselves. Camp sectors were established and people moved to sections where they could find relatives or people from the same villages for comfort.

With fewer activities in the camps, IDPs started to organize into different committees, to facilitate aid agencies in delivering basic services. With their newfound relative peace and organizational skills, IDPs moved to establish more client-oriented committees such as camp coordination committees, conflict resolution and reconciliation committees, camp sheikhs committees, youth and women committees, and committees for specific sectors such as health, water, education, etc.

As the situation subsided, negotiations for a new peace deal were unfolding in Abuja. A peace agreement was signed in May 2006 by only one of three rebel movements in the peace talks. This unexpected development dampened the expectations of the IDPs and Darfurians in general who expected a breakthrough in the negotiations. The new agreement fell short of the expectations of IDPs. The absence from the agreement of two important rebel leaders further exacerbated the problems. New rebel movements and alliances were established, resulting in new rounds of conflict in many parts of Darfur. Instead of a new peace deal creating conditions for peace, new conflict was raging across Darfur.

The aftermath of the Abuja agreement created conditions for new political maneuvering by the non signatories. IDP camps became their entry points. The following points may have contributed to the political awakening of the IDPs who were already feeling abandoned by the international community.

1. Ethnic dimension of the conflict that targeted people of certain communities perceived to be rebel sympathizers or supporters.
2. The confinement of a large number of people into camps (“extended prisons” as the IDPs call it) with ample time for discussion on issues.

3. The high level visits made to the camps by senior UN and bilateral government officials, the media and other high profile individuals, which created opportunities for IDPs to raise and discuss issues.
4. Access to telecommunications such as cell phones which make it possible for the IDPs to hold extensive discussions on a variety of issues with fellow IDPs in other camps, their political leaders, and rebel commanders in the field.
5. The pressure from government security agencies inside the camps, which further aggravated already strenuous relations, coupled by daily harassment by militia moving freely outside the camps
6. The organizational skills and other trainings such as the paralegal services provided by aid agencies to empower the IDPs of their rights and obligations.
7. The political messages from the Diaspora, rebel leadership, commanders and others urging the IDPs to press for their demands.
8. Infiltration into the camps by rebel militia to intimidate and threaten IDP leadership, individuals and other groups who do not follow their political positions.

With their newly acquired political strength amid their difficulties and infighting, the IDPs have become a strong voice in the peace process, often criticizing the strategies of the international community and the duplicity of the government. In political discussions in camps, CAD learned that the majority of IDPs stated their objection to participate in the census and election due to the prevailing insecurity, which inhibits voluntary return. This objection and clear stance on a specific issue is an example of discussions that regularly take place in politically-astute camps such as el Salam and Kalma.

It is important to note that the international community has also played an important role in giving IDPs their political voice. As the conflict continued and the Native Administration and government failed to deliver needed aid to IDPs, the displaced communities turned to international humanitarian aid for their basic services. This transition of confidence from the government and Native Administration to the international NGOs has allowed for the international community unhindered access to the camps. This was followed by many important high level international visits to the camps with wide media coverage, bringing the issues of the IDPs at the forefront of the international community and the United Nations Security Council. By lending a sympathetic ear to the IDPs during such visits, IDPs were offered a place and a centre stage to express their anger and frustration against the government and with the peace process.

However, the IDPs themselves are far from being united under a single leadership. Abdulwahid's claim of total allegiance by the IDPs is being contested by many non Fur IDPs whose sole solidarity with the Fur IDPs is their common desire to see that their issues are addressed both by the government and the international community. This alliance believes that its unity will force the international community and the government to compensate for their losses. These divisions amongst the IDPs have more recently been highlighted by insecurity concerns within the camps as the IDPs' accusations of violence have spread from the Janjaweed to amongst their fellow IDPs.

On the other hand, the government has made efforts to penetrate the camps and take control of camp security to end support to the rebel movements. For example, following the October 2007 incident of the murder of a government soldier in Hamidia camp in West Darfur, government authorities declared their desire to forcibly enter into camps to apprehend criminals, and to open police posts. It has become quite obvious that the IDP camps are now targeted by both the government and rebel movements.

Possible return of IDPs with new ideas

The political awakening of IDPs has started a new era of engagement in both micro and macro-level politics in Sudan, however, this change has also had dangerous ramifications for the community. Divisions between IDPs have led to violence as was the case of the Kalma expulsion of mainly Zaghawa SLA/MM supporters in October 2007. On 20 June 2006, IDPs in Hassa Hisa camp in West Darfur murdered three national staff of a local NGO (Water, Environmental and Sanitation). The reasons behind the attacks were linked to rumors that the staff was planning to poison IDP children, and tension between the Fur and Zaghawa over the signing of the DPA. In many ways, the incidents in Kalma and Hassa Hisa and others demonstrated that IDPs have not only borrowed the political understanding formerly exclusive to political parties, but also adopted the violent practices of expulsion and killing of minorities with different opinions and political allegiances.

The reintegration into village life following a future settlement will require a great deal of compromise and an admission by Darfurians and the government that the previous traditional system of governance must be amended and reformed. As many sheikhs in camps such as Asalam and Dereij noted, the reconciliation between IDPs and traditional leaders will be one of the most difficult tasks in a post-agreement period. Although IDP camp leaders state that the traditional system has lost its authority, they also stated that reconciliation is possible through the Native Administration's admission of guilt in abandoning IDPs in their time of need. This starting point in what IDPs see as a lengthy reconciliation process would still need to include changes to the system that would allow for a more democratic power sharing agreement that would include the rights to local organization of sheikhs or locally appointed leaders. Through their experience in camps, these sheikhs have demonstrated their ability to organize and represent their people in difficult times. Their experience can later be included in a post-conflict governance structure.

Another necessary reconciliation will be amongst the IDPs themselves. As the expulsion in Kalma demonstrated, the violence of eviction is not exclusively used by Arab militias but by the politically-divided IDPs. The extreme case of Kalma also illustrated how the battle over the support of IDPs is continuously splintering the group, first with the conflict between the mainly Zaghawa SLA/MM supporters against the mainly Fur SLA/AW supporters. Following the expulsion of most of the Zaghawa from Kalma, the division between tribes continued as the majority Fur face accusations of unjust political dominance made by minority tribes in the camps such as Dajo and Birgid.

This example of further divisions amongst the victims of the conflict will be a defining factor on sustainable peace in villages.

Conclusion

Darfur will never be the same. Millions of civilians displaced from their villages, others in refugee camps, hundreds killed and land, the most precious and source of both political and economic power, has changed hands in favor of communities accused of perpetrating the violence. The conflict in Darfur remains unresolved and if the past five years are to serve any lesson, indications are that the fighting will continue to drag on for years to come.

All the parties to the conflict are yet to fully embrace peace. All are convinced and are pressing for military victory and annihilation of the other(s). So far, there is little sign that the conflicting parties are prepared for political negotiations facilitated by the United Nations. Peaceful resolution to the conflict and the return of the IDPs to their original homes seems to be drifting away every day that passes.

In the meantime, there has been a fundamental change in the mindset of ordinary Darfurians who have found themselves mobilized in IDP camps and led by an unexpected leadership composed of Darfurians who previously did not have a chance at governing their fellow citizens. The integration of IDPs, the loss of confidence in the government and traditional leaders, as well as the advent of a new management or governance system led by IDP sheikhs, are critical to the future of any sustainable peace agreement in Darfur. Whether the international community and other stakeholders decide to either revive the DPA or start over with a new agreement, the challenge will remain the same of finding compromise and accepting that any degree of reconciliation will not alter the recent and permanent changes of mindset and mobilization of Darfurians.

ANNEX II: IDP Camp Profile

Kalma Camp, Nyala, South Darfur

1	<p>Chronology</p> <p>2003: Beginning of Displacement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- 2003: Displaced populations (Kaileik, Shattaia, Korolle, and villages of SE Jabal Marra, Mornei, Bindissi, Mukjar, Artalla, Hamada and others from Intifada (Nyala). <p>2004: Establishment of Kalma</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Mid Feb 2004: Intifada attacked by GoS police forces. Displaced population heads towards Kalma.- Mid February 04: Kalma camp established and named after the Dajo Sheikh of the area-Sheikh Kalma.- February 04: Humanitarian agencies (MSF-H, UNICEF) start to provide assistance for the camp population- 2 July 04: Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) starts camp coordination- July 04-05: Attacks around West Darfur increase and extend to South Darfur (Shearia, Labado, Muhajariya) resulting in the expansion of Kalma Camp.- 21 August 04: MoU is signed between GoS and UN to regulate relations between GoS authorities and international humanitarian agencies.- 02 November 04: GoS officials organize forced relocations of IDPs to camps in Nyala- 03 November 04: SG Kofi Annan urges Khartoum to stop all forced IDP relocation operations.- 04 November 04: UN agencies report on increase in sexual harassment cases suspected against Arab militias.- 04 November 04: HAC suggests that Kalma must be dismantled, IDPs fear eviction by the authorities.- 13 November 04: UN commission of Inquiry visits Kalma for collection of evidence of crimes.- 13-14 November 04: Overnight shooting in Kalma, four people wounded, 3 suspected rebels detained and four killed.- 22 November 04: GoS police compound outside the camp attacked by rebels.- 23 November 04: Armed police denied access to the camp clinics where some rebels were being treated.- 24 November 04: UN says rebels responsible for the attack at Kalma, killing 25 police officers.- 02 December 04: Shooting around Kalma camp. <p>2005: Expansion of Kalma</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- December 04 – Jan 05: large influx of people to the camp (17,608 new IDPs registered), allegedly due to a GoS offensive east of Kalma. The camp expands to 8 sectors.- January 2005: Population of Kalma increases to 136,216 individuals, camp is overcrowded, plan for relocation debated.- March 2005: MSF-H publishes “The Crushing Burden of Rape: Sexual Violence in Darfur”, a report to raise awareness about ongoing violence
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against women.

- March 2005: HAC appoints a new manager for Kalma. NGO meetings inside the Kalma characterized as illegal by authorities.
- April 2005: Steady deterioration of security. IDPs subjected to threats, looting, beating and rape. Armed militia closer to the camp.
- April 2005: Consideration of relocation of IDPs to Al Salam camp.
- 6 April 2005: Visit of SRSR Jan Pronk to Kalma, a pro-UN rally is organized in the camp.
- 23 April 2005: GoS police in Kalma open fire in the direction of the camp.
- 24 April 2005: HAC sub-commissioners appointed to different sectors in Kalma. All interventions in Kalma must receive HAC's approval.
- May 2005: UN SG, Kofi Annan, visits Kalma.
- 01 May 2005: NRC is ordered by HAC to leave Kalma camp within 24 hours. HAC accuse NRC of creating divisions between IDPs and the GoS.
- 15 May 2005: Deputy Sheikh Abaker Taha arrested by the GoS police.
- 17 May 2005: Renegotiation access between NRC and GoS resumes. NRC's term extended for three months.
- 19 May 2005: Confrontation between IDPs and GoS police inside Kalma camp.
- 20 May 2005: HAC and Saudi Red Crescent offices burnt by IDPs. HAC and number of Sudanese NGOs leave the camp after threat and looting.
- 20 & 31 May 2005: GoS imposes a ban on all motorized commercial traffic to Nyala (17 Km west). Kalma becomes more isolated. Commercial ban imposed on Kalma. The ban is to prevent a market economy taking hold in Kalma, and to avoid permanent settlement. The ban will only be lifted if the humanitarian community starts relocating Kalma's population to Al-Salam camp.
- 6 June 2005: a group of armed men enter Kalma, steal, shoot in the air and harass IDPs. Also shooting takes place inside CARE compound.
- June 2005: GoS reports that large numbers of Kalma IDPs are returning to Wadi Saleh in West Darfur. UNHCR monitoring shows that many of those returnees are not IDPs but people coming from South Darfur for non-conflict reasons.
- 17 June 2005: Deputy SRSR, Manuel da Silva, and GoS Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, visit Kalma. DSRSG raises concerns with Wali of SD, about GoS commercial ban, potential relocation of IDPs, and risk of flooding in the camp.
- 20 June 2005: Humanitarian agencies start an information campaign for Kalma IDPs on voluntary relocations to Al Salaam camp. IDPs are not pleased with the campaign believing this was the start of a forced relocation.
- 21 June 2005: WFP decides not to continue distribution until new headcount is organized.
- July 2005: Increase of armed robberies to NGO compounds in Kalma.
- July 2005: AU builds a police station in Kalma camp.
- July 2005: A new military check point is established between Nyala and Camp in addition to the NS and GoS police check points.

- July 2005: US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice and French Foreign Minister, Philippe Douste-Blazy visit Kalma.
- August 2005: NRC contract expires. GoS approaches other agencies to take camp coordination.
- September 2005: Increase in number of attacks on IDPs outside the camp is reported by AU.
- September 2005: Visit of UNSG Special Advisor on Prevention of Genocide, Juan Mendez.
- September 2005: Incident at OXFAM compound in Kalma related to recruitment of staff. Several hundred men and women entered the compound throwing stones and threatening OXFAM national staff with death. OXFAM out of camp for four days. Sheikhs help resolve the issue.
- October 2005: a headcount is organized in Kalma. Number of IDPs adjusted down to 89,754 from 163,000 individuals.
- 23 October 2005: 17 returnees from Kalma to Tama village (22 km N of Nyala) killed by armed men on horse and camel.
- 23 October 2005: GoS police arrest a leading sheikh in Kalma, who is charged for illegally collecting firewood from prohibited forest area. IDPs report the arrest to AU who did not intervene, and as a result IDPs kidnap and took hostage 24 WES staff. GoS police fire at the IDPs, injuring some.
- 25 October 2005: All hostages released after negotiations by AU and UN officials. Agencies evacuate Kalma for several days.
- November 2005: AU receives daily reports of IDP harassment when moving outside the camp to collect animal fodder and firewood.
- November 2005: NRC contract with GoS renewed for 5 months (4 Nov 05 – 4 April 06).
- 8 December 2005: Wali of South Darfur declares the end of the ban on commercial traffic.
- 16 December 2005: commercial traffic between Kalma and Nyala resumes.
- 17 December 2005: Start of firewood patrols for Kalma IDPs through a joint effort by GoS police and AU.

2006: Kalma Politicized and Armed (DPA Division)

- 5 January 2006: The Wali of South Darfur visits Kalma.
- 27 January 2006: IDPs in Kalma demonstrate in protest against attacks on Mershing. IDPs call for criminals in Darfur to be brought before the ICC and welcomes UN troops in Darfur.
- 27 February 2006: Firewood Patrol cancelled as exchange of fire occurs between nomads and GoS police for three hours, north of Kalma.
- March 2006: NS imposes a fuel embargo on Kalma. After negotiations by OCHA, the embargo is lifted.
- April 2006: Visit of UN Emergency relief coordinator, Jan Egeland is denied by GoS.
- 4 April 2006: NRC camp coordination in Kalma expires, renewal denied and NRC is ordered to leave South Darfur immediately.
- 6 April 2006: DSRSG, Manuel da Silva, criticizes the restriction imposed by GoS on aid workers including the expulsion of NRC.

- 8 April 2006: Official complaint from the Sudanese Police Headquarter concerning the armed elements inside Kalma IDP camp.
- May 2006: Security in the camp deteriorates AU's 24 hours presence for seven days not possible.
- May 2006: Visit of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, to Darfur.
- May 2006: increase in political affiliations (SLA/AW, JEM-NS, SLA/AG, and SLA/M) in Kalma as result of the DPA.
- May 2006: HAC expelled from Kalma by IDPs.
- 2 May 2006: Demonstration in Kalma, IDP calls for UN forces to be deployed in Darfur. A letter is delivered to the AU by the IDPs stating high level of insecurity, AU's failure to protect the camp and insufficient humanitarian assistance.
- 5 May 2006: Darfur Peace Agreement signed in Abuja by GoS and SLA/MM. SLA/WA and JEM did not sign.
- 8 May 2006: UN Emergency Relief Coordinator-Jan Egeland visits Kalma. An IDP demonstration against the GoS and the DPA takes place in the camp and turns violent. One OXFAM translator attacked. The AU compound is looted and destroyed, one interpreter is killed. AU, UN and NGOs evacuate the camp.
- 30 May 2006: Killing of Fur youth leader and his aunt by a Zaghawa IDP raises tensions between Fur and Zaghawa in Kalma.
- June 2006: An increase of arms in camp and random shooting at night is noted. Increased tension due to the disagreement over the DPA, with majority of IDPs not supporting the DPA.
- 1 June 2006: GoS agrees to renew NRC contract for one year as camp coordinator.
- Mid June 2006: nine incidents of armed theft from NGO compounds and schools in Kalma camp, three incidents of armed violence and one INGO national staff killed.
- 12 June 2006: Heavy shootings in Kalma by armed men from 8 pm until 3 am.
- 15 June 2006: TAM visits and held discussions with Sheikhs and IDPs.
- 26 June 2006: AMIS initiated day patrols three times a week.
- 29 June 2006: INGO national staff killed while on night duty.
- July 2006: New displacements, 25,000 IDPs from North Darfur (Tawila, Korma).
- July 2006: Request for stronger AU presence in the camp by IDPs.
- 7 July 2006: two male IDP bodies found shot and killed near the camp.
- 20 July 2006: two individuals from Kalma, traveling on Ishma-Kalma road in donkey cart attacked, one killed, the other injured.
- 30 July 2006: NGOs in Kalma express deep concern regarding increase in attacks and rape of IDPs north of Kalma and request for an increase in AMIS patrol and UNMIS intervention with the authorities.
- 3 August 2006: UNMIS meets with the Wali to discuss the increasing vulnerability of women in Kalma due to insecurity.

- 3 August 2006: National Security personnel arrested the Executive Director of a national "peace-building" NGO, who is also the Omda of Hajar (65 Km from Nyala). He was accused of mobilizing IDPs in Kalma not to return to their villages.
- 7 August 2006: Women in Kalma initiate a meeting with UN, donor and INGO representatives in the camp, to share their experience, and appeal on urgent action in stopping attacks on women.
- 8 August 2006: attacks on women continue, NGOs re-issue expression of concern to UNMIS and AMIS.
- 11 August 2006: The Wali announces that a suspect has been arrested accused of killing the AU translator on the 8 May 2006. Seven other people were also arrested and implicated with the murder.
- 16 August 2006: HAC informs NRC that camp coordination is restricted to coordination of humanitarian activities, and that protection activities are unacceptable.
- 16 August 2006: Two men in Kalma market beaten. The incident sparks rioting, exchange of fire and an increase of tribal tension in camp. IDPs from three tribal committees to work to reestablish stability in the camp.
- 16 August 2006: AU suspends the firewood patrol till October due to bad road conditions in the rainy season. Agencies request for a revision on the suspension.
- 26-27 August 2006: About 60 SLA/MM soldiers were reportedly spotted in Kalma.
- 28 August 2006: A Fur IDP shopkeeper was reportedly attacked by suspected SLA/MM in sector 3.
- 28 August 2006: Shooting reported in sector 5 primary school allegedly by Minawi supporters.
- 3 September 2006: Six women were abducted by armed militias. One woman raped.
- 6 September 2006: Five women from sector 5 raped by armed men while on their way to fetch firewood in the direction of Kukuja hills, about three hours walk from Kalma.
- 4 October 2006, armed men stormed in 2 houses in sector 4, three people killed and one wounded.
- 14 November 2006: 20-25 women were abducted by unknown armed men in Kunduwa forest.
- 17 December 2006: Five armed NS officers arrested Kalma individuals when returning to the camp from Nyala on commercial vehicle.
- 15 December 2006: a group of IDPs coming from firewood and grass collection (men and women) were attacked by a group of Janjaweed, five women abducted.
- 23 December 2006: Five IDPs attacked by two armed militias while collecting firewood in Gondowa forest, but managed to escape.
- 22 December 2006: One IDP traveling to Nyala arrested, searched and badly beaten by military at a check point, accusing him of being *tora bora (rebel)*.
- 23 December 2006: two IDP women raped by armed men on their way to

firewood collection north of Kalma.

2007: Kalma Divided in Ethnic/Tribal Lines

- 11 January 2007: Rape of three women from sector 1 in Kalma by four armed Arab militia, while fetching firewood in Umdurwa area
- 26 January 2007: Attempted rape of 2 IDP women by Arab men in military uniform.
- 26 February 2007: One IDP woman attacked and raped by 2 armed men in civilian clothes, on her way back from firewood collection from Banku area.
- Beg. March 2007: SLA/M tries to establish offices in Kalma (Sector I and VIII), resulting in rioting and the death of four supporters.
- 9 April 2007: Janjaweed entered sector 1 to retrieve alleged stolen cattle.
- 29 April 2007: Heavy shooting in the evening from the railway towards Kalma camp.
- 29 April 2007: Three girls fetching firewood east of Kalma attacked, beaten and raped by 2 armed militiamen.
- 06 Sept 2007: Attempted theft of a UNICEF vehicle during which the four thieves were stopped and killed by IDPs protecting the vehicle
- 18 Sept 2007: Zaghawa ask for OCHA and UNMIS intervention to claim compensation for the death of the three Zaghawa thieves. The fourth thief was from the Tunjur tribe.
- 22 Sept 2007: UNMIS and OCHA meet with the Zaghawa and Fur leadership in an attempt to dissolve growing tension between the tribes
- 20-27 Sept 2007: Worries over delays in the food distribution in the camp due to the insecurity
- 27 Sept 2007: A joint mission of OCHA and UNMIS meet with Kalma leaders to agree on the necessary security for food distribution in the camp
- End of Sept – early Oct 2007: Displacement of 5,000-10,000 Zaghawa and Massaliet from the camp
- Oct 2007: Displaced IDPs scattered to different camps including overcrowded Otash. Some IDPs are later moved to Sacalee camp.
- Oct-Dec 2007: Relative calm in the camp after the exodus

2008:

- January 2008: The Dajo claim that the management of the camp does not reflect tribal diversity and is dominated by the Fur
- 28 Jan 2008: The sheikhs agree to allocate more leadership posts to different tribes such as the Dajo, Birgid, and Tunjur.
- July 2008: Fuel problems in the camp as National Security limit fuel access. There is insufficient fuel to support the water pumps.
- 28 July 2008: National Security enter sector I where they claim to have confiscated weapons and arms. The arms are displayed to UNAMID
- 25 August 2008: Government forces enter the camp and fighting leads to 30 deaths. UNAMID assists MSF Holland in the evacuation of the injured to Nyala hospital
- 26 August 2008: UNAMID assists with the burial of the IDPs killed during the attack on 25 August
- 27 August 2008: Six prominent Fur political figures resign from the

	<p>government over the deaths of IDPs on 25 August</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 03 Sept 2008: UNAMID Senior Management led by DJSR General Anyidoho visits Kalma camp - 03 Sept 2008: High-level government delegation including the Wali of Khartoum and the Minister of Interior visit South Darfur to meet with leaders about the Kalma incident. - 19 Oct 2008: JSR visit to Kalma - 09 November 2008: UNAMID conducts its first workshop on the “Mandate of the Mission and the Civic Responsibilities of IDPs” - 04 December 2008: Civil Affairs conducts a workshop on “Conflict Resolution – A Community’s Agenda” for 47 youth participants - 14 December 2008: Civil Affairs conducts its final series of workshops on the “Mandate of the Mission” and “Conflict Resolution” <p>2009:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 04 Jan 2009: Civil Affairs attends meeting with Kalma IDP leadership to discuss letter from national security reaffirming the IDPs right to freedom of movement - 01 Mar 2009: Civil Affairs conducts mission to Kalma to advise IDPs not to conduct themselves in a manner that would draw undue negative attention to themselves in the light of the forthcoming ICC announcement. - 21 Mar 2009: UNAMID substantive sections visit Kalma IDP leadership to discuss their refusal of life saving humanitarian aid following the recent expulsion of 13 INGOs from the Sudan 	
2	Current size/population	<p>Approximately 92,000 individuals</p> <p>It is the most politically charged IDP camp in the whole of Darfur, located 15 km east of Nyala.</p>
3	Camp organization/structure	<p>The camp is organized into 8 sectors/centers, each sector headed by a sheikh* who represents one or more ethnic groups, who coordinates with sub-sheikhs*. Each sector is named after the village where majority of the IDPs are displaced from. In late 2007, Sector 0* was formed by the movement of predominantly Zaghawa IDPs from Kalma Sector 8 to an area which is actually the junction between Kalma and Bilel camp. It is reported that a new wave of Zagawa IDPs have arrived from Muhajeriya following clashes in the area in early 2009.</p> <p>Sheikh of Sheikh: Ali Abdul Rahman Tahir Deputy Sheikh: Tijani Adam Ahmed Sheikh-center 1: Saber Kanan Sheikh-center 2: Yousif el Tijani Adam</p>

		<p>Sheikh-center 3: Ibrahim Adam Ahmed Sheikh-center 4: Salah Abdul Gader Sheikh-center 5: Bahar Adam Musa Sheikh-center 6: Adam Sharif Omer Sheikh-center 7: Issa Adam Ahmed Sheikh-center 8: Bashar el Duma</p> <p>Women leaders : Khadija el Daia and Aisha Abdul Rahman</p> <p>* Such leaders act as IDP representatives, however, these leaders acquired such titles in the camp.</p> <p>No presence of a camp coordinator. Matters of humanitarian assistance coordinated by OCHA on an ad hoc basis, but for operational and limited reasons, it cannot offer full coordination.</p> <p>Matters of security – There is 24 hour protection by the Formed Police Unit and the military presence.</p>
<p>4</p>	<p>Surrounding environment</p>	<p>The camp is located across major livestock migration route used by Arab nomads, hostile to IDPs. Previously a forest area, almost all of the trees in the area have been cut down by the IDPs. There is an adequate access to water with many water pumps built across the camp, however, access to fuel is sometimes cut by National Security. The camp is located in the middle of a valley and is prone to flooding during the rainy season. There are poor relations with residents in the area resulting in an unsafe environment. The area the camp is located belongs to the Dajo tribe who have repeatedly requested that the government return their land.</p> <p>Living conditions in the camp are poor. The camp is overcrowded and lacks basic sanitation infrastructure. The shallow latrines used are full and overflow during the rainy seasons. Access to most parts in the camp is difficult and streets are jammed with vendors. Efforts to build a drainage system have not succeeded due to reluctance by IDPs to give way part of their plot for fear of being</p>

		relocated outside their protective zones within their tribes.
5	Tribal composition	<p>The camp is predominantly Fur. Other represented groups include: Dajo (30 per cent), Massaliet (5-8 per cent), and other groups (5 per cent).</p> <p>However, other reliable estimates indicate: Fur (60-70 per cent), Dajo (10-25 per cent), Massaliet (5-8 per cent), and other groups (3-5 per cent).</p> <p>Inter-tribal relations were defined between signatories and non-signatories to the DPA prior to the exodus of most SLA-MM supporters from the Zaghawa in October 2007.</p>
6	Places of origin	<p>Sector 1 Dajo (Ishma, Um-Zaifa, Sani-Reel, Neira) Fur (Artala , Kashalango) Massaliet and Marariet</p> <p>Sector 2 Fur (Shataiya, Kaileek, Jimeiza, Wadi Saleh)</p> <p>Sector 3 Fur (Shatayia)</p> <p>Sector 4 Fur (Wadi Saleh)</p> <p>Sector 5 Fur, Massaliet (Kuja, Donky-Deres).</p> <p>Sector 6 Fur (Abu-Ajura, Wadi-Saleh, Shatayia)</p> <p>Sector 7 Fur (Wadi Saleh, Dagarez) Birgid (Yasin) Dajo (Ishma, Abu Odam)</p> <p>Sector 8 Birgid (Labado, Marla)</p>
7	Demographic characteristics	According to UNICEF, about 65 percent of the IDP population in Kalma is composed of women and children, 20 percent youth, and 15 percent men.
8	Income-generating activities	There is an elaborate network of shops, kiosques, and stands, selling products such as vegetables and soap. Timber cutting Handicrafts are available through a programme sponsored by the NGO CHF. Brick-making is a key commercial activity in the camp to the extent that the water supply is often

		<p>disrupted due to the excessive use of water for production. Seedlings and nurseries are also found in the camp.</p>
<p>9</p>	<p>Social and humanitarian services</p>	<p>Ninety per cent of the camp has access to food distribution. Adequate access to water and health services are reasonably good, however, in 2008 there have been problems with access to fuel which affects access to water. The shelter available is perhaps the best compared to other IDP camps in South Darfur, but inadequate. There have been floods in the camp in mid-2008 which caused damage to the shelters.</p> <p>NRC was the camp coordinator but left since early 2007 due to disagreements with the government, which accused them of interfering in Sudanese politics. OCHA has attempted to coordinate the camp on an ad hoc basis but for operational reasons, it cannot fulfill that role. UNHCR has attempted to assist in the coordination through the Kalma Coordination Group.</p> <p>As of 05 March 2009, 13 INGOs were expelled from the Sudan. 10 of the 13 had operations in South Darfur and at least 6 of those expelled were working in Kalma IDP camp covering services in the water, sanitation, health and food sectors.</p> <p>Expelled INGOs South Darfur: Oxfam GB, MSF-H, MSF-F, Solidarite, CARE, ACF, Mercy Corps, Save- US, IRC, CHF</p> <p>Former distribution of services: Food: WFP/WVI Water: UNICEF/WES, CARE, Oxfam Shelter/NFI: CARE, Oxfam, UNICEF, JLC, CHF Primary Health Care: MSF-H, IRC, SPRC/SRC, UNICEF/WHO/MoH, GHF Secondary Health Care: Nyala Teaching Hospital Basic Drug Supply: MSF-H, IRC, SPRC/SRC, UNICEF/WHO/MoH, SPCR, GHF Education: UNICEF, MoE Sanitation: UNICEF/WES, SPRC/SRC, Oxfam, CARE Nutrition: ACF EPI: MSF-H, IRC, UNICEF/WHO/MoH Agriculture: CHF</p>

		<p>Protection: UNICEF, IRC/UNDP, SPCR, CHF, UNFPA</p> <p>Coordination: OCHA (Back Stopping)</p>
<p>10</p>	<p>Active/visible political groups</p>	<p>Kalma has become the center of political activities and increasing militancy among the IDPs hence state security organs for sometime have been trying unsuccessfully to dismantle the camp into a cluster of smaller manageable camps.</p> <p>There are links between political party supporters and their leaders outside of the camp. The political groups found in the camp include:</p> <p>SLA/AW: forms the largest political group within the camp, generating its support mainly from the majority Fur. Abdulwahid communicates with IDPs leaders.</p> <p>SLA/M: Prior to Oct 2007, the Zaghawa and Dajo followers of the SLA/M formed a significant political group, particularly in sectors I and VIII. The SLA/MM attempted to open offices in Sectors I and VIII, however, their efforts were thwarted due to contention with the majority SLA/AW supporters in the camp. SLA/M supporters have mostly left the camp after their expulsion in October 2007.</p> <p>JEM: There is a small presence of the JEM's supporters.</p> <p>All movements, particularly the SLA/MM and the SLA/AW allegedly smuggled weapons inside the camp for defensive as well as intimidation of other groups.</p> <p>Elements of National Security have infiltrated the camp to gather information on the activities of the different groups.</p> <p>Presence of the NCP and the opposition political parties in general remains minimal and irrelevant in the camp.</p>

		<p>SPLM have tried unsuccessfully to establish links with the IDP leadership and influence them to work together toward a common goal as marginalized groups in Sudan. However, IDP leaders have vehemently opposed any such new approaches due to SPLM's lack of strategy toward the Darfur conflict.</p> <p>Differences between the IDP representatives and Fur Native Administration on SPLM's approach. SPLM has provided financial support to the Fur Native administration, represented by the former Magdoom, to mobilize its community ahead of the coming elections.</p>
11	Most influential political groups	<p>The control of the camp is mostly monopolized by the Sheikhs who are present in each sector and report to the Head of Sheikhs, Sheikh Ali. In addition to the Sheikh system, there is an executive committee.</p>
12	General political inclinations	Refer to No.10 Active/Visible political groups
13	Formal relations and linkages with the Movements	Refer to No.10 Active/Visible political groups
14	Traditional tribal leadership structures	<p>The traditional tribal leadership is represented by the Sheikhs who are present in each sector and report to the Head of Sheikhs, Sheikh Ali.</p> <p>There are divergent views between the current Sheikhs and the Native Administration of the role of each group now and in the future. Sheikhs indicate that their new role as leaders in the camps could be extended to the areas of return because of the distinctive services they provided during times of need, but insist that it is up to the community to decide. The Native Administration states that the current leadership of the Sheikhs is only limited to camps to help organize their people for the delivery of humanitarian services and once people</p>

		return the old Native Administration will resume its role. Both sides however agree that the people will make the final decision on who will be their leaders.
15	New tribal leadership structures	NSTR
16	New leadership	Before the DPA, youth had emerged as a new leadership force within the camp. However, the situation has now changed. Since the signing of the DPA, youth leadership and activities became tribal and went underground along ethnic lines and no longer poses as a strong force in the camp.
17	Reconciliation efforts and DDDC	<p>The reconciliation committee has initiated and conducted reconciliation activities inside the camp and has so far being able to manage conflicts inside the camp including death. Factors related to the reconciliation agreements have been dealt on tribal basis, i.e. compensation, blood money (Diya) all paid by the tribes, with most of the support coming from outside the camp. The implementation has been supervised by the reconciliation committee which affirms it has been respected.</p> <p>In matters of accusations of criminal activities, the accused are sent to their tribal chief inside the camp for judgment and punishment. This system of justice reflects the trend within the camp to respect both the new Sheikhs within the camp, and traditional tribal structures.</p> <p>The IDPs remain vehemently opposed to any plans for return without guaranteed security and compensation for their losses. The census is a delicate subject to the IDPs who link it to the DPA and refuse to return to participate in any registration. The IDPs have voiced their strong</p>

		<p>support of the ICC’s indictment of the president and their opposition to the Sudan People’s Initiative and the Qatar initiative.</p> <p>The dissemination of the DDDC is limited to radio broadcast, IDP’s acceptance and participation is dependent on the political settlement which should reflect their demands such as compensation, right of return, land ownership rights. No mechanism has been put in place with regards to their involvement in the process itself. However, IDPs stress on the representation of IDPs from camps itself rather than others claiming authority.</p> <p>The IDPs boycotted the census which they feel was not properly conducted. IDPs insist that elections should not be held while they remain in the camps.</p>
<p>18</p>	<p>Key camp concerns</p>	<p>Concerns of IDPs are many, but could be divided into immediate and medium to long term. The immediate concern of the IDPs is protection and security both inside and outside the camp. IDPs call for the continued support for the deployment of international forces to provide protection and escort outside the camp. There was no GoS police presence and AU from May 2006 after the killing of AU language assistant during the visit of Jan Egeland until the deployment of the Formed Police Unit in 2008. One important IDP concern is the absence of camp coordination, a position that has been vacant since the departure of NRC. Another major concern is lack of education services for hundreds of young children, health facilities, proper sanitation and drainage, etc.</p> <p>The medium and long term concerns include;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment of mechanisms to record loses of properties by the IDPs • Disarmament of all armed militia from rebels as well as from Arabs • Comprehensive peace between the government and rebel movements • Compensation for human and material loses during the conflict

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rehabilitation of their villages and provision of services • Orderly return to their villages
19	Camp security situation and arrangements	<p>The situation in and outside the camp has been tense with continued insecurity. There have been on and off armed militia activities in the area and around the perimeter of the camp. As reported by UN agencies and INGOs, there have been an increase in the number of human rights violations committed outside the camp, in particular rape of IDP women and girls.</p> <p>Security inside the camp in the joint responsibility between the Sheikhs and the youth who undertake night patrols in their respective areas.</p> <p>The government attack on the camp on 25 August 2008 severely worsened relations between the government and the IDPs. The 24 hour patrols of the Formed Police Unit have resulted in decreased violence.</p> <p>Before the DPA, youth from all different ethnic groups had established youth committees and took full responsibility of security matters. However, after the DPA, youth structure broke down due to infighting and killing youth leaders from respective tribes. Currently, security in the camp is handled on sectoral basis and youth from each ethnic group is responsible for the security of their sector (s).</p> <p>Regarding the internal disputes within the camps, such issues are solved by the sheikhs.</p>
20	Women and youth	<p>Women</p> <p>Women groups in the camp are active and have established their own committee to organize themselves and raise their issues and concerns with relevant institutions and organizations such as NGOs, UNAMID, visiting dignitaries and their meeting with other committees in the camp. The first women group committee was established during the visit of the former Secretary General of</p>

the United Nations, Kofi Annan in Kalma in May 2005. Each sector is represented by two women with a Head Sheikha named Sarra, from Fur. The committee fully participates in all meetings and activities in the camp and later takes responsibility in the dissemination of the decisions at grassroots level.

In addition, women groups have sub-committees for specific activity such as firewood patrols to liaise with UNAMID to ensure cooperation and save return to the camp. Furthermore, women committees are responsible for the organization of women and family related activities such as workshops, community mobilization in sanitation, reconciliation and maintaining a peaceful environment in the camp. Members of the women committees have established their own saving fund and contribute SD 100 each month to cover expenses related for their activities.

Youth

Between 2004 until the DPA was signed in May 2006, youth groups in the camp were active, elected head of youth, secretary general, established sub-committees and organized themselves to address issues related to their group. However, since the DPA was signed, youth groups became involved in politics as pro and anti DPA and no longer unified as one group.

Clashes erupted in the camp among youth from different tribes which resulted in the killing of several active youth leaders including the head and deputy youth leaders from Fur, two youths from Zaghawa and others from different tribes. Tension was further escalated by the alleged involvement of government security organs which wanted to see Fur youth weakened if not totally dismantled.

In November 2006, Fur youth committee dismissed their leader, Al Tayib Kaprous on allegations of harassing two Zaghawa girls who attended a private school he run in the camp. This step together with the DPA's slow response paved

	<p>the way for the de-escalation of the conflict among the youth. Moreover, youth from Dajo and Massaliet severed ties with Zaghawa youth and formed their separate youth committees, which further isolated and weakened Zaghawa youth. Since then, youth leadership and activities went underground along ethnic lines for fear of their security.</p> <p>At the moment, the hostilities among the youth groups from the different communities have went down due to the reduction of active support of the DPA. Each youth group undertakes their own separate activities secretly and patrol their respective sectors at night and there is no youth leader representing youth from the entire camp. The emergence of strong youth groups who have challenged the leadership of Sheikhs in the camp is no longer valid. Nowadays, such claim seems to be myth rather than a reality on the ground.</p> <p>Another activity in which youth are involved is the paralegal center in Kalma, a programme which has been initiated and managed by IRC and UNDP.</p>
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