HEMISPHERES

THE TUFTS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

A Tufts Undergraduate Student Publication

NEW AND OLD WARS

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Foreword

The difference between "new" and "old" wars is not about what is empirically new, even though the articles in this journal suggest that there are many "new" aspects of contemporary political violence. Rather it is about new ways of understanding or interpreting war. By understanding wars differently, we come up with very different policy prescriptions.

"Old" ways of thinking about war treat political violence as the expression of a legitimate political grievance or as a deep-rooted political conflict that can no longer be resolved peacefully. The policy prescription is then either winning or reaching a compromise through internationally mediated peace talks.

There are many alternative ways of thinking about war; some of them are presented in this journal. If we assume that political violence is about the immediate gains from violence rather than a deep-seated grievance—loot and pillage, for example, or constructing an ideology based on hatred of the "other"—then "old" war policy prescriptions will have the opposite effects than intended. Trying to win provokes more violence and peace talks legitimate armed groups.

My own view is that the distinction between political and criminal violence is becoming blurred (perhaps it always was!) and therefore policy should focus on law enforcement as it relates to individuals rather than collective peace-making. This is what I mean by a human security approach. Human security is what individuals enjoy in a rights-based, law-governed society. Human security is about spreading rights-based rules in contrast to national security, which focuses on exclusive national interests.

I hope this journal will be a contribution to new ways of thinking about war and possible solutions. The implications of new technologies like robotics, the gendered character of violence, or new tactics and strategies are all crucial issues to investigate if we are to change the dominant mindsets of both scholars and practitioners.

Mary Kaldor
March 24, 2014

Editors' Note

We are pleased to present the 37th edition of *Hemispheres: New and Old Wars.* A special thanks to Mary Kaldor, whose book *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* inspired the theme for our journal this year. The diversity and quantity of this year's submissions reflect the importance of critically examining the changing nature of warfare. Although sovereign states continue to be the primary figures within the international legal and political community, non-state actors have begun to take on a larger role. This can be witnessed by the emergence of multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and international criminal organizations as serious and influential players within the international system. Violent conflict has moved from primarily inter-state to intra-state warfare and there have been significant changes in the strategies and tactics used by aggressive agents. It is essential that we study these fundamental changes in order to better understand the United States' foreign policy agenda and role in the international community, as well as the legal implications of technologically advanced weaponry.

This year's publication has confronted these complex issues and offers a broad interpretation of the theme "new and old wars." Author Abdulmajeed Al Saud discusses the impact of technology on future wars within the international legal system, while author Clarisse Awamengwi expands the definition of new war to the ongoing fight against sexual violence, and author David Riche explores how economic power has become a strategic and important way to assert power. In an honest interview, William Monroe, a career Foreign Service Officer and former U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain, addresses the future of the United States' evolving presence in the Middle East. The imagery of this year's photo exploration offers readers a visual connection to modern day battles including human rights and climate change. It is our hope that the diverse set of voices published here will stimulate conversation and increase discussion and the changing nature of warfare.

We would like to thank all of those involved in the production of the 37th volume of *Hemispheres.* We are sincerely grateful to all of the authors who submitted their academic work, as well as to ALLIES: Alliance Linking Leaders in Education and the Services, whose senior members contributed an editorial written specifically for this issue. We would also like to thank Mary Kaldor, William Monroe, and Tanya Henderson for all of their contributions to this year's journal. Additionally, we are so appreciative of our extraordinary editorial board whose dedication, hard work, passion, and collaboration have made this a truly remarkable volume.

Maxine Jacobson & Lauren Krouskoff

Articles

Lethal Autonomous Robots:
A New Challenge to the International Legal System

Abdulmajeed Al Saud, *Northeastern University*

Abstract

Lethal autonomous robots ("LARs") are closer to becoming reality than most people think, and the prospect of their arrival presents a number of logistical, legal, and ethical challenges that demand attention now. Indeed, the possibility of "killer robots" roaming the battlefield has the potential to change not only the nature of combat, but also the way that we think about and understand the rules and ethics of war, what it means to be a soldier, and how we value human life. Further, the organization Human Rights Watch has explained that, while the primary concern about LARs focuses on the risk they present to innocent civilians, the implications of their development and use extend to all areas of international law and politics, thus making LARs one of the most significant issues of the 21st century.[1]

While LAR technology may seem relevant only in the realm of science fiction, recent military and intelligence sources have indicated that killer robots are not so distant on the horizon. In fact, a former U.S. Air Force chief scientist has stated that the technology currently exists to facilitate "fully autonomous military strikes,"[2] and research is underway by several countries to create robots that can be deployed in the battlefield and operate fully independent of human control or interference. Already, scientists have developed several robot models that can carry machine guns and advanced rifles,[3] and the U.S. Army is testing the abilities of the Crusher Unmanned Ground Combat vehicle to replace traditional means of transport and reconnaissance.[4] Such robot systems will be designed to "compute the kill decision very fast,"[5] and have the potential to make the traditional soldier obsolete.

These advances in technology have outpaced our ability to fully consider the legal and ethical concerns surrounding their use, however, and it is unclear whether such systems comply with International Humanitarian Law ("IHL"). As a result, a number of scholars, diplomats, politicians, and even members of the military have begun to speak out about the ramifications of autonomous robotic warfare, and a rigorous examination of the legal and ethical implications of LAR technology is now underway. For the most part, these disparate groups have concluded that, while LAR targeting may be permissible under the IHL in most circumstances,[6] the fact that these weapons will neither be

accountable as "individuals," presents ethical issues (as well as legal questions) that "lower the bar for war"[7] and need to be addressed sooner rather than later. This report will examine where LARs fit within the current legal and geo-political landscape, as well as the moral and ethical problems they present. The analysis will then turn to the desirability of acting now to curtail the use of LARs, or if such pre-emptive regulation is premature in light of the current status of international law and the possibility of creating "moral robotic weaponry."[8]

LARs Occupy a "Grey" Area in International Law

While LARs present challenges to the international legal system on a variety of levels and have the potential to implicate a number of laws and norms, their greatest threat is to what is commonly known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or the Law of Armed Conflicts ("LOAC"). Simply stated, IHL is an amalgamation of laws and behaviors that regulate conduct during armed conflicts (known as *jus in bello* in the legal context). It is derived from the Geneva and Hague Conventions, as well as other treaties, agreements, and specific cases, all of which seek to protect those who are not engaged in combat (civilians) and to regulate the methods and means of those who are (soldiers and weapons). Four "bedrock" principles constitute *jus in bello*: (1) military necessity; (2) distinction; (3) proportionality; and (4) unnecessary suffering or humanity.[9] LARs are problematic with respect to each of these principles; however, their legality is the most contentious in the context of the IHL rules of distinction and proportionality.[10]

LARs and the Principle of Distinction

The principle of distinction has the aim of protecting civilian lives during armed conflict, and therefore specifically prohibits targeting civilians and indiscriminate attacks (Geneva Conventions 1977, arts. 51 and 57). As Major Jeffrey S. Thurner (2012), a military officer in the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps explained:

> The jus in bello principle of distinction requires belligerents to distinguish between combatants and civilians. It applies to both real persons and tangible objects. The intent is to minimize the harm to civilians and their property. Commanders have the affirmative duty to distinguish between these before ordering an attack. This principle is intended to prohibit indiscriminate attacks.[11]

The ability of LARs to operate according to such standards and within such parameters is questionable and has become a key issue of debate. Some analysts, including scientists who are currently working on artificial intelligence programs, believe that LARs cannot conform to this standard, and therefore would in all circumstances be unlawful under IHL. Specifically, they point to the limitations of even the most advanced artificial intelligence technology,

where sensors of the type required to satisfy the principle of distinction simply have not been invented. Critics of LARs further argue that advanced robots still do not have the ability to understand context, which is often critical in distinguishing an enemy combatant from a civilian, and the rise of urban and asymmetric warfare, where lawful targets deliberately imbed themselves within civilian populations will present even further challenges for even the "best" robots.[12]

Proponents, on the other hand, point to the increased precision offered by modern technology, as well as the ability of LARs to "wait it out" in order to make a more reliable assessment of the situation.[13] According to this argument, because LARs are "not constrained by the notion of self-preservation," they can be programmed to sacrifice themselves to "reveal the presence of a combatant" thereby aiding "live troops" in their efforts to distinguish combatants from noncombatants in a complex, harried battle situation.[14] Whether an LAR could be programmed to realize such a strategy (not to mention whether military commanders would be willing to "sacrifice" an obviously expensive and sophisticated piece of machinery for such purposes) remains to be seen, and is indicative of the complicated nature of the debate surrounding LARs and the principle of distinction. Quite simply, they have the potential to operate both within and outside of the rules.

LARs and the Principle of Proportionality

The rule of proportionality rests upon the fundamental humanitarian idea that, regardless of the fact that two belligerents are engaged in armed conflict, they need to exercise restraint. Specifically, proportionality dictates that the kind and degree of force used must not exceed what is absolutely necessary in order to achieve an articulated military goal (Geneva Protocols 1977, art. 51(5)(b)). In other words, the "damage" (both intended and collateral) cannot be excessive in light of the stated objective; you can't burn the village to capture one man. Because it relies so heavily on subjective judgment and context specific decision-making, the rule of proportionality has been called "one of the most complex rules of international humanitarian law," and is often the subject of heated debate even in conventional warfare (for example, the U.S. response to the September 11th attacks has been criticized by some as being disproportionate).

With respect to LARs, operating according to the rule of proportionality presents a number of distinct problems, many of which are arguably insurmountable obstacles to their legality under IHL. Like military targets themselves, proportionality is constantly in flux, with the "value" of any given objective shifting according to a variety of outside forces. The value of a given target may outweigh or be proportional to any collateral (civilian) damage at one moment, but circumstances can shift somewhat abruptly, leading to a situation where either the target's worth has been reduced or the unintended damages greatly exceed the force necessary for the operation. In such

instances, LARs would likely be far inferior to humans in their ability to reassess the situation, understand and appreciate context, and make the *value* judgment that is necessary to meet the proportionality standard. As Christof Heyns, the U.N. Special Rapporteur who has examined the implications of LAR technology noted in a recent report:

> Proportionality is widely understood to involve distinctively human judgment. The prevailing legal interpretations of the rule explicitly rely on notions such as "common sense," "good faith," and the "reasonable military commander standard." It remains to be seen to what extent these concepts can be translated into the computer programs, now or in the future.[15]

Given this explanation of the vital link between several distinctly human qualities and the rule of proportionality, it would seem impossible for LARs to meet the standard. A robot with "common sense" or "good faith" just doesn't seem possible.

Nevertheless, even those who agree that the proportionality determination is a *human* judgment call still maintain that "workarounds" can be developed to enable commanders to use LARs on the battlefield without violating IHL.[16] Specifically, proponents argue that LARs could conceivably be employed in situations involving high value targets where declared hostile forces predominate and the level of conflict has already escalated to such a level that it is unlikely that the dynamic will change.[17] In other words, this scenario envisions lawful LAR use in a "stable" armed conflict, for instance on a conventional battlefield with warriors on both sides and very few civilians thrown into the mix (or none at all). While such opportunities are few and far between in modern conflict, this argument does present a possibility for legal LAR use. Proponents also argue—on somewhat less stable ground—that LARs could be programmed to make real time calculations of collateral damage, and to cease operation once a pre-determined acceptable limit of casualties is exceeded.[18] Whether and how such programmed proportionality would work remains unclear, but it again presents a reasonable justification for the legality of LARs. Finally, it is also important to recognize that humans are often notoriously fallible when it comes to assessing issues of proportionality, and that the history of warfare (both ancient and modern) is replete with instances where human judgment and emotion led to extremely disproportionate responses (for example, the My Lai massacre). In this respect, there may be very little difference between the likelihood of LAR error and human miscalculation: both robots and the people who make them misjudge.[19] Accordingly, as with the rule of distinction, LARs appear to be both permissible and impermissible under IHL, occupying a grey area that is arguably both legal (and in some respect superior) and unlawful at the same time.

A Collective Pause: The Advantages of Pre-emptive Regulation

While such questions regarding the legality of LARs abound, the issue then becomes whether the time is ripe to get rid of the uncertainty once and for all by putting the wheels of regulation in motion. Because LAR technology has yet to be realized fully, however, any effort to regulate and/or ban LARs would be pre-emptive, which is unchartered territory in the realm of international law. In this respect, international bodies would be faced with a number of unique obstacles, and therefore need to consider whether "pre-emptive regulation" is truly desirable or if a wait-and-see approach would prove more advantageous. Nevertheless, the prospect of LARs on the battlefield has garnered more attention over the past several years, a number of international bodies have made increasing calls to regulate sooner rather than later.

Most notable among these organizations that have studied LARs and subsequently called for active regulation of their development and use are Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the United Nations, which established a special inquiry into the issue. In 2012, Human Rights Watch, through the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, issued a report entitled "Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots" that strongly advocated for a prohibition against LARs. After a high level analysis of current LAR technology and the challenges LARs present to the international system, this report called for states to follow their obligations under international law and to subject "killer robots" immediately to review and regulation. Specifically, the HRW report pointed to Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention that states:

> In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of war, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.[20]

Arguing forcibly that this standard must apply to LARs, the HRW report (2012 contends that the review of robotic weapons "should take place at the earliest stage possible and continue through any development that proceeds."[21] The report then outlines and highlights the ways in which LARs are incompatible with the International Humanitarian Law principles of distinction, proportionality and military necessity, and concludes that "[b]efore it becomes even more challenging to change course, states and scientists should take urgent steps to review and regulate the development of technology related to robot autonomy."[22] Ultimately then, the Human Rights Watch report supports an immediate ban on LAR technology, for it deems such technology completely incompatible with International Humanitarian Law. After all, HRW reasons, how can International Humanitarian Law function with "Human" removed from the picture?

Special United Nations Rapporteur Christof Heyns takes a similar position in his report issued in April 2013, where he emphatically encourages an aggressive approach to the regulation of LARs. Unlike his supporters at HRW, however, Heyns recognizes that pre-emptive regulation is a novel concept, but nevertheless remains confident that the need to regulate LARs is immediate and needs to take precedent over other international arms treaties. According to Heyns, "the pressures of the future" need to be regulated now "while it is still possible," despite the fact that we may not yet fully comprehend or appreciate the role and implications of LARs on future warfare.[23] This is because later attempts at regulation, once the technology has been developed and is fully operational, will undoubtedly be more difficult to achieve; states will simply not be willing to give up their "killer" robots. Heyns notes:

> Although it is not ideal to attempt regulation while not knowing the full parameters and capabilities of the subject matter, once the technology of LARs is developed and operational, the availability of its systems and the power of vested interests may preclude efforts at appropriate control.[24]

Here, then, Heyns (as well as others) sees the opportunity to regulate what will unarguably become an increasingly problematic issue while it is still in its infancy, which he views as an advantageous position rather than a liability. In Heyns' view, such an opportunity to "pause" and reflect prior to the full scale deployment of a new military technology is both a moral imperative and an opportunity to be pro-active (as opposed to re-active) that is uncommon in the world of arms control. This opportunity "to engage with the risks (. . .) in a proactive way" is unparalleled according to Heyns, and the international community needs to act now to tame killer robots, before it's too late.[25]

Regulating in the Dark: The Pitfalls of Pre-emptive Regulation

As with any technology that revolutionizes the use of lethal force, little may be known about the potential risks of the technology before it is developed, which makes formulating an appropriate response difficult. Proponents of LAR research and development point to this uncertainty as adequate justification to delay regulation, noting that any effort to "kill" killer robots before they "come to life" is not required by International Humanitarian Law and, moreover, could result in unintended consequences. Further, proponents argue that pre-emptive regulation operates on the incorrect assumption that LARs can never be programmed to comply with International Humanitarian Law, even though a number of potentially viable safeguards have already been proposed to address this potential problem. In this respect, supporters of LAR technology do not dispute that military robots will have to comply with International Humanitarian Law,[26] but instead reason that attempts to restrict research are both untimely and dangerous.

LARs Within the Current Framework

As noted above, arguments in favor of pre-emptive regulation are founded on the belief that LAR technology and IHL as it currently stands are incompatible, and therefore the introduction of robots on the battlefield will lead to a disintegration of the current regime of international law that governs the laws of war. As Christof Heyns noted, LAR technology has the potential to "create serious international division and weaken the role and rule of international law—and in the process undermine the international security system."[27] While such grave predictions do have merit as a theoretical *possibility*, critics of pre-emptive regulation argue in response that LARs do not present the threat to international law (and the "international order") that naysayers like Heyns predict, but instead can operate within the current system without having to scrap and rewrite the laws of war as they currently stand. As Major Thurnher explains:

> Although the development of LARs represents a significant advancement in warfighting, it is not so drastic a change as to warrant throwing out the existing body of international laws. LAOC can evolve to encompass LARs and provide necessary and sound guidance to their use.[28]

Based on this reasoning, proponents of pre-emptive regulation argue that attempts to restrict or prohibit LARs are flawed in two respects: first, the parameters of LAR use remain unknown, therefore any law enacted at this time may be either overly broad or too narrow (this is a "legislating in the dark" argument); second, reacting now incorrectly interprets international law as being wholly incompatible with LAR use, when in fact IHL/LAOC "is a flexible and robust body of law"[29] capable of responding to the unique set of *potential* problems posed by "the robotics revolution."[30] In this respect, proponents offer what they believe to be an unbiased, more realistic assessment of LARs and their relation to international law, since this argument recognizes that, under *jus in bello* the answers to questions surrounding the morality of using autonomous technologies remain ambiguous.[31]

The Prospect of Viable Compliance Mechanisms

Additional arguments against pre-emptive regulation of LAR technology center on the possibility of creating an "artificial conscience" for robotic warriors, which would allow them to make "ethically superior" decisions when engaged in combat.[32] This logic envisions a world where scientists will be able to build and program machines that have an internal morality similar—though not in any way equal to—that of humans, and that these "moral machines" will be capable of making the crucial determinations necessary to stay in compliance with International Humanitarian Law. In other words, regulation will not be necessary because LARs will be just like humans and therefore pose no threat to international law.

Chief among the proposed compliance mechanisms for LARs is what roboticist Ronald Arkin has described as an "ethical governor" that could be programmed into all machines. Essentially, this restraint would dictate that two steps must be followed before an LAR could take any action.[33] First, the robot would have to process what it senses and filter this information through the various constraints imposed by International Humanitarian Law and the rules of engagement. If the machine determines that an attack violates a constraint at any point during this "testing" process (for instance, if there is some question regarding whether a non-combatant is within range of the target and could become collateral damage), the proposed maneuver cannot go forward. If no such constrain applies, however, the LAR will still need to consider whether the attack is actually required under operational orders (a yes / no answer), and if, under the circumstances the proportionality test will be met.[34] According to Arkin, LARs operating with an ethical governor will make superior decisions compared to humans when evaluating whether a given action complies with international law.

Similar to but more comprehensive than an ethical governor is the concept of Strong AI, which envisions robots operating with artificial intelligence (AI) that has a "similar or greater capacity to think like a human."[35] LARs equipped with Strong AI will have a cognitive capacity equal or greater than human, but will not be bound to instincts of self-preservation or fear, thereby making them superior in every respect. According to HRW 's report, strong AI robots will, in essence, possess a "general capacity for abstract human thought and problem solving,"[36] but will lack all the imperfections that make humans human. As one champion of AI has explained: "AI driven robots on the battlefield may actually lead to less destruction, becoming a civilizing force in wars as well as an aid to civilization in its fight against terrorism."[37]

Critics respond that Arkin's view is both overly simplistic and far too ambitious. Specifically, Wendell Wallach, a scholar at Yale's Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics and a proponent of pre-emptive regulation argues that, by suggesting that "moral robotic weaponry is inevitable and right around the corner," Arkin allows the idea of an ethical governor to serve as a catch all solution, when in reality the technology is nowhere near as developed as he suggests.[38] Similarly, some experts in robotics and AI have called the prospect of Strong AI the "Holy Grail" of AI research, highly desirable but never attainable.[39] Taken together with a general unease over the idea of moral robots making a decision to kill humans, these well-acknowledged limitations in technology continue to put proponents of LARs on the offensive when discussing compliance mechanisms. In the end, the idea of an "ethical machine" is simultaneously compelling and unsettling, which is why pre-emptive regulation appears to cut both ways.

Conclusion

While the future of warfare and weaponry remains subject to contingencies and events that cannot be predicted, little doubt exists that the weapons of the future will be increasingly sophisticated and that the traditional role and appearance of a warrior will change. LARs represent one of the most significant developments in military affairs since the development of the nuclear bomb,[40] and it's therefore not surprising that they have become the subject of debate even before they have made their debut. Blurring the distinction between weapons and warriors, LARs have the potential to make autonomous decisions about their own use and therefore present significant challenges to the current system of International Humanitarian Law.[41]

Analysis shows, however, that LARs neither operate wholly outside of international law (and therefore are de facto illegal), nor entirely within its bounds (and thereby as legal as any other weapon). Instead, LARs occupy a grey zone, which for some is problematic and unacceptable, while for others is an area of acceptable uncertainty that is to be expected whenever new technology is introduced to the battlefield. Indeed, as one expert on LARs has noted, "this is because the technology, like all military force, could be just or unjust, depending on the situation."[42] Accordingly, the use of LARs will remain a contentious issue, with questions of both legality and morality in the forefront of the dispute. The technology, however, will undoubtedly continue to advance and be perfected, impervious to the battles that it has engendered and the revolution in warfare that it portends.

Notes

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20.   Human Rights Watch, 21.
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22.   Ibid., 46.
23.   Heyns, 6.
24.   Ibid., 7.
25.   Ibid.
26.   Human Rights Watch, 27.
27.   Heyns, 6.
28.   Thurnher, 82.
29.   Ibid.
30.   Heyns, 5.
31.   Asaro, 15.
32.   Troop.
33.   Human Rights Watch, 27.
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40.   P.W. Singer, *Wired for war: The robotics revolution and conflict in the 21st century.* New York: Penguin (2009), 179.
41.   Heyns, 6.
42.   Asaro, 15.

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The Failure of Turkish Policy in the Syrian Civil War

Joseph Sax, *Tufts University*

Abstract

This paper examines Turkey's involvement in the Syrian Civil War, in the context of Turkey's role as a major player in the Middle East during the late 2000s. I begin by showing how the thaw in Turkish-Syrian relations of the 1990s gave way to the total severing of ties between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. I then track Turkish responses to the beginning of the uprising in Syria, with particular focus on the series of cross-border clashes that took place between Turkey and Syria in the early stages of the conflict. Internal responses to the car bombings that took place in the city of Reyhanli in May of 2013 are used to illustrate the public relations backlash on the part of the Turkish electorate against Turkish policy in Syria. The paper seeks to demonstrate how Turkey's attempts to engineer an outcome to the Syrian Civil War resulted in significant blowback that ultimately damaged the credibility of the Turkish government.

"Aware that development and progress in real terms can only be achieved in a lasting peace and stability [*sic*] environment, Turkey places this [the objective of Zero Problems with Neighbors] at the center of her foreign policy vision."[1] Such is the standard Turkey holds itself to in the conduct of its foreign policy: a vision for interacting with its neighbors with a "responsible and humanistic vision." Indeed, in the past decades Turkey has become a preponderant regional power. Turkey projects its soft-power capabilities, via both rhetorical and economic influence, into the wider Middle East.[2] However, since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, Zero Problems with Neighbors was, in the words of an American diplomatic official, "totally derailed."[3]

As the Syrian Arab Spring transformed into the ghastly Syrian Civil War, Turkey has found itself in an extremely difficult position, brought on by the inflexibility of Erdogan's foreign policy and the inability of the Syrian opposition to coalesce into an effective alternative to the regime. The Syrian Civil War has shattered over a decade of uninterrupted growth in power and influence for Turkey. Where once Turkey found itself bridging international disputes and using economic policy to pry open formerly hostile areas, it now finds itself taking sides in a bloody crisis.

Turkey's problematic policy toward Syria stands out as one of the Erdogan government's major challenges, if not outright failures. While the government typically showed a fairly high approval rating for its foreign policy decisions,

especially when tensions were high with Israel, its specific decisions with regards to Syria are viewed with disapproval by 70% of Turks.[4]

This paper will attempt to examine how Turkey went from a meteorically rising power in the Middle East, repairing its battered relationship with Syria and widening economic ties with its neighbors, to a partisan and supposedly sectarian player in the bloodiest chapter of the Arab Spring. I will draw on both contemporary media coverage of the Syrian Civil War and Turkish politics, as well as a number of interviews conducted in the summer of 2013. Among the informants I spoke to in Istanbul and Ankara were journalists, college professors, a former military officer, and a number of American diplomatic staff. From the kidnappings in Deraa to the bombings in Reyhanli, I will track Turkey's role in the Syrian conflict from the strategic perspective within Syria to the domestic Turkish political scene. Among the questions to be answered are the following: did Turkey act rashly in declaring President Assad morally bankrupt and throwing itself behind the opposition? When did the Syrian Civil War become a Turkish domestic issue? How do Turks feel about Turkish policy toward Syria? Finally, what are the consequences of Turkish support for Syrian rebel groups, and is Turkey succumbing to sectarianism?

Erdogan may have thought he would have Western backing for his belligerent stance on Syria, but he forfeited an advantageous position as middleman by cutting all his links with Assad. As for sectarian motivations for his actions, Erdogan has pushed support of opposition elements of many stripes and colors since long before more explicitly Islamist groups gained prominence, but currently sectarian affiliation is the only way to align oneself with the main players on the ground.

Before the eruption of the Syrian crisis, before even the immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi, Turkey was carving out a sphere of influence to project power within the Middle East. Some have labeled this new outward focus "Neo-Ottomanism," which Etyen Mahçupan sums up in *Today's Zaman* as seeking to be a prominent actor in global affairs5. The particular flavor of Neo-Ottomansim added by the AK Party also includes an Islamic identity.[6] The result has been that Turkey is certainly the predominant economic power in the region, though the degree to which it is accepted by its Arab neighbors as a role model is uncertain.

Will Turkey's foreign policy logic will be guided by predominantly religious impulses? "Absolutely not," says James Jeffrey, quoted by Malik Mufti from a leaked WikiLeaks cable. "At the end of the day we will have to live with a Turkey whose population is propelling much of what we see. This calls for . . . a recognition that Turkey will often go its own way."[7] What Jeffrey calls "Turkey going its own way" is interpreted by Malik Mufti as Turkey projecting both hard and soft power regionally as the US does globally.[8] Mufti quotes an International Crisis Group report that asserts that Turkey has shifted its foreign policy concerns from a focus on "hard security" issues to an emphasis on soft power and economic matters.[9]

The examples of Turkish economic hegemony are manifold. Turkish Airlines flies to more destinations than any other airline in the world. Turkish

firms export to Syria, Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan while Turkish construction companies collect contracts all over the Middle East.[10] According to a political science professor interviewed in Istanbul, Turkish exports have skyrocketed in the past 30 years, from $2 billion in 1980 to $150 billion at present.[11] This economic contact has translated into cultural and social penetration, with Turkish soap operas dominating the television shows of Syria's traditional geopolitical partner Iran. In fact, Turkey seemed to be winning a battle for influence over the Syrian street through public diplomacy and soft power, even if Iran continues to enjoy the absolute geopolitical loyalty of the Syrian government.[12]

Concurrently with its expanding economic influence, Turkey has trumpeted its status as a role model in the region, but its perception of itself is inflated. Interviews in Turkey reveal Arab ambivalence toward Turkey as a regional role model. A professor at Istanbul Kultur University was of the opinion that narratives of Turkey as a regional role model were intended primarily for domestic rather than international consumption. He added that this narrative was particularly resented by the Arab intelligentsia.[13] A U.S. Diplomatic official commented that the Arab world was "sick" of hearing about Turkey as a role model.[14]

In addition to seeking the status of role model for the Middle East, in the past decade Turkey has sought to elevate its importance in the global community. Our brief case example for this will be Davotoglu's clever if ill-fated attempt to reach a compromise on the Iranian nuclear swap deal. In 2010, at the height of tense negotiations regarding Iran's nuclear program, Foreign Minister Davotoglu teamed up with the Brazilian prime minister to ship Iranian low-enriched Uranium abroad for enrichment. This would allow Iran to mine its domestic uranium supply and fuel its civilian nuclear infrastructure without having the kind of uranium enrichment capabilities to produce weapons-grade material. Iran, for its part, viewed the deal favorably.[15] However, the deal was squashed by the U.S. and new rounds of sanctions were applied, much to the chagrin of the Turkish foreign policy establishment, who felt, in the words of an American diplomatic official, "blindsided."[16]

Although Turkey and Syria have had historically tense relations, the decade of AKP rule that preceded the Syrian civil war showed a marked improvement in relations between the two countries. Previously, Syria had earned the ire of Turkey by hosting Kurdish separatist leader Abdullah Ocalan and providing him with safe refuge against Turkish security forces. In 1994, however, the Turkish military began applying heavy pressure on the Syrian regime to evict Ocalan. Hafez al-Assad, the Syrian president at the time, bowed to Turkish threats and surrendered the fugitive Ocalan to Turkish law enforcement.[17]

Ocalan's capture by Turkey with the help of Syria set in motion a process of healing for the two countries' relations. After the death of Hafez al-Assad, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan personally reached out to Syria's new president, Bashar al-Assad, with overtures of friendship and international partnership. According to an article published in the Turkish newspaper *Today's Zaman*, Erdogan and Assad "have met frequently and are known to have a friendly relationship. Trade ties have also grown between the two

countries."[18] There was a thaw in relations during the 1990s and the 2000s, in which Turkish and Syrian leaders genuinely worked together and resolved the territorial dispute over the status of the province of Hatay. These factors lead to about $1 billion dollars in Turkish investment in Syria between 2000 and the beginning of the rebellion in 2011, as well as "many other investments in the political and social spheres."[19] Syria became integral to what a U.S. diplomatic official called Turkish "economic mercantilism," or creating an economic situation in the Middle East conducive to Turkish influence and soft power projection.[20] Turkey even tried to work out a peace deal between Syria and Israel, but the effort was canceled following the outbreak of hostilities in Gaza in 2008.[21]

Bashar al-Assad, president of the Syrian Arab Republic, gave a poignant interview to the Wall Street Journal in January 2011, which is quoted by Fouad Ajami in his book The Syrian Rebellion: "Syria is stable. Why? Because you have to be strongly linked to the beliefs of the people. This is the core issue."[22] When Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000, many in Syria and abroad hoped he would live up to these words. The international press in 2000 was confident that the new president would lead Syria to achieve great things and rise above the violence of years of dictatorship under Hafez al-Assad.[23] Much was made of Assad's western, apolitical upbringing. After the death of his older brother Basil, Bashar was even called "The Hope" within Syria.[24] However, Bashar was quickly fast-tracked through the ranks of the Syrian security apparatus and ultimately given authority over Syrian operations in Lebanon in 1998, a field in which he would later distinguish himself for his ruthlessness. The entire Baathist regime bent over backwards and made a mockery of the "democratic" institution of the Syrian presidency to prepare for Bashar's succession, going so far as to amend the Syrian constitution's dictum that the president be at least 40 years of age. The minimum was changed to 34 years—Bashar al-Assad's exact age.[25]

Bashar al-Assad's first significant act to squash his image as "The Hope" was the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. According to Ajami, Hariri's killing was undeniable proof to the Syrian people that "the regime had not changed, Bashar was his father's son."[26] On the international scene, Bashar played a geopolitical game for control of Lebanon as brutally as Hafez, continuing to pick off prominent Lebanese who worked against Syria's control of the country in the mid-2000s, including journalists Samir Kassir and Gebran Tueni.[27]

Bashar also disappointed those hopeful for economic reforms. He undertook certain liberalizations to the Syrian economy, but these were mostly to the benefit of his own inner circle and a cabal of Sunni business leaders whose loyalty had long since been bought by the regime.[28] There were some audacious moves in the 2000s to invigorate Syria's truly tepid economic situation, but most were ineffectual. Syria's first private banks opened in 2004, with a total of 13 operating nationwide by 2010.[29] Attempts were made to make the bureaucratic recruitment process more meritocratic, and some Baathist subsidies were gradually rolled back.[30] David Lesch, who spent many years in

Syria and at one time knew Bashar al-Assad personally, notes the proliferation of civil society groups and organizations calling for reform during the early Bashar years, only for high-ranking members of the security services to go to Bashar and tell him off allowing such calls to gain momentum.[31] Ultimately, Lesch firmly discounts expectations of Bashar al-Assad's benevolence as misplaced. He points out that Assad spent only 18 months in London, and has a mindset defined by the Cold War, Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Lebanese Civil War.[32] According to Ajami, Bashar should be viewed in the same light as his father Hafez, the man who killed over 15,000 Syrians in Hama.[33]

In March 2011, a group of kids from the town scrawled the now-famous chant "the people want the downfall of the regime" on a wall in the town of Deraa, near the border with Jordan.[34] They were picked up by security forces from the military base outside of town, tortured, and returned several days later to their terrified families.[35] Protests sprang up in the city, which were beaten back with water cannons.[36] Assad, who was by all accounts genuinely startled and surprised by the uprising,[37] authorized greater use of force by the regime. Ten days of lethal confrontations between the regime and the protesters left 200 civilians dead, many from sniper fire.[38] Ajami puts the body count by early May at 887, around half of which were in Deraa.[39]

During the early stages of the Syrian uprising, before it can truly be called a Syrian Civil War, the long détente between Turkey and Syria which had begun with the expulsion of Ocalan had not yet soured totally. Former Israeli ambassador to Turkey, Alon Liel, went so far as to claim: "Despite all the casualties, I don't see Erdogan abandoning Assad, or calling him to resign."[40] Even in May 2011, Erdogan and Assad had not totally severed ties. In February of 2011, Erdogan insisted that "there should be no problems between brothers," referring to himself and Bashar al-Assad.[41] The Zaman quoted Erdogan insisting that president Assad was "a good friend of mine . . . However, he was late in taking these steps [toward reform] . . ."[42] Turkey spent the next few months in intense talks with the Syrian regime in an attempt to convince Assad to accept the reform and end the violence.

However, the Turkish-Syrian relationship rapidly disintegrated amidst continuing violence and encroachment on Turkish territory. Turkey worked to convince Assad to stop the violence and accept reforms until late September, but to no avail. Erdogan's patience began to visibly fray in June of 2011, when he called Maher al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad's younger brother "brutish and inhuman."[43] The next month, sources reported that Turkey had sent a letter to Bashar al-Assad demanding he fire his strongman brother. The regime, of course, did no such thing.[44] As it became increasingly clear that no political settlement would be reached, Turkey moved toward a policy that encouraged regime change.

The intensification of the crisis, especially in northern Syria, and the deteriorating relations between Syria and Turkey throughout 2011 led to the evolution of Turkey's role in the crisis, from that of back-door channel to Assad to sponsor of the opposition and host for thousands of refugees. The first

refugees crossed the border into Turkey in April, settling in Hatay province.[45] This prompted Foreign Minister Davotoglu to call an emergency cabinet meeting, which, upon its conclusion, announced Turkey's willingness to give refugees shelter if "they are not happy at their homes."[46]

While refugees poured into Turkey fleeing mass killings of civilians in northern Syrian cities, Turkey gradually shifted its government policies to match its growing distaste for the Syrian regime. Over the summer of 2011, it became clear that not all of the Syrians on the Turkish side of the border were refugees fleeing the violence. Concurrently with the emergence of numerous Turkish NGOs giving themselves names such as "Change for Syria," the Turkish government began to allow armed rebels to take refuge within its borders. The most well-known of such groups was the band of Syrian army defectors under the leadership of Riyad al-As'ad, a former Air Force colonel, which declared itself the new Free Syrian Army.[47] Even before the organization of the unified military opposition to Assad, Turkey had already hosted the meeting that would prove to be the embryo of the internationally recognized political alternative to the Baath Party in Syria: the Syrian National Council. This meeting, held in Antalya and running from late May to early June 2011, kicked off proceedings by rejecting a rather ersatz-seeming amnesty deal and call for national dialogue by Assad himself, announcing themselves the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people and declaring the beginning of a process to bring about a "new, democratic Syria."[48]

The beginning of August saw a barrage of negative PR by Turkish president Abdullah Gul thrashing the Syrian regime and revealing the degree to which Turkey was losing patience with it's "little brother."[49] Erdogan declared on August 7th that the Syrian Crisis had become a "domestic issue" for Turkey because of the shared border between the two countries, informing the world that Turkey would not sit idly by and ignore the chaos in Syria if it threatened its critical national interests.[50] Six hours of meetings on August 9th between Foreign Minister Davotoglu and Syrian officials—which included a two-hour conversation with President Assad—went nowhere, and a week later Davotoglu issued a public statement demanding an unconditional end to the government crackdown or "there would be nothing more to discuss."[51] Another statement issued a few days later read: "We do not want foreign intervention in Syria but we do not accept and will not accept any operations against civilians." This was Turkey's "final word" on the situation,[52] and in a final round of statements accusing Assad of lying, butchering civilians, and failing to follow through on political promises, Erdogan revealed his government had broken all ties with Assad.[53]

The diplomatic rift between the Turkish and Syrian governments has been exacerbated by a number of cross-border incidents involving the militaries of both countries. The first such incident was the downing of a Turkish reconnaissance jet that allegedly penetrated Syrian airspace on 23 June 2012.[54] While early indications suggested a possible escalation of tensions,[55] Assad adamantly avoided bellicose rhetoric and expressed regret that the Turkish plane had been

brought down.[56] In October of the same year, Syrian artillery shells crossed the border and caused deaths in Turkey on a number of occasions. When a Syrian mortar killed five people in Akçakale, the Turkish parliament passed a bill authorizing retaliatory military action against Syrian targets. Turkish artillery killed three Syrian soldiers in retaliation.[57] The Turkish government, like President Assad earlier in 2012, made it clear that direct war with Syria was not their intention. Deputy Prime Minister Besir Atalay, quoted in *Today's Zaman*, remarked: "The bill is not for war, it has deterrent qualities."[58] AKP spokesperson Huseyin Celik added, "This is not a resolution that licenses war. If you want security and peace, you must be ready for a fight at all times."[59] While this rhetoric made it quite clear that Turkey did not want open war with Syria, it also sent the message that Turkey was willing to take military action against the Syrian government should provocations continue. However, despite this bellicose rhetoric, there would be no meaningful Turkish military action inside Syria, even though spillover of the Syrian conflict continued.

This spillover effect was evident on 11 May 2013, when two car bombs were set off in the market of the Turkish city of Rehanli, killing 53 people.[60] Turkish authorities immediately connected the attacks to Syrian intelligence, returning to bellicose rhetoric with Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinç promising to "do what is necessary" should the Assad regime be behind the attacks.[61] The day after the bombings, police arrested nine Turkish nationals and charged them with carrying out the bombings at the behest of the Syrian mukhabarat (secret police).[62] At time of writing, the Turkish newspaper *Hurriet Daily News* reports that the trials are ongoing, with a total of 33 suspects behind bars. Of those 33, 19 will be tried, with prosecutors pushing for aggravating life sentences for 14 of them. Two of the suspects are Syrian nationals. Fourteen of the suspects are being charged with "membership of a terrorist organization," (exactly which organization is not specified).[63] According to Turkish news site worldbulletin.net, the Adana prosecutor's indictment accuses the suspects of having collaborated with Syrian intelligence,[64] though such accusations have not been carried widely in recent Turkish media coverage of the trials. This is in sharp contrast to the immediate aftermath of the bombings when Turkish officials were leaping to blame Syria. Some sources indicate that the culprits behind the bombings were not, in fact, the Syrian government, but radical groups within the opposition. In particular, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),65 an offshoot of the al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), claimed responsibility for the bombings as part of a larger battery of threats hurled at the Turkish government for closing certain key border crossings between Turkey and Syria.[66] One Turkish academic suggested the possibility that groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra sought to bring Turkey into direct conflict with the regime, though quickly added that the hypothesis of Syrian regime involvement was just as likely.[67]

Whether or not anyone was trying to bring Turkey into direct involvement in the Syrian Civil War, the Reyhanli bombings served to decisively prove at least one thing: the Turkish government, despite its heated tone, is totally

unwilling to become internally entangled in Syria. As put by a Turkish university professor, the Erdogan government is suffering from a gap between rhetoric and capability.[68] For example, as late as August 30 2013, Erdogan was pushing for decisive intervention in Syria to stop the violence. "It must be like the one in Kosovo. It must not be an in-and-out intervention over one or two days, but aim at making the regime give up," said the Prime Minister, despite American insistence that any military action be of a limited nature to punish chemical weapons use rather than instigate regime change.[69] However, only three days later on September 2nd, Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc made a far more modest claim: ". . . If there were to be an invitation to Turkey to take a role, then we would have looked at the authority we have in hand, and could work around something within the limits of that authority. But . . . the United States will unilaterally decide to conduct such an operation."[70]

Contacts in Turkey articulated a number of causes for Turkey's lack of capacity for a unilateral intervention. First, the military is apparently hesitant to become involved in cross-border operations. A Turkish university professor, and a retired military officer speaking with the author both related the military's hesitation to take sides.[71] In addition, contacts in Turkey expressed a range of opinions on the degree to which recent trials and detentions of military officers had adversely affected the capabilities of the Turkish military. Far from the age in which the Turkish military took a lead on foreign policy, Turkey's Syrian policy was described by more than one contact as a failure of civilian strategic thinking with the military remaining largely passive.[72]

As important as what the Reyhanli bombings reveal about the Turkish foreign policy establishment's stance toward Syria, is what it has revealed, or caused, with regards to public perceptions on Turkey's role in Syria. Jihad al-Zein, writing in Lebanon's *An-Nahar* and quoted by *Al-Monitor*, suggests that Reyhanli was what truly triggered public debate in Turkey over the Syrian Civil War.[73] The two Kemalist opposition parties, the CHP and much more hard-line MHP, have leapt upon the blasts as an opportunity to criticize the Erdogan government for its Syria policy. The MHP party leader Devlet Bahceli issued the following statement shortly after the bombings: "The privileges granted to the Syrian opposition, and assistance provided and support given to them have prepared the ground for the conflagration on our neighbors' soil to spread to our borders. Prime Minister Erdogan's war narrative against Syria . . . and his threats against the Damascus administration have drawn our country into a dirty and bloody maelstrom."[74]

It is clear that Erdogan has long considered the Syrian Civil War as an issue of domestic security for Turkey, but only recently, since Reyhanli has it become a domestic political issue as well. Public demonstrations against Erdogan's policies in Syria first flared up immediately after the bombings; however, they were limited to border communities witnessing the effects of the neighboring conflict firsthand. The city of Antakya, the cultural and economic center of Hatay and home to many Arabic-speaking Turks, has become the focal point for demonstrations between Turkish Alawites and Alevis supporting

the regime, and Syrian refugees who fled its violence.[75] With the explosion of protests at Taksim square, Turks critical of Erdogan turned in part to Syria to illustrate their grievances with AKP rule. Syria news aggregator *Syria Deeply* polled a small number of protesters at Gezi Park for their thoughts on Erdogan's Syria policy, and their responses were universally negative, though for varying and sometimes contradictory reasons.[76] One respondent described a "huge rage" in response to the bombings in Reyhanli. Demographically, Erdogan's most vocal opponents are Alevis, relatives of Syria's Alawites, who view the opposition as hijacked by extremists and the survival of the Assad regime as the lesser of two evils.[77]

Arming the rebels is a point of particular contention for critics of Erdogan. Turks, especially Turks of a secular bent, want nothing to do with extremist groups and do not look kindly on a future Syria administered by said groups, yet Erdogan has tried to draw international attention away from the extremism of various Syrian armed groups, saying it was "more important to focus on the 'chaos' that al-Assad has created."[78] However, according to Semih Idiz, a foreign-policy commentator for *Al-Monitor* harshly critical of Erdogan's Syria policy, by turning a blind eye (at best) or supporting (at worst) extremist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra or ISIL and allowing them to seize the attention of the world, Turkey inadvertently guarantees that Western powers will refuse to fund and arm any Syrian opposition groups for fear that the weapons could end up in the wrong hands.[79] Many Turks see the government's sheltering of the rebel groups as highly irresponsible. Elizabeth O'Bagy, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, quoted in Syria Deeply: "Domestic instability in Turkey is partly because of [Turkey's] intervention inside of Syria. A lot of people in Turkey are angry that the Turkish government is allowing Syrians to use the Turkish border to take in weapons and supplies,"[80] remarking further that Turks are angrier at the Turkish government than at the Syrian rebels themselves.

Erdogan's support for the Syrian rebels is predicated on the logic that the groups with the best track record on the battlefield are the groups most deserving of funding and support. However, the clearly religious bent of Turkey's favored groups and inelegant use of the word "Sunni"[81] have put Turkey, with or without Erdogan's permission, in the "Sunni" camp in an increasingly sectarianized conflict. However, not only is the broader Middle East becoming sectarianized around the conflict, Turkey's internal politics are being split and polarized by the Syrian Civil War. According to Cengiz Çandar, Turkey's 15 million Alevis, while distinguishing themselves from Syrian Alawites, are united in "a spirit of solidarity against Sunnis as a common denominator."[82] Furthermore, this group, making up a fifth of Turkey's population, is a core part of the constituency of the Republican People's Party (CHP), Turkey's main opposition party. The wild accusations of responsibility for the Reyhanli bombings that the CHP and AKP sling at each other are, according to Çandar, yet another omen of how Sunni-Shia conflict can be exported from Syria to Turkey."[83]

While it is very difficult to call Turkey's policy toward Syria a success, Erdogan and Davotoglu were certainly not unique in predicting an inevitable end to the Assad regime when the violence began. Erdogan almost certainly expected more Western backing than he ultimately got. Regardless, Turkey's policy approaches toward Syria have achieved little aside from blowing "Zero-problems" out of the water, exposing its population to the dangers of the conflict next door, fracturing its already polarized political scene, and forfeiting its status as a non-sectarian player in the region. Turkey's long process of rapprochement with Syria would have given them an enviable position had they remained a bystander to the conflict, but Erdogan squandered his personal channel to Assad when he broke ties completely in an attempt to ride the waves of the Arab Spring to even greater Turkish popularity on the Arab Street. Now, three years on and over a hundred thousand dead, Turkey is starting to truly feel the pressure from the Syrian Civil War in its domestic politics.

Notes

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The African Battleground:

An Analysis of China's Positioning as an Alternative to US Aid, Trade, and Investment

David Riche, *Tufts University*

Abstract

This paper will first provide data on China's global economic growth and China's increased involvement in Africa through trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). In the second section, it will discuss the extent of US involvement in Africa in order to establish a baseline for comparison with the Chinese alternative. It will explore past US initiatives while focusing on current policy shifts and objectives. In the third section, it will discuss the independent variables, or theoretical Sino-African dynamics that reflect China's actions in Africa in the context of China as a rising global power. How has China politically distinguished itself from the US? And finally, the paper will explore the case example of Nigeria to show empirically the extent of variance between US and Chinese relations with African nations.

Introduction

Since the 1960s and 1970s we have seen an evolution in Sino-African relations. Initially focused on forming ideological bonds with other developing nations to "advance Chinese-style communism and [. . . to] repel Western 'imperialism,'" since the Cold War, China has now focused more on trade, aid, and investment in developing Africa.[1]

Over the past two decades, China has worked to strengthen economic ties to the African region as well as bolster its political legitimacy. Presenting itself as a developing country, China's relationship with African nations is framed as "south-south" as opposed to the US-African relationship deemed "north-south." Among other things, this framing of a south-south relationship has allowed China to focus on its own economic initiatives such as the extraction of natural resources/energy and the development of African import markets. Meanwhile, as an example of a developed democracy, the US has focused its economic involvement in the region on promoting democracy, free markets, and rule of law and reaching the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals by decreasing deaths by malaria and HIV and lowering child mortality rates.

The disparities in political ideologies between the US and China are exacerbated in the context of China's economic rise. As China's influence in

Africa continues to grow, we see a decline in the US's original vision for the region: one in which African nations find prosperity through the pursuit of democracy, rule of law, free markets, and respect for human rights. Provided an alternative to American aid, trade, and investment, African autocrats are empowered by China's "praising" of their economic models that are "suited to individual national conditions."[2] Furthermore, China's economic model of development, one in which a single party has full authority over the state and economic growth, serves as an example for the developing African countries to which it likens itself. This message directly contradicts that of the US.

Thus, within the context of China as a rising economic power with increased involvement in Africa, we are led to central the question: Is China presenting an alternative system to the US in Africa? Furthermore, if China is presenting an alternative to the US, how can we characterize this alternative in terms of similarities or differences to the American option? And lastly, assuming China and the US to be comparable potential for economic influence in Africa, what independent variables are creating disparity between Chinese and American visions and actions in the region?

In order to answer these questions, this paper will first provide data on China's global economic growth and China's increased involvement in Africa through trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This section will provide preliminary information on "China's rise in Africa" in order to justify the subsequent research. In the second section, we will discuss the extent of US involvement in Africa in order to establish a baseline for comparison with the Chinese alternative. We will explore past US initiatives while focusing on current policy shifts and objectives. In the third section, we will discuss the independent variables, or theoretical Sino-African dynamics that reflect China's actions in Africa in the context of China as a rising global power. How has China politically distinguished itself from the US? And finally, we will explore the case example of Nigeria to show empirically the extent of variance between US and Chinese relations with African nations.

Section I: Data on China's Growth and Sino-Africa Economic Relations

Over the last two decades, China's GDP has consistently grown around a rate of 9% per year (See Graph 1). This rapid economic expansion has subsequently led to increased resource and energy demands in order to support Chinese energy intensive manufacturing sector. Combined with declining domestic petroleum production and insufficient coal output, China has thus begun to pursue overseas sources of hydrocarbon fuels. Once the largest exporter of oil in Asia, since 1993, China has become a net importer of oil.[3]

China's demand for energy imports is high and is projected to increase. As of 2004, China became the world's second largest oil consumer. Furthermore, for the foreseeable future, China's oil consumption is expected to increase 10% per year, while oil and gas imports are expected to increase from their current

value of 33% of China's total demand to 60% by 2020.[4] Also by 2020, the International Energy Agency projects that China will surpass the US as the world's largest importer of oil. Since regional oil and gas extraction is not expanding fast enough to meet China's needs, and since the Middle East's supply is primarily allotted to European and American markets, China has turned to African nations like Angola, Sudan, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria to meet its growing energy demands.

According to the US Energy Information Administration, in 2010, out of China's daily 4.8m barrels of crude oil imports, 2.2m (47%) came from the Middle East and 1.5m (30%) from Africa.[5] With roughly a third of Chinese oil imports coming from African nations, maintaining Sino-African relations will remain a high priority on the Chinese international political agenda. In fact, to increase oil extraction and secure future stability in Sino-African oil relations, Chinese government firms have invested billions of dollars on construction and infrastructure development projects in Algeria, Angola, Gabon, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. In the process of securing oil, gas, mineral, and other natural resources, these projects have boosted Chinese GNP since they rely heavily on Chinese engineering and construction resources.[6]

Evidently China's natural resource stake in Africa plays a large part in its economic involvement in the region. Looking at Graph 2, we see that roughly 80% of African exports to China are mineral products like oil, iron ore, metals, and other commodities. Meanwhile African imports from China consist mainly of machinery, transportation equipment, communications equipment, and electronics.[7] As indicated in Graph 2, while machinery makes up 29% of imports; transportation, textile, and chemical imports are also significant. Furthermore, China's top five trading partners are Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Nigeria, and Egypt, three out of five partnerships of which are centered on mineral imports to China (See Table 1).[8] Thus, while African exports to China consist mostly of mineral products, African imports from China are quite diversified with an overall emphasis on sophisticated manufactured products.

In 2009, China surpassed the US as Africa's largest trade partner with total trade between Africa and China exceeding $166b.[9] In order to maintain, develop, and incentivize these strong economic ties, China has developed a "two-pronged approach."[10] On the one hand, China offers African states resource-backed development loans modeled after its 1970s arrangement with Japan. Like in the 70s, these loans leverage African nations' natural resources in order to receive new infrastructure and technology from China. Since 2004, China has conducted this type of deal with "at least 7 resource-rich countries in Africa, for a total of nearly $14b."[11] A prime example is the oil-backed loans provided to Angola where Chinese companies built roads, railways, hospitals, and water systems to help reconstruct the country. Other such loans were offered to Nigeria to develop electricity-generating technology and to the Republic of Congo and Ghana for a hydropower projects.[12]

On the other hand, China is developing Special trade and Economic cooperation Zones (SEZs) in Africa modeled after China's own SEZs. While China

now has over 100 SEZs, seven are currently in progress in Africa including "two in Nigeria: the others in Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Zambia, and, possibly, Algeria."[13] As in China during the nascent stages of its own economic development, these zones target growth in manufactured exports. In Africa, they are being employed in "least developed countries" that have high mineral exports and poor infrastructure and institutions. The strengthening of manufacturing in mineral-export countries helps diversify the domestic economy as well as combat currency deflation that is often a symptom of natural resource exports. These economic balancing effects of SEZs are crucial in the economic development of natural-resource suppliers. A developed manufacturing sector perpetuates further employment opportunities, infrastructure development, and new technologies—creating the opportunities for these countries to profit from mineral exports while simultaneously developing beyond their current circumstances.

Perhaps in part a result of China's recent African focus, African economies have done quite well in the last decade. On average, GDP in sub-Saharan Africa has grown 4.7% per year between 2000 and 2011.[14] Despite China's two-pronged initiative, its economic model of resource-backed loans and special economic zones has done little to translate into progress in fighting poverty. According to the World Bank's Poverty and Equity Data, Nigeria, a recipient of Chinese loans and the location of China's SEZs still faces intense poverty levels, with 68% of its population earning less than $1.25 a day. Other countries with high levels of Chinese economic interaction including Angola and Sudan also face high levels of poverty at 43.4% and 19.8% respectively (See Table 2 with accompanying image). Although this relationship does not necessarily indicate causation, it does indicate that despite vast economic benefits created through Sino-African ties, on a whole, the great population is not adequately benefiting. While in the next section of this paper we will look into US involvement in Africa, the final section of this paper will return to this issue with an empirical analysis—comparing the differences between Chinese and American involvement in Nigeria and how the presence of each has affected Nigerian development.

Section II: US-Africa Relations and US Foreign Policy Shifts

Beginning in the 1980s when African nations were desperate for international aid, the World Bank and IMF, backed by the US, made its financial support contingent on the adoption of democratic reform.[15] By the 1990s, the democratization of policymaking began to play a major role in enacting economic policy that benefited the people rather than solely a wealthy minority. One such example was in 1990s Zambia when democratic policymaking led to changes in the pricing of maize, creating a reduction in national food shortages.[16]

Beyond benefits derived from the promotion of democratic politics, the US has contributed significantly to lowering child mortality rates, fighting HIV, reducing death by malaria, and promoting democratic independence.

Due in large part to the research and distribution of vaccines by USAID, child mortality rates have dropped by nearly a third over the last two decades, the number of those newly infected by HIV is decreasing, the number of deaths by malaria has decreased by 50% in the last decade. Additionally, USAID provided institutional support and civil capacity building to South Sudan, resulting in the independent Republic of South Sudan in 2011 after two decades of civil war.[17] Although the US plans to continue its fight against disease and for democracy, following President Obama's recent visit to Africa, US foreign policy toward Africa on a whole is facing a major shift.

Formerly characterized as a relationship based on American aid, the US is hoping to rebrand its relations with Africa toward something more akin to a partnership based on trade. As Obama stated earlier this year in Tanzania after visiting Senegal and South Africa, "Ultimately, the goal here is for Africa to build Africa for Africans [. . .] and [the US's] job is to be a partner in that process."[18] In the coming years, the US sees itself playing a more hands-off role in nations' internal affairs, while simultaneously strengthening its bonds with developing African nations through trade.

This new wave of US foreign policy toward Africa is slightly different than what was expressed in 2012. In the *US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa* published in 2012, the US shows an intent to partner with sub-Saharan African countries to pursue four pillars: "(1) strengthen democratic institutions; (2) spur economic growth, trade, and investment; (3) advance peace and security; and (4) promote opportunity and development."[19] While aid was formerly the US's go-to carrot for promoting democracy in developing African countries, as stated previously, the US is looking to shift its relations toward trade.

In addition to recent shifts toward trade with Africa, since 2000 with the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the US has been making strides toward increased trade with Africa. The AGOA has played a central role in boosting and diversifying US-Africa trade. The AGOA provides duty-free imports from Africa, allowing for a wider variety of imports beyond strictly natural resources.[20] Furthermore, in conjunction with USAID, the AGOA has created three African Regional Trade Hubs in Ghana, Botswana, and Kenya, promoting the development of inter-regional roads and trading of goods.

Looking back to Obama's recent trip, executing his African tour just three months after Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Africa, Obama was able to draw a strong juxtaposition between the US and China's economic involvement in the region. While both countries are intent on promoting their own economic activity through trade, the US is focused on not simply consuming raw materials, but also "support[ing] local economic capacity."[21]

In order to prove the US's commitment to regional development and trade, Obama announced two initiatives. The first was Power Africa, "a $7b program combining public and private funds and loan guarantees, aimed at ensuring cleaner, more efficient electricity generation capacity."[22] As lack of affordable and secure energy sources for internal use is one of the main infrastructural hurdles holding back much of developing Africa. This initiative is focused

on filling that gap while also promoting the development of clean energy for export. The second initiative is Trade Africa, an initiative focused on increasing trade frequency within Africa, between the US and Africa, and between Africa and global markets. Initially implemented in the East African Community (EAC) countries of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, Trade Africa is expected to "double intra-regional trade in the EAC, increase EAC exports to the US by 40%, and reduce by 15% the average time needed to import or export a container from the ports. . . ."[23] If implemented as anticipated, both of these initiatives would greatly benefit the region, increasing economic activity and inter-regional and inter-continental trade.

Now, despite efforts by the US to appear less overbearing, China still exists as a source of major competition for African resources, trade partnerships, and internal development contracts. In 2009, China became Africa's largest trading partner and in 2012 alone invested more than $40b in African countries, promising another $20b in aid by 2015. That same year, in 2012, Sino-Africa trade was $128b while US-Africa trade was $100b.[24] While the US's initiatives remain focused on development, Chinese initiatives remain centered on economic growth. Furthermore, China's south-south rhetoric and accompanying non-interference policies appeal to many least developed countries as ideal given their current states of development. In the next section, we will continue the discussion of how Chinese rhetoric and diplomatic relations with Africa have strengthened its Sino-Africa ties. Furthermore, we will look at various independent variables that may indicate variance in China's choice of which African countries with which it engages.

Section III: Comparing US-African and Sino-African Rhetoric, Perception, and Politics

Since 1995, Africa is the second fastest growing region of the world with an annual per capita income growth at 2.2% and a decrease in the poverty rate of 10% from 1995 to 2010. Furthermore, we have seen major progress in social indicators such as drops in childhood mortality and rises in primary school enrollment.[25] Over the past decade, there have been two major international players that have assisted these regional development and growth accomplishments: the US and China. In this section we will discuss China's motivations behind its relatively recent appearance in Africa. Moreover, we will explore how China distinguishes itself from the US both in rhetoric and action.

To summarize from the first section of this paper, China's main motivation in Africa is economic: to gain through natural resource acquisition and trade. While the vast majority of Chinese imports from Africa are natural resource and mineral imports, its exports to Africa consist primarily of sophisticated machinery and manufactured products. Furthermore, the Chinese companies contracted for supply contracts with energy-rich African countries are primarily Chinese state-controlled businesses that hire white-collar Chinese and blue-collar African employees. Unrestricted in its ability to use "diplomacy,

trade deals, debt forgiveness, and aid packages" to court African countries, Chinese companies have a leg up over their American competitors.[26] From the Chinese economic perspective, African nations exist as suppliers of raw materials and novel export markets for Chinese goods.

But China has more to gain in Africa than just economically; politically, China has much to gain too. As an emerging power on the global scene, China is forward-looking in creating allies with other developing regions. Moreover, as a means to isolate Taiwan from its global ties (five out of 24 of which are with African nations as of 2007), China has vigorously campaigned to become closer with these African nations.[27] Moreover, with over a quarter of the UN General Assembly's voting members from Africa, Chinese influence in this region can hold significant sway in the UN and its agencies like the World Trade Organization. In recent years, for example, African states have assisted China in blocking Taiwan from the World Health Organization as well as tabling a condemnation of Chinese human rights practices at the UN's Commission on Human Rights.[28]

In order to explain China's approach to wooing Africa, we must understand how China's background has shaped its foreign policy. The China's interests abroad stem from its historic background of feeling "cheated by the world system, especially by "imperialists of the nineteenth century."[29] China has therefore adopted a strong foreign policy of "preventing or limiting the development of 'hegemony,' whilst . . . trying to carve out space for itself as its economy continues to grow."[30] In line with China's foreign policy of preventing hegemonic domination, China has been particularly active in Africa where "the [West's] attempted prosecution of political and particularly economic designs on weak underdeveloped states has been more brazen."[31] In order to enhance China's image abroad, it has pursued the "development of common interests with [the] Third World to raise [its] global stature and increase [its] bargaining leverage with the United States."[32] To the backdrop of providing an alternative to American hegemony, the development of Sino-African relations is seen by China as a means to bolster its new position in the international system while simultaneously preparing for future growth under the restraints of a US-dominated world order.

China's means of pursuing this anti-imperialist foreign policy is by way of its economy. Through trade, aid, and investment, China is looking to expand its global influence, strengthen ties with developing countries and serve as an alternative to the US. In theory, since 2000, Chinese foreign policy has tried to appear as 'a friend to all.' This image of itself has been part of the broader strategy to rise as a global power without inciting alarm.

One of China's core principles in its 'friend to all' policy is to respect the sovereignty of its international partners through non-interference. As China works to assist the governments of other developing countries and expand its influence, "China [does] not make demands upon other nations' sovereignty, economic models, governance, or political culture."[33] In this respect, Chinese foreign policy has been shaped in contrast to the US's. Whereas the US has a

record of intervention through humanitarian and democratization pursuits, China frames its relationships as 'mutually beneficial,' free of interventions.

To greater distinguish its flavor of African involvement from that of the US, China has shaped its rhetoric to espouse ideals of mutual benefit. By the early 2000s, China had devised a comprehensive strategy for gaining the favor of countries that had previously looked up to the US. Chinese leaders began to employ a new rhetoric, enunciating "a doctrine of 'win-win' relations, highlighting that [. . .] African nations might benefit from their relationships with China even as China benefits from its relationships with them."[34] This rhetoric of "mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity" is iterated in Beijing's official policy paper of 2007, *China's Africa Policy.*[35] This concept of a 'win-win' Sino-African relationship is much different from Africa's donor-recipient relationship with the US. Contrary to the image of the rich helping the poor, the 'win-win' rhetoric implies a south-south exchange that, through cooperation and mutual respect, results in the betterment of both parties. As an alternative to American aid, trade, and investment, a Chinese *partnership* understood as a 'win-win' partnership appeals much more to a developing Africa. Although the US is making strides toward emulating China's 'win-win' policy through its newfound trade partnership, these policy changes are coming over a decade after China's. Furthermore, they are unnatural given the US's international reputation for intervention and the north-south power dynamic that is inherent in any US-African relation.

Furthermore, Africa's relationship with China comes with far less infringements on state sovereignty than when dealing with the US. While the US leverages its position of economic superiority to pursue its human rights agenda in the developing world, China maintains state rights to be paramount, respecting national sovereignty over all else. This harkens back to China's touted policy of non-interference. In most cases, human rights violations can be traced back to the negligence of the state. Therefore, where these 'injustices' exist, the US views it as the duty of the international community to rectify them since, as evidenced by their very existence, the home state is internally incapable. In contrast, having had a long history of international intervention in its own domestic affairs, China views state rights as paramount to human rights. China abides by a non-interference principle that "holds that human rights should not be a reason for one country to interfere in another's internal affairs."[36] While this principle helps justify China's treatment of its own citizens, it also rings well with African states that, subject to the will of the US vis-à-vis the UN and the "international community," are often the victims of external influence and intervention.

Now, one might be able to overlook these infringements on sovereignty if the intentions and results of these infringements objectively benefited the state and its citizens. But, from the non-Western perspective, these interventions cannot be justified nor claimed to be objectively just. Thus, China is extremely skeptical of the US's "promotion of human rights, regarding it as

a Trojan horse by which the West might undermine Beijing."[37] China fears that the US has expanded its influence in Africa in order to advance its views of liberal capitalism and project its own value systems on the developing world. Even further, China sees these projections as "the tools of neoimperialists advancing on both China and the developing world."[38] This perception of American encroachment on state sovereignty for the purposes of strengthening American dominance is quite startling to China. Through institutionalized partnerships with African states, China has been able to streamline its anti-neoimperialist rhetoric through legitimate communication channels.

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is one such example of China's institutionalized relationship with Africa. Through FOCAC, which provides a forum for "routine meetings between heads of state," China has found an ideal outlet to espouse its anti-"neoimperialist" rhetoric.[39] In 2000, at the end of a FOCAC meeting, China released the statement that

> countries that vary from one another in social system, stages of development, historical and cultural background, and values, have the right to choose their own approaches and models in promoting and protecting human rights in their own countries . . . [that] the politicization of human rights and the imposition of human rights conditionalities themselves constitute a violation of human rights.[40]

Recognizing that China could offer an alternative to the US, many African nations welcomed this rhetoric with open arms. In 2006, FOCAC approved a three-year action plan that included a "pledge that China would double aid to Africa by 2009 (to reach about $1 billion) and set up a $5 billion China-Africa development fund to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa . . ."[41] Furthermore, as part of this agreement, China would send 100 agricultural experts and 300 youth volunteers to Africa, build 30 hospitals, as well as take part in several other economic and development-related projects. Although a small result, the south-south solidarity that this forum promotes enables China to court African nations through pledges of infrastructure development among other concessions.

Now, despite this display of Sino-African relations in a positive light and mutually beneficial light, the US remains extremely critical of Chinese intentions in the region. ". . . Western analysts have criticized China's developing relations with Africa as based purely on securing oil supplies and other natural resources, which has led to claims that China supports authoritarian regimes at the expense of 'democracy' and 'human rights.'"[42] Furthermore, Chinese corporations, under government directive, have been charged with caring more about making quick economic profits than the developmental impact of their presence. In order to rectify this perception of Chinese involvement in Africa, China has continued to place tremendous emphasis on sustained relationships with African governments through FOCAC and other informal channels; and as evidenced by the continued strength of Sino-African relations, China's maneuvering has proved successful.

Overall, China's foreign policy has framed itself as an alternative to the US. Through the formation of 'win-win' rhetoric in the context of south-south relations, China has been able to successfully gain the trust of many African governments despite the US's historic stronghold in the region. Furthermore, through using formal channels of communication like FOCAC, China has solidified its partnership with the region in a legitimate and meaningful way.

Now, although China has been able to politically frame itself as an alternative to the US, has it been as successful in implementation?

Considering that the Chinese economy is rapidly developing and requires vast amounts of external inputs as well as a large market for the sale of goods, the developing countries in Africa seem to be the ideal partners to meet both of these needs. As a largely undeveloped region, much of sub-Saharan Africa is resource-rich. "Both the Chinese government and Chinese companies perceive Africa to be rich in natural resources, particularly in crude oil, nonferrous metals, and fisheries."[43] China's access to raw materials for production of manufactured goods is essential for both maintaining its economic growth and its current government's political legitimacy (especially since much of that legitimacy is tied to China's economic success). Therefore, a crucial aspect of Chinese involvement in Africa is its access to natural resources and underdeveloped markets.

Oil in particular is one such resource that China perceives as a vital incentive for maintaining good relations with Africa. Since China is the second largest consumer of oil in the world, and does not have substantial domestic oil reserves of its own, it is necessary that China build relationships with a range of foreign states with stakes in oil, gas, and other resources. From a macro-level perspective, these relationships are necessary in order to diversify China's supply of oil and to prevent it from falling victim to American influence. ". . . Beijing believes that it cannot trust the world markets for long-term supplies of oil, gas, minerals, and other commodities, since the United States [. . .] has longstanding relationships with key oil suppliers like Saudi Arabia."[44] Thus, Chinese relationships with Africa, and in particular, resource-exporting states are essential for economic success and national security.

In order to compensate for the US's current oil consumption dominance, China has built infrastructure in developing countries with natural resource surpluses. China has developed relationships with these countries, mainly through infrastructure development, with the end goal of controlling resource extraction for China's own economic benefit. For example, China "has at least $3b invested in Nigerian oil" and another "$3b invested in the Sudanese energy sector" for a total of $10b in Sudan alone since the 1990s.[45] Most energy analysts believe that China eventually wants "to control the entire process of resource extraction, from taking commodities out of the ground to shipping them back to China."[46] Additionally, much of China's "energy investment in Africa is [. . .] accompanied by aid for infrastructure."[47] In Angola, for example, China supplied a $2b credit line to support offshore drilling which eventually helped make Angola China's single largest oil supplier.[48]

Beyond the prospects for resource extraction, increased potential for trade in Africa has led China to foster relationships in an attempt to capitalize on a potentially new and unsaturated market for sale of goods. As China looks to continue its trajectory of extraordinary growth, its Sino-African relationship is becoming increasingly important. For the last 30 years, China's domestic economy has grown on average around 9% while its export economy has averaged a growth of over 17%. Although China's desire to establish export markets may seem insatiable, its relationships with African states certainly help support a portion of China's export requirements.

As supplemental aspects of resource extraction contracts and to expand export market potential, the Chinese central state has been extremely involved in infrastructure development projects in Africa. It has, at times, compelled "Chinese building companies to deliver projects in Africa at a loss as a means to advance wider national interests."[49] These building projects have opened up access to new rural markets for the sale of inexpensive manufactured goods from China. By "construct[ing] roads and bridges across Africa [. . .], where most major donors abandoned funding infrastructure decades ago," China's aid has filled gaps in domestic infrastructure that are crucial for the expansion of markets.[50] Furthermore, as of 2007, the World Bank had estimated that the Chinese import-export bank had administered loans in Africa valued at nearly $13b in infrastructure projects alone. These loans have provided much-needed capital for internal development of African nations while simultaneously tying their development initiatives to the will of the Chinese coffers.

But, these very visible changes that Sino-African relations are bringing to the region are not all considered to be positive. Despite the Sino-African relationship creating many visible examples of African development through trade, FDI, and infrastructure development, the perceived trade imbalances have created bad press for China. ". . . [C]ritics have claimed that, for the most part, Africa is exporting oil and other raw materials to China while importing cheap manufactured Chinese goods—an exchange remarkably similar to that of the colonial era."[51] Although a significant portion of Chinese exports to Africa are inexpensive household goods that "inhibit light industry and may harm the poor as potential producers," roughly half of Chinese exports to Africa are goods that are much more affordable than their American equivalents. These include items like "machinery, electronic equipment, and 'high- and new-tech products,'" goods that would be far more expensive possibly uneconomical to produce in Africa itself.[52, 53]

Conversely, China's trade with Africa has many benefits for African countries as well. China values its relationships with African countries so greatly, that in 2006, "China waived all debt from governmental interest-free loans due at the end of 2005 for 31 heavily-indebted African countries."[54] Furthermore, "the investment of over 800 Chinese enterprises has promoted African industries and is break the longstanding hold that the West has had over trade in commodities between Africa and the rest of the world."[55] Having an alternative to the

US has increased African states' economic autonomies—offering more options in investment partners, product pricing, production, sales, and investment.

Throughout this section, we have identified three main motivations behind Chinese involvement in Africa: resource acquisition, opportunity for export markets, and political influence. Over the course of the last three sections, it has become clear that China is in fact presenting an alternative to the US. While the US's image in the region has been painted by top-down restrictions centered on principles of human rights, democracy, free markets, etc., China's image is one of empathy. China relates to the developing state, presenting economic growth initiatives coupled with ideologies of non-intervention and mutual benefit. All else equal, these foreign policy differentials are what constitute the independent variables in this analysis. The dependent variables of this study are constituted by the overall trend in US-Africa and Sino-Africa relations. While the US has trended toward pursuing human development and standard of living initiatives, China has focused on economic growth.

In the fourth and final section of this paper, we will test these conclusions by briefly look at the case study of Nigeria.

Section IV: Explaining the Variance—Nigeria as a Case Example

Let us first look at recent US involvement in Nigeria. In addition to the economic incentives of keeping good relations with a country that has a growing economy and vast oil reserves, the US also has a vested interest in supporting human rights against internal terrorist organizations like Boko Haram of northern Nigeria. Due to corruption of the political elites, US-Nigerian relations have been strained over the past decade.[56] According to the Chatham House's 2013 report on stolen oil, since Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999, civilian officials and political "godfathers" have had ample access to the remains of large-scale theft networks.[57] These political elites are "infamously dependent on looting state-controlled oil revenues to sustain their power and position."[58] Regardless of political corruption, US foreign aid to Nigeria has increased from $486m in 2008 to $625 in 2012, making Nigeria the US's 8th largest aid recipient.[59] As little has been done to combat the corruption with which Nigerian politics are imbued, it appears that for now, the US has other more pressing foreign policy objectives to pursue.

Preceding President Obama's September 2013 meeting with Nigeria's President Goodluck Jonathan, Obama released a press statement outlining the US's major objectives in terms of the future of its relations with Nigeria. First and foremost, Obama highlights Jonathan's commitment to the democratic election process. Secondly, he discusses Nigeria as an "energy producer"—both providing and consuming energy. And finally, he addresses Boko Haram as "one of the most vicious terrorist organizations in the world" and reaffirms America's commitment to helping Nigeria deal internally with the threat while Nigeria "remain[s] responsive to its people and follow[s] the rule of law."[60] From this press release and other similar releases by Under Secretary of State

Wendy Sherman, it becomes clear that the US's primary foreign policy objectives in Nigeria are to 1) maintain democratic elections moving forward into the 2014 election year and 2) suppress Boko Haram which threatens to undermine the government and destabilize the economy.[61] Looking back to Section 2, these objectives fall precisely under pillars (1) and (3) of the US foreign policy toward Africa as dictated in the *US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa*.

In addition to being the US's 8th largest aid recipient, according to the US Trade Representative statistics, Nigeria is currently the US's 23rd largest goods trading partner.[62] Since the beginning of US-Nigeria Trade Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 2000, we have seen a large increase in US imports from Nigeria. Looking at Graph 3, we see that from 2001 to 2008, US imports from Nigeria steadily increased from $8.7b to $38b. In 2009, we see a drop in imports to $19b, reflecting the US's decreased consumption of oil as a result of the global financial crisis. In terms of trade goods composition, US exports to Nigeria are primarily made up of cereals ($1.2b), vehicles ($1.1b), and machinery ($.720b).[63] In contrast, US imports from Nigeria consist almost exclusively of oil, making up $33.6b of imports in 2011.[64]

But despite having strong ties with the US politically and through trade, aid, and investment, China has still been able to beat out the US on bids for resource contracts. "In Nigeria, "a promised $7 billion in investments and rehabilitation of power stations secured for [China] firms oil areas sought by [American] multinationals."[65] In part, this is due to China's method of bidding. As discussed earlier, Chinese resource bids are packaged with investments and infrastructure loans. Unable to compete, private American competitors have withdrawn from the competition, allowing China to freely purchase rights to Nigerian oil fields.[66] Beyond this $7b deal, Chinese firms have invested billions more, using Chinese engineering and construction resources to build up Nigerian infrastructure. In July 2005, PetroChina concluded an $800m oil deal and in January 2006, China National Offshore Oil Corporation purchased a 45% state in Nigerian offshore oil and gas (a nearly $5b investment).[67] These investments regarding the oil industry have helped make Nigeria richer, allowing it to pay off all of its outstanding loans and expand internal government capability.

Furthermore, China has significantly aided Nigeria in the technology development sector. While the US has been hesitant to transfer technology, especially capabilities that can be used militarily, China has had few qualms.[68] Recently, China and Nigeria have collaborated to launch the communications satellite, Nig-Sat I. This was a groundbreaking effort for Nigeria, "in which China has provided much of the technology necessary for launch, on-orbit service and even the training of Nigerian command and control operators."[69] While China has gained from this exchange by proving its efficacy in satellite technology, Nigeria has benefited from the access to new technologies and capabilities provided by the satellite.

On the other hand, it can be argued that China is taking advantage of Nigeria by refusing to develop certain capabilities that would diminish its needs for Chinese imports. A primary example is the petrochemicals industry, where

reportedly Nigeria could easily produce the materials itself, but due to developmental barriers, is forced to import from China and India.[70] If this is true, China has been selective in its initiatives, valuing the added economic benefit of export markets over Nigerian development and economic independence.

To summarize, while the US has centered it relationship with Nigeria on aid, trade, democracy promotion, and internal security, China's interactions with Nigeria have been centered on economic progress. China has focused its funding on Nigerian government projects rather efforts head by the international community. Perhaps viewing the security dilemma from the perspective of a developing country, China engages in anti-hegemonic behavior in Nigeria—trying to economically win over Nigeria against the US. In contrast to the US, China's willingness to ignore internal corruption and disruption provides China with flexibility in both giving aid and supporting military expansion and technological advancement.

Conclusion

Through our brief analysis of Nigeria, we can see that many of our previous conclusions from Section 3 are confirmed. As China is able to compete with the US in economic transactions due in part to its state-run economic model and in part to non-restrictive foreign policy objectives, China poses a legitimate economic alternative to the US. On the other hand, China's aid and developmental support cannot compare to what the US has to offer. With substantial influence over the IMF and World Bank, the US still presents itself as the best option for providing developmental support—considering human development and economic development. Regardless, the fact remains: the US's longstanding promotion of democracy, free markets, and human rights supported by economic incentives is being challenged by China as an alternative trade, aid, and investment partner. As China's presence in the region is relatively new, along with its rise as a global economic power, much is left to be seen. Only the future can tell whether countries will trend toward unbridled economic growth or development through democratic reform.

Appendix

Graph 1: China GDP Percentage Growth Rate

Source: http://www.google.com/#q=China's+GDP+growth. Data from the World Bank.

Graph 2: Sino-African Trade Composition

Source: http://cdn.static-economist.com/sites/default/files/imagecache/290–width/images /print-edition/20130323_MAC309.png. Data from Africa Research Institute; IMF.

Graph 3: US-Nigeria Goods Trade Balance

Data from World Bank (See Table 3).

Table 1: China's Top 10 African Trading Partners

	Economic type	Average annual trade, 2006-2010 (US $ million)	Share in total China-Africa trade
Angola	Oil export	18,627	21%
South Africa	Diversified economy	166,86	18%
Sudan	Oil export	6,445	7%
Nigeria	Oil export	5,774	6%
Egypt	Diversified economy	5,384	6%
Algeria	Oil export	4,155	5%
Libya	Oil export	4,154	5%
Republic of the Congo	Oil export	3,241	4%
Morocco	Diversified economy	2,548	3%
Benin	Agriculture	2,097	2%
Weight of top ten trading partners in total China-Africa trade			76%

Source: Lu Yong, http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/t820242.htm. Data from Capital Week.

Table 2: Poverty Ratio in Choice African Nations

Country	Poverty gap at %1.25 a day (PPP) (%)	Year
Angola	43.4%	2009
South Africa	13.8%	2009
Sudan	19.8%	2009
Nigeria	68%	2010
Egypt	N/A	N/A

Source: http://data.worldbank.org/topic/poverty. Data from the World Bank.

Table 3: US-Nigeria Goods Trade Balance

Year	US Exports	US Imports	Net
1985	675.7	3001.9	−2326.2
1986	408.8	2530.3	−2121.5
1987	295.2	3573.5	−3278.3
1988	356.8	3278.6	−2921.8
1989	490.3	5283.9	−4793.6
1990	553.2	5982.1	−5428.9
1991	831.4	5168	−4336.6
1992	1001.1	5102.4	−4101.3
1993	894.7	5301.4	−4406.7
1994	509	4429.9	−3920.9
1995	602.9	4930.5	−4327.6
1996	818.4	5978.3	−5159.9
1997	813	6349.4	−5536.4
1998	816.7	4194	−3377.3
1999	627.9	4385.1	−3757.2
2000	721.9	10537.6	−9815.7
2001	955.1	8774.9	−7819.8
2002	1057.7	5945.3	−4887.6
2003	1016.9	10393.6	−9376.7
2004	1554.3	16248.5	−14694.2
2005	1619.8	24239.4	−22619.6
2006	2233.5	27863.1	−25629.6
2007	2777.9	32770.2	−29992.3
2008	4102.4	38068	−33965.6
2009	3687.1	19128.2	−15441.1
2010	4060.6	30515.9	−26455.3
2011	4911.6	33854.2	−28942.6
2012	5028.6	19014.2	−13985.6

Data from World Bank.

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Good Neighbors and the Second World War:

A Strategic Analysis of US-Brazilian Relations on the Eve of World War II

Adam Ratzlaff, *Tulane University Class of 2013*

Abstract

Over the course of the 1930s and 1940s, the international landscape changed dramatically. The great depression rocked the global economy, strong ideological leaders came to power in many countries, and the Second World War erupted. Both the United States and Brazil saw the rise of strong leaders during this era, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Getúlio Vargas. Both of these leaders changed the course of their respective nations' foreign policy. As President Franklin Delano Roosevelt sought to promote his Good Neighbor Policy through mutual respect of the other sovereign nations of the Western Hemisphere, Vargas looked for strategies to improve the geopolitical standing of Brazil. Although many within the United States feared that Brazil had fallen under the Axis sphere of influence, decisions regarding World War II did not always align with ideological beliefs. Before the end of WWII, Brazil had sent troops to fight alongside the Allies in the European Theater. Following an analysis of the conditions, constrains, and expectations faced by the Roosevelt administration, this paper examines the different strategies employed by the United States during the lead up to World War II in convincing Brazil to side with the Allies.

Over the course of the 1930s and 1940s, many events and changes occurred in the political and economic systems of the world that eventually culminated with the advent of the Second World War, further altering the world order. These events included the Great Depression and the rise of strong democratic, fascist, and populist leaders in various countries throughout the world. However, despite the rise of these leaders, their respective nations did not align strictly across ideological lines when World War II broke out. In fact, many countries choose to remain neutral or to join the Allies despite having ideological similarities to the Axis powers. One such example of this was Getúlio Vargas's Brazil. Despite the *Estado Novo* government's fascist tendencies, Brazil sent troops to fight alongside the Allies in the Italian theater. A large part of this was due to the efforts of the United States diplomatic corps. This paper seeks to explain Brazil's decision to fight with the Allies through a strategic analysis of US foreign policy in the years leading up to World War II.

Both the United States and Brazil had new leaders come to power in the early 1930s; Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the United States and Getúlio Vargas in Brazil. Both Vargas and Roosevelt were strong leaders that drastically changed the domestic and geopolitical stances of their respective countries, Vargas with his *Estado Novo* and Roosevelt with the New Deal. While the domestic changes caused by these policies were astounding, both leaders also changed the way that their nations' foreign policy was conducted. While the roles played by the United States in World War II and in the reconstruction of Europe and Japan in its aftermath are the most common examples of how the Roosevelt administration altered US foreign policy, President Roosevelt's US-Latin American policy differed from the norm. His Latin American policy would be one of "respect" and that sought to "associate . . . with other American Republics,"[1] an approach that became known as the Good Neighbor Policy. While maintaining the regional hegemony of the United States, the Roosevelt administration would change the character of US foreign policy not only with Latin America, but also with the rest of the world. Meanwhile, Getúlio Vargas sought to bolster the geopolitical position of Brazil in the world. The 1930s and the lead up to World War II provided Vargas with the opportunities that he needed to increase his nation's international prestige.

In order to analyze US policies, I will use a framework established by Christopher Fettweis for analyzing grand strategy.[2] While this paper will analyze the strategic relationship between the United States and Brazil rather than overall US grand strategy, the Fettweis framework still supplies a good outline for understanding the causes, background and strategy used by the United States in its relations with Brazil during the 1930s and early 1940s. The Fettweis framework provides an outline that I will follow through the analysis of this era's US-Brazilian Foreign policy (see Table 1). I will begin by seeking to explain the conception of the world held by the Roosevelt administration.

Table 1. Fettweis Framework for Analyzing Grand Strategy

Source: Fettweis, Christopher. "Lecture on Spain, pt. 1." *Strategy and Politics- POLI 4630.* New Orleans, September 18, 2012.

This will be based upon the words and actions of Roosevelt and those working within his administration. Expanding upon this, I will examine the national interests and expectations of the United States as it applies to US interactions with Brazil and to the possibility of the impending spread of the War in Europe and Asia into the Western Hemisphere. After examining these elements, I will analyze some of the external forces that effected US-Brazilian relations, namely, the measures taken by Germany and Argentina and the role of isolationists within the US Congress. After examining the elements that go into the consideration of developing strategy, I will analyze the implementation of US strategy and policy in its relationship with Brazil throughout the 1930s and early 1940s. To conclude an analysis of the Brazilian response to the measures taken by the United States, as well as Germany, will be conducted, taking into consideration Vargas's and Brazil's expectations and thoughts.

Roosevelt's Conception of How the World Worked

Since the United States gained independence, the foreign policy employed by this nation generally followed the advice of the Founding Fathers. Often referred to as isolationism, the United States preferred to focus on domestic issues and foreign commerce rather than becoming involved in the frequent political conflicts of Europe. This sentiment was perhaps best captured in the words of Thomas Jefferson, who said that the foreign policy of the United States should be one of "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."[3] As the other nations of the Western Hemisphere began to gain their independence, the United States quickly recognized their sovereignty, but did not actively participate in any of their independence movements (with the notable exception of Cuba in 1898). This relationship was altered in 1823, when President James Monroe made his seventh speech to Congress, in what later became known as the Monroe Doctrine:

> . . . In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers . . . The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so . . . It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and

impartial observers . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the ami-
cable relations existing between the United States and those powers
to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend
their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our
peace and safety . . . with the Governments who have declared their
independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on
great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could
not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or con-
trolling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in
any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition
toward the United States . . .[4]

With this declaration, President Monroe established the precedent of the
United States as being an ally, or at the very least an interested bystander, of
the free nations within the Americas. The Monroe Doctrine further declared
that the United States would not interfere in the affairs of European countries,
but that any intervention on the part of the European powers within the West-
ern Hemisphere would be seen as an attack on the United States. Furthermore,
the United States claimed to respect the sovereignty of the other American
Republics. Despite this, the United States failed to uphold the ideals of the
Monroe Doctrine. Although the Monroe Doctrine called for the joint defense
of the Western Hemisphere and cordial relations between the nations of the
Americas, this was rarely the case. At multiple points throughout the early
19th century, the United States failed to honor the promise of joint defense
as declared in the Monroe Doctrine. Notable cases of this include the Brit-
ish invasion of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands and several cases of European
nations invading Latin America in order to force them to pay back loans. In
none of these cases did the United States follow the principals of the Monroe
Doctrine in assisting the other American Republics in defending the West-
ern Hemisphere from Europe. Not only did the United States allow European
nations to interfere within the Western Hemisphere, but the US government
used military force at various times throughout the 19th and early 20th cen-
tury to promote the US policy objectives and interests.

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt sought to return to the values laid
out in the Monroe Doctrine.[5] Roosevelt believed that the United States
should not interfere in the affairs and should respect the sovereignty of its
southern neighbors. In his first Inaugural Speech, Roosevelt outlined what
would become known as the Good Neighbor Policy, the position that would
become the cornerstone of US-Latin American relations during the Roosevelt
administration:

In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this nation to the policy
of the good neighbor-the neighbor who resolutely respects himself
and, because he does so, respects the rights of others- the neighbor
who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agree-
ments in and with a world of neighbors. . . .We now realize, as we have

never realized before, our interdependence on each other; that we can not merely take, but must give as well.[6]

In various speeches throughout the 1930s, Roosevelt fiercely condemned the interventionist policies of his predecessors[7] and believed that the best way to ensure the promotion of US interests was not to use American might to force our will upon the nations of the Americas but to strive toward the ends that would be in the best interests of the hemisphere as a whole, through mutual respect and the attainment of common goals. This became an "American foreign policy [that] may be summed up in 'the Monroe Doctrine and the Golden Rule.'"[8] Roosevelt was a true liberal institutionalist when it came to hemispheric affairs. Various examples of this can be seen not only in the Roosevelt administration's rhetoric, but also in many of the actions that they took. Roosevelt supported various resolutions of nonintervention at Pan-American Conferences throughout the 1930s (these will be examined in more depth later in this paper) and respected the sovereign decisions of other American nations that ran counter to US public opinion and interest. Some examples of this include the abolishment of the Platt Amendment[9] and in the administration's decisions in how to manage Mexico's nationalization of American owned oil companies.[10] In relation to Brazil,

> The record . . . shows that the Roosevelt administration eschewed domineering, deceitful diplomacy toward Brazil and never devised any program for establishing economic, political, or military control over that country . . .[11]

As can be seen, rather than using American influence to force American interests upon the rest of the nations of the Western Hemisphere, the Roosevelt administration thoroughly believed in the principles of the Good Neighbor Policy, a policy that followed the tenets of respect for other nations' sovereignty and the joint resolution of problems.

Since Roosevelt believed that nations' sovereignty should be respected, he was willing to work with foreign leaders whom he did not necessarily agree with nor approve of. The most evident example of such a leader was Joseph Stalin. Despite the fact that it was common knowledge that Stalin had committed atrocities inside the Soviet Union, Roosevelt worked with him against the Axis powers. This is of key importance in understanding that Roosevelt's view of the world; he was would cooperate with other nations and respect their domestic sovereignty so long as they were would work with him against the Axis powers and toward a more cohesive world order. This can be viewed as an extension of Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, looking at a global rather than hemispheric level, and provides a better understanding of why Roosevelt sought to work with Getúlio Vargas despite the *Estado Novo*'s fascist and nationalist tendencies.

The ideals championed by the Roosevelt administration and captured in the Good Neighbor Policy follow within the liberal rather than realist

school of thought. The Good Neighbor Policy sought to expand the concept of national defense to hemispheric defense through joint efforts within the Americas based upon mutual respect.[12] This idea fell within the American tradition of foreign policy as established by the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt sought to improve the geopolitical position of the entire Western Hemisphere by working with one another to reach these ends. To Roosevelt, the domestic politics of the other American Republics came second to improving affairs at the hemispheric level and respecting the sovereignty of each of these nations.

US National Interests and Expectations of the Future

Despite Roosevelt's view of a world in which the United States would be able to improve political and economic relations with Latin America, he was fully aware of the possibility of another war brewing in Europe. Despite the fact that many politicians in Washington did not believe in an active foreign policy, Roosevelt believed that the United States could prosper from a more peaceful world. Although Roosevelt and his colleagues may have agreed on what was in the national interest, they had different means of achieving these goals. While most of Congress believed that the United States should focus on the home front, Roosevelt pushed for a more aggressive foreign policy as well as attempting to fix many of the domestic problems caused by the Great Depression.

The two most important national interests that both isolationists and Roosevelt's camp could agree upon were national security and improving an economy weakened by the Great Depression. Although both groups had very different means of achieving these goals, these are interests that both sides strove to achieve. While isolationists saw the best means of achieving these goals as increasing trade protection, through the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, and not becoming involved in the affairs of other nations, Roosevelt saw the opening of trade and joint efforts in international affairs as the best means of growing the economy and maintaining US national security.

During Roosevelt's first term, he was predominantly concerned with domestic issues, particularly the implementation of the New Deal policies to combat the effects of the Great Depression. However, by the mid-1930s, the antecedents of World War II were beginning to occur in Europe and Asia; Italy invaded Ethiopia, Japan invaded China, and Germany "annexed" new territories. By this time, Roosevelt and many other world leaders were concerned that this war could expand into the Western Hemisphere.[13] Realizing that it was only a matter of time before World War II reached the Western Hemisphere, Washington started looking for the most likely location of an incursion into the Americas and concluded that it be through the Brazilian Bulge, located in the northeastern region of the country.[14] The Brazilian Bulge had the geographic importance of being close to West Africa and the Azores, creating a pathway into the Western Hemisphere. Seeing as Hitler had already expressed his interest in making Brazil into a "New Germany,"[15] the Roosevelt

administration began negotiations to convince Brazil to side with the Allies in the impending Second World War.

External Constraints

In addition to this understanding of the global system, expectations of the future, and US national interests, the Roosevelt Administration had to consider actors and situations other than Brazil that affected the US-Brazilian relationship. Within the United States, the US Congress contained many devout isolationists within their ranks who believed that the United States should not get tied down in alliances or, for that matter, even involved in the affairs of other nations. Simultaneously, US foreign policy decisions must take into account the actions of other nations and their effects on US-Brazilian affairs as well as other US foreign policy objectives. To this end, the two countries that had the greatest impact on US foreign policy with Brazil were Argentina, Brazil's neighbor and frequent rival, and, of course, Hitler's Germany. Balancing the relationship between Brazil and Argentina proved a challenge to US policy makers while simultaneously trying to prevent Brazil from falling into the Axis's sphere of influence and the potential invasion of the Americas.

On the home front, Roosevelt had to make careful calculations in his decisions regarding foreign affairs. Isolationists viewed many of the problems that plagued the United States as results of having interfered in global affairs, punishment for not heading Jefferson and the other Founding Fathers when they warned of "entangling alliances." Thus becoming allied and agreeing to the defense of the entire Western Hemisphere seemed foolish to isolationists. Furthermore, the lack of truly democratic governments, and often dictatorships, in many Latin American nations caused further concerns about allying the United States with these nations.[16] In 1933, isolationists had even passed neutrality acts through Congress weakening the President's ability to conduct foreign policy. However, despite the efforts and beliefs of isolationists, the American public strongly supported hemispheric defense measures and the use of force if one of the American nations was attacked.[17] By framing the issue of hemispheric defense in terms of an extension of the Monroe Doctrine, and pointing to the threats caused by new military technologies (namely airplanes), Roosevelt was able to successfully convince Congress to that expanding relations with the other nations of the Americas was beneficial to the United States.

While the United States feared an Axis invasion of the Western Hemisphere through the Brazilian Bulge, Brazil was more concerned with a potential invasion from its southern neighbor, Argentina.[18] In fact, both Brazil and Argentina were actively seeking countries willing to export arms to their respective nations, creating an arms race between these two South American countries.[19] At several points, the rivalry between Brazil and Argentina put pressure on the US-Brazilian relations. The most notable of these occasions took place when the US Navy agreed to sell retired ships to the Brazilian Navy. Argentina, concerned

that Brazil would become relatively more powerful then themselves, urged Washington not to sell these vessels to Brazil. Washington eventually yielded to Argentine demands, which ultimately harmed US-Brazilian relations with Brazil viewing the United States as less than fully committed to their partnership.[20] Furthermore, although it appeared as though Brazil was the primary interest of Nazi Germany, the large European populations within Argentina (particularly Italian, but with a moderate German population as well), the Argentine Government's apparent support of the Axis powers (in the opinion of many US policy makers at the time)[21] and the traditional ties between the German and Argentine Militaries frightened the United States and the Roosevelt administration.[22] This fear led the United States to have to balance their concerns and objectives over US-Brazilian relations with the potential Axis influence in Argentina. The delicate balance of power in South America, with the fear of war erupting between Argentina and Brazil, made it more difficult for the United States to implement its strategic relationship with Brazil.

Hitler's plan for world conquest involved a grand strategy not focused solely on Europe, but the whole world. In regards to Brazil, Hitler saw the large country with an immense German population, as the key of his South American strategy.[23] This strategy featured several different elements with the end goal of creating a "new Germany" out of Brazil, and thus attaining raw materials to fuel the Nazi war machine.[24] Hitler's strategy involved a three-pronged approach, utilizing economic, political and covert actions to pull Brazil into the Axis's sphere of influence. Although Brazil had been under the Anglo-American sphere of influence since gaining its independence, the Great Depression and Brazil's encouragement of European immigration to Brazil provided openings for Nazi Germany to exploit.

From the economic end, Nazi Germany greatly benefited from Brazil's decreased trade with the United States and Great Britain due to the Great Depression. By the mid-1930s, the United States and Great Britain were only just returning to pre-1929 levels of trade, but Germany had vastly expanded their trade with Brazil.[25] The dramatic increase in German-Brazilian trade was fueled by two important elements; Germany's need for raw materials for the Nazi war machine and their trade practices during the 1930s. Brazil had long been an exporter of raw materials to the developed nations of Europe and the United States. However, with the global economic collapse in 1929, Brazil found that they no longer had markets for their primary goods. This occurred at the same time Nazi Germany began their economic recovery and manufacturing a military complex, providing Brazil the demand they needed for raw materials.[26] However, the trade balance in convertible currencies was not high enough to maintain this mutually beneficial trade cycle. With this in mind, Germany created a new form of currency that benefited Germany and its trade partners at the expense of other nations; the *Ausländer-Sonderkonten im Inland Mark*, or simply ASKI-Marks. ASKI-Marks were a discounted form of currency that could only be used for trade with Germany, or a currency that created a barter system (at better rates then the going exchange rate and with

lower tariffs on goods) with Germany.[27] The ASKI-Mark allowed Germany to push competing nations out of foreign markets by flooding the market with ASKI-Marks that could only be used to trade with Germany. This in turn created a continual demand for German goods, further bolstering the German economy. While this form of trade ran counter to the liberal trade policies favored by the United States, it enforced a cycle of strengthening trade ties between Brazil and Germany.

Politically, Nazi Germany was also able to offer Brazil something that the United States was at that point unable to offer. The United States had been hesitant to sell armaments to the various nations of Latin America. However, Germany had no such qualms about the sale of weapons. Particularly since German foreign policy analysts saw Brazil as "the bulwark against inclusion of South America in Roosevelt's anti-Germany policy."[28] Due to trade imbalances, caused by the use of the ASKI-Mark and Germany's high demand for primary materials, Germany even allowed Brazil to purchase many of these weapons using ASKI-Marks. To add to this, Germany invited various Brazilian military leaders to visit and see the efficiency of the German military.

By the end of the 1930s, over 800,000 first and second-generation German citizens lived in Brazil.[29] This provided Hitler and the Nazi party in Germany with several strategies that they could employ within Brazil. It further provided Hitler with the groundwork for his claim that "Brazil could be turned into a new Germany."[30] The primary tool that Hitler employed toward reaching this goal was trying to instill a strong sense of German national pride within the German-Brazilian population. This was done in two key of ways: 1) visits by dignitaries to the various German settlements, and 2) the creation of the Brazilian Nazi Party, made up predominantly of German immigrants to Brazil.[31] The "dignitaries" that were sent to the German Brazilian settlements were all Nazi party officials charged with convincing the German population in Brazil to remember their allegiance to the "Fatherland" and to participate in their local Nazi Party.[32] The purpose of the Brazilian Nazi Party was to ensure that the interests of the Reich were supported in Brazil.

The tactics used by Germany, as well as the threat of Argentina and the hindrance of isolationists within the United States, made developing a strategy for US-Brazilian relations more challenging. Not only did Roosevelt have to convince the Vargas government that the country providing them with subsidized trade was an enemy, he also had to convince his own Congress that the dictator of Brazil should be a trusted ally. All the while, maintaining the stability of the region by preventing conflicts from flaring up between Brazil and Argentina. Roosevelt's strategy would have to have many facets if it were to accomplish all of these objectives.

US Strategic Relations with Brazil

Now that we have examined the components that are necessary in establishing a foreign policy strategy, we are able to explain and examine the actual

strategy implemented by the United States as it relates to US-Brazilian relations. Continuing to follow the Fettweis Framework of Grand Strategy, US strategy will be examined as it pertains to military, economic, political, and cultural decisions made by the United States in the 1930s and early-1940s.[33] Although each of these strategic components was used to different effect and at different levels, all are important in understanding how the United States sought to convince Brazil to side with the Allies in the pending war in Europe and in understanding the many facets of Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy.

After successfully selling a "continentalized" version of the Monroe Doctrine to Congress,[34] Roosevelt had a slightly freer hand in dealing with hemispheric security. However, despite Congress's acceptance of this premise, they were still hesitant to approve the armament of Latin America. A large part of this was due to the lack of democracies within the region and the fear that providing arms to these nations would create instability. For this reason, until 1942 direct military aid in the form of weapons was minimal.[35] Washington sought to encourage Brazil to enforce the area around the city of Natal in the Northeast of Brazil in case of a German invasion, but Brazil was unwilling to do so, preferring to station troops in the southern edge of the country to prevent a potential invasion from Argentina. Further, Vargas declared that the only way that Brazil would be able to arm the Northeast and still maintain its defenses against Argentina was if the United States agreed to arm the Brazilian military. At this refusal, the Roosevelt administration requested the Brazilian government's permission to station US soldiers in the Natal area. However, once again Vargas declined, refusing on the basis that it threatened Brazilian sovereignty. This did not stop the Roosevelt administration, rather than relying on direct military support for the defense of the Brazilian Bulge, Roosevelt turned to the private sector. In order to circumvent the issue of not being able to create a military base in Brazil, the Roosevelt administration offered to assist with the expansion of Pan-American Airlines into South America.[36] While not technically military in nature, this resulted in the construction of an airbase in the Natal region that was not technically that could be, and later was, transformed into a military base. To further strengthen this construction and the expansion of Pan-American Airlines, the US State Department pleaded with Brazilian authorities and provided evidence that various German airlines were spying on the Brazilian populace. This eventually led to the expulsion of these airlines from the country and the drastic expansion of Pan-American Airlines.

As was the case with Germany, economic strategy played an important role in US-Brazilian relations. However, the United States had always followed a liberal economic trade policy and was not going to change this practice. In fact, the US government frequently condemned Germany's use of the ASKI-mark, claiming that it was an unfair trade practice.[37] Shortly after Roosevelt took office, Congress passed the Hawley-Smoot Act, raising US tariffs to unprecedented levels. While these tariffs were designed to protect US industry during the Great Depression, a spillover effect of this policy was to decrease trade with other countries, harming their economies. This weakened

the position of the United States in being able to use its economic hegemony over the Americas to force concessions among its trading partners. As part of the Good Neighbor Policy, Roosevelt sought to place the nations of Latin America, and particularly Brazil, into a different tariff bracket by placing them under a "most favored nation clause." Much to the surprise of Brazilian leaders, the United States and the Roosevelt administration did not seek anything in return for this gesture.[38] The United States believed that by returning to pre-1929 trade arrangements US soft power would return as well, placing the United States in a better position to negotiate with Brazil in the future. Despite this gesture of good will, the Roosevelt administration was hesitant to use foreign aid as a strategy, fearing that this could be misinterpreted as a return to "Dollar Diplomacy." It wasn't until 1940, that Roosevelt started to provide direct foreign aid to Brazil and other Latin American nations. At this point, Roosevelt authorized large levels of direct aid for Brazilian industrialization until the end of his term.[39] Although the United States was not using economic power as a strong foreign policy tool at the beginning of this era, these strategies proved useful in the long run.

US political strategy toward Latin America during the lead up to World War II focused on two elements; signs of general good will at the Pan-American conferences and creating personal relationships between leaders through visits between these two nations. There was no use of hard political pressure on the part of the United States, reflecting Roosevelt's commitment to the Good Neighbor Policy. Rather, all political maneuvers made by the United States in Latin American affairs were based on the premises of mutual respect and collective action. Over the course of Roosevelt's time in office, the United States participated in several Pan-American Conferences, providing the opportunity to expand upon the ideals of the Good Neighbor Policy. The first Pan-American Conference of the Roosevelt years took place during December 1933 in Montevideo, Uruguay. Upon arriving at the conference, the US delegation was bombarded with complaints about America's past interventions within the region. In fact, at the 1928 conference in Havana, Cuba, the United States had refused to sign a resolution of non-intervention in the affairs of the other sovereign nations of the Americas.[40] However, for this conference, President Roosevelt planned to reverse the decision of his predecessor and told the delegation ". . . to destroy the barriers preventing amicable relations with the other American Republics and to restore harmony within the Hemisphere."[41] Much to the surprise of the other delegations at the conference, the United States voted in favor of the "Convention on Rights and Duties of States" that stated, "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another."[42] At the following Pan-American conferences, in Buenos Aires (1936) and Lima (1938), the United States continued this trend and agreed to various measures geared toward resolving conflicts between the nations of the Americas on a multilateral basis.[43]

The other political tool that the Roosevelt administration employed as part of the Good Neighbor Policy was the personalization of foreign policy through

various high-level diplomatic visits. These visits included those between high-ranking military officers and diplomats and were intended to demonstrate the good will and respect that the United States felt toward Brazil. They also served as an opportunity to demonstrate to Vargas's military advisers that the United States was as capable and willing to provide military training and support as the Third Reich.[44] The most important of these visits took place in 1943, when President Roosevelt visited Brazil for himself after meeting with the other Allied leaders in Casablanca. This trip was one of the first times that an American president had visited Latin America and was well received by Vargas and his advisers.

The most innovative strategy used as a part of the Good Neighbor Policy was that of cultural strategy in foreign affairs. The Good Neighbor Policy called for mutual respect and associating with the other nations of the Americas.[45] In order to achieve the goals established above, it was necessary for "the Washington government to become 'culture conscious'- the hemisphere defense concept of the Roosevelt administration was not limited to military issues but involved cultural and ideological aspects as well."[46] For Roosevelt, this called for more than just the respect of different government leaders, but also the respect and association between the people of the Western Hemisphere. In the same way that Roosevelt strived to instill Pan-American ideals within the leaders of the hemisphere, Roosevelt wanted the citizens of the Americas to also embrace a Pan-American identity. It was thus necessary to show the people of Latin America and the United States the mythos of their common histories and the diverse cultures that make up the Western Hemisphere, attempting to create a Pan-American identity that drew from the shared history of the Americas but embraced diversity. Promoting this within the United States also had a particular necessity in that the majority of the American public knew little to nothing about Latin America. Some notable examples of this include the hero of a popular story going to Brazil to learn Spanish and a prominent businessman from Denver writing to the State Department to ask if buildings in Buenos Aires had glass windows.[47] This effort included several different elements, led by the newly created Department of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), under the leadership of Nelson Rockefeller.

The Department of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs was tasked with improving cultural relations with Latin America and knowledge of Latin America within the United States. This was done in two key ways: the creation of a Pan-American Identity through the distribution and circulation of propaganda and various cultural exchange programs geared at sharing experiences and arts from the different regions of the Americas. Propaganda was distributed with the intent of instilling a sense of Pan-American Identity throughout the Western Hemisphere. There were two main messages that this propaganda sought to share with the people of the Americas, a shared historical mythology and that to address the problems that faced the modern world required the collaboration of the Western Hemisphere. The mythos of a shared historical background was based the colonization of the Americas by Europeans

and that the hardships that all of these settlers faced in the New World had altered created something uniquely American. The story was strengthened by the idea that all of the American (North and South) revolutionary leaders had not been fighting just for the independence of their respective countries, but for the Americas as a whole.[48] This shared history suggested that the Americas, despite their historical, economic, and cultural differences shared a common history and expanded the idea of "American Exceptionalism" to include the entire hemisphere. The second element that CIAA propaganda sought to instill was one of collective action. A pamphlet handed out in 1942 read:

> The many great problems that face the world today place a new emphasis on the word AMERICAN: In the Western Hemisphere we have come to the realization that if we should solve those problems successfully, we must face them not as North Americans and South Americans, but as Americans All.[49]

The phrase, "Americans All," became the catch phrase for the Pan-American ideal. The CIAA and the Roosevelt administration believed that by creating stronger ties between the people of different American nations, the practice of foreign policy could be more easily conducted.

The Department of the Coordinator Inter-American Affairs also sponsored various programs and cultural exchanges during the pre-war and war years. These programs were designed to provide further insight into the different cultures of the Americas and to enhance understanding between the American peoples. The cultural exchanges of artists were incredibly popular as part of the Good Neighbor Policy. Various musicians, actors, and artists from the United States made goodwill tours of Latin America. Stars, including Orson Welles and Walt Disney, made trips to Brazil.[50] Several of these individuals were further encouraged to take their experiences and use them to create new propaganda, or cultural productions, for the CIAA. It was during this experience that Walt Disney, who ardently embraced this style of program, created his character José Carioca who would be featured in various Disney productions.[51] Another type of program that was typical of the CIAA during this period was bringing various Latin American products to the United States. The most successful case of this took place in 1942 when the New York department store Macy's, worked in conjunction with the CIAA to host a fair selling Latin American products to the American public.[52]

The Roosevelt administration utilized various strategic tools in their attempt to get Brazil to side with the Allies and to assist in Hemispheric Defense plans. All of these strategies fall squarely within the ideals established by the Good Neighbor Policy as articulated by Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In military, economic, political, and cultural strategies, the Roosevelt administration tried to act in a manner that was honest and respectful. However, at the same time, these tactics sought to create a sense of Pan-American identity and joint responsibility for the defense of the Americas. Although Brazil was hesitant to side with the United States in the event of war, before the Second

World War had ended, Getúlio Vargas had sent Brazilian troops to fight alongside the Allies in Europe.

The Brazilian Response

Although Franklin Delano Roosevelt fell very much within the liberal tradition and abhorred the idea of using the geopolitical position of the United States solely for national gains, Getúlio Vargas was a classic realist. Vargas had no problem manipulating the United States and Nazi Germany, to improve the geopolitical status of Brazil. In fact,

> . . . sources [primary government documents] amply document the Machiavellian opportunism of Brazilian leaders who skillfully probed the vanity, anxieties, and prejudices of their counterparts in other countries and were remarkably successful in bartering geographic accident for valuable economic, military, and political concessions from Washington.[53]

Getúlio Vargas was an extremely cautious leader in many respects and in many ways hesitant to jump into alliances, both domestically and internationally. This characteristic made the process of convincing Vargas to side with the Allies extremely difficult. However, it did make it far easier to convince Vargas not to side exclusively with Nazi Germany. Over the course of the 1930s, Vargas tried to consolidate his power while positioning Brazil to improve its geopolitical status. It was not until January 1942 that Brazil fully sided with the Allies.

During the early 1930s, Getúlio Vargas sought to gain as much as possible from both the United States and Germany. Throughout this time period he held secret meetings with both parties and told them both that he was under pressure from the opposite side and doing everything within his power.[54] In 1937, the United States was convinced that Vargas had fallen into the Axis's sphere of influence. With the assistance of the *Integralista* (A fascist style party in Brazil) and Brazilian Nazi parties, Vargas overthrew the existing Brazilian Congress and rewrote the constitution. The new constitution was highly nationalistic and contained various elements of fascism.[55] Despite this, Vargas continued to tell the United States that he was not fascist and sympathized with the ideals of Pan-Americanism. Brazil continued to ask the United States for concessions on arms shipments and other forms of aid.

Meanwhile, Vargas was also playing the Axis powers in order to generate as many concessions he could out of their ranks as well. Even as Brazil was permitting Pan-American Airlines to spread into Brazil and kicking German Airline companies out of the country, the Vargas administration was informing Nazi officials that they were under severe pressure from the United States, even though the United States rarely put overt political pressure on the other American Republics, with the exception of Argentina,[56] during this era.[57] Furthermore, immediately after using the Brazilian Nazi and *Integralista* parties to increase his control over Brazil, Vargas disbanded these parties. Once again

Vargas claimed to Nazi officials that he had to do so for fear of American ret-ribution.[58] All the while, Vargas invited German and Italian dignitaries to visit the country and sent military officers to the Axis countries on diplomatic mis-sions. Vargas also agreed to protect Italian assets when Mussolini joined Hitler in declaring War and personally wired Hitler to congratulate him on surviving an assassination attempt in 1939.[59] The realist Vargas was sure that he could play both the United States and the Axis powers in order to improve Brazil's geopolitical status.

Weeks after the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor and the Axis declaration of war on the United States, Brazil finally cut relations with the Axis powers. Shortly later, Brazil informed the United States that they wanted to do more for the war effort than simply cutting diplomatic relations with the Axis powers. Brazil wished to send the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) to fight alongside the Allies in the European Theater. This decision was not based on any true allegiance to the United States or to the ideals of Pan-Americanism. Rather, this was a calculated decision by the Vargas administration in order to improve Brazil's post-war negotiating power.[60] Furthermore, the Vargas administration's agreement to send troops to fight in Europe required the aid of the United States in the form of weapons for the Brazilian army.[61] Brazil had managed to get the United States to offer Brazil the arms that they had desired all along.

Conclusion

While the strategies implemented by both Brazil and the United States dur-ing this period eventually led to the desired outcomes, Brazil being armed and allied with the United States, both nations' strategies failed to achieve the desired objectives quickly. Vargas's true desire to improve the bargaining and geopolitical position of Brazil for the post-war years ultimately failed entirely. Vargas had been convinced that Brazil would receive a position on the Secu-rity Council of the United Nations when the war had ended. However, due to conflicts over Brazil's manipulation of both sides during the pre-war years, Britain had never been as pro-Brazil as the United States. Thus Britain tried to prevent Brazilians from fighting in the European theater and participating in the post-war negotiations.[62] Furthermore, the newly equipped military who had fought against fascism in Europe led to the ultimate fall of Vargas shortly after the World War II concluded.

For the United States, the Good Neighbor Policy faired far better. Although the policy failed at convincing Brazil to fully side with the United States until after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Brazil and the rest of Latin America, with the exception of Argentina, did so immediately after. Furthermore, the United States had better relations with the various nations of Latin America in the years following the Good Neighbor Policy then they had had before. These culminated in the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948, an organization that shared many of the objectives of Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy.

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8. Ibid.
9. After the Spanish-American War (1898) the United States had a large amount of influence over the newly independent island nation of Cuba. In order to ensure that the United States was able to maintain a large level of influence, the United States required Cuba to adopt the Platt Amendment. This amendment gave the United States the right to intervene in Cuban affairs and required Cuba to seek US approval for international negotiations. In 1934, the Roosevelt administration abrogated this amendment.
10. In 1938, the vast majority of the oil production in Mexico was controlled by British and American oil companies. The Mexican government ordered that these companies increase the minimum wage paid to Mexican employees, but the companies refused to do so. In response, President Lazro Cardenas nationalized oil production in Mexico. The US government under FDR, sought to ensure that the oil companies were well compensated for the loss of their assets, but did not seek to remove Cardenas from power.
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Combatting Sexual Violence in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

Clarisse Awamengwi, *University of Virginia*

Abstract

The scale of sexual violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is labeled as the worst in the world; however international humanitarian actors, local organizations, and the Congolese government have failed to adequately respond to this atrocity. Efforts at combatting sexual violence in the DRC must recognize the relationship between the debilitated political economy, the militarization of hegemonic masculinities, the destabilization of communities, and consequently the rate of this violence. Ideas about masculinity have been produced by cultural, historical, and political-economic factors. Hence, the epidemic of sexual violence in the DRC should not be viewed simply as a "weapon of war," or as a simple intensification of Congolese patriarchy. Rather, it is embedded in the context of unequal gender relations in a patriarchal society, societal expectations of men to achieve hegemonic masculinity by fulfilling traditionally sanctioned roles, and the social suffering experienced by men unable to meet these gendered expectations. Men who have been disempowered turn to violence as a form of asserting masculinity. Combatting sexual violence in the DRC requires deconstructing hegemonic masculinities and reconstructing ideas about gender to better-fit current socioeconomic realities in the DRC. It is also essential to locate social institutions that contribute to the creation of gendered identities and focus on youth as a target group, for lasting social change can only be achieved if they are active participants in the fight against destructive gender ideals. This requires humanitarian actors to shift away from the pervading portrayal of men as "perpetrators" and to recognize men as victims of the conflict. Women—the sexual victims of men's disempowerment—cannot be empowered if men are not actors in the process of social change.

Introduction

The Second Congo War began in 1998, following the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, as the Hutu Interhamwe militia responsible for perpetrating the genocide fled into the Eastern Congo following their defeat by the Rwandan Patriotic Forces (RPF).[1] The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo

(AFDL), led by former RPF leader Paul Kagame, supported by Uganda's People Defense Force (UPDF) and Angola, entered the Congo in order to kill *géno-cidaires*, many in Hutu refugee camps. Although the war officially came to an end in 2003, with the installation of a new transitional government headed by President Joseph Kabila, violence persists in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as armed groups continue to fight in the Eastern Congo. The war continues today largely due to the economic exploitation and illicit extraction of the DRC's natural resources by parties to the conflict: Rwanda, Uganda, and local militia groups such as the Mai Mai. The Congolese government also perpetrates this violence as state officials and army officers are involved in the exploitation of resources.[2] Lastly, international corporations from countries, such as the United States, France and Belgium also propagate the conflict through their deep involvement in the illicit extraction of the Congo's resources, particularly coltan.[3]

Sexual violence in the provinces of the Eastern Congo is labeled as the worst case in the world. Mass rape, exploiting girls as young as six months to women as old as 84, has been carried out in the Congo by all militia groups, the Congolese national army (FARDC) and the national police force. United Nations peacekeeping forces (MONUC and MONUSCO) have also been implicated in cases of rape and sexual slavery against women in the region,[4] especially in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, Ituri, and the Orientale. The most common form of rape practiced by armed groups is gang rape, where four or more men capture a woman and rape her, one after the other. Often the men destroy vaginal and reproductive organs by cutting women's genital organs with knives, opening pregnant women's stomachs, and shooting women woman through their vaginas with a gun.[5] Many times women are raped in front of their children, and husbands are often forced to rape their own wives after the rapists. Additionally some women are taken as sex slaves by these groups and raped daily for months.[6] At times women become impregnated by the rapist, so they are not only burdened by the physical and mental scars of the rape, but birth children whose families often reject them. Despite widespread awareness of sexual violence in the Eastern DRC, the Congolese government and the international community have failed to adequately respond to this atrocity.

Mass Rape as an Effective Strategy and Its Impact

Several non-governmental (NGOs), as well as the UN, have collected data on rape in the Congo. There are many problems with such data, primarily that most rape cases go unreported because women are afraid to report them, lack a means of seeking help, or die on their way to the hospital. Secondly, many victims are raped on more than one occasion. Thirdly, those able to reach clinics might be counted more than once. Lastly, as previously mentioned, many girls and women are victimized by more than one perpetrator.[7] Despite these data limitations, the latest comprehensive study on rape in the DRC, published in

the *American Journal of Public Health* in June 2011, estimates that almost two million women have been raped. Furthermore, women continue to be raped at a rate of almost one per minute, a rate which may be increasing due to the increasing number of rape cases.[8] Between January and July 2013, in the North Kivu province, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) monitoring teams registered 705 cases of sexual violence, including 619 cases of rape: during the same period in 2012 only 108 cases were registered.[9]

The terrorization of women through rape has far-reaching effects on its victims, their families, and their communities. Rape survivors are often left in precarious medical states. For example, "a condition called fistula is caused by the destructive insertion of guns and sticks into the women's vaginas that tear the walls of the vagina and rectum, and leave many permanently incontinent."[10] Some victims also suffer from prolapsed uteri, a condition in which the uterus is displaced into the pelvic cavity.[11] Victims additionally have a higher risk of contracting HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). Women widely lack access to healthcare facilities that can repair their injuries and provide the necessary drugs to prevent the transmission of STDs. In the long-term, taking into account the social gravity of rape, the most concerning problem is not only that of inadequate healthcare access. Rather, it is the manner in which raped women are negatively regarded and stigmatized by their communities, irrespective of whether or not it has been medically demonstrated that they contracted an STD. As expressed by a local leader, "most rape survivors are assumed to be infected by HIV so rather than receiving healing reception . . . they are promptly ostracized from their communities . . . Contracting AIDS was also expressed as men's greatest fear concerning acceptance of their violated wives."[12] The stigma women face also compounds the psychological trauma from their rape. Some of the symptoms manifested are intense fears, anxiety, phobias, tension, nightmares, anger, hostility, chronic depression, suicidal ideation, suicide attempts, and dissociative symptoms.[13] They lose their sense of self and their sense of belonging in society. Rejected, victims are rendered homeless and poor, with no viable economic means of survival. Some have to refrain from their daily occupations due to severe physical injuries. Others are afraid to leave their homes to fetch water, farm, or engage in any sort of economic activity due to the risk of being raped again. Society suffers as a whole because women are left incapable of taking care of themselves and their children, and a general breakdown in social morals leads to the disintegration of communities.

Throughout history, sexual violence has been as much a part of war as killing, but with different forms and purposes.[14] Given the common views of Africa as "backwards" and "barbarous," it is easy to assume that cultural and ethnic tensions are responsible for the mass rapes in the DRC. However, it would be wrong to come to that conclusion, for the scale of rape in the DRC today cannot be primarily or solely attributed to culture.[15] Rape in the DRC has to do with several, intersecting factors, especially patriarchal cultural understandings of gendered identities and roles that have enabled the toleration of

sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) in the contexts of the war and the political economy created by war. This works on two levels. The worsening socioeconomic circumstances of men have led to the militarization of hegemonic masculinities. Secondly, the insufficient response of the Congolese government and the international community, which is largely due to the fact that the chaos of the conflict enables the illegal exploitation of mineral riches found in the region,[16] has cultivated an environment of impunity resulting in the mass proliferation of sexual violence.

Congolese society is patriarchal. Men are the protectors and the decision-makers of the family, while women are expected to perform domestic duties, raise the children, and help support the family through small commercial activities or farming.[17] Gender roles position women as subordinate to men, and women's social status is based on marriage. The greatest virtue of a marriageable woman is her virginity. The maintenance of sexual purity while married is, thus, of utmost importance because "in patriarchal societies the woman's body is viewed as the property of the nation."[18] As argued by Trenholm et al. (2011), to seize a woman's body "as in war-rape, is to claim victory over the enemy and serves as an 'element of communication' to the patriarchal protectors that they have failed to defend her."[19] Following from this understanding, one sees that "the effectiveness of rape as a strategy or weapon of war relies on the pervasive cultural norms that value women's sexual virtue. It is this public ownership of women's sexuality that makes it possible to translate an attack against one woman into an attack against an entire community or ethnic group."[20] Military ideology, which advances the idea of hyper-masculinity, indoctrinates members of armed groups to assert their masculinity through all means of violence, including sexual violence. Building upon the preexisting cultural frames that attach concepts of honor, shame, and sexuality to women's bodies, mass rape is a potent strategy.[21] In this context, war rape is used as an act of sexual terrorism, directed at women so as to inflict shame upon the entire family and community. Husbands symbolically lose their masculinity due to their inability to protect their family assets.[22] Rather than fight against these ill acts, the husbands and families are so destabilized by the sexual corruption of "their woman" that they react by ostracizing her. By so doing, the perpetrators are empowered and the social ties that bind families and communities are continually weakened.

Rape also contributes to the "chaos necessary to loot the DRC's vast resources, particularly . . . coltan, a resource required for the making of mobile phones and electronics, of which the DRC holds an estimated 80% of the world's deposits."[23] Rwandan and Ugandan parties remain interested in the Congo today mainly because of its economic resources. Reports from the UN Panel of Experts show that a multitude of foreign companies work through local partners linked to the rebel and militia groups.[24] The Congolese government is also directly involved in the mining industry as Congolese army officers control some mines as a source of personal enrichment—an outright violation of Congo's mining laws, which prohibit military presence in mines.[25]

The two groups accused of causing the most harm, FARDC and the FDLR are the most involved in the illegal exportation of minerals and often collaborate to loot resources. Due to the vested interest of the Congolese military and government, militias, and foreign nations in the DRC's resources, a culture of impunity and tolerance pervades in regards to rape.

This atrocity also continues because women have been silenced. In a patriarchal society like the Congo, where sexuality is a taboo issue, rape is seen as a private matter. Many women fear that their case will become public, and the shame that would follow. There is also fear of reprisal from the rapist. Even though the Congolese parliament passed a law in 2006 criminalizing rape, with penalties ranging from 5 to 20 years, enforcement of this law has yet to be seen.[26]

Humanitarian Missions in the Eastern DRC

The epidemic of sexual violence in the Eastern DRC has been labeled a weapon of war. Although it is indeed being utilized as a tool in war, the problem with such a single-dimensional understanding of rape is that it allows outsiders to view sexual violence perpetrated by men as "normal" and culturally acceptable. This issue needs to be understood as a historical and political process, not an ahistorical or apolitical occurrence. Assuming this as the "truth" hinders efforts by NGOs to empower victims of sexual violence and bring about gender equality in this society. It is necessary to deconstruct the social structures and the beliefs upholding them in order to gain a better understanding of the epidemic of rape in the DRC. The scale of sexual violence in the Eastern DRC is imbedded in the context of the conflict, its debilitating effects on the political economy, and, consequently, the inability of men living in these conflict-torn zones to fulfill their traditional functions in society. A more effective approach for NGOs is to deconstruct the social structures and the beliefs upholding them.[27]

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) is one of the major international NGOs providing emergency and long-term assistance to victims of the conflict. To date, the "IRC has assisted more than 40,000 survivors of sexual violence and their families with counseling and medical care, as well as legal services . . ."[28] They also help "vulnerable women to form village savings and loan associations. These allow women to collectively save and then use the money to start small businesses, such as small-scale farming or shops and market stalls, which grant them more financial independence and security."[29] The IRC is also the pioneer of the new Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT) for rape survivors. CPT has been recognized for dramatically reducing "PTSD symptoms and combined depression and anxiety symptoms."[30]

Women for Women International supports victims of sexual violence in the DRC through a one-year training program in "business and vocational skills, rights awareness and health education classes, and emotional support." Since 2004, Women for Women International has helped more than 58,000

women in the North and South Kivu provinces. Women are able to earn an income and provide for themselves by taking courses such as bread-making, ceramics production, soap making, and agribusiness, and then sell their products in the market.[31] In January 2005, Women for Women International also launched the Men's Leadership Program (MLP) after Congolese women expressed that in order to reshape the vast inequalities between genders in the Eastern Congo men could no longer be excluded from community-based efforts to empower women. They illuminated the fact that without the involvement of men, "women's lives may improve in the short term, but there will be very little 'effect on the overall institutional, societal and structural transformations needed to achieve true gender equality.'"[32] Hence, MLP was designed "to engage men in intervention, prevention and reconciliation efforts"[33] and to garner the support of male leaders who could use their influence in their respective communities to foster changes in gendered attitudes.

Lastly, HEAL Africa (HA), is a DRC-based NGO that has provided post-rape treatment, counseling, and support to about 40,000 women since 2003. HA has a holistic, three-tiered approach that focuses on health, empowering women, and community. The HA Medical Center in Goma provides a variety of health services to rape survivors and the community at large, including fistula repair, HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention, and orthopedic surgery. Over 91 rural health centers and clinics support those unable to make it to the main hospital.[34] Among many of HA's initiatives, the Gender and Justice program seeks to tackle the root causes of gender inequality in the DRC by creating opportunities for men and youth to reflect on gendered attitudes toward women and ways in which they can be counteracted. HA works in concert with communities and their leaders through Nehemiah Committees (NC), which "sensitize and mobilize community leaders to care for their vulnerable by supporting foster family programs, reintegration of widows and victims of sexual violence—as well as stimulating economic recovery through local agriculture and small animal husbandry."[35]

The organizations outlined have different perspectives and foundational approaches to helping victims of sexual violence in the DRC, however they have one common attribute, highlighted by the predominantly male local leaders in a study conducted in the DRC by Trenholm et al. (2011). The predominantly male local leaders in this study contested that the focus of the international community on the raped woman is a "misreading of local realities." A "misreading of local realities" refers to the systematic focus of humanitarian actors on the lucid victims—raped women, and conversely the exclusion of men and other pertinent community actors. The leaders advanced the argument that "the entire society suffers from war-rape, yet little regard has been paid to this aspect."[36] These leaders could be interpreted as having a gender-blind perspective on violence. However, there is much validity to their dissatisfaction with humanitarian aid for victims of sexual and gender based violence.

I will argue that development practitioners in the Eastern DRC need to deviate from the pervading portrayal of "men as perpetrators" and "women

as victims" as it excludes men from the process of development and makes them antagonistic toward ideas of gender equality. Gender analysis of sexual violence has lost sight of the power relations that constitute gender.[37] Gender equality and women's empowerment have become lock words, "disengaging while engaging, and concealing/blocking while revealing and framing."[38] "Gender" has come to mean simply women and men, not gender and the power relations that constitute it. Hence the one-dimensional view of "women's empowerment," which focuses on making women the sole benefactors of NGO programs, has led to a systemic exclusion of other social actors and institutions that contribute to the creation of gendered identities and their social implications. They advance women's participation as the path to empowerment, concealing the reality that gendered identities and roles are co-created and have to be reconstructed by both men and women. Sexual violence in the DRC cannot be effectively abetted and gender equality cannot be realized if both men and women are not agents of social change.

Hegemonic Masculinities and Femininity in the Eastern DRC

It is instructive to delve into the complexities of gender and masculine identities in the Eastern DRC and its relationship to SGBV. Understanding these gendered identities allows one to see how the alienation of men from projects that attempt to bring about empowerment and gender equality for victims of sexual violence does not produce any significant social change in that direction. A study conducted by HA across the North Kivu province in 2010 demonstrates that there is a "contradictory relationship between idealized, hegemonic masculinities and the actual realities of men's lives."[39] Ideas about masculinity and femininity are co-created and upheld by both men and women. The ideal in this culture is that "men are supposed to be providers and household heads, they should behave in non-violent ways toward household and community members, and be responsible, good negotiators and problem solvers." Secondly, a "real man" is able to provide financial support to his family and friends, for a man's fortune must to be shared to have value. [40] This requires men to have higher incomes than their wives so that they can carry out their societally sanctioned masculine duties. In order to maintain their leading social position, men have to adhere to this identity irrespective of the economic and social stresses that may render these ideals unattainable for the majority. In a patriarchal society, men who cannot fulfill these normative male roles are marginalized and reduced to the inferior status of a woman.[41] In the Eastern DRC masculinity in not a given quality; rather, men must strive to achieve this hegemony through a continuous reenactment of power.

There is a necessary interdependence between women and men, for without women, a man cannot become a "real man." Men demonstrate financial independence by acquiring a family and children and providing for them. Women play a role in reinforcing these norms through the expectations they place on men. As expressed by a female farmer, "the woman can gain an

income from her personal activities, but it's best if the money comes from her husband." All female respondents in this study including lawyers and activists expected men to be the main breadwinner. The important message here is that for Eastern Congolese women "their idea of empowerment is to demand respect, rights and liberties within a patriarchal society." [42] It is essential that development organizations realize this particular conception of women's empowerment, and the implications it has for community development and gender equality.

These understandings of gender are culturally as well as historically situated. Gender relations in many African countries, including the DRC, were shaped by colonial encounters. However, one cannot state conclusively that the current system of patriarchy derives solely from colonial influence. As sketched in Chinua Achebe's historical fiction *Things Fall Apart*, in Ibo society women and men were designated particular roles. For example, the *egwugwu,* nine important males who represented the ancestral spirits of the clan, served as a customary judicial system and made important decisions on behalf of the clan. [43] Chielo, a woman, was the priestess of *Agbala*, the Oracle of the Hills and Caves.[44] She served an important role as the only person in communication with the spirit of *Agbala* who rendered important decisions on the community, such as going to war with another village. While gender identities were and remain distinct, women consistently played important roles in African society.

However, while women have always been always been an integral part of African society, the influence of Victorian ideology in African colonial and postcolonial contexts importantly re-shaped gender roles in Africa. In colonial mission schools, "girls received 'training for the home' stressing domestic activities, dressmaking and embroidery."[45] Nancy Hunt also notes that "in conjunction with girls' education the medical department established clinics for women in order to facilitate the opening of girls' schools and to produce pupils to be trained as hospital nurses."[46] Hence, colonial institutions constructed meanings of gender by institutionalizing certain roles for women that were of 'lesser' importance than those of men. The consequences and implications of these institutional demarcations of gender are visible in the gender relations in many African societies today, including the DRC. Huss-Ashmore et al. explore gender relations in *African Food Systems in Crisis: Contending with Change.* In the chapter "Gender, Land, and Hunger in Zaire" women are described as the predominant farmers in society, responsible for the preparation, sowing, and weeding.[47] On the other hand, banana beer is made, drunk and sold by men, whose labor day as peasants ends at noon. In the Eastern DRC, as in many other areas in Africa, "husbands and wives typically keep their cash resources separate."[48] Women received income by selling food produce, and men, from beer. In a patriarchal society, an important part of this dynamic is the expectation that men should have the higher income in order to take care of the household. As the contributions of women to household income from outside sources increases, women tend to increase "their claims

to personal autonomy and decision-making authority with respect to children."[49] Female income becomes problematic only when a woman is earning more than a man, therefore threatening male dominance. This is the reality encountered by many Congolese men today, as they struggle to preserve their gendered identities in the face of a destabilized environment and economy.

The destabilization of the nation wrought by decades of war has led to a weakened economy, endemic corruption, lack of functioning, adequate social services, and impunity.[50] Frequent land conflicts, looting by militiamen and the continued exploitation of the DRC's natural resources by parties of the conflict disrupt the economic and social health of communities. This has had severe consequences on the ability of men to fulfill the role of a "real man." For example, farmers who have been excessively looted by armed men express that they are no longer able to fulfill their responsibilities. This leads to war-related psychological trauma such as self-devaluation, discouragement and emasculation. Male productivity in farming declines, status symbols cannot be obtained,[51] and farming becomes stigmatized as feminine—a job that does not provide the necessary income to achieve hegemonic masculinity. In Butembo, a semi-urban town, the limit for marriage is set at age thirty. By this time a man must have a house of his own. These expectations remain in place despite economic circumstances. Men who are unable to fulfill these norms are humiliated and lack personal value and self-esteem.[52] Where men are disempowered, especially young men who have been socialized in this war-torn environment with little economic opportunity, they resort to violence as a means of demonstrating their masculinity.[53]

The *barza*—the traditional setting where boys participate in the family and village councils, is an important social structure that has always served to socialize young men in the formation of masculinity, while teaching respect of women and elders. However, elders note that these structures are crumbling in the face of war and insecurity.[54] A militarized masculinity has sometimes replaced the *barza* masculinity in the Eastern DRC. It is important to recognize that the military is largely viewed as an institution "only for the desperate," meaning men from resource-poor backgrounds who lack education and social networks."[55] Combatants are normally socially sanctioned and receive no respect in their communities. However, as war rages on, militia men and members of rebel groups reside and operate within their communities, providing violent examples to young boys.

Without the training of the *barza*, several long-standing social norms can lead to exceptional sexual violence. For example, there is the belief that "power is connected to sexual prowess." In the past having many wives was a status symbol, but today, even though polygamy is less respected due to economic strife, men want several women to claim the image of a "boss." Men also regard women's bodies as tradable commodities, legitimizing sexual activity without the consent of the female partner.[56] Sexual violence often mirrors domestic violence. As expressed by Congolese woman, "a husband that beats his wife is not punished. They say he 'educates his wife,' and they see nothing wrong with

that."[57] Economic deprivation and military violence close off earlier means for maintaining masculine privilege in society. Although this is not a justification for sexual violence, it is important to recognize the complex circumstances under which men display these attitudes toward women.

In essence, men are experiencing social suffering. Laura Lee (2012) argues that "social suffering results from what political, economic, and institutional power does to people, and reciprocally how these forms of power themselves influence responses to social problems."[58] Masculinity is increasingly threatened by economic inequalities. The suffering being experienced by men is psychologically traumatic for them. Many humanitarian actors have failed to recognize this suffering, evident by their one-dimensional views of men as "perpetrators." Men have been victimized by the war too, and need psychological and medical help to deal with the violence and stresses of wartime. Men's abhorrent actions are intricately related to the social suffering experienced when they are unable to fulfill their patriarchal duties. By focusing solely on women's empowerment, NGOs further threaten masculinity. This explains why "men do not regard an economically successful wife as an asset but as a nuisance."[59] By providing business and vocational training classes exclusively to women, NGOs increase women's ability to exert economic influence and make independent choices, yet men cannot be "men" if women are financially above men. Women-centered programs offer little information on alternative ways of affirming male identity.[60] Men are therefore antagonistic toward the ideas of gender equality, as they do not see any benefit in the transformation of social relations.

New Strategies to Address Sexual Violence in the Eastern DRC: The Role of Religious Institutions and the Inclusion of Youth

While social transformation is necessary to combat SGBV in the Eastern DRC, neither men nor women want what Westerners envision as "gender equality." Gender is constructed, conditioned in the process of education and socialization. It can be carefully reconstructed to better-fit new social and economic realities, but there are certain foundational aspects of gender that cannot be uprooted easily. Economic and political instability has brought irreversible changes to the DRC that necessitate a reconstruction of gendered expectations and conceptions of femininity and hegemonic masculinity. Men have to be active agents of this change. As women's empowerment is perceived as male disempowerment in this society, re-approaching the issue from the lens of "community empowerment" will be better suited to this environment.

While I advocate for a community-based approach, concerns that the inclusion of men and boys may undermine feminist goals to empower women should be taken seriously.[61] It is important to ensure that the inclusion of other actors does not weaken the voice of women in the resolution of this conflict as sexual violence. However, a "nuanced understanding of the operation

of power suggests that it should not be viewed as a zero sum game and that addressing hegemonic masculinities should operate in the interest of women and men."[62] Approaching the issue through a victim-focused lens is not effective, for it does not change the underlying causes of rape: the social institutions and cultural believes that shape the meanings of gender and what is socially acceptable. Nor does a victim-focused approach build a community that understands the plight of rape victims. A "community empowerment" rather than "women's empowerment" is less likely to alienate key actors in social transformation such as men, youth, authority and local governments.

Nehemiah Committees (NC) are one of the most successful examples of a community-based program in the Eastern DRC. NCs began in 2000, supported by HEAL Africa, as an interfaith program to support "survivors of sexual violence, orphans, widows, and other vulnerable populations."[63] There are more than 140 NCs consisting of village leaders, men and women representing all faith groups and ethnicities in communities, and local synergies of pastors, priests, and imams trained in conflict resolution.[64] NCs are HEAL Africa's first line of entry for all their other programs. They work to rebuild or create new systems of support damaged by violence and periods of war. By sensitizing communities to reduce the stigma of rape, traumatic fistula, and HIV, NCs create a more comfortable environment for the reintegration of victims of sexual violence. NCs address grievances such as inequitable access to resources, and land disputes that are triggers for violence. They also work to identify and build shelter for rape survivors who are no longer able to return home. Lastly they implement a host of HEAL Africa programs such as micro-finance by reviewing applications and providing loans.

A poignant example of the NCs community approach is the conflict mapping and management project,[65] conducted in March 2011 in North Kivu province. NC leaders, HEAL Africa community program staff, and young adults undertook a five month long implementation and evaluation project that included conflict mapping and mitigation training, and the assessment of HEAL Africa community actions and projects.[66] In total, 315 NC members, local leaders and young adults received training and directly participated in activities. Of those trained, 40% were women.[67] Among many of the conflicts targeted by the project was SGBV. NCs asserted that "SGBV not only affects women, but helps maintain levels of underdevelopment as women are economic earners and cultivators. The continuation of placing women as vulnerable and inferior mutes their intrinsic role in peace-building and development. An absence of knowledge around gender rights written in constitutional law helps to maintain gender discrimination."[68] Despite the weak state of governance, the continuation of violence, and socio-cultural conflicts, the consistent efforts of HEAL Africa and NC "communities throughout Maniema and North Kivu, Congolese women and men, young and old; Muslim and Christian, Hutu and Hunde are making strides together toward the restoration of social ties and relationships with one another."[69] The work of NCs to create stronger and more cohesive communities in spite of conflict should be applauded.

There are two important points to extract from this brief synopsis of Nehemiah Committees that will be further explored. First, the foundation of NCs is religious. In the midst of this turmoil NCs recognized that the institutions that considerably affect and shape local social realities are religious. Community leaders partnered with pastors, priests, and imams to rebuild community bonds and reshape various ideas concerning issues such as ethnicity, gender violence, and land ownership. Second, the inclusion of youth in the conflict mapping project was the first time NCs and HEAL Africa had solicited the expertise and opinion of young adults in peace-building."[70] In fact of the 315 total group members, 114 of them were young adults.[71] This intergenerational approach to conflict mitigation and mapping is something that needs to be carried forward, particularly in reference to reshaping identities of masculinity and femininity to better fit the current and future reality of DRC. In order to curtail the cycle of violence, NGOs, community organizations, and other actors need to focus on youth. By youth, organizations typically mean people aged 15–25, but "youth" can also be conceptualized as "a transitional stage in life between childhood and adulthood rather than as a rigid construct based on age.[72] Young men especially need to be targeted, as they are significantly disaffected by the conflict, the depletion of resources, the lack of educational and employment opportunities, and consequently the inability to transition to adulthood through marriage and even when married, maintaining the position as the "breadwinner." When young men are unable to assert hegemonic masculinity in the societally sanctioned way, they often turn to violence as a source of masculinity,[73] leading to an increase in the number of youth combatants and the rates of sexual violence perpetrated by both combatants and non-combatants. It is imperative for NGOs to involve all youth in post-conflict building and discussions of masculinity and femininity, recognizing the grave need for the reconstruction of gendered identities.

Ideas about gender and the acceptability of sexual violence are imbedded "in the processes, practices, images and ideologies, the distributions of power in the various sectors of social life."[74] This suggests a "need to go beyond micro-level work with men as individuals to challenge normative, heterosexist male power as it is structurally invested in institutions, such as the legal system and police."[75] In the Eastern DRC, key institutions include police, health centers, religious centers, formal courts, and schools. Police and law enforcement are important because they represent the justice system, but tend to turn a blind eye on rape due to institutionalized hegemonic masculinity. Religious institutions can also shape community attitudes toward sexual violence. On one hand, these institutions may already teach their congregations to respect and empower women. Conversely, some religious leaders may "profess dogmas that strongly support male dominance and entitlement can have a negative influence on sex roles and indirectly perpetuate gender discrimination."[76] Given the fact that religious organization are greatly influential moral authorities in their communities and hence "can play a major role in educating people to take a stand against gender based violence,"[77] it

is pertinent for NGOs to educate these leaders on the role of unequal gender relations in propagating unacceptable sexual violence against women. Such training and education equips religious leaders to educate their communities, and thus play an essential role in spurring positive social change in the direction of gender equality. For these reasons it is important that NCs and HEAL Africa recognized the influence of religious institutions in their communities and brought together different religious leaders to support victims of sexual violence and dispel stigmas.

Traditional and customary systems play a complex role in the case of DRC sexual violence. These "informal judicial systems may be more developed and firmly ensconced than formal state systems, particularly in the developing world and post-conflict and transitional setting."[78] Yet customary institutions, mostly dominated by men, often "encourage gender inequality and practices that may be harmful to women and girls."[79] In the case of the Eastern DRC, the negative economic impact of the conflict, the disaffection of the community with traditional leaders, and the intergenerational conflict between youth and traditional leaders has led to the weakening and de-legitimization of traditional authority.[80] Nevertheless, these institutions were and remain influential in shaping ideas of gender and sexual violence, and remain a core part of efforts to change gendered identities, especially at the community level.

As traditional authority erodes, the importance of youth in combating sexual violence rises. The political economy of conflict and youth exclusion from social and political systems has driven young men toward violence to attain economic self-sufficiency and culturally proscribed hegemonic masculinity.[81]

The conflict has generated significant shifts in the socioeconomic sphere, primarily people's access to land and resources, and the organization of local authority.[82] Youth face un-and underemployment, and insufficient and inappropriate education and skills. Without access to sufficient income most young men are unable to afford a house or bride price required for marriage. Consequently their inability to marry curtails their transition to adulthood and full "manhood." Many studies suggest that these circumstances lead to youth involvement in "criminal activities—such as drugs trade, armed groups and other illegal trade—that offer livelihood opportunities"[83] and a new social identity.[84] The second social transformation derives from poor governance and youth exclusions from political participation. As explained by Hilker et al., "participation in the formal political system does not provide an outlet for youth to express their needs, aspirations and grievances." Violence becomes a way to circumvent the power structures that marginalize them.[85]

This reaction to exclusion is mirrored in local and traditional political systems. The root cause of youth exclusion from the social, economic, and political sphere lies in the "rigid institutions and social norms that mediate transitions from school to work and family formation."[86] As referenced by Hilker and Fraser, the intergenerational problem between youth and elders, which has led to the weakening of traditional authority by young combatants, grows from the fact that "in many parts of Africa, young people have effectively

been 'infantilized' by traditional elites. Instead of harnessing the potential of a new generation of youth, a generation gap has effectively built up between the 'led' and the 'leaders,' with young people being 'led' despite making up the majority of the population."[87] Youth participants in the HEAL Africa conflict mapping and mitigation project acknowledged the intergenerational conflict between traditional leaders and youth. "When asked how to proceed in the face of inter-generational conflict, specifically regarding distrustful relationships between local chiefs/leaders and young people, 75% [of] young adult participants in interviews stated that the best practice was listening to one another."[88] Traditional authority must provide spaces for youth to voice their opinions and contribute to decision-making. Exclusion of youth from forums of authority, especially in this difficult socioeconomic context has led to general opposition and conflict.

Lacking meaningful economic opportunities and political voices, militias continue to operate within communities, leading to militarized masculinities. Violence as a means to an end, whether social by asserting hegemonic masculinity through rape, or economic by exploiting communities and resources for personal gain, becomes legitimized.

In order to put an end to this cycle of sexual violence, organizations and community leaders have to "recognize the importance of youth as both partners and beneficiaries of development and conflict prevention."[89] It is important to conduct an on-ground assessment to determine the ways in which youth issues should be addressed in the Eastern DRC. This should necessarily involve the participation of youth as they best understand the causes of their disaffection. Youth have to be an important part of local, regional, and national conflict resolution as they are the population that has most endured the socioeconomic effects of the war. It is also important for NGOs to extend psychological services to all youth, and also create opportunities for the economic empowerment of young men. For example, micro-finance programs can be extended to young men, in addition to teaching them appropriate educational skills such as vocational training that can lead to viable employment opportunities. Incorporating education about human rights, SGBV into the curriculum of vocational training programs might be a practical way to engage youth in discussions of gender.

It is important to realize that the political economy of the war itself limits the opportunities currently available to youth. The efforts of one NGO alone are not enough to provide economic resources to sustain the entire population. Creating a significant number of job opportunities requires an increase in the capacity of the state to sponsor social services and invest in economic development. This requires the DRC government to first stop the illegal extraction of natural resources by state officials and army officers, and secondly to expertly channel state revenue toward the construction of a strong economic environment. Equally, the international community must hold responsible foreign companies that are participating in the pillage of the DRCs resources, and most importantly corporate policies in the Eastern DRC's mining sector must

respect the human rights of the population and the sovereign right of the DRC to benefit fairly from the resources of its land. This might not attainable at the moment. In the meantime, it is important for organizations to collaborate by using their resources to co-create opportunities for the communities in which they work. As argued by Douma et al., organizations cannot offer the "whole package" themselves; effective cross-referencing between organizations is important for the provision of sexual violence assistance.[90]

Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

To a large extent, the scale and persistence of sexual violence in the Eastern DRC is a direct consequence of the unequal gender relations that derive from problematic conceptions of hegemonic masculinities and femininity in this region. For this reason, more on the ground investigation is needed on the development of militarized hegemonic masculinities in the DRC in the past decade and the factors that have led to severely violent portrayals of masculinity. Concurrently, NGOs must understand that some aspects of gender and sexuality are deeply ingrained and cannot be completely uprooted. Hence, organizations have to recognize the hegemonic masculine ideals that men are traditionally required to fulfill and the economic constraints young men face in meeting these requirements.

It is also essential for these NGOs to understand that women in the Eastern DRC do not perceive of gender equality as absolutely equality between males and females. Rather, their idea of empowerment is to enhance respect, rights, and liberties within a patriarchal society. Organizations working in the DRC need to recognize that this conception of women empowerment implies that empowering women also requires increasing the socioeconomic resources available to men so that men are better able to fulfill their roles in society. Gender ideals in the DRC need to be reconstructed to better-fit current social and economic realities. It is important that men and all youth are not excluded from this discourse, as their exclusion will have negative ramification for the success of any efforts at social change in this society.

In order to help men deconstruct destructive ideals of hegemonic masculinity and reconstruct more socially acceptable principles of masculinity, development practitioners in the Eastern DRC need to deviate from the pervading portrayal of "men as perpetrators" and "women as victims." This one-dimensional accusatory portrait excludes men from the processes of societal development and positive change, by making them antagonistic toward ideas of gender equality.

NGOs also must recognize that men and youth have been severely traumatized by the war, not just women. Psychological services and medical care should be extended to these groups in order to help them better deal with the effects of wartime violence and economic stresses. In order to curtail the cycle of general and sexual violence in the DRC, NGOs, community organizations, and national and international actors need to focus on youth—especially

young men—as a target group. This is due to the fact that having grown up in a conflict-torn environment; youth are significantly disaffected and lack crucial educational and economic opportunities. Consequently, they are unable to transition into full manhood and tend to react by asserting masculinity through violence. It is pivotal that community leaders, organizations, and the DRC government to fully address the issue of SBGV and the economic deprivation of young men.

To combat the economic difficulties facing young men, which has contributed to the development of militarized hegemonic masculinities, extensive research should be conducted to determine the current state of the DRC's economy and the implications it has for the socioeconomic resources available youth.

NGOs should also look to address the role of youth in traditional authority structures and the intergenerational conflict between youth and traditional sources of authority. NGOs should advocate for traditional authority to open spaces and forums for youth opinion and contribution to the development of societal norms and laws.

Youth, men, women, traditional authority, religious structures, and society as a whole should be engaged through community-based empowerment strategies to more directly tackle the epidemic of sexual violence in the Eastern DRC. As part of this effort organizations should locate the institutional, cultural, and financial barriers to an effective response. In this way organizations can work in concert with society as a whole to challenge the normative, heterosexist male power built into institutions such as the legal system and police. The partnership of influential legal, traditional, and religious institutions is especially helpful, for they would contribute significantly to current efforts to reshape ideals of masculinity and femininity in the DRC, community attitudes, and responses to sexual violence.

In conclusion, the continuation of massive sexual violence in the DRC is rooted in the persistence of the wider conflict, motivated and financed by the illicit extraction of natural resources by regional, national and international parties. Hence, it is necessary for all humanitarian actors in the DRC to recognize the cause of continued conflict in the DRC and to take a political stance against the illegal activities that propagate the war in the Eastern DRC. If international actors do not firmly renounce the involvement of corporations from countries such as the United States and France in the illicit extraction of the DRCs resources, the humanitarian efforts of actors from these same Western nations are essentially futile as long as large-scale violence pervades due to the political economy of the war.

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The Bleeding Hearts and Minds of the West:

Assessing Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan

Joey Shea, *McGill University*

Abstract

The publication of the *Field Manual 3-24* in 2006 marked a significant shift in the strategy of American counterinsurgency operations. Operations in Afghanistan necessitated a reexamination of the conventional technical-organizational approach to counterinsurgency warfare; the emphasis on defeating insurgent forces by force alone was shifted to winning the 'hearts and minds' of the local population. This paper examines the 'hearts and minds' approach by assessing its theoretical foundations, aims, and practical implementation. For the sake of conceptual clarity, the "hearts and minds" approach is categorized into two separate types of activities; humanitarian and development activities aimed at establishing and increasing legitimacy for the central government; and information operations aimed at understanding and manipulating cultural knowledge. These two types of activities are explicated within the context of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and then assessed. The argument stemming from this analysis is twofold; first, the "hearts and minds" intellectual foundation is imbued with Western assumptions about legitimacy and culture. Western cultural determinism and modernization theory underlie USA military doctrine and, therefore, inhibit strategic judgment and assessment. Second, the practical implementation of the hearts and minds technique lacks significant verifiable empirical evidence of success. An analysis of 'hearts and minds' programs shows how flawed assumptions have resulted in flawed programs. In conclusion, Western theories and assumptions have prevented the military from an accurate assessment of the needs of the population and the population itself. The flaws in the intellectual foundation of the hearts and minds approach are thus translated into tactical failures.

Introduction

The debate over the counterinsurgency strategy adopted by the United States and its NATO partners is one that continues to receive considerable attention. Academics, militarists and journalists have all weighed in on the efficacy,

effectiveness and rationality of current counterinsurgency doctrine. Sparked by insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the approach of the 2006 publication of US Army *Field Manual 3-24* has defined debate for almost a decade. The manual adopts what has been historically called the "hearts and minds" approach.

This paper will examine the "hearts and minds" approach by assessing its theoretical foundations, aims and practical implementation. The term "hearts and minds" is vague; it can be interpreted in various ways and is associated with numerous tactical activities. For the sake of conceptual clarity, this paper will categorize the "hearts and minds" approach as humanitarian and development activities aimed at establishing and increasing legitimacy for the central government; and information operations aimed at understanding and manipulating cultural knowledge. The theoretical underpinnings and practical implementation of these operations will be analyzed and assessed, with specific reference to programs such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the Human Terrain Teams. They will serve to represent the two different forms of operationalized hearts and minds activities, respectively.

It will be shown that problems with the hearts and minds approach stem from an intellectual foundation rife with uncritically examined Western assumptions. The argument is twofold; first, the "hearts and minds" intellectual foundation is imbued with Western assumptions about legitimacy and culture. These assumptions have yet to undergo any critical examination by the military and are accepted unquestioningly as objective truth. Cultural determinism and modernization theory, stemming from a distinctly Western perspective, underlie USA military doctrine and, as a result, inhibit strategic judgment and assessment. Second, the practical implementation of the hearts and minds technique lacks significant verifiable empirical evidence of success. An analysis of such 'hearts and minds' programs as Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the Human Terrain System shows how flawed assumptions have resulted in flawed programs.

Development of the "Hearts and Minds" Approach

Texts such as the 2004 *Counter-guerrilla's Operations Handbook, Security International Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era* and *Counterinsurgency Warfare and Practice* share the same approach to counterinsurgency. They characterize the U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine of the Donald Rumsfeld era, emphasizing conventional tactics and material superiority.[1] Such a technical-organizational approach focuses on the "tactics, organizational structures and operations of the insurgents, [which] move then to designing structures processes and counter-operations that exploit [their] technical and structural weaknesses."[2] This was the strategy initially pursued by the United States when they entered Afghanistan in response to the attacks of 9/11.[3] It sought to eliminate Al-Qaeda leadership and to execute a decisive military defeat of Taliban force.[4] The Taliban was decimated within the first ten days

of operations.[5] Despite this initial success, these operations merely to delay insurgent violence, rather than to eradicate it completely. As the mission progressed, the emphasis on defeating insurgent forces solely by force alone shifted, and attention was refocused on winning the "hearts and minds" of the local population.[6]

Technology and conventional force alone was proven inadequate in modern counterinsurgency operations. The shift toward winning the hearts and minds occurred within both military and academic circles and prompted a great deal of literature. Academics and militarists alike weighed in on the pop-centric counterinsurgency debate; exploring its historical precedents, theoretical underpinnings and practical implementation. Winning hearts and minds would require the support and understanding of the local peoples. It was argued that "defeating the political subversion of insurgencies requires making a difference in the lives of the local population" and "understanding the local culture."[7, 8] The post-Rumsfeld Pentagon advocated for this softer approach to counterinsurgency, focusing on humanitarian and development efforts and the operationalization of anthropology.[9]

This theoretical reassessment was marked by General David Patreus's *Field Manual 3-4*. In stark contrast to the 2004 handbook, the *FM 3-24* dedicates less than ten percent to the tactical and technical organizational approach. Instead, it states that "legitimacy is the main objective" of counterinsurgency operations.[10] The aim, therefore, of counterinsurgency operations is "to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government."[11] Success, therefore, depends on a legitimate central government, rendering conventional military operations subordinate to securing the support of the local population.[12] Conventional operations play a supporting role by helping to maintain security for the political and economic activities. In addition to this emphasis on legitimacy, there is also a focus on the role of culture in insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. Beatrise Heurser argues that this publication marked "the cultural revolution in counter-insurgency." [13] Culture "under the impact of a anthropological approach" dominates as a means to both understand and counteract insurgency.[14] Societal analysis is paramount, as an understanding of "culture or cultures, beliefs, identity/identities, the structures, organizations, institutions of society, roles, statues, social norms, values, attitudes and perceptions" is argued to be necessary for any successful COIN operations.[15] The "hearts and minds" approach can therefore, be broadly divided into two categories: (1) "a specific set of activities in the field of humanitarian and development affairs, conducted or financed by military units" aimed at winning the support of the local population through a legitimate central government," and; (2) "a set of activities within the field of information operations and psychological operations," predicated on the idea that culture is a dimension of warfare that can be operationalized.[16]

This paper will now examine both categories of the hearts and minds approach. Their theoretical foundations will first be analyzed and critiqued. Then, the effectiveness of their practical implementation will be assessed.

For both development efforts and the operationalization of anthropology, it becomes clear that they are predicated on dubious and uncritically examined Western assumptions. Modernization theory, a Legal-Rational approach to legitimacy, and cultural deterministic anthropological theory underlie these activities and find their origins within Western traditional of thought. These Western theories and assumptions have prevented the military from an accurate assessment of the needs of the population and the population itself. The flaws in the intellectual foundation of the hearts and minds approach are thus translated into tactical failures.

Legitimacy via Development

The "hearts and minds" approach centers around the idea that winning and maintaining the support of the local population is paramount to the success of any counter-insurgency operations. Winning hearts and minds "translates into diverse tactical activities aimed at increasing the support from the local population and the legitimacy of the host central government."[17] Activities that aim to increase legitimacy are operationalized into humanitarian aid and development programs. This approach is argued to be rooted in modernization theory and a normative Western approach to legitimacy. Counterinsurgents have preconceived ideas about the needs and grievances of the population and are unable to critically examine such assumptions. Furthermore, there is a lack of empirical evidence that these hearts and minds activities have had any measurable impact. Through an analysis of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, it is clear that these activities are not overwhelmingly successful. This outcome is argued to be based on theoretical flaws, ineffectiveness of actual implementation, and resource constraints.

Theoretical Underpinnings and Its Flaws

The *FM 3-24* argues, "killing insurgents [. . .] by itself cannot defeat an insurgency."[18] Instead, it insists that counterinsurgents "cut off the sources of that recuperative power," a task which involves "redressing the social, political, and economic grievances that fuel the insurgency"[19] through a "focus on the population, its needs and its security."[20] These activities are predicated on the assumption that "defeating the political subversion of insurgencies requires making a difference in the lives of the local population."[21] The aim of these counterinsurgency operations is therefore "to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government" through humanitarian and development aid.[22]

The particular understanding of legitimacy, which underlies these "hearts and minds" activities stems from a distinctly Western context. Fitzsimmons argues that:

> The premise of most Western thinking on counter-insurgency is that success depends on establishing a perception of legitimacy for the ruling regime among some critical portion of the local population. Among

the mechanisms available to counter-insurgents for establishing that legitimacy, one of the most prominent in both practice and doctrine has been the improvement of governance in the form of effective and efficient administration of government and public services. Good governance, by this logic, is the key to 'winning hearts and minds.'[23]

The particular rendering of political legitimacy found in the *FM 3-24* stems from the legal-rational tradition, originating from Western political thought.[24] Legitimacy, in this view, is moral and rational. This legal and rational approach allows for an objective analysis of legitimacy; there is a strict and verifiable distinction between legitimacy and illegitimacy. Furthermore, Engell argues that "it allows for a technocratic planning and implementation of operations that 'simply' fulfills these objective criteria that automatically lead to legitimacy."[25]

In addition to the Legal-Rational tradition, pop-centric counterinsurgency is predicated on modernization theory. This theory "emphasized a teleological convergence of societies through several stages of modernization from primitive traditional forms toward Western-style industrialization, secularization and political pluralism."[26] It assumes that developing nations should be assisted in their inevitable transition toward Western-style political, economic and social institutions. History is used to enforce and justify this approach, selectively choosing past experiences as objective examples to indicate future advancements. Hearts and minds counterinsurgency operations similarly assume that political legitimacy is won through economic growth, political representation and effective administration.

However, this notion of legitimacy, based on Western legal-rational assumptions and modernization theory, is not universal. There exist many alternative views of legitimacy outside of this particular Western tradition. For example, Max Weber argues legitimacy is simply a popular perception or belief in its existence.[27] He identifies three different forms: charismatic authority, based on the charisma of the leader; traditional authority based on custom of the past or habit, and; rational/legal authority with legitimacy based on the perception that a government's powers are derived from set procedures, principles, and laws.[28]

Engell argues that "acknowledging different forms of authority and legitimacy beyond the legal/rational challenges some of the assumptions underpinning the hearts and minds approach."[29] Western forms of legitimacy are not universally applicable; what constitutes sound and justified governance in the West is not necessarily the case in Afghanistan. Malcolm Chalmers argues that "at the hearts of these projects is an acceptance of universal norms."[30] It is imprudent to assume universal norms of legitimacy without considering differences in cultural attitudes, historical precedents, geography, and other factors that shape societal attitudes. Western norms are imported and enforced by development and humanitarian projects without critical examination of their effectiveness within the specificity of Afghan society. These programs are inherently normative; yet do not recognize themselves as such.

The fundamental issue is that they fail to recognize various forms of legitimate authority and the path toward its establishment.

Legitimacy is subjective. Lipset argues that legitimacy stems from the ability to create and maintain a popular belief in the political system and a perception that the systems institutions are the best suited to a particular society.[31] Reforms should imitate local existing values and legitimacy, rather than importing Western ones. Western counterinsurgents must understand that their basic assumptions about establishing legitimacy in a particular society may be false.[32] General Sir David Richards, an ISAF Commander in Afghanistan states that,

> The legitimacy of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan speaks more directly to the concerns of the local population; i.e., sometimes military capacity cannot be replaced by soft power. Security failure cannot be mitigated by development activities: if you are an Afghan who has spent 30 years fighting, you have learned not to put faith in the wrong side, because it comes back to haunt you.[33]

Afghans are being offered different forms of government by a variety of actors, which speak to different conceptions of legitimacy. Therefore, the norms underlying the "hearts and minds" approach must be taken into critical consideration. Western counterinsurgents must enter into dialogue with their own preconceptions and recognize the importance of analytical objectivity.

Practical Implementation and Its Failures

The operational tactic in which these principles manifest themselves is known as "clear, hold, build" in which insurgents first "clear" an area from insurgent presence, "hold" this clear territory as a safe zone from which insurgents are isolated, and subsequently "build" the social and political institutions needed to provides health care, education and most importantly, legitimate governance in order to win the "hearts and minds" of the host government.[34] In Afghanistan, this technique was operationalized by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams program. Their strategy was to "extend the central government's reach and create zones of stability that will win over local people."[35] CIMIC-teams (civil affairs) meet with local leaders to establish trusted networks and to collect information regarding the desires of the local population. This information is then used to determine which humanitarian and development activities will be most effective. These activities are either performed by the military itself or are contracted out to NGOs or international organizations. The United States Army funds these programs through the Commanders Emergency Response Programs (CERPS), which were described by the US Defense Secretary as "resources to improve local governance, delivery of public services, and quality of life."[36] The government of Afghanistan and ISAF is therefore "involved in a struggle for the support of the local population."[37] This support is argued to depend on recognizing and addressing the needs and legitimate grievances of the local population upon which the insurgency thrives.[38]

However, there is evidence that indicates the ineffectiveness of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. To begin, many have questioned the utility of the military's involvement with aid activities. Stephen Cornish argues that the development projects of the PRTs in Afghanistan have often been "costly, wasteful, lacking in quality and often not taking into account community needs."[39] Canadian Major General Lewis MacKenzie stated that, "soldiers are not social workers with guns. Both disciplines are important, but both will suffer if combined in the same individuals."[40] The quality in the delivery of development and humanitarian programs is severely undermined when executed by undertrained personnel. Military units do not receive adequate training in these fields, causing projects to be less effective and sustainable.

Projects carried out by the military may actually incur harm if they do not foresee the unintended consequences of their actions. For example, Michelle Parker, a former development adviser to the commander of ISAF explained that, "PRT dug wells in a village as a reward for providing information. The team did not conduct a water table analysis and the new wells caused wells in a neighboring village to dry up. The village with the dry wells thought the United States did it intentionally and was no longer supportive of the new Afghan government or US efforts in the area."[41]

In addition to this harm-inducing lack of experience, programs were based on the capacity fo the military force rather than the needs of the population.[42] Rietjens found that "little attention was paid to the involvement of the local population, which resulted in decreased sustainability, a lack of cohesion with social structures, a lack of ownership, and mismatches between the assistance activities and the actual needs."[43] He points to the fact that the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team in Baghlan "did not identify the stakeholders of its assistance activities."[44] Apparently, only some of the local authorities were consulted and there was no structure in place by which to identify relevant local parties.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams have not been overwhelmingly successful in the fulfillment of their mandate. Many factors have contributed to these failures including a lack of resources. However, it is clear that flawed assumptions about legitimacy and popular support are significant contributors. The military does not receive the proper training to implement these programs effectively, which further exacerbates underlying legitimacy issues. A lack of awareness as to the needs of particular communities makes the effectiveness of these programs highly questionable: how can you win popular support by addressing societal grievances when those grievances remain unknown? Finally, these key issues stem from a fundamental problem; Western counterinsurgents consider their norms universal and fail to recognize that their programs do not fit within local particularities.

Operationalizing Culture

Another dimension of the "hearts and minds" technique centers on the idea that cultural understanding is paramount to the success of any counter-insurgency

program. Culture is approached as a dimension of warfare than can be oper-ationalized. Anthropological knowledge is integrated into education and campaign planning, serving two purposes: as a way of explaining the enemy's thought and behavior and as a basis for interacting with foreign societies. Cul-tural awareness and understanding is argued to curtail misunderstandings between counterinsurgents and the local population, thus reducing kinetic operations. However, US military doctrine which espouses this concept, has deeply flawed views of culture. Additionally, there is a lack of empirical evi-dence to suggest that these culture centric counterinsurgency programs have had any significant impact.

A Fallacious Intellectual Foundation

Montgomery McFate was one of the main proponents of the recent reemer-gence of an anthropological approach to counterinsurgency. She argued that the "organizational structure is not military but tribal; tactics are not conven-tional but asymmetrical."[45] Technology, training and tactics developed during the Cold War did not respond to the needs of current low-intensity counter-insurgency operations. The over-reliance on conventional military force has been detrimental and the lack of anthropological knowledge in the military since the Vietnam War has had devastating consequences for counterinsur-gency operations. Traditional combat methods have failed in Afghanistan because "coalition forces have been fighting a complex war against an enemy they do not understand."[46] Military strategy should be heavily informed by cultural considerations. She argues, "successful counterinsurgency depends on attaining a holistic, total understanding of local culture."[47] Forces must use anthropology to exploit the social and cultural dynamics of the country in an attempt to reduce the occurrence of kinetic operations.

The idea that cultural knowledge must be an integral part of counterin-surgency operations at first seems entirely obvious. If the aim is to win the "hearts and minds" of the local population, an understanding of their cul-ture and society is most certainly a prerequisite for any operations. Most will agree that culture matters in counterinsurgency operations. However, the manner in which it is operationalized and conceptualized is of the utmost importance. It is this conceptualization and operationalization of culture that is most flawed within US military doctrine. The versions of culture asserted by military officers, academics and anthropologists in the context of counter-insurgency operations is highly problematic. Patrick Porter argues that these culturalist approaches "paint foreigners as non-dynamic exotic beings fixed in time."[48] Furthermore, this flawed approach "overstates continuities within cultures," "misses the interactive and power-political nature of war" and "mis-conceives what culture is."[49]

McFate herself, the co-author of the *FM 3-24* and founder of the Human Terrain System, has questionable views about culture and its relationship to armed conflict. For example, she believes that the United States is inherently different in its understanding of war than its enemy. The United States is

'Clausewitizian,' and understands armed conflict as "a rational extension of politics by other means."[50] She states that these adversaries:

> Neither think nor act like nation states. Rather, their form of warfare, organizational structure and motivations are determined by the society and culture from which they come. Attacks on coalition troops in the Sunni triangle, for example, follow predictable patterns of tribal warfare: avenging the blood of a relative (al tha'r); demonstrating manly courage in battle (al-muruwwah); and upholding manly honor (al-sharaf). Similarly, al Qaeda and its affiliated groups are replicating the Prophet Muhammed's 7th-century process of political consolidation through jihad, including opportunistic use of territories lacking political rulers as a base, formation of a corps of believers as a precursor to mass recruiting, and an evolution in targeting from specific, local targets (such as pagan caravans) to distant powerful enemies (for instance, the Byzantine Empire). To confront an enemy so deeply moored in history and theology, the US Armed Forces must adopt an ethnographer's view of the world: it is not nation-states but cultures that provide the underlying structures of political life.[51]

In this view, contemporary counterinsurgency is a result of ancient Oriental impulses. Culture is therefore non-dynamic; the enemy is predictably determined by longstanding religious, cultural, and tribal affiliations. Being partly written by McFate herself, the *FM 3-24* is imbued with this same view of culture, which is "logically consistent, bounded, highly integrated, internally coherent, and animated often by a single unifying narrative."[52]

There are many flaws with this approach. To tease out these tensions, let us consider the wartime behavior of Afghans. Patrick Porter argues that "the wartime behavior of Afghans suggests that their culturally rooted beliefs and taboos are not decisively important," instead, "the Taliban operate as cultural realists, reinventing their cultural codes as they go."[53] The Taliban "operates primarily not according to rigid cultural codes, but to a strategic calculus of success and failure. It has proven to be pragmatic and innovative."[54]

The Taliban in Afghanistan is not reducible to a single ethnic identity. Although its base of support are Pashtuns, their leadership has both Durrani and Ghilzai members. Additionally, they include rival and marginalized tribes, such as Hazara groups in Ghazni.[55] The Taliban is "ready to accept anybody who shared their views and accepted their rules, regardless of ethnicity and tribe."[56] Furthermore, there have been many instances where the Taliban have "compromised their cultural codes for strategic success."[57] For example, the production of opium was banned in 2000 by Mullah Omar, along with a *fatwa* against poppy cultivation. However, the American anti-narcotics program created grievances among the population and therefore allowed for opportunities for the Taliban. They capitalized on this development and now defend this large and profitable industry.[58] By doing this, they not only benefit economically but are also perceived as protectors of the rural economy. Also,

mandatory beards for men and a ban on music and movies were both annulled due to a desire to win popular support of the people.[59] Finally, the Taliban severely targeted public education in the pre-9/11 era. Even immediately after they were removed from power, they violently preyed on eduction by assassinating teachers and blowing up schools. However, they have recently begun a new program of school-building. These programs are not limited to religious instruction and the curriculum is said to include geography, history, physics and chemistry.[60] Some argue that this drastic shift in policy is a result of the Taliban's severe unpopularity in some parts of Afghanistan. Porter states that "this suggests a willingness to sacrifice dogma for popularity."[61] McFate's cultural determinist view contradicts the Taliban's strategic actions.

McFate is not the only theorist with a skewed understanding of culture within the US military; a leaked *Special Forces Advisor Guide* handbook shows how official US doctrine is based on misguided cultural theory. The sections of the guide, which summarize the military's views of culture, stem from antiquated anthropological theory.[62] Specifically, the Values Orientation Model by anthropologist Florence Kluckhohn and psychologist Fred Strodtbeck is argued to have heavily influenced the *Guide.* Developed in the 1950s, the Model is based on the premise that all cultures have "a central core of meaning—basic values."[63] Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck argue that, "value orientations are complex but definitely patterned principles, resulting from the transactional interplay of three analytically distinguishable elements of the evaluative process—the cognitive, the affective and the directive elements—which give order and direction to the ever-flowing stream of human acts and thoughts as these relate to the solution of "common human problems."[64] Furthermore, the Values Orientation Model maintains that "large cultural regions are dominated by easily characterized culture values that can be charted on a simple scale expressing tendencies related to rive cultural elements with three possible responses for each of the five cultural elements."[65]

According to Price, anthropologists have since strayed from these attempts to identify national character and broad cultural types. One reason is because simple characterizations of cultural variations simply ignore the complexities of many behaviors and beliefs. While normative cultural behaviors and values can be identified via statistical assessments, there are still significant variations within peoples in a society. The *Guide* itself admittedly acknowledges the problems of the Values Orientation Model, stating that the summaries "represent sweeping generalizations about very large regions. They are deliberate simplifications, intended only to capture some of the basic cultural differences and similarities among cultural regions."[66] However, such a disclaimer does not negate the damage in using outdated and bunk anthropological theory as the basis for cultural understanding.

Price goes even further, arguing that the *Guide* "is a relic of the military's institutional-cognitive view of the world . . . as it codifies and affirms prevailing social facts of the values already institutionally believed to be governing actors around the globe."[67] Price's "reading of the history of anthropological

interactions with military organizations from the Second World War to the present finds a consistent structural history of cultural knowledge selection in which the large trends of independent academic research have been categorically ignored."[68]

The cultural aspect of the "hearts and minds" approach is not intrinsically flawed. In fact, cultural understanding in counterinsurgency operations is essential to win the support of the population. However, the cultural theory underlying current US military doctrine is highly problematic as it is characterized by cultural determinism and antiquated anthropology. These theories are uncritical of their own subjective bias and therefore create and enforce cultural stereotypes, inhibiting sound strategic judgment.

Practical Implementation and Its Failures

In addition to the *FM 3-24*, the cultural approach to winning 'hearts and minds' manifests itself in the Pentagon Office of Operational Cultural Knowledge.[69] Arising out of a pilot proposal by Montgomery McFate, an experimental counterinsurgency program named the Human Terrain System (HTS) was established. Its aim was to embed social scientists with front-line army units in Iraq and Afghanistan.[70] This program defines human terrain as "the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic and political elements of the people among whom a forces is operating, defined and characterized by sociocultural, anthropologic, and ethnographic data."[71] The goal of this program, as stated by the Secretary of Defense budget, is to "reduce IED incidents via improved situational awareness of the human terrain by using . . . information to understand key population points to win the will and legitimacy fights and face the insurgent IED networks."[72] Furthermore, "capability must be developed to provide a means for commanders and their supporting operations sections to collect data on human terrain, create, store, and disseminate information from this data and use the resulting information as an element of combat power."[73] Human Terrain Teams are comprised of a HTT leader, a cultural analyst, a regional studies analyst, an HT research manager and an HT analyst.[74] These teams collect data on political leadership, kinship groups, economic systems and agricultural production.[75] They use Mapping Human Terrain Software, which is "an automated database and presentation that allows teams to gather, store, manipulate and provide cultural data from hundreds of categories."[76] By giving commanders the ability to understand and deal with the human terrain, the system addresses shortcomings in cultural awareness at both the operational and tactical level.[77] The programs means to use social scientists to "correctly" interact with the local community to build relationships and thus reduce kinetic engagements.

The effectiveness of this program is questionable, as there exists little verifiable empirical evidence supporting its success. For example, Army Col. Martin Schweitzer (82nd Airborne Division) claimed that after HTS anthropologists were embedded with their units "combat operations had been reduced by 60 percent."[78] However, North Caroline Congressman, David

Price, filed a Freedom of Information Act, requesting records that would substantiate or support this claim. In response, Price "received a series of emails from Col. Schweitzer, who conceded that he had no actual data on this and had simply given figures that expressed what seemed to be occurring."[79] Furthermore, after the program had grown quite significantly, "no commander ever made a similar boast about HTS' influence and complaints about the program's recruits metastasized."[80] American journalist John Stanton has also written extensively about the program; outlining the programs mismanagement and its overall inefficiency in the field.[81] Since its inception, it has been plagued with criticism. While various reports have been released to verify its organizational legitimacy, there has yet to be any conclusive evidence speaking to its strategic effectiveness.

The Human Terrain System is predicated on flawed and misguided cultural assumptions. It sees culture as fixed; a variable to be quantified and manipulated. However, these assumptions are negated when considering the Taliban's strategic evolution. Like the United States, they too are eager to gain popular support for their cause. Despite McFate's assertions, insurgents in Afghanistan are not slaves to their cultural, ethnic and religious affiliations. Instead, they are pragmatic and strategic actors, working toward the same goal as the United States: victory in the field.

Conclusion

Since the 2006 publication of General Patraeus' *Field Manual 3-24*, the term "hearts and minds" has been widely discussed, becoming a buzz word on evening news-programs and in morning papers. The term itself is vague when considering actual on-the ground operations. What does is mean to win the "hearts and minds" of a population? How is this abstract concept operationalized into real programs? For the sake of conceptual clarity, the "hearts and minds" approach was categorized into two separate types of activities; humanitarian and development activities aimed at establishing/increasing legitimacy for the central government; and information operations aimed at understanding and manipulating cultural knowledge. The scope of "hearts and minds" operations is certainly not limited to these two activities; it was simply a useful analytic tool used to set precise boundaries on the scope of analysis. The intellectual foundations of these two "hearts and minds" categories were analyzed, along with the effectiveness of their operationalized programs.

It was found that both categories were similarly flawed in their theoretical foundations. Both were hindered by assumptions stemming from a distinctly Western perspective. The form of legitimacy underlying development activities is based on modernization theory and a legal-rational approach. Furthermore, the cultural aspect of the "hearts and minds" approach has similar issues. It too is based on questionable 'cultural determinist' theory. These underlying theories originate in the Western tradition and their proponents fail to recognize their relativity. Such theories have proven to be ill-suited to

other societies. Finally, the practical implementation of these concepts was not found to be decisively successful. Both the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the Human Terrain System were plagued with problems stemming partially from their dubious theoretical basis. In order for the "hearts and minds" approach to be successful, militarists and academics alike need to engage in critical dialogue with their preconceptions. By acknowledging the problem of analytic objectivity, one can begin to unpack the myths through which the West is inclined to view the world.

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Photographic Exploration

Visualizing the Battle

Maura McQuade, *Photo Editor*

With the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent end of the Cold War, the world entered a new era of global violence. Conventional warfare fought between state-employed combatants on a sprawling battlefield became less common, replaced by counterinsurgencies, terrorist activities and public demands for human rights. The images in the subsequent pages reflect a variety of issues associated with both conventional and modern-day warfare. Included are snapshots of conflicts in Syria and the Gaza Strip. Aspects of conventional warfare including territorial disputes and balance-of-power politics lie at the source of these conflicts and manifest in continued violence today.

But not all modern-day disputes result in violence. Some of the most contentious modern issues reflect battles for human rights, environmental justice and the search for a middle ground between modernization and an appreciation of cultural tradition. Overpopulation has led to crowded, chaotic lifestyles and a variety of connected issues such as food security, territorial disputes and global health availability. Globalization's impact can be seen in some of the world's most historical cities; we see signs of commercialized Western products seep across the globe. With these changes comes an increased demand for human rights recognition. Marriage equality and calls for same-sex marriage rights have swept the world. Finally, our generation is beginning to understand the importance of combating climate change. While the effects of our changing environment are staggering, it is important to also recognize that these implications do not affect our society equally as populations of lower socioeconomic status, non-whites, and developing countries bear the brunt of the issue.

The following photographs capture just a few of the issues that have, and continue, to face our world today. They bring to life many of the topics discussed in this journal through the eyes talented undergraduate photographers who bring a unique perspective to each subject.

Ryan Fleer, Tufts University

The Gaza Strip in the town of Sderot, which is the closest Jewish community to the strip. They are under constant threat of rocket attack, but we were fortunate enough to travel extremely close to the Strip Border. Gaza Strip.

A few hundred feet from The Wall lays a mural constructed by a local resident in hopes of fostering a peace with the people who live on the other side. Gaza Strip.

Simona Gilman, Tufts University

Remembering Babi Yar and the 33,771 lives claimed on September 29, 1941, in Kiev, Ukraine. Jerusalem.

Shehryar Nabi, Tufts University

Protestant Christians conduct an annual New Year's service in Lahore, Pakistan. Recent violence against Christians in Pakistan has alerted the international community to the state of minority faiths within the country. Lahore, Pakistan.

On August 4th, 2011, protesting the government's decision to not allow a student march from occurring that day, the Student Federation of the University of Chile called for Chilean citizens to take to the streets.

Will Rose, Tufts University

An abandoned Syrian military outpost. Golan Heights.

A fallow minefield.

David Riche, Tufts University

"Mariage Pour Tous" rally at Place de Bastille in Paris: A celebration of a legal victory in the battle for marriage equality. Performance by MIKA. Paris, France.

Nicholas Pfosi Photography

Visitors explore a receding glacier. Switzerland.

Tufts Divest for the Future, Tufts University

Tufts University students march to the administrative offices in Ballou Hall to show support for a proposal to divest the University's endowment fund from fossil fuel companies. Medford MA, USA.

Abdiel Garcia, Tufts University

The rapidly developing city square of Plaza de la República.
Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Yuchun Bian, Tufts University

The subways are so crowded that sometimes it is suffocating However at the same time, crowds in Beijing are so used to this style of life that they create an order that actually functions in the seemingly chaotic subway station, and in the city as a whole. Beijing, China.

Interviews

The United States' Evolving Presence in the Middle East:
A Discussion with William Monroe

Interview by Adrienne Larson

Biography

William T. Monroe served as a career member of the U.S. Foreign Service Office for almost 34 years. After joining the State Department in 1978, he studied Arabic and then first served at the U.S. Embassy in Egypt. Other assignments in the Middle East included Iraq, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain. He was Deputy Chief of Mission in Kuwait 1999–2002 and Deputy Chief of Mission in Pakistan 2002–2004. In 2004, he was appointed U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain, where he served until 2007. He also served in Burma, China, and Singapore in Asia, and as Deputy Chief of Mission to the U.S. Mission to OECD in Paris 2009–2011. Prior to joining the State Department, he worked for three years as an international trade specialist in the Department of Commerce, first in the Bureau of East-West Trade and then in the Commerce Action Group for the Near East. He received his BA from Stanford University in 1972 and a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School in 1974.

1. *Considering the fact that the U.S. is producing more of its oil domestically, how critical will our relations with the Gulf countries be in the near future? How significant will the role of oil sales be in political diplomacy of the coming decades?*

The fact that the U.S. is producing so much more of its own energy now is comforting and reduces the possibility that disruption of oil supplies can be used as a direct threat to the United States, as happened in the 1970s. However, that misses the point. Oil is an internationally traded and priced commodity. As we have seen, any time there is a crisis that threatens to disrupt oil or gas supplies, petroleum prices around the world, including in the U.S., rise. That can have a depressing impact on global economic growth, including in the U.S. Regarding the Gulf, more than 85 percent of the oil and most of the gas that flows through the Strait of Hormuz goes to Asia. If that oil were cut off, international oil prices would rise immediately, and oil and gas prices (including gasoline) in the U.S. would soar. So we would be impacted. While it is not necessarily essential that we have good relations with all of the oil and gas producers of the Gulf (and, obviously, we have not had good relations with Iran for years), we do have a strong economic interest in ensuring that oil

and gas flows out of the Gulf, and that interest inevitably will continue to be a factor in our relations with the countries of the Gulf as long as the world's economy remains petroleum-based.

2. *How optimistic are you about the recent nuclear talks with Iran? In your opinion, have harsh economic sanctions been an effective deterrence for Iran in running their nuclear program?*

Expectations need to be realistic. There is no question that reaching an agreement in the nuclear talks with Iran will be extremely difficult. But that does not mean it is wrong to try hard to reach an agreement. The options to not trying are worse. War, in my view, could be potentially disastrous for the region, have untold unexpected consequences, and at best delay but not end Iran's nuclear ambitions (in fact it would certainly stiffen Iran's resolve to attain a nuclear capability). The other option would be stiffer sanctions. I believe that sanctions, and economic hardship, can have an impact on Iran's leaders. Let's not forget that sustained economic hardship was an important factor in the Iranian leadership's abrupt decision to end its war with Iraq in the 1980s. And it is clear that sanctions played a significant role in bringing Iran to the negotiating table now. The problem is that, over time, economic sanctions get harder and harder to sustain politically, as they often disproportionately affect the poor. But stiffer sanctions, rather than war, is certainly the more prudent course of action if the current talks fail.

3. *How does the Islamic state of Iran affect U.S. Iranian relations? Do you see a more allied relationship between the U.S. and Iran in the future, despite our differing political structures and ideology?*

The issue is not whether or not Iran is an Islamic state. The issue is how Iran acts in the regional and international arenas. To the extent that it interferes in the internal affairs of its neighbors, supports international terrorism, or poses other threats, including the development of nuclear weapons, it will of course be impossible for the U.S. and Iran to have normalized or, as you put it, "allied" relations. But Iran is an important country in the region, and I think we all hope that there comes a day when our two countries can have a normal productive bilateral relationship.

4. *Do you believe the U.S. is pivoting away from the Middle East and toward East Asia (i.e., Obama Administration's "pivot" toward Asia) is well justified? What do you think should be the main U.S. priorities in our relations with our East Asia allies?*

Regarding the "pivot" to Asia, I do not think this "pivot" implies a lessening of relations with the countries of the Middle East. It is definitely a signal that we have important interests with our friends and allies in Asia, but it does not suggest that we will move away from engagement in the Middle East. The amount of time and energy that Secretary of State John Kerry has expended on such issues as Syria, Iran, and Middle East peace certainly attests to that.

At the same time, East Asia is too important not to seek ways to enhance our engagement there. In terms of our priorities in Asia, I believe that they fall into two broad categories. One is trade. East Asia has long been an area of dynamic economic growth, and it is important that we both promote the efforts of American companies to trade and invest in the region, and continue the hard work of removing barriers to doing business there. The second broad interest is security. One reason East Asia has been able to sustain its robust economic development is the relatively stable environment that has existed there since the end of the Vietnam War. It is in every country's interest to maintain that secure regional environment.

5. *Do you feel the policy decisions by former President Bush and his administration were effective in responding to security threats in the Middle East?*

Interesting question. The short answer, in my view, is that the policies of the Bush Administration made the situation better than it was but not as good as it could have been. On the positive side, whatever you may think of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the fall of Saddam Hussein removed a destabilizing element in the region—a leader who had attacked two of his neighbors in the past and could certainly have threatened the region's stability in the future. Second, it cannot be denied that there have been no successful or serious threats of terrorist attacks in the U.S. since 9/11. Third, the Bush Administration's promotion of democracy in the region at the least encouraged people in the region to think more about democracy and helped plant some of the seeds that subsequently led to the Arab Spring. To the extent that people focus on internal governance issues and the possibility of participating in the choice of leaders and policies, it should in the long run have a positive impact on regional security.

That said, the badly flawed manner in which the Bush Administration launched the occupation of Iraq, and its unfortunate decision to drop its focus on Afghanistan while dealing with Iraq, left both countries unstable and provided new breeding grounds for terrorism—and thus new security threats. And if you praise the Bush Administration for its support of democracy in the region—which I do—you also have to acknowledge that the path toward democracy has proven messy and difficult, and that in the short term it is not at all clear that the Arab Spring has reduced security threats from the region. Quite the opposite, in fact, in Syria.

6. *How important do you feel the U.S. maintaining a favorable image abroad is?*

It is better, of course, to have a favorable image abroad than an unfavorable image. But many factors go into the image of a country abroad, and there can be differences between images of the country and its people, and attitudes toward the country's policies. We have been most successful in cultivating a favorable image of our country when we have engaged in people-to-people contact—encouraging students to attend U.S. universities, organizing exchange programs and visits that expose foreigners to our democratic institutions, our culture, and

our freedoms, or fostering military-to-military contacts. Over the years, work-ing at several U.S. Embassies in the Middle East and Asia, I found that many of our best, strongest friends were individuals and officials who had studied or worked in the United States and understood our country. It is crucial that we maintain these opportunities, which no doubt help our image abroad.

That said, our policies, no matter how well-intentioned, do have an impact on our image abroad, and while we should be aware of that, "image" should not be the determining factor in our decision-making. Our image has obvi-ously suffered in the Arab world because of our support for Israel, but that support is not going to change. Drones have been an important component of our fight against terrorism, and eliminating terrorists is a policy success, but it comes at the expense of our image in the countries where the drones land and civilians die, most notably in Pakistan. Sometimes, our image is adversely affected in the most unexpected ways. One would think that support of demo-cratic freedoms would be popularly received in those countries whose people are striving for democracy. But in both Egypt and Bahrain, our support for democracy led—incredibly—to widely-believed allegations that the U.S. was backing terrorists. Why? Because in Egypt we dealt with the democratically-elected, and since popularly ousted, Moslem Brotherhood government of Mohamed Morsi, and in Bahrain our support for democracy was interpreted by Sunnis as support for the majority Shias, who allegedly have connections with Iran and Hizbollah. So there is no magic formula for improving the U.S. image in the short-run.

7. *Please remark on your experience with the changing nature of warfare over the past few decades. What trends do you believe will define military engagement in the 21st century—both on the part of the U.S. and from other countries?*

The most obvious change over the decades has been the remarkable advances in technology. I first lived in a country at war when I was in Iraq in the early 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war. That war was characterized, for the most part, by big land battles along the border; it is possible that we will not see those kinds of static battles again. Neither Iraq not Iran had an operational air force, so there was no air war except for some inaccurate Iranian scuds (in sharp contrast to the accurately directed missiles and bombs so often featured in warfare today). By the time I arrived in Kuwait by the turn of the century, we were just beginning to use drones for reconnaissance—a harbinger of things to come. Technology, of course, is changing everything. It allows us to rely more on weapons systems and less on the traditional ground army of past wars. But there are some potentially worrisome consequences of these changes. First, the increased reliance on technology, and not soldiers, may remove politi-cal constraints on leaders who could be more reluctant to go to war if large numbers of people had to be mobilized and deployed. And second, with the advancement of technology, more countries—and even non-state actors—may get access to weapons that would allow them to project more military

force than their smaller size might suggest. A good example of this, of course, is the drone. Now that its efficacy has been so well demonstrated, it will not be surprising if this new weapon falls into the wrong hands.

8. *What parallels, if any do you see between the U.S.'s involvement in Afghanistan with the Vietnam War. What factors do you think distinguish the two situations?*

There are at least two important parallels between the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Vietnam, and they should have raised alarms as we contemplated our intervention in Afghanistan. First, in both cases we were supporting weak, flawed governments fighting local opponents. We had the money and the firepower; our opponents were fighting on their home turf, had sanctuaries they could flee to, and knew that sooner or later we would leave. It is extremely difficult to "win" a war in those circumstances. The second similarity was that in both cases our leadership went into the fray with astonishingly little knowledge or understanding of the countries and cultures they were entering. This was even more the case as we voluntarily expanded the battlefield into new countries—Cambodia in the case of Vietnam, Iraq in the case of Afghanistan. Our bad understanding of both of those countries only compounded our difficulties and left terribly fractured societies as we departed.

But there were important differences. Unlike in Vietnam, the American people fully supported our intervention in Afghanistan. This was due initially to the clear provocation and casus belli for the war In Afghanistan—the September 11 attacks, which were directly attributable to elements on Afghan territory. This was not the case in Vietnam, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution notwithstanding. And over time, a second important difference had a significant impact on American attitudes. The Vietnam War was waged largely with a drafted army, so that the war effort affected large segments of society which became increasingly disaffected. For the war in Afghanistan, in contrast, we fought with a completely volunteer army. The fighting burden was carried by a much smaller slice of the American public, and most Americans remained largely unaffected by the war effort.

9. *How do you believe the U.S. should respond to growing popular unrest in Egypt?*

It is not clear to me there is "growing" popular unrest in Egypt. There are troubling signs, to be sure, but large segments of Egyptian society were genuinely concerned about the direction the Morsi Government was taking Egypt and supported his removal. It is widely believed that if fully free and fair presidential elections were held today, presumed candidate for President Al-Sisi would win. But that does not mean that the U.S. should unreservedly support the direction Egypt now seems to be heading. Far from it. First, the Egyptian government has overreached in its pursuit of stability, going after liberals, journalists, civil society and others who might normally support a more secular regime. And second, the complete repression of the Moslem Brotherhood and

potentially other Islamists may succeed in the short run but will surely fail in the long run. The Islamists will not go away, and a way has to be found to bring Islamists into the political process and create an inclusive political environment. Otherwise, the longer term risk of violence and terrorism is real. We should not exaggerate the influence that the U.S. has in Egypt now, but we must remain engaged, even with the military. We should vigorously raise our concerns about human rights violations, urge the government to find ways to bring Islamists back into the political arena, push the government to meet its commitments to a genuine democratic transition and free and fair elections, and provide economic assistance in areas that directly benefit the Egyptian people, such as education and health. I would be cautious about cutting off all economic and military aid. We have had some unfortunate experiences completely cutting off aid to allies in the past, most notably in Pakistan. Maintaining some support or engagement is almost always more productive.

10. *What should be the most important priorities in the U.S.–China relationship in this century?*

I see three main priorities in the U.S.-China relationship in the coming years. Perhaps because I spent three years in the 1990s working on U.S.-China trade issues while at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, I put trade issues at the top of the list. China has a huge and growing economy, and will be a dominant player in international trade in the coming years. It is essential that we work with China to ensure that it engages in fair trade practices and opens its growing domestic market to foreign exporters and investors in a fair and transparent way. Second, as China's economic and political power grows, it will be important to ensure that China does not play a destabilizing role in the region. Finally, we must work closely with China on environmental issues. China is so big, and its economy consumes so many resources and emits so many pollutants, that any efforts by the U.S. and the rest of the world to deal with climate change and other environmental issues will be meaningless without China's active participation. Although China's environmental challenges are daunting, I am confident that China in time will play a constructive role. Otherwise, its economic growth will be choked by overwhelming air pollution, unclean and disappearing water resources, and an unhealthy and disaffected population. There are already signs the Chinese leadership recognizes this.

The Emerging Role of Women at the Negotiating Table:
A Conversation with Tanya Henderson

Interview by Lauren Krouskoff

Biography

Tanya is a human rights attorney, specializing in gender, children's rights and poverty law, with significant experience in program development, nonprofit management, and peace advocacy. She received her JD from Suffolk University Law School and pursued her LL.M (Master's of Law) in international law from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Her LL.M thesis, "Does International Gender Law Exist?: A Comparative Study of International Practice and Human Rights Law," sought to establish a legal basis for gender discrimination, beyond the impermissible distinction based merely on biological sex, within existing international human rights law. Prior to joining WAND, Tanya was the National Director for the U.S. Section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), a legal consultant for the Ministry of Social Affairs in Lebanon on issues of gender based violence and women's political participation, and worked in Ethiopia as part of a research team in conjunction with the Harvard Medical School, researching and drafting policy related to gender inequality, poverty and mental health law.

1. *What are some of the critical characteristics that distinguish modern warfare from traditional tactics?*

The nature of war has changed. Unlike traditional wars fought between nations, a rise in intra-state violent conflict concerning ethnic and religious identities, control of natural resources, and economic and political power has resulted in modern day conflicts characterized by systematic acts of violence against civilian populations. Today 90% of casualties in armed conflicts are civilians, an overwhelming majority of whom are women and children. Sexual violence and forced displacement have emerged as strategic new tactics of war.

2. *How are civilian populations, particularly women and girls, impacted by these new forms of warfare?*

Traditional gender norms result in women bearing responsibility for homes, families, and communities. Now that warfare targets these institutions, women bear the responsibility of holding together communities and rebuilding in the aftermath of conflict.

Additionally, gender based violence has risen to a whole new level. It's no longer a consequence of war. "Rape, pillage, and looting" have always been elements of warfare. But with intrastate conflicts, many of which have been ethnically driven, there has often been a strategic goal of ethnic cleansing. Rape has become a strategy of warfare. If you can take down a man's woman, you have not only beaten him, but you have also taken away his "manliness." This is a psychologically gender driven strategy to break down opposition forces. When your society has been at war for so long, masculinity is often defined by the ability to wield a weapon or rape a woman. As a result, gender norms attributed to masculinity perpetuates the conflict and violence.

In some cases child soldiers are forced to rape their mother, sister, or aunt as a form of initiation. Once you have done this you can no longer return home. You belong to the army because what else can you do? You've imposed the ultimate shame upon your family.

3. *What are some of the conclusions you drew regarding international gender law while working on your thesis at Fletcher?*

The word gender is not a universally understood term. In fact, by definition, gender is cultural and social construct that is both contextually and time driven. It can change and be redefined by each unique culture and people. The only universality to understand is that gender is based in the differentiation of power. This explains why it is so interwoven in conflict. Some people will tell you that you can't talk about conflict without talking about gender.

My finding was yes; there is a growing body of international gender law. There have been a number of laws, resolutions, and findings that support a broader understanding of discrimination—not based solely on biological sex, but on the attributes and associations tied to gender roles. It's a broader understanding of what constitutes sex discrimination.

4. *What actions should the US government take to ensure women's rights in Afghanistan?*

Women's Action for New Directions recommends that the US government should ensure that:
- the women of Afghanistan are represented and that their priority concerns are fully reflected in all stages of the reconciliation talks and that gender parity is sought in negotiating teams, including peace jirgas; Afghan women should constitute no less than 25 percent of negotiation and transition teams in accordance with the Afghan Constitutional guarantee for women's representation in Parliament;
- negotiated peace agreements affirm the constitutional guarantee of equality of men and women;
- concrete measures to prevent and respond to violence against Afghan women and girls address potential trends of violence leading up to, and following, the withdrawal of foreign troops;

- Afghanistan's criminal justice system promotes and protects Afghan women and girls, including comprehensive trainings for the judiciary and police to implement international human rights standards and Afghan national laws such as the constitutional guarantee of equality for men and women; the 2008 National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA); and the 2009 Law on Elimination of Violence against Women;
- female recruitment and retention increases within the Afghan National Security Forces, particularly in the Afghan National Police and investments should be made in gender sensitivity training to address the distinct needs of women and girls as outlined in the Afghan Women and Girls Security Promotion Act.
- international and foreign aid is directed to programs that support the ongoing political, economic and social advancement of Afghan women and girls, including gender parity in healthcare, education, and employment opportunity;
- the withdrawal of combat troops should include a complete elimination of drone strikes and night raids.

5. *What forms of international and national policy work have been developed to address this issue?*

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR1325) and it's 4 follow-up resolutions (1820, 1888, 1889, and 1960) collectively seek to address the disproportionate impact of armed conflict on women and girls; and promote female leadership in conflict prevention, resolution, and peace building. SCR 1325 requires UN Member States to develop National Action Plans (NAPs) that provide for women's participation in peace and conflict decision-making; the protection of women and girls; and gender training.

In December, 2011 President Obama issued an Executive Order outlining a U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (U.S. NAP) that contains commitments from the Department of State, Department of Defense, USAID, and other relevant federal agencies. The US NAP actively works to:

1. Integrate and institutionalize a gender-responsive approach to all diplomatic, development and defense related work.
2. Foster women's rights, leadership, and participation in all aspects of peace-building, conflict prevention, and decision-making in matters of peace and security.
3. Strengthen efforts to protect women and children from gender based violence and discrimination and hold perpetrators accountable in conflict affected environments.
4. Create conditions for stable societies and lasting peace by investing in women's health, education, and economic opportunities.
5. Provide safe and equitable access to humanitarian assistance by responding to the distinct needs of women and children.

The U.S. NAP's lifespan is only guaranteed under the current administration. The Women, Peace and Security Act, introduced in 113th Congress will codify the US NAP and guarantee congressional oversight and evaluation of its implementation.

6.   What do you think the biggest challenge is to getting the Women, Peace, and Security Act passed by Congress?

Honestly, I don't think they see it as a pressing issue. Women tend to be a second thought, particularly in security processes. Syria was the first conflict that arose under the governance of the US NAP. It was the chance to implement mandated US responsibilities to advocate for women as equal partners in peace and security processes. And we did not do this adequately—we failed. The role of women in conflict prevention and peace building is still an afterthought, if a thought at all. So, I don't think that this is a pressing policy on the Hill. Even if policy makers support it, they'll say that we already have the NAP . . . there's so much else that Congress has to make happen . . . healthcare, social security, the Farm Bill . . . Or the downside is, it's just a "women's issue." Or, I've even heard, "I don't want this to become another abortion issue."

Editorials

Old Wars, New Conflicts, and Changing American Civil-Military Relations

Philip Ballentine and Michelle Cerna, *Tufts University*

Changing Conflicts, Changing Civil-Military Relations

In Mary Kaldor's 1999 book *New and Old Wars,* the author defines "Old Wars" as conflicts between territorial states using uniformed troops deployed in large numbers to serve state interests.[1] According to Kaldor, expansion in the scale of conventional warfare and adoption of new destructive technologies (notably nuclear weapons) has curtailed the outbreak of classic Old Wars.[2] After 1945, the United States increasingly fought combinations of uniformed soldiers and guerrillas employing insurgent tactics. These conflicts proved difficult and frustrating for U.S. policymakers and military leaders to define objectives for and wage, and they were extremely hard for the American public to understand.

The end of the Cold War accelerated the shift away from the Old Wars model. Globalization has forged a new model of warfare that Kaldor labels "New Wars."[3] The rise of non-governmental organizations, international institutions, and transnational terrorist and criminal groups has introduced new actors and stakeholders into war. The proliferation of cheap and available advanced weapons and communication technologies (such as the AK-47, rocket-propelled grenade, and cell phone) has made low-intensity irregular warfare more deadly. Simultaneously, particularistic ethnic, religious, and other identity-based movements (many located in fragile states) have increased globally since 1990.

The transition from the Old Wars model toward New Wars poses challenges for American civil-military relations as policymakers and the military adapt to a new environment. The complexities, long duration, and ill-defined nature of New Wars require civilian policymakers and military leaders to cooperate closely. Blurred distinctions between civilians and the military in New War engagements thus translate into merged roles and spheres of expertise between the civilian and military sectors of the U.S. national security community. However, overlapping civilian and military contributions and roles increase the risk of civil-military tensions, making effective civil-military relations crucial for both security and success in the modern era.

Civil-Military Relations Theory

As civil-military relations experts note, in order to maintain democracy, civilian authorities must retain command of the military, and America has historically maintained a high degree of civilian control. Theorists disagree on how to simultaneously maintain this control and provide a strong national defense, though most agree that "military contempt for civilian culture, . . . civilian hostility to the traditional martial values, and . . . demographic trends showing fewer and fewer personal connections with the military"[4] are all both causes and results of tensions in the civil-military relationship.

Political scientist Samuel Huntington's 1957 book *The Soldier and the State* proposes an ideal "objective civilian control" that constructs the military as professionals with autonomy in managing the operational level of war as well as their own unique martial culture.[5] Huntington contrasts this with "subjective civilian control," where civilians impose liberal American social values on the military that can harm operational effectiveness.[6] According to Huntington, military leaders have the right to insist on developments that improve military efficiency rather than accepting meddling, uninformed civilian mismanagement.[7] Contemporary Huntingtonians argue that modern civilian culture is "unraveling" and straying far from traditional American values,[8] that "ignorant, uncaring" civilian leaders undermine the military's combat effectiveness,[9] and that military leaders need autonomy to manage military operations.[10, 11]

Huntingtonian assertions of civilian leadership's inadequacy and the need for military insistence have not gone unchallenged. Sociologist Morris Janowitz's 1960 book *The Professional Soldier* asserts that military culture needs to adapt to a changing civilian society.[12] Janowitz warns that the military might otherwise become "unresponsive to civilian control, and civilians would therefore stop providing the support needed" to maintain a strong military.[13] Janowitz's intellectual heirs assert that today's armed forces are "alienated from, disgusted with, and even hostile to civilian society."[14, 15, 16] This divide undermines civilian command and risks the loss of mutual respect and support between the military and civilians.[17] Huntington and Janowitz's theories were both influenced by the era of Old Wars, and although they remain relevant, the emergence of New Wars has propelled the integration of civilian and military spheres within the national security community (civilian policymakers, the military, intelligence agencies, law enforcement, diplomats, and many other fields), thus creating new challenges for effective civil-military relations.

A Brief History of American Civil-Military Relations

Despite the popular conception of the "minuteman" and the Framers' concern regarding a large standing military, the American Revolution was fought by proto-professional soldiers of the Continental Army, and the Republic formed a standing army as early as 1791.[18] For most of the 1800s, the United States' small professional military largely remained in the periphery on the frontier,

and civil-military tensions only flared during sporadic major conflicts.[19] In the Mexican-American War, General Zachary Taylor "openly opposed" President Polk's war policies and developed a political following.[20] During the Civil War, President Lincoln dismissed the Union Army's commanding officer, Major General George McClellan, after McClellan publicly criticized the President's measures to abolish slavery in occupied territories, as well as other policies.[21]

The logic of Old Wars led to increases in the size and sophistication of the military, which began to coalesce as an independent profession, contributing to harmonious civil-military relations. World War II (the ultimate Old War) represented the minimum tension between civilian policymakers and the military, a moment when "the power of the professional military leaders reached unprecedented heights."[22] Huntington notes that the military essentially ran the war in terms of major policy and strategy decisions, and its approach was popular with civilian elites and the public.[23] According to Huntington, "an astounding harmony of purpose and policy prevailed . . . American civilians, now at war, willingly handed control over to the armed forces."[24]

Old War logic—well-defined military operations, mobilization of the whole society for war, clearly-defined enemies, and existential stakes—contributed to non-contentious U.S. civil-military relations as civilians wholeheartedly supported military efforts. However, after 1945, the emerging framework of New Wars began to erode civil-military harmony. The Korean and Vietnam Wars engendered serious civil-military tensions and high-profile clashes between civilian and military leaders. During the Korean War, President Truman refused General Douglas MacArthur's requests to attack China with nuclear weapons. MacArthur responded by publicly threatening China with nuclear attack and making a high-profile and public statement advocating a general war against communism, concluding with the phrase, "There is no substitute for victory."[25] President Truman replaced him. In Korea, military leaders understandably chafed under restrictions on their use of force imposed by civilian policymakers as negotiations dragged on for nearly two years and the war ended roughly with the prewar *status quo* intact, leaving little sense of triumph to justify the military's sacrifices.

This pattern of increasing civil-military confrontation continued during the Vietnam War. Afterward, military elites blamed civilian politicians and officials in the Johnson and Nixon administrations for strategy motivated more by a desire for "re-election than producing good policy," and resented their micro-management of military operations.[26] On a broader level, the anti-war movement created mutual animosity and distrust between soldiers and large segments of the American public. These developments allowed civil-military relations on both the Huntingtonian and Janowitzian models to break down: the military began to assert itself in strategic (not operational) policy and grew significantly more culturally distinct from civilian society. General Creighton Abrams, Chief of Staff of the Army from 1972–1974, implemented a plan to automatically deploy the National Guard in "even the smallest commitment of Army units" for the first time, and there is strong evidence showing that

this was an attempt to restrain the President's ability to initiate military action without high political costs.[27] After 1973, the military became an all-volunteer force that increasingly drew recruits from particular geographic regions (the South), military family backgrounds, and people with similar (more politically conservative) political outlooks; this self-selection has persisted ever since.[28]

As a result of the Vietnam War, the 1980s and 1990s military "did everything it could to avoid" responding to New War-type conflicts, such as peacekeeping operations in fragile states or large-scale interventions of any kind.[29] At the same time, the military declined in size and became a more distinct, technically-focused profession as weapons became more advanced. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act reorganized the military to improve civilian control and military effectiveness by establishing Unified Combatant Commands with a direct chain of authority through the Secretary of Defense to the President.[30] Goldwater-Nichols also created a powerful Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and reduced inter-service rivalry. This shift coincided with a rise in public confidence in the military, which, after a 1981 low of 50%, steadily rose to 68% in 1990.[31] Public confidence in the military is positive, but it also boosts the military's ability to impose its own preferences on policy (including major foreign policy decisions) by publicly speaking out on policy issues. During CJCS General Colin Powell's 1989–1993 tenure, he made several public statements opposing intervention in Bosnia and articulated the "Powell Doctrine" defining the permissible conditions for military intervention.[32] This represented a serious infringement upon the traditional conception of civil-military relations, in which civilian leaders set foreign policy and strategy while the military provides *advice* on military aspects of strategy and executes military operations.

During the 1990s, analysts began identifying a worrying divergence in attitudes and backgrounds between civilians and the military, coupled with mistrust and conflict at high levels, that they termed the "gap." A prime example of this view came from then-Colonel Charles Dunlap's widely-discussed 1992 essay describing a dystopian near-future in which a military coup is precipitated by high public confidence in the military, intractable societal problems, and military leaders' new willingness to enter non-military fields.[33] While Dunlap's article served as a warning rather than actual forecast, it expressed serious fears that the dividing line between military leaders and civilian policymakers was being eroded and that civil-military relations were suffering. Since then, scholars have observed that the longstanding trend of the military being more conservative than society as a whole has increased, and other divergences have widened as well. [34]

Quantifying the Civil-Military Gap

In the late 1990s, academic studies quantified the civil-military gap and revealed significant rifts between civilian policymakers and military leaders on many issues. The Triangle Institute for Security Studies' (TISS) polling

in 1998–1999 indicated that military and civilian leaders largely agreed on foreign policy issues such as arms control and nuclear proliferation (topics particularly relevant to Old Wars), but exhibited the widest disagreement on issues related to New Wars such as humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping operations, and responses to failing states; military leaders were much more opposed to all these options than civilian policymakers.[35]

Civilian and military leaders also held divergent views on how insistent military advisors should be in asserting their opinions. Although 83.4% of military leaders and 74.1% of civilian non-veteran leaders agreed that senior military leadership should play an advisory role when considering an armed intervention,[36] differences in opinion emerged thereafter. 49.7% of military leaders believed they had the right to *insist* (as opposed to being neutral, advising, or advocating) on setting rules of engagement for a conflict, whereas only 21.1% of civilian leaders agreed.[37] Likewise, 51.9% of military respondents believed they should insist on an exit strategy in such a debate, compared to only 38.1% of civilian respondents.[38] These changes began to affect policy as the military's voice grew stronger. A 1999 study found that before the end of the Cold War, "civilian preferences prevailed in well over 90 percent" of decision-making cases (59 of 63), but after the Cold War, civilians prevailed "in fewer than half [5 of 12]."[39]

Elite civil-military relations were not just characterized by disagreement, but also by elements of mutual distrust and suspicion. Civilian and military officials both believed that they respected their counterparts, but they were less sure that their counterparts returned their respect.[40] In general, 47.9% of active military elites felt that the military received less societal respect than it deserved.[41] In the study, 52.3% of military leaders felt that civilian leaders were "somewhat ignorant" about the modern military,[42] and only 36.2% believed that civilians understood service members' sacrifices.[43] Many civilian officials felt they were not respected enough by military leaders and were skeptical of whether their military counterparts normally obeyed civilian orders that they opposed.[44]

While such a detailed study has unfortunately not been repeated since 1999 to quantify the current gap, it is clear that the civil-military divide has continued and in some ways intensified in America's period of conflicts with New Wars elements after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

"New War" American Civil-Military Relations After 9/11

The United States' wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the global pursuit of terrorist networks, have exhibited many elements of New Wars, including multiple transnational terrorist cells, sectarian violence, and insurgent forces exploiting new technologies and blurring the lines between war and organized crime in fragile state environments. These conflicts have required the military and civilians to tightly coordinate and combine military force, diplomacy, economic development, public health, and cultural and linguistic knowledge, among many other elements, thus making it more important

than ever before for the military and civilians to work together effectively. For example, one U.S. economic development program in Afghanistan has involved at least ten civilian government agencies in a range spanning from the Department of State to the Department of Agriculture.[45] None of this work could be done without military efforts to provide security, and the military also contributes expertise in non-military fields such as infrastructure construction. On the security side, the post-9/11 environment has witnessed unprecedented cooperation among the CIA, Department of Defense (both military and civilian components), and FBI, among many others, to dismantle global terrorist networks.

However, civil-military relations after 9/11 have not been completely harmonious. Some analysts suggest that mistrust and a poor overall relationship between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and senior military leaders led the Bush administration to dismiss military input and caused military leaders to stifle their concerns in the pre-war planning process for the Iraq War.[46] In 2006, a group of retired generals publicly excoriated Secretary Rumsfeld and the Bush administration over the conduct of the Iraq War and suggested that they spoke for many active-duty officers, thereby representing a low point in recent civil-military relations.[47] Military advice is critical to crafting effective policy and strategy, and modern wars are more complex and less defined than past conflicts, yet the fundamental distinction between civilians who make policy and military leaders who conduct operations must remain valid to sustain democracy. That being said, civilian leaders must do their best to integrate military assessments and advice in order to further foreign policy and strategy. Civil-military relations are a two-way street.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates presided over the dismissal or forced retirement of six senior military leaders—two service secretaries, a service chief, CENTCOM's commander, and two top commanders in Afghanistan—during his 2006–2011 tenure.[48] Several of these firings were the result of serious civil-military clashes, including when CENTCOM commander Admiral William J. Fallon repeatedly and publicly contradicted the Bush administration's stated policy on Iran.[49] In 2009, General Stanley McChrystal (then commanding the International Security Assistance Force) asked President Obama to commit 30,000–40,000 more troops to Afghanistan. When the President balked and civilian officials asked McChrystal not to publicly discuss the matter, the request was leaked along with the claim that the General would resign if it were not granted.[50] In 2010, McChrystal was quoted in a magazine article disparaging the President, Vice President, and civilian national security officials; McChrystal was ultimately compelled to resign.[51]

In a January 2014 op-ed, a retired Secretary Gates described civil-military relations during his tenure. He characterized Congress as a "partisan abyss" motivated by political self-interest at the expense of national security.[52] Gates chastised the military for trying to "take control of the policy process," but went on to say that the Obama administration fostered a "controlling" environment

in national security decision-making that emphasized domestic politics.[53] He also wrote that the President was often "deeply suspicious of [the military's] actions and recommendations."[54] Future insider accounts may uncover how civil-military relations have continued to change at the policymaking level over the past several years. Civil-military tensions were evident in mid-2013 when several retired and active-duty military officers prominently spoke out about the risks, costs, and downsides of military strikes on Syria (then being proposed by the Obama administration) and criticized the administration's larger Middle East policy.[55]

Public attitudes regarding the military have also changed since 9/11: confidence in the military has surged while confidence in civilian institutions has plummeted. Those with "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the military averaged 61% from 1975–1999; from 2000–2013 they averaged 76%.[56] In contrast, from 1975–1999, the proportion of Americans with the same level of confidence in Congress averaged 30%, but from 2000–2013 it averaged 17% and confidence in the President has fallen as well.[57] In 2013, the public had the most confidence in the military out of all institutions surveyed, including organized religion and law enforcement.[58] Public support for and confidence in the military is essential for national security, but a wide confidence gap between the military and civilian government is a worrying sign for balanced civil-military relations.

America's recent wars have been fought by a much smaller proportion of American citizens than previous major wars; roughly 2.5 million troops have served in Iraq and Afghanistan compared to 8.7 million in Vietnam, 5.7 in Korea, and 16.1 in WWII.[59, 60] The burden of war has fallen on a smaller population of soldiers and their families, though both the wars and soldiers' deployments have been longer than in the past. Because the experience of today's soldier is more remote from the American mainstream, it is harder for civilians to imagine and relate to military service. Unlike WWII, when America united as a society to defeat enemy states on defined battlefields, a smaller number of highly trained professional soldiers (and some civilians) are fighting shifting and indistinct enemy groups (many backed indirectly by unfriendly states) around the world.

Civil-military experts Paul Gronke and Peter Feaver note that "public confidence in the military masks . . . a deeper divide . . . Support for [civil-military relations] is solid, yet understanding of what it means in practice is lacking."[61] As the military shrinks and becomes more professionalized, technology advances, and planned downsizing occurs, the chances for civilians to engage with the military will diminish. This will increase the likelihood of future culture clashes, unfamiliarity, and resentment on both sides. The technological complexity of war and less military experience among civilian policymakers will make military advice even more important in crafting policy and strategy, but a large civil-military gap may cause civilians to either mistrust or give uncritical deference to the military.

Civil-Military Relations at the Undergraduate Level

As the continuing rise of New Wars blurs the distinction between civilians and the military within the national security community, civil-military relations become even more important as both sides must work even more closely together. Political scientists Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn suggest that increasing the military's presence in civilian society, improving civilian understanding of military affairs, and enhancing the military's focus on civil-military relations in education can address the gap.[62] Some civil-military relations experts highlight a role for universities in fostering improved civil-military relations.[63, 64, 65] To this end, undergraduate students at Tufts University involved in the Institute for Global Leadership's EPIIC program with the theme "The Politics of Fear" worked together with three military academies (USMA, USNA, and USAFA) to form a student organization called the Alliance Linking Leaders in Education and the Services (ALLIES) in 2006. ALLIES chapters hold discussions and events investigating the impact of civil-military relations and explore subjects including veterans' affairs, female military integration, military intervention, and responses to climate change. Civilian and military students jointly plan and execute academic conferences, kinetic simulations, and research trips each year to examine civil-military relations. These discussions and programs help raise awareness on a wide range of issues that affect civil-military relations and allow students to meet and interact with experts from military and civilian spheres.

As members and then co-leaders of the Tufts ALLIES chapter, we have seen ALLIES help cadets, midshipmen, and civilian students build mutual respect and understanding across the civil-military divide and learn more about each other's institutional culture. Civilian students learn to appreciate aspects of the military such as chain-of-command and heavily structured planning processes. Conversely, military students are exposed to civilian perspectives that may differ from their own and learn to work with individuals from a broad range of academic disciplines.

Although student initiatives cannot directly address civil-military relations in the national security community, we believe that organizations and projects at the undergraduate level such as ALLIES are laying the groundwork for effective civil-military cooperation. Adding more chapters to the framework of ALLIES, creating new student initiatives around civil-military collaboration, and increasing the examination of civil-military relations in academic courses could help tomorrow's leaders bridge the civil-military gap and confront the challenges posed by New Wars of the future.

Notes

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5. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 11.
6. Ibid., 2.
7. Ibid., 70–71.
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The Age of New Wars:
Noncombatant Immunity and the Doctrine of Double Effect

Maura McQuade

As the rigidity of classical warfare sinks into an image of the past, the modern age has catapulted us into an era of New Wars, where violence often seeps outside the boundaries of the battlefield to include noncombatants. According to the Iraq Body Count, up to 125,725 civilians have died as a direct result of the Iraq War since America's invasion in 2003.[1] Today's drone strikes in Pakistan—where at least one in five strike victims is a noncombatant—lack strict discrimination between civilians and militant.[2] It would seem that expanded military technologies, in addition to more precise weaponry and intelligence capabilities, would provide for minimal civilian casualties in the modern era. Instead, the idea of noncombatant immunity and lack of civilian responsibility has faded, to be replaced by strategic bombardments of cities and non-military targets. Michael Walzer, author of *Just and Unjust Wars*, notes that the total warfare of the twentieth century "does not mean that everyone is equally and totally responsible."[3] It does, however, necessitate a closer inspection of a noncombatant's responsibilities are in warfare. There exists no blanket policy to judge noncombatant immunity; it is necessary to understand the complications that arise from modern-day violence, the responsibilities of citizens engaged in war and a weighing of costs when targeting civilian mobilization efforts.

Before delving into the complications of non-combatant immunity in modern warfare, it is necessary to note the standard theory titled Nature of Necessity. As Morris Greenspan summarizes, in warfare "it is necessary to compel the submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life and money."[4] This idea is essential to weighing the moral validity of endangering the lives of noncombatants in times of war. Walzer, however, notes that this view can be seen as a code for weighing the probability and risk of an action, rather than relying upon the moral justifications. We will find going forward that this is a common fallback in the argument defending civilian casualties. If we are to eliminate risks in the long run and minimize our destructive impact, can it sometimes be acceptable to sacrifice the lives of a small group of innocent people?

The War Convention states that, "noncombatants cannot be attacked at any time and cannot be objects or targets of military activity."[5] This statement carries with it a major flaw: when and how can we distinguish a modern civilian entirely unconnected to the war effort and, therefore, a pure noncombatant? Under whose authority is this designation? Walzer notes that the mobilization

efforts necessary for a nation to enter and fight in war require "vast numbers of workers [to assist in the effort] before an army can even appear in the field."[6] Back home, civilians are necessarily intertwined in the war effort as providers of food, clothing, and armaments to those fighting on their behalf. Propaganda campaigns like that featuring Rosie the Riveter in the 1940s encourage noncombatants to actively have a hand in the war effort as a matter of national pride and duty. Supplying equipment from home, notes Walzer, leads to a temptation for the opposition to attack the enemy "behind its own lines."[7] If we are to eliminate the expenditure of time and money, according to the Nature of Necessity theory, does it not make sense to cut off an enemy at its source?

Though this may be seen as effective in achieving an ultimate victory, Walzer differentiates between direct and indirect contribution to the war effort along the lines of responsibility. "The distinction is not between those who work for the war effort and those who do not, but between those who make what soldiers need to fight, and those who make what they need to live like the rest of us."[8] Those who are immune from attack, therefore, may still be aiding the war effort by providing food, water and necessary supplies to combatants. These civilians, in Walzer's view, have not sacrificed their right to life, as their activities are not distinctly threatening to the opposition. On the other hand, citizens employed in munitions factories or other efforts directly resulting in a threat to the enemy are not so separate from combatants themselves. In these circumstances, just war theorists have argued that direct contributions render the civilians viable targets for aiding the war effort more fundamentally.

Upon consideration of this distinction, I am inclined to ask whether one might differentiate between those democratic societies in which people have influence upon the ultimate decision to enter conflict, and those authoritarian regimes in which the public is at the disposal of its leader. Expanding upon Walzer's case, war philosopher Brian Ordend clarifies that, "even if civilians have voted for war, or support the war effort, they remain non-threatening because they do not have arms, are not trained to kill and have not been deployed against the lives of the opposing side."[9] Orend describes a difference between the "internal attitude" of a people and "external danger" they present. To illustrate this, he asks us to imagine if we believe a baby in a belligerent nation to be fair game simply because he is a citizen, even if he is not old enough to be morally responsible for the actions of this country. We are asked to not hold the citizens of a society—no matter its political construction—responsible for the actions of its government.

I am hard-pressed to agree whole-heartedly with Orend's take here, though I do not insist that a democratic nation's choice to go to war legitimizes violence upon all its citizens of voting-age. Were this the case, no country would strive for democratic structure. That being said, I am tentative to see the drafted serviceman in Vietnam as a more viable target in warfare than a pro-military activist or propagandist advocating the brutal torture of the opposition whose feet are safely planted on American soil. Does our internal attitude not play some role? Are our external actions some times coerced to

make those who might be actually less responsible more valid targets? Perhaps the munitions worker, seen as a viable target for his direct relation to the war effort, is only employed due to his proximity to the workplace and his dependence on his income to survive. He may have no ideological drive to create weaponry; he is employed out of societal necessity. His neighbor however, is safe to preach violence and war to the public, maintaining his immunity so long as he is not physically creating the tools used to kill. But are his words and influence not just as influential? To draw a distinct line between those outwardly commit acts of violence or create the means to do so with those who create the popular support for the action itself seems strained.

To a certain extent, Orend does tackle the idea of coercion when he addresses the idea of taxation as an avenue for military support. Though our taxes may knowingly go directly to the war effort, Orend insists this is an example of coercion in a democratic state: our taxes are mandatory, and we cannot be held responsible for the use toward which they are ultimately directed. He insists that "the degree to which the state is centrally involved in this coercion and transfer process renders it clearly the vastly larger, indeed the only, concrete permissible target."[10] It is here again that I stop to question: does a democratic nation not differ in this regard? Does the coerciveness of government taxation become less set in stone if we civilians have the ability to vote these representatives in and out of office and therefore having a say in where our government spends its money, albeit indirectly?

Finally, as Orend insists that the "state" entity be the only viable target of attack, we must consider what makes a democratic country such as America a peculiar case. For two hundred years, we have prided ourselves on the idea that the state is not so separate from our civilian population. Our military, a viable target in warfare, is commanded by a civilian Commander-in-Chief. Our elected political leaders come from all walks of life and draw their power from the American citizenry. Our laws and decisions are not decided upon entirely behind closed doors, but instead with consideration of lobbying groups, non-governmental organizations and civilian input. It is hard for me to understand how we can split the responsibility of war so definitively as that of the state and not of the people. Though my neighbor may make the decision to enter the military, I may actively vote for a representative who sends him to war. How does he sacrifice his rights to life in becoming a combatant whereas I, who may sit at home and champion the destruction of the enemy, am immune solely based on my not physically serving? With the responsibility of democratic citizenship, I believe, we must consider if in doing so we are sacrificing a certain amount of immunity when our "internal attitudes" may directly result in external force.

In light of this, I find it important to consider the Doctrine of Double Effect, a theory which I believe Walzer correctly summarizes as "a way of reconciling the absolute prohibition against attacking noncombatants with the legitimate conduct of military activity," a reconciliation which he believes comes too easily.[11] Like the driving force behind the Supreme Emergency theory, Just War

theorists rely on the Doctrine of Double Effect as a recognition of an "out," or an acknowledgement that in extenuating circumstances one must often weigh the lesser of two evils. Unfortunately, those who are required to do the weighing are often those who are not able to consider every angle or every fact driving the decision. The laws of war, notes Walzer, "leave the cruelest decisions to be made by the men on the spot with reference only to their ordinary moral notions or the military traditions of the army in which they serve."[12] Though he cites four conditions in which the Doctrine ought to hold (the morality of the act itself, the morality of the effect, good intention of the act and justification under Sigwick's proportionality rule), just war theorists tend to focus upon the final two points when considering the justness of an unjust action.[13]

Is this not counterintuitive in itself, however? If an act is unjust at its core, no amount of proportionality or positive intention should be able to make it become just. Although I may be able to reconcile the action with myself and even acknowledge it as the right thing to do, the sentiment alone cannot transform it into an acceptable moral action. Walzer bluntly asks, "What difference does it make whether civilian deaths are a direct or indirect effect of my actions? I can hardly matter to the dead civilians."[14] In the same sense, therefore, the Doctrine may work to justify and give reason to an unjust action. It does not, however, excuse the action as being just nor does it morally reconcile the act as acceptable. Walzer's corrected version of the Doctrine states that "the double effect is only defensible when the two outcomes are the product of the double intention, first that the good be achieved, and second that the foreseeable evil can be reduced as far as possible."[15] The action will never truly become moral or just, but if the proper care is paid it may be possible that the action shall be defensible under these guidelines.

No noncombatant ought to be a direct target of modern warfare. Today's technology is advanced enough that we have the ability to me more discriminate in our enemy-targeting. However, in the age of total warfare it can be difficult for one to draw the line between combatant and noncombatant contributions to the war effort, particularly when pilotless aircraft and missiles have enabled us to destroy our enemies from the safety of our own country. Even more difficult still, the ultimate decision often comes down to those least prepared to make the decision: ordinary combatants themselves. We cannot, by any means, create a distinct line to determine noncombatant immunity, and the second principle of the War Convention may have been optimistic in attempting to do so. However, we have a responsibility to consider the role of every citizen in the war effort and to avoid, at all costs, killing those who have not freely exhibited a desire to harm.

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
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