

Organizational Barriers to Peace:

Agency and Structure in International
Peacebuilding

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of
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By
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ABSTRACT

The peacebuilding literature agrees that international peacebuilding should be sustained over several years and adapted to the specific institutions and capacities in each post-conflict country. To do this IOs, INGOs, and bilateral donors doing peacebuilding work would have to adapt their aims, approaches, and programming to each country context and to changes in that context. Organizational theory finds that this type of adaptation and learning is very difficult for most organizations. This dissertation asks whether this holds true for peacebuilding organizations. Can IOs, INGOs, and bilateral donors doing peacebuilding work adapt to and learn from a post-conflict context? If so, why? If not, why not?

This dissertation tests a hypothesis that three characteristics – non-defensive and valid learning behavior, downward accountability routines, and peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines and frames – are necessary and jointly sufficient for an IO, INGO, or bilateral aid agency to take significant and systematic action to reduce the gap between its peacebuilding aims and outcomes in a post-conflict country. It tests this hypothesis with five diverse organizations (two IOs, two INGOs, one bilateral donor) at six critical junctures in Burundi's thirteen-year war-to-peace transition. One of these organizational case studies falsifies this hypothesis, showing that while the three independent variables were necessary and sufficient for consecutive adaptation over two critical junctures, they were insufficient for the organization to sustain its relevance with Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory over each of the six critical junctures. This dissertation then builds a new typological theory from the five detailed ethnographic case studies that describes how the three initial independent variables combine with three other factors – entrepreneurial leadership committed to peacebuilding, readily available peacebuilding funds, and organizational change processes – to achieve varying degrees of alignment with Burundi's war-to-peace transition.

The findings from this dissertation indicate that most IOs, INGOs, and bilateral donors are likely to be unable to repeatedly adapt to big shifts in a country's war-to-peace transition. The changes in the post-conflict context are too big and happen too fast for most international actors to keep pace. The conclusion identifies the factors that

determine why different types of organizations adapt to differing degrees. The least adaptive organizations had two characteristics in common: 1) incentive structures that rewarded feedback to headquarters, not dialogue with the state or society concerned (i.e., upward accountability), and 2) they did not believe that peacebuilding was the most important thing that they were doing, but instead prioritized development aims and programming (i.e., peacebuilding frame not predominant). The most adaptive organizations, on the other hand, were 1) focused on peacebuilding as the most important thing that they were doing in Burundi (i.e., predominant peacebuilding frame); 2) they had teams that combined technical knowledge of the specific peacebuilding activity and local knowledge of the specific institutions that the organization aimed to change (i.e., sufficient peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines); and 3) they were guided by entrepreneurial leaders who were committed to peacebuilding and willing to coerce the organization into pursuing its peacebuilding aims.

To develop a fully specified typological theory, the findings from this dissertation will be tested in other countries. Nonetheless, interviews with headquarters staff, interviews with staff from other organizations in Burundi, and document review indicate that the patterns observed with the case study organizations provide at least part of the explanation for the behavior of the larger universe of IOs, INGOs, and bilateral aid agencies engaged in peacebuilding in different conflict-torn countries around the world.

DEDICATION

For Georgia

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I am grateful to my PhD Committee – Peter Uvin, Antonia Handler Chayes, and Karen Jacobsen – for their enthusiasm, encouragement, critiques, wisdom, and insight. I am grateful to them for understanding what I was trying to do and for helping me along the long and winding path toward my goal. I want to thank them for the investment that they have made in me and in my work and for their compassion. I am honored to have worked with you. I also want to thank my amazing Fletcher PhD colleagues. I would not have been able to make it through this process without you. In particular, Dipali Mukhopadhyay, Kimberly Howe, and Christof Kurz were invaluable allies in this journey. Dipali and Kim accompanied me through the final stages in this process with kindness, wisdom, keen intelligence, compassion, and courage. Thank you. I want to thank my many other wonderful friends who have been so supportive and loving. I am so grateful to have you in my life. My parents managed to support me in the process without pressuring me. What a gift. Mom, thank you for your love, understanding, and support, and for reminding me to take care of myself. Annie, thank you for being my 8-ball. Your wisdom has been so precious. Dad, thank you for getting it, loving it, supporting me, coaching me, and helping to keep me on the ball. I loved sharing this process with you. Finally, I want to thank Matthias. I could not ask for a better, smarter, more loving, or more supportive partner. You made this dissertation possible in so many ways. Thank you for believing in me.

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1 INTRODUCTION

“Organizations are more than instruments;
they are themselves bundles of desires.”¹

Browne and Wildavsky, 1983

Mortar shells flew overhead. From the rooftops we watched bullet tracers as they were launched one by one across the sky. Uncertainty and intrigue were the subtext of all conversations. The war and peace processes were both raging, and no one knew what would happen next.

I lived in Burundi from 2000 to 2002. I was drawn to it by its beauty and complexity and because I could get a good job in a country where few others were interested in going. At age 25, I became the reporting officer for the UNICEF Burundi country office. My job was to help the UNICEF country representative report to headquarters on the political and security situation there. His predecessor, Louis Zuniga, had been murdered only a year earlier, and UNICEF headquarters wanted to keep close tabs on the situation.

I came to UNICEF and Burundi hoping to understand whether international organizations (IO), bilateral donors, and international non-governmental organizations (INGO) could perform effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding. For the four previous years, I had been working for a think tank (the Council on Foreign Relations) and an international network (Forum on Early Warning and Early Response) on the policy and theory of conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding. I needed to know how this theory translated into practice.

During my two years living in Burundi, I noticed a paradox. On the one hand, I saw regional and international actors support Burundians in achieving seemingly miraculous

1 Angela Browne and Aaron Wildavsky (1984), “Implementation as Exploration (1983),” in Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, *Implementation, Third Edition, Expanded* (Berkeley: University of California Press) 252.

advances in their peace process. Time and time again, the peace process moved forward, achieving what no one thought was possible just a few years or months earlier. International and regional actors did not just focus on the formal Arusha negotiations; they also tried to help Burundians talk to one another. They tried to build up Burundian research organizations. They helped create a free Burundian media. They facilitated dialogue among former enemies. They helped to resolve local-level conflict.

On the other hand, many of the IOs, INGOs, and bilateral donors based in Burundi seemed completely detached from the country. They did not understand the origins of the war or the daily reality of most Burundians. Many expats seemed not to care about the suffering at their doorstep. To them, Burundian people were numbers on lists: numbers of internally displaced, numbers of refugees, numbers of dead, and numbers of beneficiaries.

I returned to Burundi every couple of years over the next decade. Each time I saw important advances in the peace process but also that big challenges remained. Security was established throughout the country. New buildings were built. Refugees and people in exile returned home. Laws were passed. New organizations were formed. But human rights abuses were still rampant. People were incredibly poor. Justice was a distant hope.

Bilateral donors, the United Nations (UN), INGOs, and the regional heads of state had clearly helped Burundi to get this far. At the same time, so many international actors seemed to be largely ignorant of Burundi's past and, in many ways, its present.² So many international actors in Burundi seemed to be completely detached from Burundi and its people. They worked there. They were supposed to help people there. But there was so much they did not know, see, or understand. Events in Burundi seemed to trigger a formulaic response. Violent conflict meant humanitarian programming. Elections meant

² Interviews conducted in July to October 2002 for International Crisis Group, "A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi," *ICG Africa Report No 57* (February 21, 2003).

development or post-conflict programming. New elections meant development programming.

Burundi's peace process did not follow a clear, linear trajectory from war to "peace." Instead, between 2000 and 2009, a comprehensive peace agreement was negotiated and implemented at the same time that the war continued. One by one, between 2000 and 2009, the rebel groups agreed on and began implementing their ceasefire agreements. This presented a challenge for many of the international institutions operating in Burundi. Even though many of them aimed to contribute to Burundi's peace, they seemed to be stuck in their humanitarian and development mindsets without a clear idea of how to operate in the gray area that Burundi occupied.

Staff who understood what was happening in Burundi often complained about the dysfunction of their own organizations. They described the high turnover of staff and their lack of background knowledge of Burundi. They complained that many international staff were more interested in pursuing their next post and benefitting from the high levels of "hazard pay" they would receive for living in Burundi than in improving the lives of Burundian people.

Many of the international institutions that were supposed to help Burundians along their path toward peace were, in many ways, lost. Yet, some were not. Some international actors made seemingly critical contributions to Burundi's war-to-peace transition. How could IOs, INGOs, and bilateral donors be simultaneously so effective and so ineffective at supporting Burundi along its peacebuilding trajectory? Why were international actors plagued by so many rules and systems that seemed to prevent them from understanding and responding to Burundi's specific situation? What were these rules and systems, and how were they different in different types of organizations? Clearly the opportunities in the Burundian context made a difference. But why could one organization take

advantage of these opportunities while another could not? Was it just luck, or was there something else involved?

1.1 Whose peace?

One of the big challenges facing all organizations doing peacebuilding in Burundi was the lack of clarity around the concept of peace. Definitions of peacebuilding and peace are vague. They agree on what peace is not – war or large-scale violent conflict – but not on what peace is. They agree on what peace should do – enable states and societies to resolve conflict peacefully and ensure – but not on how to do it.

As an increasing number of actors have gotten involved in international peacebuilding over the past decade, the conceptual waters have been further muddied. In the 1990s and before, peacebuilding was the foray of a few relatively small international NGOs. But as the goals of international peacebuilding expanded from trying to keep a peace that had already been negotiated to building and sustaining national institutions that could maintain peace, many organizations who were formerly only doing humanitarian, development, or peacekeeping work entered the peacebuilding business. As the case studies in this dissertation show, few of these organizations altered their standard operating procedures, knowledge base, or systems to enable them to identify the likely determinants of peace in a war-torn country and contribute to building them.

Increasingly, organizations doing this work aimed to support both peacebuilding, “activities to prevent violent conflict and institutionalize peace,” and statebuilding, an “endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions, and legitimacy of the state driven

by state-society relations.”³ Because few actors distinguish between the two concepts at the operational level, I discuss them both under the category of peacebuilding. The paradox is that the organizations engaging in peacebuilding aim to support an endogenously driven process that replicates their own norms of liberal democracy, rule of law, and a market-based economy.⁴ They aim to support endogenously driven institution formation that embodies exogenously driven norms.

In spite of their liberal democratic ideals, very few of the international actors that I interviewed in Burundi between 2002 and 2011 thought that it was feasible to create these types of institutions in Burundi anytime soon, if ever. But their project documents and program strategies were replete with lofty goals that reflected their liberal, democratic, and market-oriented ideals. How did they reconcile the gap between their ideals with the reality of what they could do in Burundi and with Burundi’s neo-patrimonial institutions?

Donors are not stupid, and they are not unaware of the way in which patronage-driven political systems inhibit development.... But donors are operating in an environment that values optimistic action rather than reflection, and which makes it difficult to acknowledge the limited scope for outsiders to influence events in the short to medium term. So despite some genuine interest in gaining a better understanding of politics, people easily revert to the comfort zones offered by their own professional expertise.⁵

To reconcile their aims and the reality in the country, both prescriptive and critical literature on peacebuilding argue that intervening organizations should have an in-depth

3 OECD-DAC (2008), “State Building in Situations of Fragility: Initial Findings – August 2008,” (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Accessed August 30, 2009 at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/9/41212290.pdf>.

4 Michael Barnett (2006), “Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After War,” *International Security* 30, 4:87-122.

⁵ Sue Unsworth, “Is Political Analysis Changing Donor Behavior?” (presented at the Conference of the Development Studies Association, London, 2008), <http://www.gsdr.org/go/display&type=Document&id=3191&source=rss> (accessed March 18, 2012).

understanding of the country context in which they are intervening and adapt this understanding – and their aims, strategies, and programs – to fit this context.⁶

Peacebuilding must be responsive to context and able to adapt to new conditions and requirements as the context changes. It must also be sustainable: Following bitter conflicts, sustainable peace is only available on the basis of sustained effort lasting a decade or more. This does not mean that all peacebuilding projects have to be sustained for so long, but that the overall strategy sees the process through.⁷

The peacebuilding literature also argues that for an organization to ensure that it is doing programming that is appropriate for the particular context, it must identify and question its theory about how it will bring peace to the country, or its *theory of change*.⁸ To implement these best practices, intervening organizations would have to be transformed from “rule-based bureaucracies into adaptive, learning, and networked organizations.”⁹

Peacebuilding interventions aim to change a changing context. The vast majority of peacebuilding projects and programs aim to support or catalyze change at the individual, interpersonal, organizational, institutional, or cultural level. They aim to do so in a context that is rapidly shifting, where political alliances are being redrawn and renegotiated, renewed war and violence are a constant threat (or even reality), public and private investment are surging (or about to surge), former combatants are trying to find new work, crime rates are increasing, and expectations for a “peace dividend” are high after years of war.

This dissertation asks whether it is possible for IOs, INGOs, and bilateral donor organizations to adapt to and align with the reality in the war-torn countries that they

6 Saferworld, International Alert, and FEWER, *Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack*, (London: 2004).

7 Dan Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together - Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding* (Brattvaag: Royal, April 2004), 10, <http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2000/0265/ddd/pdfv/210673-rapp104.pdf>.

8 RPP, *Reflecting on Peace Practice: Participant Training Manual* (Cambridge: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2008); Susanna P. Campbell, “When Process Matters: The Potential Implications of Organizational Learning for Peacebuilding Success,” *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 4, no. 2 (2008): 20–32.

9 Mark Duffield (2001), *Global Governance and the New Wars* (London: Zed Books), p. 265.

aim to influence and if they can sustain this type of adaptation over time. It asks if and how these organizations reconcile the likely gaps between their aims and the reality of the countries that they want to help. It seeks to answer this question by studying five different types of organizations engaged in peacebuilding work in Burundi over the past thirteen years. It studies how these organizations interact with the big changes in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory and how this influences their capacity to meet their aims. In the next stages of this research agenda, I will test the findings from these case studies with organizations of the same type in other countries.

By studying the organizational routines, rules, and systems that are replicated by IOs, INGOs, and bilateral aid agencies through their interventions in different countries, this research examines one of the most consistent determinants of peacebuilding outcomes in divergent country contexts. These organizations intervene in multiple countries and use their same standard operating procedures and approaches in each one. No other scholarly work has been conducted on the organizational routines and patterns of behavior in diverse organizations engaged in peacebuilding. Nor has anyone examined the capacity of IOs, INGOs, and donor aid agencies engaged in peacebuilding to adapt to, align with, understand, or ultimately transform national institutions. As a result, this dissertation fills a broad and important gap in the peacebuilding literature. Its findings have implications for the scholarly literature on peacebuilding effectiveness as well as the actual effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts. It also has potential implications for international relations literature on the factors that motivate the behavior IOs, INGOs, and bilateral aid agencies, literature on institutional change and adaptation, and the organizational learning literature.

1.2 Brief synthesis of findings

At the beginning of each of the six new phases in Burundi's war-to-peace transition from 1999 to 2011, no one could predict the trajectory that the transition would take. There were signs and probabilities, but no certainty. When there was certainty, the opportunity to influence the trajectory had already passed. This dissertation has found that the organizations engaged in peacebuilding were not able to take advantage of the new opportunities and demands offered by each new phase of Burundi's thirteen-year war-to-peace trajectory. They were not able to sustain peacebuilding. The changes in Burundi were too big and fast for one organization to keep up with. In each of the six phases in Burundi's peacebuilding process from 1999 to 2011, the needs, players, and approach needed changed. But most IOs, INGOs, and bilateral donors were not able to change that quickly or alter their capacity and approach that fundamentally.

The one case study organization, the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP), that was able to continually try and align its approach with the big trends in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory did so by eventually moving away from its core peacebuilding focus on Burundi's leaders and becoming more of a conflict resolution and leadership training organization. Each of the other four case studies lost their focus on Burundi's peacebuilding process and shifted to more standard development programming or, in the case of the UN office in Burundi (BNUB), simply stopped pushing for peace.

The bureaucratic routines of the four UN missions deployed to Burundi, the UN Development Program (UNDP) Burundi Office, and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) program from 2005 to 2011 created a technocratic approach to liberal peacebuilding. This removed the norms, ideals, and ideas from peacebuilding projects and programs. While the aim to create the determinants of liberal institutions was behind many of their projects and programs, the bureaucratization of peacebuilding

led to the development of standard projects and programs that were often devoid of the original concept or ideal. As a result, staff implementing these projects and programs were often more concerned with delivering the project as designed rather than achieving the behavioral or institutional change necessary for the existence of liberal institutions.

In spite of the claim by most international peacebuilding organizations that they can adapt to the conflict environments in which they intervene and sustain this alignment over the full peacebuilding trajectory, their institutional rules, routines, and norms take priority over those of the countries in which they intervene. As a result, international peacebuilding in Burundi is a temporary, supply-driven phenomenon. No organization has been able to sustain peacebuilding, and each organization's approach was driven primarily by its capacity and approach, not by the specific needs of Burundi's institutions. Because many of the patterns of organizational behavior present in the IOs, INGOs, and bilateral aid agencies operating in Burundi are reflected globally across each organization, international peacebuilding is likely to be temporary and supply-driven in other countries as well.

1.3 Roadmap

This dissertation follows a typical structure, with several case studies sandwiched between theoretical, methodological, and concluding chapters. Chapter 2 provides a synthesis of the relevant literature and outlines the theory that is tested in the case study chapters. Chapter 3 describes the research design and methodology employed in this dissertation. Chapter 4 describes the peacebuilding process in Burundi from 1999 to 2011. It establishes the trends to which the organizations performing peacebuilding in Burundi should have been paying attention. Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 present the five organizational case studies and analyze how and why they interacted with Burundi's war-to-peace transition. Chapter 5 is about the four UN missions in Burundi mandated

by the UN Security Council. Chapter 6 studies the UNDP in Burundi. Chapter 7 discusses the interventions by the UK DFID in Burundi. Chapter 8 is about the office of the international NGO, CARE International, in Burundi. Chapter 9 focuses on the BLTP.

Chapter 10 analyzes the trends that patterns that appear across all case studies and the differences between the case studies. In addition, it analyzes the patterns that are observable in the twenty-eight sub-cases that appear because I measure each of the case studies at six points in time, and two of the case studies are not operational for the first point in time. This cross-case comparison allows me to test the ideal-type theory that I present in Chapter 2 and to build a new typological theory that describes how peacebuilding organizations are likely to interact with and influence a war-torn country's war-to-peace trajectory. I conclude with a synthesis of the main findings from this dissertation, the potential implications of these findings for both theory and practice, and a brief description of the next stage in this research agenda.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

Can international organizations (IO), international non-governmental organizations (INGO), and government aid agencies transform patrimonial, conflict-ridden institutions into those that guarantee liberal democracy, rule of law, and a market-based economy? The record thus far in places such as Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, and Burundi and even “success cases” such as Mozambique shows that these organizations face significant obstacles in this effort. International peacebuilding efforts may help create stability and promote acceptance of liberal norms, but to date they have largely failed to fulfill their aim of creating liberal democratic states.¹⁰ Why is this?

Scholars attribute the failure of international liberal peacebuilding efforts to the unwillingness of national elites to embrace liberal institutions; the predominance of “illiberal” patrimonial institutions in conflict-ridden countries; the impossibility of achieving such a high degree of institutional transformation within such a short timeframe; the neocolonial nature of these efforts; the insufficient resources and political capital available to peace operations; and inadequate coordination, strategy, and tactics. While each of these explanations is likely to contain *part* of the reason for poor track record of international peacebuilding efforts, they all fail to consider one important question: Are IOs, INGOs, and bilateral donor agencies *organizationally structured* to change behaviors and build institutions in highly complex and dynamic post-conflict and transitional environments? This dissertation aims to answer this general question, as well as several more specific related questions.

- Are there organizational characteristics of IOs, INGOs, and donor government agencies that systematically inhibit or enable external organizations in their response to, adaptation to, interaction with, and ultimate transformation of

10 Virginia Page Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace and Civil War,” *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2004): 269–292.

national institutions in countries facing and/or emerging from large-scale violent conflict?

- If so, what are these characteristics, and to what degree are they present in the *organizational field* of international agencies engaged in peacebuilding?¹¹
- Is there a causal relationship between these characteristics and successful or unsuccessful instances of peacebuilding by one organization or a group of organizations?
- If so, what is the relationship between these characteristics and instances of success and failure in the overall organizational field of external organizations engaged in peacebuilding and the common types of organizations contained therein?

Why would international efforts to build peaceful states face organizational challenges? Prescriptive and critical literature on peacebuilding argues that intervening organizations must have an in-depth understanding of the countries in which they intervene and adapt their approach to positive and negative changes in this context.¹² Unfortunately, while context-specific understanding and adaptation are difficult for all organizations, they may be particularly difficult for organizations engaged in peacebuilding.

Unlike most studies of peacebuilding, which attempt to understand the aggregate success of all relevant efforts in one country and deliver an overall stamp of “approval” or “failure,” this research project disaggregates the organizational and institutional causes of success and failure by examining the micro-level interactions between intervening organizations and the national institutions of state and society that they aim to influence. To this end, it uses organizational sociology and thorough ethnographic field work to build and refine a typological theory that describes how the “organizational field” of international actors engaged in peacebuilding interact with, adapt to, align with,

11 An organizational field describes “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products.” DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 64-65.

12 International Alert, Saferworld, and FEWER, *Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack* (London, 2004); RPP, *Reflecting on Peace Practice: Participant Training Manual*.

and ultimately influence the national institutions that they aim to transform. In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of the relevant literature.

2.1 Concepts and definitions

Peacebuilding and statebuilding are vague concepts, and this causes problems for organizations that aim to implement them. This is in part because peace is a vague and much debated concept, with no agreement among scholars as to when it does or does not exist.¹³ The only possible agreement is that peace is the absence of large-scale violence.¹⁴ In other words, there is some agreement of what peace is not, but very little agreement as to what it is. This research employs the term *peacebuilding organization* to refer to organizations with both peacebuilding and statebuilding aims, as there are few organizations that engage uniquely in statebuilding.¹⁵ Peacekeeping is also included in the concept of peacebuilding, as most of the United Nation's peacekeeping is increasingly governed by multidimensional mandates that fall within the broader framework of peacebuilding.¹⁶

13 Charles C. T. Call, "Knowing Peace When You See It: Setting Standards for Peacebuilding Success," *Civil Wars* 10, no. 2 (June 2008): 173-194; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Johan Galtung (1969), "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, 3:167-191; Keith Krause and Oliver Jueterstonke, "Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environments," *Security Dialogue* 36 (2005) p. 449.

14 Call (2008), "Knowing Peace When You See It."

15 Michael Barnett (2006), "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After War," *International Security* 30, 4:87-122.; Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart (2008), *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Executive Office of the Secretary-General (2006), *Inventory United Nations Capacity in Peacebuilding*, (New York: United Nations, September).

16 Although several of this paper's hypotheses and conclusions may also be applicable to conflict prevention, this dissertation focuses on the concept of peacebuilding because the number of international actors are greater during the post-conflict phase, and there more opportunities for both effective and ineffective organizational learning in relation to their peacebuilding aims. In addition, peacebuilding fits within the broadest concept of conflict prevention, which includes "actions to prevent conflict from becoming violent," both before and after the outbreak of war. Peter Uvin (2002), "The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 1, 1 (2002):5. The Peacekeeping Best Practices Section at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations defines Multidimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations as "United Nations peacekeeping operations comprising a mix of military, police and civilian components working together to lay the foundations of a sustainable peace. Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (2008), "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines," Peacekeeping Best

When appropriate, I differentiate between the concept of peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity, the latter being that which simply aims to do programming that is aware of the conflict dynamics but for which addressing them may not be the organization's primary goal. An organization that is conflict-sensitive is one that understands the conflict dynamics of the country in which it works, understands the relationship between those dynamics and its own actions, and acts to reduce the negative impact of its work on the conflict and increase the positive impact.¹⁷

Both statebuilding and peacebuilding refer to two often convoluted levels of analysis. At the first level is the overall aim of creating a liberal democratic state, to which most peacebuilding organizations believe they contribute but are unable to measure or quantify this contribution. The second level describes a standard list of activities and tasks – from training of parliamentarians to the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants – that are assumed to contribute to the larger liberal democratic agenda. The term *post-conflict country* refers to a country that has experienced war and violent conflict but has recently gone through a peace process and often been the recipient of a peacekeeping mission. “[P]ostconflict is frequently a misnomer for societies that are still experiencing periodic flashes of violence,” although it is still used to describe them.¹⁸ The term *war-to-peace transition* refers to the period between all-out war and the clear existence of a sustainable peace.

For the purpose of this dissertation, an international peacebuilding organization is an external organization – whether initially founded to implement humanitarian, development, political, security, conflict resolution, or even peacebuilding programming

Practices Section, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, (New York: UN Secretariat) p. 97.

¹⁷ International Alert, Saferworld, and FEWER, *Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack*, 3.

¹⁸ Michael Barnett and Christoph Zürcher (2007), “The Peacebuilder's Contract: How External State-building Reinforces Weak Statehood,” *Research Partnership on Post-war Statebuilding*, p. 8.

– that “adopts goals and objectives” intended to impact the drivers and causes of peace.¹⁹ This research does not study national peacebuilding organizations or private contractors because they are likely influenced by somewhat different variables than those examined here. The specific types of *international* peacebuilding organizations investigated here are IOs, donor government development agencies, and INGOs. This research focuses on field-level learning, not learning between different units of one organization located in different countries, unless this learning enables the organization working at the field level to adapt better to and learn from the actual circumstances of the country in which it intervenes.²⁰

Organizational learning is defined as being manifested when there is *action to detect and correct errors between intentions and outcomes*.²¹ This definition is adapted from the work of Chris Argyris and Donald Schön: “Learning is defined as occurring under two conditions. First, learning occurs when an organisation achieves what it intended; that is, there is a match between its design for action and the actuality or outcome. Second, learning occurs when a mismatch between intentions and outcomes is identified and corrected; that is, a mismatch is turned into a match.”²²

For Argyris and Schön, single-loop learning occurs when an error is “detected and corrected without altering the underlying values of the system.”²³ Double-loop learning – when individuals openly and honestly examine their assumptions and behaviors in order to detect and correct an error – may play a role in helping peacebuilding organizations reassess and adapt their theories of change about the causes of peace to the

19 OECD-DAC, “Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities,” OECD Journal on Development 8, no. 3 (2007), p. 8.

20 Lise Morje Howard (2008), UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 19

21 Chris Argyris (1992), On Organizational Learning, (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers), p. 68.

22 Argyris 1992, p. 67.

23 Argyris 1992, p. 8.

country environment.²⁴ Argyris and Schön find that organizational behaviors and systems where “search is enhanced and deepened, where ideas are tested publicly, where individuals collaborate to enlarge inquiry, and where trust and risk-taking are enhanced” are more likely to encourage double-loop learning and therefore produce organizations that are less dysfunctional in terms of incongruent ends and means.²⁵ While Argyris and Schön define the alignment of intention and outcome as the manifestation of organizational learning, this paper examines factors that cause *action* to align the intention and outcome of peacebuilding aims. Achieving the desired outcome on the causes of peace can never be guaranteed even if informed action is taken; there are too many exogenous factors at play.

Argyris’ and Schön’s definition of organizational learning differs from that of James March and others who argue that organizational learning can take place in the absence of intended outcomes.²⁶ James March writes that learning has two different meanings: improvement in outcomes versus improvement in the learning process.²⁷ The learning process includes a series of steps: “beginning with the taking of an action, followed by the monitoring of the outcomes of the action, their interpretation, and then some modification of the propensity to repeat the action.”²⁸ The problem, March says, is that “[s]tudents of improvement sometimes presume that improvement has stemmed from a particular learning process, and students of learning processes sometimes presume that

24 Argyris 1992, pp. 67-68.

25 Argyris 1992, p. 153.

26 Barbara Levitt and James G. March (1988), “Organizational Learning,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 14:319-340; Jack S. Levy (1994), “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” *International Organization* 48, 2:306.

27 James G. March (1992), “Learning and the Theory of the Firm,” in James G. March (2008) *Explorations in Organizations* (Stanford: Stanford Business Books) pp. 84-85.

28 March (1992), “Learning and the Theory of the Firm,” p. 85.

they are describing a process that necessarily leads to improvement. Neither presumption is warranted in general.”²⁹

Jack Levy defines organizational learning as “a change of beliefs at the individual cognitive level.”³⁰ George Huber defines organizational learning in terms of the acquisition of knowledge: “An organization learns if any of its units acquires knowledge that it recognizes as potentially useful to the organization.”³¹ This dissertation addresses the learning process through one of its independent variables – learning behavior – which relates to how the organization processes information about the relationship between its aims and outcomes. It does not assume that this learning process will lead to action, but rather investigates whether a type of behavior that is likely to encourage learning leads to action. It asks whether the organization changes its behavior based on new information and knowledge and whether this new behavior enables the organization to better achieve its peacebuilding aims.

2.2 The significance of learning and adaptation for peacebuilding

The scholarly literature on peacebuilding agrees on one thing: *For peacebuilding to be successful, it must help support an endogenous change process in the war-torn country that enables the existence of formal and informal institutions of state and society that can sustain a just peace.* But the literature largely fails to ask whether the organizations engaged in peacebuilding are structured to support this type of change. The literature implies that organizations doing peacebuilding work need to adjust their approach to each country context and alter it as the conflict dynamics change, but it does not ask whether the

29 March (1992), “Learning and the Theory of the Firm,” p. 85.

30 Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (1994): 287.

31 George P. Huber, “Organizational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the Literatures,” *Organization Science* 2, no. 1 (1991): 89.

organizations are capable of this degree of adaptation and learning. This dissertation aims to fill this significant gap in the literature.

The first relevant literature, upon which much of the peacebuilding and statebuilding scholarship draws, is about state formation processes in Western Europe and Africa. This literature helps us to understand what the state formation process in countries currently emerging from civil war might have been like if the international community had not intervened. Historically, in North America and Western Europe, war-to-peace transitions occurred through decades-long, violent institution-building processes, where different actors vied for control of the state and the loyalty of its peoples.³² The state formation process did not follow a clear linear trajectory and was marked by high levels of conflict and instability.³³ The literature on state formation processes in Africa, and much of the rest of the non-Western world, points to a similarly turbulent process, although one which is likely to result in institutions that are dissimilar to those in European and North American states.³⁴ Perhaps surprisingly given this literature, modern international peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts aim peacefully to transform war-torn states into modern liberal, democratic states defined by the rule of law, markets, and liberal democracy, which generally referred to as the liberal peace

32 Charles Tilly (1985), 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp. 169-191.

33 Dietrich Rueschemeyer (2005), "Building States - Inherently a Long-Term Process? An Argument From Theory," in *States and Development: Historical Antecedents of Stagnation and Advance*, ed. Lange Matthew and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan); Michael Mann (1993), *The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914, The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 3 (New York: Cambridge University Press).; Mohammed Ayoob (2007), "State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure," in *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace).

34 See 'Signposts to More Effective States: Responding to Governance Challenges in Developing Countries', Institute of Development Studies 2005, pp. 59; Ayoob, "State Making, State Breaking and State Failure." Bruce Berman (1998), "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism," *African Affairs* 97:305-341. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999), *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, *African Issues*. (London Oxford Bloomington: International African Institute in association with J. Currey Indiana University Press).

agenda.³⁵ They aim to do so over a period of a few years, or possibly even a decade, through a relatively standard template of programs and strategies.

The scholarly literature on peacebuilding offers several critiques of this liberal peace agenda.³⁶ First, the peacebuilding scholarship is largely critical of the standard template of strategies, programs, activities, and tasks that is replicated from one country to the next.³⁷ For Barnett, the template approach to peacebuilding is problematic because a “mandate or doctrine that established fixed rules would either become out of sync with a complex reality or would dangerously shoehorn that reality so that it fit the rules. Either way, it could be fatal for the operation.”³⁸ Woodward argues that the supply-driven peacebuilding templates favor international legitimacy over national or local legitimacy, giving “priority to those aspects of a state’s capacity and political will seen necessary to implement the rules and norms of the current international economic and security

35 Michael Barnett (2006), "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War," *International Security* 30, 4:87-112; Marina Ottaway, "Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States," in *State Failure, Collapse, and Reconstruction*, ed. Jennifer Milliken (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), Roland Paris, "Wilson's Ghost: The Faulty Assumptions of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding," in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001); Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull, "Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas About Failed States," *International Security* 32, no. 4 (2008): 106-139.

36 Michael Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War," *International Security* 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006), Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation* (Washington, D.C. Arlington, Va.: United States Institute of Peace Press; Association of the United States Army, 2005), Marina Ottaway, "Promoting Democracy after Conflict: The Difficult Choices," *International Studies Perspectives* 4 (2003), Marina Ottaway, "Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States," in *State Failure, Collapse, and Reconstruction*, ed. Jennifer Milliken (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), Marina Ottaway and Anatol Lieven, "Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy Versus Reality," in *Policy Brief*, ed. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washington, DC: 12 January 2002), Roland Paris, "Wilson's Ghost: The Faulty Assumptions of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding," in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003).

37 Daniel Serwer and Patricia Thomson, "A Framework for Success: International Intervention in Societies Emerging From Conflict," in *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007).; BBPS, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines".

38 Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace," p. 91.

order... not to those aspects of domestic governance seen critical to the protection of human rights and citizen security at home.”³⁹

Second, peacebuilding scholarship argues that the wholesale application of the liberal peace agenda to countries emerging from conflict can stifle national peacebuilding capacity and local democratic processes and thus reduce the country’s capacity to sustain peace.⁴⁰ In addition, attempts to push forward all of the reforms present in the liberal peace agenda can lead to more, rather than less, conflict and violence. “In their effort to radically transform all aspects of the state, society, and economy in a matter of months (and thus expecting conflict-ridden societies to achieve what took Western states decades), peacebuilders are subjecting these fragile societies to tremendous stress.”⁴¹ Third, the literature argues that because the liberal peacebuilding approach attempts, although unsuccessfully, to transplant Western institutions or their outputs, it largely fails to support a state formation process and state-society interactions that would be critical to the eventual formation of a liberal democratic state.⁴²

Fourth, the peacebuilding literature points to numerous contradictions between the various programs and strategies that comprise liberal peacebuilding, which can lead international peacebuilding actors to work at cross purposes and reap harm on the host state and society. Peace and justice imperatives can be at odds with political efforts to secure peace. Efforts to strengthen state institutions may contradict those that promote

39 Susan L. Woodward, “Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using Knowledge to Improve Peacebuilding Interventions,” *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 1:2, (2007): 143-170., p. 161.

40 Astri Suhrke, “The Limits of Statebuilding: The Role of International Assistance in Afghanistan,” *International Studies Association Annual Meeting* (March 2006); Astri Suhrke, “Reconstruction as Modernisation: The ‘Post-Conflict’ Project in Afghanistan,” *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 7 (2007 Oct): 1291-1308.; Call and Cousens; Ghani and Lockhart; Virginia Page Fortna, ‘Peacekeeping and Democratization’, in Anna Jarstad and Timothy Sisk (eds.), *From War to Democracy* *Ibid.*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp.39–79.

41 Barnett, “Building a Republican Peace,” p. 87

42 Barnett and Zuercher; *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 1 (2007 MAR): 27-48.; Beatrice Pouligny, “Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed At Building ‘New’ Societies,” *Security Dialogue* 36:4, (2005): 495-510.

democratization and economic liberalization.⁴³ Initiatives focused on establishing peace and security for the state may be disharmonious with those that promote democracy. “The failure to deal with such dilemmas can have devastating effects, thus undermining both long-term democratization and peace.”⁴⁴

These dilemmas and contradictions may lead to more conflict and instability, rather than less.⁴⁵ “[W]hile democracy as a political system is associated with peaceful conflict management both within and between states, the road to democracy is often conflict-ridden.”⁴⁶ In the face of scarce resources, “outsiders” working for peacebuilding organizations are charged with making difficult decisions among competing priorities and resolving the numerous ethical and political dilemmas that emerge. “[G]iven the difficulty of understanding post-conflict dynamics and the even greater difficulty of correctly predicting the impact of one’s actions upon them, error is very likely. At the same time, the cost of error is extremely high and entirely borne by locals.”⁴⁷ Consequently, peacebuilding is not likely to be as straightforward as some frameworks would lead one to think.⁴⁸ This creates the need to learn from and adapt approaches to the post-conflict country environment, which includes the national and international actors operating there.

43 Roland Paris, 'Wilson's Ghost: The Faulty Assumptions of Post-conflict Peacebuilding' in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds.), *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p.781.

44 Jarstad, p. 18.

45 Uvin, OECD. Peter Burnell, "The Coherence of Democratic Peacebuilding," in UNU/WIDER Conference on Making Peace Work (Helsinki, Finland: 28 April 2004), Virginia Page Fortna, "Peacekeeping and Democratization," in International Studies Association (San Diego, CA: March 2006). Thomas Carothers, *Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006),

46 Anna K Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas in Peacebuilding*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2008), p. 19.

47 Peter S. Uvin, "Difficult Choices in the New Post-Conflict Agenda: The International Community in Rwanda after the Genocide," *Third World Quarterly* (April 2001), p. 185.

48 Jack Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds., *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005); Serwer and Thomson, "A Framework for Success: International Intervention in Societies Emerging From Conflict," Smith, "Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together". PBPS, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines".

In response to the challenges outlined above, the scholarly and policy literature develop several prescriptions for improving peacebuilding practice, all of which point to the importance of a high level of organizational learning and adaptation.

2.2.1 UNDERSTAND AND ADAPT TO CONFLICT DYNAMICS

Peacebuilding scholarship calls for international actors to understand better the contexts in which they operate and to design their programs to meet the needs and support the capacities of the country in which they intervene. From one perspective, this understanding helps international actors “take into consideration the potentially adverse effects of their interventions in all dimensions.”⁴⁹ From another, it enables real understanding and support for local capacities and “how collective life continues to organize itself, even amid many difficulties”⁵⁰ so that international actors can avoid acting as if they “could rebuild a society without first identifying and recognizing locally existing resources.”⁵¹

As the capacities and dynamics in the country change, the strategy and program should also change. “The first thing peacekeepers must do is identify the nature of the conflict they face.... But their decisions, to take this a step further, can rarely be static. Circumstances change and strategic peacebuilding must adjust to ‘spoilers’ and mobilize appropriate incentives.”⁵² This understanding and adaptation in relation to peacebuilding aims requires “building reflexive monitoring mechanisms to allow for a calibration of policies through constant evaluation is critical.”⁵³

49 Charles T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth, *Building States to Build Peace*, (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 2008), p. 370.

50 Pouligny, p. 507.

51 Pouligny, p. 502.

52 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *United Nations Peace Operations: Making War and Building Peace*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 56-57.

53 Ghani and Lockhart, p. 192.

Policy and best practice literature echo scholarly literature's emphasis on aligning peacebuilding programs with the needs, capacities, and dynamics of each country.⁵⁴ The term for this alignment is *conflict sensitivity*. The literature indicates that while "[a]ll efforts undertaken in a conflict area should be conflict-sensitive... interventions intended to prevent conflict and build peace must also be held accountable for their impact on the specific factors that drive and shape that conflict."⁵⁵ The methods recommended to improve conflict sensitivity are conflict analysis, conflict-sensitive programming, and conflict-sensitive monitoring and evaluation, all of which require that peacebuilding organizations systematically learn from and adapt to the environments in which they operate.⁵⁶

2.2.2 QUESTION THEORY OF CHANGE ABOUT CAUSES OF PEACE

Scholarly and best practice literature argues that increased peacebuilding effectiveness requires that peacebuilding organizations question their underlying assumptions about the causes of civil war and peace. Oliver Richmond argues that the failure of liberal peacebuilding to evaluate its claims has created a crisis of legitimacy with the local populations that it aims to help.⁵⁷ Susan Woodward argues that current peacebuilding policies "tend to be based on research that has been superseded and that, in any case, proposed competing arguments."⁵⁸ As a result, interventions that are based on ideas of the causes of war or peace that academia has proven wrong "may do more

54 Best practice literature refers to empirical reviews of best practices as well as prescriptive guidelines or methods that are designed to improve peacebuilding practice.

55 OECD-DAC, "Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities," OECD Journal on Development 8, no. 3 (2007 Nov): 104., p. 8.

56 ; Susanna P. Campbell (2008), "When Process Matters: The Potential Implications of Organizational Learning for Peacebuilding Success," Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 4, 2:20-32.

57 Oliver P. Richmond (2009), "A post-liberal peace: Eirenism and the everyday," Review of International Studies 35:557-580.

58 Woodward, p. 154.

harm than we would by ignoring causes altogether.”⁵⁹ Barnett et al echo Woodward’s concern: “Different agencies work with alternative modes of operationalizing peacebuilding, which, in turn, are reflective of different strategies for achieving peace after war. These strategies, though, more often than not, reflect unexamined assumptions and deeply rooted organizational mandates rather than ‘best practices’ born from empirical analysis.”⁶⁰ The assumptions about how a peacebuilding activity or strategy will contribute to peace are referred to as theories of change.⁶¹ According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), the “theory of change represents how the interveners (policy makers, program designers, implementers) assume that their strategies can bring about their goals (vision of peace) in this context.”⁶²

The OECD-DAC’s peacebuilding evaluation guidelines and Campbell argue that to understand and improve the impact of a peacebuilding activity on a conflict environment, the underlying theories of change should be identified and assessed to ensure that their hypotheses are appropriate for the particular post-conflict country and have not already been debunked by more recent academic research.⁶³ Questioning the relevance of theories of change to each context is likely to require that organizations engage in double-loop learning, which means that they openly critique and test their assumptions about their organizational strategies and purpose.⁶⁴ Double-loop learning

59 Woodward, p. 154.

60 Barnett et al, p. 53.

61 Cheyanne Church and Julie Shouldice, *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Part II: Emerging Practise & Theory*, (Londonderry: INCORE, 2003), p. 33.

62 OECD-DAC, “Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities”, p. 54.

63 Ibid., p. 54; Susanna P. Campbell (2008), “When Process Matters: The Potential Implications of Organizational Learning for Peacebuilding Success,” *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 4, 2:20-32.

64 Argyris 1992, p. 153; Saferworld International Alert, and FEWER, *Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack*, (London: 2004) Ch. 5, p. 3.

is the most challenging type of learning for an organization to carry out, placing even greater demands on peacebuilding organizations' learning and adaptive capacity.⁶⁵

2.2.3 FOCUS ON INCREMENTAL AIMS AND DISCOVER COUNTRY'S PARTICULAR WAR-TO-PEACE TRAJECTORY

Peacebuilding scholarship also recommends that peacebuilding organizations reduce their ambitions and focus on more incremental goals that allow them to support each country's particular war-to-peace trajectory. "[P]erhaps the greatest challenge for the international community in trying to assist war-torn societies is to be ruthlessly modest about its ambitions. Aspirations to establish positive peace through short- to medium-term intervention fly in the face of historical experience."⁶⁶ Barnett argues that current peacebuilding approaches fail to take this incremental approach: "Instead of grand plans, peacebuilders should celebrate incrementalism."⁶⁷ Here, we see a divergence between the peacebuilding scholarship that critiques the current peacebuilding approaches and some of the policy literature that focuses on producing increasingly complex metrics, benchmarks, and frameworks to guide peacebuilding and nation building.⁶⁸ Nonetheless, even these template-based approaches emphasize the importance of adapting, adjusting, and learning from the local context.

65 Argyris 1992; Ernst B. Haas, *When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

66 Cousens, Introduction, p. 15-16

67 Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace," p. 112.

68 Jack Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds., *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005); Serwer and Thomson, "A Framework for Success: International Intervention in Societies Emerging From Conflict," Smith, "Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together". PBPS, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines". The Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) metrics that the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) is developing, outlines a series of stages in the conflict transformation and stabilization process (e.g., imposed stability, assisted stability, and self-sustaining peace), and then provides indicators to determine whether the country is moving from one stage to the next. In its forty-pages, the MPICE outlines hundreds of indicators for peacebuilders to use in establishing Political Moderation & Stable Democracy, Security, Rule of Law, Economic Sustainability, and Social Well-being.

A more incremental approach leaves room for peacebuilding organizations to discover and learn which approaches may be most appropriate for a particular time in a country's war-to-peace transition. Incrementalism requires that "peacebuilders confess to a high degree of uncertainty" in what they are doing and how they will achieve the desired ends.⁶⁹ Admitting to this uncertainty, actively gathering information about the needs, capacities, and perceptions of the post-conflict state and society, and developing strategies and activities in response requires a high degree of effort to understand the relationship between organizational intentions and outcomes, further increasing the learning capacity expected of peacebuilding organizations.

2.2.4 INCREASE LOCAL FEEDBACK AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Several authors recommend that peacebuilding organizations deal with the uncertainty about the war-to-peace trajectory in the countries in which they intervene by increasing the feedback that they receive from the local population.⁷⁰ "Because the citizens of a country are the most important judges and juries in deciding whether the rules are legitimate, it is essential to report to them on a regular basis... [and] find ways to obtain citizen feedback in order to calibrate the strategy and enhance the citizens' trust."⁷¹

2.2.5 INCREASE LINKAGES AND COORDINATION WITH OTHER PEACEBUILDING ACTORS

Scholarly and policy literature also emphasize the interdependence of all actors, including peacebuilding organizations, in a post-conflict context. The policy literature largely recommends that this interdependence be addressed through the development of an integrated, coherent strategy of the international community that is aligned with the

⁶⁹ Barnett and Zuercher, p. 31-32.

⁷⁰ Barnett, p. 110.; Barnett and Zuercher; Pouligny; Ghani and Lockhart.

⁷¹ Ghani and Lockhart, 192.

needs, priorities, and policies of the state concerned.⁷² According to Dan Smith, the trick is to combine the different peacebuilding activities (or the peacebuilding palette) together “in ways that are specific to the country, region, and conflict in question, for greater effect – like mixing paint.”⁷³ With the right mixture, the aggregate whole becomes greater than the sum of the parts.

Coordination is intended to provide a forum for the various (primarily international) actors to ensure that they continue to work toward their overarching strategy.⁷⁴ The problem is that coordination and integration are largely voluntary activities and can facilitate but not enforce the desired collective action.⁷⁵ Voluntary coordination does not often resolve the numerous contradictions in the liberal peace agenda described above. In addition, research by the Reflecting on Peace Practice project has revealed that “linkages” between individual projects can create a “cumulative effectiveness” that improves peacebuilding success.⁷⁶ While coordination can facilitate these linkages, it does not automatically result in either linkages or cumulative effectiveness. The interdependence between all actors in a post-conflict context and the possible importance of linkages for cumulative effectiveness point (yet again) to the importance of the learning capacity of peacebuilding organizations. Not only do peacebuilding outcomes depend on how these organizations interact with the state and society in which they intervene, but they also depend on how peacebuilding

72 OECD-DAC, “Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities”.; Cedric de Coning, “Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions: A Norwegian Perspective,” *Security in Practice* 5, (2007).; Espen Barth Eide et al., “Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations,” (2005 May 2005).; Ghani and Lockhart.

73 Smith 2004, p. 27.

74 de Coning; OECD-DAC, “Encouraging Effective Evaluation,” 2007.

75 Susanna P. Campbell, “(Dis)Integration, Incoherence and Complexity in Un Post-Conflict Interventions,” *International Peacekeeping* 15:4, (2008): 556-569.; Susanna P. Campbell and Anja T. Kaspersen, “The UN's Reforms: Confronting Integration Barriers,” *International Peacekeeping* 15:4, (2008): 470-485..

76 OECD-DAC, “Encouraging Effective Evaluation,” 2007, p. 40; Mary B. Anderson and Lara Olson, *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners*, (Cambridge: The Collaborative for Development Action, 2003)., p. 48-49.

organizations learn from and adapt to simultaneous and sequential actions by other peacebuilding actors.

2.2.6 CATALYZE AND FACILITATE LOCAL AND NATIONAL SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

The peacebuilding policy and scholarly literature are largely in agreement that buy-in and ownership by the host state and society are essential for even a modicum of positive peace. “[E]ven where enforcement is used at the outset, the peace must eventually become self-sustaining, and consent needs to be won if the peace enforcers are ever to exit with their work done.”⁷⁷ To achieve buy-in from the state and society, international actors have to understand the dynamics of the state and society well enough to develop approaches that will resonate and become “owned.”

[W]e need to reconceptualize how the staffs of international organizations or international NGOs conceive of their role in any peacebuilding process. Contrary to what they may be inclined to feel or believe, they are not the main actors, but should think of themselves as facilitators in a leverage process. This means that one needs to be modest, flexible, patient and unobtrusive – almost the opposite of what informs most of the current practices.⁷⁸

For peacebuilding organizations to be facilitators and catalysts of a country’s social change process, they would need to be highly sensitive to the different needs and perceptions in the country.⁷⁹ “Perceptions alter citizens’ expectations of gain and the decisions they make in regards to reform... [I]f local actors distrust third parties, they will remain fearful, suspicious, and unwilling to compromise.”⁸⁰ Understanding and managing the numerous perceptions and needs of the host state and society and engaging with the various actors in a way that encourages their buy-in and ownership would require a high degree of sensitivity and adaptation to the context.

77 Doyle and Sambanis, p. 56.

78 Pouligny, p. 508

79 Ghani and Lockhart, p. 225.

80 Andrea Kathryn Talentino, 'Perceptions of Peacebuilding: The Dynamic of Imposer and Imposed Upon', *International Studies Perspectives* 2007, p. 154

Interestingly, some of the critical theorists in international relations, many of whom question the legitimacy of international statebuilding, have a similar focus: The local and national actors, and the everyday reality in which they live, should be the focus of any peacebuilding effort.⁸¹ For these authors, the main purpose of international peacebuilders is to negotiate with, empower, and emancipate national actors. Oliver Richmond argues, “A post-liberal peace requires that international actors use a range of methods that enable local actors and the most marginalized to engage with a discussion of their own requirements for needs provision and their own understanding of rights and institutions.”⁸² This bargain between the local and international actors may result in a very different institutional form than that envisioned by the most ardent liberal peacebuilders.⁸³

This vision of peacebuilding has significant implications for the IOs, INGOs, and bilateral donors trying to support it. Peacebuilding interventions aim to change a changing context. They aim to support or catalyze change at the individual, interpersonal, organizational, institutional, or cultural level.⁸⁴ They aim to do so in a context that is rapidly shifting, where political alliances are being redrawn and renegotiated, renewed war and violence are a constant threat (or even reality), public and private investment are surging (or about to surge), former combatants are trying to find new work, crime rates are increasing, and expectations for a “peace dividend” are high after years of war. Browne and Wildavsky argue that in such circumstances, organizations have to be prepared to alter both their means and their ends.

⁸¹ Oliver Richmond, “Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace:,” in *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding*, ed. Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam (London: Zed Books, 2011).

⁸² *Ibid.*, 239.

⁸³ Christoph Zuercher, “The Liberal Peace - A Tough Sell?,” in *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding*, ed. Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam (London: Zed Books, 2011).

⁸⁴ John Paul Lederach, “Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies” (1997).

If change – altered relationships among participants leading to different outcomes – is the idea behind implementation, the continuous adjustment of objectives is called for just as much as modification of instruments for attaining them. Implementation ceases being static; it becomes dynamic by virtue of incorporating learning of what to prefer as well as how to achieve it.⁸⁵

What would it take for an organization to adapt both its aims and its approach to achieve the desired change in a country emerging from war?

2.3 Studies of organizational learning in peacebuilding and statebuilding

Only one author, Lise Morje Howard, has directly addressed the relationship between organizational learning and peacebuilding success, although she focuses only on the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and does not assess the causes of effective or ineffective learning. Benner and Rotmann catalogue the learning infrastructure of the UN, but do not examine the particular importance of learning for peacebuilding or the organizational barriers to learning in the UN or other organizations. Dan Smith hints at the importance of organizational factors for peacebuilding success, suggesting that “the emphasis of research could be placed not on the problem [of peacebuilding] but on the institutions that attempt to solve it” and calling for the use of “theory of organizations, bureaucracy, and management to ask whether current

⁸⁵ Angela Browne and Aaron Wildavsky (1984), “Implementation as Exploration (1983),” in Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, *Implementation, Third Edition, Expanded* (Berkeley: University of California Press) p. 234.

institutions are optimal for the tasks assigned to them.”⁸⁶ However, he does not pursue this line of research. This dissertation aims to fill these significant gaps in the literature.

In her recent book, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, Howard finds that organizational learning is a necessary condition for the successful implementation of UN peacekeeping mandates.⁸⁷ Specifically, she finds that first-level organizational learning, “certain favorable ‘situational factors’ of the country emerging from civil war,” and “consensual but only moderately intense interests of the powerful members of the Security Council” are jointly sufficient to explain the success of UN peacekeeping.⁸⁸

First-level learning focuses on the *process* of learning; it is “not based on learning discrete, concrete ‘rules of the game,’ because the game is constantly changing.”⁸⁹ For Howard, first-level learning takes place at the field level, while second-level learning occurs at the headquarter level and influences the conditions for first-level learning.⁹⁰ Howard argues that first-level learning may be particularly important not only because of the changing dynamics of the country context, but also because of the tendency of the UN Secretariat to transpose the same set of institutional blueprints, based on the liberal peace agenda, onto different countries.⁹¹ Interpreting the broad strokes of the Security Council mandate and adapting the standard institutional blueprints to the reality of the post-conflict country requires first-level learning.

While Howard found a “fair amount of first-level learning *within* peacekeeping missions” that she studied – contributing to the success of these missions – she found the

86 Dan Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together*, Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, vol. (Brattvaag: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004 April 2004). p. 15

87 Howard, p. 2.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid, p. 19

90 Ibid, pp. 14-18

91 Ibid, p. 341.

UN to be deficient in second-level learning, or learning *between* missions.⁹² Second-level learning improves “the preconditions for first-level learning” by changing the organization’s overall “means, structures, and goals.”⁹³ Howard found high levels of organizational dysfunction in terms of the UN Secretariat’s second-level learning capacity, which is “indicated when sections of the organization work at cross purposes with one another, important general insights from one operation are not adequately transferred to other operations, actions are at odds with the fundamental principles of the organization, and there is no systematic evaluation of programs, goals, or methods.”⁹⁴ Here, Howard points to but does not investigate numerous possible systematic barriers to learning within the UN Secretariat.

This research picks up where Howard left off. Based her work and on a thorough review of the peacebuilding literature, this research deepens her argument as to why first-level organizational learning is likely to be a determinant of peacebuilding success. It then examines the type of organizational learning that may be most conducive to peacebuilding success and the structural, historical, and normative determinants for this type of learning. While Howard hints at some of these determinants, she does not thoroughly investigate them or even provide an analysis of the UN’s general learning capacity. A contribution of this dissertation is the development of a taxonomy outlining the peacebuilding learning capacity (i.e., organizational learning capacity in relation to peacebuilding aims) of the three most significant sub-types of peacebuilding organizations – multilateral, donor government, and non-governmental organizations. Howard, on the other hand, investigates only the UN Secretariat.

92 Ibid, p. 330.

93 Ibid, p. 19-20.

94 Ibid, p. 330.

This research differs from Howard's in terms of her basic assumptions about success. Howard measures success primarily as the implementation of the peacekeeping operation's Security Council mandate as well as a general assessment of the "state of the country after the completion of the UN intervention."⁹⁵ She largely evaluates learning, not what is being learned or what the barriers to learning and thus to success might be. She does not question the normative and institutional assumptions inherent in Security Council mandates and their alignment with the needs and capacities of the post-conflict country.

In contrast with Howard, this research dives into the debate about the applicability of the liberal peace agenda and examines how different structural, historical, and normative determinants impact how peacebuilding organizations navigate the large gap between the maximalist expectations of the liberal peace agenda and the minimalist institutional capacity of the state and society emerging from conflict. In addition, while Howard examines success on the macro level by identifying a peacekeeping operation as either a success or failure, this research examines micro- and meso-level incremental success by assessing the degree to which peacebuilding organizations regularly detect and act to correct errors between peacebuilding aims and the outcome(s) of activities. It then examines how each of these activities contributes to key proximate events and processes that have created positive momentum in the country's war-to-peace transition. It also reviews the literature on the specific programmatic approach to see what "lessons" were integrated into the specific project under study. This research does not ask whether the right or wrong approach to peacebuilding is being undertaken, but asks whether a peacebuilding organization knows if it is implementing an approach that will deliver the

95 Ibid, p. 7-8.

desired results. If it does possess this knowledge, this research asks whether it systematically acts to align its intentions and the outcomes of its activities.

In their article, *Learning to Learn? UN Peacebuilding and the Challenge of Building a Learning Organization*, Benner and Rotmann review the DPKO's learning infrastructure as it has developed since 1992 and conclude that "turning the UN into a learning organization is unfinished business at best."⁹⁶ This research builds on their conclusion that the UN is an imperfect learning organization and examines how this is manifested at the field level and how it impacts the UN's ability to learn in relation to its peacebuilding aims. While Benner and Rotmann's analysis focuses on the transmission of lessons learned between successive UN peace operations, or what Howard defines as second-level learning, this research examines the first-level learning capacity of DPKO, as well as other cases.

For Benner and Rotmann, learning is important for DPKO because the context-specific nature of peacebuilding "requires strong local knowledge and shrewd and sober political analysis coupled with skilled leadership."⁹⁷ They write that the context-specific knowledge necessary for peacebuilding makes learning even more difficult than in other fields, such as environmental protection, where "consensual knowledge based on generalized scientific evidence is much more likely to be produced by 'epistemic communities.'"⁹⁸ Other than these two claims, for which they provide no supporting evidence, Benner and Rotmann do not discuss why learning might be particularly important for peacebuilding organizations or what type of learning or knowledge may increase the success of peacebuilding efforts or question which types of organizational structures or processes are likely to lead to more effective learning in relation to

96 Thorsten Benner and Philipp Rotmann, "Learning to Learn? Un Peacebuilding and the Challenges of Building a Learning Organization," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 2, no. 1 (2008): 43-62., p. 56.

97 *Ibid.*, p. 58.

98 *Ibid.*

peacebuilding aims. They largely assume that learning by the UN is good, regardless of what is learned. Contrary to Benner and Rotmann, this research does not assume that all organizational learning is positive, but investigates how and what type of organizational learning advances or detracts from peacebuilding aims.

The existing literature on the relationship between organizational learning and peacebuilding success provides important support for this dissertation research, at the same time as it leaves many gaps to be filled. It supports this research in that it shows that learning matters for peacebuilding success and that the UN is not a perfect learning organization. The gaps that it leaves include identification of the barriers to learning within different types of peacebuilding organizations; a thorough analysis of the relationship between organizational learning and peacebuilding success; an analysis of whether each organization's definition of success, as manifested in its aims, is achievable; and an analysis of the implications of the learning capacity of peacebuilding organizations for the numerous prescriptions for improving peacebuilding practice found in the scholarly and policy literature on peacebuilding and statebuilding. These are gaps in the literature that this dissertation will fill.

2.4 Peacebuilding organizations as learning organizations

What does the theoretical literature on organizational learning say about how peacebuilding organizations can be expected to learn?⁹⁹ Organizational learning and adaptation are challenging for all organizations. Entrenched routines, cultures, and patterns of behavior make quick change and adaptation difficult. Individuals have

⁹⁹ I originally wrote this section of the literature review for my dissertation proposal and then later on edited part of my proposal into a book chapter. This section here was included in the book chapter. Susanna Campbell, "Routine Learning? How Peacebuilding Organizations Prevent Liberal Peace" (London: Zed Books, 2011), 89–105.

different interpretations of what should be learned and in which direction change and adaptation should take place.

2.4.1 ORGANIZATIONS LEARN WHAT THEY DEFINE AND MEASURE AS SUCCESSFUL

Organizations learn in relation to targets. Organizational behavior depends on the relationship between the outcomes they observe and the aspirations, or targets, they have for those outcomes.¹⁰⁰ An organization therefore learns what it defines and measures as successful. Measuring success in peacebuilding is particularly challenging because of the large number of factors that contribute to success and failure, the unique circumstances of each conflict environment, and the high degree of conflict sensitivity and organizational learning required to measure incremental success. When peacebuilding impact is measured, it usually takes place in the form of detailed evaluations carried out by academics after a project or program is finished, leaving few opportunities to adapt and change an ongoing intervention. A catch-22 emerges. While organizational learning capacity helps to determine a peacebuilding organization's capacity to measure success, improved capacity to measure success is essential for organizational learning. Consequently, better assessment of incremental impact on the causes of peace is likely to be critical in improving peacebuilding practice.

2.4.2 ORGANIZATIONS LEARN THROUGH HISTORICAL FRAMES AND KNOWLEDGE-LADEN ROUTINES

Organizational routines guide learning. Organizations learn "by encoding inferences from history into routines that guide behavior."¹⁰¹ Routines are the rules, "procedures, technologies, beliefs, and cultures [that] are conserved through systems of

¹⁰⁰ Barbara Levitt and James G. March, "Organizational Learning," *Annual Review of Sociology* 14 (1988): 320.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 319.

socialization and control.”¹⁰² Action in organizations therefore “involves matching procedures to situations more than it does calculating choices.”¹⁰³ Because learning is based on “interpretations of the past more than anticipations of the future,” peacebuilding organizations are likely to apply old solutions to new problems, whether they fit or not.¹⁰⁴ Because routines shape behavior in organizations, organizational learning is limited to aspects of experience that are translatable into routines.

The routines – and the individuals who observe success and translate it into routines – largely determine, and limit, what an organization can learn. Individuals make numerous mistakes in their attempts to interpret and draw lessons from history, leading to “systematic biases in interpretation.”¹⁰⁵ As a result, an organization’s best practices may be difficult to capture fully, translate into routines, and replicate. Because of the complexity of conflict environments, and the unique nature of each conflict, it is even more likely that interpretations of peacebuilding success that are integrated into routines will be flawed. Furthermore, because organizations learn from history, even when a lesson is learned, it may not be the right lesson. Organizations are often taught the same lessons repeatedly and learn only the lessons they can easily translate into the language of preexisting routines.

Organizational routines are representative of larger organizational frames.¹⁰⁶ These frames are “approaches to problem solving used by organizational personnel,” determining “what counts as a problem, how problems are represented, the strategies to be used to solve those problems, and the constraints and requirements placed on possible

102 Ibid., 326.

103 Ibid., 320.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid., 323.

106 Lynn Eden, *Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

solutions.”¹⁰⁷ These criteria are developed during “the creation of organizations and during periods of organizational upheaval” when “actors articulate organizational goals and draw on and modify existing understandings, or knowledge, of the social and physical environment in which they must operate.”¹⁰⁸ These organizational frames are critical to organizational learning because they determine how organizations interpret and understand their experiences (i.e., histories) and thus encode them into knowledge-laden artifacts and routines. It is organizational frames, rather than historical facts, that determine how organizations act.¹⁰⁹ Nonetheless, historical interpretation is subjective. Even the lessons that are recorded into routines may be wrong. Jack Levy writes that people “use history instrumentally,” selecting “from historical experience those cases that provide the greatest support for their preexisting policy preference, or they reinterpret a given case in a way that reinforces their views.”¹¹⁰

The role of routines and frames in organizational learning poses particular challenges for peacebuilding organizations because these organizations were largely designed to implement other types of activities (i.e., development, humanitarian, human rights, or conflict resolution). These organizations will have difficulty encoding lessons learned about peacebuilding impact into routines that were designed to support and reward other types of programming. In addition, while routines can adapt incrementally, adaptation requires some proof of necessity, which calls for assessment of success or failure. Because of the difficulty of assessing the impact of peacebuilding efforts, there is weak evidence within many peacebuilding organizations of the need to change or adapt

107 Lynn Eden, “‘Getting it Right or Wrong’: Organizational Learning about the Physical World,” in *Organizational Learning in the Global Context*, ed. M. Leann Brown, Michael Kenny, and Michael Zarkin (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), 198; Eden, *Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation*, 49–50.

108 Eden, “‘Getting it Right or Wrong’: Organizational Learning about the Physical World,” 49–50.

109 *Ibid.*, 199.

110 Jack S. Levy (1994), “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” *International Organization* 48, 2:306.

routines in order to improve peacebuilding practice and thus few incentives to do so.

Because organizational learning is dependent on historical routines, it is largely path-dependent. According to Powell, “path-dependent models suggest that institutional arrangements are not likely to be flexible; they cannot change rapidly in response to perturbations in the environment.”¹¹¹ In other words, organizational action and learning reinforce historical frames, which in turn influences what is learned and which actions are taken. An organization’s original institutional environment is particularly important, as it imprints the organization with its routines, resources, knowledge, structure, and culture, upon which new organizational forms must draw.¹¹² The path-dependent nature of organizational learning is likely to have real significance for many peacebuilding organizations that were founded to achieve different aims, particularly in a less complex and dynamic environment.

2.5 Pathologies of the global governors

There are distinct barriers to learning in bureaucracies, which is the organizational form of many peacebuilding organizations. Barnett and Finnemore explain that IOs, which are bureaucracies, tend to reproduce themselves. “Solutions that involve regulation, arbitration, and intervention by rational-legal authorities (themselves or other organizations) appear sensible, rational, and good to IOs and so disproportionately emerge from IO activity.”¹¹³ Instead of responding to the needs of the post-conflict state and society, international bureaucracies are likely to recreate institutions and programs in their own image. “The result is that what began as a relatively narrow technical

111 Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,” in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, ed. Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), 193.

112 W. Richard Scott and Gerald F. Davis, “Organizations and Organizing: Rational, Natural, and Open System Perspectives” (2007): 252.

113 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics” (2004): 34.

intervention (training police) expands into a package of reforms aimed at transforming non-Western societies (where most peacebuilding takes place) into Western societies.”¹¹⁴ Rather than catalyzing a change process, bureaucracies are likely to try to do much of the work themselves in a manner that fits with their standards and approach.¹¹⁵

According to Barnett and Finnemore, “the same normative valuation on impersonal, generalized rules that defines bureaucracies and makes them powerful in modern life can also make them unresponsive to their environments, obsessed with their own rules at the expense of primary missions, and ultimately lead to inefficient, self-defeating behavior.”¹¹⁶ These factors are likely to significantly inhibit the degree to which bureaucracies can be expected to learn from the particular post-conflict country in which they intervene and design programs that meet the needs and capacities of the post-conflict state and society.

The norms contained in the liberal peace agenda may actually prevent peacebuilding organizations from identifying and supporting the needs and capacities of the host country. Barnett and Finnemore point out that IOs derive their authority from their normative mandate. Member states established IOs to protect values that they could not protect on their own, and IOs therefore derive their authority from the delegation “IOs are thus authoritative because they represent the collective will of their members,” which is embodied in international law and human rights conventions.¹¹⁷ If they were to pursue less ambitious normative aims than those contained in the liberal peace agenda, they could risk compromising their basis of authority.

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid.

116 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” *International Organization* 53, 4:699-700.

117 Barnett and Finnemore, “Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics,” 22.

Western donor agencies and NGOs also have normative missions and constraints. Western donor agencies are accountable to their governments and may find it difficult to compromise their own liberal democratic ideals for solutions that may be less palatable to their populations and legislative bodies (i.e., corruption, inequality, etc.). Or if they do aim for stabilization rather than liberalization, they may be unwilling to collect valid information about their outcomes, which is a prerequisite for learning. Most NGOs also possess highly normative mandates (i.e., humanitarian, human rights, sustainable development, religious focus), although the degree to which they can compromise them is dependent on their organizational culture and their relationship with their donors.

Peacebuilding organizations are primarily accountable to actors that are external to the state in which they intervene, rather than to the beneficiaries that they claim to serve. A bilateral aid agency is accountable to its home government and political constituency. An IO is accountable to its member states. A NGO is accountable to its donors. Peacebuilding organizations' incentive structures are aligned with the policies and systems of these external constituencies, not those of the host state and society.

This tendency toward external accountability is described by some as the broken feedback loop of international aid.¹¹⁸ “[A] unique and most striking characteristic of foreign aid is that the people for whose benefit aid agencies work are not the same as those from whom their revenues are obtained; they actually live in different countries and different political constituencies. This geographical and political separation between beneficiaries and taxpayers blocks the normal performance feedback process.”¹¹⁹ While some monitoring and evaluation systems attempt to gather information about the beneficiaries' perception of the goods delivered, they often rely on easily measurable

118 Elinor Ostrom et al., *Aid, Incentives, and Sustainability: An Institutional Analysis of Development Cooperation* (Gothenburg: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2001).

119 Bertin Martens et al., “The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid” (2002): 64.

deliverables rather than impact or outcome.¹²⁰ They also have difficulty gathering accurate information from beneficiaries, who may be reluctant to voice displeasure with the services provided.¹²¹ The cultural gulf between the taxpayer or donor and the beneficiary is enormously wide, and a great deal is lost in translation, when attempted.¹²²

The problem of broken feedback loops applies to IOs, donor governments, and NGOs alike. Alnoor Ebrahim argues that because NGOs' dominant emphasis is on upward accountability to donors, rather than accountability to the communities that they profess to serve,¹²³ NGOs have a short-term focus on outputs and efficiency criteria, causing them to "lose sight of long-range goals concerning social development and change."¹²⁴ He concludes that too much upward accountability greatly compromises "field-level learning and downwards accountability."¹²⁵

The multitude of organizations engaged in peacebuilding find common ground in the liberal peace agenda. It is large and general enough that they can each fit their own mandate within it.¹²⁶ The peacebuilding activities, projects, and programs that support this normative agenda during war-to-peace transitions, represent the full-spectrum of what it is assumed a state needs to recover from war and build the foundation for a liberal democratic state: security (mine action; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; security sector reform; small arms and light weapons); political framework (democratization, good governance, institution building, and human rights);

120 A Ebrahim, "Accountability Myopia: Losing Sight of Organizational Learning," *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* (2005): 64, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?db=pubmed&cmd=Retrieve&dopt=AbstractPlus&list_uids=1829370796920182010related:-pTmIAw7YxkJ <http://nvs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/34/1/56>.

121 Martens et al., "The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid," 15.

122 Ibid.

123 Ebrahim, "Accountability Myopia: Losing Sight of Organizational Learning," 61.

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid., 149.

126 Michael Barnett et al., "Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?," *Global Governance* 13 (2007): 35–58.

reconciliation and justice (dialogue, transitional justice, and trauma healing); and socio-economic foundations (physical reconstruction, economic, health, and education infrastructure, repatriation and return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and food security).¹²⁷

Nonetheless, the consensus around the liberal peace agenda masks the enormous gap between the ideal liberal democratic state and the form and function of states emerging from years of war and large-scale violent conflict. To support incremental stages in the war-to-peace transition, peacebuilding organizations must somehow acknowledge these tradeoffs, identify intermediary aims, and evaluate their progress toward these aims. Yet, IOs, donor governments, and NGOs may be unwilling to compromise their value-based mandate for less satisfactory aims.

Most traditional international relations literature offers little insight into how IOs, INGOs, and bilateral aid agencies behave when intervening in a country's war-to-peace transition. In international relations, most of the discussion of institutions focuses on the role of international organizations as representatives, or agents, of states and the principal-agent dilemma that arises from that relationship. "Realism and liberalism provide no basis for asserting independent utility functions for IOs. Ontologically, these are theories about states. They provide no basis for imputing interests to IOs beyond the goals states (that is, principals) give them."¹²⁸ Although, according to David Lake, there "are two complementary strains of contemporary theorizing that conceive of IOs as agents" – constructivist institutionalism and principal-agent theory – neither of these approaches address interaction between field-based organizations and the country

127D Smith, 'Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together', Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding 2004,, modified slightly, p. 28

128 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations," *International Organization* 53, 4:706.

environments in which they intervene.¹²⁹ The principal-agent “approach tells us when and where agents are likely to be autonomous, but relatively little about what the bureaucrats are likely to do with their independence.”¹³⁰ Furthermore, principal-agent theory “requires *a priori* theoretical specification of what IOs want,” which in the case of peace and statebuilding is often vague and shifting.¹³¹ “Constructivist accounts of bureaucratic interests fill in this gap, even as they have trouble accounting for variations in agent autonomy.”¹³² Nonetheless, this literature avoids analyzing the interaction between the organization and the country environment in which it intervenes, even at the same time that it hints that this is an important area for research.

129 For an overview of current application of principal-agent theory to international organizations see Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds. (2006), *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

130 David Lake (2007), “Delegating divisible sovereignty: Sweeping a conceptual minefield,” *Review of International Organizations* 2:222.

131 Barnett and Finnemore (1999), “Pathologies of International Organizations,” p. 705; Bruce Jones, Richard Gowan, and Jake Sherman (2009), *Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an era of Strategic Uncertainty* (New York: Center on International Cooperation).

132 David Lake (2007), “Delegating divisible sovereignty: Sweeping a conceptual minefield,” *Review of International Organizations* 2:222.

3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH

METHODS

3.1 Overview

This dissertation builds a typological theory that describes why some peacebuilding organizations are able to maintain their alignment with a country's war-to-peace transition, while others are not.¹³³ I build this theory in stages. First, based on the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, I developed a hypothesis that describes the factors that determine whether or not an organization systematically adapts to and learns from a country's war-to-peace transition. The independent variables are: accountability routines, knowledge-laden routines and frames, and learning behavior. The dependent variable is: significant and systematic action to reduce the gap between peacebuilding aims and outcomes.

Second, I test this hypothesis through detailed ethnographic research into five different types of organizations engaged in international peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive development in Burundi over a thirteen-year period (1999–2011). I analyze the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable at each of the six critical junctures in Burundi's thirteen-year peacebuilding trajectory. One of the case studies, the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) falsifies my original hypothesis: it has positive values on each of the three independent variables, but does not take significant and systematic action to reduce the gap between its peacebuilding aims and outcomes at all of the critical junctures in Burundi's thirteen-year war-to-peace transition.

133 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2004). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science* (Cambridge: MIT Press), p. 240.

Third, once the BLTP falsifies my original hypothesis, I begin the theory-building phase of the research. In this phase of the research, I examine the ethnographic case study data in detail to uncover the additional factors that determine whether or not the case study organizations are able to respond to big changes in Burundi's war-to-peace transition. Because none of the case studies aligned with all of the six critical junctures in Burundi's war-to-peace transition, I examine the additional factors that determine the instances when they do and do not align. Because two of the case studies were not operating in Burundi during the first critical juncture, I have twenty-eight points when I measure the relationship between the independent and dependent variables ($5 \times 6 = 30$, $30 - 2 = 28$). I measure the dependent variable in terms of: 1) whether the organization carried out important *new peacebuilding actions* to reduce the gap between its *macro-level* peacebuilding aims and outcomes within one year of the critical juncture; and 2) whether the organization took systematic actions to reduce the gap between the *micro-level* aims and outcomes of its *ongoing peacebuilding programming*.

Fourth, based on my review of the factors that determined the outcomes on the dependent variable of each of the twenty-eight sub-cases, I develop a typological theory. This typological theory explains the conditions that were necessary and/or sufficient for the case study organizations to attain each of the four potential values on the dependent variable. It describes four "types" of organizations engaged in peacebuilding work. Type 1 describes the characteristics of organizations that were not aligned with the context at either the macro- or the micro-level. Type 2 describes the characteristics of organizations that were aligned with the context at the macro-level, but not at the micro-level. Type 3 describes the characteristics of organizations that were aligned with the context at both the macro-level and the micro-level. Type 4 describes the characteristics of organizations that were not aligned at the macro-level, but were aligned at the micro-level.

The findings in this dissertation are based in part on over 300 interviews (130 of which were conducted specifically for this dissertation) that I conducted with people who work for organizations doing peacebuilding in Burundi, their government counterparts, people who are supposed to benefit from their peacebuilding projects and programs, international and Burundian observers, and headquarters staff. I conducted these interviews in Burundi between 2002 and 2011. I also reviewed substantial archival data about each of the case study organizations and the Burundian context and conducted participant observation as an international organization (IO) employee and evaluator.

3.1.1 BUILDING A TYPOLOGICAL THEORY

A typology is an “organized system of types,”¹³⁴ categorizing a phenomenon of study into different types. Some typologies aim to classify a category of things but do not actually develop a theory about them. These *descriptive typologies* aim to “identify and describe the phenomena under analysis.”¹³⁵ For example, there could be a descriptive typology of types of states or political systems.¹³⁶ *Explanatory typologies*, on the other hand, aim to explain the factors that cause a particular outcome. They make “predictions based on combinations of different values of a theory’s variables.”¹³⁷ They answer the question, “If my theory is correct, what do I expect to see?”¹³⁸ This dissertation builds an explanatory typology.

Such differentiated theories not only allow for more discriminating explanations; they are also of greater practical value for policymakers,

¹³⁴ David Collier, Jody LaPorte, and Jason Seawright, “Putting Typologies to Work: Concept Formation, Measurement, and Analytic Rigor,” *Political Research Quarterly* 65, no. 1 (2012): 217.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ Colin Elman, “Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics,” *International Organization* 59 (2005): 296.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 297.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

who can use them to make more discriminating diagnoses of emerging situations. Contrast, for example, a general explanatory theory such as “war is often the result of miscalculation” with a typological theory that distinguishes the conditions under which different types of miscalculations... may lead to war.¹³⁹

Explanatory typologies can be used to test an existing theory or build a new theory. This dissertation sought to build a new typological theory. But, it was informed by existing theory. The hypothesis outline below describes the characteristics of the ideal peacebuilding learning organization. An organization with these qualities would be able to alter both its aims and means in response to significant changes in a country’s war-to-peace transition and maintain its focus on peacebuilding over the entire thirteen-year period under study. Because the existing literature does not articulate the specific causal pathways that would lead to this outcome, this dissertation builds a new theory based on the existing literature and on five ethnographic case studies.

Researchers creating typological theories often use both deductive and inductive techniques, iteratively refining their types based on the insights from theory and from case study research.¹⁴⁰ By starting off with a hypothesis that identified the characteristics of an ideal peacebuilding learning organization, I was able to categorize the disparate and complex data on my case study organizations to test my initial hypothesis. By also including open-ended questions in my interview protocol and a modified grounded theory approach in my data analysis, I was able to uncover new alternative explanations, identify new significant variables, and build a much more nuanced theory.

While this strategy relies on induction, it is analytical, theory-driven induction. The use of analytical induction does not exclude making use of deductive or quasi-deductive theoretical ideas, particularly theories on discrete causal mechanisms that may form the building blocks for more

¹³⁹ Ibid., 237.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 240.

ambitious or integrative theories, to help guide the empirical approach.¹⁴¹

In the conclusion of this dissertation, I present the typological theory that I built through this deductive and inductive process. In the next phase of my research, I will test this theory by looking at the same types of organizations in three or four additional countries. Through this theory testing process, I will develop a theory that should be generalizable to the population of IOs, international NGOs (INGO), and bilateral aid agencies pursuing peacebuilding aims in different conflict-torn countries around the world.

3.2 Theoretical Framework

The institutional and organizational literature outlined in Chapter 2 is inconclusive as to the precise factors that enable organizations to learn and adapt.¹⁴² Consequently, this dissertation tests a hypothesis that was built from several of the most prominent theories in the field of organizational learning and the political economy of aid, but does not fully adopt any single theory. The hypothesis is: *Three organizational characteristics are necessary and jointly sufficient for an organization to take significant and systematic action to reduce the gap between its peacebuilding aims and outcomes:*

- 1) *Significant and Representative Stakeholder Dialogue Routines* (versus *Upward Accountability Routines*) – incentives that encourage staff to get regular feedback from beneficiaries and other stakeholders and adjust their aims and/or programming in response to this information;
- 2) *Predominant Integrated Peacebuilding Knowledge-laden Routines and Frames* (versus *Not Predominant and/or Non-integrated Peacebuilding Knowledge-laden Routines and Frames*) – the organization’s core knowledge-laden routines and conceptual frames combine political, technical peacebuilding, and country-specific knowledge; and

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 240–241.

¹⁴² George P. Huber (1991), “Organizational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the Literatures,” *Organization Science* 2, 1:107; Ariane Berthoin Antal, Uwe Lenhardt, and Rolf Rosenbrock (2001), “Barriers to Organizational Learning,” in Dierkes et. al., eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press) p. 39.

- 3) *Non-defensive and Valid Learning Behavior* (versus *Defensive and Invalid Learning Behavior*) – The organization’s staff systematically seek valid information about the relationship between peacebuilding aims and outcomes and process this information in non-defensive way.

The inverse of each of these dichotomous variables, marked by parentheses, indicates its negative value. Each of these variables is described in further detail below.

3.2.1 ACCOUNTABILITY ROUTINES

The *accountability routines* variable builds on the finding in the peacebuilding and international aid literature that IOs, donor governments, and INGOs are largely unaccountable to the purported beneficiaries of their activities (See Chapter 2, Section 2.1.5).¹⁴³ They are only formally accountable to their headquarters or regional offices. The negative value – *upward accountability* – indicates that the organization only has incentives to report to and respond to headquarters or a regional office, not to respond to the interests and needs of the various stakeholders in its programming in the conflict-torn country. The positive value on this variable – *significant and representative stakeholder dialogue routines* – indicates that the organization has put in place mechanisms to correct for its tendency toward upward accountability by engaging in regular discussions with a representative group of stakeholders and incorporating this feedback into programming.

I measure this variable by asking staff from each case study organization how they are incentivized to spend their time and what their managers hold them accountable for. Did the incentive mechanisms in the organization generally encourage staff to respond to feedback about their projects, or did the organizational priorities and incentive mechanisms discourage staff from responding to feedback about the effectiveness of their aims and programming? (See Annex B for the Semi-Structured Interview Protocol containing the full list of questions for this variable).

143 Martens et al., “The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid”; Ostrom et al., *Aid, Incentives, and Sustainability: An Institutional Analysis of Development Cooperation*.

An organization has only *upward accountability routines* if its formal incentive mechanisms discourage feedback from and regular discussion with beneficiaries and other important stakeholders in the organization's peacebuilding work. An organization has *Significant and Representative Stakeholder Dialogue Routines* if it has established mechanisms and practices that incentivize staff to engage in regular discussions with a representative group of stakeholders relevant to each intervention by the organization. A necessary component for this variable is actual discussion with the beneficiaries and other important stakeholders, not just the receipt of written reports from them. Significant dialogue with a "non-representative" group of stakeholders does not count as a positive value on this variable. In other words, if the staff regularly talk to their government counterparts, but never talk to the beneficiaries, civil society organizations, or other observers who may have important information about the intervention, then the staff do not receive the type of diversified feedback that they would need to make decisions about the direction of the intervention.

The specific indicators that I examine are: incentives that guide staff priorities and use of time; reporting and feedback requirements; frequency of field visits; the type of people that staff normally talk to; the presence or absence of mechanisms to receive feedback from beneficiaries and other stakeholders; and organizational culture in relation to feedback on outcomes and impact.

3.2.2 KNOWLEDGE-LADEN ROUTINES AND FRAMES

The variable *knowledge-laden routines and frames* refers to the organization's core knowledge and worldview and has two values: 1) knowledge-laden routines and conceptual frames that combine political, technical peacebuilding, and country-specific knowledge and are predominant in the organization; 2) knowledge-laden routines that do not combine political, technical peacebuilding, and country-specific knowledge

and/or are not predominant in the organization. This variable is based on the idea from the peacebuilding literature that peacebuilding aims to deliver tangible peacebuilding results (e.g., technical peacebuilding knowledge) based on an in-depth understanding of the political nature (e.g., political knowledge) of the country context (e.g., country-specific knowledge). This variable investigates the knowledge and frames that exist in practice, not only in the discourse of the organization. The “predominant” aspect of this variable means that peacebuilding should be the top priority of the organization, which allows it to view all of its programming through a peacebuilding lens.

As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.4.2), *knowledge-laden routines* constitute the core knowledge of the organization. They are created by training staff, by hiring staff with certain types of training, and through policies and guidelines that staff use to design, implement, and evaluate their programming. Not every programming guideline or training program automatically becomes a knowledge-laden routine. Knowledge-laden routines are present only when they are actually used by staff on a regular basis and become part of the accepted knowledge that staff use to decide on programming priorities and to design, implement, and evaluate their interventions.

Knowledge-laden routines are representative of larger organizational frames. The *organizational frame* is the organization’s worldview. It determines how the organization sees its operating environment. Does it see it as a peacebuilding challenge, development challenge, humanitarian challenge, or conflict resolution challenge? The organizational frame determines the information that organizations consider to be most important in the post-conflict environment. Knowledge-laden routines determine how an organization acts on that information. The organizational literature talks about knowledge-laden routines and frames in conjunction because the organization frame determines the type of knowledge that the organization “thinks” is most important and, in turn, builds in its staff. These knowledge-laden routines, in turn, reinforce the organizational frame.

I measure whether an organization has a predominant peacebuilding frame based on whether or not it articulates peacebuilding as the primary purpose its intervention in a country. I measure whether an organization has sufficient peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines based on whether or not its staff believe that they are skilled at peacebuilding and have been trained in the specific technical area of peacebuilding that is the focus of their project or program. I also ask whether and how staff are able to integrate local and political knowledge into their project design and implementation. This is not a maximalist measure of peacebuilding knowledge, but rather a minimalist measure of “good enough” training and contextual knowledge.

The role of knowledge-laden routines and frames in organizational learning is likely to pose a particular challenge for peacebuilding organizations because they were largely designed to implement other types of activities (i.e., development, humanitarian, human rights, or conflict resolution) and may be “imprinted” with the cognitive, normative, and regulative structures of their original mandate.¹⁴⁴ As a result, they may have difficulty encoding lessons learned about the peacebuilding impact of their activities into knowledge-laden routines and organizational frames that were designed to support and reward other types of programming.

3.2.3 LEARNING BEHAVIOR

The *learning behavior* variable examines an organization’s patterns of response to information about the outcomes of its work. This variable has two measures: 1) Non-defensive and Valid Learning Behavior, and 2) and Defensive and Invalid Learning Behavior. *Non-defensive and valid learning behavior* occurs when the organization’s staff systematically seek valid information about the relationship between peacebuilding aims

¹⁴⁴ W. Richard Scott, *Institutions and Organizations, Foundations for Organizational Science* (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 1995), p. 115.

and outcomes, and process information in non-defensive way. *Defensive and invalid learning behavior occurs when an organization's staff do not systematically seek valid information on relationship between peacebuilding aims and outcomes, and process the information that they receive in a defensive way.*

Non-defensive and Valid Learning Behavior allows the information that results from Significant and Representative Beneficiary Dialogue to be openly discussed and evaluated. Predominant and Integrated Peacebuilding Knowledge-laden Routines and Frames enable action in response to this new information that is focused on achieving the specific peacebuilding aim in its particular target context.

To gather data on this variable, I asked interviewees: Does your organization seek valid information about the relationship between its aims and outcomes? When it receives information about the relationship between aims and outcomes, what does it do with it? How does your organization process positive and negative information about its outcomes? What is the standard behavior of leaders and managers in your organization (e.g., facilitating, directing, observing)? Are these behaviors uniform across the organization, or do they differ between teams and/or country offices?


This variable is based on the work by Argyris and Schön, who find that organizational behaviors and systems where “search is enhanced and deepened, where ideas are tested publicly, where individuals collaborate to enlarge inquiry, and where trust and risk-taking are enhanced” are more likely to encourage organizations to question their underlying assumptions and address gaps between their aims and outcomes (e.g., engage in double-loop learning).¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ Chris Argyris, *On Organizational Learning* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 153.

3.2.4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

This hypothesis claims that each variable is necessary and that together they are jointly sufficient to enable an organization to act regularly to maintain alignment of its peacebuilding aims and outcomes. Learning behavior determines how information about the relationship between peacebuilding aims and outcomes is processed. Peacebuilding Knowledge-laden Routines and Frames determine what is understood from the information and what solutions are devised. Downward Accountability Routines determine if information about outcomes is gathered and how people are required to respond to it. Accountability Routines also determine the type of information that is processed through learning behavior.

Figure 3-1: Relationship between the independent variables



3.2.5 SIGNIFICANT AND SYSTEMATIC ACTION BY AN ORGANIZATION TO REDUCE THE GAP BETWEEN ITS PEACEBUILDING AIMS AND OUTCOMES

The dependent variable is *significant and systematic action by an organization to reduce the gap between its peacebuilding aims and outcomes*. I measure this variable in terms of: 1) whether the organization carried out important *new peacebuilding actions* to reduce the

gap between its *macro-level* peacebuilding aims and outcomes within one year of the critical juncture; and 2) whether the organization took systematic actions to reduce the gap between the *micro-level* aims and outcomes of its *ongoing peacebuilding programming*. For shorthand, I will refer to these two measures as *New Peacebuilding Actions* and *Adjustment of Ongoing Peacebuilding Programming*. Each of these aspects is dichotomous, giving the dependent variable four potential outcomes.

The dependent variable is based on Argyris' definition of organizational learning. For Argyris, organizational learning is about identifying and acting to correct misalignment between an organization's aims and the outcomes of its activities in relation to those aims.¹⁴⁶ It does not refer only to the intake and processing of information; action based on that information is also necessary. "This distinction is important because it implies that discovering problems and inventing solutions are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for organizational learning."¹⁴⁷

To measure the dependent variable, I had first to establish the peacebuilding context to which the organization should respond. I did so by identifying the main critical junctures in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory between 1999 and 2011 (See Chapter 4). To identify these critical junctures, I reviewed the detailed event-level data from 1999 to 2011 on Reliefweb. I examined the reports on Burundi during this period by the UN, the International Crisis Group (ICG), Human Rights Watch, the Economist Intelligence Unit, Refugees International, and others. I discussed Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory with experts on Burundi's war-to-peace transition. Based on all of these sources, I identified the six critical junctures that I describe in Chapter 4, each of which ushered in a big new trend in the country.

146 Adapted from the definition by Argyris (1992: 67), "Learning is defined as occurring under two conditions. First, learning occurs when an organization achieves what it intended; that is, there is a match between its design for action and the actuality or outcome. Second, learning occurs when a mismatch between intentions and outcomes is identified and corrected; that is, a mismatch is turned into a match."

147 Argyris, *On Organizational Learning*, 62.

If an organization was trying to impact peace in Burundi, it had to pay attention to these critical junctures. These critical junctures significantly changed the nature of the governance or security situation in Burundi. They indicated whether or not Burundi's war-to-peace transition would move in a generally positive or negative direction until the next critical juncture occurred. They were the six moments when the nature of the game in Burundi changed: important new opportunities arose, old ones closed off, and new political and security actors and issues emerged. These critical junctures were so big and transformed the political and security climate in Burundi to such a degree that they would be relevant to any organization's overall peacebuilding goal.

To measure whether or not the organization takes *New Peacebuilding Actions*, I ask whether the organization responds within one year of a critical juncture by initiating new peacebuilding programming, significantly scaling up existing peacebuilding programming, or by changing its overall peacebuilding aims. These actions must be aimed at reducing the gap between the organization's overall peacebuilding aims and its outcomes that results at least partly from the new trend in Burundi's war-to-peace transition.

To measure whether or not the organization *Adjusts its Ongoing Peacebuilding Programming* I ask whether, in general, its staff pay attention to whether or not a peacebuilding project is achieving its aims and make regular adjustments to the project's aims or means to help to close gaps between its aims and outcomes. I assess this variable across the entire organization in terms of the general tendencies of its staff. In many of the case studies, there were exceptional projects where staff regularly adjusted their programming, but this was not the norm for the organization.

Whether an organization *Adjusts its Ongoing Peacebuilding Programming* or not is not measured in relation to the six critical junctures, but in terms of the project life cycle. The lifecycle of a project or program can take place within one phase of Burundi's war-to-

peace transition or can cross over phases. This variable also assesses adjustments in the new programs or projects that are initiated as a *New Peacebuilding Action* after a critical juncture in the war-to-peace transition. After they are initiated they then qualify as “ongoing programming”.

All external organizations doing peacebuilding work in conflict-torn countries have to operate within the constraints of the project or program lifecycle, which is usually independent of events in the conflict-torn country. A project or program is designed to run for a set amount of time, usually from one to five years. Once the project or program is under way, the organization usually does not have the flexibility to completely stop it and allocate the money and staff to something completely different. A project or program also targets a very specific context (e.g., one organization, several communities, several leaders, one ministry, etc...) that is much smaller and more specific than the overall peacebuilding context or the organization’s overall peacebuilding aim. As a result, it is important to measure how an organization adjusts its ongoing programming in response to specific changes in its target context to determine whether or not it attempts to maintain the relevance of its programming once it is underway.

Even for the best-designed programming, the dynamic nature of war-to-peace transitions means that some adjustment is inevitably necessary. Peacebuilding aims to create change in a changing context, which makes it almost impossible to predict how events will unfold. Some degree of adjustment to reduce the gap between a project or program’s aims and outcomes is therefore necessary. To measure whether or not an organization generally adjusts its ongoing peacebuilding programming I ask: Did the organization pay attention to the influence that its project or program was having on the target context? Did it try to adjust its program/project aims or approach to better achieve its intended outcome on this context? Or, did it just implement the project and program

as planned with little concern for the reality of the institutions, organizations, groups, or individuals that they aimed to transform?

The dependent variable does not assume that systematic actions by peacebuilding organizations will automatically lead to the desired outcome on the causes of peace. Rather, it is based on the proposition that systematic and significant actions to reduce the gap between its peacebuilding aim and outcome significantly increases the likelihood that a peacebuilding organization will achieve these desired peacebuilding outcomes. Conversely, if an organization does not take significant or systematic actions to reduce the gap between its peacebuilding aims and outcomes, it is unlikely to intentionally achieve its aims.

3.3 Case selection

This dissertation uses an embedded case study design.¹⁴⁸ The primary unit of analysis is the country-level office of an IO, INGO, or government aid agency that has clearly specified its peacebuilding, statebuilding, and conflict sensitivity aims.¹⁴⁹ This unit is embedded within the country context in which these organizations operate, and the interaction between the organization and this context is analyzed. I selected Burundi from 1999 to 2011 as the country case and five different external organizations for the organizational cases. By examining five organizations' interactions with one country's peacebuilding trajectory over a thirteen-year timespan, I was able to control for the general country context. I could then examine the degree to which each organization interacted with this context and analyze the reasons for the organizations' responses or

¹⁴⁸ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2009), 46.

¹⁴⁹ From now on, I will refer to peacebuilding, conflict sensitive development, and statebuilding under the label of peacebuilding.

lack of response. The thirteen-year period also allowed me to test the influence of different staff and organizational reforms on organizational behavior.

The secondary level of analysis is the population of organizations engaged in peacebuilding in Burundi. Because each of the case study organizations represents one of the most common types of organizations doing peacebuilding in Burundi, my findings have implications for the broader population of organizations doing peacebuilding work in Burundi, or the “organizational field.”¹⁵⁰

In the next phase of research, I will analyze the overall patterns of interaction between international peacebuilding actors and war-torn countries that appear within the broader field of peacebuilding globally. I will test the theory generated from my study of organizations in Burundi with the same types of organizations in three or four additional countries to develop a generalizable theory of how external peacebuilding organizations respond to, adapt to, interact with, and are likely to influence national institutions in countries facing or emerging from large-scale violent conflict. In this dissertation, I have explored the likely generalizability of my findings through interviews with staff at headquarters who have experience with their organization in several countries, and through archival research into evaluations of the organization’s operations in other conflict-torn countries.

3.3.1 ORGANIZATIONAL CASE SELECTION

To select the organizational case studies for this dissertation, I went to Burundi in March 2009 to gather information on my universe of cases. Through interviews with potential case study organizations and observers, I identified the international actors in Burundi that had an explicit focus on peacebuilding and had been implementing

¹⁵⁰ DiMaggio and Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.”

programs and projects in Burundi for most of the thirteen-year period under study (1999–2011).

I selected five case study organizations that represented the general variation in the universe of cases doing peacebuilding work in Burundi from 1999 to 2011 (See Figure 3-2). I selected case study organizations that vary along two categories: 1) the core organizational mandate, and 2) the classification as an International Organization (IO), International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO), and bilateral aid agency. Whether or not an organization is an IO, bilateral aid agency, or INGO helps determine the accountability structure of the organization. The founding organizational purpose (i.e., development, humanitarian aid, conflict resolution, etc...) is closely linked to the organization's knowledge-laden routines and frames.

I selected two IOs – the four UN Missions in Burundi (UNOB, ONUB, BINUB, and BNUB) and the UN Development Program (UNDP). These two case studies vary in terms of their core mandate. I also selected two INGOs – the BLTP and CARE International. These two organizations vary in terms of their core purpose and size. I selected only one bilateral aid agency – the UK Department for International Development (DFID). From 2002 to 2004, DFID's program in Burundi was solely focused on peacebuilding, not development, providing important variation in the core purpose of the organization. DFID is widely regarded as being one of the best bilateral development donors, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected countries, which made it an important critical case to study. If even DFID had difficulties aligning with the Burundian context, then less evolved development organizations would be likely to have had much more difficulty.

Figure 3-2: Organizational Case Studies



Because my case study organizations had to agree to be case studies in my research, my case selection is biased toward organizations that have a certain degree of openness and non-defensiveness. Each organization had to agree to share their internal documents with me, allow me to interview any of their staff and partners, and ask observers about their work. All case study organizations thought this would be a useful exercise for them. During the interviews, many staff commented that it was very helpful to be able to talk about the organizational issues that they deal with every day and that they felt had a big influence on their capacity to do good work.

Although the UN Missions are generally defensive about information regarding their performance, staff were very open when discussing the pros and cons of their organizations and what they felt they did and did not do well. CARE Burundi and BLTP staff were also very open and reflective when discussing their organization and work. DFID was initially more closed and guarded, requiring official permission from headquarters before agreeing to allow me to use them as a case study. Once agreement was given, however, they were very open although not very self-critical. UNDP was

generally quite closed and guarded. Only a few staff in the Burundi country office were willing to talk openly and in a self-reflective way about UNDP's work. Staff in the UNDP Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) in New York and Geneva were much more open and reflective about the work of the organization and the challenges and opportunities that they faced.

This bias in my case selection strategy has significance for my findings. The organizations that agreed to participate in my research were more amenable than other organizations to both peacebuilding and to learning. They were the most likely cases for the outcome of study. As a result, my finding that none of them were able to systematically adapt to the big changes in Burundi's war-to-peace transition or maintain the relevance of their ongoing programming has implications for organizations that are less open and focused on peacebuilding. If the organizations focused on peacebuilding and learning were not aligned with Burundi's war-to-peace transition, then the organizations not focused on these things were highly unlikely to have been aligned with Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory or make a positive contribution to that trajectory.

3.3.2 COUNTRY CASE SELECTION

I examine these five organizations' interactions with one country's (Burundi's) institutions over a thirteen-year period (1999–2011). The selection of one country allows me to control for the general country environment and examine how the case study organizations interact with the same context. Burundi was selected as the post-conflict country environment because it has undergone a relatively typical war-to-peace transition. While it is not an important priority for any one country's foreign policy, it is relevant for the international community's overall pursuit of peacebuilding. It was one of the two pilot countries selected by the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).

The main reason to choose Burundi, however, is that it is off the geopolitical radar of the most powerful countries and institutions. It has no natural resources; is not involved in the war on terror; is of at most modest emotional value to Belgium (its former colonial ruler) and France (the francophone); has no major multinational corporations on its territory; and is of little to no strategic interest. As a result, a case study of Burundi allows me to isolate bureaucratic imperatives from political imperatives. Because the bureaucratic imperatives of peacebuilding organizations are the main subject of this study, Burundi is the ideal case study for generating this typological theory. Burundi's geopolitical position meant that the case study organizations were not heavily influenced by pursuit of political goals other than peacebuilding.

I have been conducting research in Burundi since 1999. My knowledge of the country and reputation as a professional evaluator and researcher, the excellent reputation of my advisor (Peter Uvin) there, and my personal relationships helped to convince case study organizations to allow me to do this research. Staff at these organizations gave hours of their precious time to do interviews with me, shared confidential information and documents, and allowed me to sit in on internal meetings. My history with Burundi, and that of my advisor, helped me to gain the trust of the leadership of my case study organizations.

For the next phase of this research, I will test the theory that I generated in Burundi in three other countries. To be comparable, these countries should have had a peacebuilding process that has been going on for approximately ten years. International actors should have been trying to do peacebuilding work in the country for about this period. To test alternative explanations for the theory that I build in this dissertation, the additional case studies should differ from Burundi in a number of ways. If possible, there should be a case where the national institutional determinants match more closely with the peacebuilding organizations' vision of what they want to create. This would

influence the degree of difficulty of alignment between international and national norms. The willingness of the government to support and buy into the international peacebuilding and statebuilding aims should vary to examine how this might influence the interaction between national and international actors. The degree of conflict in the country should vary to see whether this alters the organizational aims and rate of adaptation and change. One of the cases would ideally have more data on a variety of indicators to test if more information about outcomes makes a difference in the way that organizations interact with the country. The degree of geopolitical prominence of the country should vary, to examine whether more or less attention from headquarters makes a difference. The size of the country should also vary because this influences information flows, organizational structure, and organizational decision making.

3.4 Data Gathering and Analysis

The data gathering techniques used for this dissertation include semi-structured interviews, archival research, and participant observation. The descriptions and analysis contained in this dissertation are based on over 300 semi-structured interviews, reviews of hundreds of archival documents, and several cases of participant observation. Over 130 of these interviews were done specifically for this dissertation research using the interview protocol. I conducted the other 180 interviews, often with colleagues, between 2002 and 2009 for evaluations of the case study organizations and the international community in Burundi.

I began gathering data for this dissertation in 2000, although I did not know it at the time. I was a staff person at UNICEF Burundi, responsible for reporting to UNICEF headquarters and donors on the evolving situation in the country and on UNICEF's response to it. Although I did not conduct any interviews at the time, this experience

gave me a good basis for knowledge of the situation in the country and the international community's response to it.

In 2002, I transitioned to a position as a formal researcher and analyst for the ICG. I began researching the standoff taking place between the donor community in Burundi and the Burundian government about the resumption of development cooperation. ICG published my report – *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi* – in 2003.¹⁵¹ I conducted over seventy interviews with Burundian officials, members of Burundian NGOs, members of the Burundian media, international donors, UN officials, and INGO staff. I observed several donor coordination meetings and other meetings on the topic. I also reviewed hundreds of documents. I have used my interview transcripts and some of the other data that I collected for this dissertation.

In 2004, I conducted an external evaluation with Peter Uvin of the BLTP. We conducted over fifty interviews with participants in the BLTP workshops and observers and observed one of the BLTP workshops ourselves. We also reviewed dozens of documents for this evaluation. These data and our evaluation have informed this dissertation. I conducted a follow-up evaluation of the BLTP for the World Bank in 2008. In addition to reviewing dozens of additional documents, I conducted over thirty interviews in Burundi for this evaluation. These interviews and the other data that I gathered have informed my analysis in this dissertation.

In 2009, I conducted three separate field visits to Burundi. The first two were solely for the purpose of my dissertation research. During these trips, I conducted over 100 interviews with staff from the five case study organizations, members of the international community, and Burundian collaborators and observers. I also participated in several

¹⁵¹ ICG, "A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi."

internal meetings of my case study organizations and gathered hundreds of documents. These interviews and documents form the core of my case study analysis.

My third trip to Burundi in 2009 was to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the \$35 million that the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) contributed to Burundi. For this report, I conducted over sixty interviews with UN staff, Burundian government officials, beneficiaries of the PBF projects, and observers. I used a Stratified Purposeful Sampling Strategy to identify key staff involved in relevant organizational decision-making and the implementation of peacebuilding programs, key partners, and key observers.¹⁵² I also gathered and reviewed hundreds of documents. These data have informed my analysis in this dissertation.

Finally, in 2009, 2010, and 2011, I conducted over thirty interviews via phone, email, Google chat, and in person in Geneva; New York; Washington, DC; and Bern, Switzerland with staff at the case study organizations' headquarters, staff who were formerly posted in Burundi, and international and Burundian observers. I gathered documents about the case study organizations through these interviews. I also gathered hundreds of archival documents about the organizations from the Internet and read many books and articles on Burundi to develop the description and analysis of Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory.

I used archival research to map out the peacebuilding goals and programs of each of the case study organizations. Archived reports and assessments from each organization at the global level helped me assess the likely generalizability of my findings from Burundi to these same organizations in other countries. I used the semi-structured interviews to understand why the organization acted, or reacted, in the way that it did

¹⁵² A Stratified Purposeful Sample is a "sample within a sample." I chose the categories of people with whom I wanted to talk and then selected people within each category who would give me a broad range of perspectives on my variables of interest. Michael Quinn Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*, Third ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001), 240.

and to identify the key frames and unwritten routines that determined individual behavior within the organization. I used the participant observation methods to observe decision-making meetings and the presence or absence of “learning behavior” within the organizations and teams under study.

3.4.1 DATA ANALYSIS

To analyze the data gathered through my interviews, archival research, document review, and participant observation, I used process tracing to examine the causal pathways between the dichotomous independent variables and the dichotomous dependent variables articulated in my hypothesis. Once I realized that the pathways that I had articulated in my hypothesis were falsified by my BLTP case study, I began to build a new theory by analyzing the data that I had gathered on several alternative explanations. “Combining these modes of inductive and deductive development of typological theories with methods of within-case analysis, particularly process-tracing, can substantially reduce the limitations of Mill’s methods and other methods of comparison.”¹⁵³

I first assessed the significance of each of my ideal-type variables and the alternative explanations to judge which ones were significant for the outcome of study. Then I compared these variables across all five case studies. In this sense, I engaged in both data analysis and new research simultaneously, regularly analyzing my data during and in between field trips to examine how they were aligning with my hypothesis and whether I was generating new theories. Nonetheless, in the presentation of my findings, I have kept the discussion of my findings from these two phases of analysis separate. My interview protocol (see Appendix B) asked questions that were open enough to gather information on alternative explanations that I had thought of and those that I had not.

¹⁵³ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 262.

When coding the interviews, I coded for the ideal-type variables, the alternative explanations that had come up through literature review, and new alternative explanations that came up in my interviews.

Because I measured the dependent variable at the six critical junctures in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory, comparison of all of the case studies left me with twenty-eight sub-cases (two organizations did not operate during the first phase). I then compared the conditions that led to each of the different outcomes. I identified which conditions were necessary in all of the sub-cases, which conditions were jointly sufficient but not individually necessary, and which conditions seemed to be insignificant for the outcome of study. From this analysis, I generated a new theory that specifies the four different types of interactions that peacebuilding actors can be expected to have with a country's war-to-peace transition and the conditions that lead to each outcome.

In conducting my data analysis, I employed four approaches drawn from Bernard to constantly check validity: 1) Look for consistency and inconsistency between knowledgeable informants and investigate the reasons for this; 2) fact-check people's reports of behavior or environmental conditions; 3) welcome negative evidence, see what it says about your theory, and seek out alternative explanations; and 4) try to fit extreme cases into your theory.¹⁵⁴

3.5 Conclusion

This dissertation employs a typological theory-building approach that is informed by existing theory. It studies five typical types of organizations engaged in peacebuilding in Burundi over a thirteen-year period. Based on these in-depth case studies, it falsifies the original hypothesis and builds a new theory. The new theory is made more robust by

¹⁵⁴ Russell Bernard, *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, Fourth ed. (Oxford: Altamira Press, 2005), 453–454.

comparison across the twenty-eight sub-cases that are identified by measuring the dependent variable at six points in time for each case study (two case studies are not operational during the first phase). The revised variables and new theory are outlined in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.

In designing and conducting my dissertation research, I have aimed to comply with the four criteria of good case study research: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability.¹⁵⁵ I have aimed to ensure construct validity – “identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being studied” – by using many different sources of evidence and discussing my variables and findings with key informants in each of my case study organizations after I had finished all of the interviews.¹⁵⁶ In each case, the key informant validated my measurement of the variable and offered interesting additional insights. I have aimed to assess the internal validity of my theory (i.e., validity of the causal relationship articulated in my theory) with process tracing to test whether I had, in fact, identified the right causal pathways. I have tried to maintain the external validity (i.e., clearly defining the domain in which my findings can be generalized) by selecting an example of the five most common types of organizations engaged in peacebuilding work in Burundi. The full external validity of this theory to organizations operating outside of Burundi will need to be tested through study of other examples of these same types of organizations in other countries. I tried to ensure the reliability, or replicability, of my design by being as explicit as possible about the decisions that I have made during my research process and by keeping an excellent record of all of my data so that, theoretically, someone else could review the same data and come to the same conclusions.

¹⁵⁵ Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 40.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 41.

4 BURUNDI'S PEACEBUILDING TRAJECTORY, 1999–2011

We have just entered a new phase. The people of Burundi must know this; they must know that no more time must be lost in so senseless and futile a conflict and that the time has come for political realism and collective responsibility so that Burundi may become a land of milk and honey, where each citizen has the capacity to realize his or her potential in complete freedom and justice.¹⁵⁷

President Pierre Buyoya
23 January 1999

4.1 Introduction

In January 1999, the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi lifted the sanctions imposed on the country since 1996. Rwanda, Zaire, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Uganda had established the sanctions on Burundi to protest the 1996 coup by President Buyoya and to force all parties to the conflict to enter multi-party negotiations.¹⁵⁸ International donors followed suit, freezing approximately \$300 million in development aid.¹⁵⁹

The sanctions came on top of a raging civil war. In October 1993, Burundian Army officers assassinated Burundi's first Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, sparking large-scale massacres of the minority Tutsi population and deadly reprisals by the Tutsi-run army against the majority Hutu population. The country quickly descended into a civil war fought between the Burundian Army (Forces Armées Burundaise, FAB) and two Hutu rebel groups, the Forces Nationales de Libération du Peuple Hutu (Palipehutu-FNL) and the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD). By 1999,

¹⁵⁷ Government of Burundi, "Letter Dated 1 February 1999 From the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council - S/1999/106" (United Nations Security Council, February 2, 1999), 3.

¹⁵⁸ ICG, *Burundi Under Siege: Lift the Sanctions Re-launch the Peace Process* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 28, 1998), i, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/001-burundi-under-seige.aspx> (accessed December 1, 2011).

¹⁵⁹ Alexis Sinduhije, "Burundi Faces Economic Woes Despite Sanctions End," *Reuters AlertNet* (Bujumbura, Burundi, 1999), <http://reliefweb.int/node/45315> (accessed September 5, 2011).

an estimated 200,000 Burundians had been killed by the fighting and approximately 1 million more had been forced to flee their homes.

In 1998, former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere had started Burundi's official all-party negotiations, the Arusha peace talks, which were convened in the Tanzanian capital. The Arusha peace process was African-led, overseen by the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, made up of Rwanda, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire until 1997), and Uganda. In 2001, South Africa joined the mix, repeatedly providing essential political, financial, and military capital. In spite of the regional actors' real commitment to Burundi's peace process, it faced numerous obstacles.

Burundi is a small, hilly country nestled in the center of Africa. It is much less well known than its neighbor to the north, Rwanda, or to the west, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), but has been embroiled in the same conflicts in the Great Lakes Region. It is one of the most densely populated (240 people per square kilometer in 1999) and poorest countries in the world.¹⁶⁰ From independence from Belgium in 1962 until 2001, Burundi was ruled by a Tutsi clan from Bururi province that monopolized the state, military, and economy and used violence, intimidation, and exclusion to maintain their power. The Bururi clan's tight grip on power and violent tactics led to intense oppression of Hutus, exclusion of other Tutsis from government, and several waves of massacres and reprisals, Hutus against Tutsis and vice versa. As a result, for many Burundians, the war began well before 1993.

Even though the Burundian conflict took on an ethnic dimension, at its root was fierce competition for control over the Burundian state and its resources. Unlike many other territories colonized in Africa, the countries of Rwanda and Burundi occupy the same general territory and maintain much of the social structure that existed before

¹⁶⁰ Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), *Country Profile 1999-2000 Rwanda Burundi* (London, 1999), 53.

colonialism. The hierarchical social structure and strict deference to authority passed down from Burundi's pre-colonial feudal system pervade politics, governance, and everyday life. Burundian politicians still compete desperately to be at the top of the totem pole, with little concern for the many Burundians sidelined from power and its benefits. These dynamics contributed to shifting alliances, political standoffs, and patterns of governance throughout Burundi's peacebuilding process.

This chapter synthesizes Burundi's peacebuilding process between 1999 and 2011 (see Table 4.1). It begins in 1999 after the removal of the embargo reinvigorated the peace process and, as Buyoya's above quote demonstrates, led many Burundians to believe that peace would be accompanied by "milk and honey" for all.¹⁶¹ It ends at the end of 2011. At numerous points in between, Burundians and international observers declared, "Burundi is at a crossroads."¹⁶² At these critical junctures, it was unclear whether Burundi would advance toward peace or succumb to violence and renewed war. This chapter outlines the six major phases in Burundi's peacebuilding processes that were triggered by these crossroads, or critical junctures. Each phase represented a new trend in Burundi's peacebuilding process, one that was unpredictable by even the most seasoned Burundian analyst. Prior to each new trend was an intense period of uncertainty as to which direction Burundi would take.

The term *peacebuilding process* refers to the time period when key national and international actors attempted to bring peace to Burundi. It describes a period when such efforts were not limited to fledgling negotiation and mediation processes, but also included peacebuilding programming that aimed to address the causes and

¹⁶¹ Government of Burundi, "Letter Dated 1 February 1999 From the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council - S/1999/106," 3.

¹⁶² "Ban Lauds Burundians for Gains in Consolidating Peace," *UN News Centre* (Bujumbura, Burundi, June 9, 2010), <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34964&Cr=&Cr1> (accessed September 5, 2011); Filip Reyntjens, *Again at the Crossroads-Rwanda and Burundi, 2000 – 2001*, Current African Issues (Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute, May 2001).

manifestations of conflict and peace. While Burundi's official peace process was launched in 1998, it was only in 1999 that the process gained real momentum and spurred calls for the renewal of international assistance and the implementation of significant peacebuilding programming. Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory continued in a generally positive direction until mid-2010, when its multiparty elections went sour. By 2011, although the number of actors engaged in peacebuilding was diminishing, the threat of renewed war was growing daily.

I identified the six phases discussed below through a detailed review of the literature on Burundi and news reports and discussions with Burundian experts and analysts. The beginning of each phase is generally regarded as the key point when the dynamics in Burundi's peacebuilding process shifted and a new trend emerged. The events that trigger each phase are political and primarily focused on who governed the country. The leadership of Burundi determined whether there was an opening to address the causes and manifestations of the conflict, which are by nature highly political. Politics is about who gets what, when, and where, and any international intervention intentionally or unintentionally influences this dynamic.

Hans Morgenthau's 1962 analysis of the challenges facing the political dynamics of foreign aid aptly describes one challenge that the political nature of intervention presents.

It follows from the political nature of foreign aid that it is not a science but an art... an analysis of the situation in the recipient country and, more particularly, its projection into the future and the conclusions from the analysis in terms of policy can only in part be arrived at through rational deduction from ascertainable facts. When all the available facts have been ascertained, duly analyzed, and conclusions drawn from them, the final judgments and decisions can be derived only from subtle and sophisticated hunches. The best the formulator and executor of a

policy of foreign aid can do is to maximize the chances that his hunches turn out right.¹⁶³

The organizational case studies that follow this chapter discuss how international institutions managed their hunches about Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory and their interaction with it. Now we turn to Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory itself.

4.2 Phase I: The Unexpected Success of the Arusha Process – January 1999–October 2001

On January 23, 1999, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire, and Ethiopia lifted the sanctions they had imposed on Burundi in July 1996. Around the same time, donors pledged to increase the amount of "expanded humanitarian aid" to Burundi, which had also been suspended since 1996.¹⁶⁴

The sanctions were lifted partly in response to the positive progress made in the Arusha peace negotiations.¹⁶⁵ By removing the sanctions, the Regional Peace Initiative signaled its vote of confidence in Burundi's peace process and removed a major barrier to renewed international aid. International donors, too, were hopeful about the Burundian government's commitment to the peace process, particularly when they compared it to the political upheaval and war raging in Burundi's western neighbor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC; Zaire until 1997).¹⁶⁶ The removal of sanctions gave them

¹⁶³ Hans Morgenthau, *A Political Theory of Foreign Aid*, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 56, no. 2 (June 1962), p. 309.

¹⁶⁴ ICG, *Burundi: Internal and Regional Implications of the Suspension of Sanctions - International Crisis Group* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, May 4, 1999), <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/003-burundi-internal-and-regional-implications-of-the-suspension-of-sanctions.aspx> (accessed December 1, 2011).

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

the opportunity to contribute to laying the foundations of peace in Burundi by providing additional financial support.

Table 4.1: Synthesis of Phases, Trends, and Opportunities in Burundi's Peacebuilding Trajectory

Phase	Critical Peacebuilding Event	New Peacebuilding Trends	New Peacebuilding Opportunities
Phase I: Jan. 1999 – Oct. 2001	Removal of regional embargo	New momentum behind Arusha peace process and war intensifies.	Opportunity to give aid for peace Opportunity to support Arusha process
Phase II: Nov. 2001 – Nov. 2003	Inauguration of transitional government	Implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement is under way, but proceeding very slowly. Intense fighting continues between government and CNDD-FDD and FNL rebel groups.	Opportunity to support transitional government in implementing Arusha's reforms Opportunity to encourage rebel groups and government to agree on and implement a ceasefire Opportunity to engage in conflict-sensitive socio-economic development to prepare for reintegration of refugees, internally displaced, and former combatants, and decrease the impoverishment of the Burundian people
Phase III: Dec. 2003 – Aug. 2005	Integration of the CNDD-FDD rebel group into transitional government	Security is established throughout majority of the country. Parties push for quick implementation of provisions in Arusha Agreement necessary for post-transition elections to occur. Inter-party tensions and competition threaten to derail transition. Fighting continues between Army/CNDD-FDD and FNL rebel group.	Opportunity to support transitional government in carrying out reforms necessary for a successful end to the transition Opportunity to encourage the FNL and government to agree on and implement a ceasefire Opportunity to engage in conflict-sensitive socio-economic development to prepare for reintegration of refugees, internally displaced, and former combatants and decrease the impoverishment of the Burundian people
Phase IV: Sept. 2005 – April 2009	Successful completion of first democratic elections since outbreak of war	New Hutu president is democratically elected without significant violent incidents. CNDD-FDD begins consolidating power over government and its resources. Inter-party tensions again stall government. Fighting continues with FNL rebel group.	Opportunity to implement peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive development programming throughout country in all sectors Opportunity to strengthen the accountability relationship between the Burundian government and the Burundian people (i.e., statebuilding) Opportunity to help Burundians establish institutions and culture that will prevent the reemergence of violent conflict and war, including through the protection of human rights, provision of rule of law, and promotion of the peaceful resolution of disputes Opportunity to begin to heal trauma, social isolation, and destruction of society that resulted from the years of war and oppression Opportunity to grow Burundi's economy so that it benefits all Burundians and pulls the country out of extreme poverty Opportunity to support sustainable and equitable reintegration of former combatants, refugees, and internally displaced Opportunity to encourage the FNL to stop fighting and join the Burundian government and security institutions
Phase V: May 2009 – May 2010	Implementation of ceasefire agreement with the FNL rebel group and integration of FNL leadership and combatants into government and security forces	War is over. Final rebel group enters Burundian government and preparations begin for forthcoming elections. Political violence and intimidation increase in lead up to elections.	Opportunity to integrate the FNL into the Burundian government and security institutions Opportunity to help ensure that pre-electoral period sets the stage for free and fair elections Opportunity to continue rebuilding an economy and society that suffered from years of war and inequality Opportunity to strengthen the accountability relationship between the Burundian government and the Burundian people (i.e., statebuilding) Opportunity to help Burundians establish institutions and culture that will prevent the reemergence of violent conflict and war, including through the protection of human rights, provision of rule of law, and promotion of the peaceful resolution of disputes
Phase VI: June 2010 – Dec. 2011	Withdrawal of all opposition parties from electoral cycle	Burundi begins path toward one-party state. Government increases political violence and imposes new limits on political freedom. New rebel group emerges.	Opportunity to bring opposition back into electoral cycle Opportunity to encourage government to stop political violence and encourage political freedom Opportunity to prevent the emergence of a new rebellion Opportunity to continue to strengthen the institutions of state and society that will prevent the reemergence of civil war and grow the Burundian economy so that it benefits all Burundians

Nonetheless, between January 1999 and October 2001, Burundi's peacebuilding process experienced extreme highs and lows. The Arusha peace negotiations advanced, faltered, and then advanced again. Violence escalated, civilians fled the violence, and then violence raged even more. Just as the country seemed to descend into full-scale war, there was a breakthrough in the Arusha negotiations and the Transitional National Government was inaugurated. For distant observers and Burundian analysts alike, this phase offered few moments of certainty as to whether Burundi would advance toward war or peace.

4.2.1 THE PEACE PROCESS

The suspension of sanctions against Burundi in January 1999 was seen by many as "a major shot in the arm for the peace process," but the shot wore off quickly.¹⁶⁷ For most of 1999, although the nineteen parties to the Arusha peace process met regularly, they did not make much progress. The mediator, Julius Nyerere, and international donors funding the talks were frustrated with the slow pace. Nyerere criticized the parties at the talks for "wasting, time, money and hope."¹⁶⁸ An international donor commented that it was difficult to guarantee continued funding for peace talks when "many of the participants seem to treat it as a free holiday."¹⁶⁹ In fact, the high per diems paid at the Arusha talks became a disincentive for the participating parties to come to agreement,

¹⁶⁷ Refugees International, *Give Burundi a chance* (Refugees International, November 30, 1999), <http://reliefweb.int/node/56661> (accessed February 9, 2012).

¹⁶⁸ "Burundi Negotiators to Meet for Consultations," *Agence France-Presse* (Dar e Salaam, October 1, 1999), <http://reliefweb.int/node/53473> (accessed September 5, 2011); "Burundi Peace Talks End in Deadlock," *Reuters AlertNet* (Arusha, Tanzania, July 16, 1999), <http://reliefweb.int/node/49779> (accessed September 5, 2011).

¹⁶⁹ "Burundi Negotiators to Meet for Consultations"; "Burundi Peace Talks End in Deadlock."

particularly as several “Arusha mansions” of participating politicians were still under construction in Bujumbura.¹⁷⁰

As the peace talks stalled, intense fighting continued between the government on one side and the CNDD-FDD and FNL rebel groups on the other. In fact, the rebel groups did not participate in the peace talks, greatly reducing the likelihood that any agreement would be accompanied by a ceasefire.¹⁷¹ Civilians greatly suffered at the hands of both the army and the rebel groups. In a particularly egregious display, the army forced over 320,000 Burundians to live in camps far from their homes so that the rebel groups could not hide out in their neighborhoods. People in these *regroupement* camps lived in deplorable conditions, with many succumbing to disease and death.¹⁷²

Although the Burundians were by far the most affected by the war, some internationals also became targets. On October 12, 1999, the UNICEF Representative from Chile, a Dutch World Food Program (WFP) Logistics Officer, and seven Burundian staff were killed by rebels during a visit to a *regroupement* camp in Rutana province.¹⁷³ Their deaths sent shockwaves throughout the international community in Burundi. The UN evacuated all non-essential personnel and reduced its activities to a minimum.¹⁷⁴ Combined with the lack of progress in the peace process and the desolate situation for so many Burundians, the murder of the UN staff made Burundi’s prospects seem even

¹⁷⁰ Informal discussions in Bujumbura, Burundi, 2000 and 2001.

¹⁷¹ The CNDD-FDD and FNL originally did not participate in the Arusha talks because they were preoccupied with fighting for Laurent Kabila’s side in the DRC war. Later on, Nyerere kept them out of the talks because he thought it would initially make the Burundian Army more amenable to the negotiations. Observer (O14), via telephone, December 9, 2011.

¹⁷² UN Department of Public Information, *Briefing by Humanitarian Coordinator for Burundi*, Press Briefing (United Nations, December 3, 1999), <http://reliefweb.int/node/56860> (accessed February 9, 2012).

¹⁷³ UN Country Team, *Press Statement on the incident resulting in the deaths of two UN staff members in Rutana Province (Burundi) 12 Oct 1999* (Burundi: United Nations, October 13, 1999), <http://reliefweb.int/node/54150> (accessed February 9, 2012).

¹⁷⁴ UN Department of Public Information, *Press Briefing by Special Representative on Burundi* (Bujumbura, Burundi: United Nations, October 19, 1999), <http://reliefweb.int/node/54572> (accessed February 9, 2012).

gloomier. "Hope is in short supply in Burundi these days," said Kathleen Cravero, the Humanitarian Coordinator, as she presented the UN Country Team report written in early 1999, entitled "Choosing Hope."¹⁷⁵ Cravero was one of the few survivors of the Rutana murders.

The appointment of Nelson Mandela as the new mediator of the Arusha process in the wake of Nyerere's October 1999 death again raised the prospects for peace. Mandela brought new energy and prestige to the process and, on August 28, 2000, succeeded in getting the nineteen negotiating parties to sign the Arusha Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation.¹⁷⁶ The Arusha Agreement contained relatively comprehensive guidelines for Burundi's three-year transitional government and the creation of its new institutions. It offered two major solutions to Burundi's war: power sharing and equitable economic development. The power sharing arrangements addressed the ethnic origins of the war, while Protocol IV of the agreement outlined a comprehensive plan for reconstruction and development.

Although an impressive document written largely by international advisors in consultation with the Burundian politicians, the Arusha Agreement did not include a ceasefire or agreement on who would lead Burundi's three-year transition. In spite of Mandela's efforts, the rebel groups who were fighting the war refused to sign onto an agreement that they had not participated in drafting.¹⁷⁷ As a result, the Arusha Accord was an agreement between all of the other major and minor political parties in Burundi,

¹⁷⁵ UN Department of Public Information, *Briefing by Humanitarian Coordinator for Burundi*, Press Briefing (United Nations, December 3, 1999), <http://reliefweb.int/node/56860> (accessed February 9, 2012).

¹⁷⁶ Initially, only eighteen parties signed the agreement, although the nineteenth signature soon followed.

¹⁷⁷ ICG, *Burundi after Six Months of Transition: Continuing the War or Winning Peace?* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, May 24, 2002), <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/046-burundi-after-six-months-of-transition-continuing-the-war-or-winning-peace.aspx> (accessed December 3, 2011).

but not between those who were actually engaged in battle – the Burundian Army, the CNDD-FDD, and FNL. It did not contain arrangements that would end the fighting. The parties also failed to agree on who would lead the three-year transitional period. The Arusha process was supposed to agree on the president and vice president of the three-year transitional period that would precede democratic elections and autonomous governance. These gaping holes in the agreement made it impossible to implement without further agreements on the ceasefire and transitional leadership. Mandela continued to negotiate for both.

By spring 2001, neither the negotiations on the ceasefire nor the transitional leadership showed positive progress. The implementation of the Arusha Agreement was behind schedule, even in areas that did not require a ceasefire or transitional leadership.¹⁷⁸ At the same time, fighting between the rebel groups and the Burundian army increased to unprecedented levels. In March 2001, the FNL launched sustained attacks on several predominantly Tutsi neighborhoods in Bujumbura.¹⁷⁹ They “held” the neighborhood of Kinama for approximately two weeks, engaging in intense combat with the Burundian Army.¹⁸⁰ Thousands of Burundians fled their homes, and hundreds of civilians and fighters were killed. During the weeks following the bombardment, hundreds of dead and several mass graves were discovered.¹⁸¹ According to International Crisis Group (ICG), the FNL launched the attack to weaken Buyoya’s credibility as the guarantor of Bujumbura’s security so that his position in the ongoing

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Fondation Hironnelle, *Burundi/Négociations: Le FRODEBU accuse le gouvernement de vouloir saboter le processus de paix*, Press Release (Arusha, Tanzania, March 13, 2001), <http://reliefweb.int/node/77987> (accessed February 9, 2012).

¹⁸⁰ Agence France-Presse, “Rebels in heavy fighting in Burundi’s capital,” *Agence France-Presse* (Bujumbura, Burundi, March 6, 2001), <http://reliefweb.int/node/77572> (accessed February 9, 2012).

¹⁸¹ AFP, “Nearly 100 bodies found in Burundi capital after fighting,” *Agence France-Presse* (Bujumbura, March 15, 2001); AFP, “160 more bodies found after battle in capital,” *Agence France-Presse* (Bujumbura, March 20, 2001).

negotiations over the transitional leadership would be weakened.¹⁸² In addition to the FNL attack on Bujumbura, fighting between the CNDD-FDD and the Burundian Army spread to provinces that were normally peaceful. By mid-2001, there was intense fighting and indiscriminate attacks on civilians in thirteen of Burundi's seventeen provinces.¹⁸³

The success of the peace process in neighboring DRC was thought to be contributing to the escalation of Burundi's conflict.¹⁸⁴ Disarmament processes in the DRC were encouraging CNDD-FDD rebels based there and their Rwandan allies to move across the border and regroup in the Kibira forest in Northwest Burundi.¹⁸⁵ In May 2001, Jan Van Eck, a Burundi Analyst at the Centre for International Policy Studies in Pretoria, warned that Hutu rebels in the DRC were moving to their bases to Burundi with the ultimate aim of overthrowing the Tutsi governments in Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda.¹⁸⁶ ICG reported that the death of Laurent Kabila in January 2001, in fact, triggered the implementation of a plan that he had made in September 1999 to "move the war towards the East, by first attacking Burundi."¹⁸⁷ Furthermore, the CNDD-FDD and FNL were growing stronger. For the first time, they appeared to be coordinating their operations

¹⁸² International Crisis Group, *Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock, The Urgent Need for a New Negotiating Framework*, Africa Report (Brussels-Nairobi: International Crisis Group, May 14, 2001), 8, [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/burundi/Burundi%20Breaking%20the%20Deadlock%20The%20Urgent%20Need%20For%20A%20New%20Negotiating%20Framework.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/burundi/Burundi%20Breaking%20the%20Deadlock%20The%20Urgent%20Need%20For%20A%20New%20Negotiating%20Framework.pdf) (accessed February 8, 2012).

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁸⁴ Simon Denyer, "Analysis - Burundi slides back towards all-out war," *Reuters AlertNet* (Nairobi, May 15, 2001), <http://reliefweb.int/node/81445> (accessed February 9, 2012).

¹⁸⁵ IRIN, "Peace in Congo may prolong war in Burundi," *Integrated Regional Information Networks* (Nairobi, April 18, 2001), <http://reliefweb.int/node/79990> (accessed February 9, 2012).

¹⁸⁶ IRIN, "Burundi: Arusha accord 'on verge of collapse'," *Integrated Regional Information Networks* (Nairobi, May 4, 2001), <http://reliefweb.int/node/80918> (accessed February 9, 2012).

¹⁸⁷ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock, The Urgent Need for a New Negotiating Framework*, 1.

and were recruiting new members.¹⁸⁸ After the FNL offensive in Bujumbura in March 2001, it was reportedly recruiting 1,000 new members.¹⁸⁹

In May 2001, Jan Van Eck and the ICG warned that both the Army and the rebels were preparing for a major battle and that Burundi was “sliding once again towards widespread civil war.”¹⁹⁰ The combination of escalating fighting between the Burundian Army and the rebel groups, the faltering ceasefire negotiations, and the inability of the signatories to the Arusha Agreement to agree on who would lead the transitional government led many to fear Burundi’s peace process was doomed.¹⁹¹ Burundians had hoped that the signature of the Arusha Agreement in August 2000 would bring peace; instead they faced the threat of a war that could engulf the entire Great Lakes Region.¹⁹² A regional observer summed up the general mood about Burundi in June 2001: “If it’s not the rebels, politics and poverty will bring the country down.”¹⁹³

Surprisingly, in July 2001, an agreement on the leadership of Burundi’s transitional government was reached. A summit meeting of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi designated Burundi’s actual president, Pierre Buyoya, as the Transitional President and Domitien Ndayizeye, a key player in Burundi’s major Hutu party, FRODEBU, as the Vice-President.¹⁹⁴ This arrangement would last for the first eighteen months of Burundi’s

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock, The Urgent Need for a New Negotiating Framework*, Africa Report (Brussels-Nairobi: International Crisis Group, May 14, 2001), 8, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/burundi/Burundi%20Breaking%20the%20Deadlock%20The%20Urgent%20Need%20For%20A%20New%20Negotiating%20Framework.pdf> (accessed February 8, 2012).

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., ii.

¹⁹¹ Simon Denyer, “Analysis - Burundi slides back towards all-out war,” *Reuters AlertNet* (Nairobi, May 15, 2001), <http://reliefweb.int/node/81445> (accessed February 9, 2012).

¹⁹² Pan African News Agency, “80% des burundais préoccupés par la guerre civile dans le pays” (Bujumbura, Burundi, June 5, 2001), <http://reliefweb.int/node/81796> (accessed February 9, 2012).

¹⁹³ IRIN, “Burundi: IRIN Focus - Containing the crisis,” *Integrated Regional Information Networks* (Bujumbura, Burundi, June 28, 2001), <http://reliefweb.int/node/83075> (accessed February 9, 2012).

¹⁹⁴ UN Security Council, *Statement issued by the Government following the Fifteenth Summit Meeting of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi (S/2001/752)*, Letter to the Security Council (Bujumbura,

planned three-year transition. For the second half of the transition, the Hutu parties that participated in the Arusha process would choose the new president and the Tutsi parties would choose the vice president.

The agreement on the transitional leadership once again made Burundians and international actors hopeful that Arusha Agreement would be implemented. However, before this could happen, a protection force had to be established to guarantee the physical safety of politicians returning from exile to take part in the new government.¹⁹⁵ Because of their roles as both perpetrators and victims of the war, many of these exiled politicians still feared for their lives. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan indicated that without a ceasefire, UN troops would not be deployed for this task leaving the Regional Peace Initiative and South African mediation searching for other options.¹⁹⁶

In October 2001, just a few days before President Buyoya and Vice-President Ndayizeye were to be inaugurated, the South African Special Protection Unit arrived in the country. Nelson Mandela had convinced the South African army to deploy this unit. These 700 South African troops were mandated to protect approximately 150 politicians who were returning to Burundi to be part of the transitional government.¹⁹⁷ Not all Burundians welcomed the troops. Extremists on both sides had objected to their

Burundi: United Nations, July 31, 2001), <http://reliefweb.int/node/84770> (accessed February 9, 2012).

¹⁹⁵ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: One Hundred Days to Put the Peace Process Back on Track*, Africa Report (Arusha/Bujumbura/Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 14, 2001), 1, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/burundi/Burundi%20One%20Hundred%20Days%20to%20put%20the%20Peace%20Process%20Back%20on%20Track.pdf> (accessed February 8, 2012).

¹⁹⁶ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: One Hundred Days to Put the Peace Process Back on Track*, Africa Report (Arusha/Bujumbura/Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 14, 2001), 3, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/burundi/Burundi%20One%20Hundred%20Days%20to%20put%20the%20Peace%20Process%20Back%20on%20Track.pdf> (accessed February 8, 2012).

¹⁹⁷ AFP, "S. African troops arrive in Burundi for VIP protection force," *Agence France-Presse* (Johannesburg, October 28, 2001), <http://www1.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/ACOS-64BEZY?OpenDocument&cc=bdi&rc=1> (accessed February 9, 2012).

deployment, with Tutsi hardline groups calling on Burundians to attack them.¹⁹⁸ In spite of these threats, the South African troops arrived without incident and the transitional government was inaugurated on November 1, 2001. Nelson Mandela had once again helped Burundi's peace process make a major step forward.¹⁹⁹

In spite of the progress in the peace process, war raged and institutional reform moved at a snail's pace. Clashes continued between the rebels and the Burundian army, again killing civilians and forcing them to flee their homes.²⁰⁰ Rwandan Hutu rebels who had carried out the genocide were reportedly now fighting the Burundian Army on its own soil.²⁰¹ The FNL continued to launch ambushes on military and civilian vehicles, making simple road trips treacherous for all.²⁰² Reflecting the mixed messages of hope and fear, increasing numbers of refugees began to voluntarily return to Burundi from Tanzania.²⁰³

¹⁹⁸ Claire Keeton, "Burundi still volatile despite transition installation: analysts," *Agence France-Presse* (Johannesburg, October 31, 2001), <http://www1.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/OCHA-64C9QV?OpenDocument&cc=bdi> (accessed February 9, 2012); IRIN, "Burundi-South Africa: SA troops face 'delicate mission'," *Integrated Regional Information Networks* (Johannesburg, n.d.), 30 October 2001 edition, <http://www1.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/OCHA-64CVEG?OpenDocument&cc=bdi> (accessed February 9, 2012). The intention had originally been to have a mixed Hutu-Tutsi protection force, but the parties were unable to agree on the composition of the force. The International Protection Force was seen to be a stopgap measure, and their responsibility would be taken over by the Burundian force. This never happened.

¹⁹⁹ AFP, "S. African troops arrive in Burundi for VIP protection force."

²⁰⁰ AFP, "Two wounded, thousands flee as Burundi violence erupts," *Agence France-Presse* (Bujumbura, Burundi, August 15, 2001), <http://www1.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/OCHA-64BSBP?OpenDocument&cc=bdi>; (accessed February 9, 2012).

²⁰¹ AFP, "Rwandan rebels infiltrate Burundi, clash with army," *Agence France-Presse* (Bujumbura, Burundi, August 26, 2001), <http://www1.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/ACOS-64CNYZ?OpenDocument&cc=bdi> (accessed February 9, 2012).

²⁰² AFP, "Burundi troops, civilians killed in rebel ambushes," *Agence France-Presse* (Bujumbura, Burundi, September 10, 2001), <http://www1.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/OCHA-64C44V?OpenDocument&cc=bdi> (accessed February 9, 2012).

²⁰³ AFP, "800 refugees return from Tanzania to Burundi," *Agence France-Presse* (Bujumbura, Burundi, August 18, 2001), <http://www1.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/OCHA-64CF5H?OpenDocument&cc=bdi> (accessed February 9, 2012); Pan African News Agency, "350 Burundi refugees return home" (Bujumbura, Burundi, August 20, 2001),

4.2.2 AID FOR BUILDING PEACE

As Burundi's peace process and ongoing war vied for attention, another conflict brewed: the battle over the resumption of aid to Burundi. The international attention that Burundi's war and peace process received outweighed this tiny country's strategic importance. The regional heads of state saw Burundi as a potential success story and an island of stability in a region fraught with conflict.²⁰⁴ International actors hoped to assuage their guilt from not preventing Rwanda's 1994 genocide by trying to prevent the same thing from happening in Burundi.²⁰⁵ Nelson Mandela was impressed by their commitment:

It will remain for us one of the most promising features of the Burundi peace process that so many heads of state or government, or their delegated representatives, gave of their time and energy to attend and participate in the plenary sessions at Arusha... It must have sent a powerful message that the leaders in the immediate region, on the continent and on the broader international front care about peace in the world, no matter where it may be under attack.²⁰⁶

Once the embargo was lifted in January 1999, international actors and the Burundian government alike advocated tirelessly for the resumption of aid to this impoverished country. The ICG remarked that during the first half of 1999, Burundian diplomacy focused almost solely on advocating for the resumption of development

<http://www1.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/ACOS-64C6M8?OpenDocument&cc=bdi> (accessed February 9, 2012).

²⁰⁴ ICG, *Burundi Under Siege: Lift the Sanctions Re-launch the Peace Process*; ICG, *Burundi: Internal and Regional Implications of the Suspension of Sanctions - International Crisis Group*.

²⁰⁵ Michael S. Lund, Barnett R. Rubin, and Fabienne Hara, "Learning from Burundi's Failed Democratic Transition, 1993-1996: Did International Initiatives Match the Problem?," *Cases and strategies for preventive action 2* (1998): xii, 247; ICG, *Burundi Under Siege: Lift the Sanctions Re-launch the Peace Process*.

²⁰⁶ Nelson Mandela, *4201st meeting of the United Nations Security Council* (New York: United Nations, September 29, 2000), 3, [daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=S/PV.4201&Lang=E](https://access-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=S/PV.4201&Lang=E) (accessed December 14, 2011).

cooperation.²⁰⁷ In January 2000, Marc Nteturuye, Burundi's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, declared:

We also expect the international community to accompany the peace process along the way, to be on the side of the Government and help them to conduct the peace process to a safe harbor. The peace process needs political support, but it also needs economic assistance and support for reconstruction.²⁰⁸

The UN, several international advocacy organizations, the mediators, and even donor governments joined the refrain. "It is by opening Burundi up to economic assistance and thus easing the suffering of the population, and giving them confidence in the peace process, that the international community can best help the Arusha talks," French President Jacques Chirac said at the talks in February 2000.²⁰⁹

While the peace process, war, and debate about aid persisted, the Burundian people suffered. The war, sanctions, and withdrawal of aid had made an already impoverished people dirt poor. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in 2001 was estimated at US \$120, down from an average of US \$240 between 1980 and 1985.²¹⁰ Rapidly escalating fighting forced hundreds of thousands of Burundians to flee their homes, far away from their fields and communities. With over 200,000 dead from the war, people were traumatized and even more were vulnerable. They had lost loved ones on whom they

²⁰⁷ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: Proposals for the Resumption of Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation*, Africa Report, May 4, 1999, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/004-burundi-proposals-for-the-resumption-of-bilateral.aspx> (accessed September 11, 2011).

²⁰⁸ UN Department of Public Information, *Press Conference by Permanent Representative of Burundi*, Press Release (Burundi: United Nations, January 14, 2000), <http://reliefweb.int/node/58359> (accessed February 9, 2012).

²⁰⁹ Emmanuel Giroud, "Burundi peace depends on ending Tutsi power monopoly: Mandela," *Agence France-Presse* (Arusha, Tanzania, February 21, 2000), <http://reliefweb.int/node/59781> (accessed February 9, 2012).

²¹⁰ UN Security Council, *Interim report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation in Burundi* (New York: United Nations, November 14, 2001), <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2001/1076&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC> (accessed December 14, 2011).

depended for their health and livelihood. Insecurity and drought further reduced their capacity to live decently, resulting in waves of malnutrition, disease, and death.

The state was also suffering, although to a different degree. Not only did it have less money to spend, but the available money was worth less and goods were more expensive. By 1999, inflation continued to rise steadily, export earnings had dropped 50 percent, and the cost of imports had increased by 25 percent.²¹¹ The budget deficit swelled, and the black market flourished as people in power found ways around the embargo. The only stable income for the state was from beer: The Arabarudi Brewery in Bujumbura remained largely unaffected and continued to provide 60 percent of its profits to the government.²¹²

The desperate economic situation made the resumption of responsible aid even more urgent.²¹³ Because the Burundian war was largely a conflict over scarce resources, resolving the conflict required an enlarged pie that could serve more people, more equally.²¹⁴ In Burundi's primarily agricultural economy, the state was the main route to wealth and prosperity. Prior to 1996, aid had provided over 80 percent of total investment in the country.²¹⁵ The resumption of aid would therefore contribute to the individual prosperity of many Burundian politicians, further increasing their fervor to advocate for it. The Burundian people desperately needed more sustainable and equitable aid that would allow them to take charge of their own livelihoods, rather than

²¹¹ "Economic Sanctions Against Burundi Suspended," *Africa Recovery, United Nations* 12, no. 4 (April 1999), <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/subjindx/124sanc.htm> (accessed September 8, 2011).

²¹² ICG, *Burundi Under Siege: Lift the Sanctions Re-launch the Peace Process*, 36.

²¹³ ICG, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, February 21, 2003), <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/057-a-framework-for-responsible-aid-to-burundi.aspx> (accessed October 6, 2011).

²¹⁴ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: Proposals for the Resumption of Bilateral and Multilateral Co-operation*, Africa Report, May 4, 1999, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/004-burundi-proposals-for-the-resumption-of-bilateral.aspx> (accessed September 11, 2011).

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

depending on periodic humanitarian handouts that had predominant since the outbreak of war. Refugees International argued that investing in programs in secure areas of the country would “build momentum for peace by focusing people on the future instead of the past.”²¹⁶ Nonetheless, very little investment of this type took place.

All actors saw the impact that increased resources would have on the power balance and the prospects for peace. The rebels saw the resumption of aid to the Burundian government as a shift in the balance in the government’s favor. Politicians knew that people in the government would benefit from increased aid. It would give them more power and leverage and allow them to offer a “peace dividend” to the people. If people could see the benefit of peace, it was argued, then maybe they would stop supporting the warring parties, in whichever ways they did this. As a result, development was seen as a cause of peace at the same time that peace was seen as a cause of development.

In spite of their financial and political commitment to Burundi’s peace process, Western donors were reluctant to provide development or peacebuilding aid to Burundi. Without an end in sight to the war, donors questioned whether a state with such a weak administration, pervasive cronyism, and nepotism was ready for development assistance, much less direct budgetary support. The resumption of development aid, after all, meant supporting one side of the conflict by pouring money into the coffers of the government. When the sanctions were suspended, Jerome Ndiho, the Brussels-based spokesman for the CNDD-FDD rebel group, declared, “We think that it is a big political mistake to end sanctions. It gives Buyoya a big push to go on killing our population and not continue with negotiations.”²¹⁷

It was not the need for money that was in question, but rather the mechanisms through which this money would be spent (i.e., through a corrupt, dictatorial state), the

²¹⁶ Refugees International, *Give Burundi a chance*.

²¹⁷ Refugees International, *Give Burundi a chance*.

signal that it would send to a government that was still engaged in war, and how it would shift the balance of power between the warring parties.²¹⁸ Donors also feared that their aid would encourage the war by giving the government more money with which to purchase weapons. The ebbs and flows in the peace process and war only reinforced donor skepticism.

Donors used the promise of development aid to entice Burundian politicians to negotiate. Once the Arusha Agreement had been signed, they moved the goalpost and promised to release aid once the transitional government was inaugurated. The carrot of aid proved to be an effective conditionality tool, as Burundians and the government were starving without it. As the next chapters will show, donors lost much of their leverage once the aid was actually released.

The discussion around aid in Burundi raised the importance of peacebuilding – or the use of international aid and intervention to build the foundations of a just peace – from the early stages. Protocol IV of the Arusha Agreement outlined a framework for equitable reconstruction and development.²¹⁹ Furthermore, Nelson Mandela believed strongly that Burundi’s conflict was rooted in its poverty and inequality and that addressing this social and economic inequality was at the foundation of Burundi’s peacebuilding process: “It must be possible for the people of Burundi to materially distinguish between the destructiveness of conflict and the benefits of peace.”²²⁰

²¹⁸ ICG, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi*.

²¹⁹ Parties to the Arusha Agreement, *Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi* (Arusha, Tanzania, August 28, 2000), sec. Protocol IV.

²²⁰ Nelson Mandela, Donors Conference on Burundi, Paris, 6-7 December 2000. Citation available in ICG, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi*, 9.

4.3 Phase II: Peace with War – November 2001–November 2003

On November 1, 2001, Burundi's transitional government was inaugurated for a three-year period with Buyoya as its president. This event began a decidedly upward trend in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. It led to an unprecedented peaceful transition from a Tutsi leader to a Hutu leader and real progress in the ceasefire negotiations with the rebel groups, making an end to the war seem possible. Nonetheless, immediately after the inauguration, uncertainty returned.

The inauguration of the transitional government did not ensure that President Buyoya would turn over power to his Hutu vice president after 18 months, and it did not guarantee that the new government would carry out the institutional reforms to which they had committed in the Arusha Agreement. The installation of the transitional government essentially moved the Arusha process to Burundi. The Arusha signatory parties chose the president, vice president, and twenty-six new ministers. Once in the new government, these parties continued many of the same political battles that had preoccupied them during the Arusha talks. Only now they had no one to mediate their disagreements.²²¹

It took the new government two months to agree to appoint the Transitional National Assembly, the body responsible for passing the new legislation required for Arusha's reforms. The implementation of the Arusha Agreement was already behind schedule by this point, and the stagnation only worsened. The transitional politicians were engaged in difficult work. Although Arusha gave a framework for Burundi's transitional institutions and major reforms, the transitional government had to work out the details.²²² They had to make institutional reforms while occupying these new

²²¹ ICG, *Burundi after Six Months of Transition: Continuing the War or Winning Peace?*, 2.

²²² *Ibid.*, 8.

institutions – writing the rulebook while playing the game. Many of the members of the transitional government were former enemies. They had helped cause the death of each other’s loved ones and were now sharing conference rooms and charged with governing the country together. At the same time, they had to manage their own constituencies, many of whom were very wary of this new partnership and what it might cost them.

The Arusha Agreement mandated the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) to oversee Burundi’s three-year transitional period and ensure that the key benchmarks stipulated in the agreement were met.²²³ The IMC was comprised of signatories of the agreement and headed by Berhanu Dinka, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Burundi. Unfortunately, while the IMC held regular meetings and followed key events, it did not have the leadership or leverage to make the government implement the Arusha Agreement. “The IMC is being transformed into a credit society for its members, a small forum for perpetual negotiations, where the parties procrastinate with no consciousness of the urgency of their task or the suffering of the people of Burundi.”²²⁴ Even the IMC’s own executive committee lamented its incompetence: “It is deplorable that the [IMC], which should have been the driving force behind the campaign to educate the population and garner support for the accord, should be reduced to the mere role of spectator.”²²⁵

All the while, the battle between the Burundian Army and the rebel groups raged on. In fact, just after the transitional government was inaugurated, both the Army and

²²³ At the time of Amb. Dinka’s appointment as the head of the IMC, he was the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and Regional Humanitarian Advisor for the Great Lakes Region. United Nations Information Service, *Secretary-General Appoints Berhanu Dinka as His Special Representative for Burundi*, Biographical Note (New York: United Nations, July 24, 2002), <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2002/sga811.html> (accessed February 9, 2012).

²²⁴ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock, The Urgent Need for a New Negotiating Framework*, 25.

²²⁵ Report by the working group of the CSAA (IMC) Executive Committee, together with other transition institutions, pursuant to its charter, 8th Session, 22-26 April 2002, quoted in ICG, *Burundi after Six Months of Transition: Continuing the War or Winning Peace?*, 7.

the rebels launched new offensives against one another. The negotiation table and battlefield had merged. Each side attempted to weaken the enemy on the battlefield in order to strengthen its stance at the negotiating table. Although ceasefire talks continued, now between the transitional government and the rebel groups, the rebels remained reluctant to agree to a ceasefire before their conditions had been met: "It is the insurgency itself which gives the rebels their political leverage."²²⁶

Burundians were exasperated by the slow implementation of the Arusha Agreement and the escalating fighting. According to Joseph Ndayizeye of Ligue ITEKA, Burundi's foremost human rights organization at the time, the politicians had caused the conflict and people had little trust that they would fulfill the promises made at Arusha.²²⁷ Bad governance is "the root cause of all the problems we are facing now... hatred, deprivation, nepotism, corruption, and an almost feudal style of leadership."²²⁸ Burundian people had hoped that the Arusha Agreement would bring an end to the war and a badly needed influx of aid. Instead, all they saw was more war, abuse, and poverty.

The transitional government, too, was anxious for the arrival of aid. Donors had promised hundreds of millions of dollars at each annual donor conference since 1999, but most of the non-humanitarian aid had still not arrived.

The government is angry that the international community has not yet released the promised funds. Mandela pushed them to sign the Arusha Agreement with the understanding and the promise that they would receive the money. Now they are angry because the funds haven't come through and the economy is falling apart, and they do not know how to

²²⁶ Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), *Burundi Economic and Political Outlook*, n.d., 33, http://www.eiu.com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/report_dl.asp?issue_id=84154208&mode=pdf (accessed February 9, 2012).

²²⁷ Anaclet Rwegayura, "Burundi: Famine Hits Hard As Fighting Continues in Burundi," *Pan African News Agency* (Dar es Salaam, October 4, 2000), <http://reliefweb.int/node/70066> (accessed February 9, 2012).

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

hold together the transitional government or the state without this money.²²⁹

Although the new government was anxious for donors to give aid, particularly budgetary aid that would be delivered directly to the state's coffers, it could not give donors clear plans as to how it would spend the money or demonstrate their capacity to manage it transparently and efficiently.²³⁰ Government officials even confirmed that corruption and embezzlement were commonplace.²³¹ The state, after all, was the main route to wealth, and the transitional government seemed to be "more concerned with bringing the dividends of peace to themselves, not their people."²³² People in power went so far as issuing death threats to donors for withholding aid.²³³

The Burundian government, the UN, and international advocacy organizations had put forward countless arguments as to why donors should again provide non-humanitarian aid to Burundi.²³⁴ The country was in financial ruins. The people were impoverished. The government was too poor to govern. But donors did not have the funding options that allowed them to support a government that was as fragile as Burundi's and still engaged in a civil war. Humanitarian assistance went directly to international non-governmental organizations (NGO) to provide short-term assistance. NGOs had been providing this "short-term" assistance for almost ten years at this point, all the while creating dependency and decreasing the capacity of Burundians to reconstruct their own lives.²³⁵

²²⁹ Observer (O9), Bujumbura, July 1, 2002; ICG, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi*, 11.

²³⁰ ICG, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi*.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 13.

²³² ICG, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi*, 13.

²³³ International Observer (O18), Bujumbura, July 30, 2002.

²³⁴ Refugees International, *Give Burundi a chance*; ICG, *Burundi: Internal and Regional Implications of the Suspension of Sanctions - International Crisis Group*.

²³⁵ ICG, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi*, 14–15.

The other options for donors were budgetary aid that went directly to the state account or structural aid that supported projects or programs developed and implemented by government ministries.²³⁶ Budgetary and structural aid required that the transitional government have the capacity to manage the funds transparently and efficiently and produce good programs and plans, neither of which it could do. Instead, it was preoccupied; its members were focused on “jockeying for posts, trying to get donors to resume cooperation, and fighting to win a war, not developing or implementing a transitional program.”²³⁷

Donors did not have pots of money reserved for transitional programming. They had money for humanitarian assistance, money for development, and a bit of money for peacekeeping. But none of their aid was intended to help a fragile state that was still in the midst of war to govern more effectively. Nor did donors have money set aside to help citizens hold the state accountable or build their own livelihoods in the midst of conflict and instability.

The donors that did have peacebuilding funds – namely United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department for International Development (DFID), and the World Bank – supported small initiatives by international NGOs or the African Union’s new peacekeeping mission in Burundi, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). While many of these initiatives made important contributions to the peace process, they did not come close to addressing the scale of the problems facing the country at that time. Poverty, inequality, displacement, war-related trauma, and weak state institutions risked reversing Burundi’s gains before it had become eligible for funds that might help combat these conditions.

²³⁶ ICG, *Burundi after Six Months of Transition: Continuing the War or Winning Peace?*, 9.

²³⁷ ICG, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi*, 12.

Miraculously, Burundi's war-to-peace transition advanced. On May 1, 2003, President Buyoya handed the presidency over to his vice president, Domitien Ndayizeye, who became the first Hutu president to remain in office throughout his full tenure. The Burundian Army, as the holder of political, financial, and military power, had played a key role in allowing this transition to take place.²³⁸ In October and November 2003, ceasefire agreements were signed between the final faction of the CNDD-FDD and the transitional government, immediately improving the security situation throughout the country. Only one rebel group now remained outside of Burundi's peace process: Agathon Rwasa's faction of the FNL.

The creation of the transitional government and subsequent breakthroughs during this period presented significant opportunities for peacebuilding. The transitional government needed a great deal of support and assistance in their efforts to reform the government and set up the framework for Burundi's new institutions. The health, education, sanitation, and electricity systems were in ruins or nonexistent. They needed to be built or rebuilt to serve the entire population equally. Reconciliation and healing were needed at all levels of society. Civil society organizations and media were relatively strong for a war-torn country but were still in need of new resources and support. Burundi's rural farmers needed to be able to reconstruct their own lives and rebuild all that had been destroyed by the years of war, conflict, oppression, and intense poverty.

The inauguration of Burundi's transitional government led to such a seismic shift in the direction of Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory that it should have caused organizations engaged in peacebuilding to examine the relevance of their ongoing programming. As with the removal of the sanctions in 1999, it should have caused them

²³⁸ Observer (O11), Bujumbura, March 25, 2009.

to act to change their overall strategy and aims to align with the needs and opportunities of Burundi's new reality.

4.4 Phase III: Peace, Transition, and a Little War – December 2003– August 2005

On November 23, 2003, President Domitien Ndayizeye formed his new twenty-seven-member cabinet that included Pierre Nkurunziza, the leader of the biggest rebel faction (CNDD-FDD), as the new Minister of Good Governance and State Inspection and three other CNDD-FDD representatives as members of Parliament who carried some ministerial responsibility.²³⁹ The creation of this new government marked the integration of the majority of Burundi's rebel groups into government. The conflict between Burundi's political parties was far from resolved; it was just transferred to the arena of government rather than the battlefield. But for Burundi's war-to-peace transition, this was a truly significant step.

If the removal of the embargo in January 1999 marked the beginning of Burundi's exit from war, and the inauguration of the transitional government in November 2001 marked the start of the implementation of Burundi's peace agreement, the integration of the CNDD-FDD into Burundi's government attained peace, or negative peace. It established security throughout most of the country for the first time since the outbreak of the war in 1993. Nonetheless, a great deal of uncertainty remained as to whether the ceasefire would survive the political wrangling that was sure to come.

²³⁹ International Crisis Group, *End of the Transition in Burundi: The Home Stretch* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 5, 2004), 8, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/081-end-of-the-transition-in-burundi-the-home-stretch.aspx> (accessed December 6, 2011).

4.4.1 THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT'S PACKED AGENDA

The transitional government rapidly sped up its implementation of the Arusha Agreement soon after the CNDD-FDD joined. The earlier transfer of power from Pierre Buyoya to Domitien Ndayizeye had proven that Burundi's leaders were serious about implementing the Arusha Agreement and that the Regional Peace Initiative would do its utmost to ensure that it stuck to the overall timetable. Now that there was a ceasefire with all groups but Rwasas FNL, the transitional government had less than a year to organize the elections that would end the transitional period. To abide by the transition's three-year timeframe, the elections would have to be organized by October 31, 2004.

To hold the elections in less than a year, the transitional government would have to reach a ceasefire agreement with the remaining rebel group, the FNL, which still was not participating in official ceasefire negotiations.²⁴⁰ It would have to implement the ceasefire agreements signed in November 2003 by Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD and the agreements signed by two smaller factions of the CNDD-FDD and FNL in 2002. The implementation of these agreements required that the rebel combatants be either demobilized or integrated into the new National Defense Force (FDN), which had not yet been created. The rebel groups would also have to transform themselves into political parties. The government and international community would also have to facilitate the return of displaced people and refugees to vote in the elections. An interim post-transitional constitution would have to be agreed upon and adopted by referendum, several other laws adopted, and five rounds of rounds of elections organized – the

²⁴⁰ International Crisis Group, *End of the Transition in Burundi: The Home Stretch*.

referendum, two local-level elections, and the National Assembly and Senate elections.²⁴¹

The president was to be appointed by the Senate and National Assembly.

A well-functioning government would have had great difficulty completing these tasks within eleven months. For Burundi's transitional government, it seemed next to impossible. On the political side, there was enormous tension between the CNDD-FDD and FRODEBU, the main Hutu party. The main Tutsi party, UPRONA, took FRODEBU's side. The CNDD-FDD believed that FRODEBU benefitted politically from the CNDD-FDD's years of fighting. FRODEBU was not directly linked to a rebel group but was the main political beneficiary of the Arusha Agreement.²⁴² In other words, the CNDD-FDD did all of the fighting, but the Arusha Agreement gave FRODEBU the rewards. Now that both FRODEBU and the CNDD-FDD were part of the transitional government, their historical conflict became a major impediment to governance and the preparation for the upcoming elections.

In fact, the organization of the elections and the post-transitional constitution were the source of much of the tension between FRODEBU and the CNDD-FDD. All of the parties were concerned about how they would fare in the elections and how the outcome would affect their power, wealth, and security.

In the end, politics were personal for each politician involved.²⁴³ People feared for their lives and those of their families. They feared that their access to wealth and ability to pay off their debt would be taken away.²⁴⁴ They feared that they would lose the

²⁴¹ For more information about the 2005 elections, see: International Crisis Group, *Elections in Burundi: The Peace Wager* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 9, 2004), <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/B020-elections-in-burundi-the-peace-wager.aspx> (accessed December 6, 2011).

²⁴² International Crisis Group, *End of the Transition in Burundi: The Home Stretch*, 13–16.

²⁴³ Observer (O10), Bujumbura, July 10, 2002.

²⁴⁴ General commentary from interviews conducted in Bujumbura, Burundi in 2002 for ICG report: ICG, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi*.

personal prestige that they had gained and that all that they had fought for would be lost if they did not hold onto power.

The CNDD-FDD party members felt that they had a greater chance of winning if elections were held at the scheduled time. The less time they spent in government, the less they would be tarnished by people's negative perception of the transitional government.²⁴⁵ FRODEBU party members believed that they would be at an advantage by delaying the elections.²⁴⁶ An intense conflict within the government ensued. In response, the CNDD-FDD withdrew from the Cabinet and Parliament on several occasions. There was intense political wrangling and positioning among the various political parties. This created a high degree of uncertainty as to whether an agreement on the interim constitution or electoral calendar would ever be reached. As the political infighting continued, it became increasingly clear that the elections would be delayed.

For the Burundian people, the political antics increased their fear about the elections. The last round of democratic elections in 1993 had led to waves of violence and death and the onslaught of the war.

People flee from here because they are afraid that it will turn out just like in 1993. They think that war is going to break out again because of the elections. The Tutsis are afraid, and the Hutus are afraid. How can you think that there is nothing to be afraid of when those who are supposed to reassure us say they too are worried about the situation?²⁴⁷

While politicians fought for their political livelihoods, much of the rest of the population continued to fight for their lives. In August 2004, the Secretary-General reported that summary

executions of civilians, torture, sexual violence, illegal and arbitrary detention continue, with impunity, primarily targeting the civilian population. The situation is particularly grave in Bujumbura Rural. Both

²⁴⁵ International Crisis Group, *End of the Transition in Burundi: The Home Stretch*.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ International Crisis Group, *Elections in Burundi: The Peace Wager*, note 63. From an interview conducted by ICG in Kirundo or Ngozi province in October 2004.

FNL and joint FAB/CNDD-FDD forces have been accused of grave violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, as well as looting and subjecting the population to a constant state of fear.²⁴⁸

In 2004, mass graves were uncovered in Bujumbura Rural, and sexual violence and rape was widespread, including of minors.²⁴⁹

The FDN and FNL committed grave human rights violations against the Burundian population. Both forces targeted suspected supporters of the other.²⁵⁰ The FDN reportedly burned large swaths of houses and conducted summary executions and mass arrests of suspected FNL supporters during the electoral period.²⁵¹ In addition, fighting in the northwest of the country caused thousands of Burundians to temporarily flee from their homes.

At the same time, many Burundian refugees living in Tanzania and people who had been internally displaced felt optimistic enough about the situation in Burundi to return home. Between January and August 2005, 26,077 Burundian refugees returned to their home country, encouraged by the elections and the conclusion of the transitional phase.²⁵² The number of IDPs living in displacement camps fell to 116,799 living in 160 camps during this period.²⁵³

²⁴⁸ UN Security Council, *First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)* (New York: United Nations, August 25, 2004), 9–10, <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2004/682&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC> (accessed December 14, 2011).

²⁴⁹ UN Security Council, *Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi* (New York: United Nations, November 15, 2004), 9, <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2004/902&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC> (accessed December 14, 2011).

²⁵⁰ UN Security Council, *Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi* (New York: United Nations, September 14, 2005), 5, <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/9447029.23297882.html> (accessed December 14, 2011).

²⁵¹ UN Security Council, *Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi*, para. 14; UN Security Council, *Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi*, 5.

²⁵² UN Security Council, *Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi*, 6.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

4.4.2 THE BURUNDIAN MILITARY: FROM BARRIER TO ENABLER OF PEACE

Cooperation between the former rebels and Burundian Army was initially more successful than the negotiations among the politicians. A ceasefire had gone into effect immediately after the CNDD-FDD and the transitional government signed the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement on November 16, 2003. Almost immediately, the CNDD-FDD began to put some of its combatants into cantonment areas, while others collaborated with the Burundian Army in joint campaigns against the FNL. DFID, the UN, and the EU paid for food to be delivered to the combatants – a risky but important action that enabled the peacebuilding process to advance.²⁵⁴

Although the ceasefire with the CNDD-FDD was holding, the integration of the rebel forces and the army into a new FDN was stalled.²⁵⁵ This posed a threat to the forthcoming elections because the demobilization of the rebel groups was a prerequisite for their participation. If the CNDD-FDD fighters were not demobilized, the CNDD-FDD could not register as a political party. If the rebel groups were not integrated into the new FDN, the military would not be under the full control of civilian authority, challenging the legitimacy of the newly elected government. Furthermore, many Hutus would feel threatened by the persistence of an all-Tutsi military.²⁵⁶

The creation of the FDN was a herculean task and particularly critical for Burundi's peacebuilding process. Many believed that the issues blocking the integration of the rebel

²⁵⁴ IRIN, "Burundi: Ex-rebels complain of poor living conditions in cantonment camp," *Integrated Regional Information Networks* (Bujumbura, November 25, 2004), <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/52203/BURUNDI-Ex-rebels-complain-of-poor-living-conditions-in-cantonment-camp> (accessed April 20, 2012); DFID staff person (D4), Bujumbura, Burundi, March 20, 2009.

²⁵⁵ International Crisis Group, *End of the Transition in Burundi: The Home Stretch*, 9.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

and military forces were so intractable that they would prevent the implementation of the Arusha Agreement and a peaceful end to the transition.²⁵⁷

Several issues prevented the rebel groups and Burundian Army from being integrated into a new Burundian FDN. First, the parties could not easily come to agreement on who qualified as a combatant and was thus eligible for assistance. Second, they were unable to agree on how the different positions within the rebel groups, political movements, and the Burundian Army would be harmonized to ensure that each group had power within the integrated defense forces and that each individual had the competence to carry out his or her task. Third, the integration process was delayed in part because the Burundian Armed Forces were engaged in a counterinsurgency campaign against the FNL and did not want to go into cantonment or give up their heavy weapons. Fourth, the reintegration of former combatants into society was delayed because of the weak capacity of the National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration.

All of the barriers to the creation of the integrated security forces were overcome before the 2005 elections, although their resolution was neither easy nor obvious. For example, the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) that was mandated to implement the ceasefire agreements proposed solutions for the status of combatants and harmonization of military grades. But the CNDD-FDD had not been part of the JCC and rejected its conclusions. In summer 2004, another joint group that included the CNDD-FDD was mandated to try and find a solution to these questions.²⁵⁸ This group was made up of military planners and other technical staff, not the higher-level political players who had been involved in the JCC.²⁵⁹ With the permission of Nkurunziza and the support of the

²⁵⁷ Observer (O11), Bujumbura, interview.

²⁵⁸ International Crisis Group, *End of the Transition in Burundi: The Home Stretch*, 10.

²⁵⁹ Military BLTP Participant (B2), Bujumbura, December 8, 2008.

Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP; see Chapter 9), this group managed to come up with an acceptable proposal that allowed the integration of the rebel and army forces into the Burundian FDN to advance, although some issues remained.²⁶⁰ The breakthrough surprised many observers and analysts. Amazingly, Burundians had again managed to overcome seemingly insurmountable differences and establish new institutions that would enable power sharing among former enemies.

The Burundian military had been the instigator of Burundi's war and had constituted the primary barrier to its resolution. Now it was a major driver behind Burundi's peacebuilding process. For long-time observers of Burundi's politics, the Army's decision to support the Arusha Agreement, rather than try to block it, was "extraordinary."²⁶¹ It was a "clear sign that the Arusha process had created a change" in power and politics in Burundi.²⁶²

The army leadership supported the reforms outlined in Arusha because it believed that it would fare best if it de-politicized itself.²⁶³ The Tutsi parties were gradually losing political ground, and according to the ethnic power sharing provisions of the Arusha Agreement, they would need to be transformed into integrated Hutu-Tutsi parties. An all-Tutsi army that had been the driver of the war would not fare well under Hutu leadership. As a result, the Army saw that it would gain by transforming itself into an integrated force that would be more palatable to Burundi's new leadership. The disarmament of Army and rebel combatants officially began in December 2004, over a month after the elections were originally scheduled to take place. The remaining issues

²⁶⁰ Peter Uvin and Susanna Campbell, "The Burundi Leadership Training Program: A Prospective Assessment" (July 2004); International Crisis Group, *Elections in Burundi: The Peace Wager*.

²⁶¹ Observer (O11), Bujumbura, interview.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ International Crisis Group, *End of the Transition in Burundi: The Home Stretch*, 9.

preventing the formation of the new defense force were regulated by presidential decree on May 11, 2005, less than a month before the communal elections.

4.4.3 PEACEKEEPING DELAYS AND SAVES THE TRANSITION

On June 1, 2004, the United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB) was established in Burundi to help organize the elections and oversee the disarmament and demobilization of Burundi's rebel groups. The first contingent of troops was AMIB's 2,612 troops, who were "re-hatted" in Blue UN hats.²⁶⁴ The Burundian government, South Africa, and the Regional Initiative had been campaigning for several years for the UN to send a peacekeeping force. While the UN Security Council and Secretariat debated whether to send troops, the South Africans and African Union stepped in to fill the need for a protection and peacekeeping force. Without them, it is unlikely that Burundi's peacebuilding process would have advanced so smoothly.

Even after the inauguration of the transitional government in November 2001, the UN had remained reluctant to deploy a peacekeeping force because of the continued fighting between the rebel groups and the government. It did not want to intervene in a war – only once there was "a peace to keep."²⁶⁵ The Security Council's reluctance to deploy a peacekeeping mission in Burundi also reflected the relative unimportance of Burundi in international geo-politics. In 2003, the UN had approved a Chapter VII mandate – enabling the use of force – in the DRC, despite the fact that fierce fighting continued between the Army and rebel groups combined with horrific atrocities by all

²⁶⁴ Henri Boshoff, Waldemar Vrey, and George Rautenbach, *ISS - Monograph 171: The Burundi Peace Process, From Civil War to Conditional Peace*, Henri Boshoff, Waldemar Vrey and George Rautenbach (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, n.d.), 77, <http://www.iss.co.za/pgcontent.php?UID=30049> (accessed December 7, 2011).

²⁶⁵ Stephen Jackson, *The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB): Political and Strategic Lessons Learned*, Lessons Learned Report (New York: United Nations, July 2006), 9, <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbps/Pages/PUBLIC/ViewDocument.aspx?docid=796&cat=32&scat=305> (accessed December 7, 2011).

sides against the Congolese people.²⁶⁶ But the Security Council refused to mandate a force in a less severe context in Burundi.

In December 2003, South African Vice President Jacob Zuma told the Security Council of the “tremendous progress” recently made in the peace process in Burundi and asked them to deploy a UN peacekeeping force.²⁶⁷ Because of other priorities on the Security Council agenda and internal competition related to the war in Iraq, it took the Security Council until May 2004 to mandate the mission. The head of ONUB arrived in Bujumbura at the end of June 2004, only four months before the planned end of Burundi’s transition.²⁶⁸ The late arrival of ONUB contributed to a prolongation of Burundi’s transitional phase.

Once ONUB arrived, it collaborated closely with the South African mediation and Regional Initiative to help the transitional government pass the legislation and make the reforms necessary for the elections to take place between June and September 2005 and bring the transitional phase to an end. “ONUB’s close and regular contact with the regional heads of state [who] had influence with Burundi’s political leaders played a decisive role in curbing isolated political attempts to sink the process.”²⁶⁹

On August 19, 2005, Pierre Nkurunziza, the former head of the largest faction of the CNDD-FDD, became Burundi’s new president in elections that were widely recognized as being free, fair, and largely peaceful. Nkurunziza and his party won by a big margin, showing that the Burundian people were ready for real change.²⁷⁰ International

²⁶⁶ UNSC, *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1493* (New York: United Nations, July 28, 2003); Susanna Campbell, *Regional Peacekeeping in Central Africa: The African Mission in Burundi Sets a Precedent*, Unpublished Paper (Medford, MA, December 4, 2003).

²⁶⁷ Jackson, *The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB): Political and Strategic Lessons Learned*, 7.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁹ Boshoff, Vrey, and Rautenbach, *ISS - Monograph 171: The Burundi Peace Process, From Civil War to Conditional Peace*, Henri Boshoff, Waldemar Vrey and George Rautenbach, 113.

²⁷⁰ Peter Uvin, *Life After Violence: A People’s Story of Burundi* (London: Zed Books, 2009), 20.

oversight of Burundi's transitional phase officially ended on August 9, 2005, with the final meeting of the Implementation Monitoring Committee.

Burundi had yet again made it through a highly tumultuous and action-packed phase in its war-to-peace transition. During this phase there was constant uncertainty as to whether the various parties and armed movements in the transitional government would come to the agreements necessary for the elections to take place. The South African facilitation and Regional Initiative remained constant facilitators and monitors of Burundi's transition. They pressured the parties to keep their commitments and facilitated the dialogue necessary to resolve their disagreements.

4.4.4 THE CONTINUING QUEST FOR AID

In February 2004, the Secretary-General's assessment mission that prepared ONUB's mandate provided the following analysis.

The nature of the Burundian economy has been a factor in the hostilities, which can, simply put, be considered as competition between the haves and have-nots in a zero-sum game. Many of the assessment mission's interlocutors stressed that in Burundi, even more so than in other post-conflict countries, the equitable expansion of economic and social opportunities is essential for a sustainable peace.²⁷¹

The assessment mission also remarked that in spite of the general acceptance of this analysis and its inclusion in the Arusha Agreement, "little actual progress seems to have been achieved" at that point in addressing equitable social and economic development.²⁷²

²⁷¹ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi* (New York: United Nations, March 16, 2004), para. 26, <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2004/210&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC> (accessed December 14, 2011).

²⁷² *Ibid.*

Although Western governments gave significant diplomatic support to Burundi's peace process, they were not as forthcoming with financial support. Even the money that donors had promised for the organization of the 2005 elections was not immediately forthcoming. The UN, the Burundian government, and international advocacy NGOs advocated once again for donors to release the promised funds.²⁷³ In the Secretary-General's December 2003 report on Burundi, he wrote that there "is a risk that the hopeful signs of peace which have now begun to appear could be lost unless they are accompanied by improvements in the living conditions of the population as a 'peace dividend.'"²⁷⁴ He reiterated his call for donors to disburse the funds that they promised in Paris and Geneva and respond to other funding appeals.²⁷⁵

While there was sufficient funding for DDR from the World Bank's Multinational Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), there was no pot of money set aside to support the creation of the new integrated army and police or to feed and shelter the combatants who were languishing in cantonment camps until they were either demobilized or integrated.²⁷⁶ The soldiers in these camps had to build their own shelter and sanitation arrangements. Donors provided food, but that was all.²⁷⁷ They were unused to spending their development money in this way. In fact, international donors' support for Burundi's entire security sector reform (SSR) process during this period experienced significant institutional setbacks. "Not only were external capacities for the

²⁷³ International Crisis Group, *Elections in Burundi: The Peace Wager*.

²⁷⁴ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation in Burundi*, Report to the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, December 4, 2003), para. 70, <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2003/1146&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC> (accessed December 14, 2011). DATE?

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 67.

²⁷⁶ International Crisis Group, *End of the Transition in Burundi: The Home Stretch*.

²⁷⁷ Boshoff, Vrey, and Rautenbach, *ISS - Monograph 171: The Burundi Peace Process, From Civil War to Conditional Peace*, Henri Boshoff, Waldemar Vrey and George Rautenbach, 66.

highly political and sensitive SSR-related work limited, but so were technical and financial resources.”²⁷⁸

In Brussels in January 2004, donors had pledged US \$1.3 billion over a three-year period but remained reluctant to disburse the funds because of the government’s inability to produce clear programs indicating how they would spend the money. Peaceful and effective elections marking the post-transition period became the new milestone for the release of promised funds.

4.4.5 ANOTHER HOPEFUL NOTE

In spite of the enormous challenges and frequent setbacks, this phase in Burundi’s war-to-peace transition ended on a very high note. The FNL was still fighting the government but had lost much of its strength, and the skirmishes were confined to the northeastern provinces. Burundi’s politicians, military, and rebel groups had shown that they were able to compromise, collaborate, and transcend many of their differences. The regional heads of state, South African mediation, the UN, and several donors had given timely and targeted assistance that had helped Burundians agree on the interim constitution, electoral framework, and conditions of an integrated military and police. The UN and many donors who had previously been reluctant to commit significant resources toward peacebuilding in Burundi were now cautiously engaged in helping Burundi sustain and expand the progress made. At the same time, the efforts of several of the international NGOs that had been important peacebuilding actors during the first two phases began to decline as donors shifted their focus to the government and the UN.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 101.

²⁷⁹ Observer (O11), Bujumbura, interview.

For organizations engaged in peacebuilding, the period from November 2003 to August 2005 presented many opportunities to support Burundi's war-to-peace transition. The needs were enormous: political dialogue, disarmament and demobilization, reintegration of the army, equitable socio-economic development, the organization of elections, helping prepare citizens to hold their government accountable, legal and legislative reform, and many more. At the same time, there was a high degree of uncertainty as to how the situation would unfold. Would the parties come to agreement? Would elections take place? Would they be free, fair, and peaceful, or would they once again trigger violence? How would the army and rebels integrate into one force? Would they be effective? As with all peacebuilding opportunities that occurred in Burundi, the opportunity and uncertainty went hand in hand. There was an opportunity for international intervention precisely because there was the risk that without it the situation would deteriorate. And once a peacebuilding intervention was initiated, no one knew exactly how it would interact with and influence the rapidly changing institutional dynamics.

4.5 Phase IV: Hope, Party Politics, and the Consolidation of Power

– September 2005–April 2009

The 2005 elections were a success. They brought an end to Burundi's nine-year peace process and ushered in a legitimate, sovereign government, overwhelmingly chosen by its people. Hope was in the air – hope for the fulfillment of basic needs, prosperity, and security. Hope for sustainable peace, and hope for resolution and reconciliation. This hope was shared by peasants, politicians, international civil servants, and regional politicians. Burundi's war had affected them all – although average

Burundians had paid by far the greatest price – and they had all worked hard to reach this point.

The new government saw itself as the voice of the people, who up until this point had been mere pawns of the political class. “With our new political orientation, everything is possible,” remarked Burundi’s new president, Pierre Nkurunziza.²⁸⁰ At his inauguration, Nkurunziza declared that primary education would be free for all Burundians, addressing an issue at the core of the Hutu population’s exclusion from politics, the army, and wealth.²⁸¹ Soon after, he declared that maternal and child health would be free.²⁸²

The government clearly sees itself as a fresh break in Burundi’s history: a government representing the majority of the people, inclusive and negotiated, and connected to the ordinary people in ways in which no previous government was.... [The President’s] first decision – free elementary schooling for all Burundians – exemplified this perfectly: In a country where social exclusion took place through highly unequal access to education, and in which the war had further destroyed the education system, the decision constituted a radical and visible break with the past... deeply appreciated by ordinary people everywhere.²⁸³

The international community was hopeful as well – hopeful that Burundi would now be a real partner in development.²⁸⁴ The Regional Peace Initiative and South African facilitation hoped that the new government and the FNL would finally reach a sustainable ceasefire agreement and put an end to the lingering war. In practically every domain, there were opportunities to help Burundi consolidate the peace it had gained.

²⁸⁰ Marianna Oforu, “Burundi: A New Beginning,” *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*, September 20, 2005, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/burundi-8211-new-beginning> (accessed December 9, 2011).

²⁸¹ IRIN, “Burundi: Nkurunziza Announces Free Maternal Healthcare, Pay Rise for Workers”, May 1, 2006, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200605010081.html> (accessed October 11, 2011); Tony Jackson, *Equal Access to Education a peace imperative for Burundi* (International Alert, June 2000), http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/burun_ed_en.pdf (accessed February 20, 2012).

²⁸² IRIN, “Burundi: Nkurunziza Announces Free Maternal Healthcare, Pay Rise for Workers.”

²⁸³ Peter Uvin, *Life After Violence: A People’s Story of Burundi* (London: Zed Books, 2009), 21–22.

²⁸⁴ DFID staff person (D4), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

4.5.1 THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE CNDD-FDD'S POWER

In October 2006, less than two months after being elected, the Burundian government notified the UN that it wanted ONUB to withdraw and for the UN to focus on development, not peacekeeping or peacebuilding.²⁸⁵ The government was taking its cue from Rwanda, which had liberally used its authority to revoke the right of international organizations and individuals to work there.²⁸⁶ The Burundian government's decision to kick ONUB out was one of the first indications that it would take Rwanda's approach and, perhaps more surprisingly, that it would work. While the international community viewed Rwanda as an efficient and effective development partner, it saw the Burundian government as one enmeshed in corruption, human rights violations, and dirty party politics from the beginning of its tenure.²⁸⁷

The tensions and competition that had preoccupied the CNDD-FDD, FRODEBU, UPRONA, and the other parties during the transitional phase continued to preoccupy the government, but this time the CNDD-FDD was clearly in charge. During Nkurunziza's first year in office, the CNDD-FDD consolidated its control over state industries; jailed prominent members of the opposition, civil society, and media; and used torture and summary executions to silence its critics and ensure its control over the state and its wealth.²⁸⁸

Through various appointments, many of which violated the law, the CNDD-FDD succeeded in controlling most of the state institutions and related companies. In violation

²⁸⁵ Stephen Jackson, *The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) - Political and Strategic Lessons Learned*, Independent External Study (New York: Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, July 2006), <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/ONUB%20Lessons%20Learned.pdf> (accessed October 30, 2011).

²⁸⁶ Observer (O12), via telephone, May 4, 2010.

²⁸⁷ Informal conversations with members of the international community, Bujumbura, March and June 2009.

²⁸⁸ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: Democracy and Peace at Risk* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, November 30, 2006), <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/120-burundi-democracy-and-peace-at-risk.aspx> (accessed December 9, 2011).

of the interim constitution, Nkurunziza gave FRODEBU and UPRONA fewer ministries than those to which they were entitled.²⁸⁹ He also filled most of the technical and directorial posts in the government and state-run companies with CNDD-FDD members before establishing the commission that was supposed to ensure that these appointments were merit-based.²⁹⁰ CNDD-FDD governors also dismissed FRODEBU communal administrators in violation of the law on communal administration.²⁹¹

The new government used other methods to silence voices of opposition: arbitrary arrest, torture, and even assassinations. In July and August 2006, the government threw several prominent opposition politicians – including the former President Domitien Ndayizeye – into jail on charges that they were staging an attempted coup. The charges were widely viewed as unsubstantiated.²⁹² Three of the politicians – all Tutsi – were tortured, rekindling ethnic tensions simmering beneath the growing inter-party warfare.²⁹³ The mere mention of a coup also rekindled many Hutu’s fear of a repeat of the 1993 coup that had triggered the war.²⁹⁴

The newly integrated FDN sought to resolve the ongoing conflict with the FNL by defeating them on the battlefield. In 2005 and 2006, fighting in the Northwestern provinces again escalated, this time between the FNL and the newly integrated FDN.²⁹⁵ To augment the FDN’s fire fight, the National Intelligence Services (SNR) and newly created Burundian National Police (PNB) rounded up suspected FNL supporters,

²⁸⁹ Ibid., 7.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Ibid., 3.

²⁹³ Ibid., 3.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 2–3.

²⁹⁵ UNSC, *Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi* (New: United Nations Security Council, March 21, 2006), 5.

including local administrators; militants; and some FRODEBU supporters and jailed, tortured, and even executed them.²⁹⁶

The government also began to crack down on Burundian media and civil society. “Given the weakness of the opposition and the CNDD-FDD’s dominance of the state institutions, the strongest opposition to the new government has come from the press and civil society.”²⁹⁷ Key civil society leaders and journalists were jailed for speaking out against the government, acts that were condemned by international observers: “The Committee to Protect Journalists is alarmed by the ongoing campaign of intimidation by the authorities in Burundi against radio stations that have cast doubt on a government claim to have uncovered a coup plot.”²⁹⁸

In reaction to the violent oppressive tactics that had come to characterize the CNDD-FDD government, a party congress voted in early 2007 to remove its party leader, Hussein Radjabu, from power and replace him with a more moderate personality.²⁹⁹ Several of Radjabu’s political supporters defected from the CNDD-FDD and formed their own party block, depriving the CNDD-FDD of its majority in the National Assembly. To protest the unwillingness of Nkurunziza to give them their share of posts in government, FRODEBU and UPRONA took advantage of the CNDD-FDD’s newfound weakness and prevented any legislation from being passed by the National Assembly, essentially

²⁹⁶ Ibid., 8; International Crisis Group, *Burundi: Democracy and Peace at Risk*, 4.

²⁹⁷ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: Democracy and Peace at Risk*, 9.

²⁹⁸ Committee to Protect Journalists, “CPJ condemns continuing harassment of radio journalists,” *Committee to Protect Journalists: Defending Journalists Worldwide*, October 2, 2006, <http://cpj.org/2006/10/cpj-condemns-continuing-harassment-of-radio-journa.php> (accessed December 10, 2011).

²⁹⁹ ICG, *Burundi: Restarting Political Dialogue* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 19, 2008), 3, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/B053-burundi-restarting-political-dialogue.aspx> (accessed December 10, 2011).

stalling the government.³⁰⁰ A game of tit-for-tat followed, with the old and new guard continually trying to punish one other for bad behavior.

A compromise was reached in November 2007, which led to the establishment of a new government that gave FRODEBU and UPRONA the posts that the constitution promised them.³⁰¹ The UN Integrated Office in Burundi's (BINUB) Cadre de Dialogue Project organized targeted meetings, and the Executive Representative of the Secretary General (ERSG) and his top advisors engaged in quiet diplomacy that apparently contributed to this breakthrough.³⁰² Unfortunately, the cooperative atmosphere did not last. In May 2008, Burundi's Constitutional Court backed a decision by President Nkurunziza to replace a Radjabu's dissident group of CNDD-FDD Members of Parliament (MP), allowing the CNDD-FDD again to dominate the National Assembly and stop negotiating with FRODEBU and UPRONA.³⁰³

4.5.2 BURUNDI'S NEW AND OLD GUARD

The battles between the CNDD-FDD on the one hand and FRODEBU and UPRONA on the other were a conflict between the new and old civil servants. Former government officials and observers repeatedly complained about the lack of experience and training of the CNDD-FDD officials and the fact that posts were allocated on political, not meritocratic, grounds.³⁰⁴ Politicians from FRODEBU and UPRONA politicians and Tutsi members of the army had participated in years of negotiations. They had been trained in Burundi and abroad. They had run a well-functioning, if impoverished, civil service.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 4.

³⁰¹ Ibid., 5.

³⁰² United Nations, *Report of the Technical Assistance Mission to BINUB*, UN Restricted (New York: United Nations, October 19, 2007), 4.

³⁰³ ICG, *Burundi: Restarting Political Dialogue*, 7.

³⁰⁴ This was an overall message that was conveyed repeatedly during the author's interviews in Burundi in December 2008.

Through all of this, the old leadership had become accustomed to political compromise.

CNDD officials had not.

Much of the government is also rather inexperienced in managing a major bureaucracy, with all this implies in terms of contradictory messages, unclear policies, problems with the donor community, etc.... They are not helped in this respect by the fact that the experienced senior civil servants in the bureaucracy belong to the two losing political parties and hence often do nothing to help the new government, rather enjoying seeing it fail.³⁰⁵

The CNDD-FDD had been excluded from government, governance, and the Arusha negotiations, into which they had reluctantly bought in 2003. While the Arusha negotiations were going on, the CNDD-FDD was fighting in the bush and running a rebel movement. They were using violence and coercion to maintain the cohesion of their movement and win a seat in power. To some degree, they maintained this approach once they were elected to office.

When the CNDD-FDD was elected, the existing members of government and the international community treated them with what they interpreted as a lack of respect. This only reinforced the CNDD-FDD's defensiveness and unwillingness to compromise. "They did not treat [Nkurunziza] with proper respect. I think that set the tone for the problems. [The government was] not prepared to have the international community tell them what they should be doing."³⁰⁶ FRODEBU and UPRONA had a similarly condescending approach. "Since 2007, these two parties have often behaved like parties of notables, convinced of their intellectual and social superiority and underestimating the 'members of the maquis' of the CNDD-FDD."³⁰⁷

³⁰⁵ Uvin, *Life After Violence: A People's Story of Burundi*, 22.

³⁰⁶ Observer (O13), via telephone, October 12, 2011.

³⁰⁷ ICG, *Burundi: Restarting Political Dialogue*, 13. The term *maquis* refers to rebel groups and is derived from the guerilla groups in the French Resistance.

While the parties within the government were fighting with one another, the integrated Burundian army was much more united in its ongoing battles with the FNL. The FNL and the government had signed a comprehensive ceasefire agreement on September 7, 2006, but fighting between the two forces continued, as did the arrest and abuse of people known to be allied with the rebels.³⁰⁸ Pressured by Tanzania, the FNL signed a new ceasefire declaration on May 26, 2008.³⁰⁹ This declaration led to regular discussions between the FNL leadership, Agathon Rwasa, and President Nkurunziza and eventually to the demobilization of FNL combatants and the allocation of government posts to its representatives in 2009.³¹⁰

4.5.3 A DIFFERENT TYPE OF GOVERNANCE

The tumultuous political context distracted politicians and civil servants from what should have been their main task: governing. They had waited years to attain power – risking their lives, killing others, and traumatizing themselves in pursuit of this goal. The state had always been linked to financial power and, since independence, had become even more so.³¹¹ A position in government gave one access to state-run companies and other state resources, including international aid, with which to conduct politics and fulfill one's obligations, including rewarding supporters, supporting families, and punishing opponents.³¹² Uvin synthesizes the historical origins of this political behavior.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., 9.

³⁰⁹ Ibid., 10.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Floribert Ngaruko and Janvier D. Nkurunziza, "An Economic Interpretation of Conflict in Burundi," *Journal of African Economies* 9, no. 3 (2000): 370–409.

³¹² Peter Uvin, "Corruption and Violence in Burundi," *New Routes*, 2009, http://www.google.ch/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=the%20corruption-conflict%20intersection%20new%20routes&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2&ved=0CB0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.life-peace.org%2Findex.php%2Fdownload_file%2Fview%2F57%2F144%2F&ei=hsbjTrb2KPSQ4gTZxZSdBQ&usg=AFQjCNHUPYXRMWGVKCKLNqvlzKTO7_9ag (accessed December 10, 2011).

Since independence, most Burundians have lived in a state that, while formally based on a Weberian rational-bureaucratic model akin to states in Western Europe, in reality functioned along lines more akin to pre-colonial client-patron relationships. Ordinary Burundians knew how this system worked – how to behave in order to solicit benefits (even though in theory as citizens they had rights to those benefits), how to donate little gifts to get things done. To Westerners, this may have looked bad or corrupt, but to most Burundians this was familiar terrain: things had always worked this way, and, as long as the power-holders were people with some traditional claim to power who delivered the goods, this system possessed a certain legitimacy.³¹³

Even though these practices were generally accepted by Burundians, in the time since independence they gradually became more abusive and had created greater poverty, “until the war dealt the final death blow to the illusions ordinary people had.”³¹⁴ The line was drawn.

Increasingly, the types of abuse of power that many politicians and administrators engaged in went beyond what could be justified or recognized by ordinary Burundians.... When teachers require sex with female students to let them pass, or when employers do the same to hire, this not only runs counter to the modesty Burundians pride themselves on; it is also perceived as a clear abuse of power.³¹⁵

By the time the CNDD-FDD was elected to office, corruption was rampant and they did nothing to reduce it. In fact, between 2005 and 2010, Burundi dropped from 130th to 170th position on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.³¹⁶ During its first year in office, the CNDD-FDD was plagued by several corruption scandals that contributed to the turmoil within the CNDD-FDD and worsened its relationships with opposition parties and donors.³¹⁷

³¹³ Ibid., 17.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ Uvin, *Life After Violence: A People’s Story of Burundi*, 74–75.

³¹⁶ Transparency International, “policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi,” *Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index*, n.d., http://transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi (accessed April 20, 2012).

³¹⁷ ICG, *Burundi: Restarting Political Dialogue*; International Crisis Group, *Burundi: Democracy and Peace at Risk*, 7.

The widespread corruption and political turmoil showed ordinary Burundians what they already knew: Politics and government benefited those with connections to people in power, while everyone else lost out. If, as Peter Uvin argues, the civil war showed that “nobody in power gave a damn about the needs and interests of the majority of the population,” then the period from 2005 to 2009 only reinforced this belief, as increased levels of corruption were combined with growing oppression and monopolization of power – this time by the new guard.³¹⁸

The Arusha Agreement had worked in many ways: It had led to power sharing and the end of ethnic parties and had diminished the ethnic notion of conflict.³¹⁹ But it had not stopped the competition for the state’s resources or the desire of politicians to monopolize power and the resources that came along with it. According to a prominent Hutu intellectual and Director of the BLTP (see Chapter 9), Fabien Nsengimana:

Burundians do realize that, in fact, the main cause of the conflict is the control of the resources which are extremely limited. The control of resources is so crucial that it becomes more and more a question of life and death. You will keep in your mind that the state is the principal employer and the principal source of economic resources. That’s why every political protagonist would like to rush after power.³²⁰

In the face of the political games and increasing corruption, most Burundians continued to struggle to survive. While the end of fighting in most of the country after November 2003 established a degree of security that most Burundians had not experienced for a decade, the increasing crime and banditry in the post-election era may

³¹⁸ Uvin, “Corruption and Violence in Burundi,” 17.

³¹⁹ Judith Vorrath, *Democratization as Integration: Exile, Return, and Changing Conflict Lines in Burundi’s Democratic Post-war Transition* (ETH, Zurich: PhD Dissertation, 2010).

³²⁰ Fabien Nsengimana, “Briefing on BLTP Activities” (Washington, DC, January 16, 2008), 2, <http://www.google.ch/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=burundi%20leadership%20training%20program%20briefing%20on%20bltp%20activities%20fabien%20january%2016%202008&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCUQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.wilsoncenter.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FFabien%20520presentation%25201-16-08%2520WWICS.doc&ei=mrHPTsOdNpSQ4gS0p6lq&usg=AFQjCNFpkkUO2SYpQkjVXovlnz62EI28Qg> (accessed November 25, 2011).

have undermined people's perception that peace had made a tangible difference in their lives.³²¹

[T]he prime face the war took for people was criminality and banditry, and much of this was not necessarily the same as 'THE WAR' in capital letters – the big conflict between clearly defined politico-ethnic parties. If criminality continues or even worsens after the official end of the war, there is not only no peace dividend, but also no peace, period.³²²

Burundi's economic climate after the 2005 elections offered financial dividends for some, but did not make a big difference in the daily lives of most Burundians. Poverty was too pervasive and its origins too deep to be altered in just a few years. The Gross National Income (GNI) per capita was US \$210 in 1990, US \$90 in 2003, US \$110 in 2006, and went up to US \$170 in 2009.³²³ While this was certainly an improvement on the 2003 figures, most people still suffered from extreme poverty. In 2006, 93 percent of Burundians lived on less than \$2 a day.³²⁴ In fact, for many Burundians the post-transition period actually brought increased financial hardship because of the high rates of inflation and growing numbers of people – returning refugees and more international staff.³²⁵ Money did not go as far, and there were more people competing for scarce resources.

4.5.4 THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

International aid increased dramatically in the post-transition period, from a low of US \$38 million in 1996 to US \$180 million in 2005 and then up to US \$264 million by

³²¹ Uvin, *Life After Violence: A People's Story of Burundi*, 46.

³²² Uvin, "Corruption and Violence in Burundi," 46.

³²³ The World Bank, "Data Catalog", n.d., <http://data.worldbank.org/> (accessed February 9, 2012).

³²⁴ *Ibid.*

³²⁵ Informal discussions, Bujumbura, 2009.

2009.³²⁶ But this increase most directly benefited politicians, civil servants, some returning refugees, demobilized combatants, and new entrants into the army and police.³²⁷ Some ordinary Burundians saw temporary benefit from UN projects designed to deliver peace dividends, but these projects were largely poorly designed and undermined by corruption.³²⁸ Otherwise, new schools, new local court offices, the removal of soldiers from the population, and improvements in some of the health infrastructure were visible signs of improvement for many Burundians, although the services that filled this new infrastructure were still highly dysfunctional and corrupt.³²⁹ The justice system and police were in a particularly sorry state – unable to uphold a semblance of rule of law.³³⁰

After the 2005 elections, the number of international players significantly increased, as did the types of activities that they supported. Donors and NGOs were anxious to help Burundi capitalize on the success of its peace process and prevent the country from sliding back into war. They wanted to help the government fulfill its commitment to universal primary education and free maternal and child healthcare, which Nkurunziza had announced without any planning or funding. Several donors, including DFID (see Chapter 7), jumped in to try and fill the void.

³²⁶ OECD-DAC, “QWIDS - Query Wizard for International Development Statistics”, n.d., <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx> (accessed February 9, 2012).

³²⁷ Pyt Douma and Jean-Marie Gasana, *Reintegration in Burundi: between happy cows and lost investments* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” October 2008).

³²⁸ Susanna Campbell, *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*, Evaluation (Bujumbura, Burundi: BINUB, n.d.), <http://www.unpbf.org/burundi/burundi-progress.shtml> (accessed September 18, 2011).

³²⁹ Ibid.; Cabinet d’Etudes, de Recherches et de Traitements Informatiques, *Etude Diagnostique sur la Gouvernance et la Corruption au Burundi* (Bujumbura: Republique du Burundi, May 2008); International Monetary Fund, *Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Framework - Second Implementation Report - Republic of Burundi* (W: International Monetary Fund, October 2010).

³³⁰ Francois Nyamoya, *Reflexions sur la Problematique de la Justice Burundaise* (Bujumbura, 2008); Campbell, *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*.

In October 2006, Burundi was selected as one of the first two countries on the agenda of the UN's newly created Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). The PBC was established to prevent countries emerging from war from descending back into it.³³¹ Paul Collier found that 44 percent of civil wars descend back into violent conflict within five years of ending.³³² To stop this from happening, the PBC was supposed to maintain international attention and focus on post-conflict countries by helping donors to focus on core peacebuilding priorities, coordinate their efforts, and ensure that the country had the necessary resources to carry out its peacebuilding priorities.³³³

The selection of Burundi as a country of focus for the PBC brought new donors to Burundi – most notably the Norwegians, Dutch, and Japan – in addition to Burundi's traditional donors. It was also one factor that encouraged Burundi's more traditional donors – Belgium, the European Commission, the United States, the World Bank, France, the UK, and Germany – to increase their support to the country.³³⁴ The PBC was also linked to a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), which granted Burundi \$35 million to be allocated through the UN to peacebuilding projects.³³⁵

Under the overall leadership of the Regional Initiative and South African facilitation, Burundi's multilateral and bilateral donors and several international NGOs had made an important contribution to the success of Burundi's peacebuilding process thus far. The international community had continued "investing time and money for years, never giving up, bringing protagonists together, acting as intermediary, absorbing the costs of negotiations and implementation of the key provisions of the transition, taking real risks

³³¹ Challenges and Change Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility", no. A/59/565 (December 2, 2004): 69.

³³² Paul Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil war and Development Policy* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003), 83.

³³³ Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility," 69.

³³⁴ Interviews with key informants in international community, Bujumbura, 2009.

³³⁵ Campbell, *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*.

in the process.”³³⁶ The Regional Initiative and South Africans had repeatedly convened the Burundian government and the rebel groups – time and time again – and pressured them to stick to their commitments. All of these efforts had helped the protagonists in Burundi’s war, with the exception of the FNL, transcend many of their differences and establish a new institutional framework intended to promote reconciliation and prosperity.

Unfortunately after the 2005 elections, Burundi no longer had strong external advocates for its peacebuilding process. The Regional Initiative was torn apart by competition among the various states involved and disagreement on their end goal for Burundi.³³⁷ After all, many of the members of the regional initiative – Rwanda, DRC, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya – were not liberal democracies either. Although South Africa continued to lead the negotiations with the FNL, rivalries with Tanzania broke apart cohesion between their efforts and the Regional Initiative.³³⁸ The international community tried to maintain its oversight of Burundi’s peacebuilding process by establishing a Partners Forum in September 2005. However, the government objected to this forum on the grounds that it duplicated the efforts of its National Committee on Aid Coordination. The international community responded by reducing the ambitions of its forum. The PBC did not attempt to pick up the pieces or use its political leverage to encourage the government to work toward peace.

BINUB was supposed to play a prominent role in coordinating the international community but did not make this a priority. The ERSG of BINUB preferred a much quieter type of diplomacy than what he viewed as the more abrasive and condescending

³³⁶ Uvin, *Life After Violence: A People’s Story of Burundi*, 22+23.

³³⁷ Observer (O14), via telephone, interview.

³³⁸ Observer (O12), via telephone, interview.

approach of many international donors.³³⁹ The Burundian government, in turn, tried to discourage a coherent approach among the international community and continuously reminded them that Burundi was a sovereign territory and would not respond to their pressure. Most international advocacy with the government happened behind the scenes. “There is the willingness to ensure that the government does not seem to be overly under the pressure of the international community, but the pressure is there.”³⁴⁰

There was also a conceptual reason for the lack of focus by the international community in the post-transition period. There was no agreement as to what peacebuilding was or how to do it. The PBC strategy framework and core priorities for peacebuilding in Burundi were relatively vague and generic. The Arusha Agreement provided a much better analysis and framework, although much of it was now outdated. Donors coordinated well in their specific sectoral groups – justice, human rights, security sector reform – but they did not have an overall approach or strategy. Even if there had been an overall international strategy, there is no guarantee that it would have increased the effectiveness of international peacebuilding efforts. As the organizational case study chapters will show, peacebuilding projects or programs made a difference because of the skill and knowledge of the individual staff involved and the buy-in and knowledge of their Burundian counterparts.

Donors were at the mercy of their Burundian counterparts and had few levers of their own other than delaying the distribution of funds. Many donors were more committed to Burundi’s peacebuilding success than Burundian politicians. “They are tired, but they can’t let it fail because if they do it is their failure. It was a real success. Now they want to see if they can save it.”³⁴¹ At the same time, many donors could not

³³⁹ Key informant interviews, BINUB staff, Bujumbura, 2009.

³⁴⁰ Observer (O11), Bujumbura, interview.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

fully engage in development cooperation with Burundi: There were the corruption, human rights violations, ongoing fighting with the FNL, and uncertainty as to what the 2010 elections would bring.³⁴²

NGOs, too, faced difficulty in working on peacebuilding programming. The new government had cracked down on NGOs because they thought they were taking away money that the government should be receiving. They were also reluctant to give work permits to NGOs working on peacebuilding.³⁴³ “INGOs pay attention to not having a direct political role. They know that the situation is delicate now.”³⁴⁴

In spite of the challenges, there were some important peacebuilding successes during this period, most notably in the area of security sector reform and dialogue between the political parties. But there was a fundamental problem within much of the international community: The parties did not have the skill or willingness to implement high-quality conflict sensitive development or peacebuilding programming.

The system understands pretty much nothing of the dynamics of political change... Democracy, good governance, rule of law, justice – all are on the agenda, but none of these is rooted in a fine understanding of the specifics of Burundi. Donors continue to profess totally unrealistic goals – what Pritchett and Woolcock so nicely call “skipping straight to Denmark,” without clear intermediary goals, a fine sense of the system they are intervening in, or any discussion of what they will abstain from intervening in.³⁴⁵

In fact, the post-transition period in Burundi saw the return of standard international programming approaches that reinforced the power and privilege of the Burundian state. Some INGOs, UN projects, and donor approaches were innovative and truly designed for Burundi’s reality, but they all had to comply with a new norm of

³⁴² Key informant interviews with international donors, Bujumbura, 2009.

³⁴³ Observer (O11), Bujumbura, interview.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Uvin, *Life After Violence: A People’s Story of Burundi*, 79.

sovereignty. The CNDD-FDD was in charge now and wanted to do things their way. All peacebuilding actors had to contend with this reality.

4.6 Phase V: Peace, Political Violence, and New Elections – May

2009–May 2010

In April 2009, Agathon Rwasa, the leader of the FNL, officially demobilized. The FNL was finally ready to participate in Burundi's political institutions rather than challenging them as an external rebel group. By June 2009, the FNL members were given their long-awaited positions in government, and the demobilization or integration into the security forces of its combatants was under way.

Burundi's war was finally over. After almost sixteen years of death, destruction, and displacement, all of Burundi's political parties and rebel groups had been integrated into its government. Theoretically, violence would no longer be necessary because political parties would resolve their conflicts peacefully within the halls of government. When this phase began, most international actors were relatively convinced that Burundi was now on the path toward peace and development, although many still remained cautious.³⁴⁶ When this phase ended, a complete shift had occurred in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory, away from multi-party democracy and toward authoritarianism. Most international actors were caught completely off guard.³⁴⁷

The end of Burundi's war had come in phases – the Arusha Agreement was signed, the transitional government was inaugurated, the CNDD-FDD joined the transitional government and demobilized, democratic elections were held, and, finally, the FNL had joined the government and security forces. With each new phase, signs of peace and

³⁴⁶ Key informant interviews with international donors and INGO staff (C11), Bujumbura, 2009.

³⁴⁷ Key informant interviews with members of the international community in Burundi and observers, 2010.

prosperity appeared. Beach clubs opened along Bujumbura's sandy Lake Tanganyika coast. Well-off Burundians dined by the pool. Expats played weekly beach volleyball games, with no realization of the death and destruction that had taken place just a few miles away. Only a few years earlier, gunshots and mortar shells had echoed from the surrounding hills. Restaurants and roads had crumbled into ruin. Now, Bujumbura was once again becoming a holiday paradise. Tourism was taking off, and Burundi was being downgraded on travel threat lists. New businesses flourished, and streets were repaved. In Bujumbura, at least, these were visible signs that Burundi was truly in a post-conflict phase. With the integration of the FNL into the government, this became irrefutable. The war was over.

During its fifteen-year peace process, Burundians had built a vibrant civil society, impressive independent media, and a culture of openness and dialogue. Compared to its regional neighbors – Rwanda, DRC, Kenya, and Uganda – Burundi was the only real multi-party democracy.³⁴⁸ But the memories of war were still there. Burundians had not forgotten what had happened. They lived with it daily.

In spite of the end of the war, violence remained a daily reality. Domestic violence grew. Mob justice was common in the face of a corrupt and ineffective judicial system.³⁴⁹ So many Burundians had become used to violence.

With the end of the conflict, people still aren't afraid to kill. They learned that experience during the conflict. People live the horrible situations of conflict and now they aren't afraid to do other stuff. People have much more courage because they participated in the murders in the crisis. Many men were trained and even the community was trained to be armed and to kill people. Even youth and women were trained. This

³⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch, *Pursuit of Power: Political Violence and Repression in Burundi* (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 2009), 11, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/06/03/pursuit-power> (accessed December 15, 2011).

³⁴⁹ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, February 17, 2010), 19, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/155-africa-burundi-credible-elections.aspx> (accessed December 15, 2011).

greatly increased the violence in households. We never lived this before the war.³⁵⁰

Crime and banditry also increased, removing from many Burundians any real sense of security.³⁵¹ Political violence also reemerged, dormant during much of the transitional and immediate post-transitional period. The CNDD-FDD and the FNL began this trend in 2008 and 2009 while they were still in ceasefire talks, launching attacks and targeted assassinations at each other's supporters.³⁵² These attacks continued even once the talks were over and the FNL was finally integrated into the government and registered as a political party.

In the lead up to the 2010 election cycle, planned to take place from May to September, the CNDD-FDD and FNL launched attacks and counterattacks against one another's supporters. They built youth gangs, made up of demobilized combatants and the multitude of unemployed youth.³⁵³ The political violence was most vitriolic between the CNDD-FDD and the FNL, but soon many of the other parties became involved. They amassed their own youth gangs and used violence and intimidation in their pursuit of electoral victory.³⁵⁴ They committed numerous pre-electoral abuses,

including campaigning before the legally authorized campaign period; assassinations; arbitrary arrests; verbal confrontations; fraud in distributing the identity documents required to vote; restrictions on free assembly; bribes and vote-buying; use of state vehicles for campaign purposes; physical confrontations; disturbance of party meetings; and hiring and firing based on political affiliation.³⁵⁵

³⁵⁰ Care staff member (C1), Bujumbura, June 8, 2009.

³⁵¹ Uvin, *Life After Violence: A People's Story of Burundi*.

³⁵² Human Rights Watch, *Pursuit of Power: Political Violence and Repression in Burundi*.

³⁵³ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections*.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch, "We'll Tie You Up and Shoot You" (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 14, 2010), 11, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/05/14/we-ll-tie-you-and-shoot-you-0> (accessed December 15, 2011).

But the abuses by the CNDD-FDD were by far the worst. “Human Rights Watch and local election monitors have found that CNDD-FDD members – including state officials – are responsible for the majority of the abuses, which include personal attacks, arbitrary arrests, and what appears to be a politically motivated murder.”³⁵⁶ In fact, targeted political assassinations were clearly on the rise.³⁵⁷

The CNDD-FDD was committed to winning the elections at all costs.³⁵⁸ Although they were slated to win, they wanted to continue to control communal level governance and maintain their two-thirds’ majority in the National Assembly that allowed them to pass legislation without consideration for the other parties.³⁵⁹ The CNDD-FDD was fundamentally uncomfortable with sharing power, continuing to employ the authoritarian decision-making structure and tactics that it had honed through years of warfare.³⁶⁰

The pre-electoral violence and abuse increased the likelihood of political violence during the election cycle. And this time around, there would not be international peacekeepers to ensure security as there had been in 2005. Security would be left up to Burundi’s corrupt and amateur police force.³⁶¹ International election observers would be present, but they would have little capacity to prevent violence or intimidation. They could simply report on it. The capacity of BINUB had also been weakened with the expulsion of its head, ERSG Youssef Mahmoud, in late 2009. He was the third representative of the Secretary-General in a row to be asked to leave Burundi. With

³⁵⁶ Ibid., 4.

³⁵⁷ Human Rights Watch, *Pursuit of Power: Political Violence and Repression in Burundi*, 9.

³⁵⁸ Human Rights Watch, “We’ll Tie You Up and Shoot You,” 11.

³⁵⁹ Ibid., 4.

³⁶⁰ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections*.

³⁶¹ Key informant interviews, Bujumbura, 2009.

Mahmoud's departure, the government ensured that the UN would be weakened and unable to keep a close eye on its conduct during the elections.³⁶²

Corruption and abuse of power remained flagrant. None of the cases of violations against political parties or charges against the police was properly investigated by the government, only encouraging other political parties to take up arms to protect themselves.³⁶³ As before, the government tried to constrain the civil society and media from challenging them in any way. The assassination of the vice president of Burundi's main anti-corruption NGO – the Organization for Combating Corruption and Financial Misappropriations (OLUCOME) in April 2009 – was a particularly audacious attempt. Senior members of the security forces are the suspected culprits.³⁶⁴ In late 2009, the organizing license for the NGO umbrella organization – the Forum for the Reinforcement of Civil Society (FORSC) – was cancelled. The Human Rights Watch analyst in Burundi was also kicked out of the country after publishing a May 2009 report on the growing political violence.³⁶⁵ Despite the intimidation and arrests of civil society and media, they remained active and continued to report on and challenge the conduct of the government.

The international community was relatively unresponsive to the increasing political violence and limits on political freedom. They were focused on the organization and outcome of the elections. They were generally counting on a successful electoral period, although several donors were still skeptical.³⁶⁶ In the face of clear political intimidation, targeted political assassinations, imprisonment of opposition candidates, and other acts

³⁶² International Crisis Group, *Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections*, 21.

³⁶³ Human Rights Watch, "We'll Tie You Up and Shoot You," 14.

³⁶⁴ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections*, 7.

³⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch, *Closing Doors? The Narrowing of Democratic Space in Burundi* (New York: Human Rights Watch, November 23, 2010), <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/11/23/closing-doors-1> (accessed December 15, 2011).

³⁶⁶ Key informant interviews with international donors to Burundi, 2009.

intended to influence the outcome of the elections, on what grounds would the international community judge the elections as free and fair? Apparently, what mattered most to donors was the international stamp of approval that *said* the elections were technically free and fair.³⁶⁷ In other words, if they were technically sound and did not lead to large-scale violence, then the elections would be judged as legitimate. Although the violations in 2005 had not been nearly as flagrant, the same standard had been applied there as well, as Peter Uvin reminds us.

Note that what was mainly peaceful about these [2005] elections was the day they were held. There was significant intimidation before the elections, as the parties fought the CNDD-FDD (which possessed parallel administrations throughout most of the country) for local control. Afterwards, the usual mechanisms of cooptation and intimidation allowed further solidifying of power. Hence, democratic elections are sandwiched between non-democratic processes, but the international community needs only the day itself to allow itself to congratulate itself on its beautiful success.³⁶⁸

The international community helped integrate some FNL rebels into the government, military, and police and disarm the rest. It gave the money and technical support to organize the elections. It pressured the government to select a truly independent electoral commission and passed quiet messages to the government dissuading bad behavior.

The international community in Burundi was most vocal and adamant in its critique of the Burundian government's new law against homosexuality – an issue that was easy for all international actors to unite around and condemn.³⁶⁹ The Belgians even withheld budgetary aid in response.³⁷⁰ In relation to the pre-election violence and intimidation,

³⁶⁷ Key informant interviews with international donors to Burundi, 2009.

³⁶⁸ Uvin, *Life After Violence: A People's Story of Burundi*, 69. Footnote 6.

³⁶⁹ Voice of America, "Burundian Homosexuals Suffer Under New Anti-Gay Law" (Nairobi, August 3, 2009), <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-08-03-voa31-68659452.html> (accessed December 15, 2011).

³⁷⁰ Key informant interview, member of international community, 2009.

however, there was no such unanimity or condemnation. The members of the international community simply hoped that the elections would be peaceful and that Burundi would continue on its slow and winding path toward democracy and development. They hoped that Burundi would continue to appear as an overall success – partly their success – and give them a good return on their investment.

4.7 Phase VI: A One-party State and a New Rebellion – June 2010– December 2011

In Burundi, peace is reversible. In May 2010, Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory took a decidedly undemocratic turn that led to the exclusion of almost all opposition parties from government, a significant increase in targeted political assassinations, and the emergence of a new rebel movement. In 2012, war is again looming. There is no peace process anymore. The international community is engaged but also resigned to the situation. They will not leave for fear of being blamed for Burundi's descent into war, if it does happen. But they stay, watching a new rebellion emerging and authoritarianism becoming rooted, and are unable or unwilling to do much to change the situation.

The first round of elections in Burundi's 2010 electoral cycle – commune-level elections – was held on May 24, a few days later than planned because of mistakes made by UNDP (see Chapter 6). To the relief of all, this round of elections was not accompanied by serious violence.³⁷¹ It was, however, strategically important for all parties. The communal councils approved all nominations of senior civil servants, elected

³⁷¹ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to Political Impasse* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, February 7, 2011), 2, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/169-burundi-from-electoral-boycott-to-political-impasse.aspx> (accessed December 15, 2011).

the Senate, and would therefore determine the number of seats and positions allocated to each party.³⁷²

The CNDD-FDD won the communal-level elections by 64 percent. The opposition parties responded to the results by declaring “massive electoral fraud.”³⁷³ They had all thought that they would get a much greater percentage of the vote and had received reports of irregularities at the polling stations. Investigations into the allegations revealed that the fraud “was not at a level that would have significantly altered the election results.”³⁷⁴ Nonetheless, there was fraud and some violence. When the opposition complained of fraud, neither the government, the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), nor the international election observers investigated the specific allegations or responded to the opposition candidate’s complaints.³⁷⁵ In addition, the CENI refused to make the vote tallies available to the opposition as required by law.³⁷⁶

The opposition parties responded by boycotting the remaining three rounds of elections, including those for president and parliament. They formed a coalition – l’Alliance des Démocrates pour le Changement au Burundi (ADC-Ikibiri) – and demanded that the CENI be dismissed and the commune-level elections annulled, or they would not rejoin the electoral process.

The international community responded to the opposition’s complaints by declaring the elections to be free and fair and calling on the opposition parties to rejoin the electoral process.³⁷⁷ Burundian civil society largely echoed the same refrain.³⁷⁸ The East African Community (EAC) sent a delegation to Bujumbura to speak with the opposition and the

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ Ibid., i.

³⁷⁴ Human Rights Watch, *Closing Doors? The Narrowing of Democratic Space in Burundi*, 20.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., 20–21.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., 21.

³⁷⁷ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to Political Impasse*, 19.

³⁷⁸ Key informant interview with member of Burundian civil society, Bern, Switzerland, 2011.

government, but little came of these talks.³⁷⁹ The UN Peacebuilding Commission did not intervene.

There were no concerted attempts to address the opposition's claims, investigate the fraud, or engage the opposition and the government in real dialogue about the electoral process. Several local organizations, including the Burundi Leadership Training Program (see Chapter 9), attempted to help the parties resolve the issues, but this was unsuccessful and did not receive strong support from international or regional actors.³⁸⁰ There was practically no coverage of the elections in the international press, and what news there was focused on their success.

The Burundian government, however, responded with conviction. At the beginning of June 2010, the government banned all meetings by opposition parties. Grenade attacks were launched in several locations, unattributed to either the government or the opposition. Police surrounded the residence of Agathon Rwasa, the head of the FNL, who subsequently fled to an undisclosed location. Other opposition leaders were captured by the National Intelligence Services, and several of them were tortured.³⁸¹

Meanwhile, the presidential elections were held on June 28, with the only candidate, Pierre Nkurunziza, winning with 91 percent of the votes. In spite of the opposition's withdrawal, the election cycle continued to move forward as planned, with only the CNDD-FDD, UPRONA, and several other small parties close to the CNDD-FDD participating.³⁸² The government imprisoned or attempted to silence in other ways media and civil society.³⁸³ The leaders of opposition parties fled the country. By the end of the election cycle in September 2010, the CNDD-FDD had a secure hold on all

³⁷⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Closing Doors? The Narrowing of Democratic Space in Burundi*, 19.

³⁸⁰ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to Political Impasse*, i.

³⁸¹ Human Rights Watch, *Closing Doors? The Narrowing of Democratic Space in Burundi*.

³⁸² International Crisis Group, *Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to Political Impasse*, 6.

³⁸³ Human Rights Watch, *Closing Doors? The Narrowing of Democratic Space in Burundi*.

branches and levels of government. Burundi was truly a one-party state. Appointments in the Senate and National Assembly strictly followed the Constitution's quotas for ethnic and gender balance, although this did not address the Hutu-Hutu conflict that was now simmering.

The international community and regional actors interested in Burundi continued to follow the situation, but did not attempt to influence its course. Many of them had decided that the elections were a Burundian problem and that the CENI should sort it out.³⁸⁴

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon even visited Burundi on June 9, 2010, and declared, "It is imperative that these elections be a success. "Burundi has an opportunity to become a success story and a model for the continent."³⁸⁵ But he did not take any significant actions to address the withdrawal of the opposition from the electoral process or the assaults on political freedom. The international community and the Regional Initiative, it seems, believed that they could help to make Burundi's elections a success by pressuring the opposition to rejoin the electoral process and ignoring any infractions against them. A Human Rights Watch quote from a member of the European Union Election Observation Mission is illustrative:

The international community wanted to show at all costs that Burundi's elections were a success. But it wasn't true. There were serious human rights abuses, there was torture, all the opposition leaders are hiding or going into the bush – that's not a success. But, when the opposition complained, the diplomats treated the opposition like they were worthless. And when we criticized the CENI's lack of transparency, the diplomats didn't want to hear it.³⁸⁶

³⁸⁴ Observers (O15), June 2010.

³⁸⁵ UN News Centre, "Ban lauds Burundians for gains in consolidating peace," *UN News Centre* (Bujumbura, June 9, 2010), <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34964&Cr=burundi> (accessed December 16, 2011).

³⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Closing Doors? The Narrowing of Democratic Space in Burundi*, 50.

After the electoral cycle ended in September 2010, the security and political situation continued to deteriorate. Attacks and assassinations continued, targeted at both the CNDD-FDD and people allied with the opposition parties. This was not banditry or *ad hoc* acts by “armed criminals,” as the government authorities complained.³⁸⁷ It was a strategic campaign by an emerging rebel group to harm the government and by the government to squelch this rebel group and all other potential opposition.³⁸⁸

In mid-2011, the international community began to raise its concerns about the situation. A letter signed by EU Ambassadors of countries with offices in Burundi declared that the “United Nations has received serious and detailed information about at least twenty cases of extrajudicial killings as well as several dozen cases of torture reportedly committed by security officials between June 2010 and March 2011.”³⁸⁹ It called for the government to stop this practice and prosecute suspected criminals.³⁹⁰

The growing violence in Burundi only made international news when forty people were massacred in a bar on the outskirts of Bujumbura. This even received much more international attention than perhaps the entire 2010 electoral cycle. By November 2011, there was incontrovertible evidence that a new rebellion had been created, was based out of the DRC, and was collaborating with the rebel groups who continued to fight there.³⁹¹

The violence had reached frightening levels. The Observatoire de l’Action Gouvernementale (OAG), a well-respected Burundian watchdog organization, reported that at least 300 members of the FNL had been killed by the government security forces

³⁸⁷ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to Political Impasse*, 23.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁹ AFP, “AFP: Western envoys raise concerns over Burundi killings,” *Agence France-Presse* (Bujumbura, June 3, 2011), <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hR3EGG-5mpHJKrdKVCbuRfj326Cg?docId=CNG.c0c32039955369c191763a9365df1b65.5a1> (accessed December 16, 2011).

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁹¹ IRIN, “Burundi: A New Rebellion?,” *Integrated Regional Information Networks* (Bujumbura, November 30, 2011), <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=94346> (accessed December 16, 2011).

or the CNDD-FDD's youth wing since May 2011.³⁹² It also reported that violence was now being directed toward another opposition party, the Movement pour la Solidarité et la Démocratie (MSD), run by former journalist Alexis Sinduhije.³⁹³ Arrests and intimidation of journalists and civil society members continued, and the justice system failed to prosecute any of the cases.³⁹⁴

Burundi seems to be heading, yet again, toward war. The new Burundian rebel movement is not strong enough to challenge the strength of the Burundian army. But combined with potential instability in DRC, it could likely do some damage. The dialogue and freedom of expression for which Burundians fought so hard is quickly being eroded. International actors are increasingly condemning the violence, but these words seem to fall on deaf ears, or at least ears that are habituated to empty threats. The Regional Initiative is divided and no longer as committed to multi-party democracy as it was in the 1990s. Each of the countries in the region has its own problems. Most of them – Kenya, Rwanda, DRC, and Uganda in particular – have their own authoritarian tendencies. Still, many of Burundi's donors remain committed to supporting the government and civil society, even if only to ensure that they will not be blamed for abandoning Burundi if it does descend into war again.³⁹⁵

This is a sad point at which to end the discussion of Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory. The space and opportunities for peacebuilding in Burundi have eroded. At the same time, the need for good peacebuilding and conflict prevention programming has grown increasingly acute. International and regional actors missed the opportunity to address the opposition's grievances and help Burundi continue on a relatively positive

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

³⁹⁵ International Observer (O16), November 7, 2011.

war-to-peace trajectory. Whether their actions would have made a difference is unknown. Now, they mostly sit back and watch, waiting to see how the situation evolves, believing that they are unable to do much to influence it. Many donors continue to strengthen the hand of the Burundian government by giving it budgetary aid and strengthening its institutions. Most international donors, IOs, and many international NGOs are tied into a new routine of cooperating with a corrupt authoritarian state – a routine from which they, like the Burundian government, may have little chance of breaking free.

4.8 Conclusion

Uncertainty reigned at each critical juncture in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. Prior to each new trend that the critical juncture launched, no one knew if Burundi would strengthen its institutions that contribute to a just peace or succumb to those that encourage renewed war. Once a new trend was under way, there was still no certainty that it would stick. "There are factors pushing toward change, and factors pushing toward the return of the status quo, and it is not obvious which way things will go. This duality of change and continuity exists at the top and bottom of society."³⁹⁶

4.8.1 A SYNTHESIS OF BURUNDI'S WAR-TO-PEACE TRAJECTORY

Burundi's peace process was considered a success by many because five out of its six critical junctures strengthened institutions that were thought to be determinants of a just peace. Unfortunately, the most recent critical juncture led to decidedly negative changes in Burundi's institutions and the emergence of a new rebellion.

³⁹⁶ Uvin, *Life After Violence: A People's Story of Burundi*, 77.

The removal of the regional embargo in January 1999 gave new energy to the Arusha peace talks and made it possible for donors to give peacebuilding and development funding to Burundi.³⁹⁷ The inauguration of the transitional government in November 2001 proved that the politicians were committed to at least trying to implement the Arusha peace agreement, signed in August 2000. It opened the opportunity for international actors to support the government in implementing the reforms outlined in Arusha and to increase the momentum behind the ongoing negotiations with the rebel groups.

The integration of the largest rebel group, the Nkurunziza arm of the CNDD-FDD, into the transitional government in November 2003 established security throughout most of Burundi and gave international actors the opportunity to work in provinces that they had been cut off from because of the fighting. It also signaled that the parties to the conflict were committed to peace. “For the first time in years, the country seems to be headed towards a genuine end to the conflict.”³⁹⁸

The inauguration of Pierre Nkurunziza as President of Burundi in August 2005 on the heels of free, fair, and peaceful elections showed Burundians that peace was possible. The last democratic elections in 1993 had sparked the war. Fears of a recurrence pervaded the collective Burundian conscience. The inauguration of Nkurunziza offered an opportunity for international actors to help the Burundian state and society address

³⁹⁷ Between 1993 and 1999, several donors funded the Arusha peace talks but did not give anything other than humanitarian assistance to NGOs in Burundi and did not give any money directly to the Burundian government. Several other donors – namely DFID and USAID – funded international NGOs to engage in unofficial mediation (Track II or Track 1½ diplomacy) in Burundi, while others funded innovative dialogue programming by a few international NGOs, such as Search for Common Ground and International Alert. But there was very little money going to the Burundian government or to address the enormous socio-economic needs, trauma, or distrust among the Burundian people. For more details on the period from 1993 to 1999, see Michael S. Lund, Barnett R. Rubin, and Fabienne Hara, “Learning from Burundi’s Failed Democratic Transition, 1993-1996: Did International Initiatives Match the Problem?,” *Cases and strategies for preventive action* (1998), pp. 47-91.

³⁹⁸ International Crisis Group, *End of the Transition in Burundi: The Home Stretch*, 1.

the causes of the conflict and begin to rebuild the social fabric and institutions destroyed by the war.

The integration of the FNL rebel group into the government and military that began in April 2009 finally brought Burundi's lingering war to an end. It offered an opportunity for the international community to support the long-delayed integration of the FNL into Burundi's institutions and to help prevent violence and tension from escalating in the lead up to the 2010 elections or during the elections themselves.

The 2010 elections launched most recent phase in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. When the opposition contested the results of the May 2010 communal elections, there was a clear window of opportunity for the international community to intervene to facilitate an agreement between the government and opposition and bring the opposition back into the electoral process. This critical juncture led to the withdrawal of the opposition parties from the rest of the electoral process, an increase in political violence, the establishment of a one-party state, the limitation of political freedom, and the emergence of a new rebel movement.

4.8.2 PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

For international actors intervening in Burundi, taking peacebuilding actions in relation to each of these critical junctures was always risky. If they waited for certainty that their actions would deliver the intended results, then they missed the window of opportunity to influence the situation. In many cases, organizations were not willing to take this risk. However, as the next five chapters will show, many individuals were willing to stick their necks out, try something new and innovative, and coerce their organizations into supporting them in this effort. Those who were most effective were able to anticipate changes in the peacebuilding context and respond to unanticipated changes.

Both anticipation and reaction were important. Even people who were most knowledgeable about the Burundian players and institutions were not able to predict the next trend. They could anticipate and prepare for the different scenarios, but they never knew exactly how it would unfold. If they were wrong, either they revisited their assumptions and altered their approach or their programming became irrelevant to the new trend.

Innovative peacebuilding programming was the exception, not the norm. The international community's response to six critical junctures in Burundi's peacebuilding process followed a pattern that was largely disconnected from the reality. Each critical juncture signaled to the various international actors that a response was needed. But the response was often based on assumptions about the needs of a war-torn country or political imperatives within the international institutions rather than the actual needs and capacities of Burundi's institutions. It was also based on a lack of understanding within the international community of how to respond to a country that was implementing a comprehensive peace agreement at the same time that its war continued.

Once the embargo was lifted in January 1999, the UN and several civil society organizations advocated with donors to release development aid to Burundi on the grounds that aid was necessary for peace to take hold in Burundi. But this logic was counterintuitive for most donors, and they held off until they had more certainty that peace was on track and that the government could manage development aid. Instead, they focused on humanitarian assistance, support for the Arusha talks, and a small amount of support for dialogue and reconciliation initiatives.

Similarly, the inauguration of the transitional government in November 2001 and the integration of the CNDD-FDD into the government in November 2003 were met with a weak response from the international community. Eventually, peacekeepers arrived, but significant peacebuilding and development assistance failed to arrive. Perhaps only

the South Africans and the Regional Peace Initiative were really responsive to the Burundian context during this period. At the request of Nelson Mandela, the South Africans responded by deploying a force to protect exiled politicians who were returning to take part in the transitional government and then provided the soldiers for AMIB.

After the CNDD-FDD was integrated into the government in 2003, the Security Council could not decide whether it would deploy a peacekeeping force in Burundi while one rebel group still remained outside of the conflict. It made up its mind in spring 2004 and mandated Burundi's first UN peacekeeping operation, ONUB. The deployment of ONUB in July 2004, just three months before the transitional period was scheduled to end, contributed to the prolongation of Burundi's transitional period from three to five years. During this period, most international NGOs and the UN continued implementing humanitarian projects even though the majority of the country was peaceful.

After the 2005 elections, most donors decided that they could now transition from humanitarian aid to development aid. They did not have big pots of money reserved for peacebuilding programming. Donors began to work with the government on its sectoral plans and support the development of the Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan (PRSP), all with the aim of setting up Burundi to receive development assistance. With the inclusion of Burundi on the PBC's agenda in 2006, several new donors – Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and the PBF – provided aid to Burundi that was more directly focused on peacebuilding. At the same time, the funding for peacebuilding by international NGOs given by USAID, the World Bank, and DFID largely dried up. Even though Burundi's peace process was still not over and the threat of war had certainly not subsided, these donors switched primarily to development aid. The attention of the Regional Peace Initiative also began to wane after the elections, as disagreements emerged between the participating states and their focus turned elsewhere.

By the time the FNL were integrated into the government and security forces in 2009 and the second round of democratic elections were held in 2010, most international assistance was focused solely on development. Although a UN peace operation was still deployed in Burundi and donors continued to support some type of security sector reform and transitional justice, most donors, international NGOs, and UN organizations had now made the full transition to development thinking. Unfortunately, the reality in Burundi had not, as war again loomed on the horizon.

4.8.3 THE SIGNIFICANCE

This case study of Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory sheds light on the nature of peacebuilding and some of the challenges facing organizations doing peacebuilding work. Burundi's trajectory was unpredictable, fraught with uncertainty, and contradicted with international assumptions about linear war-to-peace trajectories. It shows that peacebuilding opportunities are, by definition, ephemeral. It also shows that all peacebuilding is political because its success is tied to the political dynamics at the center and periphery. Either directly or indirectly, all peacebuilding aims to influence changes political dynamics and institutions, just as changes in these political dynamics influence peacebuilding.

For an organization to respond to peacebuilding opportunities, it has to both anticipate the future direction and respond to the actual direction. But because the dynamics are so fluid and unforeseeable, any peacebuilding action is risky. One never knows whether an action will deliver the intended outcome. The actors and issues are constantly changing. This presents many challenges for organizations engaged in peacebuilding work. It means that they have to possess real knowledge and understanding of the context, but also be flexible and able to alter their knowledge and approach in response to a new trend. Even if an organization is able to align its overall

aims and approach with a new trend, it still has to adapt its programming as the trend unfolds and the relevance of its approach becomes clear.

In the next five chapters, I examine how five different types of organizations engaged in peacebuilding in Burundi navigated these challenges. I do so by measuring whether they took significant and systematic action to align their overall aims and means with the new phase in Burundi's peacebuilding process (within one year after it began) and/or whether they consistently acted to maintain the relevance of their programming once it was under way. I then examine the reasons for each organization's actions and analyze the patterns that emerge.

5 UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS TO BURUNDI: UNOB, ONUB, BINUB, AND BNUB

5.1 Introduction

United Nations peace operations have been the subject of much academic and policy study. These operations are simultaneously relied on by the world to solve some of its most intractable conflicts and reviled for their wastefulness, scandals, and numerous failures to create sustainable peace. Academics have found that peace operations do, in fact, contribute to peace at the country level, although exactly why and how this happens is still largely unknown.³⁹⁹ There have been very few studies of the micro-level effectiveness of peace operations. In post-conflict countries, these operations are constantly criticized by donors, non-governmental organizations (NGO), host governments, and the UN itself for being costly, imposing, and largely unable to fulfill their mandate. Their peacekeepers may help keep the peace, but observers are often uncertain what else they do and whether they can engage in effective peacebuilding. What explains the enormous variation in the perception of the micro-level effectiveness of peace operations?

This chapter begins to answer this question by examining the interaction between the UN peace operations in Burundi and its evolving war-to-peace transition from 1999 to 2011. This period covers four different peace operations: the UN Office in Burundi (UNOB), the UN Office in Burundi (ONUB), the UN Integrated Office in Burundi

³⁹⁹ MW Doyle, "The John W. Holmes Lecture: Building Peace," *Global Governance* (2007), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?db=pubmed&cmd=Retrieve&dopt=AbstractPlus&list_uids=related:u6hWiuRSDZkJ:scholar.google.com/ <http://www.atypon-link.com/LRP/doi/abs/10.5555/ggov.2007.13.1.1>; Virginia Page Fortna, "Peacekeeping and Democratization," in *From War to Democracy*, ed. Anna Jarstad and Timothy Sisk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).


(BINUB), and UN Office in Burundi (BNUB). These missions represent three common types of peace operations: light footprint political missions (UNOB and BNUB), a full-scale peace operation with peacekeeping troops (ONUB), and a large integrated political mission (BINUB). This chapter examines how these missions interacted with the key trends in Burundi's peacebuilding process, marked by six critical junctures (see Figure 5-1). It asks how these organizations responded to big changes in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory, whether they were able to maintain their relevance to this trajectory, and, when data allow, how their patterns of interaction with the Burundian context influenced their effectiveness.

The findings from this case study help to build a theory that may be generalizable to peace operations in other countries, particularly since the factors that enable and prevent effectiveness are largely institutional and shared across peace operations. These findings have significance for the academic community, which wants to understand the effectiveness of international organizations more broadly and the specific capacity of these institutions to build peace. They have significance for the academic study of the relationship between member-state components of these organizations and the bureaucracies tasked with carrying out the states' decisions. They will contribute to the literature on liberal peacebuilding and the role of UN peace operations in imposing liberal norms and guaranteeing peace. Finally, these findings have important implications for efforts to improve the effectiveness of peace operations, which rely on several untested assumptions that this chapter tests.

This case study finds that while the UN missions to Burundi from 1999 to 2011 made significant alterations in their aims and means in response to the critical junctures in Burundi's peacebuilding process, for the most part they were unable to maintain their relevance to the context once these changes had been made. Instead, path dependency

and bureaucratic inertia took over, preventing most of the missions from taking systematic actions to align with Burundi's changing context or influencing that context.

Figure 5-1: Actions by UN Missions to align overall aim and approach and programming with Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory



There were important exceptions when the UN's peace operations in Burundi helped save Burundi's peacebuilding process or at least gave it significant momentum. In these instances, the success of the peace operations was due to entrepreneurial leadership that was committed to peacebuilding, highly skilled teams who developed and implemented quality programming, a high degree of national ownership of the interventions, and the development of reflective processes through which these actors could come to understand their interventions and make decisions to alter their approach. Success was due to extraordinary individuals who made a slow and impersonal bureaucracy work in their favor. The UN did not train or prepare them to do this or even facilitate their work with supportive systems. Nonetheless, these individuals persevered and figured out how to make the UN's vast bureaucracy deliver some innovative peacebuilding results.

This chapter first provides background on the UN's assumptions about how it can improve the effectiveness of peace operations. Then it outlines how and why its four peace operations in Burundi interacted with the six phases in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. It then synthesizes the similarities and differences between each of these case studies and evaluates them in light of the theory presented in Chapter 2. It concludes by presenting an adapted theory about the behavior of peace operations in Burundi and discusses the implications of this theory for peace operations in other countries, academic literature about international organizations and peacebuilding, and policies to improve the effectiveness of peace operations. In the conclusion of this dissertation, the findings from this chapter will be compared to the findings from the other five case studies to generate a new theory about how organizations engaged in peacebuilding can be expected to interact with the countries that they aim to influence.

5.2 A Brief Background

There are several distinguishing factors of UN peace operations that influence the way they interact with conflict-ridden countries. UN missions are mandated by the UN Security Council and are closely monitored by the UN Secretariat. Although much of their operations are decentralized to Burundi, their mandate is set and revised by the UN Security Council, and the UN Secretariat monitors their actions closely. When a UN Mission is deployed, an enormous logistical effort is required to complete the "start-up" of the mission, including the shipment of hundreds of white UN vehicles, the construction of a secure UN compound, and, for the bigger missions, the hiring and placement of hundreds if not thousands of staff. The withdrawal of a UN mission requires a similarly labor-intensive process, which also includes firing many local staff who benefitted from the higher salaries and cushy status. As opposed to normal operations by other UN entities, peace operations receive a higher level of international

attention and have more political power because they are mandated by the UN Security Council. As a result, all member states and other UN entities are technically accountable for their mandate.⁴⁰⁰ These factors help determine the behavior of peace operations and their interaction with Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory.

In addition, there were several reforms initiated by UN headquarters that influenced the structure and organization of the UN missions in Burundi. In 1997, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan initiated a comprehensive organizational reform and restructuring process, which, among other things, aimed to strengthen the effectiveness of the UN's preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding capacities. The Secretary-General aimed to undo the fragmentation, duplication, and rigidity that had developed over the years, causing aspects of the UN structure to become "in some areas ineffective, in others superfluous."⁴⁰¹ He saw the organizational features that were most required of the UN in today's world as being the same ones that were in shortest supply: "strategic deployment of resources, unity of purpose, coherence of effort, agility, and flexibility."⁴⁰²

Increasing the coherence among the interventions of the UN's various agencies, funds, programs, offices, and departments was a core component of the UN's overall reform agenda. In 2002, the Secretary-General's second major reform report indicated that because the "common public policy challenges posed by the current global era cross both national borders and institutional boundaries... the strategies we pursue must rely on coordinated action within the organization and enhanced cooperation with outside

⁴⁰⁰ Susanna P. Campbell, "(Dis)Integration, Incoherence and Complexity in UN Post-Conflict Interventions," *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 4 (2008): 556–569.

⁴⁰¹ Report of the Secretary-General, *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform* (New York: United Nations, 1997), 11.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, 13.

partners.”⁴⁰³ The major reforms that are relevant to peace operations aimed to increase the coherence among the UN entities engaged in development and to integrate the entire UN system under the leadership of the Representative of the Secretary-General when a peace operation is deployed in a country.

The reforms focused on the UN development system created an overarching headquarters organ, the UN Development Group (UNDG), which brings together the thirty-two UN funds, programs, agencies, departments, and offices that play a role in development to deliver “more coherent, effective, and efficient support to countries seeking to attain internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals.”⁴⁰⁴ The UNDG plays a support and advisory role for its members and provides a venue for policy formulation, but does not have directive authority over the thirty-two members who have their separate governing structures.

The reforms also increased the power and support structure of the Resident Coordinator (RC). The RC became the clear head of the UN Country Team (UNCT) – the group of all members of the UNDG operating within one country – and responsible for leading the process of establishing a common strategy and objectives for development interventions in a particular country through the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). Again, while the RC became the point person for political engagement with the UNCT in country, s/he was not given directive authority over UNCT members of, which continued to report and be accountable directly to their headquarters.

⁴⁰³ United Nations General Assembly, *Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change*, Report to the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, September 9, 2002), para. 109, [http://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/4b5d557cb16e82b6c1256c3e003933dd/\\$FILE/N0258326.doc](http://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/4b5d557cb16e82b6c1256c3e003933dd/$FILE/N0258326.doc).

⁴⁰⁴ United Nations Development Group, “About the UNDG,” *United Nations Development Group*, n.d., <http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=2> (accessed January 30, 2012).

In addition to the reforms that focused primarily on the UN development system, a highly influential report released by the UN in 2000 pushed for greater coherence among all UN entities operating during the deployment of peace operations. The Brahimi report defines peace operations as entailing “three principal activities: conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peacebuilding.”⁴⁰⁵ It defines peacebuilding as “activities taken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.”⁴⁰⁶ The Brahimi report emphasizes the importance of peacebuilding to the success of peacekeeping operations, which it says requires a “focal point to coordinate the many different activities that building peace entails” with particular focus on coherence among the development and political arms of the UN because “effective peacebuilding is, in effect, a hybrid of political and development activities targeted at the sources of conflict.”⁴⁰⁷

The Brahimi report indicated that coherence and coordination should be maintained under a peacebuilding strategy and that the permanent capacity of the UN needed to be strengthened to implement programs that support these strategies.⁴⁰⁸ It recommended that coherence of the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding effort in country be maintained by collaboration between the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), who should be selected through a much more careful and systematic process, and the UNCT and at headquarters by an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF).⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁵ United Nations General Assembly Security Council, *The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, 2.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 6, 8.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

Over the years since the Brahimi report, integration has become the “guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office, whether or not these presences are structurally integrated.”⁴¹⁰ The purpose of integration is to “maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN’s response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace.”⁴¹¹ These “integrated missions” are under the overall leadership of the SRSG at the country level, who is “called upon to ensure an integrated approach that assures full and equal participation of the peace support operation and UNCT participants in the planning, implementation, monitoring, and exit planning” of the Security Council–mandated operation.⁴¹² Collaboration between the peace support operation and the UNCT is to be guided at the country level by an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) that establishes joint priorities for peace consolidation in the country.⁴¹³

The UN Peacebuilding Architecture – composed of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and established in 2005 – adopted a similar model and aim: to promote a coherent international approach to peacebuilding through the establishment of an integrated strategy under the overall leadership of the SRSG and his/her national counterparts. The PBC aimed to enlarge this coherence beyond just the UN and include member states in this effort, although the head of the UN peace support operation in the country, not the broader membership of the PBC, reports to the PBC on the evolution of

⁴¹⁰ Secretary General, *Decision of the Secretary-General - 25 June Meeting of the Policy Committee* (New York: United Nations, 2008), 1.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴¹² Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General, *Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP)* (New York: United Nations, June 13, 2006), 5.

⁴¹³ Alain Le Roy, “Remarks of the under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Alain Le Roy, to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations,” *United Nations*, February 23, 2009, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/articles/article230209.htm> (accessed December 14, 2011).

the country context. Burundi was selected as one of the first two countries on the agenda of the PBC, and in 2007 it received \$35 million in support from the PBF.

In addition to the focus on coherence, the UN's reform efforts in the area of peacebuilding aimed to increase the speed with which the UN is able to mobilize its resources to respond to the opportunities for peace consolidation that appear in the immediate aftermath of the signing of a peace agreement or ceasefire.

The Secretary-General's 1997 *Program for Reform* sought to establish measures to increase the deployment speed of UN peacekeeping operations. "A critical lesson from past experience is the need to be able to deploy operations quickly so as to establish a credible presence at an early stage and prevent a further intensification of armed conflict... Preparedness on the part of the organization must be coupled with the ready availability of trained and equipped troops."⁴¹⁴ In 2000, the Brahimi report reiterated the need for both "rapid and effective" deployment of peacekeeping forces.⁴¹⁵ The need for rapid deployment derives from the critical window of opportunity present during a country's initial transition.

The first six to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord is often the most critical period for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers. Credibility and political momentum lost during this period can often be difficult to regain. Deployment timelines should thus be tailored accordingly. However, the speedy deployment of military, civilian police and civilian expertise will not help to solidify a fragile peace and establish the credibility of an operation if these personnel are not equipped to do their job. To be effective, the missions' personnel need material (equipment and logistics support), finance (cash in hand to procure goods and services) information assets (training and briefing), an operational strategy, and, for operations deploying into uncertain circumstances, a military and political "centre of gravity" sufficient to enable it to anticipate and overcome one or more of the parties' second thoughts about taking a peace process forward.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹⁴ Secretary-General, *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform*, 37.

⁴¹⁵ United Nations General Assembly Security Council, *The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, 15.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Several reforms were made within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to increase both speed and effectiveness, although, as we will see in the discussion of DPKO reforms, there remain serious organizational needs and challenges in this area.

In 2006, the Secretary-General established the PBF, at the request of the General Assembly and Security Council, to provide immediate critical funding for interventions that are likely to have a direct and immediate impact on peacebuilding in the country concerned.⁴¹⁷ It is meant to be a quick, short-term funding source that addresses critical funding gaps and helps create more sustained support for longer-term peacebuilding.⁴¹⁸ Through a quicker response by the international community to urgent peacebuilding priorities, it takes advantage of the window of opportunity in the immediate aftermath of a ceasefire or peace agreement to strengthen core institutions and mechanisms and shows people in war-torn countries that peace will deliver actual dividends to them.⁴¹⁹

In the following pages, I examine how the UN missions to Burundi interacted with its peacebuilding trajectory and how the reforms discussed above influenced this interaction.

⁴¹⁷ United Nations General Assembly, *Arrangements for the Revision of the Terms of Reference for the Peacebuilding Fund*, Report of the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, April 13, 2009), 5, <http://www.unpbf.org/wp-content/uploads/docs/TOR.pdf>.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁹ United Nations General Assembly, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly (New York: United Nations, October 24, 2005), 25, <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan021752.pdf> (accessed December 14, 2011); Secretary-General, *Addendum 2 Peacebuilding Commission - Explanatory Note by the Secretary-General*, Addendum (New York: United Nations, April 19, 2005), 3, <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/add2.htm> (accessed December 14, 2011).

5.3 Accompanying the End of the Arusha Process: The UN's

Political Mission to Burundi (Phases I and II)

UNOB took significant and systematic actions to align its overall peacebuilding aims and outcomes in response to the critical events in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory in 1999 and 2001. While in 1999 UNOB took systematic actions to achieve its ongoing programmatic aims as well, it did not do so in response to the new trend that began in 2001. Once the transitional government was inaugurated in November 2001, UNOB was given responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the agreement. Although significant and systematic actions were taken by the Security Council to help UNOB meet that responsibility, the Secretary-General's man on the ground – SRSG Berhanu Dinka – was relatively disengaged from the process and largely unable to fulfill his mandate.

UNOB was established in November 1993 to support peace and reconciliation initiatives in the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Burundi's first democratically elected president, Melchior Ndadaye, on October 21, 1993 and the violence and chaos that ensued. The Security Council called for the establishment of this office "as a confidence-building measure, to facilitate the restoration of constitutional rule, and to promote peace and reconciliation."⁴²⁰ UNOB reported to the Department of Political Affairs (DPA).

Through UNOB, the Security Council and Secretary-General closely followed both the positive signs in the Arusha process after the regional embargo was lifted in January 1999 and the numerous setbacks in the process during this particularly uncertain time.

⁴²⁰ Secretary-General, "Letter Dated 2 November 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," United Nations Security Council S/1999/1136, November 5, 1999, <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/1999/1136&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC> (accessed December 14, 2011).

On April 12, 1999, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that because the peace process had entered a “critical stage,” he had decided to upgrade the level of UNOB by appointing the head of the office, Cheikh Tidiane Sy, as his Representative in Burundi, who was subsequently replaced by Jean Arnault in May 2000.⁴²¹ Both Sy and Arnault followed the peace process closely and engaged in informal negotiations with the various parties. This was the extent of UNOB’s programming at the time, and Jean Arnault, in particular, was a highly engaged and effective interlocutor.⁴²² He, as an individual, was able to systematically act to achieve his political aims, but did not have resources at his disposal to advance beyond quiet diplomacy.

After Mandela was appointed as the facilitator of the Arusha peace process at the end of 1999, the Secretary-General also signaled that the Arusha process was increasingly important. He appointed Amb. Berhanu Dinka as his Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region at the Assistant Secretary-General level, whereas the head of the UNOB office was at a lower grade.⁴²³ Amb. Dinka became the Secretary-General’s Representative at all Arusha deliberations.

Plans were also under way to upgrade the UN’s overall presence in Burundi once the Arusha Agreement was signed and implemented and the post-conflict threshold had been reached. The Secretary-General wrote that at this point UNOB would need to “undertake additional responsibilities in the post-conflict peace-building phase to help in the consolidation of peace and security. This will entail assisting in the implementation of the peace agreement and the establishment of new institutions as well as providing

⁴²¹ Secretary-General, “Letter Dated 12 April 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council S/1999/426, April 15, 1999AD, <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/1999/426&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC> (accessed December 14, 2011).

⁴²² Informal conversations with UNOB staff and observers in Bujumbura, 2000 and 2001.

⁴²³ UN Security Council, *UN Security Council Resolution 1286*, Resolution (New York: United Nations, January 19, 2000), <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f1bd44.html> (accessed December 14, 2011).

support for the various reforms envisaged in the agreement.”⁴²⁴ The statement implied the deployment of a full UN peacekeeping mission, not a pared-down political mission such as UNOB. The Arusha agreement called for the deployment of a Chapter VII peacekeeping mission once the agreement had been signed.⁴²⁵ But there was significant debate in the Security Council and with the UN Secretariat as to whether this would be feasible without a ceasefire agreement. In October 2001, even with the inauguration of the transitional government less than a month away, members of the Security Council reiterated their objection to a UN-mandated peacekeeping force in Burundi.⁴²⁶

In response to the November 1, 2001, inauguration of the transitional government, the Secretary-General decided to strengthen the capacity of UNOB once again, this time to support SRSG Dinka in leading the Implementation Monitoring Commission (IMC) of the Arusha agreement. He increased the number of staff and appointed a military advisor to do contingency planning for the potential deployment of a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission.⁴²⁷ In response to the incremental progress in the Arusha peace process, the UN Secretary-General made changes within his realm of influence and, of course, with the approval of the Security Council. More significant actions were not possible without a Security Council resolution that significantly changed the mandate of the UN mission on the ground.

The leadership of the IMC was, nonetheless, an enormous responsibility. It was made up of twenty-nine representatives, including the nineteen signatory parties to the

⁴²⁴ Secretary-General, “Letter Dated 2 November 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council.”

⁴²⁵ Parties to the Arusha Agreement, *Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi*, 94.

⁴²⁶ UN Security Council, *4399th meeting Monday, 29 October 2001, 12.10 p.m. New York* (New York: United Nations, n.d.), 2, <http://www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-4399.pdf> (accessed December 14, 2011).

⁴²⁷ UN Security Council, *Interim report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation in Burundi* (New York: United Nations, November 14, 2001), <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2001/1076&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC> (accessed December 14, 2011).

Arusha agreement, six civil society representatives, and four representatives from the international and regional community, including the UN. It was mandated to “Follow up, monitor, supervise, coordinate, and ensure the effective implementation of all of the provisions of the Agreement,” including ensuring that the timetable was respected and that all disputes preventing the implementation of the accord were resolved.⁴²⁸ In other words, the IMC was supposed to resolve many of the issues with the agreement that were unresolved during the Arusha peace talks. Because there were many issues in the final accord about which the signatory parties had reservations, this was a big task. Unfortunately, by most accounts, SRSR Dinka was not up to the task.⁴²⁹

The IMC was accused of being just another venue for Burundian politicians to collect per diems, which they used to buy all of the new Mercedes that were appearing on Bujumbura streets at the time.⁴³⁰ Amb. Dinka did not even put the core issues on the table so that they could be discussed and debated or actually monitor the context, as mandated.⁴³¹ IMC meetings were convened on an approximately bimonthly basis, giving the impression that the Arusha process was advancing, but this was just a foil because nothing moved forward.⁴³² The “IMC was supposed to govern the government, but instead has fallen into the same political games as the government.”⁴³³ While heading the IMC was certainly a challenging assignment, most international and Burundian observers felt that Amb. Dinka was more concerned with his retirement pension than

⁴²⁸ Parties to the Arusha Agreement, *Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi*, 88–89.

⁴²⁹ Interviews with international and UN staff members in Bujumbura, July 2002.

⁴³⁰ Interview with Observer in Bujumbura, August 1, 2002.

⁴³¹ Interview with UN staff member in Bujumbura, August 8, 2002.

⁴³² Interview with UN staff member in Bujumbura, August 8, 2002.

⁴³³ Interview with UN staff member in Bujumbura, August 8, 2002.

with engaging in the entrepreneurial leadership required to effectively monitor and facilitate the implementation of the Arusha agreement.⁴³⁴

While the Secretary-General took significant and systematic actions to increase the capacity of UNOB to carry out its growing responsibilities, his representative in Burundi did not take significant actions to the mandate given to him, even with the limited resources at his disposal. The variation between UNOB's response at the programmatic level in response to the increased momentum in the peace process that began in 1999 and in response to the inauguration of the transitional government in 2001 can be explained by a difference in leadership. Jean Arnault was an entrepreneurial leader. He used his limited means to engage in talks with the National Forces of Liberation (FNL).⁴³⁵ Amb. Dinka, on the other hand, was content to sit back and convene meetings. He did not make serious attempts to push forward the implementation of the Arusha agreement, frustrating many Burundians and internationals alike.

During these two phases, UNOB had frequent discussions with a wide and representative range of politicians and rebel leaders, giving them a good perspective on the context and, if they listened, sufficient information about its evolution. Their upward accountability to the Security Council and UN Secretary-General reinforced their willingness to pay attention to this group of "beneficiaries." The Security Council and Secretary-General were monitoring the situation in Burundi closely and requested that UNOB report back to them regularly on its evolution. They gave UNOB a clear peacebuilding frame and helped to make sure that the mission had sufficient staff with knowledge of the political context to support their activities. During both periods, UNOB was protective of the information that it received and did not share it widely within the

⁴³⁴ Interview with diplomat in Bujumbura, August 7, 2002 and informal discussions in Bujumbura August – October 2002.

⁴³⁵ Informal discussions in Bujumbura, 2001.

UN or discuss and evaluate information about its outcomes, which were part and parcel of the trends that it monitored. It had a relatively defensive approach to dealing with information about its contribution, even when it had valid information.

After 2001, UNOB benefitted from a significant organizational change in the form of new staff and a revised mandate from the Secretary-General to support SRSG Dinka in his leadership of the IMC. Nonetheless, this new focus and additional staff did not make up for the lack of will on SRSG Dinka's side to use all the means at his disposal to achieve his peacebuilding aims. Although his mission was arguably more complex than that of his predecessors, he still did not take significant actions to attempt to achieve it.

5.4 The UN Peacekeepers Finally Arrive: ONUB and Burundi's 2005 Elections (Phase III)

In response to the integration of Pierre Nkurunziza into the transitional government in November 2003 and the establishment of security in 95 percent of the country, UNOB made important contributions toward the disarmament of CNDD-FDD combatants, and the UN Secretariat began preparing for the deployment of a robust peacekeeping mission in Burundi.⁴³⁶ After all, for the end of the transition period to take place by October 31, 2004 as planned, the armed groups who had agreed to ceasefires must be demobilized and six rounds of elections organized.

A robust UN peacekeeping mission was considered critical for the demobilization of former combatants, the organization of the elections, and, thus, the successful end of Burundi's transitional phase. ONUB's important contribution to the demobilization process and organization of the elections in 2005, a year later than planned, was widely

⁴³⁶ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation in Burundi*, para. 30.

praised and ONUB was lauded as playing a critical role in Burundi's thus far successful war-to-peace transition. In terms of the theory that these cases are testing, the UN Secretariat took significant and systematic actions to align its overall strategy and approach with the new trend launched in November 2003 at the same time as it began to take systematic actions to alter most of its ongoing interventions in response to the changing context.

5.4.1 UNOB PICKS UP THE PACE

Toward the end of 2003, UNOB began to take a more proactive approach to Burundi's rapidly changing political context, in large part because the UN Secretariat was closely involved and preparing for the deployment of a robust peacekeeping mission.

After the signature of a ceasefire agreement between the transitional government, Jean Bosco Ndayikengurikiye of the CNDD-FDD and Alain Mugabarabona of the Palipehutu-FNL, on October 7, 2002, UNOB and the EU helped responded quickly to ensure that there was sufficient food for the pre-cantonment phase for Nkurunziza's arm of the CNDD-FDD.⁴³⁷ This response helped to ensure a truce between the CNDD-FDD and the Burundian Army until February 10, when fighting resumed.⁴³⁸ After the signature of the Pretoria Protocols with Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD on October 8, 2003 and November 2, 2003, food delivery was resumed to Nkurunziza's combatants in Bubanza, Ruyigi, and Makamba provinces, which the Secretary-General reported had an immediate effect of reducing violence throughout the country.⁴³⁹

The Security Council requested that the Secretary-General designate a head of the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) to oversee implementation of the ceasefire agreements,

⁴³⁷ Ibid., para. 10.

⁴³⁸ Ibid.

⁴³⁹ Ibid., para. 21.

and he appointed Brigadier General El Hadji Alioune Samba in that role.⁴⁴⁰ The UN provided financial support for the JCC in the form of the Chairman's salary, premises, and support staff.⁴⁴¹ To ensure that the cantonment sites housing former combatants were equipped with the necessary shelter and food supplies, UNOB facilitated an agreement on behalf of the UNCT with the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) to ensure that they received the necessary security to deliver humanitarian services to these sites.⁴⁴² AMIB was deployed in 2003 under the understanding that the UN would deploy a peacekeeping mission that would take over AMIB's responsibilities within twelve months.⁴⁴³

The campaign continued for a UN-mandated peacekeeping force to take over from AMIB. The facilitator of the negotiations with the rebel groups, Deputy South African President Jacob Zuma, briefed the Security Council on December 4, 2003, and made this request. He indicated that the agreement between the transitional government and Nukurunziza's arm of the CNDD-FDD made 95 percent of the country peaceful, therefore meeting the Council's requirements for the deployment of a peacekeeping force.⁴⁴⁴ It was widely believed that a UN peacekeeping force would offer the sheer manpower, international weight, and expertise necessary to ensure that the ceasefire agreements were implemented and prepare for democratic elections planned for the third quarter of 2004.⁴⁴⁵

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid., para. 26.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid., para. 33.

⁴⁴² Ibid., para. 34.

⁴⁴³ Center on International Cooperation (New York, N.Y.), *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 86.

⁴⁴⁴ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation in Burundi*, para. 30.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid., para. 31.

On December 22, 2003, the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General assess how the UN might best support the full implementation of the Arusha Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation, now that calm had been restored to most of the country.⁴⁴⁶ In response, the Secretary-General sent an assessment mission to Burundi in February 2004 composed of representatives from the UN's political, peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights, security, information, and support arms.⁴⁴⁷

While the assessment mission found that the political and security situation had significantly improved as a result of the integration of all but one rebel group into the transitional government, they also found that the implementation of the Arusha agreement was seriously behind schedule.⁴⁴⁸ The date for the end of the transition period, October 31, 2004, was just eight months away, and critical reforms in the security and judicial sectors needed to take place before then.⁴⁴⁹ Plus, elections needed to be planned and organized.⁴⁵⁰ Based on the mission's report, the Secretary-General finally declared that "the time has now come for the international community to respond positively" to Burundi's request for a peacekeeping mission.⁴⁵¹ After approximately four years of advocacy efforts by the Burundian government, rebel groups, and many international actors and observers, the stage was finally set for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission to Burundi.

5.4.2 ONUB ARRIVES WITH NO TIME TO SPARE

ONUB arrived in Burundi at the last possible minute. As a result, it took significant and systematic actions not only to align its approach with the context, but also to alter the

⁴⁴⁶ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi*, para. 1.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 30.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*, para. 100.

context so that it could achieve its mandate. In addition to changing its overall strategy and approach to meet fit the new trends in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory, ONUB also systematically acted to achieve its specific programmatic aims, with the exception of its civilian protection mandate, as the context changed.

After years of advocacy, on May 21, 2004, Security Council resolution 1545 mandated a Chapter VII peacekeeping mission in Burundi: ONUB. ONUB was finally deployed in June 2004, with SRSG Carolyn McAskie arriving in Bujumbura on June 25, 2004. The UN had delayed in deploying the mission because of the continued fighting between the government and the CNDD-FDD and FNL. The logic in the UN Secretariat was that the UN was waiting until Burundi was "ripe" for the intervention, ensuring a more successful and effective mission.⁴⁵² But Burundi was in many ways too ripe when ONUB arrived.

Because ONUB started its work in Burundi less than five months before the scheduled end of the transitional period, it had to essentially change the context so that it could accomplish its mandate within a new timeframe. Before the end of the transition, ONUB had to help a new constitution to be accepted, organize six different levels of elections, and ensure that the disarmament of former combatants was carried out.⁴⁵³

⁴⁵² Jackson, *The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) - Political and Strategic Lessons Learned*, 9.

⁴⁵³ ONUB was given a Chapter VII mandate, which permitted it to use "all necessary means" to fulfill its mandate, which had three broad strands. First, ONUB was to support the organization of democratic elections prior to the deadline for the end of the transitional government, October 31, 2004. The Security Council deemed the legislative elections to be the most crucial. Second, ONUB was to support Security Sector Reform, including disarmament and demobilization of former combatants that would not be integrated into the armed forces, and support for the reestablishment of confidence among the former rebels and members of the Burundian Army that would be integrated into a new, combined National Defense Force. Third, ONUB was given the general Chapter VII peacekeeping tasks of enabling humanitarian access, protecting civilians and returning refugees and IDPs, and ensuring the protection of UN staff and assets. UN Security Council, *Resolution 1545 (2004) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4975th meeting, on 21 May 2004* (New York: United Nations, May 21, 2004), para. 5, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/359/89/PDF/N0435989.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed December 14, 2011).

Upon arrival, therefore, “ONUB’s urgent priority had to be managing domestic and regional perceptions concerning the inevitable extension of the transitional period, placing ONUB under considerable time pressure of its own and risking that it would be seen as favoring those Burundian actors who wished for their own interests to extend the transition.”⁴⁵⁴

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that this mission “opened a new chapter in the Burundi peace process.”⁴⁵⁵ ONUB was mandated generally to “support and help to implement the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring about national reconciliation, as provided under the Arusha Agreement.”⁴⁵⁶ The mission’s SRSG was a former Canadian Government official with an impressive UN pedigree, having served as the Emergency Relief Coordinator for the entire UN system, including Burundi.⁴⁵⁷ McAskie also brought prior experience in Burundi to the job. In 1999, she was a member of Julius Nyerere’s facilitation team during the Arusha peace process.⁴⁵⁸ As a result, she brought significant knowledge of Burundi and its players to her new role.⁴⁵⁹

As the UN Secretary-General’s representative in Burundi, McAskie also took over the leadership of the IMC from Amb. Dinka. The international community and many

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁵ Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information, “ONUB: United Nations Operation in Burundi,” *United Nations*, 2006, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onub/background.html> (accessed December 14, 2011).

⁴⁵⁶ UN Security Council, *Resolution 1545 (2004) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4975th meeting, on 21 May 2004*, para. 2.

⁴⁵⁷ United Nations, *Carolyn McAskie Appointed Special Representative of Secretary-General for Burundi*, Press Release (New York: United Nations, May 26, 2004), <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sga874.doc.htm> (accessed December 14, 2011).

⁴⁵⁸ Trudeau Foundation, “Carolyn McAskie,” *Trudeau Foundation*, n.d., <http://www.trudeaufoundation.ca/program/mentorships/past/2009/carolynmcaskie> (accessed December 14, 2011).

⁴⁵⁹ Jackson, *The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) - Political and Strategic Lessons Learned*, 8.

Burundians were anxious for a more forceful international presence that could help push forward stagnating institutional reforms and negotiate an ever elusive ceasefire with the remaining rebel groups.⁴⁶⁰

ONUB's leadership team brought continuity with the previous UN and African Union (AU) missions, strong relationships with headquarters and with the South African mediation, and an intense knowledge of Burundi's history and political actors.⁴⁶¹ It was a well-conceived and selected leadership that helped the mission to start off with a high degree of understanding of the context.

The mission leadership used their knowledge and connections to resolve the political roadblocks to the end of Burundi's transitional phase. ONUB was mandated "to contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process stipulated in the Arusha Agreement, by ensuring a secure environment for free, transparent, and peaceful elections to take place."⁴⁶² After ascertaining that the successful organization of elections during such a short timeframe would be impossible, ONUB focused all of its attention on "the maximum achievable and minimally acceptable progress that could provide an incontrovertible indicator that the transition was still moving forward" prior to October

⁴⁶⁰ Interviews with members of Burundian civil society and members of the international community, Bujumbura, June 2004.

⁴⁶¹ McAskie was given two deputies. The Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (PDSRSG) position went to Nureldin Satti, who had been the DSRSG to Berhanu Dinka since 2002. Amb. Satti brought significant knowledge of the political context and created continuity between UNOB and ONUB. Ibrahima D. Fall, formerly with UNICEF, became the quadruple-hatted DSRSG, with responsibility for the development and humanitarian communities, as Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, and the Resident Representative of UNDP. In addition, Ambassador Welile Nhalpo was made the head of ONUB's Political Section. Amb. Nhalpo had been working on the Arusha peace process on the behalf of South Africa since the mid-1990s and brought to the mission not only close ties with South Africa, but a wealth of knowledge and relationships with Burundi's political actors. This relationship between South Africa and the UN was further strengthened by the continuation of AMIB Force Commander Major-General Derrick Mgwebi as ONUB's Force Commander. Jackson, *The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) - Political and Strategic Lessons Learned*, 8.

31, 2004.⁴⁶³ The progress that ONUB helped to achieve at this stage was the appointment of the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) in August 2004, the adoption of an electoral calendar, the drafting of an interim constitution, and the acceptance of a law on October 20, 2004 declaring that the draft constitution was the interim constitution until the constitutional referendum took place.⁴⁶⁴

ONUB had to accomplish its tasks in the midst of increasingly tense relationships between Burundi's political parties resulting in significant roadblocks, which it worked closely with the South African Facilitation and Regional Initiative to help resolve. For example, President Ndayizeye sought to amend the interim constitution to allow him to run for the presidency in the post-transition period, which was outlawed in the Arusha agreement and draft interim constitution. This amendment was encouraged by Vice-President Kadege, representing the predominantly Tutsi UPRONA party, who saw it in his interest to continue to deal with Ndayizeye and his party, FRODUBU, rather than one of the other "unknown" political actors, such as one of the rebel group leaders.⁴⁶⁵ ONUB's SRSG, Carolyn McAskie, met with Ndayizeye and other leaders on several occasions to "impress upon the parties the importance of adhering to the Arusha agreement and its implementation, as envisaged and agreed by the signatories, and supported by the Regional Initiative, the African Union, and the international community."⁴⁶⁶ While we do not know the degree to which McAskie's conversations contributed to Ndayizeye's decision to withdraw his proposal to amend the constitution,

⁴⁶³ Jackson, *The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) - Political and Strategic Lessons Learned*, 18.

⁴⁶⁴ UN Security Council, *Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi*, 1-3.

⁴⁶⁵ Jackson, *The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) - Political and Strategic Lessons Learned*.

⁴⁶⁶ UN Security Council, *Third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi* (New York: United Nations, March 8, 2005), para. 6, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/253/67/PDF/N0525367.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed December 14, 2011).

we do know that McAskie did identify his proposed amendment as a clear threat to the success of the elections and Burundi's overall peacebuilding process and acted quickly to encourage Ndayizeye to align his actions with these aims.

In addition to ONUB's intense political efforts to help the different Burundian political parties reach agreement on the modalities of the elections and post-transitional arrangements, ONUB was instrumental in the organization and administration of the Constitutional Referendum and elections themselves. ONUB collaborated with the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the World Food Program (WFP) to assist CENI on a technical level to organize the voter registration, which began in November 2004. It also provided a great deal of technical support for the constitutional referendum, which took place on February 28, 2005, specifically by helping to transport materials throughout the country and implement the CENI's media and civic education program.⁴⁶⁷ The Center on International Cooperation (CIC) reported that the deployment of ONUB officers alongside Burundian officers was particularly effective in ensuring security during the constitutional referendum.⁴⁶⁸

ONUB also supported the CENI in planning the electoral timetable and continued to call for conformity to it.⁴⁶⁹ Once the final timetable for the elections was established, ONUB deployed all of its relevant resources to support the organization of the elections and managed to help organize six rounds of elections of a very tight six-month period. ONUB helped ensure that the ballot boxes and other necessary materials arrived where they needed to be ahead of time and that voters were registered and knew where they

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., para. 11

⁴⁶⁸ Center on International Cooperation (New York, N.Y.), *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006*, 87.

⁴⁶⁹ UN Security Council, *Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi* (New York: United Nations, May 19, 2005), para. 9, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Burundi%20S2005328.pdf> (accessed December 14, 2011).

had to be and when. It was also deployed alongside the Burundian police and military to ensure security during the elections.

Stephen Jackson reported that ONUB's electoral unit was under intense pressure from various political actors to either speed up or slow down the electoral process, which he said they resisted deftly, focusing on the "technical" nature of their work.⁴⁷⁰ He also reported that in all of his interviews, "the single point of agreement from all was that ONUB's role in the conduct of elections in Burundi has been 'unimpeachable' and an 'immeasurable contribution' to the cause of peace."⁴⁷¹

Of course, if the Burundian political parties had not also had an interest in the organization of peaceful, free, and fair elections, then the efforts of ONUB and other international and regional actors would have been in vain. Although the political environment was tense, the large majority of Burundian parties wanted the transitional phase to end and did not desire a return to war. The international and regional actors helped to facilitate agreement among these parties, but while this was most likely a necessary condition for the successful end of the transition, it was far from sufficient. The political will and interest of the Burundian parties themselves was also necessary, and we will never know whether it would have been sufficient.

5.4.3 THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION

Although ONUB was able to systematically act to achieve its mandate of facilitating the free, fair, and largely peaceful elections in Burundi, it did not show the same determination in relation to the protection aspect of its mandate.

⁴⁷⁰ Jackson, *The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) - Political and Strategic Lessons Learned*, 18.

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 19.

In spite of ONUB's contribution to the electoral process, many Burundians were leery of its imposing presence and questioned its real purpose. ONUB was very visible in Burundi, with over 5,300 troops covering a country the size of Massachusetts, all driving around in big white jeeps.⁴⁷² ONUB's task to protect civilians "without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional Government of Burundi" carried certain complications.⁴⁷³ ONUB's role in protection was complicated by the fact that the Burundian Armed Forces (FAB) were in the midst of open combat with the FNL, which resulted in the death and displacement of civilians, while ONUB's approximately 5,300 peacekeepers were mandated in Burundi to protect these same civilians. For all this "coverage," ONUB did very little to protect civilians.

Perhaps the most blatant case of ONUB's failure at protection was the Gatumba massacre in August 2004.⁴⁷⁴ Not only was ONUB unable to prevent the massacre of 150 Congolese refugees in a neighborhood on the outskirts of Bujumbura, but they were not even aware that it happened until they were informed by the SRSG of Mission de l'Organisation de Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC) ten hours later.⁴⁷⁵ The FAB, who held the primary responsibility for guarding the refugee camp, had refused to allow ONUB to patrol after curfew and failed both to prevent the massacre and to relay its occurrence to ONUB.⁴⁷⁶ Jackson argues that the inability of ONUB to protect Burundians "added to the ease with which the new government could make the argument for the rapid phase-down of the Blue Helmet presence."⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷² Ibid., 13.

⁴⁷³ Ibid., 12.

⁴⁷⁴ UN Security Council, *Resolution 1545 (2004) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4975th meeting, on 21 May 2004*, para. 5.

⁴⁷⁵ Jackson, *The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) - Political and Strategic Lessons Learned*, 15.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid., 13.

The focus on continuity from the previous missions may have also inhibited ONUB's capacity to engage in more forceful protection of civilians. Jackson argues that because the AMIB force that formed the core of ONUB's peacekeepers had a much more minimal mandate that did not permit the same degree of force, this set a pattern for engagement within ONUB, in spite of its much broader mandate.⁴⁷⁸ This points to a significant contradiction in "best practice" for peacebuilding. On the one hand, to ensure that the organization has the necessary knowledge of the context and of past experiences in the context, best practice generally dictates that continuity of staff between missions is important. The high turnover of staff is a constant critique. On the other hand, in the case of ONUB, the continuity of forces from AMIB to ONUB set in place a certain path dependency that reduced the capacity of ONUB to act on its mandate and its relevance to new context in the country. There may be important cases, or critical junctures, where continuity is not as important as a fresh start.

ONUB's unwillingness to protect civilians may also be explained by the fact that ONUB was partnering so closely with the Burundian government and armed forces and was reluctant to weaken these partnerships. This points to a tension between ONUB's tasks and the required relationship with the government to achieve them. For example, a close relationship with the transitional government was necessary for ONUB to organize the elections and facilitate security sector reform, while a more distant relationship would have been required for ONUB to protect civilians from fighting and displacement, which was perpetuated by the Burundian government as well. The routines of sovereignty and partnership, grounded in international law and organizational procedure, may privilege some types of actions over others and make it difficult for a peace operation to reconcile a complex mandate.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid.

5.4.4 ASSESSING UNOB'S AND ONUB'S ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS IN PHASE III

After the integration of Pierre Nkurunziza into the transitional government in November 2003, UNOB again became more proactive, particularly in its support for the cantonment of the rebel combatants and in preparation for the arrival of ONUB. This was in large part because of the increased attention from the UN Secretariat on the evolving context in Burundi. Once ONUB was finally deployed, it followed events relevant to the success of the elections very closely, publishing many of them in the quarterly reports of the Secretary-General on ONUB. It acted very quickly to facilitate agreement between the political parties and to organize six successful rounds of elections.

During Phase III, ONUB systematically acted to align intention and outcome at both the political and technical levels in relation to the core purpose of its mission: the peaceful organization of free and fair democratic elections, which would mark the successful end to Burundi's transitional phase. Because Burundi's war essentially began after the last round of democratic elections, taking place in 2003, there was a high degree of concern among the population, politicians, and regional and international actors that these elections could lead to violence as well. The fact that the elections were largely non-violent and almost universally considered to be free and fair indicates that not only did ONUB systematically act to achieve its intended outcome, but it achieved its intended peacebuilding outcome. As a result, this is a case not only of action to align, but also alignment.

What explains the proactive approach of the UN missions in Burundi during Phase III and their important contribution to this phase of Burundi's war-to-peace transition? The commitment and knowledge of ONUB's leadership, the cooperation of the leadership with the Regional Initiative, the external attention to the outcome of the election, and the skill of the electoral unit are the primary contributing factors.

5.4.4.1 Leadership

The presence of entrepreneurial leaders committed to ONUB's main peacebuilding objectives in Burundi seems to have been very important for ONUB's contribution to ending Burundi's transitional phase. McAskie and Sati were highly knowledgeable about the Burundian context, the Arusha peace process, and the actors involved. They capitalized on this knowledge and their relationships with the Regional Initiative and got to work right away on addressing the numerous roadblocks to a successful end of Burundi's transitional phase. But because these individuals had only so much time in a day, there were only so many highly political objectives that they could pursue. The technical staff were not able to substitute for them – not even the Force Commander, who was most comfortable in a military leadership role but not a political one.⁴⁷⁹

While knowledge and relationships matter, they only matter to the degree that one has the political weight and leverage to act on them. You can be very well informed but not have the power to act on that information. You can also, of course, have the power to act but not be well informed. Neither of these scenarios is likely to lead to good results. In terms to the series of steps necessary for a successful end of Burundi's transitional period, ONUB had the knowledge, relationships, and entrepreneurial leadership necessary to capitalize on them to push forward to achieve its peacebuilding aims.

5.4.4.2 Information, analysis, and knowledge

In spite of the high-level of knowledge possessed by ONUB's leadership, the organization in general had problems with information management and analysis. While ONUB systematically gathered information about the context, it had difficulty centralizing this information and did not have accurate information about its outcomes.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid., 20.

ONUB's information gathering was focused on reporting to headquarters on the context in Burundi, not on understanding its contribution to the context. For the elections, ONUB benefitted from the presence of international observers and other monitors who reported on the degree to which the elections were free, fair, and peaceful. ONUB did not aim to contribute to democracy in general, but just to support good elections, and therefore did not consider the conflicts between the political parties, intimidation of voters, or other potential infringements on democracy to be part of their outcome. In relation to ONUB's other goals, it had too much information about the context and insufficient capacity to create knowledge based on that information, much less understand its contribution to the evolving context.

ONUB was envisaged to have an improved intelligence and information gathering capacity in the form of the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC), one of DPKO's new instruments of integration. Nonetheless, a year and a half into ONUB's presence in the country, the JMAC remained unstaffed.⁴⁸⁰ Apparently, the DPKO budget office had removed the funding for the JMAC from the budget before it was sent to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), which had to approve the budget for the General Assembly.⁴⁸¹ The DPKO budget office assumed that this new instrument would not be accepted by the General Assembly and preemptively removed it from the request without consulting its colleagues who wrote the budget.⁴⁸² This points to the role that bureaucratic decisions at headquarters can play in determining whether a mission has the capacity to understand the context, much less to act on that understanding.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid., 13.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid.

⁴⁸² Ibid.

Because the JMAC was not appropriately staffed, the senior leadership of ONUB and several staff with experience with Burundi placed in various units in the organization conducted the political analysis for the mission.⁴⁸³ Because this information was not centralized and a longer-term perspective was not taken, both political reporting to headquarters and intelligence gathering in the mission suffered.⁴⁸⁴ Unlike its successor, BINUB, there was no monitoring and evaluation capacity in ONUB to help the mission understand whether it was achieving its desired intermediary outcomes.

5.4.4.3 Accountability routines, knowledge-laden routines and frames, and organizational change

ONUB was accountable to UN Headquarters and the Burundian government. It had no direct feedback from the broader Burundian population on its peacebuilding interventions. Nonetheless, for its primary goals – reconciliation between the political parties, launching the disarmament process, and the organization of free, fair, and peaceful elections – feedback from the population was not a necessity. ONUB needed feedback from its contacts in government and received a high level of international feedback about the election results. External election observers monitored whether the elections were effectively organized, providing ONUB with the information necessary to understand its contribution and creating a real incentive for it to perform in relation to these targets, which were shared by ONUB, international observers, the CENI, and many Burundians. A public opinion survey of ONUB's work conducted in 2006 finds that the

⁴⁸³ Ibid., 23.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid.

vast majority of Burundians were very satisfied with ONUB's contribution to the 2005 elections.⁴⁸⁵

The skill of ONUB's election unit seems to have played a very important role in the successful organization of the elections. They organized six rounds of elections in a six-month period, without any serious glitches. Combined with the knowledge and skill of ONUB's leadership, ONUB's technical capacity in this area was critical for the success of the elections. ONUB's organizational frame was also focused on a single peacebuilding goal – the successful end to Burundi's transition. This frame was shared by headquarters, ONUB leadership, and its staff, providing the institutional incentive, leadership, and technical capacity necessary for systematic action to achieve this aim and, finally, for the achievement of this aim.

UN Missions benefit from organizational change that happens through the creation of each new mission. A mission is, hopefully, designed and created for a particular moment in a country's war-to-peace trajectory, which gives it the opportunity to start off on the right foot. In ONUB's case, this was certainly true. It was given the mandate and resources necessary to accomplish its main peacebuilding goals. Interestingly, it was also given some elements of continuity from UNOB and AMIB, which gave ONUB greater knowledge and better relationships on the one hand, but also created an element of path dependency on the other. This continuity contributed to preventing the organization from breaking out of some of the past patterns and adjusting to the new political configuration in the transitional government – in particular, to the rise of the CNDD-FDD – and to the significant difference in the mandates of AMIB and ONUB peacekeepers.

⁴⁸⁵ Jean Krasno, *Public Opinion Survey of ONUB's Work in Burundi*, External Study conducted for the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, June 2006), <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/Burundi%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20Final.pdf> (accessed October 30, 2011).

5.4.4.4 Burundian context

An additional factor influencing ONUB's capacity to systematically act to align, and its contribution to Burundi's war-to-peace transition, was the context itself. The context was ready and waiting for ONUB. In fact, ONUB's late arrival may have actually contributed to worsening the tensions between the political parties by necessitating a delay in the elections. Although the skill, knowledge, and persistence of ONUB's leaders and staff enabled the organization to navigate the political complexity that they faced when they arrived, there was a general openness to ONUB's mission and purpose. Almost all parties also believed in the importance of ONUB's involvement, giving them a significant opening and opportunity. ONUB could have squelched this opportunity with serious negative implications for Burundi's war-to-peace transition. But it did not have to create the opportunity or opening, as it was already there, ready and waiting for ONUB to act.

5.4.5 PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER

During Phase III, which began with the integration of Pierre Nkurunziza into the transitional government in November 2003 and ended with his election to the presidency in August 2005, the two UN Missions – UNOB and ONUB – lacked many of the characteristics that the theory presented in Chapter 2 hypothesized would be necessary for systematic and significant action to align their peacebuilding aims with Burundi's changing context. ONUB provides a particularly important example. It did not have systematic feedback from the population and had poor learning behavior. However, it did have a clear peacebuilding frame and the necessary peacebuilding knowledge to skillfully pursue its most critical peacebuilding aims.

ONUB also had several other characteristics that helped to compensate for its accountability routines and learning behavior: It had entrepreneurial leadership that was

committed to achieving its peacebuilding aims and had undergone an organizational change process that ensured that it had the mandate and skills necessary to work toward these aims. In other words, the organizational change process had provided a new organizational frame and ensured that the organization had the necessary knowledge-laden routines for these aims, which compensated for the organization's poor learning behavior and feedback from stakeholders. This was the type of work that the UN Secretariat did, was known for, and did well.

The nature of the aims also generated a lot of accountability for the results and support for their achievement: Everyone focused on the elections and their outcomes, and many external observers helped to monitor the ongoing progress. Nonetheless, this monitoring and attention has existed in other instances (e.g., BINUB) that were not nearly as successful and is therefore not the determining factor. The decisive characteristics seem to be the clarity of the organizational frame; the skill of its technical staff in navigating the complexity and organizing a very complex operation; the knowledge, focus, and determination of its leadership; and the desire of all political parties to participate in well-organized and internationally legitimate elections.

5.5 A More Subtle Approach to Peacebuilding: August 2005–May 2010 (Phases IV and V)

ONUB had little time to bask in the glory of Burundi's successful elections. Soon after Pierre Nkurunziza was inaugurated as Burundi's president, his government launched its efforts to weaken the international community's influence in Burundi. The government made the argument that peace had already been built in Burundi and that

the election of the CNDD-FDD proved this.⁴⁸⁶ Now, they argued, it was time to consolidate peace through reconstruction and development that would be implemented by the new government. ONUB was no longer overseeing Burundi's war-to-peace transition; the Burundian government was now in charge.

First on the government's agenda was to remove ONUB and its approximately 5,000 peacekeepers from their soil. The UN was caught off guard by this request but adjusted quickly. It withdrew ONUB and began planning for a new type of UN Mission: an integrated mission that focused solely on peacebuilding. The UN Secretariat responded immediately at the diplomatic level, engaging in high-level negotiations with the government, although it took another year to withdraw all of ONUB's peacekeepers and much of its staff and establish a much smaller integrated peacebuilding mission with no troops. In altering the mandate and structure of its peace operation in Burundi, the UN Secretariat took what the theory presented in Chapter 2 describes as significant and systematic actions to change its overall peacebuilding strategy and approach to align with the new trend in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory.

The UN Integrated Office in Burundi, known by its French acronym BINUB, was officially established in January 2007. BINUB immediately received US \$35 million from the PBF to implement a series of peacebuilding programs. Some of these projects made an important contribution to Burundi's war-to-peace transition. In these cases, the staff took systematic action to alter the project design so that it could maintain its relevance to the evolving context. Overall, however, the design and approach of BINUB's projects was not updated to ensure their ongoing relevance to Burundi's context. Between the time they were designed in early 2007 and implemented in 2008 and 2009, much had changed.

⁴⁸⁶ Key informant interview, Bujumbura, 2009.

As a result, most of them lost their intended relevance to Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory by the time they were finished.

Although BINUB was not able to systematically act to align the majority of its peacebuilding programming with the Burundian context, it did take systematic and significant actions at the strategic level in response to the integration of the FNL into the government in April 2009. Specifically, it found quick and flexible peacebuilding funds necessary to demobilize combatants associated with the FNL, enabling the FNL to participate in the 2010 elections.

5.5.1 A PREMATURE EXIT

With the dissolution of the IMC, the international community in Burundi saw the need to create a follow-on mechanism that would allow them to continue to monitor Burundi's peace consolidation trajectory and to coordinate their response. After all, Burundi was still engaged in war with the FNL and the political infighting during the transitional phase pointed to the possibility of continuing tension between the political parties. Under ONUB's leadership, the Burundi Partners' Forum was created. Its informal launch meeting on October 18, 2005, convened representatives of the African Union, Regional Initiative, neighboring countries, the UN, and donors. The plan was for it to meet regularly to discuss how international actors could best support the Burundian government in consolidating peace and promoting recovery and development and to serve as a counterpart for the PBC, which was expected to add Burundi onto its agenda.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁸⁷ UN Security Council, *Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi* (New York: United Nations, November 21, 2005), para. 15, <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2005/728&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC> (accessed December 14, 2011).

The fact that the Partner's Forum was announced during the same UN meeting that "celebrated" Nkurunziza's presidency apparently angered the new president, precipitating his call for ONUB's premature exit.⁴⁸⁸ The new government perceived ONUB, perhaps accurately, as a threat to its sovereignty. They believed that ONUB's leadership was partial to Burundi's old political leadership, and specifically with FRODUBU, with whom ONUB's leadership had a history, had been working closely since the mission's deployment, and had developed relationships during the Arusha talks.⁴⁸⁹

In November 2005, Burundi's new president, Pierre Nkurunziza, requested that the UN withdraw its peacekeepers from Burundi and did not initially accept the deployment of a follow-on UN mission. During the Security Council's mission to Bujumbura, as part of its visit to the Great Lakes Region, the government notified the diplomats of its wish for ONUB's to withdraw from Burundi. According to the Security Council mission's report:

The Government envisages a role for the United Nations primarily in reconstruction and development assistance, and suggested that the peacekeeping component of the United Nations could be gradually reduced, as security had returned to a major part of the country, with the exception of the western provinces of Bubanza, Bujumbura Rural and Cibitoke, where the operations of the Palipehutu-FNL rebellion and movements of other armed groups and weapons smuggling remained issues of concern.⁴⁹⁰

In May 2006, an agreement was reached to establish a peacebuilding mission in Burundi: BINUB. To avoid being formally declared *persona non grata*, McAskie left Burundi before the mission ended. She served from June 1, 2004, to March 31, 2006, at which point her

⁴⁸⁸ Jackson, *The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) - Political and Strategic Lessons Learned*.

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁴⁹⁰ UN Security Council, *Report of the Security Council mission to Central Africa, 4 to 11 November 2005* (New York: United Nations, November 14, 2005), para. 42,

<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20S%202005%20716.pdf> (accessed December 14, 2011). UN Security Council, *Report of the Security Council mission to Central Africa, 4 to 11 November 2005*, para. 42.

deputy, Nureldin Satti, took over as acting SRSG until the mission closed on December 31, 2006.⁴⁹¹ He was subsequently declared *persona non grata* before the end of his term. This experience led the mission leadership to recommend that “when a transition comes to an end, it may be prudent to consider replacing the entire echelon of top UN Mission management in order to promote the confidence of the post-transition government that it is dealing with an entirely new dispensation.”⁴⁹²

5.5.2 A NEW KIND OF PEACE OPERATION: BINUB

On January 1, 2007, a scaled-down UN presence began its operations in Burundi. BINUB was unique in several ways, several of which influenced its capacity to remain relevant to Burundi’s war-to-peace transition. It was a large political mission, meaning that unlike ONUB, it did not have any actual peacekeepers. But BINUB did have a broad mandate and a large staff and, as a result, was managed by DPKO and its Department of Field Support (DFS), not DPA as other political missions were. It was an integrated at the strategic and operational levels, which meant that the entire UN system in Burundi was supposed to be accountable to the head of BINUB and that several UN entities were combined into thematic units. BINUB was also the representative of the PBC at the field level. Burundi had been selected by the PBC as one of the first two countries on its agenda and benefitted from a large grant from the PBF as a result. In addition, unlike many other peace operations and political missions, BINUB attempted to empower the Burundian government to resolve its own problems rather than cajoling the officials into carrying out BINUB’s agenda.

⁴⁹¹ Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information, “ONUB: United Nations Operation in Burundi - Facts and Figures,” *United Nations*, 2007, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onub/facts.html> (accessed December 14, 2011).

⁴⁹² Jackson, *The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) - Political and Strategic Lessons Learned*, 10.

BINUB's unique structure and approach were the result of intense negotiations between the Burundian government and the UN.⁴⁹³ In these discussions, the Burundian government fought to scale down the presence and power of the UN, while the UN fought to ensure that it maintained a visible presence that would help to prevent Burundi from sliding back into war. BINUB's founding resolution reflects the government's insistence that they were now in charge. In Resolution 1719, the Security Council reaffirmed its "strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Burundi" and emphasized "the importance of national ownership by Burundi of peacebuilding, security and long-term development."⁴⁹⁴

The Nkurunziza government had modeled its approach to the international community on Rwanda's. Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the Rwandan government sought to demonstrate that it was the sovereign power and would determine the trajectory of its country, not international donors or the UN. The difference between Burundi and Rwanda is that Rwanda has been able to deliver the donors and UN what they wanted in terms of socio-economic policies, administrative efficiency, and low corruption, even though it received very bad marks on political and civil rights. The Nkurunziza government has gotten bad marks across the board.

BINUB's mandate was broad, including what had become the UN's standard template for peacebuilding: peace consolidation and democratic governance; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and reform of the security sector; the promotion and protection of human rights and measures to end impunity; and donor

⁴⁹³ Gilbert Fossoun Hougbo and Ramadhan Karenga, *Consultations between the Government of Burundi and the United Nations on the post-ONUB period, Bujumbura, 21-24 May 2006* (Bujumbura: United Nations, May 24, 2006).

⁴⁹⁴ UN Security Council, *Resolution 1719 (2006) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5554th meeting, on 25 October 2006* (New York: United Nations, October 25, 2006), 1, <http://bnub.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=JCLW1WjRMvI%3D&tabid=2963&language=en-US> (accessed December 14, 2011).

and UN agency coordination.⁴⁹⁵ This vast mandate came with few resources from the Security Council to enable its fulfillment.

The Security Council did not ask BINUB to achieve these assumed determinants of peace themselves, but to *support, promote, and strengthen* the government's capacity to do so. Only in the area of donor coordination was BINUB actually mandated to achieve a particular outcome: "Ensuring effective coordination among the strategies and programmes of the various United Nations agencies, funds, and programmes in Burundi."⁴⁹⁶ There was no guidance given as to what it would mean to support, promote, or strengthen the government's capacity or how BINUB would measure its contribution. Instead, BINUB had to fill out a results-based budgeting matrix that listed "reconstruct rule of law," "create dialogue," etc., as its measurable results.⁴⁹⁷

The contradictory messages from BINUB's aims and the results it was supposed to achieve contributed to BINUB's reluctance to measure its outcomes. It was impossible for it to achieve the results that it was supposed to, and there was no clarity as to how it was supposed to measure or report on the catalytic results implied by its mandate. In the end, BINUB's leadership developed its own approach to pursuing its mandate and treated the accountability requirements from headquarters as bureaucratic boxes to be checked not pursued.

⁴⁹⁵ Specifically, the mandate gave BINUB the responsibility to strengthen national capacity to mitigate conflict, strengthen good governance, promote freedom of the press, consolidate the rule of law, support the implementation of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement, help to develop a plan for security sector reform, help demobilize and reintegrate former combatants, reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, promote and protect human rights, help establish transitional justice mechanisms, and increase coordination by the government and within the international community, particularly for the fulfillment of the Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan. Ibid., 2-4.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid., para. 2.

⁴⁹⁷ Key informant interview, BINUB staff person, Bujumbura, 2009.

5.5.3 A SUPPORTIVE APPROACH

In response to the government's wish for a more low-key UN mission, BINUB took a qualitatively different approach to engaging with the Burundian government from that of ONUB, much of the rest international community in Burundi, and DPKO. Partly in response to instructions from UN headquarters, and partly because of the personal approach of the new Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG), Youssef Mahmoud, BINUB tried to empower the government rather than impose the UN's agenda. In fact, BINUB played such a "supportive" role that many members of the international community and Burundian civil society questioned whether it actually did anything. BINUB largely refused to take credit for its own actions but put the government or other national partners in the driver's seat and in front of the camera. For many UN staff, this approach required adjustment, but the ERSG was adamant that this adjustment be made.⁴⁹⁸

5.5.4 THE DREAM OF INTEGRATION

BINUB was also an integrated mission, perhaps the truest integrated mission the UN had fielded up to that point. It was headed by a multi-hatted ERSG, not unlike the multi-hats worn by Carolyn McAskie and her deputies. However, unlike ONUB, all of these hats were worn by one person: Mahmoud. In addition, BINUB had three integrated units – Security Sector Reform and Small Arms, Justice and Human Rights, and Peace and Governance – staffed by employees from different UN entities.

Integration was held up by the UN as an organizational panacea – enabling it to respond simultaneously and coherently to post-conflict political, development,

⁴⁹⁸ Youssef Mahmoud, "Partnerships for Peacebuilding in Burundi: Some Lessons Learned" (Unpublished Paper, October 15, 2009).; Key informant interviews, BINUB staff, Bujumbura, 2009.

humanitarian, and security needs.⁴⁹⁹ It was seen as the structural solution for the UN's fragmented and often linear approach to post-conflict intervention.⁵⁰⁰ By putting all UN entities in a country under the leadership of the Representative of the Secretary General, it was thought that the UN could ensure that its resources were consolidated toward the most urgent political priorities and reduce waste and duplication. Building on the ground laid by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon established clear guidance that established integration as the guiding principle for all post-conflict situations where both the UNCT and a peace operation are present. In these cases, the "*main purpose* of integration is to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace."⁵⁰¹ BINUB was viewed by many in UN headquarters as the perfect manifestation of this new policy and received several visits from the UN Secretariat aiming to learn lessons from BINUB's integrated experience.⁵⁰²

BINUB's integrated structure served two political purposes. First, it helped to further the integration agenda that member states and the UN Secretariat were pushing. It even served as an unofficial test case for the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP).⁵⁰³ Second, it responded to the Burundian government's call for a smaller, less powerful peace operation that was focused on peacebuilding, not peacekeeping. The government believed that the integration of the UN into one structure would reduce the leverage that it had over the government as well as the number of actors that the

⁴⁹⁹ Susanna P. Campbell and Anja Therese Kaspersen, "The UN's Reforms: Confronting Integration Barriers," *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 4 (2008): 470–485.

⁵⁰⁰ Campbell, "(Dis)Integration, Incoherence and Complexity in UN Post-Conflict Interventions."

⁵⁰¹ Secretary General, *Decision of the Secretary-General - 25 June Meeting of the Policy Committee*, 1.

⁵⁰² Key informant interviews, BINUB staff, 2009.

⁵⁰³ Discussion during workshop on Consolidation, Drawdown, and Withdrawal organized by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York, March 14-16, 2007.

government had to manage.⁵⁰⁴ Paradoxically, the integration of the UN system under BINUB actually significantly increased the leverage and power of the UN as a whole compared to what it would have been if it remained unintegrated.

The integrated structure of BINUB and the presence of flexible peacebuilding funding from the PBF enabled the ERSG to wield a higher degree of political power both within the UN and with the international community and Burundian government.⁵⁰⁵ Using the political networks of key staff who had also worked for UNOB and ONUB, the ERSG was able to gather excellent intelligence about the evolving political situation and relay messages to key political actors.⁵⁰⁶ One international observer commented that Mr. Mahmoud was always better informed than other international actors and that BINUB was a powerful force with which to contend.⁵⁰⁷ That said, many other members of the international community were frustrated with BINUB's approach. It was so focused on supporting the government and not appearing to be a domineering Western presence that it failed to consult with the rest of the international community or coordinate with them, as it was mandated.

5.5.5 A TEST OF THE UN'S PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURE

BINUB also stood out from other peace operations because it was one of the first two countries selected for assistance from the PBC and its PBF. The PBC and PBF brought BINUB several things it would not have had otherwise. The PBC brought high-level attention from headquarters to a country with almost no geo-strategic importance. This was exactly what the PBC was designed to do – marshal attention and resources on less

⁵⁰⁴ Interview with BINUB staff (UO1), Bujumbura, 2009.

⁵⁰⁵ Key informant interviews, BINUB staff and members of the international community, Bujumbura, 2009.

⁵⁰⁶ Key informant interviews, BINUB staff, Bujumbura, 2009.

⁵⁰⁷ "Observer (O17), Bujumbura", June 16, 2009.

important post-conflict countries to ensure that they did not return to violence within the short term (i.e., approximately five years).⁵⁰⁸

To support the PBC, the PBF gave BINUB \$35 million in early 2007 to for BINUB and the Burundian government to implement 18 projects that targeted core peace consolidation priorities selected by a joint UN-Government Steering Committee. This money provided the mission with funds for peacebuilding programming that it would not have had otherwise. Normal peace operations, like ONUB, only advised the government on its peacebuilding programs or implemented its own peacebuilding programs through small quick impact projects, which often had little real impact. Or they supported UNDP or other UN organizations in implementing programs, such as organizing the 2005 elections.

The PBF funding gave BINUB the resources necessary to do broad peacebuilding programming. Because much of BINUB's mandate implicitly required some type of programming, the PBF actually gave BINUB the capacity to implement much of its mandate. BINUB eventually also received funding from other bilateral donors to engage in programmatic work, but the PBF allowed BINUB to hit the ground running.

The PBF funding came with two important criteria. The selected projects were supposed to be short-term – approximately one year – and catalytic (i.e., catalyzing funding or actions by others).⁵⁰⁹ They were also supposed to target core peace consolidation priorities. Although the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) provided almost no indication of how BINUB was supposed to operationalize these concepts, there

⁵⁰⁸ Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility," 69–70.

⁵⁰⁹ Susanna Campbell, *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*, Evaluation (Bujumbura, Burundi: BINUB, n.d.), <http://www.unpbf.org/burundi/burundi-progress.shtml> (accessed September 18, 2011).

were several projects that did fit these two criteria.⁵¹⁰ These projects, which are discussed further in the subsequent sections, offer important examples of how BINUB's unique structure, mandate, approach, and partnership with the government could enable a new type of programming and engagement by a UN peace operation, one that focused on endogenous peacebuilding processes rather than imposing an agenda from above.

BINUB's PBF support also enabled an unprecedented degree of joint programming, at least for a peace operation, between the government and the UN.⁵¹¹ Each of the eighteen PBF projects had a national director from the Burundian government and a director from the UN. The projects were staffed by UN and former government staff, and in many cases, the projects were located in government offices. The projects were selected by a joint UN-government group of experts and were overseen by the Joint Steering Committee, jointly chaired by the government and BINUB. Each sector was advised by an integrated monitoring group made up of key donors, partners, and civil society organizations. Although the complex implementation and oversight structure established for the PBF projects was neither seamless nor efficient, in the best cases it did create true joint ownership and joint implementation that produced some important peacebuilding results.⁵¹²

5.5.6 INTERACTION BETWEEN BINUB AND BURUNDI'S WAR-TO-PEACE TRANSITION

How did BINUB interact with Burundi's war-to-peace transition, and how did its new approach influence this interaction? As described above, the creation of BINUB was a significant and systematic response to a new trend in Burundi's war-to-peace transition: the validation of Burundi as a sovereign, democratic state. BINUB was created

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹¹ Campbell, *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*.

⁵¹² Ibid.

in response to the Burundian government's demand that the UN scale down its presence and take an approach that it deemed to be more respectful of the government's new legitimacy. Although BINUB was established over a year after the 2005 inauguration of Nkurunziza, the planning for BINUB had already begun in early 2006. The months of effort that went into creating a new type of peace operation that responded to the requests of the Burundian government as well as some of the specific circumstances in Burundi constituted a significant and systematic effort by the UN Security Council and DPKO to align with the new context created by the election of Nkurunziza in August 2005.

Once established, BINUB kept close tabs on the ongoing political context. ERSG Mahmoud capitalized upon the knowledge and networks of several key staff who had been with ONUB and, in the case of several staff, with UNOB.⁵¹³ This core team was well informed of the inner workings of Burundi's political scene, passed messages, and gave support behind the scenes. They refused to take credit for the actions of the government or even reveal their own actions to the broader international community. Instead, this core group of BINUB staff, which included the ERSG himself, engaged in backroom negotiations, discussions, and support – hoping that this would influence the actions of Burundi's government. In this way, BINUB aimed to support endogenous change that aligned with its mandate and goals.⁵¹⁴ Although the degree to which this approach worked was the subject of debate both within and outside of BINUB, it was clear to all that it was based on a thorough understanding of the context and a desire to achieve BINUB's mandate in this context.⁵¹⁵

⁵¹³ Key informant interviews, BINUB staff, Bujumbura, 2009.

⁵¹⁴ Mahmoud, "Partnerships for Peacebuilding in Burundi: Some Lessons Learned."

⁵¹⁵ Key informant interviews, BINUB staff, Bujumbura, 2009.

Even though Mahmoud's core team of advisors kept close tabs on Burundi's political situation and aimed to influence its trajectory, they did not have fully flexible resources with which to do so. Instead, they had \$35 million provided by the PBF for eighteen peacebuilding projects as well as two contributions from its emergency basket fund.⁵¹⁶ BINUB used this money to try and influence Burundi's evolving war-to-peace transition, both by designing projects targeted at potential stumbling blocks to this transition and by supplying the government's breadth of ministries with new cars, computers, and other goods in hopes of buying its favor and increasing the government's willingness to cooperate with BINUB. BINUB also requested and received two \$1 million grants from the PBF emergency fund. These rapidly disbursed funds were used to support the political directorate and pay for the demobilization of the 10,000 adults whom the FNL said were affiliated with them.

BINUB's use of the PBF funds was a continuation of the UN Secretariat's significant and systematic action to respond to new peacebuilding context created by the election of the CNDD-FDD to office in 2005. The UN sought to repair the continuing tension with the Burundian government by ensuring that the PBF money was allocated evenly across the ministries and that each ministry received "peace dividends" in the form of new cars, computers, and other office supplies.⁵¹⁷ The incentive structure of the PBF funds – which privileged quick spending of a pre-set amount of money – also encouraged BINUB to include a large number of expensive and quickly deliverable goods in the project budgets.

In spite of the political nature of the selection and design of many of the eighteen PBF projects, several of them sought to address issues that were considered by most to be

⁵¹⁶ Campbell, *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*.

⁵¹⁷ *Ibid.*

critical to the advancement of Burundi's war-to-peace transition.⁵¹⁸ Specifically, several projects sought to support the ongoing reform and integration of the rebel groups into the National Defense Forces (FDN), and one project sought to encourage democratic dialogue at all levels of society, including between the political parties. These projects were widely recognized as making BINUB's most important contribution to Burundi's war-to-peace transition.

In the area of security sector reform, BINUB implemented a set of complementary peacebuilding projects that aimed to support the continued integration and reform of the security forces, a critical factor during Burundi's transitional phase and an equally important factor in ensuring the maintenance of security and working toward respect for the rule of law in its post-transitional period. While BINUB's projects that focused on the Burundian police and national intelligence services were highly flawed and, in one case, did harm, its projects that supported the integration of the FDN were largely successful at meeting their aims and advancing the reform of the FDN.⁵¹⁹ With the PBF funding, BINUB helped the military to rehabilitate and enlarge overcrowded military cantonment sites to accommodate the increased size of the military. This removed the military from the population and improved the relationship between the military and civilians in several cases.⁵²⁰ This project led to a spin-off project that relocated families that had been living in the existing cantonment sites, addressing a critical stumbling block for the success of the project through the reallocation of resources to this spin-off project. BINUB also supported the development and dissemination of a training curriculum within the FDN that established common standards of behavior for both old and new members.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

BINUB also developed an innovative dialogue project that built on the approach originally developed by the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) (see Chapter 9 for further details). The Cadre de Dialogue project supported four different series of discussions that empowered Burundians to analyze the barriers to a successful war-to-peace transition and develop approaches to address them. While the actual plans developed through these discussions were too general and largely discarded, the dialogue process contributed to improving the climate between the political parties and breaking the deadlock in Parliament in 2007 and supporting the establishment of the widely accepted CENI in 2009. This project was well known throughout Burundi's political and international circles and was widely regarded as being BINUB's most important contribution to Burundi's ongoing peacebuilding process.

These projects were targeted at core peacebuilding priorities. They were altered and adapted during their implementation to ensure that they maintained their relevance to the changing context. They were jointly conceived, designed, implemented, and monitored by BINUB and the Burundian government. There was a high degree of ownership and buy-in from all sides. They also largely fulfilled their objectives of improving the relationship between the population and the military and helping to create a culture of dialogue, however temporary, among Burundi's political parties, its media, and civil society.⁵²¹ These projects were not without fault – they could have been much more cost-effective, and the community and civil society components of the dialogue efforts delivered few clear results.⁵²² Nonetheless, they benefitted from systematic actions by staff to align with the context and learn from their ongoing programming and made a clear contribution to Burundi's ongoing war-to-peace transition.

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² Ibid.

The two projects supported by the PBF emergency basket fund were even more flexible and potentially more relevant than the eighteen projects supported with the original \$35 million promised by the PBF. This was precisely the purpose of the PBF's emergency fund: to support urgent peacebuilding priorities. The basket fund did not require the same type of consultative process or detailed project design as the normal PBF funding required. With this funding, BINUB was able to provide badly needed funding for the newly created political directorate and for the demobilization of the 10,000 adult non-combatants associated with the FNL: a prerequisite for the full demobilization of the FNL and their participation in the 2010 elections. As is discussed in detail in the UNDP chapter, BINUB's support for the demobilization of the adults associated with the FNL was a significant and systematic response to another critical juncture in Burundi's war-to-peace transition: the demobilization of the FNL and their integration into the government and armed forces in 2009.

BINUB's peacebuilding projects that maintained alignment with Burundi's peacebuilding context benefitted from the unique structure and approach of BINUB. In these projects, the close collaboration between BINUB and the Burundian government officials created real "ownership" of the project aims and implementation process. The government officials and staff were invested in the project and worked hard to implement it in the short timeframe and maintain its relevance to the Burundian context. The normal PBF projects (i.e., not those funded by the emergency PBF fund) benefitted from unique oversight structures that were set up for the PBF projects – bringing together local and international civil society, international donors, and government officials to monitor the progress of these projects and suggest ways to maintain their relevance to the context and to the project aims. These projects were also implemented by units staffed by both UNDP and DPKO staff who had to navigate the procedures of both agencies. While this integration increased the administrative complexity of each project,

it also gave DPKO the capacity to implement projects, stepping beyond its normal advisory role.

In spite of the systematic actions by several of BINUB's PBF-funded projects to maintain their relevance with the evolving peacebuilding context, most of BINUB's PBF projects were highly bureaucratic and failed to alter either their aims or means to align with the changing context. BINUB's unique structure and approach helped the few more innovative peacebuilding projects discussed above to systematically align with Burundi's war-to-peace transition and for several of them to make a positive contribution to that transition. But the design of the project, the readiness of the context for its approach, the willingness of BINUB's leadership to engage in the project, and the skill and knowledge of the particular international and national staff involved in the project also influenced their contribution, as is discussed in more detail below. Most of BINUB's peacebuilding projects were deficient in one of these areas, and staff simply followed a standard bureaucratic approach of implementing the project as designed, focusing on spending the money allocated to them, not achieving the desired outcomes, which in many cases staff did not fully understand. After all, most of them were not involved in the conceptualization or design of the projects.

The anti-corruption project offers a good example of the majority of BINUB's peacebuilding projects. The first problem with the project was that its goal was largely unattainable in the Burundian context. It aimed to "rebuild trust between the state and the citizens by improving transparency and reinforcing mechanisms designed to fight corruption and related offences in the whole country."⁵²³ It aimed to do so by supporting a government anti-corruption brigade, conducting community-based awareness raising sessions, and strengthening the anti-corruption court. The project was implemented from

⁵²³ BINUB, "Appui au renforcement des mecanismes de lutte contre la corruption et les malversations diverses a travers tout le Pays" (United Nations, April 5, 2007), 7.

October 2007 to December 2009. During this period, Transparency International reported that corruption increased in Burundi.⁵²⁴

The anti-corruption project aimed to target an entrenched problem that was growing rapidly, but it aimed to do so without actually tackling the systemic issues. It encouraged community members to denounce corruption, without addressing the high levels of impunity in society. As a result, no matter how enthusiastically they denounced corruption, these denunciations would not lead to prosecution and could even lead to retribution against them. It gave resources to the anti-corruption court and the anti-corruption brigades without targeting the legal framework that prevented the court from prosecuting the most important cases or protecting the brigade's independence and security. While the number of cases identified by the brigade and tried by the court did increase over the period of the project, so did the instances of corruption.⁵²⁵

The anti-corruption project faced a large gap between its aims and outcomes, but did nothing to change its aims or its approach. Why? It lacked the investment of senior leadership in the project. The staff were not pushed to alter their approach, but saw their role as more bureaucratic. They thought that they were supposed to implement the project as designed and not alter it in any way.⁵²⁶ The project was also poorly designed, focusing on the surface-level changes mentioned above and not strategically targeting the causes of corruption or trying to curb their occurrence. The project was too politically sensitive, and neither the national or international players involved seemed to want to tackle the corruption problem. In fact, one national actor reported that they saw the project as a way of doing something on corruption, even if inadequate.⁵²⁷ They knew

⁵²⁴ Transparency International, "policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi."

⁵²⁵ Campbell, *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*.

⁵²⁶ Key informant interview, BINUB staff, Bujumbura, 2009.

⁵²⁷ Key informant interview (O20), Bujumbura, 2009.

that the political will to tackle the problem was lacking but thought that this project was better than nothing. It is debatable whether spending money on an inefficient and ineffective project is better than doing nothing at all.

In addition, there was no clear information about the relationship between aims and outcomes, although information would not have been difficult to find. There was no accountability for delivering outcomes. Project staff were only accountable for spending the designated amount of money on the predetermined activities, not for achieving specific outcomes. Furthermore, the staff implementing the project did not have the training or background to design or implement a more effective project.

In sum, BINUB took significant and systematic action to align with the change in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory marked by the critical peacebuilding events in August 2005 – the inauguration of the new Burundian government and their change in approach to the UN – and April 2009, the beginning of the integration of the FNL into the government and security forces which necessitated quick international support. In addition, several of its projects targeted core peacebuilding priorities and took systematic actions to retain their relevance to these priorities. The majority of BINUB's peacebuilding projects, however, were not as well staffed or conceived and failed to systematically act to maintain their relevance to Burundi's quickly changing context. Why is this, and what is the relationship between these outcomes and BINUB's unique structure and approach?

5.5.7 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BINUB'S FORM, FUNCTION, AND EFFECTIVENESS

How did BINUB's unique structure, funding sources, and approach influence its capacity to interact with and contribute to Burundi's war-to-peace transition? BINUB's integrated form, flexible peacebuilding funding from the PBF, and approach to the Burundian government were necessary but insufficient conditions for BINUB's successes.

As a corollary, they were insufficient to prevent BINUB's numerous unsuccessful peacebuilding projects. Other factors mattered as well: knowledge, accountability structures, the quality of the project design, investment of leadership, feedback from the wide range of stakeholders in each project, and the receptivity of Burundian institutions to solutions that BINUB proposed.

5.5.7.1 Integration: an uncertain route to effective peacebuilding

While the push for an integrated UN helped BINUB combine the different knowledge-laden routines and frames of DPKO, DPA, and UNDP and implement some good peacebuilding programming, it did not cause effective peacebuilding. For the most successful projects, the integrated structure helped to bring together the political and development capacities necessary to fulfill BINUB's mandate. It gave DPKO programmatic teeth and in several good cases created an unprecedented degree of national buy-in. But this was not across the board. The majority of BINUB's peacebuilding projects were poorly designed and/or poorly implemented. Even in the most successful cases discussed above, staff struggled to manage the organizational complexity created by the operation integration of several UN entities into joint teams.

The main problem was that the routines and procedures of the different UN entities were incompatible, creating a great degree of additional work and a steep learning curve for integrated teams. Several UN agencies argued that the focus on peace consolidation contradicted their mandates. UNICEF, for example, refused a request to focus its assistance primarily on the three provinces most affected by recent fighting because its mandate was to help the thousands of vulnerable children in all of Burundi's seventeen provinces, not just those in the three most conflict-affected provinces.⁵²⁸ Even though

⁵²⁸ Interview with UN staff member (O19), Bujumbura 2009.

BINUB was integrated at both the strategic and operational levels, staff remained accountable to their home agency, fund, or program and its incentive mechanisms, which often contradicted those that the ERSG was trying to encourage. The ERSG and his senior leadership team lacked both the time and the leverage to ensure that the entire integrated mission worked toward their priorities or took actions to ensure the relevance of their projects to these priorities and to the context.⁵²⁹

For the UN, the assumption behind integration was that it already had all of the necessary pieces to the puzzle but just needed to assemble them correctly to be able to do effective peacebuilding. To integrate was to assemble the various pieces of the UN under a common vision of the UN's peacebuilding work in Burundi. This common framework was the Strategic Framework for Peace Consolidation, which was developed for the PBC and reflected in all BINUB strategic documents. As is discussed in detail below, the BINUB and its component parts lacked the knowledge, systems, learning behavior, and accountability structure to systematically act to align or align with Burundi's evolving war-to-peace transition. While integration offered a helping hand to several well-designed, well-staffed projects, it did not address the significant barriers to the alignment of the UN's peacebuilding approach with the complex dynamics of Burundi's war-to-peace transition.

In sum, although integration is often held up by the UN as a necessary and sufficient condition for effectiveness of peace operations, this case study shows that is not true. While a more coherent UN system would certainly be beneficial for many, more effective peacebuilding by the UN requires much more fundamental changes in the knowledge, targets, accountability systems, and learning behaviors of all UN entities aiming to contribute to peacebuilding. Integration, like coordination, is a means to an

⁵²⁹ Campbell, *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*.

end, not an end in itself. But because of the complexity of the UN system and the lack of feedback from the intended beneficiaries of BINUB programming, integration and coordination often appeared to be the organizational target.

5.5.7.2 Knowledge-laden routines and organizational frames

The most important contribution of integration to BINUB's interaction with Burundi's war-to-peace transition was the knowledge that it combined and the new knowledge that this combination created. Because UN agencies are broken up into specialized bureaucratic silos with corresponding capacities and no one UN entity is responsible for peacebuilding, most UN peacebuilding efforts suffer from split capacities, where national, political, programmatic, and monitoring and evaluation knowledge are not only held by different individuals, but by different UN entities who respond to different, often incompatible governing and accountability structures and organizational cultures. At its best, the integrated units in BINUB helped to bridge the knowledge gap between those who were mandated to prevent the reemergence of violent conflict in Burundi (i.e., DPKO), those who had been working on the political dimensions of the Burundian peace process for over a decade (i.e., DPA), and those who had the operational capacity to implement programming (i.e., UNDP, UNHCR).

The most successful integrated teams – specifically the Cadre de Dialogue team and the team working with the Burundian Army – combined together a deep knowledge of Burundi's political context, a clear focus on Burundi's most urgent peacebuilding priorities, and the programmatic knowledge necessary to design and implement its peacebuilding project. These teams also worked very closely with their counterparts in the Burundian government, the projects' beneficiaries, and community and civil society organizations. Several projects were housed in Burundian government ministries. Staff were seconded from ministries for each project, and each project had both director within

the relevant ministry and one within the UN. Groups of Burundian stakeholders were established to give regular feedback on the project direction and suggest alterations to its design. These arrangements integrated “local knowledge” into the design, implementation, and monitoring of their projects. Burundians “owned” these projects, were invested in their success, and were an integral component of each project team.

This was a different type of partnership than Burundian actors were used to having with UN peace operations, which were known for dictating what the government should do and having little or no real interaction with Burundian communities or civil society. UNOB, ONUB, and much of the rest of BINUB were highly removed from Burundian society and “local knowledge.” The high walls of the UN compound, ringed with barbed wire and guarded by a cumbersome security apparatus, made the UN seem inaccessible to most Burundians. Most UN staff, in turn, were so focused on writing reports, coordinating their own system, and sometimes interfacing with high-level government or international officials that they had little time to build real knowledge of the Burundian society that they were supposed to be transforming.

The government-UN joint implementation arrangements mandated for the PBF projects and the creation of integrated UN units within BINUB combined to produce an unprecedented degree of collaboration within the UN and between the UN and the Burundian government. This collaboration was a necessary condition for the contribution of the BINUB’s most important peacebuilding projects. But for most of its other projects, these arrangements did not enable the projects to systematically act to align with the relevant context or to achieve their outcomes. In the case of the police projects, the collaboration was distant at best and there was little real will for reform in the newly created, undisciplined, and highly politicized Burundian National Police (BNP). In the case of the anti-corruption project, there was the will among neither the national counterparts nor the UN staff to tackle this seemingly insurmountable problem. Even

with the projects that seemed to pursue less difficult aims – such as the small business project – the collaborative setup neither delivered high degrees of national ownership nor corrected the highly faulty project design.

For BINUB’s peacebuilding projects, UN integration and the joint implementation of these projects with the Burundian government seems to have contributed to the achievement of their peacebuilding aims only when UN staff also had the relevant peacebuilding expertise, developed mechanisms to systematically monitor the intermediary project outcomes, and made significant efforts to include their government counterparts in the project implementation and decision making.⁵³⁰ Integration and partnership alone were insufficient for BINUB to achieve its peacebuilding aims. It mattered what the staff did with the new opportunities and challenges offered by integration of the UN system and closer partnerships with the Burundian government and to what degree they understood their peacebuilding project and its relationship to the context and felt that they should alter their project to better align with the context. Staff personality and prior experience therefore played an important role in the success or failure of BINUB’s peacebuilding projects.

The problem with BINUB’s dependence on prior staff competence in peacebuilding was that none of the UN agencies that were part of BINUB – DPA, UNDP, DPKO, UNHCR, and OHCHR – provided their staff in Burundi with any significant training in peacebuilding programming, design, or monitoring and evaluation. Neither did they provide staff with any orientation on Burundi’s war-to-peace trajectory thus far, understanding of Burundi’s history, or other training that would enable them to make informed decisions about peacebuilding. The PBF and PBC were similarly mute on the subject, instead requesting that BINUB write reports and provide briefings to educate the

⁵³⁰ Ibid.

PBF and PBC on the subject of peacebuilding and how it should be done in Burundi and elsewhere.⁵³¹ BINUB brought in external consultants to help design some of the peacebuilding projects, but even most of these “experts” lacked significant experience designing peacebuilding projects and did not stick around to help the staff charged with implementing their designs adapt them to the changing context.

The large gaps in knowledge are derived from the fact that no operational UN entity thinks of itself as a peacebuilding organization. Peacebuilding is something that is done by everyone and no one. Most UN agencies, funds, programs, and offices want to claim that they do peacebuilding because there is a lot of money in it and because they implement programming in post-conflict environments. The UN PBC and PBF are the only entities that have a peacebuilding organizational frame, but they rely on programming carried out by other UN entities or member states. They are not, themselves, operational in post-conflict countries. They depend on organizations such as UNDP, which has a predominantly development frame; DPKO, which has a predominantly peacekeeping frame; and UNHCR, which has a predominantly humanitarian frame, among others.

The DPKO component of BINUB was the only organization with a peacebuilding organizational frame because it was accountable to the peacebuilding mandate given by the Security Council. But this peacebuilding frame was not supported by DPKO headquarters. DPKO, in fact, does not even normally engage in programming, which meant that its Burundi staff had very little experience not only with peacebuilding programming, but with the design and implementation of any type of project.⁵³²

⁵³¹ Key informant interviews with BINUB staff, Bujumbura, 2009.

⁵³² Key informant interviews with BINUB staff, Bujumbura, 2009.

Headquarters provided no support and even held up the appointment of key monitoring and evaluation staff because they were not used to filling these types of positions.⁵³³

In sum, even though integration helped to combine the capacities and knowledge of several UN entities, it did not make up for the lack of peacebuilding knowledge within all of the integrated entities. Furthermore, the different organizational frames of UNDP, DPKO, DPA, OHCHR, and UNHCR meant that staff working for BINUB, while still being evaluated under the frames of their home agency, faced few organizational incentives to work toward BINUB's peacebuilding aims. They would be evaluated on the degree to which they complied with their host organization's frames and priorities, not those of BINUB, which would soon be disbanded.⁵³⁴ Several staff commented that BINUB's integration and the resulting collaboration between staff from different UN agencies, funds, programs, departments, and offices was highly tenuous.⁵³⁵ It was like a rubber band stretched too thin, tearing at the edges, waiting to pop.⁵³⁶

5.5.7.3 Accountability routines

Even though the various UN organizations in Burundi were integrated to an unprecedented degree under BINUB, the accountability routines and incentive mechanisms remained separate. The various UN organizations in Burundi – UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO, FAO, WFP, UNFPA, UNIFEM, UNESCO, UNAIDS, OHCHR, OCHA, ILO, UN-Habitat – were integrated at the strategic level under the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding and the corresponding UN Development Assistance

⁵³³ Key informant interviews with BINUB staff, Bujumbura, 2009.

⁵³⁴ Key informant interviews with BINUB staff, Bujumbura, 2009.

⁵³⁵ Key informant interviews with BINUB staff, Bujumbura, 2009.

⁵³⁶ Interview, BINUB staff member (UO1), Bujumbura 2009.

Framework (UNDAF).⁵³⁷ This meant that all UN entities in Burundi were supposed to do their part to achieve these strategic plans, sometimes in collaboration with other UN entities and sometimes alone. The three integrated sections (Security Sector Reform and Small Arms, Justice and Human Rights, and Peace and Governance) were integrated at the operational level. Members of each section – from DPKO, DPA, UNDP, and OHCHR – were housed in the same office and worked to implement the same operational plans, but held contracts with their parent organization. As a result, their organizational rewards were not based on how they complied with the goals of BINUB, but with the targets of their own UN entity, which were often incompatible.

The clearest institutional divergence was between DPKO and UNDP, which had the closest partnership in BINUB's integrated structure. UNDP was also responsible for managing and disbursing the PBF funds and procuring the goods needed for BINUB's peacebuilding projects. ERSG Mahmoud simultaneously served as the Resident Representative, or boss, of UNDP and the Secretary-General's representative in Burundi, or head of the DPKO-managed peace operation. Between 2007 and 2009, UNDP's programming strategy and plan was subsumed completely under BINUB, with no clear program or plan existing for UNDP alone. In spite of this high degree of integration, DPKO and UNDP maintained their distinct and separate accountability routines. Both DPKO and UNDP were highly upwardly accountable to their headquarters at the same time as they were horizontally accountable to the Burundian government, who was their main partner and with whom they needed to maintain good relations to ensure that they would not be kicked out of the country, as ONUB had been.

⁵³⁷ BINUB, *Strategie Integree d'Appui des Nations Unies a la Consolidation de la Paix au Burundi - 2007-2008* (Bujumbura: United Nations, 2006); UN Peacebuilding Commission, *Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi* (New York: United Nations, July 30, 2007).

DPKO was accountable to its headquarters for fulfilling the Security Council's mandate, although it did not measure the degree to which it fulfilled this mandate. As a result, BINUB's DPKO staff were evaluated more generally on the perception that headquarters had of their individual effectiveness and the overall effectiveness of BINUB.⁵³⁸ This perception was based on some anecdotal evidence, but was certainly not based on an assessment of the overall contribution of a peace operation to the war-to-peace transition in Burundi, the individual contribution of staff members, or the degree of difficulty of the mandate. In the final analysis, BINUB was considered by many at UN headquarters to have been largely unsuccessful because its ERSG was kicked out and the government requested that the UN's presence, once again, be scaled back.⁵³⁹

DPKO had two overall, often contradictory, organizational targets. First, it wanted to stay in the country as long as the Security Council wanted it to, which required that it remain on the government's good side. Second, it wanted to prevent violent conflict from erupting again in Burundi, which would require that DPKO staff challenge the government if it was acting in a way that was likely to increase the risk of violent conflict. Neither of these targets was measured with real data, and DPKO constantly reported on the evolving Burundian context and the activities that it implemented, although not their outcomes.

UNDP, on the other hand, was overwhelmingly focused on spending the money that it was allocated within the designated time period. In fact, it did not actually monitor the outcomes of any of the projects with which it was charged, but had a color-coded sheet that it held up at each weekly staff meeting showing the disbursement rates of all of the peacebuilding projects.⁵⁴⁰ It aimed to fulfill headquarter demands for accountability

⁵³⁸ Key informant interview, UN Secretariat staff member (O21), New York, 2010.

⁵³⁹ Key informant interview, UN Secretariat staff member (O21), New York, 2010.

⁵⁴⁰ Participant Observation, Bujumbura, 2009.

for results by bringing in a team of evaluators to assess the overall contribution of UNDP to five key outcomes between 2005 and 2009. It gave the evaluators two weeks to do this and provided no monitoring data or other data that would aid the evaluators in making their assessment. Needless to say, the resulting evaluation reports provided little indication of exactly how UNDP may or may not have contributed to peace consolidation in Burundi, which was supposed to have been its overarching framework during this period. It tried to discredit criticism from evaluators and continuously claimed contributions to peace and development in Burundi that were not supported by evidence.⁵⁴¹

UNDP's organizational targets focused on disbursing money, getting more money from donors, maintaining a good relationship with the Burundian government so that it could continue to operate in the country, and checking off boxes indicating that it had done evaluations, which were subsequently shelved. These targets did not bode well for effective peacebuilding, particularly since the UNDP Burundi office had long had a poor reputation within UNDP in general, lacking both innovative staff and leadership willing to take risks.⁵⁴²

Within BINUB, the combination of these targets meant that staff were rewarded for spending money and contributing to the aspects of BINUB's mandate that the ERSG thought were the most important. Staff in the integrated sections had to attend meetings organized by UNDP that assessed the degree to which they had spent their allocated funds, high-level meetings held by the ERSG that discussed the project's overall approach and their contribution to Burundi's evolving war-to-peace transition that rarely got into the details, and meetings held by the joint UN-Government Steering Committee

⁵⁴¹ Participant Observation, Bujumbura, 2009.

⁵⁴² Key informant interviews with UN staff members, UN Headquarters, New York and Geneva, 2010.

for the PBF projects that reviewed some of the project details and requested some evidence of their contribution, although little was actually provided. These three meetings often sent contradictory messages to staff and offered practically no accountability for outcomes or help in refocusing ongoing projects on Burundi's changing context. The BINUB projects that seem to have made the most important contribution to Burundi's war-to-peace transition took monitoring into their own hands: creating groups of stakeholders who gave regular feedback and involving civil society and communities in the process.⁵⁴³

For the UN organizations in Burundi that did not implement joint projects with BINUB, their integration under one overall peace consolidation framework had no real impact on how they did their programming. They went about their programming in the way that they always had, focusing on their organizational frames and objectives and not on those of DPKO, BINUB, or the UN Security Council.

In spite of the lack of organizational incentives to do effective peacebuilding programming, several UN staff pursued and implemented projects that made a contribution to Burundi's evolving war-to-peace transition and even had the foresight to target critical junctures in this transition. Why?

The UN's incentive mechanisms do not easily punish poor performance by individuals or organizations. Many, possibly most, staff sit in their positions, taking few risks and delivering few interesting results, but carrying out the necessary daily tasks. The formal incentive system does little to punish or reward staff for their work, as long as it meets the very minimum requirements. One gets ahead in the UN by forming relationships with people in power and forming mini mafia, with people hiring their friends and recommending them to others. Reputation matters, but it is not based on

⁵⁴³ Campbell, *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*.

clear evidence of one's contribution to the organization's aims. Rather, it is based on the perception of peers as to one's own strengths and weaknesses and the willingness of one's bosses to provide recommendation for other positions. As a result, most UN staff spend a lot of their energy searching for new posts, applying for new posts, and networking in hopes of being chosen for a new post. They make their own way through the system by building a network in the system, learning how the system works, and learning how to play by its rules.⁵⁴⁴

Perhaps many of the UN's successes are due to the interesting nature of its work and people's desire to make an impact, even if the organization neither encourages nor rewards this impact. After all, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are interesting, complex endeavors that can deliver a lot of personal satisfaction. Unfortunately, few UN staff actually engage in peacebuilding work, instead walled inside their compounds producing reports and attending meetings that make the bureaucracy function, with significant implications for the knowledge and understanding that the bureaucracy has about the contexts it aims to influence.

5.5.7.4 Learning behavior

Despite the countless meetings and high levels of consultation between the ERSG and his core team, BINUB was characterized primarily by defensive and invalid learning behavior. The large majority of BINUB's projects lacked any information about their contribution to their peacebuilding aims, and staff had little or no training in monitoring and evaluation in general, much less more complex monitoring of intermediary peacebuilding outcomes. It took BINUB two years to find staff for its Joint Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Unit, and even when it did find staff, they were mostly junior and

⁵⁴⁴ Key informant interviews with UN staff members, Bujumbura, 2009; Participant Observation, Bujumbura and Nairobi, 2000-2002.

had no experience with M&E for peacebuilding or conflict-sensitive programming.⁵⁴⁵ As a result, for the vast majority of its work, BINUB lacked systematic valid data about outcomes preventing it from even attempting to learn from its successes and failures. Projects monitored the goods that they bought, the meetings and trainings that they organized, and the money that they spent. Most of BINUB's projects assumed that these outputs would lead to their desired outcomes and impact, but did not actually investigate whether this was the case.

In spite of the absence of systematic monitoring of project outcomes or impact, several of BINUB's peacebuilding projects developed innovative mechanisms that gave them feedback on key stakeholders' perceptions of the project and its contribution to Burundi's war-to-peace transition. The Cadre de Dialogue project created a monitoring group made up of a representative group of Burundians who evaluated each dialogue session, gave feedback to the program team, and recommended alterations to the agenda. It also had an overall approach that mandated that the Burundian participants determine the content and direction of the dialogue sessions, enabling them to largely own the process. The project team, in turn, was very inclusive of all perspectives and regularly discussed and evaluated the project, combining their various political, conflict resolution, development, and administrative experience to form a whole that was greater than the sum of the parts.⁵⁴⁶

Although the Cadre de Dialogue stuck to the main components of its project design, implementing the requisite number of meetings with the predetermined groups, it left the exact focus, form, and participants in each session undetermined, allowing this to be developed and adjusted throughout the implementation process. This flexibility in its project design allowed it to incorporate feedback from each dialogue session and alter its

⁵⁴⁵ Key informant interviews, UN staff members, Bujumbura, 2009.

⁵⁴⁶ Key informant interviews, UN staff members (UO2), Bujumbura, 2009.

approach. If the project had also been allowed to drop some of the dialogue sessions with civil society and community members that proved to be less productive and reallocated resources to more important dialogue sessions, then it would have been much more cost-effective.⁵⁴⁷ In spite of the Cadre de Dialogue's open and non-defensive learning behavior and its commitment to taking systematic action to align with Burundi's changing context, its action was bounded by the overall framework of its project design, the activities that it had committed to organizing, and the money that it had committed to spending. It was still subject to the overall accountability routines of DPKO and UNDP.

The peacebuilding projects that focused on the Burundian military did not develop the type of innovative mechanisms that the Cadre de Dialogue did, but monitoring was integrated into the conception of the project. The projects were implemented by and for the army. They wanted them to work well and complained when they did not. Of course, these projects suffered some problems – unreliable contractors, lack of consideration for military widows living in the cantonment sites, and poor supplies – but the staff implementing these projects recognized these problems and acted to correct them. They were open about the problems when asked about them and open about their capacity or incapacity to address them. They cared about the outcomes because the intention was to improve their own institution. They would have to live with the results of these projects – impacting the reputation of the staff and their position within the army.

In sum, although formal monitoring and evaluation tools might have helped BINUB's projects to improve their learning behavior, they are not the only way that an organization can gather data about its outcomes. Mechanisms that provide feedback from a representative group of stakeholders, combined with a willingness of the project

⁵⁴⁷ Campbell, *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*.

team to systematically and openly process this information and real ownership of the project by Burundian institutions, were sufficient conditions for the project to take actions on this information to improve its alignment with the institutional context.

The majority of BINUB's peacebuilding projects lacked such monitoring mechanisms, a high degree of team collaboration, or a willingness to openly process information about outcomes. In addition to the UN's own resistance to criticism and introspection, the high degree of collaboration between BINUB and the Burundian government contributed to this unwillingness to openly and honestly examine the contribution that it was making to Burundi's evolving war-to-peace transition. The Burundian government was allergic to critique, and BINUB was adamant that it should be perceived as supporting the government, not imposing anything on it. As an illustration, BINUB sought to couch the results of a 2009 external evaluation of BINUB's peacebuilding projects commissioned by the PBF in soft language that would be palatable to its government counterparts.⁵⁴⁸ They felt that any overt criticism would create more tension in an already fraught relationship.

BINUB also believed that, understandably, evaluations of their peacebuilding projects would not take into account their own institutional weaknesses and the degree of difficulty of their peacebuilding aims because of the uncooperative approach of the Burundian government. They knew that they lacked peacebuilding knowledge and that UNDP's systems were not appropriate for the high procurement demands of the PBF projects. They also knew that their government counterparts had their own significant capacity weaknesses in addition to their distrust of the UN in general. All of these factors made BINUB's work more difficult and they feared that any evaluation of impact would fail to take these constraints into account, unfairly criticizing BINUB and UNDP staff for

⁵⁴⁸ Participant Observation, Bujumbura, 2009.

many things that were beyond their control. This made BINUB staff reluctant to gather information about their projects, be introspective about what was working and what was not working, or openly report successes and failures.

BINUB's concerns raise an overall problem with gathering data about peacebuilding outcomes: The aims are often beyond what one organization can influence alone, and they often fail to gather baseline data that would establish the degree of difficulty of the peacebuilding activity and enable measurement of their relative contribution. As a result, even though formal monitoring and evaluation may not be necessary for reflective learning, when done right it can certainly contribute to a more realistic assessment of what can and cannot be achieved in a particular context, encouraging organizations to be open about their constraints and their contributions. In the absence of real data and monitoring mechanisms, success and failure become the equivalent to myth and rumor. This in turn prevents the organization from improving its knowledge of effective and ineffective peacebuilding practices and fails to provide any evidence that might help the organization to alter its overall organizational frame to be more favorable to peacebuilding. BINUB's predominant accountability routines that prioritize reporting on political events and organization outputs to headquarters over any real discussion or engagement with Burundians involved in or influenced by the BINUB's activities perpetuate this pattern. In large part, BINUB lacked sufficient knowledge or understanding of its relationship with Burundi's war-to-peace transition to be able to even begin thinking about systematically altering its relationship or better aligning with the context.

5.5.7.5 Flexible peacebuilding funding

To what degree did the peacebuilding resources allocated to BINUB influence its capacity to take significant and systematic action in response to the critical junctures in

Burundi's war-to-peace transition in 2005 and 2009? How did they influence the capacity of each of BINUB's peacebuilding projects to take systematic action to improve their alignment with Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory?

The allocation of \$35 million by the PBF to BINUB for peacebuilding projects made a very important impact on BINUB's authority and capacity to implement its Security Council mandate. Although the Security Council gave BINUB a broad peacebuilding mandate, it did not provide any funds to implement peacebuilding programs. It would have to rely on voluntary contributions from member states for these types of activities, which were not considered to be normal peacekeeping activities that could be funded by member states' assessed contributions to the UN. The PBF contribution came at a time when there were still few other resources for peacebuilding in Burundi. Without this money, it is unlikely that BINUB would have been able to implement peacebuilding programs in most areas of its mandate. With the money, BINUB became operational. The PBF funds also gave the ERSG leverage over the rest of the UN entities in Burundi that he would not otherwise have had. Even though he was given the responsibility over all UN entities in Burundi, he could only influence what these organizations did by providing them with money. The PBF funding enabled several parts of the UN system to work together toward peace consolidation in Burundi. In this way, it made BINUB's integration much stronger than it likely would have been.

The PBF funding was also flexible enough to allow BINUB to develop several innovative peacebuilding projects – most notably the Cadre de Dialogue, projects with the Burundian Armed Forces, and even the project with the National Intelligence Service. This allowed BINUB to go beyond standard UN programming to incorporate new approaches and techniques and take on riskier institutional reform processes.

While the initial PBF funding allowed the development of innovative projects, once the project implementation began, most of the innovation was lost. Then the project

became the territory of the implementing UN bureaucracies and was subject to their strengths and weaknesses discussed above. In other words, the peacebuilding funds altered the design of projects but did not necessarily alter the way that they were implemented. Any alterations in the way that projects were implemented were due to the unique UN-government cooperation that accompanied the PBF funding, the unique integrated structure of the UN, and the individual efforts of BINUB's leadership and staff. Flexible peacebuilding funding is therefore likely to influence the degree to which DPKO and/or UNDP can initiate new activities in response to a critical juncture in a war-to-peace transition, but unlikely to enable these organizations to systematically act to align their activities with the changing context.

BINUB also received two emergency grants from the PBF. Unlike the initial \$35 million, these grants were delivered within weeks and did not require an extensive planning or proposal process. They were quick and focused. They enabled BINUB to respond to the critical juncture in Burundi's war-to-peace transition created by the integration of the FNL into the military and government in April 2009. BINUB and UNDP provided a cash grant to adults associated with the FNL who were not otherwise eligible for assistance (see Chapter 6). These emergency funds therefore enabled a quick response but did not lead to a sustainable outcome. They funded projects that lacked national buy-in or ownership and were not concerned with the medium to longer-term impact of their efforts. They were concerned with providing a one-time payment to the FNL affiliates, without concern for how they used the money or whether they were reintegrated into society. There was no follow-up, just a quick response. As a result, the availability of quickly disbursed and flexible peacebuilding funds is not the panacea for effective peacebuilding programming. It can help an organization react, but it cannot ensure that programming is well designed or sustainable. In fact, it may discourage the latter.

5.5.7.6 Leadership

How did BINUB's leadership, and specifically ERSG Mahmoud, influence its actions to align in response to the critical junctures in Burundi's peace process in 2005 and 2009? How did its leadership influence the degree to which its peacebuilding projects took systematic actions to align with the changing context?

Mahmoud's constant focus on the negotiations with the FNL and his initiative to ask the PBF for emergency funding were necessary conditions for BINUB's contribution to the successful, if temporary, transformation of the FNL from a rebel group into a political party in 2009. Mahmoud was instrumental in determining BINUB's new approach to Burundi's government, which aimed to support rather than impose change, and in maintaining its focus on peace consolidation. He surrounded himself with a core team of highly skilled political analysts who kept him informed about the ongoing negotiations with the FNL and the evolving political situation. His focus on the peace talks with the FNL set the stage for BINUB's response to the integration of the FNL into the government and security forces in April 2009. BINUB's use of the PBF funds to demobilize – or pay off – the FNL's list of associated adults helped remove an important roadblock to the FNL's demobilization and participation in the 2010 elections.

Mahmoud did not play a part in the UN Secretariat's response to the change in climate that followed the election of Nkurunziza in 2005. The planning and design of BINUB was carried out by other UN staff, and not the ERSG who only arrived in Burundi in late 2006. The ERSG was instrumental in creating BINUB's institutional culture once it was established. He required his staff to change the way they related to the Burundian government, which both he and the government had found disrespectful. BINUB's new approach would be to facilitate action by the government and refuse to take credit for their actions. As a result, many observers were unclear about what exactly BINUB did and what the impact was of all of the resources being dumped into it.

Mahmoud's leadership influenced the capacity of one project in particular – the Cadre de Dialogue project – to systematically act to align with Burundi's evolving context. His leadership had little impact on the degree to which BINUB's other projects acted to align or aligned with the context. Mahmoud dedicated a great degree of energy to the design and implementation of the Cadre de Dialogue project, specifically by talking to high-level political figures, showing his commitment to the overall process, and helping unblock barriers within the UN bureaucracy. His focus on the project certainly helped to raise its profile within BINUB and ensure that it was not undermined by petty competition and bureaucratic hurdles.

The ERSG had very little influence on the implementation of BINUB's other peacebuilding projects. He focused on BINUB's overall strategy but did not get into the details of how the other projects were implemented. He intervened to save the local business project after it received a bad evaluation, but was relatively hands-off with the other projects. He turned over the chairmanship of the Joint Steering Committee for the PBF projects to his deputies and spent his own time focusing on Burundi's ongoing negotiations with the FNL and high-level interactions with government, shaping the overall strategy of BINUB, reporting regularly to UN headquarters, and managing BINUB's complex organizational structure. It was not also possible for one person to supervise all of BINUB's peacebuilding projects or ensure that they maintained their alignment with Burundi's evolving context. The people to whom he dedicated this task were not as well informed about Burundi's political situation, nor did they have a detailed understanding of peacebuilding programming. They also lacked the authority necessary to move bureaucratic barriers or influence change in other UN entities that were part of BINUB's integrated structure, specifically UNDP. Furthermore, BINUB was stuck with the staff that it had, and neither Mahmoud nor his deputies could do much to

change this. The skill and training of staff played a big role in the success of BINUB's programming, and its leaders could do little to influence either.

In sum, BINUB's leadership was instrumental in determining whether it took significant and systematic action in response to critical junctures in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory, but it was largely ineffective at influencing the alignment of the majority of BINUB's projects with the changing context.

5.5.7.7 Conclusion Period V: What matters for actions to align and alignment?

This case study of BINUB during Phases IV and V reveals some interesting trends in the causes of actions to align and the relationship between actions to align and alignment. It shows that BINUB's overall peacebuilding organizational frame, availability of flexible peacebuilding resources, and entrepreneurial leadership that was committed to peacebuilding had an important influence on the UN Secretariat and BINUB's ability to take systematic and significant action in response to two critical junctures in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory. It also shows that these factors were insufficient to ensure that BINUB's projects systematically acted to align with the changing context. Instead, even BINUB's projects that were initially well aligned with the context largely began to lose their relevance over time. The factors that influenced the direction of these projects were more structural in nature: accountability routines and the corresponding bureaucratic patterns, practices of data collection and learning behavior, and the knowledge and training of BINUB's staff. This shows that while individual leadership, new funding mechanisms, and an overarching organizational analysis and strategy can enable the organization to take important peacebuilding actions, these factors are insufficient to alter structure and day-to-day functioning, which ultimately determine an organization's capacity to systematically respond to changes in the context.

What about the relationship between actions to align and the actual achievement of the desired aims, or alignment? When the UN Secretariat took systematic and significant actions to align in response to the change of climate sparked by the 2005 elections, they altered both their aim and their means. This significant and systematic action took the form of a series of negotiations with the Burundian government, among UN agencies, and among members of the Security Council. These negotiations led to compromise on all sides: in terms of the aim of the UN mission, its structure, and its approach to peacebuilding. When BINUB acted in response to the integration of the FNL into the army and government in April 2009, it built on the back of significant and systematic action that the ERSG had been taking to push forward the negotiations with the FNL. This action helped him to recognize the opportunity and need presented by the FNL's request to demobilize non-combatant adults who had been associated with the rebel movement. He then mobilized the UN's resources to respond. If the organization had not already been focused on the negotiations with the FNL, it is unlikely that they would have recognized the opportunity or reacted so quickly or effectively. These instances show an important causal relationship between systematic and significant actions to align and alignment.

The causal relationship between systematic actions to align and alignment was not as clear-cut for BINUB's peacebuilding projects. When the same overall trend continued in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory, systematic actions to align did lead to some degree of alignment. When a team continually worked to improve its capacity to achieve its aims in a changing context, it achieved these aims to some degree. They altered their project aims, which were vague and overly ambitious in almost all cases, and/or their project design to make a significant contribution to the realization of its aims. In several cases where the project was clearly not delivering the intended results, such as the small

business project, the project team took systematic actions to align at the beginning and then essentially gave up once they realized that alignment would not happen.

When the project bridged a big critical juncture in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory, significant actions to align were not necessarily enough to ensure alignment. For example, the Cadre de Dialogue project led to the establishment of a permanent Forum for Political Parties that was run by the political parties themselves with the support from the UN and NGOs, such as the BLTP (see Chapter 9). The results of the 2010 elections significantly altered the direction of Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. They reduced opportunities for collaboration and discussion between the political parties, even as the need for dialogue grew. BINUB continued to systematically act to convene the Forum for Political Parties, but eventually they gave up as the political space for this forum had closed. This example illustrates that significant action to align may not lead to alignment when it crosses a critical juncture in the peacebuilding process that launches a markedly new direction. To realign with the context, the organization would have to revisit and redesign its overall strategy and programming approach.

5.6 Period VI: A Disappointing Turn of Events

The 2010 elections in Burundi resulted in the creation of a one-party state and the emergence of a new rebel movement by 2011. Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory had taken a sour turn, and the international community largely sat back and watched. The UN took no systematic or significant actions to pursue its peacebuilding aims; instead, it became a much weaker and more timid organization, trying even harder to maintain its good standing with an increasingly resistant government.

In January 2010, the Burundian government requested that BINUB's ERSG, Youssef Mahmoud, leave the country on the grounds that he was biased toward the CENI and against the government. With Mahmoud's departure, BINUB no longer had a leader for

the relationships and political approach necessary to dialogue with the government. He was replaced in April 2010 by Charles Petrie, a highly revered UN civil servant who had worked in multiple conflict zones and with many different UN entities.

As the elections unfolded, the opposition withdrew, and it became clear that Burundi was becoming a one-party state, BINUB was largely silent. It helped organize the elections – quickly cleaning up a ballot procurement and distribution process that UNDP had botched – but failed to intervene or attempt to negotiate a settlement between the CNDD-FDD and the opposition parties. BINUB endorsed the elections as free and fair and emphasized that the situation was now up to Burundians to resolve. After almost two decades of closely accompanying Burundi’s peacebuilding process, the UN Secretariat abandoned its post. While BINUB still had a clear physical presence in Burundi, it no longer dedicated much energy to try to influence Burundi’s war-to-peace trajectory. Like much of the rest of the international community, it sat back and watched the events unfold.

BINUB’s cadre of people who were knowledgeable about Burundi and had worked on its peace process fled, hoping to find other posts before the mission closed. In fact, at a staff meeting in July 2010, they were told to go looking for other posts.⁵⁴⁹ Just as Burundi’s war-to-peace transition was taking a decidedly negative turn, the UN Secretariat took the role of observer of Burundi’s peace process, rather than that of an integral actor in that process as it had in the past. It declared the fact that violence had not yet erupted to be a testament to the success of Burundi’s peace process, without mentioning its potential role in preventing the escalation of violence. “Despite the deep divide among political actors over the elections and the fact that a single party will

⁵⁴⁹ Key informant interviews (O22), 2009.

dominate the political landscape for the next five years, it is remarkable that neither of those factors has led to the return of large-scale violence, as has been widely feared.”⁵⁵⁰

The UN’s PBC, which was established to prevent post-conflict countries from sliding back into war, was equally unresponsive to events in Burundi. The Swiss chaired the PBC configuration on Burundi and were reluctant to make waves at UN headquarters or in Bujumbura.⁵⁵¹ After all, the capacity of the PBC in preventing the escalation of conflict was still relatively untested. The PBC neither intervened to try to stop the opposition from withdrawing from the elections nor attempted to broker negotiations between the CNDD-FDD and the opposition parties. Instead, the Swiss focused on economic development, seeing their role as continuing to help mobilize resources for Burundi for the implementation of its poverty reduction strategy. The head of the Burundi configuration, Amb. Segar, explained this decision to the Security Council.

Indeed, the integration into society of groups affected by conflict enables them to live in dignity and also minimizes the risk of former combatants taking up arms once again and returning to violence because of a lack of alternatives. This is particularly true in the case of young people, among whom the unemployment rate remains very high. Work would not only give them a sense of purpose in life but also the feeling of being an integral part of society. In that respect, socio-economic integration is a key pillar of peacebuilding.⁵⁵²

The PBF followed the Swiss lead, contributing \$9.2 million to “sustainable socio-economic reintegration of marginalized populations in three provinces bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” or those most affected by the war.⁵⁵³ In spite of the

⁵⁵⁰ UN News Centre, “Burundi outlook good ‘in many regards’ as it turns to economic development – UN,” *UN News Service*, December 9, 2010, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37005&Cr=burundi&Cr1=&Kw1=petrie&Kw2=&Kw3> (accessed February 2, 2012).

⁵⁵¹ Key informant interviews (O23), 2009.

⁵⁵² UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi (S/2011/751)*, United Nations Security Council Meeting (New York, NY: United Nations, n.d.), <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Burundi%20SPV%206677.pdf> (accessed February 1, 2012).

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*

good intentions, the findings from this dissertation combined with the UN's track record in Burundi indicate that if these projects are not implemented by skilled staff with a predominant focus on peacebuilding, not simply on development, they will be unlikely to positively influence Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory.

Even though the political and security situation in Burundi continued to deteriorate, at the beginning of 2011 the UN peace operation presence was again downgraded to a small political mission entitled the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB). BNUB was mandated by the Security Council to strengthen judicial independence, promote inclusive political dialogue, support the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, promote and protect human rights, ensure that all economic strategies in Burundi have a focus on peacebuilding and equitable growth, and support Burundi's chairmanship of the East African community.⁵⁵⁴ Unlike BINUB, BNUB was not programmatically integrated with UNDP.

Although the Security Council gave BNUB the mandate to support political dialogue and protect human rights, it had little capacity to do so or political will to pressure the Burundian government. Even though its new ERSG, Karin Landgren, was clearly a "smart lady" with a lot of experience with the UN and peacebuilding, she was not an entrepreneurial leader.⁵⁵⁵ Like her predecessor, Charles Petrie, it seems that she was given a clear message by UN headquarters not to rock the boat and risk having the head of a UN mission, yet again, kicked out of Burundi.⁵⁵⁶

The reticence to put too much overt pressure on the Burundian government was also present in the Security Council, which refused to include clear language calling for

⁵⁵⁴ UN Security Council, *UN Security Council Resolution 1959*, Resolution (New York: United Nations Security Council, December 16, 2010), <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/697/74/PDF/N1069774.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed February 1, 2012).

⁵⁵⁵ Key informant interview (O16), 2011.

⁵⁵⁶ Key informant interview (O16), 2011.

accountability for extrajudicial killings in the country.⁵⁵⁷ In the end, they agreed on more moderate language that called on the Burundian authorities to end extrajudicial killings and ensure prosecution of those responsible.⁵⁵⁸ The resolutions on Burundi are replete with statements by the Security Council that “suggest,” “encourage,” or “call upon” the Burundian government to take certain actions.⁵⁵⁹ They reflect the Security Council’s “strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and unity of Burundi,” which has prevented the imposition of any actions on the country or the enforcement of anything imposed.⁵⁶⁰

The Burundian government continued to use the UN’s deference to its sovereign authority to its advantage. It made slight improvements to satisfy the UN and other international donors while simultaneously governing as it wanted to govern, including by attacking and killing those thought to be loyal to the opposition and its emerging rebel movement. The Burundian government had a high degree of agency over its own actions and was far from being imposed upon by the UN or other international actor. The government was able to use the threat of expulsion of the UN as a way to bend it to its will. The Security Council felt that it had to have a presence in Burundi in case violence were to break out, even though it would have no capacity to prevent or respond to this violence. It seems it was better to be there and be ineffective than not be there at all.

Why were BINUB and BNUB unable to take significant and systematic action to achieve its peacebuilding aims in Burundi once the direction of Burundi’s 2010 elections became clear? It seems almost everything had changed, both within BINUB and in their

⁵⁵⁷ Security Council Report, “Adoption of Burundi Resolution,” *What’s in Blue*, December 19, 2011, <http://whatsinblue.org/2011/12/adoption-of-burundi-resolution.php> (accessed February 2, 2012).

⁵⁵⁸ UN Security Council, *UN Security Council Resolution 2027*, Resolution (New York: United Nations Security Council, December 20, 2011), <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/645/24/PDF/N1164524.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed February 1, 2012).

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

assumptions about the context. BINUB's leadership had changed, its most knowledgeable staff had left, the PBF funds were drying up, and the UN Secretariat had decided that Burundi was now largely a Burundian problem.⁵⁶¹ Theoretically, the UN could have found new entrepreneurial leadership, skilled staff, and more money – the PBF even provided an additional tranche in 2011 – but it could not push for peacebuilding in Burundi if UN headquarters would not back this approach. The gulf between BINUB's – and then BNUB's – peacebuilding aims and Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory was too great, and there was no political will in the UN to attempt to close this gap.

Burundi was, on the one hand, too insignificant. It had no real geostrategic importance and had already received attention that exceeded any importance it could claim. On the other hand, the government was too important to ignore. It provided a key contribution to the African Union's peacekeeping force in Somalia, which the US in particular appreciated. It was also a sovereign state and member of the UN and knew that it was important enough not to be imposed upon by any international actor. The UN did not have the will to challenge the government's stance and simply went along with it.

During this period, BINUB and BNUB's real targets seem to have been to maintain their presence in the country, not to ruffle the government's feathers, and to monitor and report on the evolving situation. They monitored the situation and commented on the increased violence and oppression but did little to actually change it. These were different targets than those articulated in their mandate, but they were clear to all involved. The UN was not willing to openly compromise on its pursuit of rule of law, human rights, and political freedom, but it implicitly compromised on these standards by standing by and supporting the Burundian government without taking any real action to

⁵⁶¹ Key informant interviews (O22), 2010.

try and alter the downward spiral in its peacebuilding trajectory. It was more important for the UN to accompany a failing process than to withdraw or risk being kicked out of the country by openly challenging the government's approach. Through this inaction to align its peacebuilding aims and outcomes, BINUB and BNUB became complicit in Burundi's deteriorating context.

The organizational factors that had enabled BINUB to make a positive contribution Burundi's war-to-peace transition – entrepreneurial leadership, an organizational change process, integration, teamwork, knowledgeable staff, instances of non-defensive and valid learning behavior, flexible peacebuilding funding, and innovative beneficiary feedback mechanisms – were gone. Similarly, the opportunities for peacebuilding and conflict prevention work were greatly reduced at the same time as the need for them was increasingly potent.

5.7 Synthesis of Cross-case Findings and Conclusion

Between 1999 and 2011, the UN Security Council mandated four separate peace operations: UNOB, ONUB, BINUB, and BNUB. At times, these peace operations were highly focused on Burundi's most urgent peacebuilding needs and instrumental in advancing its war-to-peace trajectory. At other times, they had little influence on Burundi's trajectory, instead appearing disconnected, sloppy, and indifferent. What explains the huge variation in the peacebuilding effectiveness of the UN's peace operations in Burundi?

In all but the most recent phase (June 2010–December 2011) of Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory, the UN's peace operations took significant and systematic actions to align their peacebuilding aims and means with new trends in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory (see Figure 5-2 and Table 5-1 below). This means that the UN Security Council, with the support of the UN Secretariat, altered its aim and approach to

peacebuilding in Burundi within one year of a critical juncture in Burundi's peacebuilding process. On the other hand, four out of six times, once a new trend was under way the UN peace operations in Burundi did not take systematic actions to align their peacebuilding programming with the relevant context. This study of four consecutive peace operations over a thirteen-year period in one country points to a pattern of high-level response to big peacebuilding events followed by path dependency once the organization's new direction was set. As a result, even though the peace operations were often on target in their initial focus on Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory, they most often lost that focus once normal bureaucratic operations were under way.

5.7.1 ACCOUNTABILITY ROUTINES, ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMES, AND LEARNING BEHAVIOR

The accountability routines, organizational frames, and learning behavior remain relatively consistent across all four UN missions and all six periods studied here and seem to have little influence on the variation in outcome across the cases. These variables, which comprise the theory articulated in Chapter 2, combine to describe the overall structure of UN peace operations, which was confirmed by discussions of how the UN missions in Burundi compare to UN missions elsewhere.

UN peace operations have accountability routines that require them to respond to their headquarters and to the host government, when it demands it. These organizations pursue norms, standards, and targets set by the Security Council and the UN Secretariat, sometimes through intense negotiations with the host government. Even when there is significant and representative stakeholder dialogue, as was the case for BINUB, this dialogue was primarily with the host government or rebel groups and therefore qualifies largely as horizontal accountability.

Figure 5-2: Synthesis of Dependent Variable for UN Mission Case

Systematic and Significant Actions to Align Aims and Means with a New Trend
in the Peacebuilding Trajectory

		NO	YES
Systematic Actions to Align Peacebuilding Programming with the	NO Relevant Context	UN Mission VI (BINUB & BNUB)	UN Mission II (UNOB) UN Mission IV (ONUB & BINUB) UN Mission V (ONUB & BINUB)
	YES		UN Mission I (UNOB) UN Mission III (UNOB & ONUB)

UN peace operations, by definition, have predominantly peacebuilding organizational frames. They aim to impact peace and security and have a variety of means of doing so. Few peace operations can be classified as simple peacekeeping missions – defined as the interposition of forces between parties who have agreed to a ceasefire. The vast majority of operations today include some peacebuilding element that aims to help to alter the institutions of state and society so that they can sustain peace. In other words, all peace operations intend to do peacebuilding; the question is whether or not they are structured to do so.

UN peace operations studied here largely had a defensive approach to information about the relationship between their aims and outcomes. When they did receive information about their effectiveness, they did not systematically evaluate and analyze this information or engage in self-reflection about how they could improve their impact. Instead, the peace operations largely assumed that they were having a positive impact on Burundi's war-to-peace transition and were defensive when told that they may not be making such an important contribution.

Combined together, these three factors gave the UN Missions in Burundi both the opportunity and the challenge of pursuing peacebuilding aims. These factors meant that the peace operations were likely to be largely insensitive to their influence on Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory, even though they regularly monitored changes in this trajectory. They were likely to be highly focused on the targets set by the UN Security Council and the Burundian government and not adjust these targets to the needs and realities of Burundi's institutions or the perspective of its people and civil society. These factors mean that even when they received good information about their contribution to peacebuilding, this information was likely to be lost or shelved and remain unprocessed beyond the specific individuals or teams that collected it. Based on the theory presented in Chapter 2, these factors would lead to the prediction that the UN Missions to Burundi would remain relatively immune to changes in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory and largely unable to align with new trends or changes in this context. The case studies presented here show a much more nuanced story, where immense efforts were made to align the peace operation with Burundi's trajectory and several of these efforts made critical contributions to the advancement of Burundi toward peace. What explains this variation?

5.7.2 SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE PROCESSES

The UN Security Council, DPA, and DPKO closely monitored significant changes in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory and altered or issued new mandates for the peace operations depending on the magnitude of the change required. These new mandates came with new staff, leadership, money, and structures. Although the UN Secretariat attempted to build on the existing UN infrastructure, these were big changes that required the deconstruction of an old organizational structure and construction of a new one. At the same time, once the new mission, structure, staff, and programming approach were in place, the bureaucracy took hold. Most staff carried out their standard programming approaches as they would have in most other post-conflict states, with little real consideration of the particular dynamics of Burundi or how these dynamics changed over time.

In three out of six cases, a significant organizational change process that prioritized peacebuilding was necessary for significant and systematic actions to align the UN mission with the new trend in the peacebuilding trajectory. Through this process, the Security Council and DPA or DPKO reconfigured the mandate and structure of the UN Mission in Burundi. UN Mission I (UNOB from 1999 to 2001) and UN Mission II (BINUB from May 2009 to May '20 0) are two exceptions.

UNOB did not need to be reconfigured because it was a small political mission that was simply continuing its political support for the Arusha negotiations. While the end of the regional embargo in 1999 triggered an important new phase in the Arusha negotiations that eventually led to the signature of the accord, it did not require UNOB to significantly change its approach. Rather, UNOB simply had to increase its political efforts, which were helped by the appointment of a new entrepreneurial leader, Jean Arnault, who took systematic and significant action, however unsuccessfully, to try and bring the rebel groups into the peace process and support the Tanzanian facilitation.

BINUB followed a similar pattern in 2009. ERSG Mahmoud was following the negotiations with the FNL carefully and was able to mobilize PBF funding to support their demobilization once it finally began in April 2009. The implication being that if an organization is already on the right course, a critical juncture does not necessarily require a change in course or significant increase in capacity but may just require increased efforts in the same direction.

It is unlikely that the Security Council would have mandated as many different missions in Burundi if the Burundian government had not required them to do so. The establishment of both BINUB and BNUB was requested by the Burundian government. The change process in these cases was therefore endogenous: caused and mandated by the context. The fact that the Security Council responded so readily to these requests points to the horizontal accountability routines of all post-election UN Missions: They are only in the country at the permission of and are there to serve the sovereign government. Further research should explore how this plays out with a host government that does not request significant changes in the peace operation form and function.

Finally, to establish BNUB in 2011, there was yet another organizational change process, but this process did not lead to significant peacebuilding action. BNUB was significantly smaller and weaker than BINUB. It was not an integrated mission. Although BNUB still had an important peacebuilding mandate, it no longer had much capacity to meet that mandate nor was its new leadership willing to take the political risks to pursue the mandate. Three of the past four heads of the UN Mission in Burundi had been kicked out by the government, and the final one, Charles Petrie, had resigned. The UN Secretariat did not want to repeat this pattern and seems to have requested that BNUB refrain from challenging the government or giving it other cause to kick out its leadership. The implicit aim being communicated to BNUB staff and leadership – to maintain the UN presence and not disturb the government – was different from the aim

expressed in its mandate – to help protect human rights, ensure political freedom, and establish the rule of law – which would have required it to directly challenge actions of the government. BNUB took actions to meet the implicit target, which largely prevented it from taking actions to meet its mandate. This implies that an organization actually has to have permission to pursue its mandate first before other organizational factors discussed here can make a difference in its capacity to achieve this mandate.

5.7.3 ENTREPRENEURIAL LEADERSHIP

At the programmatic level, entrepreneurial leadership and peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines were necessary for systematic action by the UN peace operations in Burundi to align their peacebuilding programming with the relevant context. Significant action at the programmatic level only took place in two phases: UN Mission I (January 1999–October 2003 – UNOB) and UN Mission III (December 2003–August 2005 – ONUB). In the other four phases, the UN Missions did not attempt to align their programming with the changing context, but rather allowed it to maintain its original course, veering away from Burundi’s changing reality. Although several of BINUB’s projects during Phases IV and V (September 2005–April 2009 and May 2009–May 2010) were systematically aligned with the context, this was not the case for the majority of its projects.

Once a peace operation’s aims and means were adjusted by the Security Council, entrepreneurial mission leadership became a necessary condition for ensuring that the new direction of the mission remained aligned with the regular changes in the Burundian context. UN field-level leadership had to conduct high-level discussions with the Burundian government to persuade officials to take the political action necessary for the particular peacebuilding initiative. For example, ONUB’s senior leadership persuaded the various constituencies in the transitional government to postpone the start of the 2005

elections, on the one hand, and to ensure that they took place as soon as possible and in line with Arusha's stipulations, on the other. This required sustained attention by the SRSG and her deputies, as well as their support staff.

The sustained attention of UN field-level leadership was also necessary to help bypass potential organizational and bureaucratic barriers to achievement of a peacebuilding aim. When achievement of a peacebuilding aim required that the UN work faster than usual, collaborate more than usual, or take more politically informed action, the intervention of senior leadership was necessary to show headquarters and other UN entities that these exceptions had their approval and were indeed a priority. This reflects the UN's hierarchical structure and management arrangements.

Intervention by senior leadership was not only necessary to remove potential bureaucratic roadblocks, but also to provide incentives and accountability to the staff implementing these initiatives. This speaks to the UN's incentive structure, where positive visibility is an important indicator of success in the organization and immediate management plays a critical role in an individual's promotion. The organization itself does little to reward or punish behavior. In this large, impersonal bureaucracy, personal relationships and connections are an important determinant of an individual's success. UNOB's, ONUB's, and BINUB's entrepreneurial leaders who were committed to peacebuilding helped to encourage and reward innovative peacebuilding programming by their staff.

Intervention by senior leadership was also necessary to ensure that the staff had access to sensitive political information necessary for the intervention's success and to help redirect the project when the information showed that the project was off track (i.e., when an actual or potential error between intention and outcome was detected).

The problem is that the time and energy of senior leadership is inevitably limited, which the implication that they will only be able to intervene in a few instances to ensure

that programming adjusts to the changing context. If, as in the case of BINUB's peacebuilding projects, there are more activities than senior leadership is willing or able to oversee, then it is likely that many of the interventions that senior leadership deem less important will veer off target. The exception seems to be with projects, such as those implemented by BINUB and the FDN, which were fully nationally owned and jointly implemented by the UN and the government. In these cases, adaptation to the context happened more automatically.

5.7.4 SUFFICIENT PEACEBUILDING KNOWLEDGE-LADEN ROUTINES

In addition to entrepreneurial leadership that was committed to peacebuilding, systematic actions to maintain the relevance of ongoing activities with the evolving Burundian context required sufficient peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines. In other words, they had to know their craft well enough to adapt their approach to alterations in the context and new information about what was or was not working well. They could not simply follow a pre-set roadmap, but had to have sufficient knowledge of their particular programmatic approach and their desired outcomes to adapt their approach during its implementation. The experience of the cases reviewed here shows that sufficient peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines cannot be possessed by one individual alone, but require teamwork that combine a mastery of the peacebuilding technique being employed, real knowledge and understanding of the local institutions that the project aims to influence, and an understanding of how to monitor the incremental achievements and setbacks in the project implementation.

5.7.5 FLEXIBLE PEACEBUILDING FUNDING

Contrary to the assumption in much of the literature, flexible peacebuilding funds do not stand out as having made a particularly important contribution to the capacity of

peace operations in Burundi to be relevant to the context. BINUB was the only peace operation that had large amounts of flexible peacebuilding funding from the PBF and this money did not enable BINUB to ensure the relevance of its programming. ONUB had a small amount of flexible peacebuilding funding that it used for quick impact projects, although there are no data on the contribution of these projects and they are generally thought to have little impact. The PBF funding allowed BINUB to initiate new projects that responded to critical junctures in Burundi's war-to-peace transition, but did not influence how these projects were implemented or their contribution to Burundi's peacebuilding process. In sum, flexible peacebuilding funding could allow a peace operation to begin an intervention that they thought would be relevant to the context, but could in no way ensure or even enable the peace operation to maintain that relevance or make a positive contribution to Burundi's peacebuilding process.

5.7.6 SYNTHESIS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS

The UN peace operations in Burundi followed a general pattern. Their mandates and aims were altered in response to critical junctures in Burundi's peacebuilding process. The UN Security Council and Secretariat closely monitored events on the ground and were ready to respond to a big change in Burundi's trajectory or to demands from the government that they change their approach. These significant organizational change processes initiated by the UN Secretariat enabled the peace operations to realign with Burundi's changing context. But once a new mission was installed, its programming tended to be largely path-dependent and unresponsive to relevant changes in the context.

In the two instances where a significant organizational change process did not take place, the organization was already on the right track and simply redoubled its efforts. In

one of these cases (UN Mission V – BINUB, May 2009–May 2010), flexible peacebuilding funding enabled the organization to quickly increase its response along this track.

Several factors explain the instances when UNOB, ONUB, and BNUB departed from this trend. Only when the mission had senior leadership who were both entrepreneurial and committed to pursuing its peacebuilding aims was it possible for the peace operation to either alter the context, as in the case of ONUB, and/or cajole the bureaucracy into responding to the changing context. If senior mission leadership were not closely involved closely in an intervention, then it usually veered off course, unless it was truly owned and implemented by Burundian institutions. If Burundian institutions took the project on as their own, it was automatically adjusted to the changing reality of these institutions. For an activity to maintain its relevance to the changing context, project teams also had to have the right combination of knowledge, skills, and teamwork. Some regular, well-informed self-reflection or open and non-defensive learning behavior was also necessary for each project team to figure out how to better align with the context.

Did systematic actions by UNOB, ONUB, BINUB, and BNUB to reduce the gap between their aims and outcomes lead to the actual achievement of these outcomes? Yes, except when a project crossed over a critical juncture line but its aims and means were not adjusted in response. When a project was implemented within one-trend period – not crossing a critical juncture in the peace process – systematic actions to reduce the gap between its aims and outcomes were correlated with the partial or total achievement of the desired outcomes.⁵⁶² In these cases, staff did not ask whether they were using the right overall approach, but instead engaged in regular analysis of their effectiveness and adapted their approach and/or their aims to better align with the context.

⁵⁶² These findings are based on the available data about outcomes from external evaluations and interviews. These data are not based on representative samples but are sufficient to show trends in effectiveness.

When these same projects continued past a critical juncture, systematic efforts to align its aim and outcomes were insufficient. Once a new trend was under way, the formerly “successful” project was no longer relevant to the context. It had to be either stopped, as in the case of the Cadre de Dialogue offshoot, or completely rethought. The continuation of socio-economic projects targeted at FNL ex-combatants by BINUB and BNUB after the FNL began remobilizing is an example of a project that was designed in response to one trend in the peace process but not readjusted as a new trend emerged.

This finding does not mean that all projects were well designed for the Burundian context. In fact, many of the PBF projects implemented by BINUB were not. But teams with the necessary characteristics – sufficient knowledge about peacebuilding and the context, learning processes, and, when required, support from senior leadership – took the project designs and gradually adjusted them to the context at the same time as they unofficially adjusted the project aims. It is possible that teams that were responsible for implementing very poorly designed projects gave up because they could not see how to adjust the project to the context. But these same teams also had insufficient peacebuilding and contextual knowledge, making it impossible to test this counterfactual with the available cases.

In sum, the effectiveness of UNOB’s, ONUB’s, and BINUB’s efforts to advance Burundi’s war-to-peace transition are due to the organizational change processes carried out by the UN Secretariat combined with the efforts of several highly skilled and committed individuals in each of these missions. The incentive mechanisms, patterns of learning, and training provided to peace operations do not, on their own, lead to effective peacebuilding. But highly skilled people who are committed to innovative and effective peacebuilding programming can sometimes make the system deliver good results. Perhaps this explains why so many good people continue to work for peace operations at

the same time as they lament the enormous dysfunction in the system and the lack of appreciation that it shows for their efforts.

These findings have potentially broad significance. They mean that the effectiveness of UN peace operations may be due to the efforts of entrepreneurial individuals who extend the functioning of the UN beyond its organizational design. The ineffectiveness of UN peace operations could be explained by the status quo: the knowledge-laden routines and organizational frames, accountability routines, and learning behavior that are part of the UN's organizational design. The generalizability of these findings to other peace operations has been preliminarily tested and supported through interviews with staff about their experiences in other peace operations, but should be fully examined through similar case studies of UN peace operations in other countries.

These findings also challenge several assumptions within the UN about effectiveness: that integration leads to greater effectiveness and that the PBC can help prevent post-conflict countries from descending back into violence. While the integration of BINUB may have helped to create several effective teams, it in no way ensured that all of its teams would take systematic actions to align their projects with the relevant context. In fact, integration made people's work more challenging and time-consuming while only contributing to the effectiveness of a minority of teams. In addition, the PBC was unable to prevent the emergence of a one-party state in Burundi, the use of increasingly violent and oppressive tactics by this state, or the emergence of a new rebellion. In fact, the PBC refused to take significant or systematic action to prevent these trends, showing it is unwilling to prevent the reemergence of violence in post-conflict states.

The theoretical significance of this research is also important. The case study of Burundi shows the agency possessed by host governments and their power to dictate and control the actions of international organizations and the most powerful member

states. This challenges assumptions about the power of the Security Council, international organizations, and the poorest southern states. This case study challenges the assumption in the critical literature on liberal peacebuilding: that liberal peace is imposed on southern states through neo-colonial practices. In the case of Burundi, neither peace nor liberal institutions were imposed by international organizations.⁵⁶³ Even if international actors wished to impose these institutions, they lacked the agency and adaptive capacity to do so. By repeatedly discarding representatives of the Secretary-General, the Burundian government continued to remind the UN Security Council and UN Secretariat that it was a sovereign state and would dictate the actions of the UN within its territory.

This case study also has significance for the literature on international organizations that assumes that the international bureaucracy must respond to the political framework set out by member states and does not possess agency. In fact, these findings show that it is precisely when field-based IOs operate outside of this organizational design that they are most effective.

This research also has important implications for the practice of peace operations. It shows that improvements in the effectiveness of peace operations will rely on mechanisms that encourage reflective practice, innovation rather than standardization, leadership that is committed to pursuing peacebuilding aims, and true teamwork and collaboration with the national institutions that they aim to influence.

Each of these areas of significance presents opportunities for further research. In addition, the findings presented here should be tested in other countries where the government has not demanded that the UN reconfigure its peace operations so often. In countries where the host government puts fewer demands and constraints on the UN

⁵⁶³ Campbell, "Routine Learning? How Peacebuilding Organizations Prevent Liberal Peace."

peace operation(s), are the peace operation(s) more path-dependent and less able to adjust to the critical junctures in the country's war-to-peace trajectory? Are peace operations more effective in countries that are more receptive to its aims and approach and therefore develop greater ownership of the efforts of the peace operations? The findings should also be tested in countries that received funding from the PBF, but where the UN peace operation was not operationally integrated with the rest of the UN system. Did the integration of BINUB actually have an impact on the outcomes observed, or was it simply the presence of innovative peacebuilding funding, the leadership, and the degree of collaboration with the government? Finally, what would the adaptive capacity of UN peace operations look like in a country with a very different war-to-peace trajectory? What if the country descended into war midway through? What if it continued to be successful and did not begin to edge toward an authoritarian state, as Burundi has? What if the host country was much bigger and required a much larger peace operation? Would these factors change the peace operations' patterns of adaptation and pursuit of their own peacebuilding aims?

Table 5-1: Synthesis of values for UN Mission case

Organizational Data Point	Accountability Routines	Knowledge-laden Routines and Organizational Frames	Learning Behavior	Significant Organizational Change Process	Flexible Peacebuilding Funds	Entrepreneurial Leadership Committed to Peacebuilding	Action to Align in Relation to Peacebuilding Aims
UN Mission I Jan. '99–Oct. '01 (UNOB)	External/ Significant and Representative Stakeholder Dialogue	Predominant Peacebuilding Org. Frame/ Sufficient Peacebuilding Knowledge-laden Routines	Defensive / Valid	No	No	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
UN Mission II Nov. '01–Nov. '03 (UNOB)	External/ Significant and Representative Stakeholder Dialogue	Predominant Peacebuilding Org. Frame/ Sufficient Peacebuilding Knowledge-laden Routines	Defensive / Valid	Yes	No	No	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
UN Mission III Dec. '03–Aug. '05 (UNOB and ONUB)	External/ Horizontal	Predominant Peacebuilding Org. Frame/ Sufficient Peacebuilding Knowledge-laden Routines	Defensive / Invalid	Yes	No	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
UN Mission IV Sept. '05–April '09 (ONUB and BINUB)	External/ Horizontal	Predominant Peacebuilding Org. Frame/ Insufficient Peacebuilding Knowledge- laden Routines	Defensive / Invalid	Yes	Yes	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
UN Mission V May '09–May '10 (BINUB)	External/ Horizontal	Predominant Peacebuilding Org. Frame/ Insufficient Peacebuilding Knowledge- laden Routines	Defensive / Invalid	No	Yes	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
UN Mission VI June '10–Dec. '11 (BINUB and BNUB)	External/ Horizontal	Predominant Peacebuilding Org. Frame/ Insufficient Peacebuilding Knowledge- laden Routines	Defensive / Invalid	Yes	No	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context

6 THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

(UNDP) IN BURUNDI

6.1 Introduction

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is a prominent actor in conflict-ridden countries. In most cases, it was in the country before large-scale violence erupted and will be there after it dissipates. UNDP prides itself on its sustained commitment to these countries and its close cooperation with their governments. Because of its continued presence in these countries, UNDP's board believed that the organization had an important role to play in preventing the emergence of violent conflict and reconstructing the post-war country. In 2001, the UNDP Executive Board transformed its Emergency Response Division into the Bureau on Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) with the following mandate: "To enhance UNDP's efforts for sustainable development, working with partners to reduce the incidence and impact of disasters and violent conflicts, and to establish the solid foundations for peace and recovery from crisis, thereby advancing the UN Millennium Development Goals on poverty reduction."⁵⁶⁴

The establishment of BCPR was spurred in part by the release of the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, or the "Brahimi Report", which specifically identified UNDP as "best placed to take the lead on implementing peace-building

564 Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, *Role of UNDP in Crisis and Post-Conflict Situations* (New York, 2000), <http://www.undp.org/execbrd/pdf/dp01-4.pdf> (accessed October 13, 2011); quoted in United Nations Development Programme Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), *Bureau Strategy 2007-2011* (New York, January 2007), 8, <http://europeandcis.undp.org/cd/show/47C5775A-F203-1EE9-BBCAC96CECB11142> (accessed October 13, 2011).


activities”.⁵⁶⁵ Prior to this point, UNDP’s Board had been reluctant to examine the relationship between its development work and violent conflict partly because it wanted “to protect the integrity of development programmes and insulate them from more controversial issues.”⁵⁶⁶ Nonetheless, a report commissioned by the board at this point commented, “UNDP cannot continue to do so. It must develop new methodologies and tools to integrate concern for prevention of violent conflict into its programming and measure the impact of development strategies and different types of projects on the risk of conflict.”⁵⁶⁷ What was unclear at the time and remains so today is whether UNDP would be able to transform itself from an old-school development organization that stuck to its apolitical approach into a nimble conflict prevention and peacebuilding organization that based its programming on a solid understanding of conflict dynamics and its contribution to those evolving dynamics.

Figure 6-1: UNDP Burundi's Actions to Align its Aims and Approach & its Programming with Burundi's Peacebuilding Trajectory

565 United Nations General Assembly Security Council, The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, para. 46.

566 Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, Role of UNDP in Crisis and Post-Conflict Situations, 6.

567 Ibid.



This chapter examines the relationship between UNDP and Burundi’s war-to-peace transition between 1999 and 2011. It asks if UNDP was able to maintain its relevance to Burundi’s war-to-peace transition and have a positive influence on this transition, and aims to explain why. Although BCPR was only established in 2001, UNDP Burundi had an early start on its conflict prevention and peacebuilding approach because of the presence of Kathleen Cravero as UNDP’s Resident Representative and the Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator of the UN System from 1998 to 2000.⁵⁶⁸ She brought an awareness of UNDP’s conflict prevention and recovery role to UNDP’s work in Burundi, and subsequently went to New York to run the BCPR office there.

This chapter finds that UNDP Burundi’s programming was largely disconnected from Burundi’s war-to-peace transition (See Figure 6-1 above). At several points in time, UNDP Burundi made a positive contribution to the context but in these cases the context aligned with UNDP’s approach and capacity rather than UNDP making significant and systematic efforts to maintain its relevance to the peacebuilding context. BCPR and the tools and advice that it provided had little influence on UNDP Burundi’s trajectory. Its

⁵⁶⁸ The Resident Coordinator is the leader of the UN development community present in one country and the Humanitarian Coordinator is the leader of the humanitarian community present in one country.

positive contributions to peacebuilding and conflict prevention are due to its leadership, flexible peacebuilding funds, and the skill and innovation of exceptional staff. Its insensitivity to Burundi's transition resulted largely from its faithfulness to UNDP's standard operating procedures. In other words, this case study implies that if UNDP country offices are to have an important impact on war-to-peace transitions, staff and leaders have to work outside of UNDP's normal bureaucratic practices and incentive mechanisms. This has implications for UNDP's overall effectiveness as a conflict prevention and peacebuilding organization and for our understanding of whether or not development organizations can be effective peacebuilders.

In the following pages, I discuss the interaction between UNDP and the six main phases in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory between 1999 and 2011. I ask whether UNDP took systematic and significant actions to align its overall aims and approach with the new phase in Burundi's transition, and whether its programming took significant actions to maintain its alignment with the changing context. I then conclude by synthesizing my findings and reflecting on the generalizability of these findings to other UNDP offices and to other large development bureaucracies.

6.1.1 ADVOCATING FOR AID TO BRING PEACE (PHASE I)

UNDP responded quickly to the end of regional sanctions against Burundi in January 1999, which had been in place since 1996. UNDP had become a staunch advocate for the removal of the sanctions from Burundi and the resumption of development cooperation with the impoverished country. UNDP's organizational frame and accountability structure combined together to make the resumption of aid to Burundi a core priority. UNDP was the leader of the UN development community and responsible

for organizing donor roundtables to raise funds for specific countries.⁵⁶⁹ UNDP Resident Representatives – the head of UNDP at the country level – were also rewarded by the organization foremost for “the volume of resources” raised locally.⁵⁷⁰ Contrary to much of the development discourse that argued that negative peace must precede development, UNDP advocated for the resumption of aid to Burundi on the grounds that it was a necessary condition for peace. In spite of its strong response to the removal of sanctions, UNDP did not attempt to maintain the relevance of the rest of its programming to Burundi’s evolving peacebuilding process.

By its own claims, UNDP “engaged in relentless advocacy” for resumed development cooperation before complete security had returned to Burundi.⁵⁷¹ These initial efforts culminated in UNDP’s co-organization of a donor conference for Burundi on December 12, 2001, where \$440 million was pledged for humanitarian, reconstruction, and development aid.⁵⁷² UNDP continued to organize annual donor conferences on Burundi, although the first few that it organized after the removal of the sanctions were the most visible, featuring the facilitator of the Arusha negotiations, Nelson Mandela, and other high-level representatives.

UNDP had co-organized donor roundtables for Burundi before, but significantly stepped up its efforts in response to the suspension of the embargo, which they hoped would signal to international donors that it was now “safe” to resume development

569 United Nations Development Group, “UN Resident Coordinator Generic Job Description”, January 29, 2009, <http://www.undg.org/docs/1341/RC-Generic-Job-Description--UNDG-Approved.doc> (accessed September 6, 2011).

570 Craig Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 295.

571 Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, *Second Country Cooperation Framework for Burundi (2002-2004)* (New York, July 24, 2001), para. 16, <http://www.undp.org/execbrd/archives/sessions/eb/2nd-2001/DP-CRR-BDI-2.pdf> (accessed September 28, 2011).

572 “Burundi: Donors pledge \$440 mn,” *Africa Recovery*, United Nations 14, no. 4 (January 2011), <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/subjindx/144aidf.htm> (accessed October 30, 2011).

cooperation.⁵⁷³ In advocating for the resumption of development cooperation with Burundi, UNDP made a connection between aid and peace that was largely missing from its other programming documents. It argued that development and expanded humanitarian aid, as opposed to purely lifesaving humanitarian assistance, would “help to consolidate the restoration of peace”.⁵⁷⁴

Although peacebuilding was a component of UNDP’s program, it was subservient to its overall focus on development, or organizational frame. UNDP’s overall program for this phase focused on capacity building in the area of governance, including economic management, the legislature, and civil society.⁵⁷⁵ It also aimed to reduce poverty reduction through community development, fighting HIV/AIDS, food security, and environmental restoration.⁵⁷⁶ It aimed to do peacebuilding by mainstreaming the principles of reconciliation, peaceful coexistence, and the advancement of women into all of its other programming.⁵⁷⁷ In other words, all aspects of its program – from beneficiary selection to communication with stakeholders to monitoring of the program outcomes – would be infused with an analysis of the specific causes and consequences of gender, ethnic, and socio-economic inequality in Burundi and corresponding peacebuilding techniques. In addition, as part of its governance programming, UNDP Burundi

573 Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, Fifth Country Programme for Burundi, Note by the Administrator (New York, July 24, 1995), para. 12, <http://www.undp.org/execbrd/archives/sessions/eb/1st-2nd-3rd-Annual1995/DP-1995-58.pdf> (accessed September 28, 2011).

574 Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, Second Country Cooperation Framework for Burundi (2002-2004), para. 16.

575 Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, First Country Cooperation Framework for Burundi (1998-2000) (New York, July 29, 2008), para. 33, <http://www.undp.org/execbrd/archives/sessions/eb/3rd-1998/DP-CCF-BDI-1.pdf> (accessed September 28, 2011).

576 Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, First Country Cooperation Framework for Burundi (1998-2000).

577 *Ibid.*, para. 35.

supported local NGO efforts to increase women's participation in the Arusha peace process and rebuild the capacity of Burundi's traditional elders (Bashingatahe).⁵⁷⁸

UNDP's efforts to mainstream peacebuilding largely failed. Although it did take significant and systematic action to align with the new trend in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory triggered by the removal of sanctions, it did not regularly attempt to align details of its programming align with Burundi's trajectory.

6.1.1.1 How Burundi's war-to-peace transition aligned with UNDP

UNDP's response to the removal of the regional embargo in January 1999 did not require that the organization significantly change its aims or its activities in this area. Instead of UNDP aligning with the Burundian context, the Burundian context aligned with one of UNDP's core aims: to increase the amount of development assistance coming to Burundi. UNDP's responded by scaling up its existing activities. It did not attempt to alter its overall aims or means because it assumed that they already fit the context.

Since the outbreak of Burundi's war in 1993, donors had given only humanitarian assistance to Burundi. UNDP, as a development organization, had been poorly funded during this period.⁵⁷⁹ The suspension of the embargo was a real opportunity to increase the amount of money coming to UNDP Burundi and its capacity to implement its planned activities, many of which had been delayed. This, in turn, would help to increase its standing within the broader organization. The removal of sanctions were, of course, also an opportunity to help Burundians begin to rebuild their lives, although UNDP offered no institutional incentive for this goal.

⁵⁷⁸ Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, *Second Country Cooperation Framework for Burundi (2002-2004)*, para. 19.

⁵⁷⁹ Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, *Extension of the First Country Cooperation Framework for Burundi*, Note by the Administrator (New York, December 20, 2000), <http://www.undp.org/execbrd/archives/sessions/eb/1st-2001/DP-CCF-BDI-1-EXTENSION-I.pdf> (accessed September 28, 2011).

UNDP had several incentives to focus its energy on increasing the amount development assistance to Burundi. The organization's accountability structures focused on the amount of money raised and spent. Headquarters praised staff who raised large amounts of money from other donors. Once the money was raised and allocated to a particular office, UNDP headquarters and regional offices monitored whether the money was spent in the planned areas. It prized accurate planning and spending money according to plan, not flexibility, adaptation, or a focus on what the projects actually did.⁵⁸⁰

The focus of UNDP's upward accountability routines on the amount of money raised and spent was reinforced by its horizontal accountability to the Burundian government for the organization of donor roundtables and preparation of development strategies, which the roundtables were supposed to fund. These incentives helped to encourage staff to take quick and robust action to raise more development funding once the embargo was lifted. Out of \$440 million at the December 2001 donor conference, \$41.5 million of this went to UNDP's country program.⁵⁸¹

UNDP did not ask whether or not increased aid led to increased peace or collect data on the relationship between the two. UNDP's focus on raising and spending money was supported by data on the money pledged, which was easy for the organization to monitor. UNDP gauged its success on the amount of money pledged by donors. It did not evaluate its contribution based on whether or not donors actually released the money. It did not ask whether the money had the intended impact on peace and development in Burundi. As a result, UNDP had no valid data on its target of raising

580 Ken Menkhaus and Ben K. Fred-Mensah, *Institutional Flexibility in Crises and Post-Conflict Situations: Best Practices from the Field* (New York: United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office, December 2004), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/node-22057.pdf (accessed October 13, 2011).

581 Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, *Second Country Cooperation Framework for Burundi (2002-2004)*, para. 18.

more money, and the target was shortsighted. It did not include any information on the contribution of the money pledged to its overall peacebuilding aim – to increase aid so that both peace and development would be possible. It did not even ask or informally survey whether or not more money led to more peace and better peacebuilding in Burundi.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the subsequent phases in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory challenge the assumption that more aid leads to more peace. It is true that over the next 10 years there was a correlation between more donor funding and more stability in Burundi, but the causality was most likely reversed. More stability led to more pledges and contributions from donors. Although the increased development funding and the improved security situation are likely to have contributed to consistent improvements in Burundi's economy, they have not prevented the emergence of a new rebellion and the increasing threat of war in 2011. Furthermore, as discussed below, the effectiveness of UNDP's peacebuilding programming did not increase when more money was available.

UNDP Burundi did not need new specialized knowledge to advocate for increased development cooperation. It had made the argument in previous publications. The UN Security Council, International Crisis Group, and Refugees International joined the chorus arguing that resumed aid was essential for the success of Burundi's peace process. It knew how to conduct advocacy, coordinate with other international actors, and monitor the amounts pledged. Because UNDP did not assess the peacebuilding aspect of this aim, it did not need any more specialized knowledge to do so.

The factors that enabled Burundi to make a big effort to raise more aid for peace in Burundi – disobeying the convention at the time that negative peace should precede large contributions of development aid – were its accountability routines and committed leadership. The Resident Coordinator/Resident Representative, Georg Charpentier, gave a lot of his time to this endeavor. But, Charpentier took little political risk in so doing.

The “aid for peace” argument had become commonplace in Burundi and was championed by the Security Council and many other external actors. UNDP Burundi did not need specialized peacebuilding knowledge or open and non-defensive learning behavior because all that was required was advocacy carried out by Charpentier and other officials and the technical capacity to organize the donor roundtables. UNDP knew how to do this and did it well. It did not push the edges of its knowledge or experience or do anything that was particularly unique to Burundi. It assumed that increased pledges of aid would lead to increased peace, just as it assumed that all of its other programming would have a positive impact on Burundi’s peacebuilding trajectory.

6.1.2 2001-2004 – STAYING THE COURSE AND WAITING FOR DEVELOPMENT (PHASES II AND III)

Although UNDP Burundi had responded quickly to the removal of the embargo, it largely failed to respond to the next two big events in Burundi’s peacebuilding process: the Inauguration of the transitional government on November 1, 2001 and the integration of the CNDD-FDD rebel group into the transitional government in November 2003. UNDP viewed these events as precursors to the development phase, when it would be well funded and able to implement a normal program. It did not believe that it should adapt its ongoing program as a result of these peacebuilding events. UNDP altered its overall aims and approach only when its governing board required the submission of a new two- or five-year strategy document or when UN headquarters mandated a new intervention or approach and sent corresponding money and staff.

In spite of the immense changes in Burundi’s context, UNDP maintained largely the same aims and activities between 1998 and 2004. UNDP’s program strategy was outlined in Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) that it had to submit to its Executive Board at designated times. The development of new CCF offered an opportunity for UNDP to revisit and revise its overall aims and approach. UNDP submitted its 2002-2004 CCF to

its Executive Board in July 2001, a time when a great deal of certainty existed as to whether the transitional government would ever be inaugurated. UNDP's CCF indicated that it was aligned with the priorities of the transitional government even though the government had yet to be established.⁵⁸² Once the transitional government was actually established, it failed to alter its approach to account for the particularities of transitional institutions, as opposed to normal post-conflict institutions.⁵⁸³

UNDP and other UN entities in Burundi recognized the critical importance of the integration of Pierre Nkurunziza into the transitional government in November 2003. In their Common Country Assessment, they wrote that this event marked the beginning of Burundi's post-conflict transition, which would end when it began a "true process of sustainable development".⁵⁸⁴ UNDP did not take any significant actions to respond to this critical event. Instead, it extended its 2002-2004 program for one more year so that it could align with the programming cycles of the other UN development organizations and enable them finally to develop a joint UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).

The UNDAF would establish a shared strategy and series of aims for the United Nations System in Burundi. It would also harmonize the programming cycles of the entire UN System so that all new programs began in 2005. The UN System in Burundi had first tried to develop an UNDAF in 2001, and even went as far as developing a draft

⁵⁸² *Ibid.*

⁵⁸³ Stanislas Makoroka and Oliver Le Brun, *La Revue du Projet d'Appui au Programme National de Gouvernance Démocratique*, Evaluation Report (Bujumbura, Burundi: United Nations Development Programme, February 2004), <http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=143> (accessed September 29, 2011).

⁵⁸⁴ United Nations Country Team Burundi, *Burundi: Les défis du processus de transition*, Bilan Commun de Pays [Common Country Assessment (CCA)] (Bujumbura, Burundi, February 2004), 69, http://www.bi.undp.org/documents/Bilan%20commun%20de%20pays%20_CCA%2002%2003%202004.pdf (accessed September 28, 2011). Translation from French by author.

document that was discarded.⁵⁸⁵ But, the continuing conflict and uncertainty about the peace process in Burundi delayed the document. Now that the UN believed that the conflict was finally about to end, it could prepare and begin implementing its long-awaited development strategy.

UNDP also failed to adapt the details of its programs to the changes in Burundi's peacebuilding context. UNDP's Burundi program focused on democratic governance, economic governance, combating poverty, and preventing HIV/AIDS. These activities could have been designed and implemented with a peacebuilding lens, but UNDP chose not to do so. Instead, in its 2002-2004 program it removed the goal of mainstreaming peacebuilding and conflict prevention that had appeared in its earlier program documents.⁵⁸⁶ It indicated that it would continue to help Burundi's peace process through support for the parliament, decentralization, civil society, the mobilization of aid, and support for the Ubushingantahe (traditional elders) system, but in practice most of these interventions were largely disconnected from the dynamics of the ongoing peace process.⁵⁸⁷

UNDP Burundi implemented a relatively standard set of development activities, most of which were disconnected from the particular needs of Burundi during its transitional phase. UNDP's community development project, for example, was well respected for its close connection with Burundi's rural populations and responsiveness to some of their needs, but it failed to take into account the causes or manifestations of the

⁵⁸⁵ Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, *First Country Cooperation Framework for Burundi (1998-2000)*, para. 4.; The researcher obtained a draft copy of the UNDAF in 2001, but the document was never accepted by the full UN System and reference to it has been removed from all UN documents.

⁵⁸⁶ Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, *Second Country Cooperation Framework for Burundi (2002-2004)*, para. 26.

⁵⁸⁷ Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, *Extension of the First Country Cooperation Framework for Burundi*, para. 29.

conflict.⁵⁸⁸ It was an example of UNDP Burundi's pattern of doing development programming even in the midst of conflict.⁵⁸⁹ Although there was a need for good development programming during the conflict, to ensure that it did not do harm or exacerbate the causes of the conflict, the programming should have had a conflict sensitive lens.⁵⁹⁰

An evaluation of UNDP's Democratic Governance project – a continuation of the project included in the 1999-2001 country program – provides another example of UNDP's programming. The evaluation found that the Democratic Governance project was not focused on the specific needs and capacities of the transitional government at that point in time.⁵⁹¹ Its aims and activities were more appropriate for a democratically elected Government, not a transitional government.⁵⁹² The evaluators found that the project was ill prepared for very predictable challenges that it would face in Burundi: changes of staff in key government positions, the preoccupation of government officials with politics, and the challenge of finding a national coordinator.⁵⁹³ As a result, the project got off to a late start and was unable to achieve many of its ambitious objectives. Once off the ground, the project staff believed, incorrectly the evaluators argued, that their role was to stick to the project as planned and implement it to the best of their ability, not significantly alter its aims or activities to the particular circumstances in Burundi.⁵⁹⁴

The UN's leadership in Burundi supported UNDP's path dependent approach that largely failed to take into account the capacity and needs of Burundians. The United

⁵⁸⁸ Key informant interview with international observer (D10), Bujumbura, 2002.

⁵⁸⁹ Key informant interview with UN staff member (UP1), Bujumbura, 2009.

⁵⁹⁰ ICG, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi*.

⁵⁹¹ Makoroka and Le Brun, *La Revue du Projet d'Appui au Programme National de Gouvernance Démocratique*, para. 30.

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*, 30.

⁵⁹³ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 11–12.

Nations Country Team, made up of UN humanitarian and development agencies in Burundi, blamed the poor impact of its programs during this period on the fact that beneficiaries were unable to sustain the results, rather than considering that their approach may have been poorly designed and adapted to the reality of Burundians.⁵⁹⁵

Why was UNDP able to make such a convincing argument to donors about the role of development in sustaining peace, but unable to integrate this awareness into its own programming?

6.1.2.1 Alignment with the UN System, Not Burundi's Peacebuilding Trajectory

UNDP did not attempt to align its programming with the new trends launched in November 2001 and October 2003 because it was focused on aligning with the rest of the UN System and with its own programming cycle. It was acting to align, but just not with Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. Its upward accountability routines prioritized its responsiveness to other UN entities over Burundi's evolving context.

Once UNDP had agreed on a new cooperation framework with the Burundian government, it continued to pursue these same aims and activities for the entire three-year programming cycle. It did not revisit these aims in light of big changes in the Burundian context or revelations about its own effectiveness. It did suspend and extend its cooperation framework in 1994 and 2000, but did not to significantly alter its content. UNDP headquarters and regional bureaus evaluated the office on the degree to which it implemented its activities as planned. UNDP Burundi was also evaluated on the amount of new funds that it raised to support its cooperation framework and to start new

⁵⁹⁵ United Nations Country Team Burundi, *Burundi: Les défis du processus de transition*, para. 70.

activities.⁵⁹⁶ This enabled UNDP to add on new aims activities, but not to significantly adjust its overall aims or approach.

In 2001, UNDP was focused on developing a new cooperation framework for 2002-2004, not on the dynamics of Burundi's transitional phase. In 2003, UNDP began looking ahead to the 2005 presidential elections and the transition to its post-conflict phase, as the UN categorized it.⁵⁹⁷ It wanted to align all of the programming cycles of the UN development organizations operating in Burundi so that it could finally develop a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). The UNDAF was a core part of the Secretary-General's reform agenda articulated in 1999, and would enable the UN development community in each country to work toward the same overall objectives and, ideally, advance the Millennium Development Goals. This was part of an overall push in the UN for greater unity of effort among its different constituent organizations and a reduction in duplication. The concept of integration described in Chapter 5 was another manifestation of this trend.

The UN reform efforts that pushed for more coherence and integration among UN entities on the ground assumed that these efforts would increase the UN's effectiveness. In this case, however, UNDP's desire to develop a coherent approach to development in Burundi and stick to its cooperation framework prevented it from responding to important changes in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. These changes in the transitional government were highly relevant to most of UNDP's ongoing programs, which were implemented in partnership with the government. UNDP's inability to

⁵⁹⁶ United Nations Development Programme, *Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries* (New York: Evaluation Office, 2006), <http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=884> (accessed October 13, 2011).

⁵⁹⁷ United Nations Country Team Burundi, *Burundi: Les défis du processus de transition*.

prepare for and adjust to the new dynamics in the transitional government limited its effectiveness.⁵⁹⁸

This example shows that a focus on coherence among UN organizations or other international actors may actually inhibit their ability to prepare for or respond to critical peacebuilding opportunities in the context and limit their overall peacebuilding effectiveness. A 2004 UNDP study supports this finding: “integrated institutional arrangements can also limit the range of flexibility and speed required of one actor” with serious implications for the ability of actors to respond to complex and fluid post-conflict dynamics.⁵⁹⁹ The challenge, the review notes, is finding the balance between flexibility and coherence. Too much flexibility can “serve as an invitation to strategic incoherence and lack of accountability”, while too much coherence can lead to alignment with other international actors at the expense of alignment with the changing context.⁶⁰⁰ The review found that UNDP is at the coherence-heavy end of the spectrum with “real implications for its ability to achieve its goals on the basis of a flexible response.”⁶⁰¹ These findings falsify the theory articulated in the scholarly and policy literature that greater coherence automatically leads to greater effectiveness.

6.1.2.2 The development frame and phased approach to intervention

UNDP Burundi saw itself as a development organization. It worked in and around conflict, not on it. Although its Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) had existed for several years at this point, UNDP generally believed that it did its best work in environments that were stable and without significant conflict. UNDP Burundi’s

598 Makoroka and Le Brun, *La Revue du Projet d’Appui au Programme National de Gouvernance Démocratique*.

599 Menkhaus and Fred-Mensah, *Institutional Flexibility in Crises and Post-Conflict Situations: Best Practices from the Field*, 15.

600 *Ibid.*

601 *Ibid.*

approach between 2001 and 2004 reflected this organizational frame. Within this frame, UNDP pursued a phased approach to intervention in Burundi, which viewed humanitarian assistance and development as occurring in a linear sequence, hopefully with a seamless transition in-between. UNDP seemed to be biding its time until the humanitarian phase was over and the development phase would finally begin. It was more preoccupied with the “relief-to-development transition” than with Burundi’s own “war-to-peace” transition, which it saw as a trigger of its own transition to full development programming.⁶⁰²

The reality in Burundi was much less linear and more complex. Even in the most intense phases of the war, there had always been provinces that were largely peaceful. These provinces were ready for development programming that aimed to build people’s capacity to improve their own livelihoods, rather than humanitarian programming that focused on distributing food, seeds, plastic sheeting, buckets for water, and other “life-saving” goods.

UNDP’s approach shunned the significant evidence that country’s war-to-peace transitions are not linear and should not be subject to phased programming. A 2002 review of the role of UNDP in reintegration and reconstruction programs reiterated this lesson:

Humanitarian assistance and development cooperation do not follow a consecutive linear progression but rather should be viewed in the totality of a given situation. Peace, reintegration, and development should all be considered as critical components and objectives of post-conflict management, coexisting synergistically.⁶⁰³

Several other UNDP offices seemed to shun this lesson as well. “In a questionnaire addressed to 24 countries or areas receiving assistance from UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis

602 Makoroka and Le Brun, *La Revue du Projet d’Appui au Programme National de Gouvernance Démocratique*.

603, p. 115.

Prevention and Recovery, only seven said that they did not follow a phased approach.”⁶⁰⁴

Earlier, UNDP Burundi had been one of the pioneers within the organization of a more multidimensional approach. In 1994, in response to the outbreak of Burundi’s war a few months earlier, UNDP Burundi froze its development program and developed an interim emergency program focusing on “preventive development” that aimed to contribute to peace and conflict resolution through local governance and rehabilitation programming.⁶⁰⁵ UNDP Burundi’s focus preceded the establishment of UNDP’s Emergency Response Division (ERD), the predecessor to the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). UNDP Burundi’s multidimensional approach was shared by much of the rest of the UN system at the time. An external review in 2000 praised the simultaneous response of the UN System to Burundi’s relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development needs as “one of the most encouraging examples of synergistic action in a conflict-prone country”.⁶⁰⁶

Once the Arusha Agreement was signed in August 2000, UNDP anticipated an influx of development funds and began to focus more clearly on development. The leadership of UNDP Burundi also changed around this time, encouraging the shift. In its 2004 Common Country Assessment (CCA), the UN system in Burundi identified the ceasefire with the CNDD-FDD on November 16, 2003 as the trigger for Burundi’s post-conflict transition.⁶⁰⁷ A post-conflict transition, it said, is marked by the establishment of peace and ends when the country begins a true process of sustainable human

604 United Nations Development Programme, *Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries*, 28.

605 Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, *Fifth Country Programme for Burundi*, para. 11.

606 Rafeedin Ahmed, Manfred Kulessa, and Khalid Malik, *Lessons Learned in Crises and Post-Conflict Situations: The Role of UNDP in Reintegration and Reconstruction Programmes* (New York: United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office, 2002), 16,

http://www.undp.org/evaluation/documents/LL_in_CPC_situation_2002.pdf (accessed October 13, 2011).

607 United Nations Country Team Burundi, *Burundi: Les défis du processus de transition*, 69.

development – a process that they estimated would take 2-3 years.⁶⁰⁸ The 2005-2007 UNDAF was intended to correspond to this post-conflict transitional phase.

By focusing on the transition to sustainable development, and diminishing the ongoing violence and instability in the country, UNDP hoped that to encourage donors to release long-awaited development funds. The Burundian government shared this wish. The country was broke. But in its effort to transition from relief to development, UNDP ignored the complex political dynamics and fighting that continued. Just after the inauguration of the Transitional Government in November 2001, the CNDD-FDD and FNL rebel groups significantly stepped up their attacks on the Burundian army. In fact, the inauguration marked an increase in fighting that only subsided with the integration of the CNDD-FDD into the Transitional Government in November 2003. The violence directly affected some international staff as well as many Burundians. In November 2001, the Representative of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Burundi was murdered, found floating in Lake Tanganyika. With the donor conference on Burundi planned for December 2001 in Paris, the UNDP downplayed his death and the overall trend of escalating violence, which it feared would discourage donors from committing development funds to Burundi.⁶⁰⁹

The phased approach to intervention in Burundi predetermined the type of knowledge, funding, and programming that Burundi would require at the different “phases” of its transition. Humanitarian organizations did humanitarian work. Development organizations did development work. Only a small group of NGOs engaged in truly peacebuilding work – the BLTP, International Alert, Search for Common Ground. During this period, the majority of other international organizations operating in Burundi were still focused on humanitarian relief. They brought in staff with the

608 Ibid.

609 Participant Observation as UN staff member, Bujumbura, 2001.

requisite humanitarian experience, operated under very short timeframes, and focused on the delivery of emergency goods, not longer-term sustainable programming.

In this phase, UNDP maintained its development focus and corresponding staff capacity. By its own admission, UNDP lacked the knowledge or capacity to engage in transitional programming, which was neither specifically relief or development.⁶¹⁰ Even though UNDP lessons learned documents had repeatedly warned against a phased approach, and emphasized the importance of contextually relevant programming, UNDPs knowledge-laden routines and organizational frames prevented it from acting on this learning.

Donors and NGOs reinforced UNDP's phased approach. As long as significant fighting continued, donors largely refused to give non-humanitarian aid to Burundi.⁶¹¹ Even where there was funding for development or "expanded humanitarian" programming, UNDP's NGO implementing partners largely consisted of humanitarian NGOs who lacked the capacity to implement more sustainable programming, not to mention peacebuilding programming.⁶¹² When security was finally established throughout most of the country in late 2003, most donors were still reluctant to release development funding, which they saw as only appropriate for more stable countries. Donors could not respond because they did not have funding earmarked for more transitional programming that focused on peacebuilding, early recovery, or rehabilitation.

610 United Nations Development Programme, Rapport Annuel 2003 du Système de Coordination Inter Agences au Burundi, 2003, 3, http://cfapp2.undp.org/dgo_unct_report/documents/annex_BDI_222065236.doc (accessed September 28, 2011).

611 United Nations Country Team Burundi, *Burundi: Les défis du processus de transition*, 70.

612 Ahmed, Kulesa, and Malik, *Lessons Learned in Crises and Post-Conflict Situations: The Role of UNDP in Reintegration and Reconstruction Programmes*.

In sum, the focus of UNDP and much of the rest of the international community in Burundi on a linear relief-to-development continuum prevented them from adapting to the Burundi as it actually was. These organizations' visions of themselves of relief or development organizations were supported by relief or development knowledge and relief or development programming routines, or knowledge-laden routines. These organizations were largely unable to operate in the intermediary space that Burundi occupied: where neither pure humanitarian programming nor pure development programming were needed.⁶¹³ Instead, a type of transitional programming was necessary: one that sought to strengthen the capacity of Burundians to sustain their own peace, or peacebuilding.

6.1.2.3 No data, unguided adaptation, and disconnected programming

UNDP did not seek to understand the gap between its overall peacebuilding aim and its specific projects. It gathered no data in its projects about their impact on relevant drivers of conflict or peace or on their contribution to Burundi's overall peacebuilding trajectory.⁶¹⁴ In fact, it gathered very little data on the outcomes or impact of any of its programs, instead focusing on monitoring the deliverables: number of houses rehabilitated, number of people trained, number of meetings held, etc....⁶¹⁵ Although specific projects developed a culture of discussion and self-reflection, this was not shared by the broader organization or reinforced by its interactions with its regional bureau or headquarters.⁶¹⁶

⁶¹³ ICG, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi*.

⁶¹⁴ Ahmed, Kulesa, and Malik, *Lessons Learned in Crises and Post-Conflict Situations: The Role of UNDP in Reintegration and Reconstruction Programmes*, 20.; United Nations Development Programme, *Rapport de la mission d'évaluation externe du PCAC II, Evaluation Report* (Bujumbura, January 30, 2005), <http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=147> (accessed October 30, 2011).

⁶¹⁵ Key informant interviews, UN staff members, Bujumbura, 2002.

⁶¹⁶ Key informant interviews, UN staff members, Bujumbura, 2002.

As a result, alterations to activities lacked the necessary data or analysis to close the gap between the project aim and its actual outcomes.⁶¹⁷ The absence of data in Burundi also plagued UNDP's attempts at conflict analysis. The process of developing Burundi's 2001 Common Country Assessment (CCA) revealed that incomplete data and analysis were a challenge in conflict-affected countries, particularly at the sub-national level.⁶¹⁸ As a result, the teams compiling Burundi's CCA had to rely on international sources, exposing serious deficiencies in the national statistical system.⁶¹⁹ This touches on one alternative explanation for the theory this dissertation is testing: in countries where data is widely available, there would be more information about peacebuilding outcomes and more systematic and significant actions to improve peacebuilding outcomes. Might this increase the responsiveness of organizations to the context?

Even with the available data, the analyses of the drivers of conflict and peace contained in the CCAs or other analytical documents did not make it into the programming documents. Instead, an overall analysis was done of the context to identify areas of intervention, and then programs were designed in each area without integrating the findings of this overall analysis or examining their manifestations in the target institutions of each program.⁶²⁰ Mary Kaldor's 2005 study of UNDP's work in post-conflict countries found this to be a trend across many UNDP offices.⁶²¹

In sum, even if UNDP Burundi had wanted to alter its approach in response to the significant changes in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory, it did not have information or

617 The exception to this rule is the evaluation conducted of the Democratic Governance program in 2004, which contained a good analysis of the relevance of the program to the Burundian context. Nonetheless, the project did not have its own indicators or monitoring system to assess its own relevance to Burundi's ongoing transition.

618 United Nations Development Programme, Joint Meeting of the Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA and UNICEF, with the Participation of WFP; Friday 26 January 2001, UNDAF Status Report, January 18, 2001, 7, <http://www.undp.org/execbrd/pdf/UNDAF%20status%20report.PDF> (accessed September 28, 2011).

619 Ibid.

620 United Nations Development Programme, Rapport de la mission d'évaluation externe du PCAC II.

621 United Nations Development Programme, Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries, 40.

analysis that would enable it to make informed alterations. Even if it had wanted to make its programs more relevant to Burundi's actual context, there was no data, analysis, or reflective process that would help its staff overcome the organizational frames, knowledge-laden routines, and accountability mechanisms that discouraged responsiveness to the peacebuilding context in Burundi. UNDP's leadership was not committed to peacebuilding either and did not encourage staff to think outside of the box. Nor was there significant funding for peacebuilding programming. All of these factors together contributed to UNDP's unresponsiveness to two big changes in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory.

6.1.3 2004-2007: THE TRANSITION TO "POST-CONFLICT" (PHASE III)

Burundi's three-year transition phase would culminate in democratic elections that were scheduled to take place by October 31, 2004. UNDP began preparing for the arrival of these elections in early 2004, seeing them as a trigger for the release of development aid and the real beginning of its post-conflict phase. UNDP also expected that it would play a big role in the organization of the elections. Within the UN, it had become the organization responsible for managing the money given to organize elections, procuring electoral supplies, and organizing voter education campaigns, among other activities.⁶²² A UN peacekeeping operation was to help distribute the ballots and guarantee security during the elections. Once the UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB) finally arrived in mid-2004, UNDP worked very closely with its electoral unit to ensure that the elections, finally held in mid-2005, were technically free and fair.

UNDP and ONUB were widely praised for their significant and systematic efforts to ensure that Burundi's elections were successful. They made an important contribution to

⁶²² UNDP, UNDP Electoral Assistance Implementation Guide, Democratic Governance Group, Bureau for Development Policy (New York: UNDP, 2007), <http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/UNDP-Electoral-Assistance-Implementation-Guide.pdf> (accessed February 5, 2012).

Burundi's peacebuilding process. UNDP's other programming was not nearly as relevant. It lacked a peacebuilding lens and was largely disconnected from Burundi's fast-moving war-to-peace transition. In anticipating and helping to organize the elections, UNDP had aligned with the context, but the context had also become ready for UNDP to act in an area where it had a high degree of knowledge and capacity. This was supported by its organizational frames and accountability structures. Its other programming did not benefit from such a clear match between UNDP's goals, knowledge, and incentive structure and the needs of Burundi's institutions. They followed the predominant pattern in UNDP Burundi: a tendency to do the same types of programming it had always done in Burundi, focusing on implementing each program as planning not on aligning it with Burundi's changing context.

On August 26, 2005, the former head of the CNDD-FDD rebel movement, Pierre Nkurunziza, was inaugurated as President of Burundi. The vast majority of Burundians had cast their vote in the first democratic elections since the 1993 elections that triggered the war. The inauguration of Burundi's new president marked a critical transition in Burundi's peace process. A democratically elected Hutu president was now governing the country, and the vast majority of Burundians had accepted him. Burundi's ethnic power-sharing arrangement had delivered previously unimaginable results.

UNDP played an important role in ushering in Burundi's peaceful transition to democracy in Burundi. It advocated with donors to provide the necessary funding for the elections and managed the US\$ 17.5 million that was eventually given to the election trust fund.⁶²³ It also worked closely with the ONUB Electoral Unit to provide technical support to the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), procure the

623 United Nations System in Burundi, *Lettre de Présentation de l'Equipe de Pays*, Resident Coordinator Annual Report Introductory Letter (Bujumbura, Burundi, 2005), http://www.undg.org/DGO_CONTACT/upload/AnnualReports/BDI/Lettre%20de%20l%27Equipe%20de%20Pays%202005.doc (accessed September 29, 2011).

necessary materials, train election staff, and provide civic education.⁶²⁴ Just over 87% of Burundians surveyed in March 2006 said that the UN did a “good” or “very good” job at ensuring that the 2005 elections were free and fair.⁶²⁵ Some respondents specifically praised the public information campaign run by UNDP.⁶²⁶

ONUB brought a new political awareness and focus on peacebuilding to UNCP. ONUB was intended to be an integrated mission, which meant that it would focus all of the UN System’s resources in Burundi toward common objectives. To achieve this type of coherence, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) would also have the title of Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator, and Resident Representative of UNDP. By wearing each of these four hats, it was hoped that this individual could achieve coherence between the UN’s political, humanitarian, and development arms. Although integration within ONUB was not successful across the board, there was a high degree of collaboration between UNDP and ONUB on elections and the overall tone of UNDP’s approach became more focused on the peacebuilding process in Burundi.⁶²⁷

Although UNDP’s new leadership and its partnership with ONUB contributed to UNDP’s success in supporting Burundi’s 2005 democratic elections, they did not significantly change the rest of UNDP’s program. UNDP’s 2005-2007 country program maintained largely the same focus as the previous two programs had: good governance, rehabilitation, and the fight against HIV/AIDS. It updated these areas with a focus on elections as well as coordination of community development efforts with the World

624 United Nations Development Programme, “Burundi: Moving beyond transitional government,” ReliefWeb, April 6, 2006, <http://reliefweb.int/node/204538> (accessed October 30, 2011).

625 Krasno, Public Opinion Survey of ONUB’s Work in Burundi, 7.

626 Ibid.

627 Jackson, The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) - Political and Strategic Lessons Learned, 23–24; United Nations System in Burundi, Lettre de Présentation de l’Equipe de Pays; United Nations System in Burundi, Lettre de Présentation de l’Equipe de Pays, Annual Security Council Report 2004 (Bujumbura, Burundi, 2005), http://cfapp2.undp.org/dgo_rcar/documents/letter_BDI_147021705.doc (accessed September 29, 2011).

Bank's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts.⁶²⁸ The rest of its programs remained largely consistent and there was no effort to mainstream peacebuilding or conflict sensitivity. This followed the model set out by the 2005-2007 UNDAF, which focused on simultaneous humanitarian, development, and political action, not integrated action, peacebuilding, or conflict sensitivity. Peacebuilding was considered to be a sector, not an approach.

A 2008 evaluation of UNDP's 2005-2008 support for the reintegration of IDPs and refugees provides a window into the effectiveness of its programs. The evaluation found that the project made an important contribution through the construction of basic social service infrastructure and the distribution of farming supplies.⁶²⁹ As the only project of its kind at the time of its initiation, it made an important impact on the lives of returnees. Nonetheless, it found that the project's overall performance was very poor.⁶³⁰ It suffered from poor leadership, insufficient staff capacity, and poor communication within UNDP. Even though it had included a specific reference to coordination with DDR efforts in its country program document, the project failed to do so or take advantage of other opportunities that arose during its implementation (i.e., repatriation of refugees, private initiatives, and early harvests).⁶³¹ In addition, the evaluation found that the objectives were overly ambitious and did not respond to the real reintegration needs. The project also lacked measurable qualitative or quantitative indicators and both the project and UNDP lost credibility because it was constantly late in delivering on its promises.⁶³²

⁶²⁸ United Nations Development Programme and Republic of Burundi, *Plan D'Action du Programme de Pays 2005-2007* (Bujumbura, May 2005).

⁶²⁹ United Nations Development Programme, *Evaluation du Programme d'Appui à la Rehabilitation, Réintégration des Sinistrés et de Lutte contre la Pauvreté* (Bujumbura, Burundi, September 2009), <http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=2737> (accessed September 29, 2011).

⁶³⁰ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁶³¹ *Ibid.*, 5-7, 31.

⁶³² *Ibid.*, 5-7.

While it seems that UNDP continued its previous pattern of programming that was relatively detached from the context, why was it now able to take systematic and significant actions to achieve its aim of supporting free and fair elections in Burundi? It had been unable to adapt its programming to Burundi's transitional needs. Why was it able to respond so effectively to elections that marked the end of the transition?

6.1.3.1 Organizational frames and knowledge-laden routines

UNDP had planned for the elections in Burundi and as an organization had built up a solid base of expertise in this area. UNDP had included its support for the elections in its 2005-2007 country program and the UN's 2005-2007 UNDAF.⁶³³ At the global level, UNDP had built up a capacity and reputation for its election support work. It had been engaged in significant electoral assistance activities around the world since 1991 and had become "the major implementing body for UN electoral support".⁶³⁴ UNDP therefore had the knowledge about how to support elections. The larger organization recognized this as an important area of UNDP's work, and provided staff with the necessary materials and training. In other words, UNDP Burundi had knowledge-laden routines and organizational frames that encouraged it to plan for and ensure that it had the capacity to support Burundi's electoral process.

UNDP Burundi acted to ensure that it was ready for the elections at the same time that Burundian context changed so that UNDP could act. It did not significantly change its other activities, but instead added on a new set of electoral activities that were supported and funded by UN headquarters and other donors. Unlike the inauguration of

⁶³³ United Nations Development Programme and Republic of Burundi, *Plan D'Action du Programme de Pays 2005-2007*, 1.

⁶³⁴ "UN Entities," United Nations Department of Political Affairs, 2011, <http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/elections/actors> (accessed October 30, 2011). United Nations Development Programme, *UNDP and Electoral Assistance: Ten Years of Experience* (New York, 2000), http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/Elections-Pub_DecadeReview.pdf (accessed October 30, 2011).

the transitional government in 2001 or the implementation of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement with the CNDD-FDD in 2003, the elections were predictable. Elections had long been planned for the end of Burundi's transitional period, and the vast majority of Burundians and regional and international actors agreed that they must take place. When UNDP adopted its 2005-2007 country program, it was not certain exactly when elections would take place, but it knew that there was widespread interest that they take place within a reasonable timeframe. It also knew that UN headquarters would help to ensure that it had the resources and knowledge necessary to respond.

6.1.3.2 Accountability routines

UNDP's upward accountability to headquarters created downward accountability to Burundians for free and fair elections. Because of the high visibility of elections within the international sphere, UNDP had an interest in preserving its reputation as playing an important role in election organizing. UNDP headquarters monitored the organization of the elections in Burundi closely, creating a sense of accountability for their outcome. Election support also brought in a lot of revenue to UNDP who took 7% overhead from all of the Trust Funds that it managed.⁶³⁵ UNDP's and ONUB's focus on ensuring that the elections were free and fair was shared by the majority of the Burundian people, creating a rare instance of accountability to Burundian's wishes.

Additional attention, pressure, and support for the electoral process was brought by the deployment of ONUB in mid-2004. As discussed in Chapter 5, ONUB's leadership put a lot of its political capital behind the preparation and organization of Burundi's elections. ONUB's Electoral Unit led the technical process and received praise for its capacity to astutely manage a highly complex and political election process over a very

635 Key informant interviews, UN staff members, Bujumbura, 2009.

short time period.⁶³⁶ UNDP's close partnership with ONUB's Electoral Unit, and ONUB's focus on the elections undoubtedly contributed to UNDP's capacity to respond to the often uncertain electoral context and ultimately contribute to successful elections. Given the focus of ONUB on the elections, it is likely that there was a high degree of non-defensive learning behavior within this unit, and in its communication with UNDP.

In sum, UNDP succeeded in taking the significant and systematic actions necessary to organize the 2005 elections in close collaboration with ONUB. The deployment of ONUB was a necessary condition for UNDP's response. In the areas where it did not collaborate closely with ONUB, UNDP did not systematically attempt to maintain their relevance to the context. Even though UNDP counted as a lesson learned from its 2005-2007 program the need to adapt better to Burundi's evolving political and security situation, it was unable to do so. Its staff had no training in peacebuilding or feedback about their own intermediary results that might have helped them self-correct.⁶³⁷ Furthermore, UNDP's leadership was in flux during this period and, when present, lacked the will to push for significant peacebuilding outcomes.⁶³⁸

6.1.4 2008-2009: THE FRUITS OF INTEGRATION (PHASE V)

In 2007, the deployment of the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) reoriented UNDP's focus toward peace consolidation. In collaboration with BINUB, UNDP again took significant and systematic actions to respond to an important new opportunity in Burundi's war-to-peace transition: the integration of the FNL into the government and armed forces. It also collaborated in several other BINUB projects discussed in Chapter 5 that were focused on key peacebuilding priorities, implemented

636 Jackson, *The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) - Political and Strategic Lessons Learned*, 20.

637 United Nations Development Programme and Republic of Burundi, *Plan D'Action du Programme de Pays 2005-2007*, 3.

638 Key informant interviews, Bujumbura, 2009.

in a conflict sensitive way, and made a contribution toward the advancement of Burundi's peace process.⁶³⁹ Most of its programming, however, followed the patterns set in the preceding years. It was neither adapted to Burundi's evolving war-to-peace transition nor to the specific needs of Burundi's institutions. The deployment of BINUB changed UNDP's leadership, program, and structure, but did not alter the inner workings of the organization – its routines.

The new UNDP Resident Representative was Youssef Mahmoud, who was also the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG), the Resident Coordinator (RC), and the Humanitarian Coordinator (RC). The main elements of UNDP's 2005-2007 program were subsumed within the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Support Strategy and framed within the language of peace consolidation. UNDP contributed core staff to BINUB's three integrated sections: Human Rights and Justice Section, Democratic Peace and Governance Section, and the Security Sector Reform and Small Arms Section. The majority of the staff in each of these integrated sections, regardless of which UN entity they were contracted by, were housed within the same office.⁶⁴⁰ UNDP was also made responsible for managing the US\$ 35 million given to BINUB by the UN Peacebuilding Fund in 2007, and for procuring all related goods and supplies.

Once it was subsumed within BINUB, UNDP responded systematically and significantly to the next critical event in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory: the final implementation in April 2009 of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement signed by the FNL and CNDD-FDD on September 7, 2006. Because of the pitfalls in the negotiation process, the FNL only began to disarm its combatants in April 2009.⁶⁴¹ The full

639 See also, Campbell, Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi.

640 BINUB, UN integration in Burundi in the context of a peacebuilding office BINUB: Lessons learned from Jun 2006 to Oct 2007 (Bujumbura, Burundi: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, February 2008), <http://reliefweb.int/node/260836> (accessed September 16, 2011).

641 Mahmoud, "Partnerships for Peacebuilding in Burundi: Some Lessons Learned," 11.

demobilization of the FNL's 21,000 combatants would constitute the separation of its political and military arms, which was a prerequisite for its participation in the 2010 elections. Unfortunately, the Multi-Donor Reintegration Program (MDRP) that had funded the DDR of the CNDD-FDD had closed in 2008 and there was no big pot of money to fund the demobilization of the FNL.

UNDP responded in several ways to ensure that the FNL combatants received the same reintegration assistance as the CNDD-FDD had received, and were thus able to transform into a political party. BCPR provided funding for the cantonment of the FNL and the demobilization of 11,000 associated adults.⁶⁴² The Joint UNDP-BINUB Security Sector Reform and Small Arms Section distributed the first payment to the 11,000 associated adults, which had been funded by the PBF emergency basket fund.⁶⁴³ UNDP's Early Recovery Unit followed up with the second tranche once they returned to their town of residence.⁶⁴⁴ Finally, UNDP targeted its community development program in the provinces and areas where the majority of FNL combatants returned.⁶⁴⁵

BINUB and UNDP's support for the DDR process had two goals: 1) the conversation of the FNL into a political party, which would allow them to participate in the elections

642 Key informant interviews, UN staff members, Bujumbura 2009. The associated adults constituted a group of both men and women who were not normal combatants, but were part of the FNL's broader force. They were verified on the FNL's list, but were not likely to be reintegrated into the Burundian Army or Police, but still needed to be demobilized and reintegrated into society.

643 United Nations Security Council, Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi, UNSC, November 30, 2009, para. 38, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/615/67/PDF/N0961567.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed October 30, 2011).

644 The term "early recovery" is essentially the development's community's word for peacebuilding. It aims to enable a quicker and more effective response by the international community to the foggy phases of war-to-peace transitions that do not easily correspond to strict humanitarian, peacekeeping, or development definitions. "Early recovery is guided by development principles that seek to build on humanitarian programs and catalyze sustainable development opportunities. It aims to generate self sustaining, nationally owned, resilient processes for post crisis recovery." Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery and UNDG-ECHA Working Group on Transition, Guidance Note on Early Recovery (Geneva: United Nations Development Programme Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), April 2008), 6, [http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/cluster approach page/clusters pages/Early R/ER_Internet.pdf](http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/cluster%20approach%20page/clusters%20pages/Early%20R/ER_Internet.pdf) (accessed October 13, 2011).

645 UNDP Burundi, "Appui à la réintégration durable des ex-combattants", n.d., http://www.bi.undp.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141&Itemid=236 (accessed September 20, 2011).

and, hopefully, use the democratic institutions to achieve their aims in a non-violent fashion; and 2) the sustainable reintegration of former combatants into society or into the police and military, which would, hopefully, prevent them from engaging in criminality and violence outside of the rule of law.⁶⁴⁶ The Security Sector Reform and Small Arms Section focused on achieving the first “political” goal, which their input of reintegration kits helped to jumpstart, but not the second “sustainability” goal. Both the BINUB section and the UNDP Early Recovery Unit monitored the distribution of kits and money, but not the sustainability of the reintegration of ex-combatants into Burundian society.⁶⁴⁷ With remaining PBF funds, UNDP began implementing a socio-economic reconstruction project in the provinces where high levels of FNL combatants were being reintegrated, but the implementation of the project was delayed so long that the remobilization of former combatants by the FNL in 2010 put the continued relevance of this program into question.⁶⁴⁸

Several other projects that UNDP implemented in collaboration with BINUB also made an important contribution to Burundi’s peacebuilding process: the Cadre de Dialogue Project, the projects with the Burundian National Defense Forces, and the local public service project.⁶⁴⁹ But, the majority of projects that UNDP and BINUB implemented together were not of high quality, did not act to sustain their relevance to Burundi’s war-to-peace trajectory, and did not demonstrate an important contribution to their specific aims or the general peacebuilding aims of UNDP.⁶⁵⁰ For example, UNDP/BINUB supported the reconstruction of local tribunals, but failed to consult with the population or monitor the work by the contractors, leading to shoddy work that did

⁶⁴⁶ Key informant interviews, Bujumbura, 2009.

⁶⁴⁷ Key informant interviews, Bujumbura, 2009.

⁶⁴⁸ Key informant interviews, Bujumbura, 2009.

⁶⁴⁹ Campbell, Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi.

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid.

not meet the needs of the local judiciary.⁶⁵¹ UNDP's other activities that were not implemented with BINUB were equally variable in their quality and were even more disconnected from Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory.⁶⁵² "Some communes have 300 or 1000 agricultural associations. We have been supporting these associations. Where is the impact?"⁶⁵³

The problem was not confined to UNDP. Many other members of the UN development community in Burundi had similar problems designing, implementing, and monitoring peacebuilding programming. The UN Population Fund implemented a youth peacebuilding project that was plagued by local corruption.⁶⁵⁴ Some, such as UNICEF, refused to even try.⁶⁵⁵ The UN Country Team in Burundi had a pattern of doing programming in Burundi that was largely disconnected from Burundi's peacebuilding process. Some with a more humanitarian focus were still stuck in the humanitarian mode, delivering food and other supplies to people who no longer needed it.⁶⁵⁶ Others, like UNICEF, focused on their core mandate of helping the vulnerable children in Burundi without asking how Burundi's peacebuilding dynamics related to their vulnerability or how UNICEF's programming might influence these dynamics.⁶⁵⁷ In fact, most staff rarely went to the provinces to talk to their beneficiaries and try to better understand how the conflict affected them.⁶⁵⁸ It was neither a priority on their work plan, nor within their organizational frame.⁶⁵⁹ It continued a pattern.⁶⁶⁰ These

651 Ibid.

652 Mangu Wa Kanika, *L'évaluation de l'effet Paix et Gouvernance: Inclusion politique accrue, réconciliation nationale et responsabilité à travers des structures démocratiques renforcées et la décentralisation des institutions aux niveaux national, provincial et local des programmes et projets 2005-2009 appuyés par le PNUD au Burundi* (Bujumbura, Burundi: United Nations Development Programme Burundi, November 2009).

653 Key informant interview, UN staff member (UP1), Bujumbura, 2009.

654 Campbell, *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*.

655 Key informant interview (O19), Bujumbura, 2009.

656 Key informant interview, UN staff member (UP1), Bujumbura, 2009.

657 Key informant interview (O19), Bujumbura, 2009.

658 Key informant interview (O24), Bujumbura, 2009.

659 Key informant interview (O24), Bujumbura, 2009.

organizations had been insensitive to their relationship to Burundi's conflict and peacebuilding process throughout the conflict.⁶⁶¹

These organizations felt that paying attention to the influence of their programming on Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory was too far out of their scope of work and carried a high opportunity cost.

The opportunity cost of being targeted and specific to meet peacebuilding priorities is very high because of the extent to which we have standardized programming implementation. The fact that Burundi has innovative [peacebuilding] programming is 80 to 90 percent due to Youssef [Mahmoud]. Youssef had a knack for using [PBF funding] for his own purposes.⁶⁶²

But unlike most of the other UN development organizations, UNDP had a special mandate to engage in conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming. Why was it not able to fulfill this mandate during this period in Burundi? Why was UNDP able to respond so quickly to the opportunity presented by the demobilization of the FNL, but not able to align the rest of its programming with the peacebuilding context?

6.1.4.1 Leadership and understanding

UNDP's partnership with BINUB made a big difference in UNDP's willingness and capacity to respond to key opportunities in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory. The approach of BINUB's ERSG, Youssef Mahmoud, in particular made a big difference. BINUB's leadership was directly involved in the talks that led to FNL's agreement to disarm and demobilize in 2009. Through his membership in the Political Directorate established by the South African Facilitator of the peace process, the ERSG followed the negotiations between the FNL and CNDD-FDD closely and was invested their success.⁶⁶³

660 Key informant interview, UN staff member (UP1), Bujumbura, 2009.

661 Participant observation in Bujumbura, Burundi, 1999-2002.

662 Key informant interview, UN staff member (O25), Geneva, July 2008.

663 Mahmoud, "Partnerships for Peacebuilding in Burundi: Some Lessons Learned," 10.

When opportunities arose for his office to support this process, he and his core political staff acted quickly to mobilize BINUB's and UNDP's resources.⁶⁶⁴

The ERSG's response is not so different from the approach of his predecessor, Carolyn McAskie, who mobilized ONUB's resources for the 2005 elections. The difference was that ERSG Youssef Mahmoud had a significant influence over the actions of UNDP, not just those of DPKO staff, as had been the case with McAskie. Because the heads of the three integrated sections reported directly to Mahmoud, he was able to influence the direction and focus of their programs. Partly because of the historical relationships that several key staff had with key Burundian politicians, the ERSG and his team had excellent access to information and analysis about the evolution of the negotiations and were well prepared to take advantage of this opportunity.⁶⁶⁵

The ERSG was not able to impact the operations of much of the rest of the UN system, including UNDP. Although Mahmoud was technically the boss of UNDP, the day-to-day operations were managed by the UNDP Country Director and his deputies, all of whom came from more classical development backgrounds. In addition, UNDP Burundi had an organizational culture that discouraged effective programming, leading to entrenched patterns that were difficult to change. Burundi office had developed a bad reputation because of its pre-2007 performance and weak capacity.⁶⁶⁶ In an effort to improve its capacity to manage successfully the US\$ 35 million provided by the PBF, UNDP headquarters significantly upgraded the quality and quantity of UNDP Burundi's staff.⁶⁶⁷

By 2009, the new staff had begun to shift the organizational discourse away from pure development and toward early recovery and more contextually relevant

664 Key informant interviews, UN staff members, Bujumbura, 2009.

665 Key informant interviews, UN staff members, Bujumbura, 2009.

666 Key informant interviews, UN staff members (O26), 2010.

667 Key informant interviews, UN staff members, 2009.

programming, but it was an uphill battle.⁶⁶⁸ Staff were used to staying in Bujumbura, not going out to the countryside to talk with the people they were supposed to be helping.⁶⁶⁹ UNDP's Burundi staff were predominantly Tutsi and many of them were traumatized by the conflict, reticent to go out to the countryside and talk to poor Hutu.⁶⁷⁰ Many international staff were also reluctant to leave the capital – consumed by meetings, events and reports. “Burundi is not a place where you see suffering people everywhere” and it was easy for people to focus on their high-level discussion with government and other meetings and forget that the reality was very different outside of Bujumbura.⁶⁷¹ This culture and UNDP's patterns of programming were difficult for any leader to change, particularly without the type of self-reflective reform process that Care Burundi adopted (See Chapter 8).⁶⁷²

6.1.4.2 Flexible peacebuilding funding

Leadership that was committed to peacebuilding combined with a solid understanding of the peacebuilding context were insufficient for UNDP to respond to the need for support for the FNL's disarmament and demobilization. Money was also necessary. Because it had already benefited from PBF funding and was on the Peacebuilding Commission's agenda, Burundi was an ideal candidate to access the PBF's Emergency Window funding.⁶⁷³ When the demobilization of the FNL seemed imminent, the ERSG and his team acted quickly to mobilize this funding to provide a reintegration package to the 11,000 non-combatant adults that the FNL insisted be demobilized. UNDP also mobilized its own resources through BCPR, which had established its own flexible

668 Interview with UNDP staff, Bujumbura, 2009 (UP1).

669 Interview with UNDP staff, Bujumbura, 2009 (UP1).

670 Interview with UNDP staff, Bujumbura, 2009 (UP1).

671 Interview with UNDP staff, Bujumbura, 2009 (UP1).

672 Interview with UNDP staff, Bujumbura, 2009 (UP1).

673 Key informant interview, UN staff member (O27), Bujumbura, 2009.

and rapid funding disbursement mechanism. The presence of these flexible funds made it possible for UNDP to respond quickly. Normally, the long planning process and three- to five-year country programs made it difficult for the organization to develop new interventions to respond to unforeseen opportunities. The PBF emergency fund and BCPR fund made a quick and targeted response possible.

6.1.4.3 Knowledge-laden routines and organizational frames

Under BINUB, UNDP adopted an overall frame of peace consolidation, but the knowledge of its staff, accountability routines, and procedures were still geared for development programming. The office was trying to make the shift to early recovery programming, but there was still a great deal of confusion as to what this actually meant and how it should be done.⁶⁷⁴ The connection between peace consolidation, peacebuilding, and early recovery were also unclear to most staff, making it difficult for them to develop and implement programs that fulfilled the different criteria.⁶⁷⁵

Several of the projects funded by the PBF truly had a peacebuilding lens and achieved some type of peacebuilding impact.⁶⁷⁶ They were made possible by UNDP Burundi's adoption, however superficial, of a new organizational frame. UNDP's contribution to the demobilization of the FNL was one such project. The majority of UNDP's other projects, however, retained their development frame and approach and were largely insensitive to their interaction with Burundi's war-to-peace transition. UNDP's development frame was focused on the Millennium Development Goals and implementing projects that it believed were directly relevant to them and were not already 'taken' by other UN organizations. Perhaps even more so, UNDP was interesting in maintaining the areas of programming that it had laid claim to in Burundi: economic

⁶⁷⁴ Interview with UNDP staff, Bujumbura, 2009 (UP1).

⁶⁷⁵ Interview with UNDP staff, Bujumbura, 2009 (UP1).

⁶⁷⁶ Campbell, Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi.

and political governance, civilian disarmament, community development, and judicial reform, among others, and expanding to new programmatic areas that donors were interested in funding, such as tourism.⁶⁷⁷ UNDP believed that BINUB would soon leave the country and that, finally, development and early recovery would be the predominant frames.⁶⁷⁸

The integrated Security Sector Reform and Small Arms Section, made up of staff contracted by UNDP and DPKO, had the right combination of local and political knowledge and development skills to respond to the demobilization of the FNL associated adults. They had staff with a lot of programming experience with DDR as well as those with deep knowledge of the Burundian context and technical skills. At times, its staff combined these skills nicely to support well-designed and targeted interventions, such as this one. At other times, they did not.⁶⁷⁹

In addition to these knowledge-laden routines, both UNDP and DPKO viewed DDR as a priority and wanted to be seen as contributing to its success. This organizational frame helped to encourage action in this area, as both organizations saw it as falling clearly within their mandate and approach. In fact, supporting the reintegration of ex-combatants was viewed within UNDP as one of its core areas of post-conflict programming.

In spite of the high level of political, programmatic, and local knowledge of the Security Sector Reform and Small Arms Section, they did not have specific peacebuilding programming or monitoring and evaluation knowledge. They supported the

⁶⁷⁷ Key informant interviews, UN staff members (UP2) and observers (O28), Bujumbura, 2009.

⁶⁷⁸ Key informant interviews, UN staff members (UP1) and observers (O28), Bujumbura, 2009.

⁶⁷⁹ The projects designed for the police were not as successful as many of this section's other projects. Specifically, the project that purchased uniforms for the police had serious flaws, including the absence of staff with the necessary skills or good communication within the team or between the team and their Burundian counterparts. The result was that in an effort to increase the professionalism of the police, many police officers were forced to wear uniforms that were faded and of the wrong size and cut for them. This did not increase the perceived professionalism of the police nor did it make the individual police officers wearing these uniforms proud. Campbell, Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi.

demobilization of the FNL combatants by providing them with reintegration kits, which required a good fundraising apparatus and a politically astute distribution system. The unit did not monitor the contribution of these kits to sustainable reintegration, nor was that part of the project design.

BINUB and UNDP staff repeatedly expressed their desire for more training in peacebuilding design and programming, which they felt they had been thrust into without a proper induction phase.⁶⁸⁰ A few staff did have training in peacebuilding or conflict prevention, and others were able to learn on the job, but the vast majority did not know how to do peacebuilding programming or monitor its outcomes, and UN headquarters provided very little support for this.⁶⁸¹ The ERSG brought in several external consultants to help to design programs, but these programs were not always well designed and there was no training on peacebuilding programming.⁶⁸² The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (JMEU) that was supposed to support monitoring and evaluation for all of BINUB was unstaffed for its first year, and then was seriously understaffed and lacked any specific peacebuilding expertise. In fact, in its four years of existence, the position of the head of the unit was never filled.⁶⁸³ UNDP Burundi's M&E capacity was equally weak, with one M&E advisor who had no specific peacebuilding M&E training for the entire office.⁶⁸⁴ Without M&E expertise, few UNDP or BINUB projects were able to understand their contribution to Burundi's peacebuilding process.

The dearth of peacebuilding training or knowledge among BINUB's staff reflected the position of peacebuilding within the participating organizations: DPKO, DPA, and

⁶⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸¹ BINUB, UN integration in Burundi in the context of a peacebuilding office BINUB: Lessons learned from Jun 2006 to Oct 2007, 12, 15.

⁶⁸² Campbell, Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi. and my interviews.

⁶⁸³ Interviews and participant observation. BINUB, UN integration in Burundi in the context of a peacebuilding office BINUB: Lessons learned from Jun 2006 to Oct 2007, 17.

⁶⁸⁴ Key informant interviews, UN staff members, and Participant Observation, Bujumbura, 2009.

UNDP. Although BINUB adopted peacebuilding as its predominant organizational frame, DPKO, DPA, and UNDP did not. DPKO remained focused on peacekeeping, which primarily involves the deployment of peacekeeping troops and technical advisors to conflict-ridden countries. It did not try to hire staff with experience designing and implementing peacebuilding programs. DPA remained focused on political analysis, strategic coordination and managing political missions. Just as with DPKO, these missions rarely engaged in peacebuilding programming, except when the PBF provided funding for that purpose. Even in these cases, DPA did not have a roster of staff who were skilled in the design, implementation, or monitoring of peacebuilding programs. They hired people with political analysis and strategy development skills.

UNDP remained focused on development. It developed a strong cadre of staff with peacebuilding and conflict prevention expertise in BCPR, but these people were only advisors. They were deployed to countries for a week or two and help to do a conflict analysis, design a program, assess the progress of a program, or provide some other type of support. But they could not significantly alter the incentive structure or knowledge of field staff, or influence organizational routines to make peacebuilding programming more adaptive. BCPR could only respond to requests for assistance, not impose any change that the country office did not ask for.

6.1.4.4 Learning behavior

Although staff working the FNL project shared information about the evolving negotiations and were well-informed about the situation of the FNL combatants, this information was not widely shared within the Security Sector Reform Unit, BINUB, or UNDP. Furthermore, there was not an open non-defensive learning culture in relation to programming outcomes. Staff did not attempt to gather sufficient valid information about outcomes, and when they did it was not openly discussed and debated. This was

partly because some of the information was thought to be too sensitive to discuss openly within the team. It was also because people worked on their own projects and did not regularly discuss one another's work or outcomes. In addition to relatively closed communication within the Security Sector Reform Unit, there was not much communication with the UNDP Early Recovery Unit that was supposed to follow up on the combatants.⁶⁸⁵ They worked in separate offices and did not openly or regularly collaborate.

Non-defensive learning behavior supported by valid information would have been most important for the follow-up phase of the UN's support to the FNL, which was supposed to be covered by newer PBF projects that UNDP began implementing in 2010 and 2011. The BINUB/UNDP Security Sector Reform Unit only distributed the initial tranche of cash and was not concerned with what the FNL affiliates did with the money and therefore did not need to learn from or adapt to changes in the context.

Within UNDP in general there was open and non-defensive discussion among a certain group of core staff who challenged each other's assumptions and ideas, but this discussion was not accompanied by significant data on UNDP's outcomes, particularly in relation to Burundi's peacebuilding process.⁶⁸⁶ While some interventions were rarely discussed, others were over discussed. One socio-economic reconstruction project that did aim to be conflict sensitive and learn lessons from UNDP's other efforts in this area became bogged down in discussion, consultation, and reflection. This consultative process significantly delayed the project and it eventually began to outlast its relevance.⁶⁸⁷

685 Key informant interviews, UN staff members, and Participant Observation, Bujumbura, 2009.

686 Interview with UNDP staff, Bujumbura, 2009 (UP1); Interview with UNDP staff, Bujumbura, 2009 (UP2).

687 The project that I am referring to is the final PBF project funded by the 2007 tranche. It focused on reconstruction and rehabilitation in Bubanza, Bujumbura (Rurale), and Cibitoke, the provinces that were most affected by the recent stages of the conflict. The BINUB and UNDP teams sought to include all of the lessons that they had learned from the other PBF projects in this one, resulting in the delay in its implementation by

6.1.4.5 Accountability routines

In relation to the negotiations with the FNL and support for the demobilization of the FNL's military wing, horizontal and upward accountability aligned. UNDP and DPKO were not downwardly accountable to the ex-combatants, but were horizontally accountable to the politicians and peace process that they hoped to influence. The UN Member States who funded, governed, and mandated UNDP and DPKO wanted 2010 elections to take place. The elections were another critical benchmark by which they would measure their own success.⁶⁸⁸

UNDP's other programming did not benefit from this alignment between horizontal and upward accountability, but were constrained by UNDP's primary focus on upward accountability. Most of UNDP's projects focused on their collaboration with government ministries. UNDP staff did not actually go to the countryside to understand the problem for themselves or develop a more context-specific approach. They relied on what the government ministries told them.⁶⁸⁹ For much of this period, UNDP "had difficulty being up to date with all of the agencies because we did not have anyone in the field."⁶⁹⁰

UNDP did not measure intermediary outcomes, but assessed its projects on the degree to which they spent the money allocated to them.⁶⁹¹ Staff were rewarded for spending money according to plan, delivery supplies, and organizing the events outlined in their project proposal.⁶⁹² When they achieved visible positive outcomes, they were also praised, but the incentive structure in the organization did not facilitate this.⁶⁹³ This

two years. By the time the project finally got off the ground, the problem that it was supposed to be addressing – the need to integrate the former FNL combatants into these provinces – was beginning to be replaced by a new problem: the need to stop the FNL combatants from being remobilized. But, the project was not designed to address this problem and continued largely on its previous path.

688 Key informant interviews, members of the International Community, Bujumbura, 2009.

689 Interview with UNDP staff, Bujumbura, 2009 (UP1).

690 Interview with UNDP staff, Bujumbura, 2009 (UP1).

691 Campbell, Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi.

692 Key informant interviews, UN staff members, and Participant Observation, Bujumbura, 2009.

693 Key informant interviews, UN staff members, and Participant Observation, Bujumbura, 2009.

focus on delivery, rather than outcomes or impact, was encouraged by many of UNDP's donors who also were evaluated on the degree to which they spent the money allocated to them.⁶⁹⁴

UNDP's procedures were notoriously slow, bureaucratic, and insensitive to the needs of Burundi's transition. UNDP was the "most bureaucratic organization" partly because it did "a lot of the procedural work for the whole [UN] system".⁶⁹⁵ Even so, UNDP insiders and outsiders repeatedly complained about the slowness of the bureaucracy and how it held them back from doing the type of programming that they wanted to do.⁶⁹⁶

For the PBF projects, UNDP's bureaucratic procedures led to considerable delay as they awaited the delivery of procured goods, the finalization of contracts, and the arrival of staff.⁶⁹⁷ Although BINUB and UNDP headquarters have streamlined many of these procedures, much of the bureaucracy remained conflict insensitive. This had a negative impact on Burundi's war-to-peace transition in at least two instances. In one case, the procurement office and the BINUB Security Sector Unit failed to properly examine the police uniforms that they had procured, distributing poor quality uniforms throughout the country. Instead of increasing the perceived professionalism of the police as intended, these faded purple and pink uniforms made the new Burundian National Police look faded and tattered.⁶⁹⁸ The UNDP procurement office made a similar mistake with the ballots for the 2010 elections, leading to the postponement of the elections by several

694 Gilles Marie-Paul Laheurte, *Rapport de Mission au Burundi: Appui au Centre de Service du PNUD (CISNU)*, Bujumbura, Burundi (Bujumbura, Burundi: PNUD, March 9, 2008), 9, <http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/manageevaluation/viewevaluationdetail.html?evalid=4324> (accessed September 18, 2011).

695 Interview with UNDP staff, Bujumbura, 2009 (UP1).

696 Key informant interviews, UN staff members, Bujumbura, 2009.

697 Campbell, *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*.

698 *Ibid.*

days.⁶⁹⁹ These examples show that normal bureaucratic procedures can have a big political impact and should be overseen by staff who are attentive to their impact on a country's war-to-peace transition.

Even BINUB and UNDP's more successful peacebuilding projects had to contend with very slow procedures and planning cycles that were ill-suited to the fast pace and unpredictable nature of events in Burundi. Staff in these projects prided themselves on finding ways of working around UNDP's arduous procedures and caging their requests in bureaucratic language that would aid their easy approval.⁷⁰⁰ The routines that prioritized spending money, not returning it, made staff implement activities that they considered to be relatively useless.⁷⁰¹ Project planning had to take place so far in advance that they inevitably including activities that would no longer be relevant by the time they happened. Still, they had to be implemented so that the money could be spent as planned.

Some staff were able to innovate within these constraints, cajole the bureaucracy into giving them what they needed, and implement important peacebuilding projects. But, in most cases, UNDP procedures bogged people down. Combined with their lack of peacebuilding knowledge or feedback from the people and institutions they wanted to influence, these upward accountability routines prevented most staff from implementing conflict-sensitive peacebuilding or development activities. In other words, the project implementation phase did not incorporate understanding of the evolving situation in Burundi and the relationship between the intervention and this context. This led most projects to veer significant off the course of Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory.

⁶⁹⁹ Key informant interviews (O22), 2010.

⁷⁰⁰ Key informant interview (UO2), Bujumbura, 2009.

⁷⁰¹ Key informant interviews, UN staff members, Bujumbura, 2009.

6.1.4.6 The Role of Integration

Integration helped UNDP and DPKO achieve important peacebuilding outcomes that they were not likely to have otherwise achieved. The provision of cash to FNL affiliates, which in turn facilitated the integration of the FNL into the government and armed forces, was one such outcome.⁷⁰² But, the majority of BINUB's integrated activities were not very relevant to Burundi's war-to-peace transition. Integration only changed the discourse, the leadership structure, and the aims of the integrated units. It did not alter UNDP's or DPKO's infrastructure, knowledge-laden routines, or accountability systems. Consequently, most of the activities carried out by UNDP followed the same patterns of previous years. They were primarily development activities that failed to correspond to the specific needs and capacities of Burundi's war-to-peace transition.

Although the creation of BINUB's joint programs did, in some cases, enable the creation of teams that combined political, local, and peacebuilding programming knowledge, it also further decreased the efficiency of the UN. Staff had to navigate at least two sets of bureaucratic procedures and accompanying reports and meetings, leading to a great deal of wasted time and a steep learning curve.⁷⁰³ There were also contradictory messages coming from the ERSG's office and from UNDP's leadership: the former focused on the relevance programming to peace consolidation while the latter focused on spending the funds allocated to each project.⁷⁰⁴ This left staff confused as to what the real organizational priorities were.

702 The other key outcomes were the unblocking of the deadlock in Parliament in 2007 and the appointment of a neutral head of the 2009 National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), which the Cadre de Dialogue claimed to contribute to.

703 Key informant interviews, UN staff (UO3), Bujumbura, 2009.

704 Key informant interviews, UN staff (UO3), Bujumbura, 2009. The Joint Steering Committee and Monitoring Committees for the PBF projects did regularly request information about outcomes, but in most cases staff did not deliver this information. These consultative bodies had no direct sanctions or incentives that they could mobilize to encourage the production of this information.

The UN Integrated Peacebuilding Support Strategy (UNDAF+ 2007-2008, and extended until the end of 2009) grouped all of the UN programming under common aims, but other than through the joint programs, it did not change the way that different UN entities in Burundi, including UNDP, carried out their programs. In fact, the UNDAF+ proclaimed that it had built on all of the previous aims and objectives pursued by the UN in Burundi, which it saw as an asset.⁷⁰⁵ While this did allow for continuity, it also reinforced UNDP's path dependency and tendency to doing the same types of programming in the same ways, whatever the context. The analysis used in the 2007-2008 UNDAF+ was actually developed for the PRSP in 2005, before the end of Burundi's transitional period, and not significantly updated to take into account the changes that had taken place in the previous two years, or during the UNDAF+ lifetime.⁷⁰⁶

Furthermore, the integration of the entire UN under the same strategy failed to provide the training or incentives necessary for the various UN entities involved to integrate a conflict sensitive and peacebuilding approach into their normal programming approach. The UN began to use the common rhetoric of peace consolidation, but most UN entities did not specifically develop peacebuilding interventions nor did they monitor their programs according to their conflict sensitivity or contribution to peacebuilding aims. UN headquarters offered practically no technical support or guidance to increase their country offices' capacity to do so.⁷⁰⁷ For UNDP, the peacebuilding contributions that were achieved are due to the on-the-job innovation of

705 BINUB, *Stratégie intégrée d'appui des Nations Unies à la Consolidation de la Paix* (Bujumbura, Burundi: United Nations, March 2007), 9–10, http://www.bi.undp.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=115&Itemid=148 (accessed September 18, 2011).

706 BINUB, *UN integration in Burundi in the context of a peacebuilding office* BINUB: Lessons learned from Jun 2006 to Oct 2007, 22.

707 Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, *Second Country Cooperation Framework for Burundi* (2002-2004), 15.

staff, their capacity to make the system work for them, and the innovative monitoring mechanisms put in place specifically for the PBF projects.⁷⁰⁸

6.1.5 2010 – 2011: DEVELOPMENT AND THE VIOLENT ONE-PARTY STATE

The next critical event in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory was the 2010 election cycle. After a tumultuous pre-election period, communal elections took place in May 2010. The CNDD-FDD won with 64 percent of the vote and the other parties received much less than they had thought that they would. Claiming fraud, the opposition parties withdrew from the subsequent elections. The international community declared the elections free and fair and did not make significant attempts to facilitate dialogue between the CNDD-FDD and the opposition parties. On June 28, 2010 the presidential elections were held, with Pierre Nkurunziza as the only candidate. Once the electoral period was over, Burundi had officially become a one-party state that used oppression and violence to maintain its power.

Many Burundians lost the hope that they had held on throughout Burundi's peacebuilding process: that democracy and peace were both possible.⁷⁰⁹ More violence and instability loomed over the horizon. In response to these trends, UNDP did not take systematic or significant action to change the course of events or to alter its course. By its own admission, the UN in Burundi "was often guided by problems and without sufficient regard for opportunities."⁷¹⁰ The results of the 2010 elections seemed to present a problem that the UN was neither willing nor able to deal with.

Unlike the 2005 elections, where the president was appointed by the parliament, the Burundian people directly elected the President in 2010. For both Burundians and

708 Campbell, Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi.

709 Informal discussions, Bujumbura, 2009.

710 United Nations System in Burundi, *Stratégie intégrée d'appui des Nations Unies au Burundi 2010-2014* (Bujumbura, Burundi, April 2009), <http://www.unicef.org/about/execboard/files/Burundi---UNDAF-2010-2014.pdf> (accessed September 28, 2011). Translated by author from French.

international actors this round of elections marked Burundi's real transition to democracy. For UNDP Burundi, it marked the transition toward relatively normal development cooperation between UNDP and the Government of Burundi, and a chance for it to move out from the shadow of BINUB.⁷¹¹ For the previous three years, UNDP's entire country program had been subsumed within BINUB. UNDP did not even have its own country program document from 2007 to 2009. For this new phase, UNDP had its own country program document (2010-2014) that was aligned with, but not subsumed by, the new UNDAF + (2010-2014).

UNDP was to play an important role in the 2010 elections by providing technical support to the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), procuring the needed ballots and other supplies, managing the US\$ 46.5 million election trust fund, and running a civic education campaign.⁷¹² The organization of the 2010 elections was different from the 2005 round. For the 2005 elections, there was a Chapter VII peacekeeping operation with several thousand troops and an appointed transitional government in place. As a result, the UN had a lot of leverage over the electoral process. In 2010, by contrast, the government was in the driver's seat.

For the 2010 elections, the national leadership of the electoral process posed several challenges for the UN. First, the UN could not officially begin planning for the electoral period until the government requested its support in May 2009. Second, because the government was managing the electoral process to a greater degree than it had in 2005, the success of the elections depended more on the government capacity to prevent fraud,

711 Executive Representative of the Secretary General, 2010 Resident Coordinator Annual Report - Burundi (New York: United Nations Development Group, 2010), 2, <http://www.undg.org/rcar2010.cfm?fuseaction=RCAR&ctyIDC=BDI&P=1507> (accessed September 19, 2011).; Participant observation (interviews during PBF report).

712 UNDP, "UNDP to support Burundi elections" (Bujumbura, Burundi, September 23, 2009), <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2009/september/undp-to-manage-usd-44-million-fund-for-burundi-elections.en> (accessed September 19, 2011); Secretary-General, Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (New York: United Nations Security Council, n.d.), 2, <http://reliefweb.int/node/376922> (accessed September 19, 2011).

managing a highly contentious political context, and ensure that the elections were technically sound. Third, and most destructive, the government felt that BINUB was taking sides by supporting the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), which did not initially favor the CNDD-FDD, and decided to expel the ERSG in December 2009.⁷¹³ Mr. Mahmoud's expulsion left a leadership vacuum at a time when good political leadership was most needed.

Within this context, UNDP mobilized funding for the elections and created an electoral unit to support the CENI in the organization of the 2010 election cycle, beginning in May and ending in September 2010. Unfortunately, technical failures caused the postponement of the first round of elections by three days, from May 21, 2010 to May 24, 2010.⁷¹⁴ UNDP had failed to adequately check the ballots and distributed ballots that did not contain all of the parties, creating speculation of fraud in an already politically charged environment.⁷¹⁵ As mentioned earlier, UNDP had made a similar procurement mistake in relation to police uniforms in 2009, which embarrassed both the police and UNDP.⁷¹⁶ Although DPKO mobilized MONUC resources to reprint the ballots and distribute them by the May 24th elections, the rumors about fraudulent elections had already spread.⁷¹⁷

Once it became clear that the elections would result in a one-party state, the UN conducted a review of its strategic aims and established its priorities for the next five years: economic recovery, accountable institutions, dialogue and reconciliation

713 African Press Agency, "Burundi government explains UN envoy 'expulsion'" (Bujumbura, Burundi, December 29, 2009), <http://www.netnewspublisher.com/burundi-government-explains-un-envoy-expulsion/> (accessed September 19, 2011).

714 Secretary-General, Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi, 2.

715 Key informant interviews (O22), 2010.

716 Campbell, Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi.

717 Key informant interviews (O22), 2010.

mechanisms, and transitional justice.⁷¹⁸ These priorities reflect the general strategies and priorities already articulated in the 2010-2014 UNDAF+, and had not been altered in light of the election outcome. The implementation of the UNDAF had already been delayed because of the election period, which was easy to predict but had, nonetheless, not been integrated into their planning schema.⁷¹⁹

UNDP's 2010-2014 program contained the same areas of work that UNDP had been engaged in during the previous three years, with the exception of additional programming in the area of tourism and infrastructure development.⁷²⁰ UNDP's conflict prevention and peacebuilding work continued to focus on small businesses, reintegration of returning refugees and IDPs, and the reintegration of former FNL combatants.⁷²¹ Even though the FNL combatants were demobilized in 2008, the project was far from over in 2011, with only 15% of the money allocated having been spent.⁷²² Given that the FNL was remobilizing in 2011 to form new rebel movement, the project seems to have missed its window of opportunity.⁷²³

UNDP's overall country program did not contain general conflict prevention or peacebuilding goals, or aim to mainstream peacebuilding, conflict prevention, or conflict sensitivity into its various elements. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding were compartmentalized into a few projects related to governance or small arms. Some of these projects, particularly in the area of governance, were potentially very innovative

718 Executive Representative of the Secretary General, 2010 Resident Coordinator Annual Report - Burundi, 2.

719 Executive Representative of the Secretary General, 2010 Resident Coordinator Annual Report - Burundi.

720 United Nations Development Programme, Programme de Pays pour le Burundi (2010-2014) (Bujumbura, August 2009),

http://www.bi.undp.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=5&Itemid=211 (accessed October 13, 2011).

721 UNDP Burundi, "Prévention de crises et Relèvement", n.d.,

http://www.bi.undp.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=112&Itemid=78 (accessed September 20, 2011).

722 UNDP Burundi, "Appui à la réintégration durable des ex-combattants."

723 Ibid.

peacebuilding projects.⁷²⁴ But, they were designed in 2009 at a time when BINUB and UNDP still believed that real institutional reform was possible in the Burundian government. By the end of 2010, most of the staff involved in the design of these innovative governance projects had left Burundi.

After the full election results were in, UNDP continued to implement its program as planned. After all, it was in Burundi for the long haul and had to push forward. It did not significantly alter it to take into account of the fact that Burundi was now run by a one-party state that used violence to quiet its opposition. The main alterations that UNDP made were to drop activities, such as its support for the Permanent Forum of Political Parties, that were no longer possible in the increasingly closed political climate. That said, with the support of the PBF it did launch more socio-economic activities in areas where the FNL combatants were returning, but did not take into account the relationship between these activities and the remobilization of many of these ex-combatants by a new rebellion.

UNDP's approach was supported by the BINUB and the UN Secretariat. They felt that the best approach was to attempt to stabilize the situation by pressuring the opposition parties to join the electoral process. The UN Secretary-General visited Burundi during the middle of the election period and declared: "It is imperative that these elections be a success. Burundi has an opportunity to become a success story and a model for the continent."⁷²⁵ The UN did not attempt to facilitate a serious dialogue between the opposition parties and the CNDD-FDD, nor it they have alternative strategies to encourage multi-party democracy in Burundi. It continued to declare the elections legitimate and pressured the opposition to join them.

724 Key informant interviews, UN staff members (UO4), Bujumbura, 2009.

725 UN News Centre, "Ban lauds Burundians for gains in consolidating peace", June 9, 2010, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34964&Cr=burundi> (accessed September 20, 2011).

UNDP had designed its new program on the assumption that the 2010 elections would be “successful”. The result of the elections technically fit the bill because they were free, fair, and mostly peaceful. In this light, it continued implementing its program as designed. Much of the rest of the international community initially echoed UNDP’s approach. For international actors, regional heads of state, and many Burundians, fatigue with Burundi’s peacebuilding process had set in.⁷²⁶ For them, the 2010 elections were supposed to mark a successful culmination of years of peacebuilding, not the beginning of an entirely new peacemaking process.

6.1.5.1 The leadership vacuum

Why was UNDP unable to systematically or significantly adjust its aims or approach in anticipation of the elections or in response to the unsatisfactory outcome? Leadership, or the absence thereof, certainly played a role. The expulsion of Youssef Mahmoud left a huge void in BINUB and UNDP. Mr. Mahmoud was very politically astute, knew the players well, and was highly attuned to the evolving Burundian context. He also brought his team together to discuss critical issues in Burundi that they needed to anticipate and address. Without Mahmoud, there was no longer a powerful interlocutor with the government, nor was there a direct line of communication between the evolving political reality in Burundi and BINUB and UNDP’s operational programs.

Youssef Mahmoud’s expulsion also had an impact on BINUB morale and on staff’s willingness to take risks. They no longer had a champion nor were they enthusiastic about working with a government who had been so disrespectful to their boss, particularly since he had been so deferential to the government.⁷²⁷ After Mahmoud left, other BINUB staff began to gradually leave. In fact, Mahmoud’s replacement held a staff

⁷²⁶ Interview with observer, via phone, September 2011 (O12); Interview with international donor, November 2011 (O16).

⁷²⁷ Key informant interviews, BINUB staff members, 2010.

meeting in mid-2010 telling people to begin to look for new jobs because BINUB would be closing down soon.⁷²⁸ Mahmoud's expulsion and DPKO headquarters sent a clear message to the new ERSG, Charles Petrie, that the government would not hesitate to expel him as well.⁷²⁹ He kept a low profile and did not openly challenge the government. Being declared *Persona Non Grata* was not good for one's career or for the reputation of the associated UN entity.

UNDP's leadership was relatively insensitive to the peacebuilding context in general and the implications of the election results in particular. During the election period, the head of UNDP Burundi went on vacation.⁷³⁰ He was not around to ensure that the election ballots were correctly printed and distributed. Although this may have seemed like a simple technical issue, the repercussions of the ballot blunder were significant for Burundians and for the initial tone of the election cycle.

6.1.5.2 Accountability to the government, not the people

UNDP's accountability structure also played a role in UNDP Burundi's decision not to take significant or systematic actions to enable free, fair, and peaceful elections and in the failure to adjust its aims or approach in response to the new political landscape that emerged after the elections. UNDP's accountability routines focus on upward accountability to headquarters for resource mobilization and spending, and horizontal accountability to governments for policy and strategy development.⁷³¹

UNDP works directly with the government of host countries and rarely challenges their politics or policies. It builds long-term relationships with governments and aims to sustain its presence in a country through thick and thin. It does not have the same

728 Key informant interviews (O23), 2010.

729 Key informant interviews (O23), 2010.

730 Key informant interviews (O23) and (O12), 2010.

731 Interview with UNDP staff, Bujumbura, 2009 (UP1); Interview with UNDP staff, New York, 2009 (UP3).

political clout or power as DPKO or DPA because it does not directly implement mandates from the Security Council. UNDP helps governments to accomplish their development goals, and achieve the targets to which they have committed themselves, namely the Millennium Development Goals.

UNDP generally considers governments and government institutions as its major partners. In countries emerging from conflict or going through a formal transition process, strengthening the capacity of governments and national institutions is one of the strategic objectives of the international community. The dilemma faced by UNDP [is] between ensuring long-term sustainability of programmes by favouring national ownership and the need for speed and efficiency.⁷³²

UNDP staff lack the incentive to pressure a partner government to carry out a reform that it does not desire. UNDP's partnership with DPKO under ONUB and BINUB helped it to implement more conflict-sensitive programming than it had previously pursued in Burundi. But without ONUB's or BINUB's leadership, UNDP's capacity to pressure the government significantly decreased. When Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory was heading in a relatively positive direction, UNDP could support that evolution. But, when the peacebuilding trajectory took a sharp negative turn during and after the 2010 elections, UNDP did not try and alter this trend. It continued implementing its cooperation program with the government, hoping that good socio-economic development would address the root causes of Burundi's conflict and reverse the curve. It did not ask whether or not socio-economic development under a violent, oppressive regime might reinforce some of the root causes of the conflict.⁷³³

6.1.5.3 The frame of long-term apolitical development

UNDP's predominantly development, rather than peacebuilding or conflict prevention, knowledge-laden routines and frames also influenced its response to

⁷³² United Nations Development Programme, *Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries*, 54.

⁷³³ Peter Uvin, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda* (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998).

Burundi's 2010 election period. Implicit in this organizational frame was the focus on maintaining programs over several years and pursuing long-range goals. Over the entire period under study, UNDP maintained relatively consistent organizational goals and programs, focusing on good governance, reintegration of refugees and IDPs, and the fight against HIV/AIDS. UNDP more frequently achieved its goals when the context aligned with UNDP's aims, not due to actions by UNDP to align with the context.

Even though UNDP adopted the peacebuilding frames under BINUB and BNUB, it did not accompany these with peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines. In most cases, UNDP staff did not have peacebuilding programming expertise, nor was any training of this kind provided.⁷³⁴ The bureaucratic tendency to implement a project as designed and focus on delivery, rather than outcomes, prevailed. Most projects were not based on a solid conflict analysis or assessment of the target institution, nor did they include conflict sensitive approaches to monitoring and evaluation. They were "peacebuilding" projects in name and aim. But, the majority of peacebuilding projects were implemented by staff who did not know how to adapt the original project design to the changing context. They also lacked the capacity to monitor or evaluate the contribution of the project to potential causes of peace and conflict in Burundi. The projects that were exceptions to this rule were the product of high-levels of cooperation with DPKO and are discussed in further detail in [Chapter 5](#). Most of the staff who participated in these more successful projects have left UNDP Burundi. After BINUB was closed and replaced by BNUB, UNDP continued to implement joint programs, but the peacebuilding and conflict prevention capacity that it had under BINUB was even further reduced. UNDP Burundi had "moved on" and believed that peace consolidation was representative of its past

734 The exceptions were the peace and conflict advisors deployed to work on the Cadre de Dialogue project and other staff who worked on this project, the Security Sector Reform projects, and the local public services who understood good peacebuilding programming even though they did not have formal training.

cooperation with BINUB, but not important for its present and future work in Burundi.⁷³⁵

6.2 Conclusion

Between 1999 and 2011, UNDP Burundi was highly relevant to Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory at three points in time: the removal of the regional embargo in 1999, the democratic elections in 2005, and the demobilization of the FNL in 2009. (See Figure 6-1 above) At these points, UNDP took significant and systematic actions to influence Burundi's peacebuilding process. Unlike the other cases discussed in this dissertation, UNDP did not significantly alter its overall aims and means at these periods. Instead, these were peacebuilding opportunities that fit well with what UNDP was good at and had the mandate, capacity, and funding to do. In these cases, the peacebuilding context largely aligned with UNDP.

UNDP Burundi did not respond to the other three key shifts in Burundi's peacebuilding process: the inauguration of the transitional government in November 2001, the integration of the CNDD-FDD into the transitional government in November 2003, and the sour turn to the 2010 elections and subsequent risk of renewed war . Furthermore, UNDP generally failed to maintain the relevance of its programming to Burundi's institutions and the complex political and social dynamics that infused them. There were several individual projects that were well designed and implemented and judged to be highly relevant to Burundi's institutions and the peacebuilding process (See Figure 6-2 above). But, this was the minority of projects. UNDP's programming over this period in Burundi gave it a bad reputation with UNDP headquarters and within the international community in Bujumbura.

735 Interview with BINUB staff member (UP2), October 2009, Bujumbura.

Figure 6-2: UNDP Values on Dependent Variable

Systematic and Significant Actions to Align Aims and Means with a New Trend
in the Peacebuilding Trajectory

		NO	YES
Systematic Actions to Align Peacebuilding Programming with the Relevant Context	NO	UNDP II UNDP III UNDP VI	UNDP I UNDP IV UNDP V
	YES		

UNDP was disconnected from Burundi’s peacebuilding trajectory because of its development organizational frame, its upward accountability routines, its general lack of peacebuilding knowledge, and the absence of processes that encouraged informed self-reflection. Combined together, these routines made UNDP into a slow, path dependent organization that was more focused on spending money than it was on achieving outcomes, peacebuilding or otherwise. UNDP was relevant to Burundi’s peacebuilding trajectory or made positive contributions to this trajectory only when its leaders were entrepreneurial and committed to peacebuilding, they had peacebuilding funds, teams had the right combination of political, programmatic, and local knowledge, and the

context was ready for what UNDP had to offer. Below, I briefly describe the factors that explain UNDP's patterns of interaction with Burundi's war-to-peace transition and discuss their potential generalizability to UNDP's operations in other war-to-peace transitions.

UNDP's development frame predominated in Burundi. This meant that the leadership and most staff in the organization believed that development was its primary activity. Even when UNDP was subsumed within BINUB and adopted an overall peacebuilding frame, it was guided by a development culture. Staff repeatedly commented that the peace consolidation focus was only temporary and that they were anxious to get out from under BINUB and be able to do real early recovery and development programming.⁷³⁶ Within UNDP as a whole, development was still the main priority and country offices are aware of this.⁷³⁷ Development programming is funded from core UNDP funding, conflict prevention and peacebuilding work is not.⁷³⁸ This traditional development frame, and accompanying knowledge and training of staff, largely ignores the relationship between development and violent conflict or its potential positive or negative impact on a country's peacebuilding process. Conflict analysis is not systematically done or integrated into programming, even in conflict-affected countries.⁷³⁹

UN staff that are not working directly or explicitly on conflict issues do not want to hear about conflict or its relation to their work. For instance, governance staff do not see the relevance of conflict prevention tools and approaches, because they are not framed in terms that they understand or accept.⁷⁴⁰

736 Key informant interviews, UN staff members (UP1), Bujumbura, 2009.

737 Key informant interview, UN staff member (UP3), New York, 2009.

738 Key informant interview, UN staff member (UP3), New York, 2009.

739 United Nations Development Programme, *Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries*, 57.

740 Diana Chigas and Peter Woodrow, *Assessment of BCPR-Supported Conflict Prevention Initiatives* (Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, December 9, 2009), 10.

Even though UNDP headquarters had dedicated substantial resources to building the organization's conflict prevention and peacebuilding capacity, these activities remained tangential to its development work. BCPR had its own pot of money that it can provide to country offices to implement small conflict prevention or peacebuilding activities, but it has had little success mainstreaming conflict prevention and peacebuilding throughout country offices' other program.⁷⁴¹ It provides temporary support to country offices, but does not normally continue to work with them through the design, implementation, and monitoring of peacebuilding or conflict prevention programming. BCPR's governance and rule of law programming have a potentially very high relevance to peacebuilding processes, but BCPR has been unable to help these programs adopt a conflict sensitive or peacebuilding lens.⁷⁴²

People need accompaniment in the field to be able to integrate training concepts well. However, staff really did not have the time/capacity to provide that kind of follow up, and the [Peace and Development Advisor] did not have the time to fill that gap and do everything else he needed to do.⁷⁴³

A key component of UNDP's development frame is the idea that it is in the country for the long-haul and will have a longer-term impact on the country. In Burundi, this long-term perspective led to path dependency. UNDP implemented largely the same activities the entire thirteen-year period without significantly adjusting them to big changes in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory. When UNDP did adapt to new trends it was because of new resources, staff, and mandate coming from the UN Secretariat, not because of an internal change and adaptation process in UN Burundi. In its search for continuity and sustainability, UNDP Burundi lost its capacity to adapt to changes in the context and maintain its relevance, either to peacebuilding or even to its overall

741 Key informant interview, UN staff member (UP3), New York, 2009; Chigas and Woodrow, *Assessment of BCPR-Supported Conflict Prevention Initiatives*, 9.

742 Chigas and Woodrow, *Assessment of BCPR-Supported Conflict Prevention Initiatives*, 9.

743 *Ibid.*; United Nations Development Programme, *Strategic Review of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery*, Final Report (New York, NY, March 10, 2010), 19.

development aims. After all, negative peace is a prerequisite for long-term economic growth.⁷⁴⁴

To sustain its presence in a country over the long haul, UNDP has become a jack of all trades on the one hand and a jack of none on the other. According to a 2011 review of UNDP by the UK Government: “UNDP’s near universal mandate means its technical resources are spread very thinly.”⁷⁴⁵ It has built its reputation as a financial and project management organization, but as a result its staff do not necessarily have the required skills to manage each type of project in each context. Again, from the UK review of UNDP: “UNDP’s results framework, HR, and prioritization on areas where it can add most value are all weak and reduce its impact.”⁷⁴⁶ A 2005 review of UNDP’s capacity in post-conflict countries came to similar conclusions.⁷⁴⁷ It also warned that if UNDP continued to serve as the administrator for the rest of the UN system and fill programming gaps left by other UN agencies, its focus on administration would “detract UNDP from its core development mandate and divert human resources that could be used to further develop UNDP’s lead role in development.”⁷⁴⁸

In Burundi, it seems that UNDP’s focus on raising funds, spending funds, and administering funds – all within a one-year budget cycle – was a much higher priority for the organization than achieving peacebuilding or development outcomes. This reflects the accountability mechanisms in place for individual staff.

Staff contracts and the tenure of office of the Resident Representative/Country Director are both shorter than the period of the [Country Program Document] CPD and not necessarily in phase with the

⁷⁴⁴ Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil war and Development Policy*.

⁷⁴⁵ Department for International Development, *Multilateral Aid Review: United Nations Development Programme (including the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery)* (London: UK Aid, March 2011), 4, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/MAR/UNDP-response.pdf> (accessed February 10, 2012).

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁷ United Nations Development Programme, *Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries*, 41.

⁷⁴⁸ United Nations Development Programme, *Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries*, 41.

CPD. Hence accountability for results implicitly concerns only short-term targets—such as resource mobilization, delivery and project outputs—rather than longer-term development outcomes. Since programme staff in many offices are funded from extra-budgetary resources, their accountability for results is aligned more to outputs of projects as opposed to delivering at outcome level.⁷⁴⁹

It is also challenging to hold staff accountable for development or peacebuilding outcomes, which may be caused by multiple actors and may only be attained years down the line. Yet, intermediary outcomes can be measured as can manager's efforts to adjust programming in response to information about effectiveness, as the methodology employed in this dissertation demonstrates.⁷⁵⁰

UNDP Burundi also prioritized coordination and coherence with the rest of the UN system at the expense of UNDP's alignment with the Burundian context. This, too, reflects and overall pattern in UNDP: "there is a "tendency for staff to get caught up in inter-agency preoccupations rather than the needs of beneficiaries."⁷⁵¹

UNDP's upward accountability routines prioritized its administrative and coordination function over its commitment to sustainable development or peacebuilding. There was information about how much money was spent, whether a project was implemented, and whether a UN document was created, but no systematic information about whether the activities achieved their desired outcomes or impact. Without information, no accountability for outcomes or impact was possible. This pattern, too, is found in UNDP more broadly.

"[A]lthough relevant [monitoring and evaluation] tools have been developed, their deployment has been mixed, and their application has not been systematic, consistent or widespread. Measurement and evaluation capacities in HQ and in countries are not adequate, and

⁷⁴⁹ United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office, *Evaluation of Results-Based Management at UNDP* (New York, December 2007), 37, http://www.undp.org/evaluation/documents/thematic/RBM/RBM_Evaluation.pdf (accessed October 13, 2011).

⁷⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵¹ United Nations Development Programme, *Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries*, 57.

resources are not sufficient for the needed improvement in M&E activity. BCPR's focus on projects as outputs, varied interpretations of outcomes, and a lack of clarity regarding how to measure BCPR's indirect role, specific contributions, and added value within a given context, have contributed to a tendency to focus on activities rather than outcomes or tangible results."⁷⁵²

Without an understanding of the interaction between its projects and the context, it was difficult for UNDP Burundi to know how to adapt and improve its projects even when it was willing to do so. When high-level staff, in particular, made trips to the provinces, some open and reflective discussion often took place and changes in practice did happen, but these "field trips" were few and far between.⁷⁵³ In most cases, however, UNDP Burundi did not aim to better understand or reflect on its impact or improve its programming. This, too, was a common characteristic found in other UNDP offices.⁷⁵⁴

Both national and international staff need a more supportive and stimulating environment in which time and effort is devoted to reflection and analysis, to developing a culture in which local concerns take priority over UN concerns, and to the needs and wishes of those on a career path.⁷⁵⁵

UNDP was able to overcome some of these barriers and take significant and systematic action in response to new peacebuilding trends when three factors came together: leadership, resources, and core competency. When UNDP's leadership was excited about a new opportunity in Burundi's peacebuilding process and committed to responding to it, then the organization could do highly effective peacebuilding work. Because UNDP is so decentralized, country leadership can have a big impact on the direction and approach of UNDP's program.⁷⁵⁶

Mainstreaming depends a lot on management and leadership at the country level because it is so decentralized. If you work with countries

752 United Nations Development Programme, *Strategic Review of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery*, iv.

753 Key informant interview, UN staff member (UP1), Bujumbura, 2009.

754 Department for International Development, *Multilateral Aid Review: United Nations Development Programme (including the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery)*, 4.

755 United Nations Development Programme, *Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries*, 46.

756 Key informant interview, UN staff member (UP3), New York, 2010.

that are on the brink... leadership is absolutely crucial. You can do lots of workshops with program staff, but without the leadership buy in then it doesn't work. They have to get it up front because they don't come to the training.⁷⁵⁷

Even though leadership matters a great deal, Resident Coordinators and Country Directors of UNDP do not receive significant training in conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming. "Skills and performance in relation to conflict issues are not yet a regular part of RC recruitment or personnel evaluation criteria. If they are not assessed on this measure, they will not give it priority."⁷⁵⁸

The presence of funding that was meant specifically for peacebuilding programming also helped to determine when UNDP Burundi took significant peacebuilding actions. UNDP did not have spare resources to allocate toward peacebuilding programming. To respond to a new opportunity, it had to find the money and then the staff to implement the program. In all of the cases where UNDP responded, money was earmarked for the particular type of response.

Even though UNDP is known for attempting to do many different types of programming, its responses to Burundi's peacebuilding process employed core areas of competency. In this sense, the context became ripe for what UNDP does best, and UNDP Burundi and HQ rallied their resources in response. UNDP prides itself on its donor coordination, election support, and DDR work, and has built core competencies, although still insufficient, at headquarters and in the field in these areas.⁷⁵⁹ It had the necessary knowledge-laden routines and an overall organizational frame that supported actions in these areas.

Several specific projects maintained their relevance to Burundi's war-to-peace transition and had a positive impact on that transition. In these cases, the success was

757 Key informant interview, UN staff member (UP5), New York, 2010.

758 Chigas and Woodrow, *Assessment of BCPR-Supported Conflict Prevention Initiatives*, 12.

759 United Nations Development Programme, *Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries*, 57.

due to the efforts and skill of individual staff and to the partnerships between UNDP Burundi and ONUB and BINUB. UNDP does not prevent staff from engaging in good peacebuilding work, but it does not enable them either.

UNDP's several organizational change processes made little difference in its peacebuilding actions. This was because these processes were in many ways imposed on UNDP by ONUB, BINUB, and BNUB. In addition, UNDP was not necessarily interested in doing more effective peacebuilding programming, but was instead focused on making the transition to full development cooperation.

These findings are not new to UNDP. Numerous reports and evaluations cited in this chapter have reiterated the challenges that the organization faces in its conflict programming. The vast majority of them have made good recommendations about how UNDP could alter its capacity and approach, but the basic challenges and path dependent tendency of UNDP remains, in Burundi and elsewhere.

The findings in this case study have implications for our understanding not only of what UNDP can accomplish in terms of peacebuilding and conflict prevention, but also what other development organizations that are highly upwardly accountable can accomplish. Their peacebuilding effectiveness may be found only on the margins, as was the case with UNDP Burundi. Their overwhelming focus on development and spending money may not be able to make space for more nimble, political, and labor-intensive conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming that measures progress in terms of incremental contributions. Development organizations' commitment to following the host government's lead may not leave space for challenging the same government's approaches and tactics.

This case study also challenges the assumption in some of the development literature that coherence among the international community and continuity of staff and programming over time are effective. In fact, UNDP's experience in Burundi shows that

both of these factors detracted from its peacebuilding effectiveness. Finally, this case provides an important example of slow-moving institutional change by an international organization and its mismatch with fast-paced change in a post-conflict country.

Organizational Data Point	Accountability Routines	Knowledge-laden Routines & Organizational Frames	Learning Behavior	Significant Organizational Change Process	Flexible Peacebuilding Funds	Entrepreneurial Leadership Committed to Peacebuilding	Action to Align in Relation to Peacebuilding Aims
UNDP I	External/ Horizontal	Predominant Peacebuilding Frame/ Insufficient Peacebuilding Knowledge-laden Routines	Defensive/ Invalid	No	No	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory / No Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
UNDP II	External/ Horizontal	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Defensive/ Invalid	No	No	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory / No Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
UNDP III	External/ Horizontal	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Defensive/ Invalid	No	No	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory / No Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
UNDP IV	External/ Horizontal	Predominant PB Frame/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Defensive/ Invalid	Yes	Yes	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory / No Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
UNDP V	External/ Horizontal	Predominant PB Frame/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Defensive/ Invalid	No	Yes	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory / No Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
UNDP VI	External/ Horizontal	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Defensive/ Invalid	Yes	Yes	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory / No Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context

7 THE DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (DFID) IN BURUNDI

7.1 Introduction

The UK DFID spearheaded donor efforts to improve the effectiveness of aid to conflict-affected and fragile states.⁷⁶⁰ Soon after it was established in 1997, DFID produced two white papers that committed the organization to help mitigate violent conflict so that development could be taken forward, rather than first waiting for the establishment of peace.⁷⁶¹ “The UK government sees security and stability as preconditions for development and for achieving the [Millennium Development Goals] MDGs. Thus, DFID is strongly committed to increasing its aid to fragile countries and conflict zones, where the MDGs are most vulnerable to derailment.”⁷⁶²

Over the years, DFID has progressively increased its capacity for engagement with fragile and conflict-affected states, producing numerous policy documents and guidelines and investing substantial resources in building its capacity in this area. It has created a Conflict, Humanitarian, and Security Department (CHASE), an Africa Conflict Group, a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, Global and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools (CPP), Fragile States country teams, and a joint DFID-Foreign Commonwealth Office

⁷⁶⁰ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *United Kingdom Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review*, Peer Review, 2010, 13, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/20/45519815.pdf> (accessed February 20, 2012) p. 13.

⁷⁶¹ Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together - Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding*, 36–37; Simon Lawry-White, *Review of the UK Government approach to peacebuilding and synthesis of lessons learned from UK Government funded peacebuilding projects 1997 - 2001* (DFID: London, 2003), http://www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/0,3425,en_35038640_35074403_35098280_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed October 2, 2011).

⁷⁶² Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *United Kingdom Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review*, 30.

(FCO)-Ministry of Defence (MoD) Stabilization Unit, among other initiatives.⁷⁶³ With its 2009 white paper, DFID moved “to put unprecedented emphasis on conflict and on politics as key determinants of the prospects of success in development and development assistance.... Never before... has an institution with the weight of DFID set out the arguments so clearly.”⁷⁶⁴

In spite of its pledge to work for peace in conflict-affected countries, DFID failed to honor this commitment in one of the poorest, most conflict-ridden countries in the world: Burundi. It began its engagement with Burundi in 2002 by focusing almost solely on peacebuilding, but then in 2005 quickly shifted to a focus on development, the MDGs, and aid effectiveness (see Figure 7-1 below). From 2005 to 2009, even though DFID Burundi was led by a highly skilled and knowledgeable political operative and supplied with conflict analyses and conflict advisors, its program was largely insensitive to Burundi’s conflict dynamics and sought neither to have a peacebuilding or statebuilding (i.e., state-society building) impact. In 2011, DFID announced that it would close its Burundi office and stop all bilateral assistance to Burundi. It is puzzling that a bilateral donor that has made such strong commitments to conflict-sensitive development and peacebuilding would fail to pursue these goals in Burundi – one of the poorest fragile states in the world. What explains this?


DFID’s organizational frame and accountability mechanisms that prioritize progress toward the MDGs and the aid effectiveness agenda eclipsed conflict-sensitive programming in Burundi. Recent analyses of DFID show that this pattern has appeared

⁷⁶³ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *United Kingdom Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review*, Peer Review, 2006, 43, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/57/37010997.pdf> (accessed February 20, 2012).

⁷⁶⁴ Dan Smith, “Development thinking develops – DFID’s white paper and what comes next,” *Dan Smith’s Blog*, August 21, 2009, <http://dansmithsblog.com/2009/08/21/development-thinking-develops-dfids-white-paper-and-what-comes-next/> (accessed February 20, 2012).

across DFID.⁷⁶⁵ As a result, this case study has implications for DFID’s contribution to conflict-affected and fragile states in general. It also has implications for our understanding of peacebuilding effectiveness in Burundi, particularly because DFID is so well regarded in this area of work. If DFID cannot do effective programming in fragile and conflict-affected states, who can? It also has significant implications for policy and academic debates on fragile and conflict-affected countries, most of which are constrained by a lack of detailed case studies and a reliance on untested assumptions.

Figure 7-1: DFID Burundi’s actions to align aim and approach and programming with Burundi’s peacebuilding trajectory



This chapter describes DFID’s programming in Burundi from 1999 to 2011 and how it related to the critical events in Burundi’s war-to-peace transition, discussed in Chapter 5. It discusses DFID’s work in Burundi in terms of three general periods: 1999–2004, 2005–2009, and 2010–2011. In each period, I analyze the reasons for DFID’s interactions with Burundi’s peacebuilding trajectory. I conclude by synthesizing the cross-case

⁷⁶⁵ National Audit Office, *Department for International Development: Operating in insecure environments - National Audit Office* (London: National Audit Office, October 16, 2008), http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0708/operating_in_insecure_envirnment.aspx (accessed October 18, 2011).

findings and describing the implications of these findings for the theory presented in Chapter 2, for the literature, and for peacebuilding effectiveness.

7.2 1999–2004: Supporting Burundi’s Peacebuilding Process,

Phases I, II, and III

Between 1999 and 2004, DFID completely changed its approach to Burundi. It went from being a detached donor that provided primarily humanitarian aid to one that was highly engaged in peacebuilding and supported some of the most innovative peacebuilding projects at the time. After the removal of the regional embargo in January 1999, DFID did not alter its approach to Burundi on the grounds that peace should precede aid.⁷⁶⁶ In 2002, DFID established a new office in Burundi whose main purpose was to “support the peace process in Burundi.”⁷⁶⁷ This time, the head of DFID, Clare Short, argued that peacebuilding was a “necessary prerequisite for sustained economic growth.”⁷⁶⁸ After the November 2003 ceasefire and integration of the CNDD-FDD into the Burundian government, DFID again took significant peacebuilding action by funding projects intended to help the CNDD-FDD demobilize and ease their integration into the transitional government.⁷⁶⁹ In one instance, DFID paid for food that was delivered to the

⁷⁶⁶ Statements by Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development, *House of Commons Hansard Debates for 2 Dec 1998 (pt 12)* (London, 1998), <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo981202/debtext/81202-12.htm> (accessed October 4, 2011); Parliament of the United Kingdom, “Lords Hansard text for 5 Apr 2000 (200405-10),” *Parliamentary Business*, April 5, 2000, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/vo000405/text/00405-10.htm> (accessed February 20, 2012).

⁷⁶⁷ DFID staff person (D3) by telephone, October 12, 2011.

⁷⁶⁸ Statements by Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development, *House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 19 Jul 2002 (pt 4)*, 2002, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020719/text/20719w04.htm> (accessed October 4, 2011).

⁷⁶⁹ DFID staff person (D3) by telephone, interview; DFID staff person (D6), Bujumbura, Burundi, June 6, 2009.

CNDD-FDD in the assembly areas before they were disarmed.⁷⁷⁰ DFID was well positioned to act quickly because it had a local office in place that was focused on peacebuilding and had flexible funds.⁷⁷¹ Nonetheless, once a project was under way, DFID had minimal tools to influence the relevance of the project to Burundi's changing context.

7.2.1 PEACE BEFORE AID

Before 1999, DFID viewed Burundi as a humanitarian situation. Even though UK Parliamentarians repeatedly decried the immense suffering of the Burundian people and were committed to preventing a full-scale genocide, they took limited actions to alleviate this suffering.⁷⁷² DFID gave humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organizations (NGO) and multilateral organizations, funded the facilitation of the Arusha process, and supported a few small grassroots peacebuilding initiatives, namely dialogue and women's empowerment efforts by International Alert.⁷⁷³

DFID's funding approach to Burundi did not change when the Arusha agreement was signed in August 2000. Along with many other donors, DFID wanted more evidence that the peace process was really on track before reengaging as a development partner.

⁷⁷⁰ DFID staff person (D3) by telephone, interview.

⁷⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷⁷² "House of Commons Hansard Debates for 10 Jul 1996 (pt 19)", July 10, 1996, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199596/cmhansrd/vo960710/debtext/60710-19.htm> (accessed October 4, 2011).

⁷⁷³ Statements by Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development, *House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 10 Jun 2002 (pt 1)* (London, 2002), <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020610/text/20610w01.htm> (accessed October 2, 2011); Written Evidence Submitted by International Alert, *The closure of DFID's aid programme in Burundi* (London: UK Parliament, n.d.), <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/writdev/burundi/bu11.htm> (accessed October 2, 2011); Lawry-White, *Review of the UK Government approach to peacebuilding and synthesis of lessons learned from UK Government funded peacebuilding projects 1997 - 2001*, 70.

⁷⁷⁴ At the time, it did not have much money for countries that were in between – neither strong enough to manage budgetary development aid nor experiencing such a high degree of conflict that only lifesaving humanitarian assistance was possible.

In general, most donors divided their international aid into two categories: short-term lifesaving humanitarian assistance or long-term development programming. They did not have money to support a country's transition from humanitarian to development funding. Traditional humanitarian funding was given by NGOs and international organizations (IO) directly to the people, bypassing the state. Traditional development aid was given directly to the state, largely bypassing NGOs and the people. The middle ground between the two was still very much a work in progress.

Initially, DFID had followed the lead of other donors and Julius Nyerere, the facilitator of the Arusha talks until late 1999. Clare Short said that President Nyerere had believed that the regional sanctions, in spite of the humanitarian cost, encouraged President Buyoya to commit to the Arusha peace talks.⁷⁷⁵ In this sense, DFID's peacebuilding strategy was one of withholding aid. But after the Arusha agreement was signed in August 2000, DFID and other donors continued to apply this tactic, renegeing on their own promises to reward the politician's efforts.⁷⁷⁶ They again used the carrot of renewed development cooperation to encourage the government to implement the peace agreement, which had little meaning when only on paper. Donors were also reluctant to give Burundi more money while its government was still engaged in a war with the two rebel groups. They argued that this aid would indirectly fund the war. Many donors also

⁷⁷⁴ Statements by Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development, *House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 18 Dec 2002 (pt 14)* (London, 2002), <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo021218/text/21218w14.htm> (accessed October 2, 2011).

⁷⁷⁵ ICG, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi*.

⁷⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

believed that development could only really begin once peace, defined as the absence of violent conflict, had been created.⁷⁷⁷

7.2.2 AID FOR PEACE

In 2002, DFID changed its approach to Burundi and began using aid to help to build a foundation for peace. It adopted a clear peacebuilding organizational frame. In February 2002, Clare Short and the development ministers from Norway and the Netherlands visited the countries of the Great Lakes region, including Burundi. This trip changed Short's perspective on Burundi, leading her to make more of a commitment to Burundi in particular and the region as a whole.⁷⁷⁸

I was encouraged from my recent visit to the Great Lakes that there is now a window of opportunity for achieving peace... Progress in the [Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)] peace process will enable the international community, finally, to concentrate on a partnership with governments in the region for the long-term development of their countries—an outcome keenly awaited and much needed by the long suffering population of the region.⁷⁷⁹

Interestingly, it was Clare Short's personal observations in Burundi that changed DFID's approach. The inauguration of the transitional government in November 2001 did not automatically trigger a different response from DFID, but the direct experience of the head of the organization with Burundi's reality did. Her change of heart was also influenced by advocacy by Belgium and most likely by concurrent changes in DFID's

⁷⁷⁷ ICG, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi*.

⁷⁷⁸ "DFID Staff Person, Bujumbura (D10)", July 16, 2002.

⁷⁷⁹ Parliament of the United Kingdom, "House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 6 Mar 2002 (pt 7)," *Parliamentary Business*, March 6, 2002, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020306/text/20306w07.htm> (accessed February 20, 2012).

own policies that framed aid as a tool for creating peace rather than something that could only follow peace.⁷⁸⁰

During her trip to the Great Lakes region, Short and her European colleagues used the incentive of resumed aid to get the leaders of DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi to pledge to participate actively in the ongoing peace processes.⁷⁸¹ “This was the kind of diplomatic initiative that used to be undertaken by the Foreign Office, but Short and the experts in her ministry clearly demonstrated that they were able to go farther than the Foreign Office in linking moves to secure political stability with development projects.”⁷⁸²

In December 2002, Short confirmed DFID’s commitment “to an increasing effort to bring peace and help restart efforts to develop Burundi’s full potential.”⁷⁸³ In mid-2002, DFID established an office in Burundi to ensure that DFID could “see what was going on, engage and report back, play a role.”⁷⁸⁴ The office consisted of one international and two Burundian staff. The office worked specifically on peacebuilding, with the aim of establishing peace in Burundi before DFID made the transition to normal development assistance.⁷⁸⁵ “We were there to support the peace process.”⁷⁸⁶ It also advocated with other donors to re-engage with Burundi.⁷⁸⁷

⁷⁸⁰ Clare Short, *House of Commons - European Scrutiny - Twenty-Second Report* (London: UK Parliament, 1999), <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmeuleg/34-xxii/3422.htm> (accessed October 6, 2011). Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together - Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding*, 36–37.

⁷⁸¹ Dickie, *The new mandarins*, 226.

⁷⁸² Ibid.

⁷⁸³ Statements by Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development, *House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 4 Nov 2002 (pt 8)* (London, 2002), <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo021104/text/21104w08.htm> (accessed October 2, 2011).

⁷⁸⁴ DFID staff person (D3) by telephone, October 12, 2011; “DFID Staff Person, Bujumbura (D10).”

⁷⁸⁵ “DFID Staff Person, Bujumbura (D10).”

⁷⁸⁶ DFID staff person (D3) by telephone, October 12, 2011.

⁷⁸⁷ *House of Commons Oral Evidence Taken Before the International Development Committee, Closure of DFID’s Aid Programme in Burundi, Tuesday 5 July 2011, Archbishop Bernard Ntahoturi and Patrick Watt*,

Between 2002 and 2004, DFID supported approximately thirty humanitarian and peacebuilding projects, many of them highly innovative.⁷⁸⁸ DFID's program was unique not only in comparison to many other bilateral donors in Burundi, but also in comparison to other DFID country programs.

DFID [in Burundi] did everything but the standard development program. They hired conflict advisors to sit in the country. They wanted to work with demobilized soldiers. They were doing stuff that no other donor was doing. They broke so much ground based directly on policies coming out of London... It was one our best examples ever of taking on board conflict policies.⁷⁸⁹

Along with the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), and the World Bank Post-Conflict Fund and Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), DFID's support for peacebuilding programming helped a community of peacebuilding NGOs and civil society organizations continue to flourish in Burundi.⁷⁹⁰ Most other donors at the time gave only humanitarian funding to Burundi.⁷⁹¹

Initially, the office had an annual budget of £2 million, which increased to £5 million a year by 2004. The money was flexible and intended primarily to support

Mr. Stephen O'Brien MP and Elizabeth Carriere (House of Commons: UK Parliament, 2011), <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/c1134-i/c113401.htm> (accessed September 28, 2011); Statements by Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development, *House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 17 Dec 2002 (pt 8)* (London, 2002), <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo021217/text/21217w08.htm> (accessed October 2, 2011).

⁷⁸⁸ DFID Burundi, *DFID Burundi, 2009-2011: Issues and Choices Paper - Burundi's options for 2009-11* (Bujumbura, Burundi, 2009), 1.

⁷⁸⁹ DFID staff person (D2) by telephone, May 20, 2010.

⁷⁹⁰ See Larry Beyna et al., *Greater Horn of Africa Peace Building Project - The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace: A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa*, Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: Management Systems International, June 2001).

⁷⁹¹ ICG, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi*.

peacebuilding.⁷⁹² DFID used the money to fund new projects and opportunities as they emerged. It did not have a pre-determined set of activities or goals, but sought to contribute to the momentum in Burundi's peacebuilding process.⁷⁹³ DFID funded conflict resolution at the political level, local-level peace and reconciliation work, and DDR, among many other activities.⁷⁹⁴ The recipients of these funds included the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) (see Chapter 9), International Alert, Jan Van Eck of the Center for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, Action Aid, Accord in South Africa, and the United Nations.⁷⁹⁵ It also worked to make the Poverty Reduction Strategic Program (PRSP) more conflict-sensitive and influence the quality of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and other programs.⁷⁹⁶ One-third of the money was allocated to humanitarian assistance.⁷⁹⁷

DFID also contributed money to Burundi through its African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACCP). Between 2001 and 2005, the ACCP supported DDR efforts, policy dialogue, the South African Peace Support Detachment, the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), and the secondment of the DFID Great Lakes Regional Conflict Advisor to the UN Office of Burundi's (ONUB) political section during its critical start-up phase.⁷⁹⁸

This was also a time in Burundi that was highly conducive to peacebuilding: Most rebel groups were part of the transitional government, and all parties in the government wanted free, fair, and peaceful elections to take place. The transitional government was

⁷⁹² DFID staff person (D3) by telephone, October 12, 2011.

⁷⁹³ DFID staff person (D3) by telephone, October 12, 2011.

⁷⁹⁴ DFID, "Report from DFID Assessment Mission to Bujumbura", July 2004. DFID staff person (D3); DFID staff person (D10).

⁷⁹⁵ "DFID Staff Person, Bujumbura (D10)", July 16, 2002; DFID staff person (D3) by telephone, October 12, 2011.

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁷ DFID, "Report from DFID Assessment Mission to Bujumbura."

⁷⁹⁸ DFID, *Reducing Conflict in Africa: Progress and Challenges - Africa Conflict Prevention Performance Report, 2001-05* (London: Department for International Development, September 2006),

http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.dfid.gov.uk/ContentPages/25287581.pdf.

very open to peacebuilding interventions, and many NGOs were jumping on the peacebuilding bandwagon. Most donors and UN agencies lagged behind.

While the amount of money that DFID gave paled in comparison to that of many other donors in Burundi, it was strategically targeted toward core priorities in the peacebuilding process. It was not the amount of money, but the type of money and how it fit with the context, that mattered. This challenges the assumption in much of the literature that more money will have more impact. It was not the amount of money that mattered, but the degree to which the available funds targeted key peacebuilding priorities, and the degree to which the allocated money could actually make a difference in the outcome (i.e., was it enough money to enable the desired change?).

7.2.3 PEACEBUILDING KNOWLEDGE

To support the projects that it funded and influence other peacebuilding processes, DFID Burundi made very good use of the growing ranks of conflict advisors within the organization. It benefited from period visits and advice from key conflict advisors in London and the Great Lakes region and hired consultants with expertise in peacebuilding to help monitor some of its ongoing programs.⁷⁹⁹

These conflict advisors had expertise not only in political analysis, but also in peacebuilding and development. They were not necessarily conflict resolution experts but had built expertise in the peacebuilding areas that were becoming the purview of development agencies: security sector reform, reintegration of ex-combatants, and support for dialogue processes. As opposed to the stark conflict resolution/political knowledge vs. development/humanitarian knowledge divide that I outlined in Chapter 2, these conflict advisors possessed a new type of emerging peacebuilding knowledge

⁷⁹⁹ DFID staff person (D2) by telephone, interview; DFID, "Report from DFID Assessment Mission to Bujumbura", July 2004.

that focused on the type of peacebuilding interventions in which development organizations could engage. DFID was at the forefront of creating knowledge about these types of interventions – defining what they were and how they should be done.

While DFID’s conflict advisors helped the Burundi office select good projects and influenced the design of other projects and initiatives, they were not able to systematically help to ensure the relevance of the projects that DFID funded.⁸⁰⁰ Because DFID did not implement its own projects, but funded projects implemented by NGOs and IOs, it did not have the capacity to alter the way that projects were implemented. It could recommend certain changes, but its tools for enforcing these recommendations were blunt: give money or withdraw money. It could advise and assist its grantees, but it could not control their actions, nor could a staff of three closely monitor thirty odd projects.

DFID evaluated several of its peacebuilding projects, showing that the “results were patchy.”⁸⁰¹ But these evaluations often came after the project funding had ended, which meant that DFID’s only opportunity to increase the relevance of a project was to redesign and fund it again. The DFID office believed that it made an important contribution to Burundi’s peacebuilding process: “I genuinely think we did have influence and were lucky enough to be able to make a difference.”⁸⁰² But it did not have a lot of data to show that this was the case, although several of the peacebuilding projects that it supported had good reputations among observers.

Generally, the office was given “loads of flexibility” to select projects and pursue other peacebuilding efforts without always seeking approval from headquarters or

⁸⁰⁰ DFID staff person (D3) by telephone, October 12, 2011.

⁸⁰¹ DFID staff person (D2) by telephone, interview.

⁸⁰² DFID staff person (D3) by telephone, October 12, 2011.

reporting on clear targets.⁸⁰³ This allowed DFID to support riskier peacebuilding projects and take advantage of unforeseen opportunities. In the case of some of the most risky projects – such as the provision of food for the encamped CNDD-FDD rebels in 2003 – the office requested approval from the director of DFID in London to make sure he was on board.⁸⁰⁴

DFID's decisions about which projects to fund and how to support Burundi's peacebuilding process were made by Georgina Yates, the director of the Burundi office, and Sue Hogwood, the UK Ambassador based out of Kigali. Georgina came into Burundi without a strong peacebuilding background, but quickly adapted to the context and bought into the importance of DFID's peacebuilding role.⁸⁰⁵ Sue Hogwood knew the Great Lakes Region very well and was tuned into the minute details of the politics in Rwanda and Burundi as well as the overall patterns and trends.⁸⁰⁶ Given the flexible nature of DFID Burundi's funding and the lack of overall guidance from London, the knowledge and approach of DFID Burundi's leadership made a big difference to its interaction with Burundi's peacebuilding context. The flexibility of the office's upward accountability routines gave a lot of power to its leaders on the ground.

7.2.4 DONORS AS ENABLERS, NOT IMPLEMENTERS

DFID's 2002–2004 support for Burundi's peacebuilding process provides some important insights for the theory being tested in this dissertation. It shows that donors have fewer opportunities to act to align their peacebuilding aims and outcomes than their implementing partners do. Donors have a lot of influence over a project when deciding whether to fund it or whether to fund it again. But the donor's influence

⁸⁰³ DFID staff person (D3) by telephone, October 12, 2011.

⁸⁰⁴ Key informant interview, DFID staff person (D11), Bujumbura, 2009.

⁸⁰⁵ DFID staff person (D2) by telephone, interview.

⁸⁰⁶ Key informant interviews (O11) and (O17), Bujumbura, 2009.

dramatically declines once a donor has given the money to its grantee. At this point, it is up to the implementing partner to ensure the relevance of the project to the context. DFID could only support, advise, and assist in this effort. Plus, once the money is committed, DFID staff had an interest in ensuring that it was spent, not in returning it to headquarters and possibly diminishing their future budgets.⁸⁰⁷

As a result, the ability of a donor to maintain the relevance of its programming with the evolving peacebuilding context may depend on its capacity to help cultivate non-defensive learning behavior, significant dialogue with stakeholders, and peacebuilding frames and knowledge in its implementing partners. DFID Burundi did this by choosing several implementing partners who already seemed to have these characteristics. It also worked closely with a few of these partners to help them revise their program strategies and activities. In the best cases, a donor can provide external support that helps a partner organization identify its weaknesses and improve them. In the worst cases, a donor sets targets and requires reports that distract an implementing partner from adjusting its aim and approach to maintain its relevance with the context and achieving this aim.

Did the fact that DFID had open and valid learning behavior, entrepreneurial leadership committed to peacebuilding, peacebuilding organizational frames and knowledge-laden routines, and flexible peacebuilding funds help it select good peacebuilding projects and continually act to align with Burundi's peacebuilding process? Yes, it seems that these factors were essential to DFID's approach at this time in Burundi. These factors may make a donor like DFID more likely to support these same types of behaviors in its recipient organizations. But they ensured neither that DFID selected this type of grantee nor that DFID helped its grantees undergo an organizational change process intended to enable them to become peacebuilding learning organizations.

⁸⁰⁷ DFID staff person (D2) by telephone, interview.

As a corollary, the capacity of a donor to achieve alignment between its peacebuilding aims and outcomes is likely to depend not only on its own capacity to take systematic actions to achieve its relevance, but also on its ability to influence and support the capacity of its grantees to maintain their relevance to the evolving peacebuilding context.

7.3 2005–2009 – Development and the “Fragile State”

With the inauguration of Pierre Nkurunziza as president of Burundi in August 2005, DFID again significantly changed its approach and programming. While its 2002–2004 program had supported peacebuilding activities to help bring a successful end to Burundi’s five-year transitional phase, its 2005–2009 program aimed to use development programming to strengthen the capacity of Burundi’s new government to operate a democratic state and deliver peace dividends to its people.⁸⁰⁸

When making this shift, DFID largely dropped its peacebuilding frame and adopted a more generic development mindset. As a result, even though DFID acted to align with the new trend in Burundi’s peacebuilding process ushered in by the 2005 elections, it did not act to align with its peacebuilding aims with the Burundian context or changes in this context.⁸⁰⁹ In 2009, DFID maintained its development approach and did not take significant actions to respond to the new opportunity presented by the integration of the FNL into the government and armed forces. This approach was surprising for an organization that had made such a strong institutional commitment to peacebuilding,

⁸⁰⁸ DFID Burundi, *DFID Burundi, 2009-2011: Issues and Choices Paper - Burundi’s options for 2009-11* (Bujumbura, Burundi, 2009); DFID staff person (D3) by telephone, interview.

⁸⁰⁹ DFID, *The closure of DFID’s aid programme in Burundi: Written Evidence Submitted by the Department for International Development* (London: UK Parliament - International Development Committee, 2011), 3, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/writev/burundi/bu09.htm> (accessed September 28, 2011).

particularly when the Burundi office had such a politically astute leader as Sue Hogwood.⁸¹⁰

7.3.1 A DEVOLVED OFFICE AND PROGRAM APPROACH

In 2005, DFID appointed Hogwood, the former UK Ambassador to Rwanda and Burundi, as the Director of its Burundi office. In so doing, it devolved the management of the office from London to the country level. Two program officers, a Foreign Office representative, and Burundian support staff were appointed to the office, bringing the total number of staff to seven. The integration of the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) and DFID into one office was a unique structure for DFID, intended to give its development work a political focus.⁸¹¹

The goal of the office was “to support the new government in delivering an early peace dividend to the population, building an effective state with better governance, and starting to make progress toward the MDGs.”⁸¹² DFID believed that the appointment of Burundi’s first democratically elected government in twelve years required a new approach, one that aimed to strengthen the capacity of the state to deliver basic social services, namely health, education, and justice.⁸¹³ This approach followed the policies outlined in London’s policy papers on engagement with fragile states and its overall strategy for the Great Lakes Region.⁸¹⁴

DFID’s new approach was also a direct response to the priorities articulated by the Burundian government. In his inaugural speech, President Nkurunziza had announced

⁸¹⁰ DFID staff person (D2) by telephone, interview.

⁸¹¹ Key informant interview, DFID staff person (D11), Bujumbura, 2009.

⁸¹² DFID Burundi, *DFID Burundi, 2009-2011: Issues and Choices Paper - Burundi’s options for 2009-11*, 4.

⁸¹³ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁸¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

that there would be free primary education for all Burundians.⁸¹⁵ The subsequent year, he declared that there would be free maternal healthcare.⁸¹⁶ The Burundian government had failed to plan for either of these initiatives or warn donors that they were coming down the pike. Nonetheless, DFID and other donors rallied to support them, first with humanitarian assistance and then with development aid.⁸¹⁷

Once DFID's new program got off the ground, its support for Burundi was generally divided as follows: 20 percent was allocated toward the education sector; 20 percent to the health sector; 20 percent to social protection; 20 percent to humanitarian assistance; 10 percent to justice reform, access to justice, and accountability; and 10 percent to collaboration and technical assistance.⁸¹⁸ DFID also continued to contribute to the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) until its closure at the end of 2008 and funded the organization of the 2010 elections. In addition, during 2005 and 2006, DFID supported the Burundi Leadership Training Program's (BLTP) workshops with the new cabinet and security forces. This was DFID Burundi's sole purely peacebuilding project, and it was a carryover from the pre-2005 program.⁸¹⁹

DFID's new development program gradually phased out the thirty-odd projects that it had inherited from its previous incarnation and adopted a program-based approach. In this approach, DFID collaborated directly with the government to develop and fulfill its

⁸¹⁵ IRIN, "IRIN Africa | BURUNDI: Free schooling starts with huge logistical problems | Burundi | Children | Education", September 19, 2005, <http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=56391> (accessed October 11, 2011).

⁸¹⁶ IRIN, "Burundi: Nkurunziza Announces Free Maternal Healthcare, Pay Rise for Workers."

⁸¹⁷ DFID Burundi, *DFID Burundi, 2009-2011: Issues and Choices Paper - Burundi's options for 2009-11*, 9.

⁸¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 2. Note that this distribution refers specifically to the 08/09, 09/10, and 10/11 financial years, but reflects the overall distribution of priorities for the 05/06, 06/07, 07/08 financial years as well.

⁸¹⁹ Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, *Post-Conflict Burundi: Peace-Building Through Leadership Training - Report on Three Training Modules in this Project: INAUGURAL 2005 Meeting of the BLTP Network; Follow-up with the First Element of the New Integrated Police Command of Burundi; and the Initial Retreat for the Second Element of the Police Command, Bujumbura and Gitega, Burundi, April-May 2005* (WWICS, 2005), 4.

sectoral policies in the areas of health, education, and justice.⁸²⁰ Because of the well-documented corruption in the government and ongoing scandals, the program did not provide any funding directly to the government budget.⁸²¹ Instead, it collaborated with other donors to manage the funds and gave the money to the government in increments for agreed-upon activities.⁸²²

7.3.2 DEVELOPMENT AND DIPLOMACY: PARALLEL TRACKS

DFID's program in Burundi from 2005 through 2009 existed on two parallel and largely disconnected tracks: its development track and its diplomatic track. Its development track aimed to increase the capacity of the state to deliver education and healthcare. According to DFID's own reports, DFID made an important contribution in each of these areas.⁸²³ Its justice and governance programming was also based on a development model and aimed foremost to strengthen the capacity of the Burundian government to ensure justice and rule of law.⁸²⁴ Unfortunately, the Ministry of Justice and Burundian National Police were two of the most corrupt, abusive, and dysfunctional parts of the government. As a result, DFID's efforts to strengthen the justice system were

⁸²⁰ DFID Burundi, *DFID Burundi, 2009-2011: Issues and Choices Paper - Burundi's options for 2009-11*, 10.

⁸²¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁸²² *Ibid.*

⁸²³ International Development Committee, *The Closure of DFID's Bilateral Aid Programme in Burundi - Tenth Report of Session 2010-12*, House of Commons Report (London: House of Commons, October 28, 2012),

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=the%20closure%20of%20dfid%27s%20bilateral%20aid%20programme%20in%20burundi%20tenth%20report%20of%20session%202010-12&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CD0QFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.publications.parliament.uk%2Fpa%2Fcm201012%2Fcmselect%2Fcmintdev%2F1730%2F1730.pdf&ei=zSU9T_CdEKrv0gGeltHDBw&usg=AFQjCNF9-bpSaKptY0bHzur8-iMSGDqPmQ&cad=rja (accessed February 16, 2012).

⁸²⁴ Key informant interview, DFID staff (D12), Bujumbura, 2009.

repeatedly stalled, and it eventually abandoned the aspect of its program that directly funded the Ministry of Justice.⁸²⁵

DFID's political and peacebuilding activities were mainly confined to the diplomacy and reporting work of Sue Hogwood and the FCO liaison officer. Their analyses and diplomatic actions were not integrated into DFID's development cooperation programming, or vice versa. DFID's development projects were not based on an analysis of their relationship to the conflict environment, and development assistance was not used directly to influence political outcomes.

In spite of the disconnect between its development and diplomatic tracks, DFID framed its Burundi program as a peacebuilding and statebuilding program that culminated in successful democratic elections in 2010. "In 2002, DFID first responded to humanitarian needs in Burundi created by the civil war, and the focus then moved to building a peaceful and stable state and the successful return of 500,000 refugees. These objectives were largely met when a second successive set of well-managed elections was held in 2010."⁸²⁶

7.3.2.1 Diplomacy

Hogwood was a force of nature. She was always very well informed about Burundian politics and a vocal advocate for better-quality programming by international actors and the Burundian government alike. "Sue Hogwood was amazing. There was no way to keep up with her."⁸²⁷ As the UK Ambassador to Rwanda and Burundi from 2001 to 2004, she had followed the politics of Burundi and collaborated closely with Georgina

⁸²⁵ DFID, *The closure of DFID's aid programme in Burundi: Written Evidence Submitted by the Department for International Development*, para. 26.

⁸²⁶ *House of Commons Oral Evidence Taken Before the International Development Committee, Closure of DFID's Aid Programme in Burundi, Tuesday 5 July 2011, Archbishop Bernard Ntahoturi and Patrick Watt, Mr. Stephen O'Brien MP and Elizabeth Carriere, 14.*

⁸²⁷ "Observer (O17), Bujumbura."

Yates, the previous director of DFID's Burundi office. In addition to her own capacity and network, she benefitted from the UK position on the Security Council and the knowledge base within DFID.⁸²⁸ Most of her staff were also very well respected and influential: not afraid to speak up and hold the international community and Burundians to a higher standard.

In spite of DFID's small program in Burundi, Hogwood and her team's excellent reputation with Burundians and foreigners and her determination allowed the office "to punch above its weight."⁸²⁹ She pressured the UN and other international actors to harmonize and align as dictated by the Paris principles for aid effectiveness. She also helped the UN to improve the quality of its peacebuilding programming. As an observer at the regular meetings of the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) for the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), she ensured that there was some degree of programmatic oversight, a task that neither the UN nor other donors were willing to take on.⁸³⁰

Hogwood had good relationships with key Burundian politicians and worked with her European colleagues to develop a common front on key political issues. She followed the ongoing negotiations with the FNL and the political meanderings within the government very closely and engaged in quiet diplomacy with the various parties. The office assessed itself this way:

We have been able to play an influential role. The government sees us as a partner with whom they can do business (we come with no baggage and no hidden agenda), and partners see us as leaders on joint working and [Sector Wide Approaches] SWAs, and uniquely joined-up on our development/foreign policy agenda. This places us in an influential position, and DFID can – and does – play a strong advocacy role,

⁸²⁸ Ibid., 17.

⁸²⁹ DFID Burundi, *DFID Burundi, 2009-2011: Issues and Choices Paper - Burundi's options for 2009-11*, 4.

⁸³⁰ Key informant interviews, Bujumbura, 2009.

including on best practice and conflict transformation, and on political and security issues.⁸³¹

In 2009, together with DFID's Regional Conflict Advisor, she oversaw the preparation of a Strategic Conflict Assessment that described the complex political dynamics in Burundi leading up to the elections and made recommendations for what the international community and DFID could do to reduce the likelihood of violence and increase the likelihood of sustained peace. DFID did not alter its programming in response to the findings of this analysis. DFID had also conducted a conflict-analysis workshop a few years earlier that had no impact on its programming.

In spite of Hogwood's political astuteness and the continuous conflict analysis done in the DFID office, DFID's programming was not conflict-sensitive. DFID's health, education, governance, and justice programming was largely detached from the causes of the conflict and its manifestations. Furthermore, DFID did not take significant actions to respond to the scenarios outlined in its own 2009 strategic conflict analysis or to respond to demobilization and integration of the FNL into the government and armed forces that began in April 2009.⁸³² Hogwood followed the negotiations carefully, but DFID did not take any kind of programmatic response or provide financial support for the FNL demobilization or reintegration.⁸³³ Instead, around this time DFID focused more intensely on its development program, including the creation of a new Burundi Revenue Authority.⁸³⁴

⁸³¹ DFID Burundi, *DFID Burundi, 2009-2011: Issues and Choices Paper - Burundi's options for 2009-11*, 5.

⁸³² DFID Staff person (D12), via email, February 17, 2012.

⁸³³ Ibid. One reason for the FCO's reluctance to provide financial support for the demobilization was its outstanding request against the lack of investigation or prosecution into the death of the British Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) worker who was killed by an ambush on the bus she was traveling in from Bujumbura to Kigali in December 2000.

⁸³⁴ DFID Burundi, *DFID Burundi, 2009-2011: Issues and Choices Paper - Burundi's options for 2009-11*.

7.3.2.2 Development, statebuilding, and conflict sensitivity

DFID Burundi aimed to have both a peacebuilding and a statebuilding impact through its health, education, governance, and justice programming. It believed that these interventions would help Burundi's fledgling democracy deliver a peace dividend to the population and contribute to more sustainable peace. It believed that by strengthening the capacity of the Burundian state to respond to the populations' needs in the areas of health, education, and justice, it would help strengthen Burundi's fragile state. In reality, DFID's programming in Burundi neither supported statebuilding nor necessarily delivered a "peace dividend" to the population.

DFID's health program focused on "improving drug distribution systems" by working on the supply chain.⁸³⁵ DFID assessed this work as a success because "the proportion of health centers suffering from lack of stock has declined from 55 percent in 2010 to 42 percent in 2011."⁸³⁶ DFID's education program provided money to a basket fund to which other European donors also contributed. Combined together, by 2012 these donors reported that they "supported the construction of 288 school rooms and provision of 2.2 million schoolbooks, enabling all primary school children to have a set of books in maths, Kirundi, and French for the first time."⁸³⁷ The education program also purchased textbooks and teacher training materials and helped reintegrate returning refugees into Burundi's school system.⁸³⁸ DFID also funded Care International and Catholic Relief Service (CRS) to provide care to orphans and other vulnerable children.⁸³⁹

⁸³⁵ DFID, *The closure of DFID's aid programme in Burundi: Written Evidence Submitted by the Department for International Development*, para. 17.

⁸³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸³⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 18.

⁸³⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 19.

⁸³⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 21.

DFID's justice program worked with the EU to improve the delivery of local justice by supporting the local court system. It also worked with Belgium and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) to strengthen the Ministry of Justice. "This programme was closed early as it was shown to be underperforming."⁸⁴⁰ DFID and SIDA, whose program DFID managed, also supported two international NGOs working on juvenile justice and legal aid.⁸⁴¹

Table 7-1 below lists DFID's contribution in each sector, by year.

Table 7-1: DFID's contribution to Burundi, by sector, 2004–2012

	Education	Health	Social Protection	Water & Sanitation	Governance	Economic Growth	Humanitarian	Total
2004/05	0	0	0	0	1.4	0	4.1	5.6
2005/06	1.6	3.0	0	0	1.5	0	5.0	11.2
2006/07	0	1.0	2.6	0	1.1	0	3.4	8.2
2007/08	0.1	1.3	0.6	0	0.7	0	1.4	4.1
2008/09	1.6	3.4	1.5	0.4	1.4	0	0.8	9.1
2009/10	3.0	4.4	1.1	0.4	1.8	0	2.1	12.9
2010/11 (forecast)	2.6	2.3	1.0	0.4	1.0	3.2	0.4	11.0
2011/12 (forecast)	3.0	1.8	0	0	0.8	4.0	0	9.6
Total	11.8	17.4	6.9	1.2	8.9	7.2	18.0	71.4

Source: DFID (Ev 34, Annex 4)

DFID argued that its program played "a strong role in reinforcing state capability, responsiveness, and accountability" through its support for an international NGO-run communication campaign "to promote dialogue between the citizens and the state" and its work to create the Burundi Revenue Authority.⁸⁴² In fact, DFID's program strengthened the state much more than the society or state-society relations. The

⁸⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁴¹ Ibid., para. 27.

⁸⁴² Ibid.

communication campaign that it supported intended to increase state-society interaction but was largely deemed to be unsuccessful.⁸⁴³

Its efforts to create the Burundi Revenue Authority increased the capacity of the state to collect, and extract, taxes from the population, but did not increase the responsiveness of the state to the population's needs or demands. It decreased the corruption within the tax collection system but did not make the government more accountable to its citizens. According to a UK Parliamentarian who visited the Burundi project:

The tax authority stuff is purely national budget stuff; there is no way of making it local or giving any form of accountability other than through the Government. If the Government itself does not abide by what we would expect it to, it seems to me there is not much we can do. In Burundi it could quite clearly be argued that all we are doing is raising money to go into the President's pocket, because it goes into the budget pot and we have absolutely no control whatsoever of the budget pot, which as an aid community we are contributing half to anyway."⁸⁴⁴

Corruption remains a huge problem in Burundi. A study by a local corruption watchdog found that half of the Burundian government's 2006 and 2007 budget was embezzled.⁸⁴⁵ Instead of enabling an effective social contract, the increased capacity of the government to tax the population combined could even further penalize the poorest and most vulnerable.⁸⁴⁶

⁸⁴³ DFID staff person (D1), Bujumbura, Burundi, June 1, 2009.

⁸⁴⁴ International Development Committee, *House of Commons Oral Evidence Taken Before the International Development Committee - Working With Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, Tuesday 12 July 2011*, Chris Underwood, Sophia Swithern, Jennifer Miquel, and David Mepham - *Corrected Evidence - HC 1133-i* (London, 2011), Q37 Richard Harrington <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/c1133-i/c113301.htm> (accessed October 13, 2011).

⁸⁴⁵ "Burundi: Half of the National Budget Embezzled Within Two Years," *AllAfrica* (Bujumbura, February 2, 2008), <http://allafrica.com/stories/200802020014.html> (accessed October 13, 2011).

⁸⁴⁶ EURAC, *Withdrawal by international partners would be disastrous for the peace process and for future development* | *ReliefWeb* (Brussels-Bujumbura, October 2011), <http://reliefweb.int/node/452197> (accessed October 13, 2011).

Similarly, DFID's health and education programs strengthened the capacity of the state in these critical sectors but did little to increase the capacity of the citizens to hold the state accountable for what they were delivering. As a result, DFID's programming in Burundi contradicted its own policy papers indicating how statebuilding should take place.

Statebuilding is not a technical process of strengthening government institutions this is more accurately described as "institution building". In all contexts, statebuilding is principally about strengthening the relationship between the state and society, and developing effective ways to mediate this relationship... Statebuilding is primarily an endogenous process, and a wide range of local and national actors beyond state institutions will have an impact. Many statebuilding processes in fragile situations are characterized by tensions between formal and informal institutions, with each wanting to exert influence and establish a dominant position.⁸⁴⁷

DFID inserted itself in this statebuilding dynamic and, like most other donors, increased the power and leverage of the state without also strengthening the capacity of the society or civil society to hold the state to account. Similarly, DFID inserted itself in Burundi's war-to-peace transition without examining how its programming affected the causes of Burundi's war or its ongoing peacebuilding process.

Access to education in Burundi was closely linked to the conflict.⁸⁴⁸ Hutu had been excluded from the education system, perpetuating their exclusion from state institutions, civil society, and business. In 1972, the Tutsi army sent a clear message that education could be deadly, massacring over 100,000 Hutu intellectuals. In the consciousness of many Burundians, unequal access to education was both a cause and manifestation of the conflict.

Exclusion has been at the root of Burundi's cyclical conflicts since independence in the early 1960s. Exclusion begins with differential

⁸⁴⁷ DFID, *Building the State and Securing the Peace*, Emerging Policy Paper (London: Department for International Development, June 2009), para. 10–11, <http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=3210> (accessed October 13, 2011).

⁸⁴⁸ Jackson, *Equal Access to Education a peace imperative for Burundi*.

access to education. This is especially so in a society and economy in which state employment has been virtually the only alternative to peasant agriculture, and education is the only path to such advancement. Chronic distortions in access to education have been a major factor in ensuring that the minority Tutsi have predominated in the institutions of the state. This has been most evident in the army and the judiciary, but it has extended across the whole range of state employment, especially at senior levels.⁸⁴⁹

The relationship between education and the conflict in Burundi had been discussed in the UK Parliament and in at least one study commissioned by DFID. Nonetheless, DFID's education program did not examine the relationship between its programming and the causes of the past conflict or any potential future conflicts.⁸⁵⁰ While DFID's education program may have helped to increase equal access to education, it may also have contributed to new types of discrimination and inequality. No one knows because no one asked whether this was taking place.

Similarly, DFID did not ask who received the drugs that the state delivered and who did not. An improved supply chain for drugs could certainly make an important contribution to people's health, but if the actual distribution of the drugs to individuals was not monitored, then more drugs could actually increase the potential for exclusion, corruption, and favoritism.

These challenges were partly addressed in the House of Commons discussion of UK aid policy to Burundi, DRC, and Rwanda: "It is not to say infrastructure, health, and education are not important; clearly they are. But that has got to be complemented by a more assertive attempt to assert the rights of people and for governments to respect those rights."⁸⁵¹ Another commentator expanded this argument: "Where you have got

⁸⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁰ DFID staff person (D5), Bujumbura, Burundi, June 18, 2009.

⁸⁵¹ International Development Committee, *House of Commons Oral Evidence Taken Before the International Development Committee - Working With Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, Tuesday 12 July 2011, Chris Underwood, Sophia Swithern, Jennifer Miquel, and David Mepham - Corrected Evidence - HC 1133-i*, 23.

infrastructure projects that will contribute to the local infrastructure of villages or regions, it is really critical to have civil-society oversight of the priorities for that spending and how that spending takes place. From that comes accountability.”⁸⁵²

An activity is only a peace dividend if the population perceives it to be a demonstration of the government’s capacity to provide services that acknowledge the causes of war and the possible foundations of peace. If projects intended to be peace dividends are poorly implemented or encourage discrimination and inequality, then they are unlikely to have the intended effect. DFID assumed that health and education programs were peace dividends, but did not actually design them that way or ask whether they achieved a peace dividend. In addition, recent research has falsified the theory that “short-run economic conditions are a major determinant of one’s disposition toward society and the state.”⁸⁵³

DFID’s work in the justice sector was more conflict-sensitive because it was based on an overall understanding of the role of access to justice in the conflict. Nonetheless, it took a relatively standard development approach of directly strengthening the Ministry of Justice. The program lacked a fine-grained analysis of the actors and issues preventing progress from taking place in the justice sector and could therefore not develop a more nuanced program.⁸⁵⁴ The Minister of Justice was notoriously uncooperative with donors and other international actors and repeatedly stonewalled DFID’s program, leading DFID eventually to abandon this effort.⁸⁵⁵ Otherwise, DFID supported the programming of two well-respected international NGOs working in the justice sector.

⁸⁵² Ibid., 22.

⁸⁵³ Cyrus Samii, *Microdynamics of War-to-Peace Transitions: Evidence from Burundi - PhD Dissertation* (New York: Columbia University, 2011), 128–198, <http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:130851> (accessed October 17, 2011).

⁸⁵⁴ DFID staff person (D1), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁸⁵⁵ DFID, *The closure of DFID’s aid programme in Burundi: Written Evidence Submitted by the Department for International Development*, para. 26.

7.3.3 DFID'S PUZZLING ROUTINES

It is puzzling that DFID Burundi's program from 2005 to 2009 was not conflict-sensitive and did not contain peacebuilding or statebuilding programming. DFID is the donor that has perhaps made the greatest contribution to conflict-sensitive development, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and statebuilding policies and guidelines, and in increasing the capacity of its staff in these areas. Why would DFID choose to implement a program that was devoid of this type of programming in a country that still had an ongoing peace process? Why would it do so on the heels of a three-year program that focused almost solely on peacebuilding? Even more perplexing, why would it do so under the leadership of a highly skilled political operative such as Hogwood and in an office that combined DFID and the FCO?

7.3.3.1 Responding to hope

In the aftermath of the 2005 elections, there was a type of euphoria in Burundi. The government, international actors, and average Burundians all hoped that the country was entering a new phase, and they wanted to accompany it in its journey.⁸⁵⁶ The design of DFID's Burundi program was partly a response to this hopefulness. DFID wanted to make sure that the new Burundian government could deliver its promises to the Burundian people, namely free primary education and maternal healthcare.

DFID argued that if the government could not significantly improve its health and education systems, "how stable would [Burundi] have been?"⁸⁵⁷ DFID believed that the legitimacy and stability of the government was linked to its capacity to provide the social services it had promised. It did not test this theory of change about the relationship

⁸⁵⁶ Observers (O4) in Bujumbura, Burundi, June 26, 2009; DFID staff person (D1), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁸⁵⁷ DFID staff person (D6), Bujumbura, Burundi, June 6, 2009.

between its programming and the Burundian context. Nor did it ask whether its programs may convey legitimacy on a government that may otherwise be perceived as illegitimate because of human rights abuses, the abuse of power, corruption, or other factors. Would this, in turn, create *de facto* sovereignty under the guise of *de jure* sovereignty?⁸⁵⁸

7.3.3.2 The development frame

As an organization, DFID is “completely focused on MDGs and aid effectiveness,” not on politics.⁸⁵⁹ In spite of the cutting-edge policies and publications that DFID has released on conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and statebuilding, DFID remains an organization that is primarily focused on development. As a corollary, DFID is fully committed to the MDGs and the aid effectiveness agenda set out in Paris in 2005 and Accra in 2008.⁸⁶⁰ These are the organizational frames that predominant.

During this period, DFID Burundi was guided by this organizational frame and the supporting knowledge-laden routines. Although the FCO office was combined with the DFID office in Burundi, and the head of the DFID office had an FCO background, DFID’s programming was largely focused on standard development goals. Even its justice and governance programming took a long-term development perspective, not a shorter-term peacebuilding perspective.⁸⁶¹

Sue Hogwood used her political perspective and high degree of “local” knowledge of Burundi and the region to negotiate DFID’s politically sensitive program agreements

⁸⁵⁸ Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist,” *World Politics* 35, no. 1 (1982): 1–24.

⁸⁵⁹ DFID staff person (D9) by phone, February 12, 2009.

⁸⁶⁰ OECD-DAC, “Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action,” *Development Cooperation Directorate (DCD-DAC)*, n.d., http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed October 17, 2011).

⁸⁶¹ DFID staff person (D1), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

and conditions with government, encourage the government to take certain types of actions in relation to the ongoing peace process, and influence and inform the broader international community in Burundi. This political knowledge was not employed to implement or design conflict-sensitive or peacebuilding programming, respond programmatically to key peacebuilding opportunities, or prioritize serious involvement of communities or civil society in DFID's statebuilding efforts.⁸⁶² Furthermore, the knowledge possessed by DFID conflict advisors had little real influence on DFID Burundi strategies or programming.

DFID's focus on education and health also corresponded to DFID's corporate priorities and policies, creating upward accountability incentives for results in these areas. DFID's leadership had made a strong commitment to health and education as part of the MDGs and through other key commitments that DFID had made, such as the International Health Partnership.⁸⁶³ In addition, when DFID surveyed the field of donors in Burundi in 2005 and 2006, they saw that health, education, and justice lacked the necessary donor leadership and investment. To avoid duplication of efforts, DFID focused on these areas.⁸⁶⁴

The approach that DFID had taken in Rwanda also influenced its approach in Burundi. The DFID office in Rwanda oversaw DFID's Burundi program. Hogwood reported directly to the Rwanda office. Furthermore, several of the DFID Burundi staff had worked in the DFID Rwanda office. Hogwood had been the Ambassador in Rwanda from 2001 until she took the Burundi post with DFID in 2005.

⁸⁶² DFID staff person (D4), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; International Development Committee, *House of Commons Oral Evidence Taken Before the International Development Committee - Working With Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, Tuesday 12 July 2011, Chris Underwood, Sophia Swithern, Jennifer Miquel, and David Mephram - Corrected Evidence - HC 1133-i.*

⁸⁶³ DFID staff person (D6), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁸⁶⁴ DFID Burundi, *DFID Burundi, 2009-2011: Issues and Choices Paper - Burundi's options for 2009-11*, 9; DFID staff person (D6), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

Soon after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, DFID had invested heavily in Rwanda and had prioritized pursuit of the MDGs above pursuit of peace, justice, human rights, and governance.⁸⁶⁵ It had been committed to statebuilding there, defined as increasing the capacity of the state to deliver services, not in terms of strengthening state-society relations.⁸⁶⁶ Even though Burundi was different from Rwanda in many ways, DFID applied this same frame to its work in Burundi.

The leadership of DFID Rwanda and London saw the elections as a trigger for development.⁸⁶⁷ In fact, they first argued that DFID should provide direct aid to the Burundian budget (i.e., budgetary aid) even though there would be no way to monitor the use of the funds.⁸⁶⁸ While the Burundi office successfully convinced its superiors that budgetary aid was not appropriate to the capacity and degree of corruption in Burundi, the overall development focus of the program held.

7.3.3.3 The ineffectiveness of aid effectiveness

DFID was a strong proponent of improving the effectiveness of development aid and had fully bought into the aid effectiveness agenda outlined in Paris and Accra. In DFID, “anything against Paris is bad.”⁸⁶⁹ The aid effectiveness agenda aims to help donors reduce the duplication of their efforts, the administrative burden that they place

⁸⁶⁵ International Development Committee, *House of Commons Oral Evidence Taken Before the International Development Committee - Working With Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC, Rwanda and Burundi*, Tuesday 12 July 2011, Chris Underwood, Sophia Swithern, Jennifer Miquel, and David Mephram - Corrected Evidence - HC 1133-i, 12–13.

⁸⁶⁶ International Development Committee, *House of Commons Oral Evidence Taken Before the International Development Committee - Working With Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC, Rwanda and Burundi*, Tuesday 12 July 2011, Chris Underwood, Sophia Swithern, Jennifer Miquel, and David Mephram - Corrected Evidence - HC 1133-i.

⁸⁶⁷ “Interview with DFID staff person (D13)”, October 12, 2011.

⁸⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁹ DFID staff person (D2) by telephone, interview; Observer (O3) by telephone (O3), by telephone, March 10, 2010.

on recipient countries, and the sustainability of the results of aid interventions. Specifically, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness outlines five principles:

- *Ownership* by developing countries of their own poverty reduction strategies and objectives;
- *Alignment* of donor countries behind these strategies and objectives and use of local systems to deliver aid;
- *Harmonization* and coordination of donor approaches and modalities;
- A focus on achieving and measuring *results* of development cooperation; and
- The creation of *mutual accountability* between donors and recipient countries.⁸⁷⁰

These principles refer to standard development programming in “normal” developing countries, not peacebuilding or statebuilding programming in countries facing or recovering civil war or large-scale violent conflict. By applying the aid effectiveness principles to its Burundi program, DFID’s incentive structures and routines largely acted as if Burundi were a “normal” democratic country that was relatively free of conflict or violence.

In 2005, when DFID Burundi began to implement its programs directly through and with the Burundian government, its capacity to spend the approximately £10 million in its budget for each year was greatly reduced.⁸⁷¹ The Burundian government lacked the experience, plans, or infrastructure to spend the amount of money that NGOs and the UN, however flawed, had spent.⁸⁷² Consequently, DFID’s capacity to achieve its own primary measures of effectiveness – delivering results and spending its budget – was

⁸⁷⁰ OECD-DAC, “Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action.”

⁸⁷¹ DFID staff person (D6), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁸⁷² Ibid.

reduced once it began applying the aid effectiveness agenda in a fragile and conflict-affected state.⁸⁷³

The aid effectiveness agenda and DFID's cooperation mechanisms had not been sufficiently adapted to the particular conditions of fragile and conflict-affected states. Because DFID worked directly through the government, it was unable also to work with the Burundian people. Nor was it able to develop sufficient mechanisms to help the Burundian people hold the government accountable for the results.

In spite of a few efforts to empower community groups and support media, the vast majority of DFID's support to Burundi strengthened the government, not the state (understood as being composed of both the government and the people).⁸⁷⁴ One DFID staff person commented that it is easier to do statebuilding when "the government and the state are one [and] the same," meaning that the government actually represents the interests of the people.⁸⁷⁵

Burundi's political leadership was much more focused on its own enrichment than on developing and implementing policies that would benefit its people.

People like the president of Burundi "could not care less about human rights; they have no interest at all. We have no leverage whatsoever on them, because they are quite happy for us to do whatever aid we want" presumably because they get their cut in different ways through budget support and everything like that – "and we have to work around it."⁸⁷⁶

Although the difficulty of implementing the aid effectiveness principles in fragile and conflict-affected states is well known, DFID has not provided staff with tools for

⁸⁷³ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁴ DFID staff person (D1), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D5), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D6), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D7) in Bujumbura, June 4, 2009.

⁸⁷⁵ DFID staff person (D8) in Bujumbura, Burundi, June 15, 2009.

⁸⁷⁶ Minister Richard Harrington citing a conversation that he had with the EU Ambassador to Burundi. International Development Committee, *House of Commons Oral Evidence Taken Before the International Development Committee - Working With Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, Tuesday 12 July 2011*, Chris Underwood, Sophia Swithern, Jennifer Miquel, and David Mepham - Corrected Evidence - HC 1133-i, 10.

managing these challenges.⁸⁷⁷ An audit of DFID's capacity to operate in insecure environments found that DFID did not have sufficient guidance for how staff should operate or design programs in insecure environments, and "no operational guidance on how to ensure that aid is conflict-sensitive."⁸⁷⁸ As a result, "DFID country teams in most insecure countries assess the extent and nature of conflict, but these assessments rarely make explicit links to program choices and management."⁸⁷⁹

The major modification that DFID made to take into account the circumstances in Burundi was to refuse to provide budgetary assistance directly to the government. Otherwise, DFID employed standards, mechanisms, and a statebuilding strategy in Burundi, and elsewhere, that largely acted as if the Burundian government was fully representative of its people and capable of responding to its needs and being held accountable by both the population and civil society.⁸⁸⁰

It was not that the DFID Burundi staff did not know that Burundi was in a very different situation than other countries. They were very aware of this as well as the complexities and nuances of Burundian politics. But they had a limited menu of options for engagement. DFID's institutional imperatives to transition to full "development" mode as quickly as possible, to make measurable progress toward the MDGs, and to abide by the principles of aid effectiveness predominated. Corresponding knowledge-laden routines followed.

⁸⁷⁷ Stephen Jones, Katarina Kotoglou, and Taylor Brown, *The Applicability of the Paris Declaration in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations*, Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration (Paris: OECD, August 2008), <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/1/41149294.pdf> (accessed October 18, 2011).

⁸⁷⁸ National Audit Office, *Department for International Development: Operating in insecure environments - National Audit Office*, 5, 26.

⁸⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁸⁸⁰ International Development Committee, *House of Commons Oral Evidence Taken Before the International Development Committee - Working With Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC, Rwanda and Burundi*, Tuesday 12 July 2011, Chris Underwood, Sophia Swithern, Jennifer Miquel, and David Mephem - Corrected Evidence - HC 1133-i, 4.

Staff went to workshops on fragile states, but the information provided focused more on academic literature and failed to provide specific guidance on what to do differently or how to do it.⁸⁸¹ Even the regional conflict advisor largely focused on his own initiatives, like the 2009 strategic conflict assessment.⁸⁸² He did not help the Burundi office make its programs conflict-sensitive or encourage the pursuit of development strategies that were more appropriate to a state just emerging from civil war.⁸⁸³

It is possible that by supporting the Burundian government's development priorities and engaging with them in a respectful way, DFID gained their trust and had greater influence in political discussions with the government.⁸⁸⁴ But it is impossible to know whether this was the case because DFID did not attempt an alternative strategy.

7.3.3.4 Accountability for funds and friends, not outcomes

DFID Burundi's incentive structure was guided by upward accountability routines as well as horizontal accountability routines. DFID country offices are rewarded primarily for spending the money that they are allocated and for delivering tangible results that provide good success stories for DFID's Ministers.⁸⁸⁵ In fact, DFID Burundi's successes with its health and education interventions were used by DFID's Ministers in

⁸⁸¹ DFID staff person (D1), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D5), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁸⁸² DFID staff person (D5), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D8) in Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁸⁸³ DFID staff person (D5), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D8) in Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁸⁸⁴ DFID staff person (D7) in Bujumbura, interview.

⁸⁸⁵ DFID staff person (D1), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D2) by telephone, interview; DFID staff person (D6), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D7) in Bujumbura, interview.

its testimony before Parliamentary oversight committee to illustrate the overall value of DFID's work.⁸⁸⁶

While these upward accountability routines predominated, horizontal accountability to the recipient government was also important. In DFID, being branded as "difficult" by the recipient government can be harmful for your career. It is better "if you don't rock the boat."⁸⁸⁷ In addition, DFID held itself accountable to the rest of the international community in Burundi. In line with the aid effectiveness agenda, it aimed to harmonize its approaches with the other donors in Burundi so that it could help reduce duplication and the administrative burden placed on the government by different donors and facilitate a common stance on key issues.

Although Hogwood was an outspoken member of the international community, not afraid to hold both the Burundian government and other international and regional actors to account, she also maintained a good relationship with the Burundian government.⁸⁸⁸ Interestingly, it was when her direct supervisor, based in Kigali, was in town that she tempered herself and her comments in an aid coordination meeting.⁸⁸⁹

The focus of DFID's accountability mechanisms on demonstrating tangible results, spending the allocated funds, and maintaining a good relationship with the recipient government reinforces the predominant organizational frames outlined above: the MDGs and the Paris principles of aid effectiveness. DFID Burundi's programming in the areas of

⁸⁸⁶ Testimony by Hilary Benn on DFID's support for education in Burundi, *House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 23 May 2007 (pt 0012)*, 2007, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070523/text/70523w0012.htm> (accessed October 18, 2011); DFID, *House of Commons - International Development - Fifth Special Report*, 2008, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmintdev/592/59204.htm> (accessed October 18, 2011).

⁸⁸⁷ DFID staff person (D1), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁸⁸⁸ DFID staff person (D7) in Bujumbura, interview.

⁸⁸⁹ Participant Observation, UN-Government Aid Coordination Meeting, Bujumbura, June 2009.

health and education delivered much quicker and more tangible results. It also received much more support from headquarters than the governance or justice programming.⁸⁹⁰

Pursuit of the MDGs privileges simple, easily measurable results. The MDGs fail to measure the complex peacebuilding or statebuilding that is often necessary for fragile and conflict-affected countries to make progress toward the MDGs.⁸⁹¹ As a result, measurement of progress toward the MDGs often ignores the measurement of other factors that are necessary for the achievement of the MDGs.

DFID's commitment to the Paris Declaration and the overall aid effectiveness agenda privileges horizontal accountability to the recipient government and discourages programming that helps the people and civil society hold the government accountable. Although DFID Burundi did support several small-scale efforts to create accountability, it neither had the staff time nor the organizational commitment necessary to mount significant efforts to improve the accountability of the government or even to engage in development work at the community level.⁸⁹²

DFID has amassed an impressive cadre of very smart, well-trained, and innovative staff. But there are few incentives for staff to take posts in fragile and conflict-affected countries.⁸⁹³ According to the 2008 audit of DFID's work in insecure environments, 70 percent of staff surveyed had thought that working in an insecure environment would positively impact their careers, but only 30 percent reported that taking these positions

⁸⁹⁰ DFID staff person (D6), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D1), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D5), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁸⁹¹ International Development Committee, *House of Commons Oral Evidence Taken Before the International Development Committee - Working With Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, Tuesday 12 July 2011*, Chris Underwood, Sophia Swithern, Jennifer Miquel, and David Mephram - Corrected Evidence - HC 1133-i, 6.

⁸⁹² DFID staff person (D1), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁸⁹³ National Audit Office, *Department for International Development: Operating in insecure environments - National Audit Office*, 28.

actually had a positive impact.⁸⁹⁴ Combined with the organization's predominant focus on development, the lack of incentives for staff to work in fragile and conflict-affected countries discourages individuals from taking these difficult posts and, once in these posts, from challenging the predominant organizational frames and status quo.

DFID has very strong policy guidance in fragile and conflict-affected states, but lacks the necessary institutional incentives and mechanisms to realize this guidance.⁸⁹⁵ Although the Country Director possesses a high degree of autonomy in designing the country program, DFID's organizational frames and accountability structure prioritize a development programming and quick, tangible results.⁸⁹⁶ DFID offices can include additional less conventional programming, as DFID Burundi did with its governance and justice program. But given the limited time and the many other difficulties faced in conflict-affected states, DFID's incentive structures seem to largely discourage innovative and time-consuming peacebuilding and statebuilding programming.

7.3.3.5 Learning behavior and information

By all accounts, DFID Burundi had a high degree of open and transparent information sharing within its small office.⁸⁹⁷ Staff openly discussed issues that arose in their programming and in Burundian politics. They shared information with their head office in Kigali and headquarters in London, but resolved most problems locally.

⁸⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁵ DFID staff person (D8) in Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D2) by telephone, interview; National Audit Office, *Department for International Development: Operating in insecure environments - National Audit Office*.

⁸⁹⁶ DFID staff person (D2) by telephone, interview; DFID staff person (D8) in Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁸⁹⁷ DFID staff person (D1), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D3) by telephone, interview; DFID staff person (D6), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D5), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D7) in Bujumbura, interview.

Bucking the trend in much of the aid industry, DFID Burundi staff read a lot: keeping up on the latest local news, political analyses, relevant guidance and reports from headquarters, and reports from their projects. They had access to a wealth of resources about best practices, thematic strategies, and DFID's particular approach. Other members of the international community reported that Hogwood was always on top of the latest information, both about Burundi's evolving peace process and the international community's response.⁸⁹⁸ When the office received negative information about their programs or projects, they discussed it openly and decided what to do.⁸⁹⁹ They resolved these issues at the country office level and in consultation with the Kigali office and only took issues up to headquarters when necessary.⁹⁰⁰

In the terminology of the theory presented in Chapter 2, DFID Burundi possessed non-defensive learning behavior. But DFID did not question whether its approach was the right one for Burundi. It did not have sufficient data on the relationship between its aims and outcomes, partly because this type of data was not regularly collected by Burundian government and because DFID did not try and collect these data itself.⁹⁰¹ DFID staff spent most of their time in Bujumbura interacting with their counterparts there. They relied mostly on partner quarterly reports about project outputs and on conversations with partners and observers in Bujumbura.⁹⁰²

DFID project staff conducted a minimum of two field visits a year per project.⁹⁰³ DFID Burundi staff did not believe it was their role to systematically monitor the implementation of their programs and projects outside of Bujumbura. Instead, they

⁸⁹⁸ "Observer (O17), Bujumbura."

⁸⁹⁹ DFID staff person (D1), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D5), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D7) in Bujumbura, interview.

⁹⁰⁰ DFID staff person (D6), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁹⁰¹ DFID staff person (D5), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁹⁰² Ibid.

⁹⁰³ DFID staff person (D7) in Bujumbura, interview.

focused on policy-level engagement, discussion, and reform with government officials and international partners. The FCO staff person in the office regularly went to the countryside to assess the situation, but he was not collecting information about DFID's interventions.⁹⁰⁴ The inability of offices to monitor and evaluate impact and outcomes in fragile states was a problem shared by other DFID offices.⁹⁰⁵

Although DFID possessed non-defensive learning behavior, in most cases it did not have valid information about the relationship between its articulated aims and intermediary outcomes, nor did it clearly articulate peacebuilding, conflict prevention, or statebuilding aims. In cases where DFID did act to align a program's aim and outcome, it engaged in single-loop learning in relation to its expressed goal.⁹⁰⁶ It did not question whether it was the right goal or approach or engage in double-loop learning.

7.3.3.6 The relationship between learning behavior and outcomes

As discussed earlier in this chapter, this case shows that donors do not use learning behavior and information about the relationship between aims and outcomes in the same way as NGOs and IOs that are directly implementing programs. Donors cannot, in fact, systematically and directly act to align project or program aims and outcomes. The direct actions that bilateral donors can take are limited to disbursing funds, postponing the disbursement of funds, and stopping the disbursement of funds. But as discussed above, donors also have an incentive to disburse their committed funds and view any postponement or stop disbursement as a last resort.

⁹⁰⁴ DFID staff person (D4), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁹⁰⁵ Nick Chapman and Charlotte Vaillant, *Synthesis of Country Programme Evaluations Conducted in Fragile States*, Evaluation (London: Department for International Development, February 2010), <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/evaluation/syn-cnty-prog-evals-frag-sts.pdf> (accessed October 19, 2011).

⁹⁰⁶ Two instances of this type of action were the decision to cut the funding for the PANOS media project and the decision to stop the direct support for the Ministry of Justice.

Most of DFID Burundi's "actions to align" took place in the form of dialogue with its partners – informing, advocating, persuading, discussing – about the aims, different approaches, and challenges. Then, if things did not go according to plan, DFID had to carry out the same types of activities with the Kigali and London offices – informing, advocating, persuading, and discussing its approach in Burundi; why things were not proceeding according to plan; and what the office wanted to do about it. In cases where DFID Burundi thought it was taking particularly risky actions, such as providing funding in 2005 to feed the CNDD-FDD in cantonment areas, it made sure to get the approval of DFID's governing ministers.

To further complicate matters, DFID did not train its partners in the "DFID approach" or share policy papers or guidelines with partners. It provided "technical support" during its discussions, drafted program documents, and appointed several technical assistants to serve in different ministries or international organizations.⁹⁰⁷ But DFID did not invest serious time or energy to build the capacity of its partners to implement effective programs or monitor and evaluate these programs. This light touch further reduced the capacity of DFID to achieve its outcomes. It largely relied on the capacity, knowledge, and will of its partners to achieve these outcomes.

7.3.3.7 Resources: financial and human

What else explains DFID's approach to Burundi during this period? Resources certainly played a role. Because DFID pursued long-term development objectives in Burundi and committed its resources toward these objectives, it did not have the money available for shorter-term peacebuilding interventions that would have allowed it to respond to opportunities in the context. This falsifies one of the alternative explanations

⁹⁰⁷ DFID staff person (D1), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview; DFID staff person (D5), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview

discussed in Chapter 2 – that more resources will increase peacebuilding effectiveness. Because DFID no longer directly pursued peacebuilding or conflict prevention objectives, the allocation of more resources did not increase its capacity to achieve them. In fact, the type of resources available to Burundi in 2005 decreased the capacity of the office to engage in peacebuilding or conflict prevention because these resources were intended for development programming that was largely insensitive to the conflict dynamics.

For comparison, the pre-2005 DFID funds and the PBF supported Burundi's war-to-peace transition not because of the amount of money, but because of the peacebuilding focus and flexibility of the funding. That said, if DFID had provided more peacebuilding funds between 2002 and 2004, there is no guarantee that there would have been more effective peacebuilding. Funding is only the first step. You also have to have the right idea, right opportunity in the context, right design, right people, and the capacity to adjust all of the above in response to feedback from the context.

Although financial resources may not make a difference in peacebuilding effectiveness, staff resources may. Even if DFID had decided to alter its program and adopt more specific peacebuilding goals, it would not have had the number of staff to manage it.⁹⁰⁸ DFID's budget in Burundi was small compared to its support for neighboring countries, and, as a result, the number of staff allocated to the office was also small. Even though DFID country offices have a great deal of autonomy, the amount of money and staff available to each office is determined by headquarters.

DFID headquarters' decision to assign a small number of staff followed the logic that a small pot of money required a small number of people to manage it. But in fragile and conflict-affected states this is often not the right approach.⁹⁰⁹ Because the state is still weak and does not often represent the society, donors to these states have an important

⁹⁰⁸ DFID staff person (D1), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁹⁰⁹ Chapman and Vaillant, *Synthesis of Country Programme Evaluations Conducted in Fragile States*.

accompaniment role to play that builds the capacity of the state and society to produce sustainable results. This approach is much more time-consuming, produces far fewer quick results than traditional development programming, and therefore requires more staff time in proportion to the amount of money allocated.⁹¹⁰ It also requires a focus on incremental outcomes rather than quick results.

The OECD-DAC's recent guidance on *Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance* recommends that donors increase the "staff-to-aid spending ratio" to take into account the investment needed by staff to understand local networks of power and to develop appropriate approaches for engaging with them.⁹¹¹ A DFID *Synthesis of Country Programme Evaluations Conducted in Fragile States* made a similar recommendation, commenting that "operating in a fragile state is typically more labor-intensive and expensive than elsewhere for a variety of reasons including the weakness of host governments, a risky operating environment, difficult communications, and ill-adapted internal procedures and regulations."⁹¹²

7.3.3.8 Leadership

Leadership also made a big difference in DFID's approach in Burundi, although not in the way one might suspect. Hogwood was very well respected by the international community and by many in government. She brought to DFID Burundi an intense commitment to the country and knowledge of the broader Great Lakes Region. She not only influenced DFID's approach in Burundi, but also the general approach of the

⁹¹⁰ DFID staff person (D1), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁹¹¹ OECD-DAC, *Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, February 28, 2011), 90, http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_46623180_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed October 19, 2011).

⁹¹² Chapman and Vaillant, *Synthesis of Country Programme Evaluations Conducted in Fragile States*.

international community. She was transferred to a DFID West Africa office in mid-2009, less than a year before the 2010 elections. After her departure, the DFID office shifted even further away from a political focus, and in 2011 its closure was announced. It seems that Hogwood enabled DFID Burundi to be much more politically relevant than it would have otherwise been and served as a strong advocate for DFID's cooperation with Burundi. With her absence, a great asset for DFID and Burundi was lost.

7.3.3.9 Harmonization

Did DFID's focus on harmonization of its programs with other donors make a difference for its effectiveness in terms of peacebuilding and statebuilding? One could argue that this approach reduced the burden placed on the Burundian government, giving it more time for governing. But this assumes that the Burundian government was concerned with governing, which it did not seem to be. It also assumes that the harmonized strategies had a positive impact on peacebuilding or statebuilding. However, because these approaches lacked a peacebuilding or statebuilding frame, they did not attempt to align with relevant changes in the context, which minimized their contribution. Furthermore, harmonization had little positive impact on DFID's capacity to act to align its peacebuilding aims and outcomes. If anything, harmonization with other donors reduced DFID's capacity to take action to achieve peacebuilding aims. DFID's decisions about its programs had to be made in cooperation with other international development donors. Because most of these donors also failed to adopt clear peacebuilding, statebuilding, or conflict prevention aims or approaches, DFID's development frame and priorities were reinforced by harmonization, to the exclusion of conflict sensitivity, peacebuilding, and statebuilding.

7.3.3.10 Readiness of the context

The lack of readiness in the Burundian context for the type of longer-term peacebuilding and statebuilding work that DFID Burundi hoped to pursue, particularly in the areas of justice and governance, proved to be an important barrier to DFID's capacity to systematically and significantly act to align its aims and outcomes. While the Ministers of Health and Education were generally amenable to DFID's inputs, the Minister of Justice was a notorious spoiler of donor efforts.⁹¹³ Because DFID's strategy depended on the willingness of the Minister to pursue the reform program, his support for the program was a precondition for actions to align, however limited, and alignment.⁹¹⁴ In the face of these barriers, DFID did not attempt to change its strategy, but continued to attempt to reform the justice system and push forward governance reforms bit by bit. In the end, it simply cancelled the program, both the governance program at first and then the entire DFID program in Burundi.

7.4 2009–2011: The Political Battle over DFID's Aid to Burundi

In response to the results of Burundi's 2010 elections, DFID did not alter its approach or attempt to address the increasing likelihood of armed violence or the growing authoritarianism of the government. Instead, DFID painted these "peaceful" elections as a sign that Burundi was ready to begin its "transition from a fragile state to a more stable and prosperous future."⁹¹⁵ In response, DFID decided to close its bilateral program with Burundi in 2012 and provide support only through its regional efforts to strengthen the East African Community (EAC) and its general contribution to

⁹¹³ DFID staff person (D1), Bujumbura, Burundi, interview.

⁹¹⁴ Ibid.

⁹¹⁵ Ibid.

multilateral organizations operating in Burundi: the UN, EU, and World Bank.⁹¹⁶ It justified this decision partly based on its purported contribution to statebuilding.

The programme has also invested strongly in building government capacity to deliver basic services (including access to justice), in line with DFID's fragile states principles on statebuilding. This approach has prepared the ground for a responsible exit, as sustainability has been built into most of DFID's programme.⁹¹⁷

Even before DFID made the decision to close its Burundi office, DFID Burundi had shifted even further away from peacebuilding and statebuilding (i.e., focused on two-way state-society relations and accountability). In the final stages of its Burundi program, DFID focused solely on education, health, and, to a small degree, justice and helped the Burundian government to strengthen its tax base by reforming the Burundian Revenue Authority, increasing its yield by £35 million between 2010 and 2011.⁹¹⁸ The office was no longer intensely involved in Burundian politics in part because Hogwood had left and in part because the entire international community had pulled back from its close engagement with Burundi's peacebuilding process.

DFID had anticipated and supported the 2010 elections. It had even commissioned a strategic conflict assessment that assessed the risk of violence in relation to the elections. But it was not prepared to alter its course based on the results. DFID contributed approximately £1.8 million to support the organization of the elections, election

⁹¹⁶ Written Evidence Submitted by International Alert, *The closure of DFID's aid programme in Burundi* (London: UK Parliament, n.d.), <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/writtev/burundi/bu11.htm> (accessed October 2, 2011).

⁹¹⁷ DFID, *The closure of DFID's aid programme in Burundi: Written Evidence Submitted by the Department for International Development*, 9.

⁹¹⁸ Department for International Development, *Summary of DFID's work in Burundi 2011-2012* (Department for International Development, May 2011), <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/op/burundi-2011-summary.pdf> (accessed October 13, 2011).

observers, and media coverage.⁹¹⁹ It viewed the elections as successful because they were technically sound and relatively peaceful, irrespective of the fact that they created a one-party state and a significant increase in political violence.⁹²⁰ DFID simply continued its plan that was already under way as part of its Bilateral Aid Review (BAR) to withdraw its support from Burundi.

The purpose of DFID's bilateral aid review was to help to focus its development aid on countries and multilateral organizations that deliver the best value for money.⁹²¹ It also decided to prioritize assistance to unstable and conflict-affected countries.⁹²² DFID's review of its cooperation with Burundi concluded that in order to make a significant impact on development in Burundi, DFID would have had to substantially scale up its program.⁹²³ But, the aid review argued, even a scaled-up program would be unable to deliver the desired immediate impact because the Burundian government lacked the necessary capacity.⁹²⁴

Given the BAR's criteria for selecting of countries that would benefit from DFID aid, the members of DFID's Parliamentary oversight body, the International Development Committee (IDC), and observers were perplexed by the decision to cut its aid to Burundi. Compared to the hundreds of millions of pounds that DFID was pouring into Rwanda, Uganda, and DRC, all of which suffer from their own versions of conflict and instability,

⁹¹⁹ Discussion of Burundian Elections, "Lords Hansard text for 16 Jun 2010 (pt 0001)", June 16, 2010, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldhansrd/text/100616w0001.htm#10061668000262> (accessed October 12, 2011).

⁹²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹²¹ Department for International Development, *UK Aid: Changing lives, delivering results* (London, 2011), <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/mar/BAR-MAR-summary-document-web.pdf> (accessed October 12, 2011).

⁹²² *Ibid.*

⁹²³ Department for International Development, *Bilateral Aid Review: Technical Report* (London: Department for International Development, March 2011), para. 18, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/MAR/FINAL_BAR%20TECHNICAL%20REPORT.pdf (accessed October 12, 2011).

⁹²⁴ *Ibid.*

its contribution to Burundi was minimal and by many accounts very good value for money.⁹²⁵ Why was DFID dropping its cooperation with the EAC's poorest and most vulnerable member and lynchpin for stability in the Great Lakes Region?

If the focus of the Bilateral Aid Review and DFID's priorities is fragile states, conflict states, the poorest people in the poorest countries and tackling extreme poverty so we meet the MDGs, what is the careful and rational decision and argument for ending a program in Burundi?⁹²⁶

In July 2011, the Archbishop of Burundi launched a compelling appeal before the IDC of the House of Commons for DFID to maintain its presence in Burundi, rather than reduce it at the same time as it increased funding to all of Burundi's neighboring countries.

I am worried that the signs I am seeing here and there, the noises I am hearing from the mountains that are above Bujumbura city, what you heard and listened to when you visited Burundi – that people are not at peace. The signs that we see show that, if we are not careful, there might be another war in Burundi, because most of the young people who were demobilized do not have jobs. This is why I am saying that it is not the right time for DFID, which contributed a lot, to withdraw.⁹²⁷

DFID's decision to close its Burundi program also went against the recommendations of the DFID Burundi office. A 2009 draft of DFID Burundi's *Issues and Choices* paper that outlined the Burundi office's recommendations for DFID's cooperation with Burundi stated: "We recommend that we remain engaged to help meet Burundi's enormous development needs and sustain the fragile peace. This is vital for our wider interests in the region."⁹²⁸

⁹²⁵ *House of Commons Oral Evidence Taken Before the International Development Committee, Closure of DFID's Aid Programme in Burundi, Tuesday 5 July 2011, Archbishop Bernard Ntahoturi and Patrick Watt, Mr. Stephen O'Brien MP and Elizabeth Carriere; Discussion of Burundian Elections, "Lords Hansard text for 16 Jun 2010 (pt 0001)."*

⁹²⁶ *House of Commons Oral Evidence Taken Before the International Development Committee, Closure of DFID's Aid Programme in Burundi, Tuesday 5 July 2011, Archbishop Bernard Ntahoturi and Patrick Watt, Mr. Stephen O'Brien MP and Elizabeth Carriere, 26.*

⁹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁹²⁸ DFID Burundi, *DFID Burundi, 2009-2011: Issues and Choices Paper - Burundi's options for 2009-11*, 3.

Surprisingly, the IDC was not given a complete copy of this document or a clear explanation for DFID's decision to withdraw from Burundi. Based on the evidence that they were given by DFID, in October 2011 the IDC recommended that DFID "reinstate a bilateral aid program with Burundi".⁹²⁹ In December 2011, DFID refused the IDC's recommendation, leading Malcolm Bruce MP, the Chairman of the IDC, to declare:

The Government still has not provided us with a full explanation of why it did not accept the proposal to scale up the Burundi program to make it viable which was put forward by the DFID Burundi office in its submission of June 2010 to the Bilateral Aid Review. DFID was unable to show us the unredacted submission, even in confidence. Our analysis is only as good as the evidence on which it is based and DFID has not fully explained the reasoning behind this.⁹³⁰se

The decision to drop development cooperation with Burundi was largely political.⁹³¹ While the relative unimportance of Burundi may have given the office useful autonomy in earlier years, it now made the program an easy one for DFID to drop.⁹³² With the departure of Hogwood, the office lacked a strong advocate in favor of the Burundi program. Finally, one gets the impression that programming in Burundi was simply too difficult. Unlike Rwanda and Uganda, which DFID strongly supported, the state was too fragile to deliver significant development results. Rather than scale up to address these challenges, DFID decided to withdraw leaving a gaping hole in its otherwise generous Great Lakes and East Africa strategy.

Although DFID published a series of guidance notes in March 2010 on *working effectively in conflict-affected and fragile situations*, these guidelines seemed to have had little

⁹²⁹ International Development Committee, *The Closure of DFID's Bilateral Aid Programme in Burundi - Tenth Report of Session 2010-12*, Summary.

⁹³⁰ Government of the United Kingdom, "Secret Advice Compromises Government's Decision on Burundi" (London, February 3, 2012), <http://reliefweb.int/node/474509> (accessed April 21, 2012).

⁹³¹ DFID staff person (D2) by telephone, interview.

⁹³² *Ibid.*

impact on DFID's programming in Burundi.⁹³³ It remains to be seen whether a Strategic Conflict Assessment that DFID decided to conduct in February 2012 leads to another change in DFID's programming in Burundi.⁹³⁴

7.5 Synthesis of Findings and Conclusion

DFID has become a "leading proponent of engagement in fragile states," conflict-sensitive development, and peacebuilding.⁹³⁵ It has committed to allocating 30 percent of its aid to fragile and conflict-affected states by 2014. It has amassed an impressive cadre of conflict advisors across the organization. It spent millions on research into improving the impact of development in fragile and conflict-affected states. It continues to push multilateral organizations to be more conflict-sensitive and engage in more effective conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and statebuilding.⁹³⁶ Since 2001, it has produced several white papers and policy documents that have established new standards for engagement with fragile and conflict-affected states, both for DFID and for the rest of the international community.

In spite of DFID's intense investment in improving aid to conflict-affected and fragile states, its program in Burundi was unable to maintain its sensitivity or relevance to Burundi's evolving war-to-peace transition (see Figure 7-2 below). From 2002 to 2004, DFID's support to Burundi was primarily focused on peacebuilding. It had a flexible peacebuilding fund with few strings attached and could easily take advantage of new

⁹³³ DFID, *DFID guidance on working effectively in fragile states*, A DFID Practice Paper (London: Department for International Development, March 2010), <http://www.gsdrc.org/go/fragile-states/chapter-7--dfid-guidance-on-working-effectively-in-fragile-states> (accessed October 18, 2011).

⁹³⁴ Key informant interview, 2012.

⁹³⁵ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *United Kingdom Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review*, 43; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *United Kingdom Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review*, 14.

⁹³⁶ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *United Kingdom Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review*, 35.

opportunities in Burundi's peacebuilding process and support important new initiatives by international NGOs and multilateral organizations. After 2005, DFID completely changed its approach. It directed most of its resources through the Burundian government and focused on core development priorities: health, education, and governance. Even though the peace process was ongoing, DFID's programs largely lacked a conflict-sensitive lens and did not explicitly aim to reduce the recurrence of violence in Burundi. Furthermore, the office failed to respond to key peacebuilding opportunities and new trends in Burundi's peacebuilding process in 2009 and 2010. In fact, just as the Burundian conflict seemed to be descending toward renewed conflict, DFID declared its program in Burundi a success and decided to close its office there.

Figure 7-2: 2X2 of DFID's Values on Dependent Variable

Systematic and Significant Actions to Align Aims and Means with a New Trend
in the Peacebuilding Trajectory

		NO	YES
Systematic Actions to Align Peacebuilding Programming with the Relevant Context	NO	DFID V DFID VI	
	YES	DFID IV	DFID II DFID III

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DFID Burundi had most of the trappings of a conflict-sensitive office, but these did not make a difference to its programming. Its director was a skilled political operative with in-depth knowledge of Burundi and the Great Lakes Region. The FCO and DFID were integrated into one office. A regional conflict advisor supported the office. Its staff went to trainings on improving programming in fragile states. It conducted regular in-house conflict analyses and brought in external analysts to do more conflict analysis. Its staff regularly and openly discussed the conflict environment and their programming approaches. They were all very well read and informed about Burundi and DFID's policies. The programs that DFID supported were based on a good analysis and an intensive planning process. DFID's director also had a great deal of autonomy and decision-making power.

DFID's program in Burundi between 2005 and 2011 failed to react to Burundi's war-to-peace transition because of its organizational frames, corresponding accountability routines, and politics. DFID's development organizational frame predominated in Burundi and was reinforced by management in Kigali and London. Implicit in this frame was DFID's strong commitment to the aid effectiveness agenda and the MDGs. DFID was committed to harmonizing its approach with other donors and increasing the capacity of the Burundian state to deliver basic social services that corresponded to the MDGs.

This commitment sidelined its peacebuilding, statebuilding, and conflict prevention agendas in Burundi. DFID's application of the aid effectiveness agenda in Burundi led to ineffective peacebuilding and statebuilding. It failed to design programs that took the conflict into account, and it strengthened the state, not relationships between state and society. Its focus on the MDGs supported quick, easily measurable results rather than riskier programming that had more ambiguous results. The decision to close the Burundi program in 2011 seems to have been the whim of politicians, not unlike the decision to open the office in 2002.

What is the significance of the DFID Burundi case study for the theory presented in Chapter 2? It tells us that organizational frames may have the greatest impact on an organization's responsiveness to a war-to-peace transition. For development organizations, this is a particularly important finding. Most development organizations that intervene in conflict-affected countries aim at least to do conflict-sensitive development, which means that they pay attention to how their programming can affect the causes or manifestations of conflict and peace in a particular country. Many development organizations also aim to implement some type of peacebuilding or statebuilding programming. This case study shows that unless development organizations make a peacebuilding, statebuilding, or conflict-sensitive development, their central organizational frame will be unlikely to sustain alignment with a country's war-to-peace transition. As a corollary, their peacebuilding, statebuilding, or conflict-sensitive programming is likely to be largely ineffective. Sue Unsworth agrees with the importance of the political analysis organizational frame.

So long as political analysis is seen as an optional add-on rather than as central to the whole development process, agencies will not make the necessary investment in understanding the political dynamics at work in the countries in which they operate, or make fundamental changes in their own organization, values, attitudes and behavior... the temptation to revert to technocratic, supply driven approaches will be hard to resist, and opportunities will be missed.⁹³⁷

The DFID Burundi case study also provides important insights into the particular role of learning behavior in donor organizations. Unlike NGOs or multilateral organizations that design and implement many of their projects themselves, donors primarily work through partners and depend on partners' existing capacity to design and implement the projects. Once DFID committed the money for a project or program, it largely lost its capacity to influence its direction. In response to new information about

⁹³⁷ Unsworth, "Is Political Analysis Changing Donor Behavior?"

the activity's achievement of its objectives, DFID had a limited repertoire of possible actions. It could provide "technical assistance," which entailed sitting down with the partner and discussing the problem and providing some kind of advice. Or it could stop the flow of the money, which it would only do as a last resort. But, in the end, it was highly dependent on the partner organization's willingness and capacity to implement the program. DFID Burundi did not train its partners. It did not analyze their capacity to achieve the program goals.

The DFID Burundi case shows that the capacity of a donor to achieve alignment between its peacebuilding aims and outcomes is likely to depend not only on its own capacity to take systematic actions to achieve its relevance, but also on its ability to influence and support the capacity of its grantees to maintain their relevance to the evolving peacebuilding context. This implies that donors should be supporting a whole new skill set in their staff – one that includes knowledge of organizational change processes, management, facilitation and collaboration, and monitoring systems, in addition to sectoral and programming knowledge. Ideally, the donor and the grantee would create their own type of learning organization, where the donor would be responsible for injecting new resources and skills and altering the incentive structure, and the grantee would be responsible for implementing program and ensuring consistent dialogue and feedback from the relevant stakeholders.

In sum, this case does not falsify the theory presented in Chapter 2 because it did not have all of the values present in the ideal-type theory. But it does show that good leadership, good analysis, and open and valid learning behavior are not sufficient for an organization to maintain its relevance to a peacebuilding context. Peacebuilding organizational frames and peacebuilding programming knowledge are also necessary. In addition, donors are also likely to need a new type of relationship with their grantees that is based on real collaboration, joint monitoring, and mutual capacity building.

These findings have real significance for academic and policy debates about aid effectiveness in fragile and conflict-affected states, particularly since neither the 2011 World Development Report (WDR) nor the most recent forum on aid effectiveness deal with the full extent of the problems that they raise. These findings also have important implications for DFID's peacebuilding work as well as the peacebuilding, statebuilding, and conflict prevention efforts of many other bilateral donors.

Organizational Data Point	Accountability Routines	Knowledge-laden Routines & Organizational Frames	Learning Behavior	Significant Organizational Change Process	Flexible Peacebuilding Funds	Entrepreneurial Leadership Committed to Peacebuilding	Action to Align in Relation to Peacebuilding Aims
DFID I	No program	No program	No program	No program	No program	No program	No program
DFID II	External	Predominant PB Frame/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive/ Valid	No	Yes	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
DFID III	External	Predominant PB Frame/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive/ Valid	No	Yes	Yes	Sig. & Syst. Actions to Align to Trend/ Syst. Actions to Align to Aims
DFID IV	External/ Horizontal	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive/ Valid	Yes	No	Yes	No Sig. & Syst. Actions to Align to Trend/ Syst. Actions to Align to Aims
DFID V	External/ Horizontal	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive/ Valid	No	No	Yes	No Sig. & Syst. Actions to Align to Trend/ No Syst. Actions to Align to Aims
DFID VI	External/ Horizontal	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive/ Valid	Yes	No	No	No Sig. & Syst. Actions to Align to Trend/ No Syst. Actions to Align to Aims

8 CARE BURUNDI

8.1 Introduction

Care Burundi is in many ways an exemplary learning organization. Through an intense restructuring process, it transformed its own organizational culture from a hierarchical humanitarian organization to one that empowered Burundians, lived in the communities it served, and was representative of Burundi's ethnic and gender balance.⁹³⁸ It regularly acted to improve the capacity of its projects to meet their aims.⁹³⁹ It empowered staff and partners to analyze the context and evaluate their own actions, rather than depending on external consultants.⁹⁴⁰ Staff discussed positive and negative information about their projects relatively openly and with a problem-solving mindset.⁹⁴¹ It invested significant time and resources in designing and planning innovative community empowerment interventions.⁹⁴² Its projects helped to resolve domestic conflicts⁹⁴³, increase women's confidence, increase family income, resolve conflicts within communities⁹⁴⁴, and develop community-based structures that

938 Care Burundi, *A Journey of Empowerment: CARE Burundi's Rights-Based Learning Program Approach* (Bujumbura, 2010), http://pqdl.care.org/sii/compendium/Original%20documents/CARE%20Burundi%20Learning%20Program%20Approach_final.pdf (accessed October 25, 2011).

939 Care staff member (C23), Bujumbura, 2009; Care staff member (C26), Bujumbura, 2009, 26.

940 Care Burundi, "Analysing the causes of poverty - a process and change of attitudes: Care Burundi's story" (Care, 2008), 3.

941 Care staff member (C22), Bujumbura, 2009; Care staff member (C18), Bujumbura, 2009.

942 Care Burundi, "Analysing the causes of poverty - a process and change of attitudes: Care Burundi's story"; Care Burundi, *A Journey of Empowerment: CARE Burundi's Rights-Based Learning Program Approach*.

943 Marthe Diarra, *Evaluation a Mi-Parcours du Programme Kirumara - PN BDI 060*, Extern (Bujumbura, Burundi: Care Burundi, October 2008), 31.

944 Care Burundi, *Learning from Peace and Conflict Monitoring (LCPM) Bi-annual Narrative Report, November 2007 - April 2008* (Bujumbura, Burundi: Care Burundi, April 2008).

Burundians were eager to sustain themselves.⁹⁴⁵ It was recognized among NGOs in Burundi and other Care country offices as one of the best.⁹⁴⁶

In spite of Care Burundi's obvious successes, it remained largely detached from Burundi's peacebuilding process. After 2003, it aimed to make its interventions conflict-sensitive and reinforce good governance but it largely failed on both accounts.⁹⁴⁷ Only in 2005, did Care Burundi take systematic and significant action to align with its new peacebuilding trend sparked by the first round of democratic elections (See Graph 8-1 below). Here, Care capitalized on the changing climate in Burundi and changing attitude of bilateral donors to refocus on peacebuilding programming.⁹⁴⁸

Care paid attention to the way that events in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory and conflicts in the communities that it worked influenced its ongoing projects.⁹⁴⁹ It acted to reduce the negative impact that these events had its projects.⁹⁵⁰ It acted to prevent its projects from doing harm to the communities in which it worked.⁹⁵¹ It acted to help

945 Care staff member (C23), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C9), Bujumbura, March 20, 2009; Care staff member (C11), Bujumbura, 2009; Care staff member (C26), Bujumbura, interview, 26; Care staff member (C16), Bujumbura, 2009; Care staff member (C15), Bujumbura, 2009.

946 Care staff member (C12), via telephone, 2009; Care staff member (C11), Bujumbura, interview, 11; DFID staff person (D7) in Bujumbura, interview.

947 Babu Ayindo, "Demystifying Theory of Social Change: Reflections on the Praxis of Select CARE programs in Burundi" (Care Burundi, July 26, 2008); Care staff member (C16), Bujumbura, interview, 16; Care staff member (C17), Bujumbura, March 27, 2009; Care staff member (C8), Bujumbura, 2009; Care staff member (C3), Bujumbura, June 9, 2009; Care staff member (C6), Bujumbura, June 2, 2009.

948 Care Burundi, *A Journey of Empowerment: CARE Burundi's Rights-Based Learning Program Approach*, 3; Care International - Burundi, *Strategic Journey 2007-2011* (Bujumbura, Burundi: Care International, November 2006), 16; Care staff member (C9), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff members (C10), Bujumbura, 2009; Care staff member (C11), Bujumbura, interview.

949 Care Burundi, *Learning from Peace and Conflict Monitoring (LCPM) Bi-annual Narrative Report, November 2007 - April 2008* (Bujumbura, Burundi: Care Burundi, April 2008); Care Burundi, *Learning from Peace and Conflict Monitoring (LCPM), Narrative Report, September - December 2008* (Bujumbura, Burundi: Care Burundi, January 2009).

950 Care Burundi, *Learning from Peace and Conflict Monitoring (LCPM), Narrative Report, September - December 2008*; Care Burundi, *Learning from Peace and Conflict Monitoring (LCPM) Bi-annual Narrative Report, November 2007 - April 2008*.

951 Care Burundi, *Learning from Peace and Conflict Monitoring (LCPM), Narrative Report, September - December 2008*; Care Burundi, *Learning from Peace and Conflict Monitoring (LCPM) Bi-annual Narrative Report, November 2007 - April 2008*.

Burundians resolve conflicts within households and within communities.⁹⁵² But, other than in 2005, it did not alter its overall approach, aims, or means in response to critical junctures in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory or attempt to influence policies or governance at the regional or national level. It adopted a national program in 2010 that aimed to influence governance and policies, but this program did not focus on conflict sensitivity, peacebuilding, or conflict prevention, in spite of the increasing threat of war.⁹⁵³

Care Burundi was a pilot office for conflict sensitivity, peacebuilding, and learning.⁹⁵⁴ Care UK provided technical support for conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding. It had a learning team and a conflict-sensitivity and peacebuilding advisor.⁹⁵⁵ Since 2004, Care Burundi had maintained conflict-sensitivity and peacebuilding as a cross cutting focus of all of its projects.⁹⁵⁶ It conducted regular participatory context analyses.⁹⁵⁷ All projects received regular feedback on the conflict dynamics in the communities in which they worked.⁹⁵⁸ Care Burundi was committed to learning, exchange, research, self-reflection, and continuous improvement of its

952 Care Burundi, Learning from Peace and Conflict Monitoring (LCPM), Narrative Report, September - December 2008; Care Burundi, Learning from Peace and Conflict Monitoring (LCPM) Bi-annual Narrative Report, November 2007 - April 2008.

953 Care Burundi P-Bouge Series, "Making the 'P-Bouge' Bouge: Advancing, Revisiting, Revising, and Advancing Once Again, Brief No. 3" (Care Burundi, 2009); Participant Observation, Care Burundi P-Shift Workshop, March 17, 2009; Care Burundi, "Program Shift Documents - Burundi", n.d., <http://p-shift.care2share.wikispaces.net/Burundi> (accessed February 27, 2012).

954 Care staff members (C10), Bujumbura, interview.

955 Care staff member (C2), Bujumbura, March 24, 2009; Care staff member (C3), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C4), Bujumbura, June 25, 2009.


956 Care International - Burundi, Strategic Journey 2007-2011; Care Burundi, A Journey of Empowerment: CARE Burundi's Rights-Based Learning Program Approach.

957 Care Burundi, A Journey of Empowerment: CARE Burundi's Rights-Based Learning Program Approach.

958 Care staff member (C15), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C16), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C17), Bujumbura, interview; Care Burundi, Learning from Peace and Conflict Monitoring (LCPM), Narrative Report, September - December 2008; Care Burundi, Learning from Peace and Conflict Monitoring (LCPM) Bi-annual Narrative Report, November 2007 - April 2008.

programming.⁹⁵⁹ Each project had a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework and staff person assigned to M&E.⁹⁶⁰

Figure 8-1: Care Burundi's Actions to Align its Aims and Approach & Programming with Burundi's Peacebuilding Trajectory



Why did Care Burundi – which employed so many of the best practices of peacebuilding and organizational learning – not act to align its programming with Burundi’s evolving peacebuilding trajectory? Given Care Burundi’s aim, approach, knowledge, and learning behavior, the theory presented in Chapter 2 would predict that it would have a good chance of maintaining its relevance to Burundi’s peacebuilding trajectory. The fact that it did not take significant or systematic actions to align with key peacebuilding trends in Burundi, provides important insight into the factors that

959 Care International - Burundi, Strategic Journey 2007-2011; Care Burundi, A Journey of Empowerment: CARE Burundi’s Rights-Based Learning Program Approach; Care Burundi, “Analysing the causes of poverty - a process and change of attitudes: Care Burundi’s story”; Care staff member (C9), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff members (C10), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C11), Bujumbura, interview.

960 Care staff member (C25), Bujumbura, 2009; Care staff member (C2), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C3), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C4), Bujumbura, interview.

influence an organization's alignment with a country's war-to-peace transition and, ultimately, the effectiveness of peacebuilding programming.

Care Burundi's organizational frames, knowledge-laden routines, upward accountability routines, and leadership, discouraged it from responding to the other critical junctures Burundi's peacebuilding transition. Out of these factors, its organizational frame was the most significant one. Like UNDP and DFID, Care Burundi did not have an overall peacebuilding frame nor were the majority of its staff trained in conflict sensitivity or peacebuilding.⁹⁶¹ In 2004, staff had undergone extensive training in gender and diversity and had adopted a focus on women's empowerment as one of its core programs and cross-cutting themes.⁹⁶² As time moved on, Care Burundi increased its focus on women's empowerment.⁹⁶³

Care USA, which oversaw the Burundi office, had made women's empowerment a core institutional priority and the organization had a lot of experience in this area.⁹⁶⁴ Donors were also interested in funding women's empowerment projects.⁹⁶⁵ As women's empowerment became a core focus of the office, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding receded to the background. Staff did not want to rehash discussions about the conflict, which still seemed all too fresh.⁹⁶⁶ Donors were anxious to move on to development programming. Care USA wanted country offices to achieve gains in women's empowerment and its other core objectives, which did not include conflict sensitivity or

⁹⁶¹ Care staff member (C15), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C16), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C17), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C18), Bujumbura, 2009; Care staff member (C22), Bujumbura, 2009; Care staff member (C14), Bujumbura, 2009.

⁹⁶² Care Burundi, *A Journey of Empowerment: CARE Burundi's Rights-Based Learning Program Approach*, 2-3.

⁹⁶³ Care Burundi, *A Journey of Empowerment: CARE Burundi's Rights-Based Learning Program Approach*; Care Burundi P-Bouge Series, "Making the 'P-Bouge' Bouge: Advancing, Revisiting, Revising, and Advancing Once Again, Brief No. 3"; Care staff member (C11), Bujumbura, interview.

⁹⁶⁴ Care staff member (C9), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C11), Bujumbura, interview.

⁹⁶⁵ Care staff member (C12), via telephone, interview.

⁹⁶⁶ Participant Observation, Care Burundi P-Shift Workshop, interview.

peacebuilding.⁹⁶⁷ The development background of Care Burundi's Country Directors after 2003 also played a role.

Care Burundi's staff of about 200 people was 97 percent Burundian. There were only three or four international staff at any one time: The Country Director, the Assistant Country Director, the learning coordinator, and, later on an advocacy coordinator. Care Burundi is part of Care International, a decentralized international federation of non-governmental organizations that are committed to fighting global poverty through humanitarian relief and development work.

Care began its operations in Burundi in 1994 and was initially managed by Care Canada. In 2003, Care USA took over management of the Care Burundi Office.⁹⁶⁸ Most Care Country offices are either managed by Care USA, Care Canada, or Care Australia. As a confederation, Care is composed of Care Australia, Care Canada, Care Denmark, Care Germany-Luxembourg, Care France, Care Japan, Care Netherlands, Care Norway, Care Austria, Care Thailand, Care UK, and Care USA. Each member of the Care International federation adopts the same general approach, aims, and methods, but has different leadership, staff, budgets, and operates in accordance with the laws of its home country. In addition to being in charge of specific Care Country Offices where they implement programs, Care members also collaborate with other Care offices through supporting specific programs.⁹⁶⁹

Between 1999 and 2011, there were three stages in Care Burundi's programming: 1999-2002 was the humanitarian stage, from 2003 to 2008 was the Journey, and 2009 to 2011 was the Program Shift stage. In each stage, Care Burundi adopted a different

967 Care staff member (C9), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C11), Bujumbura, interview.

968 Care Burundi, *A Journey of Empowerment: CARE Burundi's Rights-Based Learning Program Approach*.

969 Care International, "Care International Structure", n.d., <http://www.care-international.org/Structure/> (accessed October 25, 2011).

programming approach, which in turn changed the way that it interacted with the six phases in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory.

8.2 Humanitarian, Homogenous, and Insensitive – (Phase I-II)

In response to the removal of the regional embargo in 1999, Care Burundi did not attempt to alter its programming or aims. Nor did it respond to the inauguration of the transitional government in November 2001. Care Burundi was largely a humanitarian NGO from 1994 to 2002: "Care Burundi worked in spite of the conflict, not on it. We ignored the context and tried to deliver food."⁹⁷⁰ Although it implemented pilot peacebuilding projects in a northern province, peacebuilding was not mainstreamed throughout the rest of its projects.

Like most NGOs in Burundi at the time, Care Burundi provided life saving assistance to Burundians who were displaced by the conflict.⁹⁷¹ Care prioritized quick, short-term assistance to Burundians who were worst affected by the conflict: refugees, people temporarily fleeing their homes but remaining within the country (i.e., internally displaced people), and children without a home or family able to support them. Like most other international NGOs in Burundi at the time, Care did not work for sustainable solutions to the conflict, poverty, disease, or trauma that affected so many Burundians. Care paid attention to the ebbs and flows of Burundi's conflict, but was most concerned with how the attacks and fighting would affect their ability to access their beneficiaries or create new displaced populations who would need assistance.⁹⁷²

⁹⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁷¹ A handful of NGOs working in Burundi at the time focused on peacebuilding instead of humanitarian assistance. These NGOs included Search for Common Ground, International Alert, Africare, American Friends Service Committee, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Lund, Rubin, and Hara, "Learning from Burundi's Failed Democratic Transition, 1993-1996: Did International Initiatives Match the Problem?"

⁹⁷² Participant Observation, Humanitarian Coordination Meetings at the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Aid, 2000-2001, Bujumbura, Burundi.

In addition to its humanitarian projects, Care Burundi did begin a couple of peacebuilding projects in a region that was exceptionally peaceful. The northern province of Ngozi was an island of relative prosperity and peace compared to Burundi's other war-torn provinces.⁹⁷³ Here, Care began to implement a peace education project that used theatre to help Burundians resolve their interpersonal and community-related conflicts, and reportedly helped to contribute to the resolution of several community-level conflicts.⁹⁷⁴ It also began another pilot project that aimed to help rebuild the conflict resolution role of Burundi's traditional elders: the *bashingantahe*.

While these pilot peacebuilding projects did not aim to impact the macro-level peacebuilding process in Burundi, they did facilitate the resolution of conflict between several community members.⁹⁷⁵ The theatre project, in particular, helped to increase Burundians willingness to discuss the tragedies that they had all faced.⁹⁷⁶ By creating a fictional reality that mirrored their real lives, the plays helped people to understand their adversary's perspective and allow people to discuss the origins and acts of violent conflict.⁹⁷⁷ These pilot initiatives continue to influence Care's peacebuilding programming to this day.⁹⁷⁸

Even in these early days, Care Burundi wanted to mainstream peacebuilding throughout all of its projects.⁹⁷⁹ But its accountability mechanisms and organizational

973 Mark Turner, "FT.com - Special reports / Responsible business 2001", October 23, 2001, <http://specials.ft.com/responsiblebusiness2001/FT3RKYET5TC.html> (accessed October 26, 2011).

974 Julie Abbass, Peace Education Project - Grassroots Community Research, Final Summary (Bujumbura, Burundi: Care Burundi, June 10, 2001).

975 Observer (O5) by email, October 26, 2011.

976 Ibid.

977 Care staff member (C5), Bujumbura, March 25, 2009. A similar peacebuilding strategy was also being tried at the time through the development of radio soap operas by Search for Common Ground's Studio Ijambo.

978 Care staff member (C16), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C21), Bujumbura, 2009; Care staff member (C5), Bujumbura, interview.

979 Observer (O5) by email, interview.

frame did not support this.⁹⁸⁰ While Care is accountable to the standards set out by Care International, it is also accountable to the donors who fund the projects that it implements. In general, Care country offices “live” from grant to grant.⁹⁸¹ The organization lacks significant amounts of core funding for projects or programs; each office relies on bilateral and multilateral donors to fund the projects that they implement.⁹⁸² Donor priorities and preferences therefore have a big impact on the types of projects Care offices implement and the accountability requirements for these projects.

Between 1999 and 2003, the vast majority of donors were still holding off on releasing non-humanitarian assistance until fighting stopped and the implementation of Arusha was largely guaranteed.⁹⁸³ Care reported that key donors continued to focus on “emergency programming” that they were reluctant to support “reasonably long term rehabilitation and development programming.”⁹⁸⁴ As a result, Care Burundi had to restrict its ambitions to the type of programming that donors were interested in supporting. Care had to realign its “priorities with the donor funding reality” and continued to “depend on short-term donor funding opportunities”.⁹⁸⁵

Care Burundi’s focus on humanitarian programming also reflects the overall approach of Care Canada, which managed the office until 2000. Unlike Care USA, who took over management in 2001, Care Canada at the time did not have an overall awareness of conflict-sensitivity or tools that it could provide to its staff.⁹⁸⁶ An organizational climate survey conducted by Care USA in 2002 found that the staff in Care Burundi were stressed out and demoralized. Burundians in senior positions were

⁹⁸⁰ Care Burundi, “Care International in Burundi Strategic Plan Document, 2002-2005”; Observer (O5) by email, interview.

⁹⁸¹ Care staff member (C9), Bujumbura, interview.

⁹⁸² Ibid.

⁹⁸³ ICG, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi*.

⁹⁸⁴ Care Burundi, “Care International in Burundi Strategic Plan Document, 2002-2005,” 13.

⁹⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁶ Care staff member (C6), Bujumbura, interview.

primarily male and Tutsi. A few senior international staff took key decisions through a closed and opaque process.⁹⁸⁷ Most other staff reported feeling marginalized and unrepresented.⁹⁸⁸ With this type of organizational culture, it is unlikely that peacebuilding work could have been mainstreamed throughout all of its projects.

In this hierarchical society of Burundi, decades of conflict have occurred so that a few small elite can hold the power and all that comes with it. This system of governance has seeped into all walks of life. Care Burundi senior staff mirrored this as well, information was not shared, advantages were hoarded and decision-making was confined to a small elite. This worked its way down through the organization and its projects with the bottom of the pile being the 'beneficiaries' who were referred to as 'simple' people because they were uneducated.⁹⁸⁹

Between 1999 and 2003, there was also a lot of upheaval in the leadership of Care Burundi. The office did not have a country director for an entire year, and otherwise had temporary acting directors.⁹⁹⁰ Care's new Country Director, Kassie McIlvaine, arrived in 2003.

It was a horrible time to come to the office... it was rife with corruption... a highly stressful time. In the international community you had a lot of rejects from somewhere else. Everyone talked about Burundi as if it was a hell hole. There were a lot of part time and acting people because no one wanted to come to Burundi. It turns out that Kassie wanted to be closer to home, so we got a really good person.⁹⁹¹

Without stable and innovative leadership, the office was not able to significantly alter its approach. In addition, the high levels of distrust between staff, the lack of innovative leadership, the absence of staff with peacebuilding expertise, and the lack of money for peacebuilding work made it very difficult for care to mainstream peacebuilding throughout its programming. Care's pilot peacebuilding projects

987 Care Burundi, *A Journey of Empowerment: CARE Burundi's Rights-Based Learning Program Approach*, 2.

988 *Ibid.*, 2.

989 Care Burundi, "Analysing the causes of poverty - a process and change of attitudes: Care Burundi's story," 1.

990 Care staff member (C11), Bujumbura, interview.

991 *Ibid.*

continued to function, but remained largely disconnected from the rest of its culture, which was predominated by a humanitarian mindset and systems.

8.3 A Revolutionary Approach: addressing inequality in the organization and in society (Phase III-IV)

When Kassie McIlvaine arrived in Bujumbura in 2003, she began an intense organizational reform process that continued for several years. The office was too preoccupied with its own internal reforms to alter its approach in response to the integration of the CNDD-FDD into the government in November 2003. But, this reform process helped Care Burundi to alter its approach in anticipation of the new hope and new funding that materialized after the August 2005 elections.

In 2004, Care began downgrading its humanitarian programming and focused primarily on a “soft” approach that aimed to empower women, youth, and the most marginalized people to address the social inequality that was at the root of the conflict and take “the development of their communities into their own hands”.⁹⁹² When, after the 2005, hopeful donors were looking for good development and peacebuilding organizations to fund, Care was one of the best candidates around. But in 2004, when Care was preparing this new programming strategy and reaching out to donors, it was not clear that the conflict would end or the elections would take place.⁹⁹³ Care Burundi’s Country Director followed her vision, took some risks, and they paid off.⁹⁹⁴

Although peacebuilding and conflict-sensitivity were a cross cutting theme of Care’s new approach, they were not integrated into all of its projects. In addition, aside from Care’s alignment with the new hope and funding that appeared after the 2005 elections,

992 Care Burundi, “Analysing the causes of poverty - a process and change of attitudes: Care Burundi’s story,” 6.

993 Care staff members (C10), Bujumbura, interview.

994 Ibid.

Care did not alter its programming in response to the next critical event in Burundi's peacebuilding transition: the integration of the FNL into the armed forces and military. Instead, Care remained focused on the projects that it was already implementing. It paid close attention to how these projects were affected by the conflict dynamics, but did not attempt to influence conflict dynamics beyond the household or community level.

8.3.1 TRANSFORMING CARE

Care's new programming approach was based on an understanding of the symbiotic relationship between the conflict and poverty. "Programming needed to improve so as to get at what had torn this country apart for years – the conflict that was keeping the majority of the population in poverty." After talking to Burundian communities, staff realized that both conflict and poverty were caused by the "disparity" in Burundian society.⁹⁹⁵ "We were talking about power being held by a few at different levels; the exclusion from decision making and control of resources."⁹⁹⁶ As a result, Care did not think it made sense to do normal development or humanitarian programming that pretended that the country had not been ravaged by war.

In post-conflict there are issues related to the past conflict that are not completely resolved, and that can influence your interventions. This is different from development in a country that has not experienced conflict at all. There, the field is free – you still need to pay attention to not do harm. But, in a post-conflict country there is always potential for conflict. The situation can change and explode and you have to really pay attention to what is going on in the field.⁹⁹⁷

As a result of the war, people's capacity to take care of themselves is also diminished. "After ten years of civil war, people have really been affected in terms of their degree of poverty and their mentality. They have been traumatized. It is not the

⁹⁹⁵ Care Burundi, "Analysing the causes of poverty - a process and change of attitudes: Care Burundi's story," 3.

⁹⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁷ Care staff member (C5), Bujumbura, interview.

same as in a non-conflict context.⁹⁹⁸ They are also much more dependent on handouts and do not trust that they can do things for themselves. “It takes time to build trust within the community and convince people that they have experience and that they can do something together and make a contribution.”⁹⁹⁹ In addition, many of the community support mechanisms that they relied on for support no longer exist. “I understand that in Burundi before the war there was this support, but because of the war people become more individually focused, but also some of them have a lot of orphans to support.”¹⁰⁰⁰ There is also a loss of rules that govern people’s behavior. People become more used to violence and to perpetuating violence.¹⁰⁰¹ It can also lead to more corruption. “People develop some kind of strategy to fulfill their basic needs and this brings corruption.”¹⁰⁰²

To make a real contribution to poverty reduction in Burundi, Care had to address the causes and manifestations of the conflict in its programming. It had to integrate a real understanding of Burundi’s rural population into its program strategy, design, and implementation. But, before it could do this, it had to address the manifestation of the conflict within its own walls.

In a society where ethnic and social divisions reigned for years it is understandable that people do not want to dig deep to understand the tensions and their causes. Each person, and that included Care staff, had their own personal wounds and memories. Care had to find a way to create a supportive working environment so that staff and our partners were able and willing to start to dig deeper into what were the structural conditions that were holding this fertile country in poverty.¹⁰⁰³

In 2004, Care’s new senior leadership began to try and change the culture of the organization and the way that Care’s staff interacted with the communities that they aimed to help. “Office decision-making, recruitment, management, assessment, and

998 Ibid.

999 Ibid.

1000 Ibid.

1001 Care staff member (C1), Bujumbura, interview.

1002 Care staff member (C5), Bujumbura, interview.

1003 Care Burundi, “Analysing the causes of poverty - a process and change of attitudes: Care Burundi’s story,” 2.

training were restructured to increase transparency and inclusiveness of diverse staff – with a conscious effort to raise the voices and positions of women, Hutu, and Batwa across the organization.”¹⁰⁰⁴

In January 2004, there were big changes. Good ones. The people who were here before had no idea of how to work with the community, of how to respect the community. After 2005, someone who works for Care is someone who merits it.¹⁰⁰⁵

In 2004, Care Burundi began what it called its *Journey*. Under the guidance of its new leadership, Care began to restructure its entire approach. Staff went out to the different rural communities that they worked in to try and understand the community members, their needs, hopes, and aspirations. They set one objective against which they would measure their success that year: “Based on recognition of communities’ expertise, Care and its partner organizations have succeeded to better understand the disparities in Burundian society in order to maximize our impact in the contribution of seeking a sustainable peace for Burundi.”¹⁰⁰⁶ Rather than hiring external consultants to do their analyses, Care staff went out into the communities themselves and held three-day retreats to analyze what they learned. “There was a collective understanding that we, the educated staff of Care had no idea of the realities in the field, we did not truly understand the lives of our beneficiaries and what strengths and skills they had and what the true barriers to their development were.”¹⁰⁰⁷ For the issues that they uncovered, but still could not fully understand, they commissioned in-depth research studies.¹⁰⁰⁸

1004 Care Burundi, *A Journey of Empowerment: CARE Burundi’s Rights-Based Learning Program Approach*, 3.

1005 Care staff member (C21), Bujumbura, interview.

1006 Care Burundi, “Analysing the causes of poverty - a process and change of attitudes: Care Burundi’s story,” 3.

1007 Ibid.

1008 Ibid., 4–5.

When Care Burundi began, it did not “realize that the journey had started, there was no road map.”¹⁰⁰⁹ It tried new approaches, such as appreciative inquiry where you ask people to dream of where they want to go in the future.¹⁰¹⁰ It brought in scholars, such as Peter Uvin from Tufts University, to accompany them the team in its analysis and reflection.¹⁰¹¹ It asked partners to evaluate Care.¹⁰¹² It made up the process as it went along. No other Care office had done this before. Care Burundi invented it.¹⁰¹³ This thorough and intensely personal process deeply affected Care Burundi’s staff and organizational culture.

Bit by bit, there were women and people from all ethnicities who occupied posts of responsibility. People [in Care] learned how to cohabitate peacefully. It was during the war. People learned how to respect one another. It really became a culture here. People were transformed. It was mutual acceptance. After having lived an ethic war and losing members of our family. People learned how to live together and collaborate. That continues to be really good. We try to maintain the balance. Even external people say that Care is a good place to be.¹⁰¹⁴

To sustain its high degree of introspection and self-reflection, Care Burundi began to develop a strong “learning culture” that encouraged open discussion, research, exploration, and regular interaction with the communities that it aimed to help, who it now called “neighbors” rather than beneficiaries.¹⁰¹⁵ Instead of having all staff based in Bujumbura or the northern city of Gitega, it moved a staff person for each project out to the communities in which they worked. These field coordinators lived in the communities and developed a much greater understanding for their needs and perspectives than they had before. Prior to deciding to move field coordinators out to live in the communities that they worked in, Care Burundi observed:

1009 Ibid., 1.

1010 Ibid., 3.

1011 Ibid., 4.

1012 Care International - Burundi, Strategic Journey 2007-2011, 10.

1013 Care staff member (C11), Bujumbura, interview.

1014 Care staff member (C1), Bujumbura, interview.

1015 Care Burundi, A Journey of Empowerment: CARE Burundi’s Rights-Based Learning Program Approach, 5.

Our procedures and our way of working result in us spending less time with our neighbors. The fact that we arrive in our fancy 4x4 or motorcycles or with out mobile telephones and radios and that we never have the time to stay and speak with them or spend the night makes it impossible to understand the life of our neighbors.¹⁰¹⁶

8.3.2 EMPOWERING COMMUNITIES, AND BUILDING PEACE?

By 2006, Care Burundi's rigorous self-reflective process had resulted in a new strategic plan and guide for its work. It had been implementing empowerment projects since 2004 and used the lessons it had learned from their implementation to inform its reflection. Care's projects were now focused in three areas: Empowerment of Women, Empowerment of Youth, and Empowerment of the Marginalized.¹⁰¹⁷ Through advocacy and the excellent reputation it had built, Care was able to find donors willing to fund projects in each of these focus areas.¹⁰¹⁸

The widely acknowledged success of Burundi's first round of democratic elections since the war began over eleven years before welcomed in a new period of hope. Average Burundians were hopeful that the politicians had finally put an end to the political antics that had caused so much death and trauma. The newly elected politicians were hopeful that they would finally get their share of wealth and prosperity. Donors were hopeful that Burundi's peace process would be an unequivocal success – partly their success – and that Burundi could now transition toward development. Care positioned itself to be able to capitalize on this hope and deliver empowering programming to Burundians who had suffered from so many years of war and violence.

For Care Burundi, empowerment meant:

In all of our activities, we and our partners will take into account discrimination. Together with the concerned people, we will work for the adoption of attitudes, behaviors, and structures that promote the

1016 Care International - Burundi, Strategic Journey 2007-2011, 11.

1017 Care Burundi, "Analysing the causes of poverty - a process and change of attitudes: Care Burundi's story," 6.

1018 Care staff members (C10), Bujumbura, interview.

empowerment of marginalized people and the reduction of all forms of discrimination.¹⁰¹⁹

In addition, Care Burundi committed itself to conflict sensitivity. For Care Burundi this was to “Promote and support reconciliation efforts through conflict sensitive interventions and analysis at different levels (local, national, and regional) and accompany the formal and informal structures in reinforcing good governance.”¹⁰²⁰ In addition, Care committed to integrating Care International’s programming principles throughout its work: empowerment, partnership, accountability, elimination of discrimination, promotion of non-violent resolution of conflicts, and sustainability.¹⁰²¹

By 2009, Care Burundi had ten ongoing projects, most of which provided soft skills and often some type of income-generating activity to help women and their communities increase their family income, prevent sexual violence, and resolve interpersonal and community conflicts.¹⁰²² Care implemented most of these projects with national partners and through women’s solidarity groups, which they felt would increase the sustainability of the results. In addition, Care maintained one of the initial peacebuilding projects started in 2001, which aimed to increase the capacity of Burundi’s traditional conflict resolution mechanisms to address community-level conflicts and interact with the formal justice system.¹⁰²³ Care also had a project that created peace clubs at the lowest administrative level – *colline* - and “facilitated reconciliation processes with a focus on truth-telling and forgiveness.”¹⁰²⁴

1019 Care International - Burundi, Strategic Journey 2007-2011, 15.

1020 Ibid., 16.

1021 **Ibid.**

1022 Care Burundi, “Burundi Country Profile”, n.d., <http://www.care.org/careswork/countryprofiles/26.asp> (accessed February 28, 2012).

1023 Care Burundi, “Sasagaza Amahoro - From Grassroots to National Spreading Peace”, n.d., <http://www.care.org/careswork/projects/BDI065.asp> (accessed February 28, 2012).

1024 Lukas van Trier, Lessons Learned and Challenges Faced in Community-based Peacebuilding in Burundi (The Hague: Care Nederland, October 2010), 2, about:blank (accessed February 27, 2012).

Care Burundi has achieved important results with these projects, and built an excellent reputation in Burundi and within Care International.¹⁰²⁵

I have really been blown away by Care Burundi's program when I hear people actually give testimonials about how their lives have changed. When I go and talk to a woman's group and can really sense the positive energy and their vision for a more positive future. It is not Care's project, but they see it as something that they can continue. They will continue whether Care's project is there or not.

In spite of the overall success of Care's projects, the majority of them did not work on conflict, but rather in communities that had been ravaged by conflict. Aside from the two projects that focused directly on peacebuilding – the peace clubs and the local conflict resolution project - other projects did not have an explicit peacebuilding aim and did not see this as a core component of their work.¹⁰²⁶ “They don't think it is very important. I think that the first reason is that they are preoccupied with other things in their project. Second, they don't understand the effects.”¹⁰²⁷ Conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding were not included as specific goals in project documents, which meant that most staff did not feel that they had to address it.¹⁰²⁸ Projects were generally highly attuned to the dynamics in the communities in which they worked, but were not necessarily able to identify the factors that could contribute to conflict. The causes of the conflict are rooted in Burundi's hierarchical culture, and Care Burundi's staff are themselves a product of that culture. Consequently, they were often unable or unwilling

1025 Diarra, Evaluation a Mi-Parcours du Programme Kirumara - PN BDI 060; Care Burundi, “Sasagaza Amahoro - From Grassroots to National Spreading Peace”; O. Tankari, Projet Sasagaza Amahoro: Repandre la Paix - Evaluation Finale, Evaluation (Bujumbura: Care Burundi and USAID, March 2010); Lezlie Moriniere et al., Evaluation Finale du Consortium SCVM, Evaluation (Bujumbura: Care Burundi, October 10, 2007); Ayindo, “Demystifying Theory of Social Change: Reflections on the Praxis of Select CARE programs in Burundi”; van Trier, Lessons Learned and Challenges Faced in Community-based Peacebuilding in Burundi; Care Burundi, Learning from Peace and Conflict Monitoring (LCPM), Narrative Report, September - December 2008; Care Burundi, Learning from Peace and Conflict Monitoring (LCPM) Bi-annual Narrative Report, November 2007 - April 2008.

1026 Ayindo, “Demystifying Theory of Social Change: Reflections on the Praxis of Select CARE programs in Burundi,” 4; Care staff member (C15), Bujumbura, interview.

1027 Care staff member (C15), Bujumbura, interview.

1028 Ayindo, “Demystifying Theory of Social Change: Reflections on the Praxis of Select CARE programs in Burundi”; Care staff member (C16), Bujumbura, interview.

to integrate a conflict-sensitive or peacebuilding approach into their projects, particularly with everything else that they had to do.¹⁰²⁹

While gender sensitivity was mainstreamed throughout all of Care Burundi's programming, conflict sensitivity was not. Much of Care's direct work on conflict happened through this gender lens. "Care is very successful at working on domestic conflict. That would be considered successful conflict programming. But, we use women's empowerment language."¹⁰³⁰

Staff were tuned into obvious political manipulation or violence communities in which they worked, but did not actually integrate an analysis of the conflict into their program design or try directly to influence the causes of conflict in their communities.¹⁰³¹ They well-trained in analyzing how their projects might instigate conflict (i.e., Do No Harm), but most did not quite understand how their projects interacted with the conflict dynamics or could help to build a foundation for peace in Burundi.¹⁰³²

Care Burundi focused on the specific aims of its projects, the aims for which it was accountable to donors and Care Burundi's leadership. These projects aimed to impact individual lives and empower groups of Burundians to support one another. In this sense, all of Care Burundi's programming targeted an important cause and manifestation of Burundi's conflict and poverty: the disempowerment and exclusion of much of the Burundian population – women, Hutus, Twa, youth – from economic and social

1029 Care staff member (C17), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C16), Bujumbura, interview.

1030 **Ibid.**

1031 Care staff member (C16), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C2), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C3), Bujumbura, interview.

1032 Care staff member (C8), Bujumbura, interview. Do No Harm focuses on preventing the negative implications of projects in relation to immediate power relations and distribution of resources in the particular community in which a project takes place. Conflict sensitivity examines the relationship between the overall conflict environment, at both the community and country level, and the project or program. It aims to ensure that an intervening organization understands that micro- and macro-level context and the interaction between its programming and that context, and is able to systematically act to maximize the positive and minimize the negative impact that the intervention has on this context. Peacebuilding aims directly to address the hypothesized causes of conflict or peace in a community.

opportunity. But, in most cases it did not measure or regularly discuss the relationship between this programming and the causes or drivers of Burundi's conflict.¹⁰³³

Care aimed to empower disadvantaged groups, but it paid little attention to how these groups interacted with power-holders in Burundi. It paid little attention to governance, policy, government, or politics.¹⁰³⁴ Many of its program documents indicated that it would operate at the provincial, regional, and national level, but it largely did not.¹⁰³⁵ Even though Care's own analysis indicated that "the conflict is caused by politicians holding on to power, it is about access and control over resources", Care's programming did not attempt to directly address beyond trying to alter the power relationship between men and women in the communities that it worked.

The narrow focus of Care's projects on the community-level was partly because of their short-term nature. Donors only funded projects for a couple of years. Care's programming also takes a while to get going because they first have to build trust and relationships with the communities, leaving even less energy and time to work with the administration and government.¹⁰³⁶

If it is a short-term project, then we can't work with the political structures or the structures of the state... In general, the administration is there and they are just informed about what we are doing, but nothing else. The structures of the state have much more influence than Care. When we work together we have much more of a chance of impact than Care does alone. When Care leaves, the administration should continue to support what we have done... There were times when it was not easy to approach the government. We have the chance to have peace and this is a good occasion to work together. Now there is an opportunity.¹⁰³⁷

1033 Ayindo, "Demystifying Theory of Social Change: Reflections on the Praxis of Select CARE programs in Burundi"; Care staff member (C15), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C17), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C8), Bujumbura, interview; Care Burundi, Learning from Peace and Conflict Monitoring (LCPM), Narrative Report, September - December 2008; *ibid.*

1034 Care staff member (C14), Bujumbura, interview.

1035 *Ibid.*

1036 Care staff member (C5), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C1), Bujumbura, interview.

1037 Care staff member (C1), Bujumbura, interview.

Although many of the groups and associations that Care projects helped to form continued on past the Care project, in many ways the capital that Care injected in them was lost. They were now empowered and could do more things, but they lacked the resources, skills, and opportunities.¹⁰³⁸ The investment was still short term. “The impact depends on the investment.”¹⁰³⁹ Short-term investment leads to a short-term impact.¹⁰⁴⁰

Once an individual or a group was empowered, then what? How do they take the next step, take change to the next level? This was a major weakness in Care’s approach noted by many staff.¹⁰⁴¹ They appreciated the empowerment approach but thought that it did not go far enough. How could they help to change Burundian society, Burundian culture? Their analyses of the causes of conflict and poverty in Burundi always came back to Burundian culture.¹⁰⁴² Could they help to make a change at the level of culture?¹⁰⁴³ Could they alter the root causes of conflict and poverty in Burundi?

8.3.3 CARE BURUNDI: STUCK BETWEEN VISION, PROPOSALS, AND REPORTING

Why would Care Burundi, a highly regarded organization that had committed itself to empowerment, poverty reduction, peacebuilding, and conflict sensitivity in Burundi, be so detached from Burundi’s overall peacebuilding trajectory? Why would it not attempt to influence the systems of governance, power, and culture that arguably caused Burundi’s war and poverty? Why would an organization that was so aware of the causes

1038 Ayindo, “Demystifying Theory of Social Change: Reflections on the Praxis of Select CARE programs in Burundi”; van Trier, *Lessons Learned and Challenges Faced in Community-based Peacebuilding in Burundi*; Care staff member (C16), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C1), Bujumbura, interview.

1039 Care staff member (C16), Bujumbura, interview.

1040 Ibid.

1041 Care staff member (C18), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C16), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C23), Bujumbura, interview.

1042 Care staff member (C15), Bujumbura, interview.

1043 Care staff member (C9), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff members (C10), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C11), Bujumbura, interview.

of the conflict and the manifestation of the conflict at the community level, not also attempt to work on peacebuilding in all of its activities?

8.3.3.1 Accountability routines

Although Care Burundi was a highly innovative organization, the incentive structure that it operated within was not. It depended on short-term grants from donors to fund its projects, particularly while the conflict continued.

With peacebuilding and conflict-related work, traditionally, funding is very short. If you really want to develop a program at a country-level, there a tension in laying seeds in a foundation that might fall. It is so unpredictable. These conflict programs take real time. When you really think about that it is really atrocious that you would talk about peacebuilding programs when the funding arrangements are so short term. There is so much pressure on the government to do x, y, and z if they want funding. At the same time, the software, the intangible – people's emotions and experiences – no one is willing to invest in that.¹⁰⁴⁴

Care Burundi did not have a flexible pot of money that it could use for programming. Once a project was underway, the money could not easily be reallocated to another priority or completely shifted. Once underway, Care was committed to implementing the project and to achieving the desired outcomes and could only really adjust the way that the project was implemented during the mid-term review of the project. The organization was committed to developing good, well-researched projects, which contributed to a delay in its response to new opportunities in the context.

We are not very flexible because we live from grant to grant. We try to be really adaptable and flexible, and we can say for an existing project that we can adapt. We have to adapt at the project level because the project needs new resources and we have to get new funding. We have gotten slower at responding to humanitarian emergencies, partly because we have an over-intellectualizing of the conflict, after Rwanda and the

1044 Care staff member (C2), Bujumbura, interview.

refugees. We are slower because of analysis and because of the funding mechanisms.¹⁰⁴⁵

Care's dependence on grants from donors also often led it to prioritize interaction with donors and headquarters over interaction with communities. Each donor had its own reporting requirements that it wanted Care to fulfill, and reports that it wanted Care to write to show that it was doing so. To ensure that it had enough projects ongoing at any one time, Care Burundi also had to continuously prepare new project proposals. These project proposals may have been to continue an existing project, build on a previous project, or start something entirely new, but they still had to be researched, conceptualized, designed, and written. The office was also burdened by very time consuming accounting for time and money to Care USA because of earlier problems with corruption.

The senior leadership and program directors spent a big portion of their time writing proposals, reviewing proposals, writing reports, reporting to headquarters, and answering requests from headquarters for more information. The people who spent the most time with the communities that Care worked with were some of the lowest staff on the totem pole. In other words, the people who had the most direct influence on the quality of the project and the impact on the Burundian population were the people with some of the least authority in the organization. Several of these field coordinators complained that their managers were too preoccupied with writing reports and proposals to actually come visit the field and see what was happening with the projects.

When you ask how many field visits people make they will say that they are too busy to come to the field. But, it really affects the work on the ground because people don't know what is happening and they don't understand what we are doing. We feel abandoned. It affects us psychologically. Theoretically we are supposed to come to Bujumbura every Friday afternoon, but many people don't want to come because

¹⁰⁴⁵ Ibid.

their supervisors never visit them and after a full week in the field they are exhausted and just want to go home.¹⁰⁴⁶

The entire structure of Care Burundi incentivizes upward accountability and responsiveness to donors and Care USA headquarters, not to the communities (or ‘neighbors’) that Care Burundi aimed to empower. Care Burundi had tried to correct for this tendency by relocating the field coordinators to the community level in the first place. Even when donors required only superficial reporting on project outputs and outcomes, Care developed its own project monitoring system to try to account for change that it observed.¹⁰⁴⁷ Although monitoring “empowerment” and other social change goals was still difficult for many projects, it at least attempted to gather testimonials from participants and observers. Care Burundi’s senior leadership and learning team also regularly visited its projects and were generally aware of what was working and what was not.

Compared to most international NGOs, Care Burundi had a high degree of input from the various stakeholders in its projects: partners, community members, and donors. Compared to most international NGOs, its staff and leadership knew what was happening in communities and understood what daily life was like for many rural Burundians.

In spite of the high degree of feedback that Care had from communities, partners, and other stakeholders, the organizational incentives still pulled in the direction of upward accountability. Staff were overwhelmed by all of the information that they were expected to process.¹⁰⁴⁸ They continuously received reports about their own projects,

1046 Care staff member (C26), Bujumbura, interview.

1047 Care staff member (C2), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C3), Bujumbura, interview.

1048 Care staff member (C2), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C24), Bujumbura, June 8, 2009; Care staff member (C1), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C5), Bujumbura, interview.

about other projects, about Care priorities, and about new strategies and approaches.¹⁰⁴⁹ Most staff complained that they could not manage all of this information and did not have enough time to think about the implications for their projects.¹⁰⁵⁰ Much of the information was communicated via email, leaving little space or time for teams to openly discuss or process it.¹⁰⁵¹ When Care's generally overworked staff had to choose what to do with their time, many prioritized spending the time in the office writing reports and proposals over field visits and discussions with beneficiaries and partners.¹⁰⁵²

The tension in accountability feeds the inequity around learning. More time on downward accountability would... allow the learning behavior to me more productive. We have tons of data but we can't process it. I don't have a work-life balance. No one who works for this organization in a senior position has. Downward accountability gives back more. It's more satisfying. The more we have upward accountability, the more burnout there is because it gives back less. Upward accountability is counter-intuitive. Its purpose is downward accountability, possibly, but it actually creates less of that.¹⁰⁵³

8.3.3.2 Learning Behavior

Compared to all of the other case studies, Care had the highest degree of non-defensive learning behavior and continuously sought valid information about the relationship between aims and outcomes. The senior leadership was very open to discussion and criticism and sought to establish mechanisms in the office that would encourage open discussion among all staff.¹⁰⁵⁴ In addition, each project had a monitoring and evaluation person, and the office brought in external consultants to conduct baseline studies and evaluate projects. But, as mentioned above, staff did not have time to process all of this information and complained that there were no organizational incentives for

1049 Care staff member (C2), Bujumbura, interview.

1050 Care staff member (C4), Bujumbura, interview.

1051 **Ibid.**

1052 Care staff member (C24), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C18), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C3), Bujumbura, interview.

1053 Care staff member (C4), Bujumbura, interview.

1054 Care staff member (C14), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C1), Bujumbura, interview.

learning. Many staff felt that “learning” was the responsibility of the learning team, not of each project.¹⁰⁵⁵

Several staff argued that Burundian culture still discouraged open communication and discussion.¹⁰⁵⁶ People were used to hiding things or spreading rumors and even in Care Burundi’s permissive and open sub-culture.¹⁰⁵⁷ Burundian culture sometimes prevailed. Furthermore, staff were often concerned about the sustainability of their position at Care.¹⁰⁵⁸ Because projects were short term, positions were also often only guaranteed over the short term. The office sought to maintain the same staff by shuffling them to another project if one project ended, but it still created an element of uncertainty and discouraged many staff unwilling to admit fault.¹⁰⁵⁹

Each project team dealt with project information differently.¹⁰⁶⁰ Some were open about problems, whereas others hid them from view unless it was absolutely necessary to bring them to the attention of senior management.¹⁰⁶¹ There was also very little learning across teams in spite of regular meetings of the different projects.¹⁰⁶² Given all of their other priorities, staff felt that they had little energy left for reflecting on the information they received about their projects or sharing lessons learned with other projects.¹⁰⁶³

The demands of Care’s projects and contractual obligations to donors does not leave much time for critical reflection. While project teams have monthly obligations to report their work and pursue their learning agenda questions, most information is collected to inform donors whose reporting requirements tend to favor output tracking, and not dig deeper

1055 Care staff member (C4), Bujumbura, interview.

1056 Care staff member (C18), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C15), Bujumbura, interview.

1057 Care staff member (C3), Bujumbura, interview.

1058 Care staff member (C18), Bujumbura, interview.

1059 Care staff member (C18), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C4), Bujumbura, interview.

1060 Care staff member (C4), Bujumbura, interview.

1061 Care staff member (C26), Bujumbura, interview.

1062 Care staff member (C4), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C1), Bujumbura, interview.

1063 Care staff member (C4), Bujumbura, interview.

to question the program logic, or the meanings and implications of what is seen on the ground. While Care has made a concerted effort to embed learning into project agendas, knowledge can remain superficial... Furthermore, there are not yet clear and systematic policies and incentives that mandate staff to make time for analysis, sharing and learning. Without clear policies and an understanding of why reflective learning is essential, staff tend to leave responsibility for learning and reflection on the learning team.¹⁰⁶⁴

Adaptation and reflection in relation to peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity was particularly difficult because of the challenges of measuring success of community based peacebuilding efforts and linking them to the broader peacebuilding process. “The conflict and peace programs have real problems with tangible results. There are great processes, but because it does not generate a national or regional success, you can only really tell the story. There are some great stories coming out of countries in conflict, but they are just stories.”¹⁰⁶⁵

8.3.3.3 Organizational frame and knowledge

Even though Care Burundi put a lot of energy into encouraging self-reflection and seeking valid information about its outcomes, it did not have that much information about conflict sensitivity or peacebuilding outcomes.¹⁰⁶⁶ Organizations learn and act in relation to targets, and peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity were not the main target for the majority of Care Burundi’s projects.¹⁰⁶⁷ Care Burundi’s predominant organizational frame was women’s empowerment at the community level, not peacebuilding, conflict sensitivity, or political advocacy. This frame determined what the senior leadership paid attention to and what staff believed was important.

1064 Care Burundi, A Journey of Empowerment: CARE Burundi’s Rights-Based Learning Program Approach, 8.

1065 *Ibid.*

1066 *Ibid.*

1067 Levitt and March, “Organizational Learning.”

The organizational change process that Kassie McIlvaine initiated in 2003 set the stage for the adoption of empowerment programming as Care Burundi's primary frame. As part of this process, all Care Burundi staff who remained were trained in gender sensitivity and diversity awareness. Many underwent their own personal transformation processes as a result of the office's new focus on gender equity.¹⁰⁶⁸

Men...were incredibly influenced by the project and its activities and they changed themselves. I think that's because it has been so successful and the changes in women's lives that they work with were really surprising to the team and the staff. Then [the staff] were even more motivated and committed.¹⁰⁶⁹

Care USA was undergoing a parallel process where it was focusing on a few corporate priorities and core programs that reflected its comparative advantage.¹⁰⁷⁰ The empowerment of women was a theme that potentially fit with each of the core programs.¹⁰⁷¹ Care USA had a lot of experience in the area of women's empowerment, had conducted several rigorous studies of these experiences, and had developed important best practices in this area.¹⁰⁷² Several Scandinavian donors to Burundi were also very interested in supporting women's empowerment programming.¹⁰⁷³

The interest of headquarters, donors, Care Burundi leadership, and staff in women's empowerment further strengthened the prominence of this frame for the office. Care Burundi's women's empowerment programming brought a lot of attention to the office. It was viewed as an exemplary program and both headquarters and other offices were very interested in learning from its successes. This attention and support reinforced and strengthened Care Burundi's work in this area, which in turn increased the attention that

1068 Care staff member (C1), Bujumbura, interview.

1069 Care staff member (C3), Bujumbura, interview.

1070 **Ibid.**

1071 **Ibid.**

1072 Care staff member (C3), Bujumbura, interview.

1073 **Ibid.**

this work received. “Within Care Burundi, we have put some intrinsic reward around women’s empowerment. It is trendy now. There is donor interest.”¹⁰⁷⁴

Burundian women were also badly in need of empowerment. They were considered by many as second-class citizens and were subject to high levels of domestic abuse, rape, and violence. These different factors came together to make women’s empowerment Care Burundi’s core priority. The morale, if not resources and knowledge base, of Care Burundi’s youth and conflict programming suffered as a result.

Most staff felt that conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding were the realm of the conflict advisor, not their realm.¹⁰⁷⁵ Project teams focused on their specific objective, not on doing conflict analysis in addition to everything else on their plate.¹⁰⁷⁶ Most Care staff and even senior leadership did not really understand conflict sensitivity or peacebuilding and many not see why they should or how they could integrate it into their projects.¹⁰⁷⁷ If a project’s donor did not prioritize conflict sensitivity or peacebuilding, the project team did not prioritize it.¹⁰⁷⁸ The staff person assigned to help mainstream conflict sensitivity wielded little power in the organization and had to depend on the good will of the project managers and staff to look at the conflict dimensions of their programming.¹⁰⁷⁹

Care UK is the office within Care International mandated to support conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding throughout the federation.¹⁰⁸⁰ Based on interest expressed by the Burundi office, Care UK provided funding and technical support to help the office increase the conflict sensitivity of its programming and to develop effective

1074 Care staff member (C9), Bujumbura, interview.

1075 Care staff member (C16), Bujumbura, interview.

1076 Ibid.

1077 Care staff member (C11), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C16), Bujumbura, interview.

1078 Care staff member (C16), Bujumbura, interview.

1079 Ibid.

1080 Care Burundi, Learning from Peace and Conflict Monitoring (LCPM) Bi-annual Narrative Report, November 2007 - April 2008.

peacebuilding programming.¹⁰⁸¹ The regional Care UK technical advisor worked with the Burundian staff member who was given the responsibility for helping all of Care's projects become conflict sensitive. Care was successful in helping most of the projects to avoid creating conflict by applying the Do No Harm approach, and in incorporating conflict resolution training into the projects.¹⁰⁸² But, it was much less successful in actually increasing the conflict sensitivity of Care's specific projects or in linking Care's community-level work with Burundi's overall peacebuilding trajectory.¹⁰⁸³

Care UK never really provided usable tools that Care offices could easily integrate into their existing programming tools and processes.¹⁰⁸⁴ It provided some training to the conflict advisor, but not to the rest of the Care staff. The Care Burundi conflict advisor was responsible for this. But, there was little interest in conflict sensitivity or peacebuilding among Care Burundi's leadership or even within the overall organization to support his efforts.¹⁰⁸⁵ Mainstreaming conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding would have required real support from Care Burundi leadership to help to create some institutional incentives for staff to integrate yet another priority into their programming. But, the priorities of the leadership and the organization discouraged the adoption of peacebuilding or conflict sensitivity as a predominant frame. After all, Care USA wanted to address the root causes of poverty, which it equated with development thinking, not peacebuilding.

There was a time when there had been a great deal of interest within Care International in conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding, but that time seemed to have

1081 Care staff member (C2), Bujumbura, interview.

1082 Care staff member (C8), Bujumbura, interview.

1083 Ibid.

1084 Ibid.

1085 Ibid.; Care staff member (C11), Bujumbura, interview.

passed and Care UK may have missed its chance to capitalize on it.¹⁰⁸⁶ Care USA was the most powerful member of the Care family and its priorities, which did not include conflict sensitivity or peacebuilding, were pushing the organization in other directions.

Care International is a multi-mandate organization. “There is an identity issue for Care. We think we can do anything and everything well. Because we are decentralized, we look more like a quilt.”¹⁰⁸⁷ Each Care office selected its main area of focus. Care Burundi was not multi-mandate, but was primarily focused on development through community-based empowerment processes. It had a sprinkle of peacebuilding and a sprinkle of humanitarian preparedness, but its development and community empowerment frames predominated. Inevitably, the organization and its leadership choose priorities and those priorities, or organizational frames, shape what the organization thinks is important, what it pays attention to in the context, and the targets that it adjusts and adapts in relation to.

8.3.3.4 Leadership

Leadership played an essential role in Care Burundi’s frame, knowledge, and prioritization. Care Burundi became an exceptional organization within Care and among INGOs in Burundi because of the leadership of Kassie McIlvaine.¹⁰⁸⁸ This reputation was sustained by Yawo Douvon, the Assistant Country Director, and Kassie’s replacement, Michelle Carter. Because Care International is such a decentralized organization, Country Directors have a great deal of freedom to shape the priorities of an office.¹⁰⁸⁹

In 2005, Kassie was committed to both peacebuilding and empowerment frames because they fit with what donors were interested in supporting in the aftermath of the

1086 Care staff member (C8), Bujumbura, interview.

1087 Care staff member (C9), Bujumbura, interview.

1088 Care staff members (C10), Bujumbura, interview.

1089 *Ibid.*

elections. But through Care's discussions with communities and the research it commissioned, the empowerment frame soon won out and Care directed its energy in this direction.¹⁰⁹⁰ This was not solely due to Kassie's own preferences, but they certainly influenced this direction. In addition, she prioritized community-based work rather than policy-level change or advocacy.¹⁰⁹¹

Care International's reliance on the skill and focus of its Country Directors also carries drawbacks. It means that the organization has real difficulty sharing lessons learned between offices and duplicating its successes.¹⁰⁹² The freedom that Care International's structure and approach gives to its Country Directors can lead to excellent work, but it all relies on the capacity and vision of one or two people. "Whatever we do comes down to the person who is supposed to do that job. We are totally dependent on those who are conducting that specific task."¹⁰⁹³

8.3.3.5 Organizational change

The organizational change process that Kassie initiated in 2003 enabled Care Burundi to align with Burundi's new peacebuilding trend in 2005. It allowed the organization to question its overall approach, capacity, knowledge, and even the makeup of its staff, and to alter these factors to more effectively pursue its new aims. Although Care Burundi staff continued to discuss and assess their programming after this initial change process, they did attempt to alter the Care Burundi's organization's overall approach and direction.¹⁰⁹⁴ In other words, Care engaged in a high-degree of single-loop learning, taking systematic actions to align intention and outcome when evidence of

1090 Care staff members (C10), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C11), Bujumbura, interview.

1091 Care staff member (C11), Bujumbura, interview.

1092 Care staff member (C19), Geneva, 2010.

1093 **Ibid.**

1094 Care Burundi, A Journey of Empowerment: CARE Burundi's Rights-Based Learning Program Approach; Care staff members (C10), Bujumbura, interview.

misalignment appeared. But, it only engaged in double-loop learning that questioned its overall aims and approach during intense and time consuming organizational change processes, which was spurred by the arrival of new Country Director in 2003 and again in 2009, not by significant changes in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory.

8.3.3.6 Context

In 2009, when discussing and analyzing the causes and manifestations of poverty in Burundi, Care staff did not even mention conflict as an issue that they should be concerned about.¹⁰⁹⁵ Many of Care Burundi's staff were reluctant to focus on conflict sensitivity or systemic peacebuilding. The conflict, for them, was personal.¹⁰⁹⁶ It had a direct impact on their lives and their families. These were memories that many of them did not wish to dredge up or discuss, nor did they wish to think about the possibilities that the conflict may escalate again.¹⁰⁹⁷ They thought that they were in the post-conflict phase and were anxious to move forward. Politics also threatened to polarize the diverse staff. Conducting advocacy in relation to peacebuilding at the national level also put the office at risk of being kicked out of the country or becoming too politicized.

In spite of the challenges that the office faced processing the amount of information that it received about its projects, its focus on reflective practice did help it resolve many problems that arose.¹⁰⁹⁸ Care Burundi could not fix all of its problems or prevent challenges from arising, but there was a general awareness and openness of the challenges faced and willingness to address them. "The difference between this office and other [Care] offices is that it faces the normal challenges of any office – monitoring and evaluation, developing real partnerships – but instead of getting stuck in them, the

¹⁰⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹⁶ Care staff member (C1), Bujumbura, interview.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Care staff member (C8), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C11), Bujumbura, interview.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Care staff member (C1), Bujumbura, interview.

office is able to address the challenges and move beyond them. It recognizes the pain and addresses it and then moves on.”¹⁰⁹⁹

8.3.4 GOING AGAINST THE GRAIN: THE PROGRAM SHIFT (PHASE V-VI)

Care Burundi did not take significant or systematic actions to respond to the integration of the FNL into the government and military in 2009, and the related demobilization of former FNL combatants and associated children and adults. Nor did Care take significant or systematic actions to respond to the political tension and violence that resulted from the 2010 elections.

In 2009, Care Burundi began an intense year-long process called *Program Shift* that allowed it to develop a long-term program strategy that it would aim to fit projects into, hopefully leading to a longer term impact. Care USA supported the office in making this shift, bringing a development frame and its own strategic priorities. Care Burundi decided that its new program would focus on women’s and youth empowerment at the community level and aim to increase its contribution to governance.¹¹⁰⁰ This new approach aimed to establish:

a coherent set of initiatives by CARE and our allies that involves a long-term commitment to specific marginalized and vulnerable groups to achieve lasting impact at broad scale on underlying causes of poverty and social justice. This goes beyond the scope of projects to achieve positive changes in human conditions, in social positions, and in the enabling environment.¹¹⁰¹

1099 Care staff members (C10), Bujumbura, interview.

1100 Care Burundi, *A Journey of Empowerment: CARE Burundi’s Rights-Based Learning Program Approach*, 26; Care Burundi, “Program Shift Documents - Burundi”; Care Burundi P-Bouge Series, “Making the ‘P-Bouge’ Bouge: Advancing, Revisiting, Revising, and Advancing Once Again, Brief No. 3”; Participant Observation, Care Burundi P-Shift Workshop, interview.

1101 Care Burundi, *A Journey of Empowerment: CARE Burundi’s Rights-Based Learning Program Approach*, 7.

Although conflict sensitivity remained a component of this new program, it was not central to the program design or the analysis on which it was based.¹¹⁰² In fact, in this new program the conflict focus was even weaker than it had been in earlier program documents because the office was shifting even more toward development thinking.¹¹⁰³

Care's new program was based on the assumption that the 2010 elections would be relatively peaceful, free, and fair and that Burundi would continue to move gradually, if with a certain instability, toward stability and qualify for normal development.¹¹⁰⁴ Care was unsure how to react to the downward trend that resulted from the 2010 elections, and could not immediately respond.¹¹⁰⁵ It tried to shield the community associations that it worked with from manipulation by politicians or armed groups, but did not alter its programming in other ways to the fact that Burundi was becoming a more violent one-party state and a new rebellion was emerging.¹¹⁰⁶

The new program approach included more support for advocacy, governance, and aimed to have an impact beyond the community level. These shifts in Care's approach were the result of the Program Shift process and the analysis that was done at the time of the shift, not a result of its response to Burundi's context. Care Burundi only significantly altered its approach and aims during these organizational change processes that were spurred by new country office leadership and/or a change process proposed by Care International. It did not shift its approach directly in response to a shift in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory, but rather assessed the context at the time of its organizational change process and built a program around that assessment.

1102 Participant Observation, Care Burundi P-Shift Workshop, interview.

1103 Care International - Burundi, Strategic Journey 2007-2011.

1104 Care staff member (C2), Bujumbura, interview; Care staff member (C11), Bujumbura, interview.

1105 Care staff member (C4), Bujumbura, interview.

1106 Ibid.

Care's new program failed to ask whether empowerment programming through a development lens still appropriate in Burundi's new context? If Burundi's trajectory had continued to move toward peace and development, it is unlikely that this question would have come up. But, with Burundi's descent into authoritarianism and increased political violence, Care's Burundi's inattention to Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory becomes more problematic. As does the risk that Care's empowerment programming encourage rural communities to ask more from a government that is increasingly unreceptive, potentially increasing their dissatisfaction and possibly fueling conflict.¹¹⁰⁷

Furthermore, while the Program Shift process did alter the way that Care Burundi thinks about its programming, and helped to make the case for the establishment of an advocacy post in the office, it did not change the accountability structure, organizational frames, knowledge-laden routines, or learning behavior within the organization. Nor did it give Care flexible funding that it could allocate to peacebuilding priorities. As a result, it is unclear that it will significantly change the way that Care does its programming or the significant challenges that it faced in aligning with Burundi's war-to-peace transition.¹¹⁰⁸

8.4 Conclusion

Care Burundi transformed itself so that it could understand, empower, and support the Burundian communities in which it worked. Within these communities, it helped Burundians achieve greater gender and ethnic equality, resolve their conflicts peacefully, and work together to improve their economic standing. Although the office was highly connected to the communities with which it worked, it was highly disconnected from

1107 Care Burundi, Learning from Peace and Conflict Monitoring (LCPM), Narrative Report, September - December 2008.

1108 Now that the new program has been operational for a little over a year, new research could uncover what has changed in Care's interaction with Burundi's peacebuilding transition and what has not.

Burundi's overall political and peacebuilding trajectory. Of course, most Care Burundi staff were members of different political parties and followed the political dynamics closely, but over most of the period under study the organization did not aim to influence these macro-level trends or alter its interventions in relation to critical events in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory.

The Care Burundi case study shows that learning behavior, entrepreneurial leadership, systematic feedback from beneficiaries and other stakeholders, and organizational change processes are insufficient for an organization to maintain its relevance to a country's war-to-peace transition. A predominant peacebuilding organizational frame and the commitment of its leadership to peacebuilding are also necessary.

Only in relation to the 2005 presidential elections did Care Burundi alter its programmatic approach, although this was as much in response to the new focus of bilateral donors in Burundi as it was the changing peacebuilding context (See Figure 8-2 Below). This shift of focus was made possible by an organizational change process initiated by Care Burundi's new Country Director in 2003. In fact, Care Burundi's two organizational change processes were necessary for the organization to significantly alter its aims and approach in Burundi. In between, the Care took systematic actions to help its projects meet their aims, but did not aim to alter its overall goals or approach outside of its organizational change processes.

Care Burundi maintained several peacebuilding projects, integrated dispute resolution techniques into other projects, and tried to ensure that their projects did not incite conflict (i.e., Do No Harm). Burundians reported that these projects had an important impact on the resolution of inter-personal and community disputes. Nonetheless, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding were not systematically mainstreamed throughout its projects and Care Burundi's did not examine the

relationship between its projects and Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. When Care finally began to develop a program approach in 2009, which required it to align all of its individual projects under larger programmatic strategies that aimed to have long-term systematic change on its target groups (i.e., women and youth), it did not articulate the relationship between these interventions and conflict or peacebuilding. By this time, Care had largely dropped its conflict sensitivity lens.¹¹⁰⁹

When Care Burundi took significant and systematic action to align with the new trend in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory launched by the 2005 elections, it had positive values on the independent variables outlined in Chapter 2 (See Chart 8-1). It had peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines and frames, downward (in addition to upward) accountability routines, and non-defensive learning behavior that was supported by the quest for valid information. Nonetheless, these characteristics alone were insufficient for its response to the new opportunities presented by the 2005 elections. New leadership and a thorough organizational change process were also necessary to create these organizational characteristics in the first place.

Care Burundi's second organizational change process that began in 2009 did not lead the organization to align with Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. At this point in time, Care and its donors were ready to get beyond peacebuilding to focus on sustainable poverty reduction and development. Care Burundi's new leadership also supported this direction. This shows that leadership and organizational change processes in addition to learning behavior and downward accountability routines are still insufficient for an organization to be relevant to big changes in a country's peacebuilding trajectory. The organization must also have peacebuilding organizational frames and knowledge-laden routines. Care Burundi's capacity to engage with trends and critical events in Burundi's

1109 Participant Observation, Care Burundi P-Shift Workshop, interview.

peacebuilding trajectory was limited by its organizational frame that prioritized development and empowerment over conflict sensitivity and its accountability routines and access to resources.

The organization's capacity to engage with trends and critical events in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory was also limited by its accountability routines and access to resources. On the one hand, because Care depended on donor grants for its activities it did not have reserve funding that would allow it to quickly respond to alterations in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. On the other hand, Care had an intensive planning and project development process that set its trajectory for several years. Once the direction was set, it was difficult to shift it elsewhere. Care could engage in single-loop learning to enable individual projects to better achieve their outcomes, but only during key programming processes did it attempt to question its underlying theories of change and make strategic shifts in its approach (i.e., double-loop learning).

Figure 8-2: 2X2 of Care Burundi's Values on Dependent Variable

Systematic and Significant Actions to Align Aims and Means with a New Trend
in the Peacebuilding Trajectory

		NO	YES
Systematic Actions to Align Peacebuilding Programming with the Relevant Context	NO	CARE I CARE II	
	YES	CARE III CARE V CARE VI	CARE IV

At the same time that its high quality programming required significant research and planning, its reliance on relatively short-term grants from donors made it difficult for the organization to engage in truly sustainable programming. There was never a guarantee that the project would continue or the time to engage with the institutions of the state and affect larger, more sustainable change. These accountability routines, promoting quality programming on the one hand and short-term accountability to donors and headquarters on the other, were often in conflict. But, both discouraged the

organization from taking significant and systematic action to align with new trends in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory.

This case study offers important data for theory building. First, it generally supports the ideal type theory presented in Chapter 2, specifically in terms of Care's reaction to the 2005 presidential elections; although the qualities of each of these variables is slightly different in the Care case. Knowledge-laden routines and frames focused on peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and empowerment programming, not on political or development programming. Its accountability routines were both upward and downward, not either or. Learning behavior was generally non-defensive and the organization pursued valid information about outcomes, although it still had difficulty monitoring and understanding the outcomes of its programming. Its knowledge about its projects was generated as much through conversations and interviews with community members as by any other more formal monitoring method.

The Care Burundi case also shows that it is very difficult for an organization to sustain alignment with the peacebuilding trajectory. Particularly for organizations whose core mandate is not peacebuilding, the tendency is for the organization gradually to return to its primary organizational frame and veer away from peacebuilding. The potential implication is that for an approach to be truly mainstreamed into programming it has to be the primary organizational frame or priority. This priority determines how the organization views the context and which events in the context the organization responds to.

In Care Burundi, while organizational change processes and leadership were necessary for Care to achieve alignment with Burundi's peacebuilding context, they were insufficient to sustain that alignment. As indicated above, maintaining a peacebuilding organizational frame and supporting peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines, were also necessary.

Care is a multi-mandate NGO, meaning that it claimed to be able to do humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding programming. This case study shows that in practice, it may be very difficult for a field office to be multi-mandate because it has to set up systems that support one predominant approach or another. Leadership tends to prefer one approach, or sub-approach, over another. Staff cannot mainstream everything into their programming, nor can they react to all priorities. Choices have to be made for the organization to operate efficiently and to focus staff time on what the organization deems to be most important. The experience of Care Burundi raises the question of whether it is possible for a field-based office to be multi-mandate in practice.

This case study also raises the question of whether it is possible in war-torn countries to focus on the community and on governance. In many cases, community-based work, particularly of the “empowerment” type, can threaten government officials. Particularly in a very hierarchical society such as Burundi, this threatens the traditional roles of government in relation to the community. By choosing to work on policies and politics an NGO can make themselves and the communities that they work with vulnerable.

Finally, the Care Burundi case provides insights about the predominance of the liberal peace norms in peacebuilding intervention in Burundi. Care Burundi did not attempt to establish institutions that would guarantee the rights that they were fighting for, which is one valid criticism of their work. It did not aim to establish rule of law, democracy, or a market based economy. It aimed to strengthen informal institutions in the community that would enable accountability, equality, and economic development, and ultimately help to reduce poverty in Burundi. While these institutions do not contradict the liberal peace framework, they also do not directly promote it. In fact, in many cases they prioritize community above individual liberty. They aim to correct for inequality first, and then enable free choice, which contradicts many readings of

liberalism. Furthermore, Care does not impose its approach on communities, but exposes communities and individuals to the approach. It is up to the individuals and communities involved to decide whether or not they want to work with Care.

Organizational Data Point	Accountability Routines	Knowledge-laden Routines & Organizational Frames	Learning Behavior	Significant Organizational Change Process	Flexible Peacebuilding Funds	Entrepreneurial Leadership Committed to Peacebuilding	Action to Align in Relation to Peacebuilding Aims
Care I	External	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Defensive/ Invalid	No	No	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory / No Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
Care II	External	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Defensive/ Invalid	No	No	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory / No Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
Care III	External/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive/ Valid	Yes	No	Yes	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory / Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
Care IV	External/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	Predominant PB Frame/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive/ Valid	No	No	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory / Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
Care V	External/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	PB Frame not Predominant/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive/ Valid	Yes	No	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory / Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
Care VI	External/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	PB Frame not Predominant/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive/ Valid	No	No	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align with New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory / Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context

9 THE BURUNDI LEADERSHIP TRAINING PROGRAM

9.1 Introduction

In late 2002, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS) launched the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) “to increase the ability of the country’s ethnically polarized leadership to work together in consolidating its post-war transition.”¹¹¹⁰ The BLTP was the vision of Howard Wolpe who believed in the midst of such high levels of “mistrust and suspicion” it was necessary to “create a different kind of atmosphere – one in which the participants are able to see each other as ‘whole’ persons, not simply as stereotypic reflections of their ethnic and political categories.”¹¹¹¹ Only once some degree of openness and understanding among former enemies was achieved, could these individuals begin to govern together.¹¹¹² “War creates a situation where people are convinced that their own survival can only come at the expense of the other. The challenge is trying to change the culture that war creates.”¹¹¹³

As President Clinton’s Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, Wolpe had followed the Arusha peace talks closely. As he watched the parties engage in round after round of negotiations, he lamented the fact that they were not able to openly discuss their true concerns with one another – they neither had the tools nor the opportunity to dialogue directly.¹¹¹⁴ After the inauguration of the Transitional Government of Burundi in November 2001, Wolpe again saw an opening for a process that would help the former

1110 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Proposal for Renewing and Expanding the World Bank/WWICS Partnership in Post-Conflict Burundi, Proposal (Washington, DC: WWICS, July 2004), 1.

1111 Howard Wolpe, Response to Draft Evaluation of the BLTP by Peter Uvin and Susanna Campbell (Washington, DC: WWICS, July 2004), 1.

1112 Wolpe, Response to Draft Evaluation of the BLTP by Peter Uvin and Susanna Campbell.

1113 **Ibid.**

1114 Howard Wolpe, Burundi: Lessons Learned from a Regionally Sponsored Peace Process (Unpublished, May 2004).

belligerents build the understanding and relationships necessary to successfully see Burundi through its transitional phase. Just as during the Arusha process, cooperation was now in Burundi's leaders' self interest.

I believe that fundamentally people will never alter the way they behave toward one another unless they see that as a matter of self-interest. We try to assist people to come to an appreciation, first, of their interdependence. That there's value in collaboration, even with people they'd historically defined as enemies. But secondly, that they can do that. That it's possible to rebuild trust, to rebuild the ability to communicate.¹¹¹⁵

Wolpe recruited Eugene Nindorera and Fabien Nsengimana to help him run and administer the BLTP. Eugene Nindorera was the former Burundian Minister of Human Rights. He was widely respected by Hutu and Tutsi alike. He brought moral authority, political prestige, and a true insider's knowledge and understanding of the actors. Fabien Nsengimana had a similar, if more low-key, profile. As a former advisor to President Buyoya, he was well versed in Burundi's politics and leadership. Even though he lost his father and siblings in the massacres of 1972, he had decided to work toward peace and cooperation.¹¹¹⁶ As a former teacher and administrator, training and project management came naturally to him.¹¹¹⁷ Together, Wolpe, a former Ambassador, Nindorera, a Tutsi politician committed to human rights, and Nsengimana, a Hutu political advisor and former school administrator, were a powerful, well-connected team. Elizabeth McClintock brought a deep knowledge of conflict resolution and dialogue methods to the team, while Steve McDonald was a highly skilled administrator and fundraiser.

Unlike all of the other case study organizations, the BLTP was designed and built for Burundi. The team was carefully put together by Wolpe. It was made up of highly skilled individuals with deep knowledge of Burundi, politics, conflict resolution and


1115 McCune, "Relearning the Peace (Interview with Howard Wolpe)."

1116 Ibid.

1117 BLTP, "Fabien Nsengimana | Burundi Leadership Training Program," Burundi Leadership Training Program, n.d., <http://bltprogram.wordpress.com/lequipe/fabien-nsengimana/> (accessed November 23, 2011).

dialogue methods, and the procedures and preferences of western donors. It was a small organization that had an office in both Washington, DC and in Bujumbura, with excellent communication between the two.

Figure 9-1: Burundi Leadership Training Program's (BLTP's) Actions to Align Aims, Approaches, and Programming with Burundi's Peacebuilding Trajectory



Did the focus, staff, and structure of the BLTP influence its capacity to interact with and influence Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory? The theory outlined in Chapter 2 predicts that they will. It predicts that the BLTP will be the only organization able to systematically align with each new phase in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory and maintain the relevance of its programming to the evolving dynamics. This chapter finds that this was not the case. The BLTP altered its overall aims and approach to all but one of the major shifts in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory (See Figure 9-1). At the programming level, it continually acted to align with the relevant context. As a result, the BLTP falsifies the ideal-type theory outlined in Chapter 2. It finds that an organizational change process is also likely to be necessary for an organization to maintain its relevance to a country's evolving war-to-peace transition.

9.2 Accompanying Burundi's Transition: The BLTP 2002-2005

The BLTP was established to address the new trend in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory created by the inauguration of the Transitional Government of Burundi on November 1, 2001. It was created in Burundi to address a lynchpin to the success of Burundi's transitional period: the capacity of Burundi's new and old leaders to communicate with one another, so that they could undertake the legal, procedural, and political reforms necessary for the transitional period to end. The creation of the BLTP was a significant and systematic action to align with a critical event and ensuing trend in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. This alignment was spurred not by an organizational change process, but by an organizational creation process.

The original design of the BLTP was to train 100 leaders (it managed to train 95) from "diverse ethnic, social, and institutional backgrounds" in methods designed to help them put themselves in the shoes of the "other", engage in joint problem-solving, and improve their capacity to listen and communicate with one another.¹¹¹⁸ The leaders were selected through a laborious process that asked key informants to identify the most influential Burundians, for good or bad.¹¹¹⁹ Through three week-long training sessions where approximately 30 leaders at a time were sequestered away in the Northern town of Ngozi, the BLTP took 95 leaders through a process that was informative for all and transformative for many.¹¹²⁰

Because the BLTP's first donor was the World Bank Post-Conflict Fund, it originally aimed to help the leaders that it trained contribute to economic recovery, specifically by encouraging them to create economic development projects. This aspect of the program

1118 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Proposal for Renewing and Expanding the World Bank/WWICS Partnership in Post-Conflict Burundi, 1; Wolpe, Response to Draft Evaluation of the BLTP by Peter Uvin and Susanna Campbell.

1119 Uvin and Campbell, "The Burundi Leadership Training Program: A Prospective Assessment," 58.

1120 Uvin and Campbell, "The Burundi Leadership Training Program: A Prospective Assessment."

was largely a failure, as it was neither the true aim of the project or the expertise of the BLTP staff.¹¹²¹ It had been included in the design to make it easier for the World Bank to fund the project.¹¹²² Partly in response to an external evaluation conducted in 2004 as well as the refusal of the World Bank to fund another tranche, the team dropped this aspect of the project design and focused on new opportunities that emerged. The team was relatively quick to correct its course when it became clear that it was not achieving the desired outcomes. In other words, during this phase, the BLTP systematically acted to align its project aims and outcomes.

With the integration of the CNDD-FDD into the government and the armed forces beginning in November 2003, new opportunities emerged for the BLTP – opportunities that it vigorously seized. Several of the military officers who had participated in the one of the three Ngozi workshops approached the BLTP to suggest that it could be helpful with the military’s ongoing reform.

The BLTP came at a very important time. We were at the last negotiations with the CNDD-FDD... I thought this was a great idea. It could help push us forward with the negotiations. If the military can meet together and accelerate the process, then that can help push forward the politicians.¹¹²³

With funding from DFID and the European Commission, the BLTP organized trainings for members of the Burundian Armed Forces (FAB) and the Armed Political Parties and Movements (PMPA) that were being integrated into a new National Defense Force (FDN). Specifically, the BLTP trained members of each force that were charged with negotiating outstanding issues relating to their integration. What posts, grades, and status would be assigned to each force and to individuals within each force? How would armed forces with such different types of training and experience be harmonized?

1121 Ibid.

1122 Observer (O7), by telephone, January 14, 2009.

1123 Military BLTP Participant (B2), Bujumbura, interview. Translation from French by author/interviewer.

The Burundian military – dominated by Tutsis from Bururi province since Burundi’s independence in 1962 – had been at the forefront of Burundi’s war and was now at the forefront of its peace process. “Even if the politicians played a role, it was the military that suffered the consequences of the war. The military understood the need to do this [conflict resolution work] better than the politicians.”¹¹²⁴ The BLTP trainings helped the negotiators open up to and listen to one another, helping them eventually to come to an agreement on the form of the new Burundian National Defense Force (FDN).

There is general agreement among BLTP staff, military participants, and observers that this was the most important impact of the BLTP.¹¹²⁵ The military was so convinced by the value of the BLTP’s method that it asked them to design a curriculum that could be integrated into the FDN’s normal training offerings.

Before, we thought that the ‘other’ was mean – bad - even though you had never actually talked to him. That it wasn’t even worth approaching or talking with him. If we begin to talk and exchange and let people express themselves then you see that they also have ideas... There is a way to come together and understand one another. The mistrust was replaced by confidence in one another.¹¹²⁶

The successful reform of the Burundian Army and smooth integration of former rebel groups into its ranks was of critical importance to the positive evolution of

1124 Military BLTP Participant (B3), Bujumbura, December 10, 2008. Translation from French by author/interviewer.

1125 BLTP Military Participant (B6), Bujumbura, December 6, 2008; BLTP Military Participant (B5), Bujumbura, December 10, 2008; Military BLTP Participant (B3), Bujumbura, interview; Military BLTP Participant (B2), Bujumbura, interview; BLTP staff member (B4), February 24, 2009; BLTP Staff Member (B8), March 6, 2009; Adrian Johnston, Program Impact within the Burundian Forces de Defense Nationale - BLTP Monitoring and Evaluation (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS), June 17, 2007), http://www.google.ch/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=wwics%20program%20impact%20wihin%20the%20burundian%20forces%20de%20defense%20nationale%20adrian%20johnston&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCoQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fbetterpeace.org%2Ffiles%2Fwwics_BLTP_Final_Evaluation_Report_June_17_2007.doc&ei=RbTPTrzdBMzY4QTrMg_&usq=AFQjCNFn4lhln5XRHKvBLiHaJsGFaTxZCg&cad=rja (accessed November 25, 2011); Nsengimana, “Briefing on BLTP Activities.”

1126 *Ibid.*

Burundi's peace process. The BLTP helped the military leaders to achieve this success by providing a valuable input at the right time.¹¹²⁷

The BLTP came at a crucial and unprecedented time in Burundi's transition, when leaders of different political, ethnic, and socio-economic groups found themselves running a transitional government together. Leaders were trying to figure out which allegiances would assure them future power and prosperity, and they knew they were required to make compromises that they might not have been willing to make in the past. The BLTP came in at the right time and helped people to adopt new attitudes and build new relationships that could enable them to more effectively navigate this terrain.¹¹²⁸

The BLTP team recognized its relevance to the Burundian context, seized new opportunities, and helped other opportunities to emerge. In addition to its work with the military, the BLTP also initiated a training program for community level leaders – the Community Based Leadership Program (CBLP) – funded by USAID and implemented by a USAID contractor with inputs from BLTP staff. Although the CBLP did not have an impact on the overall peace process, it did help to build the capacity of “local leaders to successfully work together to solve common problems”.¹¹²⁹ It also built an “exceptionally well trained” cadre of Burundian conflict resolution experts.¹¹³⁰ In both the trainings of the military and interactions with the CBLP, the BLTP team systematically attempted to improve its ability to achieve its desired outcomes.

9.2.1 A CUSTOM-MADE ORGANIZATION

Why was the BLTP able to take systematic and significant actions to align in relation to Burundi's peacebuilding trends between 2002 and 2005 at the same time that it

1127 Uvin and Campbell, “The Burundi Leadership Training Program: A Prospective Assessment,” 33–34.

1128 Peter Uvin and Susanna Campbell, “The Burundi Leadership Training Program,” in *Preventing Conflict and Rebuilding Failed States*, ed. Michael Lund and Howard Wolpe (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), 18.

1129 Marc Sommers, *Final Field Evaluation of The Community Based Leadership Training Program (CBLP) for Post-War Burundi* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS), July 26, 2006), 3.

1130 *Ibid.*, 3–4.

systematically acted to align its ongoing projects? Unlike the other case study organizations, the BLTP was custom-made for Burundi. The idea for it originated from Howard Wolpe's experience with the Arusha process and his experience with racial reconciliation and trust-building approaches used to combat racial tension during the US civil rights movement.¹¹³¹ International actors were looking for a type of process that could rejuvenate the faltering implementation of the Arusha Agreement in 2002, and saw Wolpe and his ideas as a potential solution.¹¹³² The team of Eugene Nindorera and Fabien Nsengimana were selected because of their excellent reputation among the major political actors at the time, and their knowledge of the context. Liz McClintock adapted Harvard's Program on Negotiation approach to align with Howard's vision, and Steve McDonald managed the entire enterprise smoothly. Although the techniques presented by the BLTP were not designed specifically for Burundi, the team and vision of the project was. An enormous amount of thought and consultation went into the design of the project, including over three months of preparatory work after the World Bank funding was received.¹¹³³

Seldom in our careers have we seen a project for which the preparation was so complete and thorough, the buy-in so widespread, and the understanding of the challenge so nuanced. The project has a strong sense of how its contributions relate to the ongoing dynamics and to other donors' activities. It is very politically savvy in informing and including all possible parties, thus greatly helping its success.¹¹³⁴

Given that the organization was formed for the Burundi context, perhaps the interesting question is not why the BLTP was aligned with the context in the first place, but why it maintained alignment during this period. The organization's accountability routines played an important role. The BLTP team talked to everyone about its

1131 Steve McDonald, "allAfrica.com: Africa: Remembering Howard Wolpe, the Tireless Peacemaker," AllAfrica, October 28, 2011, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201110281611.html> (accessed November 28, 2011).

1132 BLTP Staff Member (B9), October 14, 2008.

1133 Ibid.

1134 Uvin and Campbell, "The Burundi Leadership Training Program: A Prospective Assessment," 45.

intervention.¹¹³⁵ They got regular feedback from participants about what was working and what was not working. They talked to donors and international observers about what they were doing and invited them to come and observe. They talked to government officials – to those included in the BLTP and those excluded from it – to keep them informed of its work and its accomplishments. Granted, there was not a high degree of self-criticism in these discussions – positive anecdotes were regularly recycled - but they did listen to everyone’s feedback and tried to use it to improve their work.¹¹³⁶

The World Bank Post-Conflict Fund attached few strings to the initial grant, except a request that they be allowed to observe the process and an external evaluation be conducted.¹¹³⁷ Combined with the BLTP’s high degree of dialogue with both “beneficiaries” and observers, the flexible approach of its donor helped the staff to focus their energy on improving the effectiveness of their intervention above all else. Their highly transparent and consultative process also helped to reduce the number of people who might attempt to sabotage the process. It kept other potential donors informed about the BLTP’s work, and successes, setting the stage for new funding opportunities. It also ensured that the organization was informed of new contextual opportunities envisioned by its participants – as those presented by several military attendees of the Ngozi workshops.

The BLTP processed the information that it received from its ongoing consultations with participants and observers in an open, relatively non-defensive way. Although there was not much willingness to question the BLTP’s overall theory of change, there was a commitment to improving its capacity to achieve the change that it thought possible.¹¹³⁸ Wolpe argued that they needed first to see whether the BLTP’s vision worked before

1135 BLTP Staff Member (B9), interview.

1136 Uvin and Campbell, “The Burundi Leadership Training Program: A Prospective Assessment.”

1137 Observer (O7), by telephone, interview.

1138 BLTP staff member (B4), interview.

questioning it, and this would take several years.¹¹³⁹ Within these boundaries, the BLTP regularly discussed its approach, and feedback that it received from participants, observers, and external evaluations. It did not have sophisticated monitoring and evaluation systems, although it did ensure that it had regular feedback from participants, nor did it use complex conflict analysis methods. It was simply very well informed, connected to those that it aimed to influence, and always tried to improve its capacity to meet its broader vision of enabling reconciliation among Burundi's leaders.

The BLTP achieved great relevance, contextual coherence, and flexibility with little in the way of conflict-sensitive systems. Indeed, it did not conduct cutting-edge conflict assessments; it did not systematically question and evaluate the relevance of its approach; and it did not produce good monitoring data at all – its written reports were relentlessly upbeat and un-self-critical. And yet, its organizational systems clearly worked well, suggesting that a clear vision and willingness to adapt to reach this vision, rather than highly-developed organizational systems, explains its success.¹¹⁴⁰

Indeed, the BLTP's clarity of vision seems to be one of the keys to its success. This organizational frame influenced everything that it did. It was a decidedly peacebuilding frame, and it was informed by the vast knowledge of the BLTP team, both of conflict resolution and dialogue techniques as well as of Burundi, its players, and its culture. The BLTP team did not have a wide knowledge of a variety of peacebuilding techniques, but it knew its own approach very well and was highly skilled in it – able to adapt it to new situations and opportunities, guided by its clear organizational frame that dictated how it should be used within the Burundian context.

The BLTP had a winning combination of dialogue with beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and observers alike; willingness to continuously improve its interventions and learn from its mistakes; ability to quickly take advantage of new opportunities on the

1139 BLTP Staff Member (B8), interview; BLTP staff member (B4), interview; BLTP Staff Member (B7), October 29, 2008; BLTP Staff Member (B9), interview.

1140 Uvin and Campbell, "The Burundi Leadership Training Program," 18.

Burundian political landscape and convince donors to fund them to do so; and expert knowledge of its craft and the context. In fact, the staff and process seemed so well-suited to the Burundian context at that point in time that the 2004 evaluation raised questions about its replicability in other contexts.¹¹⁴¹

The team recognized that the way that they approached situations was important: “One of the keys to whatever success we enjoy anywhere has been our capacity be flexible and opportunistic.”¹¹⁴² While this does seem to be true, the fact that the BLTP’s flexibility was grounded in constant consultation and reflection, a clear vision of what it wanted to accomplish, and a clear understanding of the relevance of this vision for Burundi seem to be equally important for the contribution that it made to Burundi’s transitional period.

In addition to the BLTP’s non-defensive and valid learning behavior, peacebuilding frames and knowledge-laden routines, and significant and representative beneficiary dialogue, several other factors influenced its adaptability to Burundi’s context and its contribution to Burundi’s peace process. Leadership clearly mattered. Not only did Howard Wolpe have the political clout and knowledge necessary for the project, but he was a tireless advocate for its vision. At the same time, he did not diminish his Burundian and international colleagues, but sought to enable them to be leaders in their domains as well. Wolpe was both politically engaged and entrepreneurial in relation to Burundi’s peacebuilding context, and he empowered his team to be politically engaged and entrepreneurial as well. They sought out opportunities, but were strategic about what they took on and thorough in their approach. The BLTP’s approach to teamwork is

1141 Uvin and Campbell, “The Burundi Leadership Training Program: A Prospective Assessment.”

1142 BLTP Staff Member (B7), interview.

also a product of their learning culture, accountability routines, and wish to practice what they preached: a culture of dialogue, consultation, and problem solving.¹¹⁴³

The type of funding available to the BLTP and the way that it managed its relationships with its donors was also key to its success. The BLTP received flexible peacebuilding resources, meaning that the money was intended for peacebuilding programming and the design was not set in stone, but allowed for flexibility and adaptation.¹¹⁴⁴ This enabled the BLTP to adapt and adjust in relation to new learning. For example, after the 2004 evaluation conducted for the World Bank Post-Conflict Fund, it largely dropped its focus on economic development projects. In addition, like Care Burundi did in 2005, the BLTP overcame its dependency on grants by getting out in front of the demand. They spoke to many different donors and did all that they could to convince these donors of the BLTP's contribution, so that donors were practically competing to fund the BLTP. This provided the BLTP with new funding to take on initiatives that it thought were most important, rather than only responding to donor priorities.¹¹⁴⁵ While flexible peacebuilding funding influences the terms of its external accountability routines, they are not one in the same. An organization can have external accountability routines to its own headquarters that are more inflexible than the requirements of specific funding sources.¹¹⁴⁶

The type of programming that the BLTP was engaged in also contributed to its ability to adapt. Because the leadership trainings did not require a high degree of infrastructure investment, as opposed to constructing a school for example, the opportunity cost of altering their approach was minimal. That said, there are dialogue projects that maintain a commitment to implementing the project as designed in spite of

1143 BLTP Staff Member (B9), interview.

1144 Observer (O8), by telephone, January 7, 2009.

1145 One of the BLTP's key donors during this period was DFID.

1146 For examples, see the UNDP, BINUB, and Care case studies.

the apparent ease with which they may be able to alter their approach. For example, BINUB's Cadre de Dialogue continued to implement its dialogue workshops with civil society and the community level even though it became clear that they were not delivering the intended outcomes. After all, their external accountability routines rewarded staff primarily for delivering planned programs and spending allocated money.

The readiness of the Burundian context for the BLTP's approach also played a role in its success. At the same time, the BLTP was designed specifically for the Burundian context. The readiness of the context is therefore endogenous to organizational factors. The organization was created to align with the context. As a result, the context is in many ways a part of the organizational design and characteristics. Furthermore, some argue that the BLTP created its own readiness: it saw an opportunity, advocated with key stakeholders and donors to allow it to take advantage of this opportunity, and altered its programming so that it could.

I don't think ripeness is that important. It is fine if you have it, but there are many situations where it is not ripe, but the alternative is too ghastly to contemplate. You don't want it to slip backwards.... There was a certain ripeness [for the BLTP], obviously. It was prior to the ceasefire. None of the players who now have no desire to come in were there at the time.... I think there are times when you need the push, and it depends on who is doing the pushing. If you just wait for the situation to be right, it might never totally become right.¹¹⁴⁷

In fact, some argued that it was precisely the lack of readiness in individual participants that made the process so powerful for them.¹¹⁴⁸ "The willingness [to change] will not come directly. Even with people who do not accept the change, being forced to dialogue and change will help them to understand and have the willingness. The

1147 BLTP Staff Member (B9), interview.

1148 Uvin and Campbell, "The Burundi Leadership Training Program: A Prospective Assessment."

willingness will evolve.”¹¹⁴⁹ It is the interaction between the intervention and the context that determines the outcome. In the absence of information about a particular intervention, one cannot determine whether or not a context will be ready for it. Likewise, in the absence of a context, one cannot determine whether or not the intervention will work. The outcome is derived from the interaction – the fit.

There is not one context that will always fail and another that can always succeed. In that way, context means nothing. In another way, context means everything. It drives almost everything. If they don’t manage to finely adapt themselves to the context, they will fail. Not because the context has the determining power of the end result. If you don’t adapt to the context, you are addressing the wrong problem or no problem at all.¹¹⁵⁰

The fit between the context and the intervention is therefore derived from how the organization understands the context and responds to it, in turn hopefully influencing the context at which point it needs to make sure that it understands and responds to the new context. The BLTP was able to do this from 2002 to 2005 because of the characteristics described above. The knowledge and position of its national staff, particularly Fabien Nsengimana and Eugene Nindorera, were essential to this understanding and to the direction of the adaptation. And yet, the presence of knowledgeable “locals” is certainly insufficient. Both Nsengimana and Nindorera had to continuously question whether or not they were understanding the situation correctly by talking to participants and observers, gathering new information, and talking with their international colleagues. It is how the BLTP sought out information about the context and how it processed that information that mattered the most, in addition to a capacity and flexibility to act on that information to improve its programming.

1149 Military BLTP Participant (B3), Bujumbura, interview.

1150 Observer (O8), by telephone, interview.

9.3 The Challenge of New Leadership: The BLTP 2006-2011

The election of Pierre Nkurunziza to the presidency in August 2005 was a major turning point for Burundi's peace process, one that the BLTP responded to with systematic but not significant actions to align its intention and outcome. Only after many of its overtures were rejected and it began to stagnate did the organization alter its aims and, in some ways, its means so that it could again take significant and systematic actions to align with the new trends created by the integration of the FNL into the government and military in 2009 and the disappointing election results in 2010.

With the election of Pierre Nkurunziza to the Burundian presidency in August 2005, Burundi experienced a new wave of hope. The country and its people had made it through a critical milestone in its peacebuilding process – Burundi's first round of peaceful democratic elections since the war had begun – and had done so with great success. In spite of the hope created by this moment, the new direction of Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory was not all hopeful. Soon after the election, Nkurunziza began to send very strong messages to the international community, including by expelling the SRSG, that he was in charge and would not be responsive to international pressure or directives.

In this context, the BLTP continued to pursue its aim of "training" Burundi's top leaders so that they could listen and communicate more effectively with one another. Just prior to the elections it had organized a workshop with the top leaders of 31 political parties, which produced an Electoral Code of Conduct.¹¹⁵¹ One month after being elected to office, President Nkurunziza, the two Vice Presidents, and all twenty members of his

1151 Howard Wolpe and Steve McDonald, "Burundi's Transition: Training Leaders for Peace," *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 1 (January 2006): 135.

cabinet participated in a five-day BLTP workshop.¹¹⁵² Howard Wolpe got Nkurunziza to agree to this workshop by reminding him that he had fought hard, if unsuccessfully, to get the CNDD-FDD included in the Arusha process.¹¹⁵³ Wolpe had hoped that the training of Nkurunziza's cabinet – the BLTP's highest-level training to date – would set the stage for further workshops with the new government, so that these new leaders could achieve the same degree of collaboration as Burundi's transitional leaders had.

Wolpe and his team failed to question whether the new government would be as receptive to the BLTP's approach or even to the BLTP team itself as the Transitional National Government had been. As the new government demonstrated in repeated interactions with the international community, it did not want to be "taught" or lectured by anyone.¹¹⁵⁴ Wolpe and his team were viewed as being allied with the old regime and with the parties to the Arusha Agreement, not with this new generation of leaders. Even if many of these leaders had participated in the BLTP workshops during Burundi's transitional period, they were not nearly as open to participating in them now.¹¹⁵⁵

Although the BLTP took immediate action to respond to the opportunity presented by the election of the new government in August 2005, by organizing a workshop with this government, it did not easily adjust to the new peacebuilding climate. The BLTP took systematic actions to achieve its aims of reconciling Burundi's leadership class, but it did not take significant actions. It continued its previous approach, using its previous means, hoping that they would continue to breed the desired outcomes.

In 2006, the BLTP began to enter a more stagnant phase in relation to the Burundian peace process. The new government felt that it should co-opt much of the previous work

1152 BLTP, "Burundi: A New Government Gets Down to Work | Wilson Center", October 18, 2005, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/burundi-new-government-gets-down-to-work> (accessed November 26, 2011).

1153 Ibid.; BLTP Staff Member (B9), interview.

1154 Observer (O6), Bujumbura, December 8, 2008.

1155 Ibid.

that had been done by NGOs, and was not open to non-financial support.¹¹⁵⁶ The government itself began to stagnate. Fierce battles raged in Parliament. Good communication and cooperation were again in short supply. The political situation significantly decreased the BLTP's opportunities to work with Burundi's leadership. During Burundi's transitional period, the BLTP had been made up of the right people, with the right approach, at the right time. Granted, getting all of the participants to the table took an enormous amount of footwork by the BLTP team, but they showed up.¹¹⁵⁷ In this new phase in Burundi's transition, it was not clear that the BLTP had the right aims, timing, or people to make this happen, or that it was even possible in the current political context.

Several observers viewed the BLTP approach as a short-term effort, not one that could be consistently applied for many years: "These projects can be selectively very useful contributions, but you have to get your aims, your timing, and your counterparts right, and you have to be patient and engage over several years."¹¹⁵⁸ Others argued that it was precisely BLTP-type of dialogue and open communication that was most needed in the post-election phase, to ensure that the gains in the peace process were not lost.¹¹⁵⁹ But the BLTP's experience in 2006 and 2007 showed that either there was no willingness among the country's top leadership for this type of approach, or the BLTP team was no longer the right team to do it.

In this increasingly unripe context, the BLTP continued to implement its projects with the newly-integrated Burundian army and initiated a new project with the newly-formed Burundian National Police. It organized a largely unsuccessful training with the

1156 BLTP Staff Member (B10), November 16, 2011.

1157 *Ibid.*

1158 Observer (O7), by telephone, interview.

1159 BLTP Staff Member (B11), December 8, 2008; Military BLTP Participant (B2), Bujumbura, interview;

Military BLTP Participant (B3), Bujumbura, interview.

new Parliament in 2006 and continued to knock at the door of the Presidency.¹¹⁶⁰ In all of these initiatives, the BLTP took systematic actions to improve its capacity to achieve the desired outcomes. Nonetheless, its programming was unable to influence the overall peacebuilding trajectory in Burundi – and the leaders that the high-level leaders that the BLTP had aimed to influence. Its work with the police and military was certainly relevant to the evolving peacebuilding trajectory, and incorporated analysis and understanding of that context, but was also stymied by the lack of political progress and infighting.¹¹⁶¹

In 2006 and most of 2007, the inability of the BLTP to achieve the degree of success that it had achieved during Burundi's transitional period forced an informal organizational change process. The organization was no longer an international NGO – zipping in and out of Bujumbura to run trainings – but had been transformed into a hybrid organization: a national NGO who always implemented projects in collaboration with international NGOs or IOs.¹¹⁶² Because this organization was now concerned with its own sustainability in Burundi, and sustainable work and salaries for its staff, it was forced to reconsider both its aims and its means.¹¹⁶³ It looked for new partners other than Wolpe's Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars (WIICS), began to initiate projects that addressed other levels of leadership – community leaders, women, etc... - and tried to diversify its training.¹¹⁶⁴

In late 2007, the BLTP managed once again to convene a group of key leaders for a three-day workshop to help break a deadlock in Parliament.¹¹⁶⁵ It also began to collaborate on a new initiative that had more sustainable interactions with top-level

1160 Tina Robiolle and Steve McDonald, "The Burundi Leadership Training Program | Wilson Center", n.d., <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/the-burundi-leadership-training-program> (accessed November 25, 2011).

1161 BLTP staff member (B4), interview.

1162 This transition began in 2004, when the BLTP received the NGO status in Burundi, but it took a few years for the BLTP to operate more or less independently from WWICS.

1163 BLTP Staff Member (B10), interview.

1164 BLTP Staff Member (B12), June 25, 2009.

1165 BLTP, *Nouvelles du BLTP*, Newsletter (Bujumbura: Burundi Leadership Training Program, September 2007).

leadership and engaged them in an open process of dialogue: BINUB's Cadre de Dialogue process. As the lead facilitator for the dialogue among political parties, Fabien Nsengimana built on the BLTP's previous work with Burundi's political parties and Liz McClintock came in to help BINUB design the Cadre de Dialogue's methodology, which was related to but less prescriptive than the BLTP's original methodology. Through this work, the BLTP also strengthened its partnership with the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, with whom it had collaborated on the earlier parliamentary workshop.¹¹⁶⁶ The BLTP also began to branch out through other partnerships with international NGOs, including Dutch Cordaid to train formal leaders at the grassroots, building on the approach developed by the CBLP.¹¹⁶⁷ It collaborated, once again, with WWICS on a new project with the Ministry of Education to offer conflict resolution training to youth in schools.¹¹⁶⁸

In its resurgence, the BLTP maintained its focus on leadership and "Getting to Yes" methods, but began to significantly broaden its definition of a leader and its purpose of working with leaders. The BLTP's new approach and the weight that its actions carried were a few steps removed from its original vision and prominence during the transitional period. The BLTP was designed specifically for Burundi's transitional phase, and still seems to have been most relevant to that period.

In all honesty this is not about leadership training. This is about breaking down barriers between people so that they are able to address their problems jointly. It is interest-based negotiations. It is making people understand that they are not going to progress if they don't get along. That is an element of leadership. Our objective wasn't the training of leaders. It was taking leaders who are in this position via history and

1166 NIMD, "Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy | Burundi dialogue proceeding carefully", December 16, 2008, <http://nimd.org/news/896/burundi-dialogue-proceeding-carefully> (accessed November 28, 2011).

1167 Cordaid, "Cordaid - Burundi women preparing for village councils", n.d., <http://www.cordaid.nl/nl/Projects/Burundi-women-preparing-for-village-councils.html> (accessed November 27, 2011).

1168 Robiollie and McDonald, "The Burundi Leadership Training Program | Wilson Center."

making them better able to work together. Or else, the country doesn't progress.¹¹⁶⁹

In 2007 and 2008, the BLTP was clearly morphing into a different type of organization with an altered goal and some altered means. It became a specialized Burundian conflict resolution, leadership training, facilitation organization that collaborated with international NGOs in most of its activities. To maintain its budget, it had to be much more opportunistic in relation to funding opportunities and had less leverage and funding to be opportunistic in relation to the evolving peacebuilding process. That said, through its partnerships, it remained an important player in ongoing dialogue efforts, however fruitless, with Burundi's top leaders.

Following this vein, the BLTP made significant and systematic efforts to conduct workshops with the FNL and the CNDD-FDD in 2009 after the FNL began integrating into the government and the military. In spite of getting the FNL to the table, the CNDD-FDD refused to fully engage in the dialogue.¹¹⁷⁰ Likewise, after the sour turn of the 2010 election cycle, the BLTP met repeatedly with key political actors to try and find a solution to the standoff between the opposition and the CNDD-FDD, to no success.¹¹⁷¹ The Cadre de Dialogue project had transformed into a Permanent Forum for Political Parties.¹¹⁷² The BLTP worked hard, in collaboration with its Dutch partner, to sustain this forum. But, the number of participants gradually declined and the fora became useless without the involvement of key political players.¹¹⁷³

Unlike in 2006, when the BLTP's efforts at facilitating dialogue among Burundi's top-level leadership did not pan out, the organization did not stagnate. It cut its losses,

1169 BLTP Staff Member (B9), interview.

1170 *Ibid.*

1171 *Ibid.*

1172 NIMD, "Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy | Political Parties in Burundi sign agreement," Netherlands Institutue for Multiparty Democracy, n.d., <http://www.nimd.org/news/1788/political-parties-in-burundi-sign-agreement> (accessed November 28, 2011).

1173 *Ibid.*

abandoned fruitless efforts, and increased its work on two new projects – a Community-Based Democracy project, in collaboration with NIMD, and a women’s leadership project, in collaboration with Cordaid.¹¹⁷⁴ The BLTP had taken systematic and significant action to align its peacebuilding aims and outcomes with the evolving Burundian context, in large part by altering these aims and realizing when its efforts were fruitless.

9.3.1 THE CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY OF CHANGE

What explains the BLTP’s stagnation soon after the August 2005 elections and its resurgence in 2008 and 2009? Can it simply be explained by changes in the context, or were there changes in the way that the BLTP interacted with the context that mattered? What happens to an organization that is custom-designed for a particular context when that context changes?

Soon after the August 2005 elections, the weaknesses of the BLTP’s approach began to show. The BLTP had trained 95 leaders at its initial three Ngozi workshops, but had been unable to follow up with many of these people and the network that it created to bring them together was largely ineffective.¹¹⁷⁵ “We have trained people, but we have not succeeded in following them to see how they have applied it.”¹¹⁷⁶

The initial Ngozi workshops did lead to arguably the BLTP’s most successful peacebuilding interventions – those that supported the peaceful integration of former rebel groups and the Burundian Army into a new force – the FDN. That said, the BLTP’s support for the FDN could only go so far. Once it had helped willing individuals to change their own outlook, it could of course not control what individuals did with this

1174 BLTP, Note sur l’Ecole de la Democratie (Bujumbura, Burundi: Burundi Leadership Training Program, November 2011); BLTP, Note sur le Projet “Renforcement du Leadership Feminin” (Bujumbura, Burundi: Burun, November 2011).

1175 BLTP Staff Member (B12), interview.

1176 Ibid.

training. It could also not guarantee that the military had the necessary funding to train and reinforce the training of the entire FDN.¹¹⁷⁷

The BLTP intervened at the individual level. It supported individual change. When several individuals within one organization were trained, this could begin to create a critical mass that could reinforce this behavior.¹¹⁷⁸ The BLTP trained a cadre of trainers in the military to reinforce these skills, but this was only one input that influenced the FDN's functioning and behavior. The BLTP's impact would always be determined by what individuals and groups did with the skills and awareness that the BLTP "experience" gave them.¹¹⁷⁹ Over time and as new actors entered the scene who had not been through the BLTP training, the application of the BLTP techniques began to dissipate.¹¹⁸⁰ The BLTP was always willing to help out and provide further training, but the funding and capacity were not always available.¹¹⁸¹

BLTP staff and several participants argue that the BLTP approach needs to be reinforced and sustained over a long time.¹¹⁸² Change takes time.¹¹⁸³ And yet, the BLTP operates from project to project, grant to grant. This is an important manifestation of its external accountability. Even if the grants begin at an opportune time, they may not end at an opportune time.

Unlike Care Burundi, the BLTP does not continue to work with the same communities, or organizations, over a long period of time. They worked with the military for over three years, which was enabled by the military's relative institutional

¹¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷⁸ Uvin and Campbell, "The Burundi Leadership Training Program: A Prospective Assessment."

¹¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*; Military BLTP Participant (B2), Bujumbura, interview.

¹¹⁸⁰ Military BLTP Participant (B3), Bujumbura, interview; Military BLTP Participant (B2), Bujumbura, interview; BLTP Military Participant (B6), Bujumbura, interview.

¹¹⁸¹ BLTP Staff Member (B12), interview.

¹¹⁸² Military BLTP Participant (B2), Bujumbura, interview; Military BLTP Participant (B3), Bujumbura, interview; BLTP staff member (B4), interview; BLTP Military Participant (B5), Bujumbura, interview; BLTP Military Participant (B6), Bujumbura, interview; BLTP Staff Member (B7), interview; BLTP Staff Member (B9), interview; BLTP Staff Member (B10), interview.

¹¹⁸³ BLTP Staff Member (B12), interview.

stability.¹¹⁸⁴ But, in several other cases the Burundian institutions were in such flux that it was not possible for the BLTP to work with them sustainably over more than a year.¹¹⁸⁵ That said, it is unclear that the BLTP has the capacity necessary to continue working with the same organizations. Once people are trained in the BLTP methodology, they do not simply need more training in the methodology but need to be able to apply the methods and create new relationships and institutions with these methods. Plus, in a rapidly changing context, the same target groups may not be relevant to the peacebuilding context, or BLTP's aims, over a long period of time.

With the BLTP's shift over to a national organization that collaborated with international NGOs and donors, its capacity to get out in front of donor demand shifted. The BLTP could no longer set the agenda as easily as it could when Howard Wolpe was its front man. It maintained high levels of discussion with beneficiaries, but did not consult as widely within the international community or with donors. It began to be viewed more as a service-provider to international NGOs, donors, and IOs. Thus, while it maintained its same values on the accountability routines variable – external/significant and representative beneficiary dialogue – the balance between the two began to shift and it became more reliant on the agendas of its external collaborators and partners. That said, it developed highly collaborative and learning relationships with these collaborators – systematically acting to align to improve their projects and continuously attempting to work with key leaders in Burundi's peacebuilding process, whether successfully or not.¹¹⁸⁶

The context and political players in Burundi had changed, and the BLTP was not as central to the peacebuilding process as it once had been. It eventually recognized and

1184 BLTP staff member (B4), interview.

1185 Ibid.

1186 BLTP Staff Member (B10), interview.

changed its approach, but the context continued to be a challenging one for the BLTP. That said, in such a challenging context where political space was being reduced and many of the gains of the peace process were being lost, the continued work of the BLTP may be even more important. As with many of the peacebuilding interventions before the signature of the Arusha Agreement in 2001, these efforts may help to plant seeds and give hope in increasingly depressing times. If the BLTP were only an international NGO, it may have already stopped its work in Burundi. Instead, as a national NGO that collaborates with international NGOs, it provides a rare vehicle through which international actors can work on peacebuilding in Burundi.

The BLTP has maintained its approach to non-defensive and valid learning behavior during this period, although it did not benefit from the same degree of external evaluation as it did during its first few years of existence. As a result, the organization primarily engages in learning about how to improve its individual projects, but does not get a great deal of feedback about how it may need to alter its overall approach, aims, or means.

The self-evaluation is fine, but sometimes you have your own blinders on so that you don't see that it's not working. Sometimes you don't interpret the information correctly and you don't see what you need to see. That's why having an external evaluator is very important.¹¹⁸⁷

The BLTP has maintained its peacebuilding organizational frame and knowledge-laden routines, although it has widened the frame to include other opportunities that focus on grassroots leadership, women, and youth. It continues to try and work with highest-level leadership, but the current political context and how these actors view the BLTP have made this very difficult. The current leadership sees the BLTP as having been something for Burundi's old leadership, not for its current crop.¹¹⁸⁸ The BLTP has

1187 BLTP staff member (B4), interview.

1188 *Ibid.*

widened its skill base a bit, but still remains circumscribed largely to the Harvard Negotiation Project's methodology, its own version of leadership development, and the dialogue approaches applied in the Cadre de Dialogue. While these techniques are broadly applicable, they are also limited. They focus on individual and inter-group change and do not include techniques to take this change to the next level – organizational, institutional, or cultural. Like all of the case studies analyzed here, the BLTP's knowledge-laden routines and frames are, on the one hand, their area of expertise and, on the other hand, inhibit them from making significant contributions to goals that reach beyond this expertise.

In spite of the obvious challenges that the BLTP has faced during this period, and in the current Burundian context, the organization came back from a post-2005 period of stagnation and reinvented itself as a relevant and highly skilled national NGO. It maintained a highly reflective approach to its own work and continuously attempted to influence Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. When its efforts were stymied, it changed course and applied its techniques to groups and individuals who were more receptive, all the while maintaining a perspective as to how these efforts could contribute to Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory.

If the BLTP had altered its composition to include more representatives from the CNDD-FDD camp, would it have been able to make a bigger impact on the peace process? There is no way of knowing. The CNDD-FDD did reluctantly engage in the Cadre de Dialogue sessions, and several CNDD-FDD spoke very highly of the BLTP's approach, but the ruling party maintained very little openness to dialogue efforts. Wolpe, up until his death in October 2011, maintained close contact with Pierre Nkurunziza and continued to discuss options to increase dialogue within his government and between his

government and the opposition.¹¹⁸⁹ Nsengimana did the same through his contacts. Given their continued dialogue with Burundi's leadership, it is unclear to what extent a change in the BLTP's leadership would have made a difference. The context may simply require less direct dialogue and peacebuilding efforts.

Would more flexible peacebuilding funding have made a difference for the BLTP's approach during this period? Highly flexible funding that was not constrained to one project would certainly have given the organization more freedom to pursue exactly the type of projects it wanted to do. It may have even led to a greater impact of its interventions during this period. It certainly would have taken some pressure off of the BLTP team to develop new partnerships, but this would have also reduced the capacity of the organization to improve its capacity and knowledge through these partnerships. That said, with enough money it could have brought in additional actors and partners who would have also increased its capacity.

The grants that the BLTP did receive were not completely inflexible. The BLTP was able to work with its partners to alter the timeframe, discontinue failing projects, and adapt its approach to changing circumstances.¹¹⁹⁰ For NGO project funding, this may be as flexible as donor funding gets. The BLTP and its partners were very adept at managing donor expectations and getting as much flexibility as possible from their regulations, and were therefore largely not stymied by restrictions on how the money could or could not be used in relation to a particular project. In sum, the BLTP's highly adaptive approach that was firmly grounded in Burundi's peacebuilding context combined with its excellent reputation to enable it to systematically act to align in relation to critical junctures in the peacebuilding process and in relation to its ongoing

1189 BLTP Staff Member (B10), interview.

1190 Ibid.

projects and to work within donor constraints to ensure some flexibility in all of its projects.

9.4 Conclusion

The BLTP case falsifies the ideal-type theory presented in Chapter 2. The BLTP has significant dialogue with a representative group of stakeholders, defensive and valid learning behavior, and a high degree of peacebuilding knowledge and focus. Even with these characteristics, it is unable to recognize that its overall approach and aims are no longer appropriate for the new phase in Burundi's peacebuilding process ushered in by the 2005 elections (See Figure 9-2). But, after internal soul searching, the BLTP decides to diversify its programming and approach and gets back on track with the new reality in Burundi.

Even though it veered off course in 2005, the BLTP is still case study organization that maintained the highest degree of relevance with Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory at the same time that it was able to continually act to align its ongoing projects with the relevant context. The BLTP did not have strict measures of success and failure, but had a clear vision of the factors that would contribute to peace in Burundi, a highly knowledgeable and locally-grounded team, and a pattern of consultation, reflection, and learning. In fact, team members argue that if the BLTP had been more focused on monitoring immediate results, they may have been less successful. If we are too results oriented "we don't give situations like this time to play out. The secret of our success, if we have any, is the patience to allow the process to play itself out. It does not happen quickly. People only change over time."¹¹⁹¹

¹¹⁹¹ Ibid.

Figure 9-2: 2X2 of the BLTP's Values on Dependent Variable

Systematic and Significant Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means with a
New Trend in the Peacebuilding Trajectory

		NO	YES
Systematic Actions to Align Peacebuilding Programming with the Relevant Context	NO		
	YES	BLTP IV	BLTP II BLTP III BLTP V BLTP VI

What does the BLTP's experience tell us about the relationship between actions to align peacebuilding aims and outcomes, and actual alignment, or achievement of outcomes? It shows that continuous adaptation at the programmatic level will not always lead to alignment with the country's peacebuilding trajectory. In many cases, the organization simply cannot adapt its capacity or its aims to the degree that might be necessary to achieve its aims after a big shift in the peacebuilding trajectory, or to help transfer its successes to the next level of impact (i.e., from individual to interpersonal, to

organizational, to institutional, to cultural). The organization may no longer have the right people, the right skills, or the right aims for the new phase, nor may it have the resources or will to alter all of these factors to better align with the context. That said, the BTLTP shows that even in an environment that does not seem conducive to peacebuilding, there is important work that can be done. If an organization is willing to significantly alter its aims and approach, it will most likely be able to sustain its relevance to the peacebuilding trajectory.

The BLTP paints a complex picture of the relationship between actions to align aims and outcomes and the achievement of those outcomes. On the one hand, if an organization continues to act to align to achieve its theory of change but does not question whether the theory of change fits the context, action to align is not likely to have a significant relationship with alignment. This is why the action to align variable talks about both systematic and significant actions. Significant equates with a willingness to alter both the organization's aims and means, and hopefully in so doing question its theory of change. On the other hand, the degree to which an organization can adapt its aims and means is, by definition, limited. An organization has its goal, its skill set, its staff, and its procedures. These things define the organization. Changing them often equates with creating a new organization.

Most organizations are only able to alter their aims, means, and accompanying procedures to a limited extent. As a result, in a dynamic and continuously changing context, their relevance to the peacebuilding trajectory is inevitably limited. Organizations cannot change as quickly as the peacebuilding context changes. Granted, an organization can maintain its relevance to the context by deciding not to work directly on peacebuilding, as the BLTP did, but to branch out to other areas of work that are less time sensitive: conflict resolution training, community development, women's empowerment, reconstruction of physical infrastructure, etc.... But, this shift also reduces

its relevance to the overall peacebuilding trajectory, alters its organizational frames, and makes it much more difficult for the organization to maintain its relevance to the overall peacebuilding trajectory.

When the context for peacebuilding in the country is improving, this continued relevance to the peacebuilding trajectory may seem unimportant. But, when the situation begins to deteriorate, as was the case in Burundi, it becomes very important because it begins to impact peacebuilding and non-peacebuilding programming. Development without political or economic freedom, and with high degrees of corruption, is unlikely to succeed. Community empowerment without good governance seems futile. Conflict resolution training in the face of increasing mistrust and violence is an uphill battle.

A high degree of adaptation in a context that is not conducive to peacebuilding is likely to lead the organization to work in areas other than peacebuilding and greatly reduce its capacity to effectively influence the country's peacebuilding trajectory. The corollary to this is that there are likely to be many fewer organizations working on peacebuilding when there is not a general openness for this type of work. This is not because there is not the demand, but because organizations doing peacebuilding cannot survive in such an environment where their attempts to achieve peacebuilding outcomes are continuously stymied. As a result, they are either likely to exit or to focus on other areas of work that do not directly address the country's peacebuilding trajectory.

Organizational Data Point	Accountability Routines	Knowledge-laden Routines & Organizational Frames	Learning Behavior	Significant Organizational Change Process	Flexible Peacebuilding Funds	Entrepreneurial Leadership Committed to Peacebuilding	Action to Align in Relation to Peacebuilding Aims
BLTP I	No program	No program	No program	No program			No program
BLTP II	Upward/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	Predominant PB Frame/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non- defensive/ Valid	Yes	Yes	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
BLTP III	Upward/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	Predominant PB Frame/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non- defensive/ Valid	No	No	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
BLTP IV	Upward/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	Predominant PB Frame/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non- defensive/ Valid	No	No	Yes	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
BLTP V	Upward/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	Predominant PB Frame/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non- defensive/ Valid	Yes	No	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
BLTP VI	Upward/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	Predominant PB Frame/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non- defensive/ Valid	No	No	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context

10 CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Many people make the mistake of confusing information with knowledge. They are not the same thing. Knowledge involves the interpretation of information. Knowledge involves listening.¹¹⁹²

10.1 Introduction

The causes of success and failure of international peacebuilding are poorly understood. “Peacebuilding is tremendously complex and prone to unanticipated consequences.”¹¹⁹³ Both scholars and practitioners of peacebuilding face an “immense task” of trying to untangle this complexity.¹¹⁹⁴ Most scholarly work on international peacebuilding has focused on several areas: the normative assumptions inherent in liberal peacebuilding, overall strategies and frameworks that guide peacebuilding, effectiveness of specific types of peacebuilding approaches, role of international coordination and coherence in peacebuilding effectiveness, sequencing of different types of peacebuilding, resonance of peacebuilding with national institutions, effect of peacekeeping on civil war recurrence, and concepts of peacebuilding success.¹¹⁹⁵ Very

¹¹⁹² Henning Mankell, “The Art of Listening,” *The New York Times* (New York, December 10, 2011), sec. Opinion, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/opinion/sunday/in-africa-the-art-of-listening.html?src=me&ref=general> (accessed December 12, 2011).

¹¹⁹³ Roland Paris, “Alternatives to Liberal Peace?,” in *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding* (London: Zed Books, 2011), 170.

¹¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁹⁵ Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Virginia Page Fortna, “Peacekeeping and Democratization,” *From War to Democracy* (2008); Virginia Page Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace and Civil War,” *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2004): 269–292; Susan Woodward, “Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using Knowledge to Improve Peacebuilding Interventions,” *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 1, no. 2 (2007): 143–170; Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond, *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009); Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam, eds., *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding* (London: Zed Books, 2011); Peter Uvin, *Life After Violence: A People’s Story of Burundi* (London: Zed Books, 2009); Michael Barnett, “Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War,” *International Security* 30, no. 4 (2006): 87–112; Roland Paris, “At War’s End: Building Peace After

few scholars have studied the actual peacebuilding institutions: how they function, how they interact with the context, and why they achieve or fail to achieve their desired aims. The studies that exist point to pathologies that are assumed to be inherent in international peacebuilding but do not examine their actual occurrence in different types of organizations or examine their relationship to peacebuilding success.¹¹⁹⁶ This dissertation has aimed to help fill this significant gap in the literature.

In this dissertation, I have asked if the different types of organizations that do international peacebuilding have characteristics that make them more or less likely to achieve their aims in a conflict-torn country. Specifically, I have studied the characteristics that influence the capacity of these organizations to keep up with the fast-paced institutional change in the national institutions that peacebuilders aim to influence.

Civil Conflict" (2004); Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (Hoboken: Routledge, 2009); Roland Paris, "International peacebuilding and the 'mission civilisatrice,'" *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 637–656 (2002); Roland Paris, "Peacekeeping and the constraints of global culture," *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 3 (2003): 441–473; Michael Barnett and Christoph Zuercher, "The Peacebuilders Contract: How External State-building Reinforces Weak Statehood," *Research Partnership on Postwar Statebuilding* (2007); Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, "Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies," *International Studies Perspectives* 9 (2008): 1–21; Cedric de Coning, "Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions: A Norwegian Perspective," *Security in Practice* 5 (2007); Laurent Goetschel and Tobias Hagmann, "Civilian Peacebuilding: Peace by Bureaucratic Means?," *Conflict, Security and Development* 9, no. 1 (2009): 55–73; Richard Gowan, *International peace operations: trends and challenges*, 2007; Alex de Waal, "Mission without End? Peacekeeping in the African Political Marketplace," *International Affairs* 85, no. 1 (2009): 99–113; Gemma Collantes Celador, "Police Reform: Peacebuilding Through 'Democratic Policing?'," *International Peacekeeping* 12:3 (2005): 364–376; Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, "The quest for viable peace □: international intervention and strategies for conflict transformation" (2005): xx, 302; Larissa A Fast and Reina C. Neufeldt, "Envisioning Success: Building Blocks for Strategic and Comprehensive Peacebuilding Impact Evaluation," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 2, no. 2 (2005): 24–41; William J. Durch, *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace and the Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006); John Paul Lederach, "Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies" (1997).

¹¹⁹⁶ Dan Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together* (Brattvaag: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004); Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations," *International Organization* 53, no. 4 (1999); Barnett et al., "Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?"; Barnett and Finnemore, "Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics"; Severine Autesserre, "Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention," *International Organization* 63 (2009): 249–280; Howard, "UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars."

The primary area of consensus in the scholarly peacebuilding literature is that peacebuilding must be context-specific. Peacebuilding hopes to change the way that national institutions function, thereby reducing the avenues for violence and increasing the possibilities for the peaceful management of conflict. Whether “peace” is sustained depends on whether national institutions and individuals in the war-torn country are able and willing to sustain it. As a result, the literature argues, peacebuilding interventions should be designed to address the specific capacities in a war-torn country and the particular causes and manifestations of its war.¹¹⁹⁷ As the national actors, issues, and dynamics change, so too should the organization that aims to influence them.¹¹⁹⁸ The organizational and institutional literature indicates that this type of adaptation and learning are difficult for all organizations.¹¹⁹⁹ It also suggests that they are likely to be particularly difficult for international peacebuilders. The incentive structure of international institutions engaged in peacebuilding discourages direct accountability to the context, instead focusing on upward accountability to donors, politicians, and other constituents outside of the war-torn country.¹²⁰⁰

This dissertation has asked whether the international organizations (IO), international non-governmental organizations (INGO), and donor aid agencies doing

¹¹⁹⁷ International Alert, Saferworld, and FEWER, *Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack*; Campbell, “When Process Matters: The Potential Implications of Organizational Learning for Peacebuilding Success”; PBPS, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines,” *Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Secretariat* (2008): 53.

¹¹⁹⁸ International Alert, Saferworld, and FEWER, *Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack*; Campbell, “When Process Matters: The Potential Implications of Organizational Learning for Peacebuilding Success”; PBPS, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines.”

¹¹⁹⁹ Barbara Levitt and James G. March, “Organizational Learning,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 14 (1988): 319–340; James G. March, “The Pursuit of Organizational Intelligence” (1999); Chris Argyris, *On Organizational Learning* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1992); Ariane Berthoin Antal, Uwe Lenhardt, and Rolf Rosenbrock, “Barriers to Organizational Learning,” in *Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge*, ed. Meinolf Dierkes et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

¹²⁰⁰ Gibson et al., *The Samaritan’s Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid*.

peacebuilding are able to adapt to big changes in a country's war-to-peace transition and also how this influences their peacebuilding effectiveness. An organization's capacity to adapt its aims, approach, and programming to important changes in a country's war-to-peace trajectory would seem to be the threshold for influencing that trajectory.¹²⁰¹ I studied five different types of peacebuilding organizations operating in Burundi from 1999 to 2011 with the aim of generating a theory that could be generalizable to other similar organizations doing international peacebuilding work in other war-torn countries. After all, most organizations have a standard set of operating procedures, guidelines, and routines that influence their behavior in similar ways in each country where they work.

I found that most of the case studies had great difficulty keeping up with the big changes in Burundi's war-to-peace transition. The rate of change in Burundi's war-to-peace transition was too fast-paced for these slow-moving international bureaucracies. None of the five organizations studied was able to alter its aims and approach in response to the six big new trends in Burundi's peacebuilding process. The one organization that came closest was the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) – a small conflict-resolution INGO that was designed and built specifically to address the challenges faced during Burundi's transitional phase (2001–2005). The other four organizations moved in and out of alignment with Burundi's peacebuilding context, often unaware of whether they were making progress toward their own peacebuilding aims.

All of the case study organizations hoped to contribute to peace in Burundi, but few were able to articulate exactly how they would do this or measure whether they had achieved their goals. Assessing their contribution to such a vague and undefined concept

¹²⁰¹ I would like to thank Diana Chigas for her assistance with this framing of the issue.

as “peace” was overwhelming for most staff. Most seemingly feasible aims seemed sorely inadequate given their hopes of establishing and consolidating peace in Burundi within a few years. This helped to reinforce a general culture in the international community in Burundi where organizations assumed that they were making a contribution to the determinants of peace, but rarely understood exactly what their contribution was. Their failure to articulate the path to their peacebuilding aims was an important barrier to the achievement of these aims. It encouraged most of the case study organizations to continue to implement their strategies and programs as planned much of the time without taking into account big or small changes in the Burundian institutions that they aimed to influence.

But there are many surprising findings from this research. Most surprising, perhaps, is the fact that in spite of the significant conceptual and organizational barriers, not to mention the difficulty of the task, all of the case study organizations made big attempts to achieve their peacebuilding aims at one point or another. In these instances, the case study organizations took significant and systematic actions to reduce the gap between their aims and outcomes in relation to big changes in Burundi’s peacebuilding trajectory.

When the cases took significant and systematic actions to align their peacebuilding aims and outcomes at both the strategic and programming levels, they had several common characteristics. They were committed to peacebuilding. They saw it as the most important thing that they were doing and focused a lot of their resources on doing it. The case study organizations’ leadership, at these points in time, was also committed to peacebuilding. These leaders were willing to support often risky and innovative programming and cajole the organization into enabling it. The staff who were implementing these peacebuilding activities often worked in teams that combined a deep understanding of the particular Burundian institutions with knowledge of how to design and implement good peacebuilding programming. In most of these cases, these teams

tried to obtain regularly valid information about their contribution to their aims and discussed this information openly and without defensiveness. In these discussions, they worked on learning how they could improve their programming based on this information.

The one case study that maintained this degree of alignment with Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory during four separate phases, the BLTP, also engaged in regular discussions with a wide range of individuals and groups who had a stake in the outcome of its projects (i.e., stakeholders). In addition, when it got off course, it benefitted from organizational change processes that enabled it to realign with the new context and reduce the gap between its peacebuilding aims and its impact on Burundi's peacebuilding context.

When the case study organizations were able to align their aims, approach, and programming with new trends in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory, they were also more likely to be successful at achieving their peacebuilding aims or at least making an important contribution to them. The organizations' rates of demonstrable peacebuilding success were higher in these instances than they were in the instances when the organizations were unresponsive to new dynamics, actors, and issues. But because most organizations did not systematically monitor their peacebuilding outcomes, it is not possible to determine exactly what happened in the cases where there are insufficient data. That said, if an organization does not have any feedback on the effectiveness of its peacebuilding programming, staff will not be incentivized or supported to continuously improve this type of programming.

The findings from this dissertation present a new way of looking at peacebuilding and the capacity of international IOs, INGOs, and government aid agencies to do it effectively. Without consideration for the particular context in which an organization works, one cannot judge the probability of whether an organization will be effective at

peacebuilding. It is the fit between the organization and the particular phase in a country's war-to-peace transition that matters. For most organizations, this fit will be difficult to maintain as trends in the country change. As a result, most organizations may be able to do effective peacebuilding only for a short amount of time. The requirements of peacebuilding change so quickly over a short period of time that, in most cases, one external organization will not have the variety of skills or national connections necessary for it to maintain its relevance to the peacebuilding context throughout several big shifts in a country's war-to-peace transition.

The findings from this dissertation make an important contribution to the literature on peacebuilding effectiveness as well as efforts to improve peacebuilding practice. The theory built in this dissertation provides a framework for understanding the organizational characteristics shared by all international peacebuilding institutions and how these shape their likely behavior in different conflict environments. Nonetheless, for this theory to be fully generalizable, it will need to be tested in other countries and with other organizations. Interviews that I conducted with headquarters staff and evaluations of the case study organizations' work in other countries confirmed that many of the factors that influence the organizations' behavior in Burundi also influence their behavior in other countries where they do peacebuilding work. But only further study into the interaction of additional peacebuilding organizations with other war-to-peace transitions will provide robust evidence of the generalizability of this theory.

The findings from this dissertation also have a potentially important contribution for the international relations literature concerned with the degree of agency possessed by IOs, INGOs, and donor aid agencies. To what degree are these organizations' outcomes at the country level explained by the efforts and decisions made by the field-based country office as opposed to the principals of these organizations? These findings

may also contribute to the broader debate on institutional change and organizational learning in the political science and sociological literature.

In the next section, I synthesize the case study findings and discuss how they test the original ideal-type theory that I outlined in Chapter 2. I then present a revised theory that I developed through the case studies. This is followed by a synthesis of the implications of this theory for different types of peacebuilding organizations and for peacebuilding effectiveness. Finally, I close this chapter by outlining several further areas of research that build on these findings.

10.2 Theory Testing

This dissertation aimed to build a theory that describes the way that different types of international peacebuilding institutions interact with countries emerging from war and violent conflict. To do this, I first developed an ideal-type theory describing the organizational characteristics that would enable these organizations to maintain their relevance to a country's war-to-peace transition. Then I tested this theory in Burundi over a thirteen-year period with five different types of international peacebuilding institutions. I presented my detailed organizational case studies in the previous five chapters. In this section, I synthesize the implications that the case studies have for the ideal-type theory.

10.2.1 RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH DESIGN AND IDEAL-TYPE THEORY

This dissertation set out to understand why some peacebuilding activities work and some do not. Based on my work experience for the UN in Burundi, evaluation of other peacebuilding activities, and study of the peacebuilding literature, I knew that success and failure could not be explained by the conflict context alone. The way that intervening organizations interacted with a conflict context also had to play a role.

To differentiate between the contribution of the intervening organization and that of the conflict context, I had to control for the context and isolate the actions of the intervening organization. To control for the context, I decided to study several different organizations in one country: Burundi. The methods chapter (Chapter 3) explains the logic for the selection of both the organizations and the country.

To focus on the contribution of the intervening organization to peacebuilding success, I decided to study the type and intensity of actions that an organization took in response to the context and to try to understand what organizational factors contributed to these actions. Then, within the constraints of the data that I could obtain on peacebuilding success, I analyzed the relationship between these actions and instances of successful peacebuilding. Successful peacebuilding is defined here as a contribution to a key event or trend in a country's peacebuilding process and/or the achievement of an organization's peacebuilding objective (see Chapter 3 for a further explanation).

After a review of the literature on organizational adaptation and learning, international aid, and peacebuilding, I developed an ideal-type theory. The theory answers this question: If an organization were to be able to systematically act to correct misalignment between its peacebuilding aims and outcomes, what characteristics would it have? The theory is this: *Three organizational characteristics are necessary and jointly sufficient for an organization to take significant and systematic action to reduce the gap between its peacebuilding aims and outcomes:*

- 1) *Downward Accountability Routines* (versus upward accountability routines) – Downward accountability routines and corresponding incentive mechanisms reward staff for systematically detecting and correcting significant gaps between peacebuilding aims and outcomes;
- 2) *Integrated Peacebuilding Knowledge-laden Routines and Frames* (versus non-peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines and frames) – The organization's core knowledge-laden routines and conceptual frames combine political/conflict resolution and humanitarian/development knowledge; and
- 3) *Non-defensive and Valid Learning Behavior* (versus defensive learning behavior) – The organization's staff systematically seek valid information about the

relationship between peacebuilding aims and outcomes and process information in non-defensive way.

Ideally, downward accountability routines would encourage staff to act on information about their interaction with the context; integrated peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines and frames would give them the skill and focus necessary to react in a way that would reduce the gap between their aims and outcomes; and non-defensive and valid learning behavior would encourage staff to gather information about their interaction with the context and come up with creative solutions to increase the alignment between their aims and outcomes.

10.2.2 TESTING THE IDEAL-TYPE THEORY

None of the case studies examined in this dissertation maintained their relevance to Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory over the entire thirteen-year period under study. The BLTP case, which was the only case with positive values on each of the original independent variables, therefore falsified the ideal-type theory. The other four cases tested four other potential combinations of the variables, providing a basis for counterfactual analysis. Some organizations in the case studies took significant and systematic actions to align with a new trend in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory but were unable to sustain this alignment once project implementation began. Other organizations were unable to align with the overall trajectory but took significant actions at the project level to adjust the design and approach to the particular context. Most organizations were a mix of the two.

The organizational frame and leadership in each case study seemed to play the most significant role in determining an organization's response to Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. They determined what the organizations thought was important and, therefore, what they responded to. Feedback from beneficiaries and other stakeholders,

open learning behavior, and relevant peacebuilding programming knowledge helped the organizations to adjust their programming once it was under way but did not ensure that the programming or overall approach were adjusted in response to big changes in Burundi's peacebuilding process. A peacebuilding organizational frame and entrepreneurial leadership were necessary for this adjustment. A significant organizational change process and flexible peacebuilding money could help an organization make this shift when its organizational frame and accountability routines indicated that it had an interest in doing so.

10.2.2.1 The Burundi Leadership Training Program


Only the BLTP came close to aligning with Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory over the thirteen-year period under study (see Figure 10-1). It took significant, systematic actions to align with four out of five of the new phases in Burundi's peacebuilding process. The BLTP was not operational in Burundi for the first phase. Once its projects were under way, the BLTP attempted to maintain their relevance to the evolving context by tweaking the way they were implemented and who was involved.

The BLTP case study was the only one that tested the ideal type theory. According to the initial assessment that I did for the case selection, it was the only case study that had positive values on each of the independent variables under study. It had downward accountability routines, political and conflict resolution knowledge-laden routines and frames, and non-defensive and valid learning behavior. The other four case studies had other values on each of these variables, which allowed me to do a counter-factual analysis of my theory (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed description of the criteria for case selection).

The BLTP case study shows that the independent variables in the ideal-type theory are insufficient for an organization to take significant and systematic action to reduce the

gap between its peacebuilding aims and outcomes. The BLTP also required a significant organizational change process to reorient its focus to the new environment ushered in by the 2005 elections. This organizational change process established the BLTP as a hybrid local-international organization. To survive in its new form, the BLTP decided to diversify the groups of people whom it trained and to integrate some new training techniques into its portfolio. Throughout the entire period, BLTP's leadership was entrepreneurial in its search for new opportunities and committed to contributing to peace in Burundi.

Figure 10-1: BLTP's actions to align aims, approaches, and programming with Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory




The other four case studies – the UN Missions, UN Development Program (UNDP), Department For International Development (DFID), and CARE – took significant actions to align with new trends in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory at least one time out of six. But none of these organizations was able to do this each time or maintain the relevance of its programming in between these critical junctures in Burundi's peacebuilding process.

10.2.2.2 UN Missions to Burundi: UNOB, ONUB, BINUB, and BNUB

The UN Missions, which included UNOB, ONUB, BINUB, and BNUB, took significant and systematic actions to align with Burundi’s peacebuilding trajectory five out of six times (see Figure 10-2). The Security Council and UN Secretariat worked together with the UN Missions in Burundi to monitor the peacebuilding trajectory closely. In anticipation of or response to critical junctures in this process, the mandate and resources of each consecutive UN Mission were adjusted. In five out of six cases, this adjustment reduced the gap between the particular UN Mission’s peacebuilding aims and perceived outcomes. In 2010, the adjustment actually reduced the capacity of the new UN Mission – BNUB – to fulfill its peacebuilding mandate.

Figure 10-2: UNOB’s, ONUB’s, BINUB’s, and BNUB’s actions to align aims, approaches, and programming with Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory



On the programming side, however, the UN Missions to Burundi did not fare so well. Four out of six times, once the aims and means of the mission were adjusted to a new trend, the programming became path-dependent and was unable to maintain its relevance to Burundi’s continually shifting dynamics. The two times when the UN Mission’s programming maintained its relevance to the evolving context – UNOB in 1999


and ONUB in 2005 – the mission’s entrepreneurial leadership and highly skilled staff saved the day, employing all of their resources to coerce the UN’s heavy bureaucracy into responding to Burundi’s changing context. Although the UN Missions did not have a culture of reflection on their interventions or significant dialogue with a representative group of stakeholders in their work, in both of these instances the mission’s predominant organizational frame was peacebuilding, and its staff knew how to implement the particular type of peacebuilding programming required. The fact that the organizations had defensive learning behavior, did not attempt to monitor their outcomes or impact, and were predominantly accountable to the UN Secretariat in New York and to the Burundian government did not seem to matter in these two instances.

10.2.2.3 UNDP

The UNDP) altered its aims and approach in response to three big changes in Burundi’s peacebuilding trajectory in 1999, 2005, and 2009 (see Figure 10-3). In each of these cases, UNDP had a predominantly peacebuilding frame. In the first instance, in response to the lifting of the 1999 regional embargo, UNDP began intense advocacy for the resumption of aid to Burundi on the grounds that it was necessary for the attainment of peace. This peacebuilding aim corresponded with UNDP’s accountability routines that prioritized fundraising by country offices. In the latter two cases, UNDP collaborated very closely with a UN Mission (i.e., ONUB and BINUB) in its response and was to some degree integrated within that mission. Its collaboration with ONUB and BINUB gave UNDP a clear peacebuilding frame and provided the leadership and money necessary to align its aim and approach with the new peacebuilding trend. For the other three critical junctures in Burundi’s peacebuilding trajectory, UNDP lacked an overall peacebuilding frame. It focused instead on development, its primary mandate.

At the programming level, UNDP did not systematically attempt to maintain the relevance of its peacebuilding projects with the context. There were several instances where UNDP projects were relevant to the context and did maintain this relevance – due to the skill of a few individuals – but these were by far the minority of cases. In the majority of projects across the entire thirteen-year period, UNDP’s projects were path-dependent. They set out on the trajectory prescribed in their plan and did not adjust their plan or approach in response to feedback from the context. UNDP’s lack of knowledge and training in peacebuilding, defensive learning behavior, leadership that was committed to development and not peacebuilding, and accountability routines that prioritized spending money over delivering impact all discouraged staff from interacting with Burundi’s changing context and left them ill-prepared to make a contribution to peacebuilding.

Figure 10-3: UNDP’s actions to align aims, approaches, and programming with Burundi’s peacebuilding trajectory



Even though UNDP had established a Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) in 2001, this office was not able to create changes in the way that UNDP operated at the country level. It was only able to respond to requests by country offices for support


with conflict analysis, program design, and strategy development. It was not able to help the country offices alter their skill sets and routines to ensure that its projects were relevant to the changes in their target institutions. UNDP's development frame and focus on raising and spending money largely prevented BCPR from mainstreaming conflict prevention and peacebuilding throughout UNDP's programs. BCPR staff report that the country offices that were most successful at peacebuilding or conflict prevention had leadership and donors who were committed to that approach.¹²⁰²

10.2.2.4 UK DFID

DFID's Burundi office was established in 2002, partly in response to the inauguration of the transitional government in November 2001. In this instance and in 2003, DFID took significant and systematic actions to align its overall aims and approach with critical junctures in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory (see Figure 10-4). After the new government was elected in 2005, DFID shifted its focus to development programming, even though the country was still engaged in a war with the FNL rebel group and the new government was inexperienced. Between 2005 and 2011, DFID did not attempt to align with Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. In fact, in 2010, it announced that it would withdraw its aid program from Burundi on the grounds that it had succeeded in helping to set the stage for trade cooperation.

¹²⁰² UNDP Staff Person (UP5), New York, March 1, 2010.

Figure 10-4: DFID’s actions to align aims, approaches, and programming with Burundi’s peacebuilding trajectory



At the programmatic level, DFID took systematic actions to maintain the relevance of its projects and programs between 2002 and 2005 but had abandoned these efforts by 2009. Between 2002 and 2004, DFID’s office in Burundi focused primarily on peacebuilding and was given a pot of flexible money to support this work. Once DFID’s development cooperation with Burundi began in 2005, it continued to engage in a few peacebuilding projects under the framework of governance and justice programming, although even these programs largely took a development approach and lacked tools to manage the poor state of Burundi’s governance and justice system. Nonetheless, staff attempted to maintain the relevance of these programs with the evolving peacebuilding context, at least until they abandoned this approach around 2009.


DFID was a trailblazer among donors in its efforts to improve aid to fragile and conflict-affected states. While these efforts made an impact on DFID aid to Burundi between 2002 and 2004, they made little difference once DFID shifted to a development frame in 2005. The fact that DFID Burundi did several conflict analyses, was led by someone who was very knowledgeable of the actors and issues in Burundi, and was supported by conflict advisors in London and Nairobi made little difference in DFID’s

approach to Burundi’s peacebuilding trajectory. For most of the period under study, DFID’s programming was not conflict-sensitive and did not have an explicit peacebuilding aim.

10.2.2.5 CARE Burundi

Before 2003, CARE Burundi was a normal humanitarian NGO plagued by corruption. After 2003, the new leadership and management of CARE Burundi transformed the organization into one of the most respected INGOs in Burundi and one of the most respected offices within CARE International. To do this, CARE’s new leadership began an intense organizational change process that changed the ethnic and gender makeup of its staff and developed a new program from the ground up, based on a real understanding of the needs and perspectives of Burundi’s rural poor. CARE Burundi made peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity a core component of this new program and was well positioned to benefit from the increased donor support for peacebuilding in the aftermath of Burundi’s 2005 elections.

Figure 10-5: CARE Burundi’s actions to align aims, approaches, and programming with Burundi’s peacebuilding trajectory



Despite CARE Burundi's systematic actions to maintain the relevance of its peacebuilding projects in their context, it largely failed to mainstream peacebuilding or conflict sensitivity throughout its other projects. After 2005, it did not adjust its aims or approach in response to Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. Its aim of helping all of its projects address a root cause of poverty – conflict and its causes – gradually faded to the background. It was simply not a priority for the leadership, donors, or staff, and the responsibility for mainstreaming this approach throughout all projects was relegated to the office's conflict advisor. The office was focused on women's empowerment and guided by a development frame that largely ignored the broader political context and the positive or negative impact that CARE's projects could have on it. CARE Burundi's very open and non-defensive learning behavior, investment in research and monitoring and evaluation, and presence of staff skilled in peacebuilding did not seem to make a difference. In 2010, the office again shifted its approach so that it could more effectively work with the Burundian government and engage in advocacy for women's and children's rights. Conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding were largely dropped from this new approach.

10.2.3 PATTERNS IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING IN BURUNDI

What do the five case studies tell us about the patterns within the broader organizational field of international actors doing peacebuilding in Burundi? Is there a common pattern in how these organizations responded to Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory? If organizations were responding to the context and its needs, one would assume so.

The five organizations did not follow similar patterns of interaction with Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory (see Figure 10-6). This is partly because each case was selected because it represented a common type of organization that engaged in peacebuilding.

The UN Missions are their own type that is only comparable to peace operations implemented by other IOs. UNDP represents a large IO that is mandated to do development but is also responsible for raising its funds from donor governments in country. It is not structurally comparable to any other organization, but is an important partner for donors and UN Missions. The BLTP is a small INGO using conflict resolution and dialogue techniques to support peacebuilding. It is generally in the same category as organizations such as International Alert, Search for Common Ground, and Accord. CARE is an international multi-mandate NGO and in the same category as Catholic Relief Services, Action Aid, Save the Children, and World Vision. DFID is a donor government development agency and in the same general category as the US Department for International Development (USAID), Swiss Development Cooperation, Belgian Development Cooperation, French Development Cooperation, Dutch Development Cooperation, German Development Cooperation, and the development arms of other OECD countries.


10.2.3.1 Patterns of interaction: the emergence of types of peacebuilding institutions

DFID focused on peacebuilding before 2005, but not afterward. Although DFID wanted to support peacebuilding programming, it was most committed to the Aid Effectiveness Agenda, which required that it align its programming with the government's development priorities as soon as possible. CARE and UNDP, both dependent on donor governments for most of their funding, started to focus on peacebuilding after 2005 when other donors increased their funding for this type of work. Then they steadily moved away from peacebuilding to focus on development, their core area of work. The BLTP was most aligned with Burundi's transition prior to the 2005 elections, when government was still open to "leadership training." In fact, the

BLTP is the only organization studied that did not take significant and systematic actions to align its aims and approach with the new trends triggered by the 2005 elections. It assumed that it was still on the right track. But the new government was not interested in the BLTP's support. After 2005, the BLTP struggled to find its relevance in the post-transition context and found a role in the integration of the Burundian National Defense Forces (FDN) and in providing support to the UN Mission's (BINUB's) peacebuilding efforts. It was no longer a powerful actor on its own, but could work with other actors to have more of an impact.

The critical turning point for all of these organizations seems to have been the 2005 elections, which brought a sovereign government into power and significantly changed the rules of the game for peacebuilding organizations. But each organization had different rules of the game. For the BLTP, as well as the other main international NGOs working on political dialogue and reconciliation in Burundi, there was much more funding from donors and openness within the government for their approach prior to the elections. Before the 2005 elections, donors had relied on INGOs such as Search for Common Ground, International Alert, and Africare to support small peacebuilding projects that they had hoped would help create a climate of reconciliation and dialogue in Burundi and contribute to the success of the formal Arusha process and the transitional government.

Figure 10-6: Comparison between case studies' response to new trends in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory



After the 2005 elections, other bigger international actors – such as the UN – made the transition to peacebuilding. They believed that now that the election had happened, Burundi could enter the post-conflict reconstruction phase and that their role was to help support this through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programming, support for justice and rule of law, support for security sector reform, conflict-sensitive development, and macro-economic reforms. Although many of these reforms were needed much earlier, the elections signaled to the UN, the World Bank, and some international donors that they could now support this type of programming because there was a legitimate government in place with which they could partner.

For many donors, the 2005 elections meant that they could now transition to development programming and stop giving money for peacebuilding and humanitarian programming to NGOs. DFID, USAID, the French Cooperation, the Belgian Cooperation, the Swiss Development Cooperation, the Norwegians, and the European Commission were among the donors who switched to development cooperation after the 2005

elections. In line with the Paris Principles and the overall Aid Effectiveness Agenda, these donors now believed that the Burundian government could and should be treated as a development partner. Most of these donors only had significant funds available for either humanitarian or development programming, and the elections signaled the shift to development programming.

The country was not more stable than before the elections. The government was certainly not stronger, as it was now staffed by a whole new generation of leadership who had no prior experience with government. Burundians were not poorer, except perhaps for the impact of rising inflation. But that did not matter for these donors. The issue was that there was now a legitimate government, in donors' eyes, and Burundi was no longer in a humanitarian or transitional phase. Therefore, it must be in a normal development phase. Other donors, such as the Swiss Political Department IV, the Dutch, and the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) had a more nuanced approach and continued to provide significant funding for peacebuilding programming after the elections.

The donors' shift to development programming was also spurred by demands from the Burundian government that they make the shift. The government argued that it had already built peace and now just needed to consolidate it. It made it clear to donors, the UN, and NGOs alike that it did not want to be trained, cajoled, or coerced into behaving one way or another. It was now in charge. Even if the government had not driven this message home, the international community would likely have responded similarly. The Burundian government's approach just highlighted the international community's powerlessness to make the Burundian government do anything that it did not wish to do.

Before the 2005 elections, donors could use the promise of renewed development cooperation to incentivize the transitional government to implement reforms or participate in negotiations. Once the elections had taken place, donors were eager to reward Burundians for their successful transitional phase and help ensure that Burundi

continued to be a success. But once they made a commitment to supporting Burundi in its post-election trajectory, they lost much of their leverage. Now they were dependent on the Burundian government to produce plans, develop policies, and approve their visas. Donors had tied their own success to their capacity to spend money in Burundi, not to reform institutions or build capacity. As a result, the Burundian government now held the keys to their success.


For the UN Missions, the situation was similar, although it had arguably less agency than the donor governments did. Immediately after it came into office, the new government expelled ONUB's Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Carolyn McAskie, and then her Deputy, Nureldin Satti, the acting SRSG. In 2009, it expelled BINUB's Executive Representative of the Secretary General (ERSG), Youssef Mahmoud. With these actions, the Burundian government reminded the UN that it was in Burundi at the permission of the government, which was also a member state of the UN and effectively one of its 162 bosses. As a result, the new UN Mission – BINUB – worked on post-conflict peacebuilding but kept a very low profile and made sure not to overtly challenge the government's authority. Its most effective peacebuilding projects were implemented jointly with government partners who developed the vision for the projects and were fully invested in their implementation.¹²⁰³

UNDP, on the other hand, neither had much agency before 2005 nor afterward. It was dependent on close cooperation with the government and sought to maintain and sustain those relationships. CARE Burundi led the way among international development NGOs in grassroots development work immediately following the 2005 elections. Other INGOs followed suit, steering clear of controversy with the government and trying to respond to the demands of the donors and, at times, the needs of Burundi's

¹²⁰³ Campbell, *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*.

rural population. But as the funding from donors shifted away from peacebuilding, their programming, too, shifted away from peacebuilding and toward development.

Figure 10-7: Comparison between case studies’ responsiveness of peacebuilding programming to relevant context



Generally, it seems that the large IOs – UNDP and the UN Missions – were the least effective at systematically aligning their peacebuilding programs and projects with the relevant context. DFID was successful for the period that it had a peacebuilding frame but was not when it had a development frame. When it was focused on peacebuilding, it also had a flexible pot of money allocated to peacebuilding and had different accountability routines and priorities than it did after 2005. Other donors in Burundi, such as USAID and the World Bank, have taken similar approaches and had similar results. CARE and BLTP were both able to keep most of their projects relevant to the people and institutions that they aimed to influence, but this is partly because they were run by highly skilled staff and innovative leaders. Most of the other INGOs in Burundi that fall into their general organizational category were much more removed from the

people and institutions that they aimed to influence and were therefore not able to maintain the same degree of relevance to the context. This variation shows that an organization's capacity to ensure that its projects are relevant to their target context may be the area that is most affected by policy and staffing changes. These changes are likely to be more difficult in some types of organizations than in others, as I will discuss in further detail below.

10.3 Theory Building

The ideal-type theory presented above was designed to be adjusted in relation to the case study data to reveal a theoretically driven, but empirically derived, theory about the interaction of different types of organizations engaged in peacebuilding with the context that they aim to influence. The organizational literature and the literature on peacebuilding failed to offer detailed theories about how IOs, INGOs, and donor aid agencies could be expected to interact with war-torn countries.

Most of the organizational literature is based on case studies of private sector businesses or public sector administration in Western countries. There is practically no literature that examines in detail how a public sector organization based in a wealthy Western country and grounded in Western ideas, institutions, and values can function in a very poor country on the other side of the world that is grounded in neo-patrimonial institutions and is recovering from years of war, violence, and trauma. No literature examines how the structure of a field-based IO, INGO, or donor office would determine the interaction between these two very different worlds.

Below, I describe how I adjusted each of my original variables derived from organizational theory to the reality faced by my case study organizations. In addition, I describe three new variables that had appeared in the literature as potential alternative explanations and were, in fact, relevant to the outcomes in several of my case studies. I

then describe the typological theory that I developed from these findings, which I will test through additional post-doctoral research with other organizations and in other countries.

10.3.1 SIGNIFICANT AND SYSTEMATIC ACTION TO REDUCE THE GAP BETWEEN PEACEBUILDING AIMS AND OUTCOMES

In the ideal-type theory, the dependent variable had two values. The positive value was significant and systematic action to reduce the gap between an organization's peacebuilding aims and outcomes. The negative value was inaction, action not to reduce the gap, or an unsystematic or insignificant response to a gap between an organization's peacebuilding aims and outcomes.

The case studies revealed that there were actually four different potential values on my dependent variable. An organization can act to reduce the gap between its peacebuilding aims and outcomes at two levels: 1) by aligning its overall aim and approach with a big new peacebuilding trend and 2) by adjusting its ongoing projects and programs to changes created by the new trend or other important changes in the institutions, individuals, or groups that it aims to influence. This distinction allowed me to account for the gaps between the organization's overall peacebuilding aims and outcomes that occurred after a critical juncture in the peacebuilding trajectory, which meant that the previous alignment was no longer valid. It also allowed me to account for significant gaps between peacebuilding aims and outcomes that occurred in ongoing projects and programs both as a result of the new trend and as a result of important changes in the specific institutions, individuals, or groups that the project or program aimed to influence.

Each organization that intervenes in a war-torn country has an overall aim for its intervention in addition to projects and programs intended to fulfill this aim. For

example, ONUB had the overall aim of helping to bring peace to Burundi by enabling a successful end to its transitional phase. To fulfill this aim, it ran several projects that helped ensure that free, fair, and transparent elections took place in a timely fashion, facilitated the disarmament of former combatants, and supported the reform of the security sector.

Figure 10-8: Potential values on dependent variable

Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Approach with a New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory

		Off Target	On Target
Systematic Actions to Adjust ongoing Peacebuilding Programming to Relevant Context	Mostly Irrelevant	1 Off Target and Mostly Irrelevant	2 On Target but Mostly Irrelevant
	Relevant	4 Off Target but Relevant	3 On Target and Relevant

I measured whether an organization took significant and systematic actions to align its overall aims and means with each of the six new trends in Burundi's peacebuilding

trajectory that emerged from this transition. I define “significant and systematic” as big sustained actions that required the allocation of significant human or financial resources. These actions were usually the result of deliberations by senior leadership because they entailed refocusing or intensifying the organization’s overall peacebuilding aims and means in response to or anticipation of this new trend.

I also measured whether an organization took systematic actions to align its ongoing peacebuilding programming with the relevant target institutions, groups, individuals, and/or behaviors. I asked whether an organization received regular feedback on the relationship between the majority of its project/program aims and outcomes and whether it adjusted the way that it implemented these projects and programs in response. By “regular,” I mean more than twice over an entire project/program period. Was there regular feedback on the majority of peacebuilding programming, and did the organization try to respond to that feedback by adjusting how it implemented the project or program, or even possibly adjusting the project or program aims? I assess aggregate project/program adjustment within each of the six main phases in Burundi’s peacebuilding trajectory from 1999 to 2011 (see Chapter 4).

10.3.2 ACCOUNTABILITY ROUTINES

In the ideal-type theory, downward accountability routines referred to mechanisms that reward staff for systematically detecting and correcting significant mismatches between peacebuilding aims and outcomes. Upward accountability routines are mechanisms that reward staff for responding to demands and priorities dictated by headquarters or donors, not for actions taken in response to changes in the country context relevant to the organization’s peacebuilding aims.

The case study research led me to further adapt this variable. In the ideal-type theory, accountability routines had a dichotomous measure: upward or downward.

Based on the case studies, I revised this variable to include three potential values: upward accountability; upward/horizontal accountability; and upward accountability/significant and representative stakeholder dialogue.

Ideally, an organization's upward and downward accountability routines would align. The upward accountability routines would support and enable accountability for the project's outcomes. As a result, what one would look for in an organization that was able to systematically align with the context would be upward accountability routines that encouraged this alignment. Furthermore, all organizations that do international peacebuilding work have, by design, upward accountability routines because their headquarters, governance system, and donors are located outside of the country.

Several of the case study organizations had horizontal accountability routines to the Burundian government. The government determined whether international donors, the UN, or INGOs could establish and maintain their offices in Burundi. The government also had to cooperate with the donors and UN on much of their programming and could therefore undermine the programming by refusing to sign onto it or cooperate in its implementation.

None of the case study organizations had formal downward accountability mechanisms for delivering what they said they would deliver or for achieving the outcomes that they said they would achieve, because they were formally accountable only to their headquarters and donors. Accountability mechanisms would have required that the organizations report back to the beneficiaries on what they were doing and get some approval or disapproval from the beneficiaries. But even in the organization that had the highest degree of discussion and consultation with beneficiaries, there was little reporting back to beneficiaries. Whatever accountability they had to the intended beneficiaries, including to the government, was created through relationship and was

largely due to the will of project staff and/or the organization's country-based leadership.

In the place of downward accountability routines, several of the organizations studied engaged in regular dialogue with a representative group of stakeholders. They regularly consulted with the people who were supposed to benefit from their work and other actors who were concerned about the outcomes. For example, the BLTP consulted regularly with its participants, key politicians who were not also participants, its donors, and other members of the international community who were not its donors. Through this process, it maintained the buy-in of key stakeholders and received regular feedback on its outcomes. Of course, this feedback and discussion did not ensure that the BLTP understood what the stakeholders wanted to communicate, nor did it ensure that the BLTP integrated the information into their programming. But at least they received the information and in many cases gained new understanding about their interventions based on this information.

I measure upward accountability routines in terms of requests from headquarters and donors in the form of accounting reports, project reports, monitoring reports, strategies, visits, and other requests for information.

I measure horizontal accountability in terms of the formal mechanisms the government can use to encourage an international actor to act in one way or another. This includes cooperation agreements, visas, approval of country plans, approval of project plans, and other dimensions where the international actor cannot act without the government's formal approval.

I measure significant and representative dialogue with stakeholders as the various mechanisms that the case studies employed to increase their understanding of the perspective of the beneficiaries and other key stakeholders in a project, program, or overall approach. A necessary component for this variable is actual discussion with the

beneficiaries and other important stakeholders, not just the receipt of written reports. Written reports, research missions, assessment trips, and new monitoring and evaluation frameworks can all help to facilitate an informed discussion, but they cannot substitute for it.

10.3.3 INTEGRATED PEACEBUILDING KNOWLEDGE-LADEN ROUTINES AND FRAMES

In the ideal-type theory, the positive value on this variable was integrated peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines and frames. This meant that the organization's core knowledge-laden and conceptual frames combined political/conflict resolution and humanitarian/development knowledge. The negative value was fragmented knowledge-laden routines and frames. This meant that the organization's core knowledge-laden routines and conceptual frames focus on either political/conflict resolution knowledge or humanitarian/development knowledge, but not both.

The revised variable has four values: peacebuilding frames predominant and sufficient knowledge-laden routines; peacebuilding frames predominant and insufficient knowledge-laden routines; peacebuilding frames not predominant and sufficient knowledge-laden routines; and peacebuilding frames not predominant and insufficient knowledge-laden routines.

In the ideal-type theory, I made the distinction between knowledge-laden routines with frames that focused on political or conflict resolution knowledge and those that focused on humanitarian or development knowledge. The idea behind the variable, derived from both organizational theory and the peacebuilding literature, was that peacebuilding should integrate political and conflict resolution thinking with the capacity to deliver humanitarian or development programming. By combining these different capacities, it would be able to act on the political knowledge in a way that would aim to mitigate the conflict.

I had focused on the knowledge-laden aspect because of Lynn Eden's work, which identified the dire consequences of unexamined knowledge that was imbedded the organizational practices in the nuclear industry.¹²⁰⁴ My investigation of organizations engaged in peacebuilding revealed that while knowledge-laden routines were important in determining whether organizations could design and implement peacebuilding interventions, they was not the most important factor in determining their responsiveness to the peacebuilding context. A predominant peacebuilding organizational frame and entrepreneurial leadership committed to peacebuilding were the most important factors. These are the only variables that were necessary each time a case study organization aligned with a new trend in the peacebuilding context and adjusted its ongoing programming to the relevant context.

The case studies showed that simply combining political, conflict resolution, and/or humanitarian knowledge does not enable an organization to design a good peacebuilding intervention. Peacebuilding knowledge is a different type of knowledge altogether. And the type of peacebuilding knowledge that is needed is very specific to the particular project and activity being undertaken. There is not one general type of peacebuilding knowledge, but rather many different types that are specific to the goal of the project or program. For example, someone who is specialized in dialogue workshops may be completely incompetent at supporting security sector reform. In addition, the type of knowledge and experience necessary at one stage in a country's peacebuilding trajectory may no longer be valuable at the next stage.

I found that the knowledge that seemed to matter for effective peacebuilding was knowledge of a particular type of peacebuilding programming; knowledge of how to assess the contribution of this programming to the context; and knowledge of the local

¹²⁰⁴ Eden, *Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation*.

peacebuilding context, relevant institutions, and individuals. Because it is difficult to find one person with all of this knowledge, sufficient peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines were often held by teams, not individuals. When it worked well, the team dynamic enabled debate and reflection and encouraged non-defensive learning behavior and the pursuit of valid information.

The organizational frame aspect of this variable is also specific to peacebuilding, not a combination of other frames. In the case studies, what mattered most in determining whether an organization responded to big changes in the peacebuilding trajectory was whether it saw itself as a peacebuilding organization. An organization that had a predominant development organizational frame rather than a predominant peacebuilding organizational frame would respond to big events in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory not in a way that would further its peacebuilding aims, but rather in a way that would further its development aims.

I measure whether an organization has a predominant peacebuilding frame based on if it articulates peacebuilding as the primary purpose for intervening in a country. I measure whether an organization has sufficient peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines based on if its staff believe that they are skilled at peacebuilding and have been trained in some way in peacebuilding. I also ask whether and how they are able to integrate local knowledge into their project design and implementation. This is not a maximalist measure of peacebuilding knowledge, but rather a minimalist measure of "good enough" training and contextual knowledge.

10.3.4 LEARNING BEHAVIOR

In the ideal-type theory, the learning behavior variable had two values: The positive value was non-defensive and valid learning behavior, and the negative value was defensive and invalid learning behavior. But the case studies revealed that there were

actually three potential values: non-defensive and valid learning behavior, defensive and valid learning behavior, and defensive and invalid learning behavior. From my research, I realized that an organization such as a UN political mission (i.e., UNOB) could seek valid information about the relationship between its aims and outcomes but not process that information in an open, non-defensive way.

The basic measure of the learning behavior variable stayed the same in my revision of this variable. It is based on the theory articulated by Argyris and Schön that organizations are more likely to question the assumptions behind their programming when they seek valid information about the relationship between their aims and outcomes and when they process that information in an open, non-defensive way.¹²⁰⁵ I measured this in interviews by asking whether valid information was sought and how information that was obtained on outcomes or impact was dealt with. I asked whether the leaders in the organization were facilitators, directors, or observers. I asked if leaders and other staff dealt with positive and negative information differently and how this was done. (See Interview Protocol in Appendix B.)

Like the peacebuilding frame and knowledge variable, this variable describes a minimum rather than a maximum measure. All case study organizations, even CARE Burundi and the BLTP, were somewhat defensive about negative information about their projects. At the same time, they were eager to hear assessments of their work and were engaged in self-reflective processes based on this information. This variable measures a relative openness and non-defensiveness to information about outcomes and the pursuit of valid information about outcomes, not the actual attainment of valid information.

¹²⁰⁵ Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schon, "Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective" (1978).

10.3.5 THE EMERGENCE OF THREE NEW SIGNIFICANT FACTORS

In addition to helping me to refine the variables in the ideal-type theory, the case studies also revealed three new variables that are significant for the observed outcomes: significant organizational change process, flexible peacebuilding money, and entrepreneurial leadership committed to peacebuilding. These variables had come up in my initial exploration of alternative explanations. While the case studies allowed me to rule out several alternative explanations, they showed me that an organizational change process, flexible peacebuilding money, and entrepreneurial leadership committed to peacebuilding could not be ruled out. In fact, they are necessary, but insufficient, conditions for some of the outcomes observed.

These variables helped the case study organizations improve their performance on the original variables of study. In other words, the case study organizations' values on the original independent variables created particular routines with which individuals in the organization had to contend. These three additional variables at times helped some of the case study organizations overcome the routines that inhibited their adaptation to the peacebuilding context.

10.3.5.1 Significant organizational change process

I measure a significant organization change process by whether an organization undergoes a process whereby it reevaluates the assumptions behind its programming, engages in real debate about these assumptions, and then redesigns its approach and adjusts its aims. This measure corresponds with the concept of double-loop learning that is articulated in the organizational learning literature.¹²⁰⁶ It also corresponds to

¹²⁰⁶ Argyris, *On Organizational Learning*.

questioning an organization's overall theory of change that is articulated in the peacebuilding practice literature.¹²⁰⁷

In the case studies, I found that positive values on all three of the independent variables were sufficient for an organization to take systematic action to align its peacebuilding programming with the relevant context. But these characteristics were not sufficient to enable the organization to take significant and systematic action to align with big changes in the country's peacebuilding trajectory. A significant organizational change process was also necessary.

For example, the BLTP had positive values on all of the variables in the ideal-type theory, but when the 2005 elections changed the leadership and political dynamics in the country, the BLTP became largely irrelevant to the new leadership context. It was not able to gain access to key leaders or influence the political process as it once had. It did not immediately notice this and continued to try and do what it had done in the past. Eventually, through a significant organizational change process that included internal soul searching as well as discussions with partners and donors, the BLTP readjusted its aims and approach to align with the new context.

The BLTP did not have to engage in a significant organizational change process at every critical juncture in Burundi's peacebuilding process because the organization was generally on track and could adjust its approach without undergoing a full reassessment of what it was doing and why. In the language of the organizational learning literature, the BLTP could engage in single-loop learning and adjust the approach and aims without questioning the underlying assumptions of its programming.¹²⁰⁸ This is because many of its assumptions remained generally valid in the new context.

¹²⁰⁷ Cheyanne Church and Julie Shouldice, *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Part II: Emerging Practice and Theory* (Londonderry: INCORE, 2003), 33.

¹²⁰⁸ Argyris, *On Organizational Learning*.

Not all significant organizational change processes lead an organization to make significant and systematic efforts to realign with the country's peacebuilding trajectory. For example, CARE Burundi's big organizational change process in 2009 took it even further away from its relevance to Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory because its development organizational frame predominated by then. Thus, the organization adjusted to align with development and its assumptions about how development would take place in Burundi. It wrongly believed that the country was heading out of conflict and that peacebuilding and conflict prevention would not need to be strong areas of work for the organization in the future.

10.3.5.2 Flexible peacebuilding money

The case studies showed that funds designated generally for peacebuilding and quickly available were a necessary condition for some of the case study organizations' actions to align their overall aims and approach with a changing context. For example, when the National Forces of Liberation (FNL) integrated into the Burundian government and military in 2009, a response was needed by the international community, but funds were not available to demobilize the FNL-associated adults who did not fit the normal criteria for combatants. The BINUB/UNDP Security Sector unit had been working closely with the ERSG to follow and support the negotiations with the FNL. Helping the FNL implement its ceasefire agreements, transform itself into a political party, and participate in the 2010 elections was a key aim of BINUB and in line with its overall peacebuilding approach. When the FNL declared that reintegrating the 10,000 associated adults was a precondition for their full conversion to a political party, BINUB requested emergency funding from PBF to support this.

The flexible peacebuilding funds were a necessary, but insufficient, condition for BINUB/UNDP to take significant action to ensure that their overall aims and approach

remained aligned with the new change in Burundi's context. If BINUB/UNDP had not also had an entrepreneurial leader committed to peacebuilding who was willing to ask for the funds and a peacebuilding frame that prioritized the integration of the FNL, then it most likely would not have taken the initiative to ask for the funds in the first place. Flexible peacebuilding funding seems to enable an organization to respond to peacebuilding opportunities in the environment, but does not guarantee that the organization will respond or that the response will be relevant at the programming level.

I measure flexible peacebuilding funds by whether the money is meant for peacebuilding programming, can be spent on many different types of peacebuilding programming, and is available within a relatively short timeframe (i.e., six months).

10.3.5.3 Entrepreneurial leadership committed to peacebuilding

For all of the organizations studied except for the UN Missions, an entrepreneurial leader who was committed to peacebuilding was a necessary condition for significant and systematic actions to align the organization's overall aim and approach with a new trend in Burundi's war-to-peace trajectory. For the UN Missions, the Security Council altered the mandate and approach even when the leader at the field level was not entrepreneurial or necessarily committed to peacebuilding (i.e., SRSG Dinka of UNOB).

An entrepreneurial leader who is committed to peacebuilding helps the organization respond to peacebuilding opportunities. In the case studies, entrepreneurial leadership mattered most for responses to align the organization's overall aims and approach with a new trend in the peacebuilding trajectory. Changes in an organization's overall approach usually require the buy-in of senior leadership. Also, peacebuilding programming is never a sure thing. It is always risky, the outcome is always uncertain, and it usually requires some type of innovation. In most of the case studies, having a leader who was committed to peacebuilding, was willing to try new things and take

some risks, and could help staff overcome bureaucratic barriers was a necessary condition for the organization's response to big changes in the peacebuilding trajectory.

10.3.6 EMERGENCE OF FOUR SUB-TYPES

This dissertation aimed to refine the ideal-type theory through in-depth case studies into the primary types of organizations that had made significant commitments to peacebuilding: a development donor, a multilateral peacekeeping organization, a multilateral development organization, an INGO focused on peacebuilding through conflict resolution and dialogue, and a multi-mandate international non-governmental organization. As discussed in Chapter 3, these case studies were chosen through diverse case selection methods. In line with this method, I created a truth table that listed all of the possible manifestations of the original ideal-type theory and then asked which of these types of organizations actually existed in Burundi. Then I selected one representative from each of the most common types.

Figure 10-9: Synthesis of new theory

Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means with a New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory

		Off Target	On Target		
Systematic Actions to Adjust Ongoing Peacebuilding Programming with Relevant Context	Mostly Irrelevant	<p>1</p> <p>Off Target and Mostly Irrelevant</p> <p><i>Necessary & Sufficient:</i> No PB Frames, No PB Knowledge, Upward/ Horizontal AR</p> <p><i>Insignificant:</i> Learning Behavior, Org Change, Flex PB Funds, Entrepreneurial Leadership for PB</p>	<p>2</p> <p>On Target but Mostly Irrelevant</p> <p><i>Necessary:</i> PB Frame, No PB Knowledge, Defensive Learning Behavior, Upward AR</p> <p><i>Supported by combination of:</i> Org Change and/or Entrepreneurial Leadership for PB & Flexible PB Funds</p>	UN Mission II UN Mission IV UN Mission V UNDP I UNDP IV UNDP V	
	Relevant	<p>4</p> <p>Off Target but Relevant</p> <p><i>Necessary:</i> Non-defensive and Valid Learning Behavior</p> <p><i>4 out of 5 cases had:</i> Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue</p>	<p>3</p> <p>On Target and Relevant</p> <p><i>Necessary:</i> PB Frame, Sufficient PB Knowledge, Entrepreneurial Leadership for PB</p> <p><i>7 out of 9 cases had:</i> Non-Defensive and Valid Learning Behavior</p> <p><i>To sustain type 3 also required:</i> Sig. and Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue and Org Change</p>	UN Mission I UN Mission III DFID II DFID III Care IV BLTP II BLTP III BLTP V BLTP VI	

I examined the contribution of the independent variables outlined in the ideal-type theory, the alternative explanations, and the dependent variable for each case study organization in relation to the six big events and ensuing trends in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. This provided me with twenty-eight points (two organizations were not operational for the first phase) with which to analyze the relationship between the independent variables, alternative explanations, and dependent variables (see Data Table in Appendix A). I use the term *sub-case* to describe each of these twenty-eight data points. From this analysis, I have developed a theory of four different organizational types (see Figure 10-9). This theory articulates the path to the four potential outcomes on the revised dependent variable. It sets the stage for the next step in this research agenda – to test this theory with other organizations and in other countries.

10.3.6.1 Type I: Off target with peacebuilding trajectory and mostly irrelevant to programming context

Type I describes organizations that work in a conflict environment but largely try to ignore the conflict dynamics. They see the conflict and its causes as factors that inhibit the programming that they really want to do, rather than factors that their programming should address or at least take into account. The majority of organizations that fall into this category are development organizations or, in the case of CARE Burundi, a multi-mandate INGO that is focused on humanitarian intervention. Each of these organizations has some type of peacebuilding aim but made a minimal contribution to the fulfillment of that aim during this period.

The organizations that fall into Type I neither took significant and systematic actions to align their overall peacebuilding aim and approach to new trends in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory nor repeatedly tried to adapt their peacebuilding programming to changing dynamics in the institutions that they wanted to influence. These organizations were "off target and mostly irrelevant" in terms of peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity. They may have been more effective in relation to their predominant organizational frames, but in general they were not conflict-sensitive and did not implement peacebuilding programming that was relevant to the context (i.e., good peacebuilding).

Four of the case study organizations had this outcome at least once over the thirteen-year period under study, providing a total of eight sub-cases for comparison: UN Mission Phase VI (BNUB); UNDP Phase II, III, and VI; DFID Phase V and VI; and CARE Phase I and II. The BLTP is the only case that never had this outcome.

The following conditions were both necessary and sufficient for the case study organizations to achieve this outcome on the dependent variable: peacebuilding organizational frame not predominant, insufficient peacebuilding knowledge-laden

routines, and upward or upward/horizontal accountability routines. In other words, this type describes an organization that does not consider peacebuilding to be one of the most important things that it was doing in Burundi. In general, this field-based organization also lacks knowledge and understanding of how to design and implement a peacebuilding program or integrate conflict sensitivity into all of its programming (i.e., design and implement programming so that it does not exacerbate the causes of the conflict or lead to conflict). In addition, the organization has upward accountability routines and/or horizontal accountability routines, but does not have much dialogue with a representative group of stakeholders.

These three factors combined to make these organizations unresponsive to the peacebuilding context at a particular point in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. They did not think that peacebuilding was important and therefore did not adjust to big changes in the context that were important for peacebuilding. They did not have the knowledge to design and implement good peacebuilding or conflict sensitive programming. They did not have feedback from a representative group of stakeholders in their programming that told them whether it was effective or should be more relevant to big new trends in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. In fact, the organizations in Type I were accountable to headquarters and the Burundian government for things other than peacebuilding or conflict sensitivity (i.e., other organizational frames and reporting priorities). Their incentive structures therefore discouraged them from interacting with the intended beneficiaries of their projects and from paying attention to the evolution of Burundi's war-to-peace transition. Their lack of peacebuilding or conflict sensitivity knowledge among staff reinforced this trend.

Each of the sub-cases in this type had one or more of the other variables under study, but they did not affect the peacebuilding or conflict-sensitive behavior of the organization. Neither non-defensive and valid learning behavior, organizational change,

flexible peacebuilding funds, nor entrepreneurial leadership made a difference in the organizations' behavior at these points in time. These factors did not cause the case study organizations to adjust their aims and approach in response to these new trends in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory or adapt most of their peacebuilding programming to changes in the institutions and dynamics that they aimed to influence.

BNUB is the only organization studied that has a predominant peacebuilding frame but falls into Type I. I do not consider this to falsify the findings articulated above because BNUB was apparently not given permission by UN Headquarters to take significant or systematic actions to achieve this frame. UN Headquarters prioritized the maintenance of the UN Office in Burundi and not angering the Burundian government. The government had expelled three out of four of the past SRSGs from the country. As a result, although BNUB's mandate indicated that it had a peacebuilding frame, the directives from headquarters did not enable it to do much to reach its peacebuilding aims. In a context of increased oppression and violence by the ruling party, working toward many of BNUB's aims would have required direct challenges to the government's approach.

Given the organizational characteristics described above, it was very difficult for these organizations to act to reduce the gap between their peacebuilding and conflict-sensitivity aims and outcomes. As a result, their capacity to achieve these aims was greatly reduced. CARE Burundi (I and II) initiated a peace education project that helped resolve conflicts among several individuals, but it was not able to integrate these approaches across the rest of its projects.¹²⁰⁹ Furthermore, the vast majority of CARE's projects at this time reinforced the causes of the conflict – intergroup division, exclusion,

¹²⁰⁹ Abbass, *Peace Education Project - Grassroots Community Research, Final Summary*; Care Burundi, "Care International in Burundi Strategic Plan Document, 2002-2005."

oppression – and some of its most costly manifestations: sexual exploitation.¹²¹⁰ DFID (V and VI) had dropped its peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity focus by this time, instead strengthening the education, health, and taxation capacity of a state that was increasingly using violent and oppressive tactics to maintain its hold on power. UNDP (II, III, and VI) during these periods lacked data about its peacebuilding contribution or the degree of conflict sensitivity of its programming. As a result, it is possible that its governance and community development projects made some contribution to addressing the causes of Burundi’s conflict or potential drivers of peace, but there was no evidence of this.

Likewise, it is possible that the UN Mission during Phase VI – BNUB – made a contribution to maintaining some degree of peace in the country. However, generally, it seemed to have little effect on the deteriorating situation and made few big attempts to reduce the growing likelihood of war. The deterioration of the political climate reduced the opportunities that BNUB had to engage in their peacebuilding work. But in response to this deteriorating situation, BNUB did not significantly alter its aims or approach to try more innovative tactics that would help to open political space and decrease oppression.

10.3.6.2 Type II: On target with peacebuilding trajectory but mostly irrelevant to programming context

Type II describes organizations that are committed to peacebuilding but have poor knowledge of the people and communities that they purport to serve. They are most likely to implement bureaucratic peacebuilding programming that has not been designed specifically for or adapted specifically to the capacities and institutions in the country, much less to the changing nature of these institutions. These organizations are likely to

¹²¹⁰ Ruth Kornfield, *The Impact of Food Aid on Community Power Relations and Social Networks: A Case Study of a Hillside in Kirundo Province, Burundi* (Bujumbura, Burundi: Care Burundi, January 2005); Care Burundi, *Using Innovative Approaches to Better Understand Sexual Harassment and Exploitation within the Food Distribution Program* (Bujumbura, Burundi: Care Burundi, June 2005).

make an important contribution to a country's peacebuilding trajectory at the beginning of a new trend, but are unable to sustain that contribution for the duration of this trend or into the next one. They may have pockets of effective peacebuilding that are sustained by highly skilled and innovative staff and committed leadership, but as time marches on and the context continues to change, even their most effective programming is likely to become irrelevant.

The organizations that fall into Type II took significant and systematic actions to align with new trends in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. But these organizations did not systematically act to align their project aims and outcomes, either for ongoing projects or for projects and programs that were initiated to address the new trend. They continued to implement their projects largely as planned and did not generally adjust them to feedback about the relationship between project aims and outcomes. The seven sub-cases that fall into this type are all from the UN: UN Mission II, UN Mission IV, UN Mission V, UNDP I, UNDP IV, and UNDP V.

The sub-cases that fall into this category share several characteristics: They have a predominant peacebuilding frame, but they have insufficient peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines and defensive learning behavior. Seven out of eight of the organizations in this type had upward/horizontal accountability routines. One had upward/significant and representative stakeholder dialogue accountability routines. The upward/horizontal accountability routine is not a necessary condition but does indicate there was a significant trend away from dialogue with beneficiaries or other stakeholders.

The necessary conditions were found in each of the organizational sub-cases to help them respond to the new trends in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory, but they did not help them adjust their peacebuilding programming once it was under way. The predominant peacebuilding frame made the organization "want" to adjust to the new trend. But the fact that they did not have good peacebuilding knowledge and prioritized

accountability to headquarters and the government over feedback from other stakeholders meant that they lacked the incentives and knowledge to adjust their programming as the institutions and behaviors that they wished to change continued to evolve.

Each organization in this type had an organizational change process and/or entrepreneurial leadership committed to peacebuilding and flexible peacebuilding funding. Five out of ten of the sub-cases in this type also underwent a significant organizational change process that enabled them to align their overall aim and strategy with the relevant critical peacebuilding event and trend. But this organizational change process did not ensure that these organizations had the staff with the right expertise to act on this new mandate or programming guidelines that corresponded with it. Those organizations that did not have an organizational change process had an entrepreneurial leader committed to peacebuilding as well as flexible peacebuilding funding that enabled the organization to respond to new opportunities created by a new trend. But these entrepreneurial leaders and flexible funds were unable to alter the organization's general capacity to engage in conflict-sensitive or peacebuilding programming.

The exception to the pattern described above was UN Mission II (UNOB). UNOB had upward/significant and representative stakeholder dialogue values for its accountability routines, but the discussions with a wide range of beneficiaries do not seem to have made a difference for UNOB's programmatic alignment because there was no will to act on this information. As discussed in Chapter 5, while the Secretary General and Security Council took significant and systematic actions to align UNOB's mandate and resources with the new trends created by the inauguration of the Transitional Government of Burundi on November 1, 2001, UNOB's leadership failed to push hard to align its interventions with the evolving context. The Burundian context at the time was certainly difficult, suffering from intense infighting amongst the members of committee

mandated to oversee the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. But international actors and Burundians alike widely criticized ONUB and its leader, SRSG Dinka, for failing to take significant actions to attempt to change the context. As a result, any valid information or dialogue with informants that UNOB had was relatively useless because it lacked an entrepreneurial leader who was committed to taking risks and pushing for peacebuilding and willing to act on this information. If ONUB had had an entrepreneurial leader who was committed to peacebuilding, then this theory predicts that it would have responded to the context in the same way as the organizations described in Type III.

Several of the organizations that fall within Type II made a positive contribution to Burundi's peacebuilding process, at times unblocking crucial barriers to its advancement. In Phase V, BINUB and UNDP helped to enable the FNL to stop fighting and participate in the 2010 elections by providing support to demobilize adults associated with the FNL. In Phase I, UNDP helped to ensure that donors committed significant funds for post-conflict reconstruction in Burundi that encouraged the negotiating parties to continue to participate in the Arusha talks, even though many donors did not fulfill their commitments for several years.¹²¹¹

In the other cases, however, the organizations took actions to align with the new peacebuilding trend but did not make an obvious contribution to the advancement of Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. UNOB (UN Mission II) set up the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) and organized meetings but did not do much to facilitate agreement or push forward the implementation of the Arusha Agreement, as it was mandated to do. In 2006, both UNDP and the UN Secretariat (UNDP IV and UN Mission IV) began designing an integrated UN Mission to take over from ONUB, which was

¹²¹¹ Group, "A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi."

asked to leave Burundi soon after the 2005 elections. The development of an integrated UN mission focused on peacebuilding was a significant and systematic response on the part of both organizations to both Burundi's enormous needs for peacebuilding as well as the Burundian government's reluctance to have a peace operation on its soil. Nonetheless, because it took so long to get BINUB established and running, the establishment of BINUB did not have much of an impact on Burundi's peacebuilding process until 2008 or 2009.

Even though several of the organizations that fall within this type made a positive contribution to the advancement of Burundi's war-to-peace transition, their programming was generally not well aligned with the evolving context. It was bureaucratic and uninformed by serious discussion with people beyond the immediate government partners. Staff were generally aware of the relationship between their work and causes or manifestation of Burundi's conflict. Much of their time was taken up trying to navigate the complexity of the UN system, reporting to headquarters, and interacting with other members of the international community and government in Bujumbura.

10.3.6.3 Type III: On target with peacebuilding trajectory and relevant to programming context

These are the flexible organizations whose main focus is peacebuilding. Their staff are highly skilled in the particular type of peacebuilding programming they implement and know the importance of consultation, dialogue, and adjustment of their approach to both opportunities and hurdles in the peacebuilding context. This category of organizations also had the most instances of clear peacebuilding success: They had information showing their peacebuilding contribution and were perceived by a range of stakeholders as making a positive contribution to Burundi's war-to-peace transition.

The organizations that fall into the “on target and relevant” type (Type III) took significant and systematic actions to alter their strategy and approach to align with the new trends in Burundi’s war-to-peace trajectory at the same time that they altered ongoing programming in response to changes in the context. The organizational sub-cases that fall into this type are UN Mission I (UNOB 1999–2001), UN Mission III (ONUB 2003–2005), DFID I and II (1999–2003), CARE IV (2005–2009), and BLTP II, III, V, and VI (all BLTP phases except for 2005–2009).

All of the sub-cases in this type had three necessary characteristics: a peacebuilding organizational frame, sufficient peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines, and entrepreneurial leadership committed to peacebuilding. These characteristics helped to ensure that the organizations focused on peacebuilding and paid attention to Burundi’s evolving peacebuilding trajectory. They helped staff respond to opportunities in this trajectory with good peacebuilding programming. The entrepreneurial leadership helped the organizations take programmatic risks and overcome organizational hurdles.

Interestingly, non-defensive and valid learning behavior, significant and representative stakeholder dialogue, significant organizational change processes, and flexible peacebuilding funds were not necessary conditions for this type. But for the one organization that was able to sustain its position in this type over almost the entire period under study – the BLTP – significant and representative stakeholder dialogue and non-defensive and valid learning behavior were necessary conditions. In addition, after the BLTP veered off course with Burundi’s peacebuilding trajectory, a significant organizational change process was a necessary condition for BLTP’s realignment. This leads to the generation of a new hypothesis that I will test in further research: *Significant and representative stakeholder dialogue, non-defensive and valid learning behavior, a significant organizational change process, a peacebuilding organizational frame, sufficient peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines, and entrepreneurial leadership committed to peacebuilding are all*

necessary and sufficient conditions for an organization to sustain the alignment of its aims, approach, and programs with a country's war-to-peace transition.

In six of the nine sub-cases of Type III, accountability routines have the value of upward/ significant and representative stakeholder dialogue. In both DFID II and III, it has the upward value only. For donors, the focus on dialogue with beneficiaries may not be as important as it is with implementing organizations. If a donor chooses the right partners who have good relationships with a representative group of beneficiaries, then the degree of stakeholder feedback to the donor is not as important. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that a donor will always choose grantees with a high level of good dialogue with beneficiaries, and even if they do, most grantees could benefit from the perspective and input of a donor who also is tuned into the context that its aims to influence.

That DFID had flexible peacebuilding funds and entrepreneurial leadership committed to peacebuilding seems to have compensated for its lack of feedback from beneficiaries and other stakeholders. It enabled DFID to continually act to align in relation to the context by allocating more money toward new approaches, rather than by pressuring its grantees to alter their ongoing programming. Again, even if DFID had received a high degree of feedback from beneficiaries, as a donor it had a limited capacity to change the programming in response to this information. It could engage in discussion with its grantees and encourage them to alter what they were doing, but it had few tools beyond dialogue and cooperation. It could threaten to delay the allocation of funds or suspend disbursements but would only do this in extreme circumstances.

The one case with an upward/horizontal value on the accountability routines variable is UN Mission III (ONUB, 2003–2005). In this case, the upward accountability measure and the peacebuilding aim were aligned toward free, fair, and relatively peaceful elections validated by international observers. ONUB balanced its accountability for international election standards with its horizontal accountability to the government

and its National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), which was responsible for organizing the elections. ONUB was accountable for helping to facilitate well-organized elections that were relatively peaceful on election day. ONUB did not consider its mandate to be to create other institutions in a democracy (i.e., free media, civil society, informed citizens, etc.) and thus did not monitor general perceptions of the fairness and freedom surrounding the overall electoral process, which was interspersed with intimidation and some violence, as discussed in Chapter 4. If ONUB had had the aim of building a functioning democracy, then upward/horizontal accountability routines would likely have been insufficient to encourage significant and systematic actions to achieve this outcome.

All but two of the sub-cases in Type III had non-defensive and valid learning behavior. The two cases that did not have this behavior involved UN Missions. The case studies of UN Missions generally show that although the UN rarely has a non-defensive approach to information about its outcomes or much information about its outcomes, there can be pockets of learning and openness in the UN. In these pockets, good teams manage to generate enough knowledge and understanding to figure out how to alter their programs so that they reduce the gap between their aims and outcomes.¹²¹²

The organizations that fall into this category all made and sustained contributions to the drivers of war and peace in Burundi during the relevant period. UNOB and ONUB (UN Mission I and III) respectively helped to advance the negotiations with the FNL rebel group and ensured that the 2005 elections were free, fair, and relatively peaceful. DFID (II and III) supported peacebuilding initiatives that may not have found funding

¹²¹² The support for the organization of the 2005 elections by ONUB and the Cadre de Dialogue, projects with the FDN, and the local public services projects implemented by BINUB are all provide examples of teams that managed to gather sufficient information about their intermediary outcomes and process this information in an open enough way to enable them to come up with ways of addressing gaps between their aims and outcomes.

otherwise. One such initiative was the BLTP's support for the integration of the new FDN, which could make or break Burundi's peacebuilding process. The BLTP during each phase (II, III, V, and VI) helped support individual and interpersonal change that, at times, enabled these individuals to more easily cooperate and engage in dialogue with former enemies. In at least two instances, this dialogue helped to break deadlocks in the peacebuilding process. In the case of CARE Burundi (IV), the community-based peacebuilding and women's empowerment initiatives changed the lives of many individual Burundians, helping them to resolve their conflicts more peacefully and increase their household income.

10.3.6.4 Type IV: Off target with peacebuilding trajectory but relevant to programming context

Type IV organizations are generally skilled at programming. They are open to critique and aim to have valid information about the effectiveness of their projects and programs. They are also generally smaller organizations that adapt easily. They may do peacebuilding between individuals and groups, but it is generally disconnected from the broader peacebuilding trajectory and political climate in which they operate. They have micro-level successes, but do not often make a contribution to addressing the causes of the conflict or potential determinants of peace.

There were five sub-cases that fell into the "off target but relevant" category: DFID IV, CARE III, CARE V, CARE VI, and BLTP IV. These organizations did not take significant and systematic actions to ensure that their aims and approach were aligned with the new trend in Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory, but they did take systematic actions to ensure that their peacebuilding programming was relevant to the particular environment that it aimed to influence. These organizations either were focused on

priorities other than peacebuilding or did not question the inherent assumptions (i.e., theory of change) in their peacebuilding programming.

In all of these sub-cases, the organizations demonstrated non-defensive and valid learning behavior. Four out of five of the cases also had significant and representative stakeholder dialogue as well as peacebuilding organizational frame that was not predominant. This points to a potentially important relationship between this type of learning behavior and systematic actions to help a program or project achieve its aims (i.e., single-loop learning), but does not alter the overall organizational strategy, means, or approach (i.e., double-loop learning). It also confirms that non-defensive and valid learning behavior, even in combination with significant and representative stakeholder dialogue, is not a necessary condition for an organization take significant and systematic action to align its aims and approach with a new peacebuilding trend. Even if an organization monitors its projects regularly, has regular discussions with a representative group of individuals and organizations who have a stake in the project outcome, gathers information from other offices and organizations, and openly discusses and evaluates this information, it is still not guaranteed to adjust to significant changes in the peacebuilding context.

The BLTP IV sub-case shows that a predominant peacebuilding frame and sufficient peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines are insufficient for significant and systematic actions to align with a new trend in the war-to-peace transition. Even when combined with entrepreneurial leadership, significant and representative stakeholder dialogue, and non-defensive and valid learning behavior, the conditions are still insufficient. An additional organizational characteristic is also necessary: a significant organizational change process that forces the organization to question its overall approach to peacebuilding and methods and helps it to readjust both its aims and means to the new context. But the CARE V, CARE II, and DFID IV sub-cases show that an organizational

change process is not sufficient for this outcome without a predominant peacebuilding frame and sufficient peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines as well.

The sub-cases that fall into this type implemented peacebuilding projects that made important progress toward their aims. But they were not able to mainstream conflict sensitivity into their programming largely because they were disconnected from the dynamics of Burundi's peacebuilding trajectory. CARE (III, V, and VI) implemented several peacebuilding projects that helped to resolve inter-personal and intergroup conflict and increase the capacity of communities to resolve their own conflicts.¹²¹³ However, it was not able to integrate conflict sensitivity throughout its programming, as it aimed to do. The BLTP (IV) continued to implement its security sector reform and other projects, but was not able to adjust its overall approach to the fact that after 2005 Burundi's new leadership was largely uninterested in the BLTP. They saw it as being allied with the old political leadership. While most of DFID's (IV) programming at this time was focused on purely development approaches, it did sustain a small justice and governance program. This program funded several INGOs working on justice and attempted to support reforms in the justice sector but was largely unsuccessful because of the intense resistance by the Ministry of Justice. The project continually attempted to achieve its aims, but did not alter its overall aims and approach until 2010 when DFID began to close down its Burundi office.

¹²¹³ Tankari, *Projet Sasagaza Amahoro: Repandre la Paix - Evaluation Finale*; van Trier, *Lessons Learned and Challenges Faced in Community-based Peacebuilding in Burundi*.

10.4 Synthesis of Overall Trends and Implications for Peacebuilding and Conflict Sensitivity

The four sub-types described above point to some overall trends in the five case studies' interaction with Burundi's peacebuilding context. First, they show that for an organization to systematically try to align with the overall peacebuilding trajectory, organizations had to think that peacebuilding was the most important thing that they were doing (i.e., peacebuilding frame was predominant) and to have entrepreneurial leadership who was committed to peacebuilding and willing to push for it.

Second, they show that for an organization to systematically attempt to maintain the relevance of its peacebuilding projects with their context, it would most likely need to pursue valid information about its outcomes and approach that information in a non-defensive way. It would also most likely need to have regular feedback from a representative group of stakeholders in the project both to collect the information and enable the organization to understand the information that it was receiving.

Third, they show that a common characteristic of all of the organizations studied here is their upward accountability. By design, these organizations respond to incentives created by people other than the intended beneficiaries of the project. The people who fund the projects and thus are allowed to vote on their effectiveness are usually located outside of the conflict-torn country and have little real knowledge of the reality of the beneficiaries or the contribution that their programming is making to their lives. The organizations and projects that were able to develop a real relationship to and understanding of their beneficiaries were also the organizations that were most responsive to Burundi's peacebuilding context. They were able partly, although never completely, to counteract their tendency toward upward accountability.

The BLTP case shows that for an organization to sustain alignment with the peacebuilding trajectory and maintain the relevance of its programming with the context, it will most likely need significant and representative stakeholder dialogue, non-defensive and valid learning behavior, a significant organizational change process, a peacebuilding organizational frame, sufficient peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines, and entrepreneurial leadership committed. In other words, the organization needs to think that peacebuilding is the most important thing that it is doing. It needs to have the knowledge to implement its particular approach to peacebuilding. It should have regular discussions with the various people and organizations who have an interest in the outcome of its work. It should approach information that it receives about its work in an open, non-defensive way. It should always aim to understand whether it is, in fact, having the impact that it thinks it is having. It should go through periodic organizational change processes that allow it to question whether its overall aims and approach are still appropriate to the country's peacebuilding trajectory and the capacities and priorities of its people and institutions. As indicated in the Further Research section below, I will aim to test this theory with other organizations and in other countries.

10.4.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR IOS, INGOS, AND DONOR AID AGENCIES

What do these findings tell us about what types of organizations are likely to have which type of outcome? The five organizations studied here are most commonly thought of as IOs, NGOs, or donor government aid agencies. These findings imply that these categories may not help us understand how an organization is likely to interact with another country's war-to-peace transition. The three necessary characteristics for an organization to be on target with the peacebuilding trajectory and for its programming to be relevant with its particular context – predominant peacebuilding frame, sufficient peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines, and entrepreneurial leadership committed to

peacebuilding – do not depend on whether an organization is an IO, INGO, or donor aid agency. Likewise, the additional factors that seem to be important for sustaining this outcome – non-defensive and valid learning behavior, significant and representative stakeholder dialogue, and organizational change – are also not dependent on IO, INGO, or donor aid agency status. Although it is easier for smaller organizations to inculcate learning behavior throughout the organization, larger organizations can help to establish pockets of learning in individual programming teams, as several UN Mission and CARE Burundi projects were able to do.¹²¹⁴

An organization's classification as an IO, INGO, or bilateral aid agency seems to have the greatest impact on the organization's accountability routines. The categories of IO, donor government, and NGO are based around the centrality of the state. IOs are made up of states, donors are states, and INGOs are not states and are not supposed to directly represent state interest.

A government donor will always be heavily upwardly accountable but could adjust for this trend by having more flexible funds that are not earmarked, giving the grantees more flexibility to respond to the actual needs and opportunities in the country.¹²¹⁵ Or donors can develop a true partnership with the government that is based on real accompaniment and is informed by consultations with all stakeholders, thus encouraging state-society relations. Donors could also alter their organizational frame by increasing the amount of money allocated to peacebuilding and even create a peacebuilding funding agency. The fact that donors tend to have the largest pots of money allocated to humanitarian and development programming is not determined by their status as a

¹²¹⁴ M. Leann Brown and Michael Kenney, "Organizational Learning: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations," *Organizational Learning in the Global Context* (2006): 1–20.

¹²¹⁵ The Dutch cooperation with Burundi after 2005 is a good example of this model and may be studied in further research.

government aid agency. It is an institutional artifact that could be changed through big policy shifts and a large organizational change process.

International organizations intervening in a country will tend to be more horizontally accountable to the host government than donors or INGOs because the host government is usually a member, or principal, of the IO. They are also likely to be upwardly accountable to the states that govern them and the states that fund them. Structurally, this makes it more difficult for IOs to engage with civil society or communities and encourages them to support the state, its policies, and its politics. But it is possible to counteract this tendency through significant engagement with communities and civil society, true partnership with government, and inclusion of a representative group of stakeholders in regularly monitoring, as several of BINUB's projects showed.¹²¹⁶

INGOs tend to be upwardly accountable to multiple donors with different requirements, leading INGOs to be preoccupied with proposal writing and reporting. INGOs also tend to be much more connected to the community than to the host government. They often deliver services in place of the government, inhibiting constructive state-society interactions. But INGOs can attempt to correct for this tendency by integrating governance programming across all of their projects, developing their own sources of funding, and attempting to develop a long-term strategy and approach in order to have a more sustainable impact. That said, not all INGOs are more grounded in the community. Some, like the BLTP, can be very closely connected to government institutions. The distinguishing factor in INGO accountability routines is that they are primarily upwardly accountable to their donors for relatively short-term funding cycles. Their capacity to establish some accountability for outcomes depends on how much

¹²¹⁶ Campbell, *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*.

freedom donors give them, how they manage their donors, and how they engage with other stakeholders.

In sum, although an organization's status as an IO, INGO, or donor aid agency influences how it engages with a country's peacebuilding trajectory, it is not likely to determine it. In the cases studied here, the international organizations tended to fall into *Type 1: Off Target and Mostly Irrelevant* and *Type 2: On Target but Mostly Irrelevant* because they were focused on accountability to the Burundian government and their programming was largely unresponsive to the context. But, during two phases, a UN Mission was also able to maintain the relevance of its programming to the context, occupying *Type 3: On Target and Relevant*. The INGOs, on the other hand, tended to fall into *Type 3: On Target and Relevant* and *Type 4: Off Target but Relevant* because they were more focused on their projects and on getting feedback from their beneficiaries than IOs or bilateral donors. But, for two phases, an INGO was in *Type 1: Off Target and Mostly Irrelevant* and one could easily imagine how an INGO could fall into *Type 2: On Target but Mostly Irrelevant* as well. Government aid agencies may be most influenced by the type of aid that they give. A development aid agency would most likely fall into *Type 1: Off Target and Mostly Irrelevant* and *Type 4: Off Target but Relevant*. But, in the cases studied here, DFID was in *Type 3: On Target and Relevant* for the two phases when its primary focus was peacebuilding.

10.4.2 ADAPTATION AND PEACEBUILDING SUCCESS

What is the relationship between the four types discussed here and peacebuilding success? In one sense, there is a very direct relationship. Peacebuilding success, as it is used here, is self-referential. It is achieved if an organization achieves its own peacebuilding goal and this goal has the desired impact on the causes of conflict and hypothesized drivers of peace. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is no agreement in the

literature on the definition of peacebuilding success. There is agreement on what it is not: full scale war and large-scale violent conflict. But, there is no agreement on what it is or how to establish it. Is it a state grounded in rule of law, a market-oriented economy, and democratic institutions, as is put forward by the liberal peacebuilders? Is it an authoritarian state that can guarantee security, stability, and economic development, as is put forward by those focusing on stability?

The basic theory of peace in this dissertation is that “peace” comes in stages and people’s expectations of what peace is will change at each new stage. These stages rarely advance linear positive progression, but the goal of peacebuilders is to help momentum go in a positive direction – toward freedom, toward equality, toward constructive state-society interactions, toward competent and responsive formal and informal institutions, away from violence, away from abuse, away from injustice. The outcome of international peacebuilding results from the interaction between the specific international actors and the specific national actors involved.¹²¹⁷ How an organization interacts with these national institutions and actors has a big influence on the outcome, but is not the only factor that determines it. It is also due to the opportunities that exist in the context, actions by other organizations, and the personalities of the national and international actors involved.

In this research, I have tried to isolate the factors within international institutions that determine their interaction with the context. But, success cannot be understood fully without corresponding examination into the specific national institutions that peacebuilding aims to influence. As a result, I have aimed to identify the factors that

¹²¹⁷ Michael Barnett and Christoph Zuercher, “The Peacebuilder’s Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood,” in *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 23–52; Ole Jacob Sending, “The Effects of Peacebuilding: Sovereignty, Patronage, and Power,” in *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding* (London: Zed, 2011).

determine the capacity of international peacebuilders to understand the national institutions that aim to influence and to adapt their aims, approaches, and programming details based on that understanding. In so doing, I have identified the threshold for peacebuilding success. If international peacebuilders do not adjust their approach to the realities of the national institutions or the trends in the peacebuilding process, then how can they influence either one? The logic follows that if an international peacebuilding organization is able to systematically attempt the gap between its aims and the reality, then it is much more likely achieve these aims over time.

The organizational cases studied in this dissertation generally support this finding. The organizations that were able to systematically adapt to and interact with the relevant context in Burundi also had more evidence that they had achieved their peacebuilding aims than those organizations that did not adapt. It is possible, even likely, that some of the organizations that did not have evidence of achieving their peacebuilding aims still made some important contribution to these aims. But, the organizations did not generally encourage or reward individuals for achieving these outcomes. This made it much less likely that individuals within the organization would try to achieve peacebuilding outcomes, encouraging them instead to aim for targets that the organization prioritized, such as spending money, raising money, writing reports, and doing conflict-insensitive development work. "Perverse incentives thrive on the absence of information."¹²¹⁸

It is also true that some of the organizations that did not have generally relevant programming, had some programming that was very relevant and helped to create momentum in Burundi's peacebuilding process. The BINUB projects that have been mentioned several times before are perhaps the best example. These projects had significant peacebuilding knowledge-laden routines, non-defensive and valid learning

¹²¹⁸ Gibson et al., *The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid*, 34.
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behavior, and significant and representative stakeholder dialogue, whereas the majority of BINUB's other projects did not.

If there were a one-to-one causal relationship between adaptation to the context and achievement of peacebuilding aims then international actors would have to know exactly how to build peace in another country and exactly what skills and tools to use. But, as the Burundi case study demonstrated, a country's war-to-peace trajectory is largely unpredictable. As a result, peacebuilding is risky and uncertain. If an organization is able to systematically adapt to new trends and changes in the relevant context then it is much more likely to eventually "get it right". It is much more likely to be tuned in to new opportunities and be able to alter its aims and approach to take advantage of these opportunities. And, hopefully it would be able to make an important contribution to advancing the country's peacebuilding process. In the least, it would much more likely to achieve its own peacebuilding aims and make these aims more relevant to the country's overall peacebuilding trajectory. If an organization regularly adapts to align its peacebuilding aims and outcomes in response to the context, but continually fails to make the contribution that it aims to make, hopefully it would close up shop and leave. Unfortunately, the cases studied here indicate that many organizations may be reluctant to choose this option, existing instead as "permanently failing organizations".¹²¹⁹

10.4.3 THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINING PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT-SENSITIVE DEVELOPMENT

The findings from this dissertation show that good peacebuilding may be temporary. In other words, very few organizations may be able to sustain peacebuilding that is relevant to the context over several years and several big changes in a country's war-to-peace transition. Organizations have a limited skill-set and routines and systems

¹²¹⁹ Marshall W. Meyer and Lynne G. Zucker, *Permanently Failing Organizations* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1989).

that support that skill set. The changes in a country's war-to-peace trajectory are so significant and rapid that one skill is not likely to be relevant to the peacebuilding trajectory over several phases. Even if the organization is successful at peacebuilding – as was the case most clearly with the BLTP – then its own success causes the needs to outpace its area of expertise. Once people were trained in the BLTP technique, the BLTP did not have a follow-up technique that could help them to apply their new skills to new circumstances. Even when the skill set remains relevant over several phases in a war-to-peace transition, the staff may not.

Peacebuilding therefore presents particular challenges for development organizations and big international bureaucracies. Development organizations increasingly aim to make an overall contribution to peacebuilding or mainstream conflict-sensitivity throughout all of their development programming. But, the development organizations studied here, which included an INGO, an IO, and a bilateral donor, were not able to sustain their focus on peacebuilding or conflict sensitivity at the same time as they focused on other development concerns. The pace of programming, the staff skills needed, the reaction time, the type of analysis necessary, and the degree of attention to the context are different for peacebuilding and conflict sensitive programming and development programming.

Peacebuilding requires a focus on consultation and inclusion of various groups. It requires an examination of the political aspect of all decisions. It requires that organizations work very closely with national partners at the same time that they supplement and build their capacity. Humanitarian routines are based on the assumption that the state is so ineffective that organizations must work around it. Development routines are generally based on the assumption that the state functions well and that donors want to align with and support its priorities and mechanisms.

Very few organizations are solely mandated to do peacebuilding and are likely to quickly shift into working on their core mandate, which in most cases is either development or humanitarian programming. After all, peacebuilding is harder, more complex, and faster moving. It requires extra effort by individuals and the organization, which will usually only be supported if peacebuilding is an organizational priority. Because of the fluid nature of the context and the goal of peacebuilding to impact the overall direction of the context, the gains of peacebuilding are tenuous and difficult to attribute solely to one actor. As a result, even the most successful peacebuilding projects often have difficulty demonstrating their contribution.

Conflict sensitive development or humanitarian intervention – which tries to decrease the negative and increase the positive contribution of the humanitarian or development to the causes of peace – are also likely to be quite difficult to sustain. Unless relevance to the peacebuilding trajectory is a clear organizational priority, it will not be a programmatic priority and will not be taken into account when making decisions about the direction or contribution of a project or program. Peacebuilding can happen on the side, in one or two projects, but these projects are unlikely to have an overall impact on the way that the broader organization engages with the peacebuilding context. If the organization does not question how big changes in the peacebuilding trajectory affect its development, humanitarian, or peacebuilding programming then, by definition, it is not conflict sensitive.¹²²⁰

When development was the primary organizational focus of the organizational cases studied here, the organization was not also able to make an overall contribution to peacebuilding or mainstream conflict sensitivity throughout their programming. The

¹²²⁰ International Alert, Saferworld, and FEWER, *Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack*. Thank you to Diana Chigas of CDA's Reflecting on Peace Practice Project for affirming that this statement is in line with the general understanding of conflict sensitivity.

organizational characteristics required to engage in this type of programming were simply not present. While the INGO – CARE International – was able to maintain several reportedly effective peacebuilding projects, it was very much “peacebuilding on the side” and was not related to Burundi’s broader war-to-peace transition or the rest of CARE’s programming. These findings do not bode well for the engagement of development organizations in peacebuilding, if only because two of the cases under study here – CARE International and DFID – had excellent reputations in Burundi and were considered to be among the best development organizations there.

For the big international bureaucracies studied here – namely the UN Secretariat and UNDP – the innovative and flexible programming required presented a real challenge. While the UN Secretariat was able to change the mandate for its Burundi missions to keep pace with Burundi’s changing context, when the politics of the Security Council allowed, it was not able to change the static nature of the bureaucracy or ensure that staff had the skills and expertise necessary for innovative peacebuilding programming. Consequently, even if a peacebuilding intervention was relevant at its design stage it was often irrelevant to the context by the time it was completed.

10.4.4 FALLING SHORT OF A LIBERAL PEACE, BUT GAINING NATIONAL AGENCY

This dissertation finds that organizational barriers to the implementation of the liberal peace agenda are so great that when the determinants of liberal peace appear in transitional or post-conflict countries they should not be attributed solely, if at all, to liberal peacebuilding interventions.¹²²¹ Peacebuilding organizations’ path dependency and upwardly accountable routines often make many liberal peacebuilders the guarantors of the status quo rather than the liberators of the oppressed. International

¹²²¹ Ibid.

peacebuilding institutions did not have the power, capacity, or authority to impose liberal democratic norms and institutions in Burundi.

Many of the people who work for organizations engaging in peacebuilding in Burundi expressed real frustration with the disconnect between their institutional norms and the reality of what they are able to accomplish in Burundi. They describe a process by which the ideals that they believed in, which caused them to join these organizations, turned into disenchantment as they were stifled by the bureaucratic reality of their organizations, which seemed to be more concerned with writing reports than with achieving real outcomes. They also expressed frustration with the task at hand: how are they supposed to support these norms and standards in an environment where so many people work against them?

My findings show that the agency of the host government is much greater than imagined by both critics and proponents of the liberal peace, in part because of how peacebuilding organizations are structured to relate to the host government. International peacebuilding organizations are under the sovereignty of the host government. All international actors that implement activities in a transitional or post-conflict country have been granted permission to be there by the host government.¹²²² This permission can be quickly taken away if the international actor acts in ways that the government disapproves of. The Burundian government demonstrated this power by kicking three consecutive Special Representatives of the Secretary General (SRSG) out of Burundi. This forced evacuation not only prevents the international peacebuilder or peacebuilding organization from achieving its liberal aims, but can do significant harm to careers. It is a coercive tool that the government can use to ensure that international actors do not push the boundaries too far.

¹²²² The exceptions to this rule are the recent cases of international trusteeship: the former Yugoslavia, Timor-Leste and Kosovo.

National and local agency are also present in the very notion of liberal peacebuilding. National and local actors determine the outcomes of all liberal peacebuilding activities because they must decide whether or not to engage in them or sustain them. If they do not support peacebuilding activities and attempt to sustain their outcomes, then these activities will not achieve liberal results. National and local ownership are therefore integral to peacebuilding outcomes. That said, the focus of most bilateral and multilateral donors on direct engagement with the state privileges national ownership (i.e., by members of the state) over local ownership (i.e., by members of communities, local governments or civil society). The organizational routines that require agreement by the state therefore detract from ownership by other members of society, often leading to the empowerment of an illiberal state.

10.4.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACEBUILDING PRACTICE AND CONFLICT-SENSITIVE DEVELOPMENT

The findings from this dissertation point to several potentially important implications for peacebuilding practice and conflict-sensitive development (grouped under the term peacebuilding for the rest of the section). First, they show that monitoring and evaluation may not be as important for peacebuilding effectiveness as has been assumed in much of the literature, or at least not outside of a self-reflective process.¹²²³ Most organizations had real difficulty monitoring and evaluating their peacebuilding outcomes and complained that they had no time to think about any information that they did receive. The case studies also showed that more monitoring and evaluation may not be the best way to improve peacebuilding effectiveness. Dialogue, discussion, and self-reflection had a bigger effect on the case studies' ability to respond to the peacebuilding context than did more monitoring and evaluation. Maybe this was because the staff had

¹²²³ Cheyanne Church and Mark M. Rogers, "Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs DRAFT" (Search for Common Ground, 2006).

little faith in their monitoring and evaluation tools, but it was also because they did not have time to process all of the information that they received. But, when they held discussions with other staff or stakeholders in the intervention, they were able to take the time to think about their work and consider its relevance to the evolving peacebuilding context.

In addition, some monitoring and evaluation actually discouraged peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity. If donors required that a project or program monitor indicators that were not related to conflict or peacebuilding, then staff were most likely to monitor those indicators and not monitor their relationship to the context. Thus, these accountability mechanisms discouraged accountability for the impact on the peacebuilding context, and instead encouraged accountability for achieving another priority. Although there were no reported instances of this among the case studies, it is also possible that a strong push for results can discourage organizations from taking on the most difficult and most important cases that are less likely to deliver immediate results.¹²²⁴

Second, these case studies show that many of the other tools and approaches that aim to improve peacebuilding effectiveness and conflict sensitivity are insufficient in the absence of the organizational characteristics outlined in the theory above. Conflict analysis and strategies are likely to be insufficient in the absence of organizational characteristics that enable the international peacebuilders to understand the context and the implication of their strategy for real institutions and real people, and to regularly adapt their analysis and strategy as the context changes. Coordination among or between international organizations, donors, and NGOs often detracted from alignment with the peacebuilding context. It all depends on what idea or strategy actors are coordinating

¹²²⁴ Key informant interview, 2011.

around. If they are coordinating around a strategy that aims to support peacebuilding and is grounded in a solid understanding of the context, then it could support responsive peacebuilding. But, most times in Burundi this was not the case. The UN's peacebuilding strategy was very generic and the more political, and important, aspects of it could not be discussed in huge coordination meetings. Furthermore, international actors in Burundi spent so much time in coordination meetings that these reduced the time that they had to talk to Burundians and go outside of Bujumbura, reducing their knowledge or understanding of the Burundian people and institutions that they intended to help or support.

Third, for conflict-sensitive development, this dissertation poses the question of whether it is feasible to mainstream conflict-sensitivity within a development organization. Development organizations usually believe that development is the most important thing that they do (i.e., their predominant organizational frame), which according to these findings would make it difficult for them to continually adapt to big and small changes in a country's peacebuilding trajectory. If an organization does not adapt to big changes in the context that determines whether conflict erupts, it is unlikely to be conflict sensitive.

Fourth, the organizations studied in this dissertation and theory described above paints a more optimistic picture for peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive development than much of the peacebuilding and organizational literature reviewed in Chapter 2 would lead one to believe. It shows that although many organizations face real difficulty understanding and adapting to the conflict dynamics, all organizations managed to do so at one time or another. They took advantage of opportunities that they thought were most relevant to their aims and approach. Leaders took chances and risks. Staff developed innovative mechanisms and programs. Organizations used new strategies and new approaches to alter their incentive structures.

These case studies and the theory presented above show that organizational change is possible. They show that it is difficult for most organizations to keep pace with the rate of change in a country's peacebuilding trajectory, but that many organizations eventually catch up. They show that some of these actors can make a critical contribution to conflict-torn country's transition toward peace, however defined. The theory articulated above shows that there observable organizational characteristics and patterns that may be replicated in other international peacebuilding institutions and which can be used as a basis for better understanding peacebuilding effectiveness and improving the likelihood that international peacebuilders will accompany war-torn countries along their path to peace.

10.5 Significance and Further Research

The findings from this dissertation have potentially broad significance for organizations engaged in peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive development, theories of peacebuilding effectiveness, theories of institutional change, theories of agency and norm dissemination in IOs and INGOs, analyses of aid effectiveness in fragile states, and theories of organizational learning. As a result, it opens up a potentially broad agenda for further research.

For organizations that do peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive development, this dissertation provides a potentially important framework that they could use to assess their likely capacity to be relevant to a country's peacebuilding trajectory. It also provides theories about ways that they could improve this relevance. Most guidelines for peacebuilding practice and conflict-sensitive development have focused on peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive development strategies, programming methods, resources, degree of coordination or integration, monitoring and evaluation approaches, the role of conflict units, and the degree and type of conflict analysis. It has not asked

whether or not the organizations doing this work can employ these methods effectively in conflict-torn countries. Some of the literature on peacebuilding effectiveness has discussed the importance of organizational adaptation and learning, but has not asked when and why it takes place, what its relationship is to peacebuilding success, and how it can be improved.¹²²⁵ The literature on conflict sensitive development has insisted on its importance and outlined the challenges that it faces, but has not investigated in detail whether or not it is possible to mainstream conflict-sensitivity into development organizations.¹²²⁶ In the next phase of this research, I aim to test the generalizability of this theory to the general populations of organizations engaged in peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive development.

The findings from this dissertation also have implications for the debate around the legitimacy of liberal peacebuilding.¹²²⁷ It challenges both proponents and critics by questioning whether or not international actors have the capacity to “impose” liberal peace on conflict-torn countries, in part because of the high degree of agency possessed by the host governments.¹²²⁸ In this way, it contributes to a growing field of “constructively critical research that raise important theoretical and practical questions, some of which challenge liberal premises without making the mistake of discarding the baby with the bathwater.”¹²²⁹

¹²²⁵ Howard, “UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars”; Campbell, “When Process Matters: The Potential Implications of Organizational Learning for Peacebuilding Success”; Mark R. Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed Books, 2001).

¹²²⁶ Peter Uvin, “Structural Causes, Development Cooperation, and Conflict Prevention in Burundi and Rwanda,” *Conflict, Security and Development* 10, no. 1 (2010): 161–179; Juana Brachet and Howard Wolpe, *Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi*, Social Development Papers - Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (Washington, DC: The World Bank, June 2005).

¹²²⁷ Campbell, Chandler, and Sabaratnam, *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding*; Newman, Paris, and Richmond, *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*.

¹²²⁸ Campbell, “Routine Learning? How Peacebuilding Organizations Prevent Liberal Peace.”

¹²²⁹ *Ibid.*

Beyond the peacebuilding field, the findings from this dissertation have potentially important significance for theories of institutional change. The debate in the institutional literature has focused on the source of institutional change and its consequences. To this end, it has debated the importance of exogenous shocks and ensuing “radical institutional reconfigurations” versus slow moving gradual changes that “may be hugely consequential as causes of other outcomes”.¹²³⁰ It has not examined the interaction between a fast-paced institutional change, such as the one that Burundi experienced from 1999 to 2011, and the often slow-paced change of the international institutions that aimed to influence Burundi’s trajectory. Both of these institutional change processes were beset by critical junctures, path dependency, exogenous shocks, and gradual institutional change. Further research will explore the implications of the findings from this dissertation and subsequent theory testing for broader theories of institutional change.

The findings in this dissertation are also potentially relevant to theoretical debates within International Relations about the agency of IOs, INGOs, and donor aid agencies. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore’s path breaking book – *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* - analyzed these international organizations in terms of their organizational characteristics, not simply as agents of states or vehicles of norm dissemination.¹²³¹ Several other authors have carried out similar analyses, but have focused on the organizational aspects of international organizations that are apparent at headquarters, not in field operations.¹²³² No one has examined the organizational factors

¹²³⁰ James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” in *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2–3; Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

¹²³¹ Barnett and Finnemore, “Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics.”

¹²³² Michael Lipson, “Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?,” *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1 (March 2007): 5–34; Michael Lipson, “A Garbage Can Model of UN Peacekeeping,” *Global Governance* 13, no. 1 (March 2007): 79–97; Michael Lipson, “Performance

of multiple types of organizations within one organizational field (i.e., the peacebuilding field) and how they relate to a determinant of peacebuilding effectiveness. Furthermore, there are very few analyses of the inner workings of IOs, INGOs, or donor aid agencies at the field level and the implications that this might have for our assumptions about their independent decision-making capacity. Most analyses of INGOs have focused on their capacity to disseminate international norms, not their capacity to operate on their own to directly affect change in individuals or institutions.¹²³³ Further research will illustrate the theoretical contribution of these findings to debates around the agency of IOs, donor aid agencies, and INGOs.

These findings also have potentially important contributions for the debate around aid effectiveness in fragile and conflict-affected states. The DFID case study provides an important lens into the performance of one of the donors who has been most committed to improving this aid effectiveness. In spite of its commitment, DFID was unable to reconcile the apparent contradictions between the aid effectiveness agenda and its commitments to a new type of partnership with conflict-affected states and societies.¹²³⁴ Further research will build upon the findings from the literature on the political economy of aid and test the generalizability of the DFID case to other donors operating in other conflict-torn countries.¹²³⁵ I will also aim to investigate whether different types of upward accountability influence the response of donors and their grantees to the peacebuilding context.

Under Ambiguity: International organization performance in UN peacekeeping," *Review of International Organizations* 5, no. 3 (September 2010): 249–284; Catherine Weaver, *Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank and the Poverty of Reform* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

¹²³³ Deborah Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan Sell, eds., *Who Governs the Globe?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

¹²³⁴ DFID, *Building the State and Securing the Peace*.

¹²³⁵ *Ibid.*

These findings also have potentially important significance for theories of organizational learning. The case studies show that open and non-defensive learning behavior is insufficient for organizations to align intention and outcome. This could potentially falsify Argyris and Schön's theory of organizational learning, or at least adjust this theory for the particular circumstances facing international peacebuilding organizations.¹²³⁶ Further research will investigate the exact contribution that this research makes to the organizational learning literature.

Based these findings, I will build and refine a typological theory that explains how different types of organizations engaged in peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive development are likely to interact with the war-to-peace transitions that they aim to influence.¹²³⁷ Interviews that I conducted with staff at headquarters and evaluations of the case study organization's work in other countries indicate that many of these findings are generalizable to the broader organization. But, they need to be tested and refined through further case study research to be considered robust.

I will test the generalizability of the findings in this dissertation, and their contribution to the literature mentioned above, through research into the same types of organizations in three or four additional countries. I will select these countries so that they offer a significantly different context from Burundi. I will select a country that is bigger than Burundi, resulting in bigger IOs, INGOs, and donor aid agencies, potentially increasing the difficulty of communication and information sharing. I will select a country that has a less positive peacebuilding trajectory to see how this may affect the organizations' capacity to adapt to its progression. I will select one that is more important geo-strategically, which may lead to more positive and negative attention from

¹²³⁶ Argyris, *On Organizational Learning*.

¹²³⁷ Elman, "Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics"; Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright, "Putting Typologies to Work: Concept Formation, Measurement, and Analytic Rigor."

headquarters. I will also select one that has a government that is more hospitable to international intervention and ideally to liberal democratic norms. It would also be good if one of the additional countries had better data on socio-economic and conflict trends to test the hypothesis of whether or not the presence of more valid information about the context makes a difference for international peacebuilders' interactions with that context.

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APPENDIX A: CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASE STUDY VALUES AND OUTCOMES

Sub-case	Accountability Routines	Knowledge-laden Routines & Organizational Frames	Learning Behavior	Significant Organizational Change Process	Flexible Peacebuilding Funds	Entrepreneurial Leadership Committed to Peacebuilding	Action to Align in Relation to Peacebuilding Aims
BLTP I	No program	No program	No program	No program			No program
BLTP II	Upward/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	Predominant PB Frame/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non- defensive / Valid	Yes	Yes	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
BLTP III	Upward/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	Predominant PB Frame/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non- defensive / Valid	No	No	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
BLTP IV	Upward/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	Predominant PB Frame/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non- defensive / Valid	No	No	Yes	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
BLTP V	Upward/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	Predominant PB Frame/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non- defensive / Valid	Yes	No	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
BLTP VI	Upward/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	Predominant PB Frame/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non- defensive / Valid	No	No	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context

Sub-case	Accountability Routines	Knowledge-laden Routines & Organizational Frames	Learning Behavior	Significant Organizational Change Process	Flexible Peacebuilding Funds	Entrepreneurial Leadership Committed to Peacebuilding	Action to Align in Relation to Peacebuilding Aims
Care I	Upward	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Defensive / Invalid	No	No	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
Care II	Upward	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Defensive / Invalid	No	No	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
Care III	Upward/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive / Valid	Yes	No	Yes	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
Care IV	Upward/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	Predominant PB Frame/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive / Valid	No	No	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
Care V	Upward/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	PB Frame not Predominant/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive / Valid	Yes	No	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
Care VI	Upward/ Sig. & Rep. Stakeholder Dialogue	PB Frame not Predominant/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive / Valid	No	No	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context

Sub-case	Accountability Routines	Knowledge-laden Routines & Organizational Frames	Learning Behavior	Significant Organizational Change Process	Flexible Peacebuilding Funds	Entrepreneurial Leadership Committed to Peacebuilding	Action to Align in Relation to Peacebuilding Aims
DFID I	No program	No program	No program	No program			No program
DFID II	Upward	Predominant PB Frame/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive / Valid	No	Yes	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
DFID III	Upward	Predominant PB Frame/ Sufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive / Valid	No	Yes	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
DFID IV	Upward/ Horizontal	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive / Valid	Yes	No	Yes	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
DFID V	Upward/ Horizontal	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive / Valid	No	No	Yes	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
DFID VI	Upward/ Horizontal	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Non-defensive / Valid	Yes	No	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context

Sub-case	Accountability Routines	Knowledge-laden Routines & Organizational Frames	Learning Behavior	Significant Organizational Change Process	Flexible Peacebuilding Funds	Entrepreneurial Leadership Committed to Peacebuilding	Action to Align in Relation to Peacebuilding Aims
UN Mission I Jan. '99 – Oct. '01 (UNOB)	Upward/ Significant and Representative Stakeholder Dialogue	Predominant Peacebuilding Org. Frame/ Sufficient Peacebuilding Knowledge-laden Routines	Defensive / Valid	No	No	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
UN Mission II Nov. '01 – Nov. '03 (UNOB)	Upward/ Significant and Representative Stakeholder Dialogue	Predominant Peacebuilding Org. Frame/ Sufficient Peacebuilding Knowledge-laden Routines	Defensive / Valid	Yes	No	No	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
UN Mission III Dec. '03 – Aug. '05 (UNOB & ONUB)	Upward/ Horizontal	Predominant Peacebuilding Org. Frame/ Sufficient Peacebuilding Knowledge-laden Routines	Defensive / Invalid	Yes	No	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
UN Mission IV Sept. '05 – April '09 (ONUB & BINUB)	Upward/ Horizontal	Predominant Peacebuilding Org. Frame/ Insufficient Peacebuilding Knowledge-laden Routines	Defensive / Invalid	Yes	Yes	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
UN Mission V May '09 – May '10 (BINUB)	Upward/ Horizontal	Predominant Peacebuilding Org. Frame/ Insufficient Peacebuilding Knowledge-laden Routines	Defensive / Invalid	No	Yes	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming with Relevant Context
UN Mission VI June '10 – Dec. '11 (BINUB & BNUB)	Upward/ Horizontal	Predominant Peacebuilding Org. Frame/ Insufficient Peacebuilding Knowledge-laden Routines	Defensive / Invalid	Yes	No	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context

Sub-case	Accountability Routines	Knowledge-laden Routines & Organizational Frames	Learning Behavior	Significant Organizational Change Process	Flexible Peacebuilding Funds	Entrepreneurial Leadership Committed to Peacebuilding	Action to Align in Relation to Peacebuilding Aims
UNDP I	Upward/ Horizontal	Predominant Peacebuilding Frame/ Insufficient Peacebuilding Knowledge-laden Routines	Defensive / Invalid	No	No	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
UNDP II	Upward/ Horizontal	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Defensive / Invalid	No	No	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
UNDP III	Upward/ Horizontal	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Defensive / Invalid	No	No	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
UNDP IV	Upward/ Horizontal	Predominant PB Frame/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Defensive / Invalid	Yes	Yes	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
UNDP V	Upward/ Horizontal	Predominant PB Frame/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Defensive / Invalid	No	Yes	Yes	Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context
UNDP VI	Upward/ Horizontal	PB Frame not Predominant/ Insufficient PB KL Routines	Defensive / Invalid	Yes	Yes	No	No Significant and Systematic Actions to Align Overall Aims and Means to New Trend in Peacebuilding Trajectory/ No Systematic Actions to Align Programming Details with Relevant Context

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Interview Protocol	
<p>Interview Date:</p> <p>Interview Location:</p> <p>Interviewee:</p> <p>Interview Duration:</p> <p>Process Notes:</p>	
Placement of Individual within Organization	
1.1	<p>What is your position in this organization?</p> <p>Probes:</p> <p>Tasks</p> <p>Time in Burundi</p> <p>Time in organization</p>
Outcomes	
2.1	<p>What peacebuilding projects, activities, or initiatives have you seen that have worked well?</p> <p>Probes:</p> <p>Why? Internal factors and External factors.</p>
2.2	<p>What peacebuilding projects, activities, or initiatives have you seen that have not worked well?</p> <p>Probes:</p> <p>Why? Internal factors and External factors.</p> <p>Unexpected outcomes?</p>
2.3	<p>How do you know whether or not a peacebuilding activity, initiative, or program has worked well?</p> <p>Probes:</p>

	<p>How do you define success?</p> <p>Country-wide and Activity-specific</p>
Action to Align Intention and Outcome	
3.1	<p>How does your unit aim to reduce violence and/or build peace?</p> <p>How does the organization in general aim to reduce violence and/or build peace?</p>
3.2	<p>In what ways has these aims been met or not?</p> <p>Probe:</p> <p>Why? How? Unexpected outcomes?</p>
3.3	<p>Have changes been made in activities to better meet these aims?</p> <p>Probe:</p> <p>When? Why? What?</p>
3.4	<p>Have changes been made in activities in response to other factors?</p> <p>Probe:</p> <p>When? Why? What?</p>
3.5	<p>Have changes been made in the aims?</p> <p>Probe:</p> <p>Why? Why not?</p>
3.6	<p>How has this organization responded to the major changes in Burundi's war-to-peace transition over the past ten years?</p> <p>Probe:</p> <p>Signing of Arusha; first part of the transition government; second part of transition government; elections; inclusion of FNL; preparation for next elections.</p> <p>What events have been most important? Why?</p>
Learning Behavior	

4.1	<p>How do people respond to positive and less positive information about the achievement of peacebuilding aims?</p> <p>Probe:</p> <p>How do people respond to this information when it involves their own work?</p> <p>When it involves other people's work?</p> <p>What information is or isn't shared or discussed?</p>
4.2	<p>How are unexpected outcomes or problems discussed?</p> <p>Probe:</p> <p>Among whom? What types of questions are asked?</p>
4.3	<p>What type of information goes back to partners and beneficiaries about the project implementation?</p> <p>Probe:</p> <p>When? How often?</p> <p>Out to general community – Government, other NGOs, other Donors, etc...</p>
4.4	<p>What is the standard behavior of leaders and managers?</p> <p>Prompt:</p> <p>facilitators, directors, or observers</p> <p>Probe:</p> <p>This country office, other country offices, HQ? Which behavior do you think is most "successful"? Why?</p>
Knowledge-Laden Routines	
5.1	<p>How were the aims of the peacebuilding activity identified?</p> <p>Probes:</p> <p>By whom?</p> <p>Through what routine process?</p> <p>Based on what analysis?</p> <p>How are the general higher-level peacebuilding aims identified?</p>
5.2	<p>What was your activity design process?</p> <p>Probes:</p> <p>Who participated?</p> <p>What was the routine process?</p> <p>What was the analysis that it was based on?</p>

5.3	<p>Based on what guidelines, knowledge or experience were the aims and activities selected and designed?</p> <p>Probes:</p> <p>Individual experience?</p> <p>From other country offices?</p> <p>From headquarters?</p>
5.4	<p>When you came here did you have access to other peoples' lessons?</p> <p>Probe:</p> <p>Within country office?</p> <p>Between teams over time?</p> <p>Between country offices?</p> <p>With other organizations and individuals in country?</p> <p>With HQ & RO?</p> <p>What type of information did you share? In what form?</p> <p>If yes, was it helpful? What? Why?</p>
5.5	<p>What lessons have you learned from implementing your peacebuilding activity? Have you shared the lessons that you have learned?</p> <p>Probe:</p> <p>Within country office?</p> <p>Between teams over time?</p> <p>Between country offices?</p> <p>With other organizations and individuals in country?</p> <p>With HQ & RO?</p> <p>What type of information did you share? In what form?</p> <p>If yes, was it helpful? What? Why?</p>
5.6	<p>What is the background and training of most the staff who you know who work on peacebuilding activities?</p> <p>Probe:</p> <p>Does your experience differ from other program staff?</p> <p>Is it different for those who work in conflict environments and those who work in non-conflict environments?</p> <p>Is it different for those who work "in" conflict and those who work "on" conflict?</p> <p>Is it different for HQ or field?</p> <p>Different for different "levels" of staff?</p>

Accountability Routines

6.1	<p>What type information is reported about the contribution of peacebuilding activities? What happens to information once it is reported?</p> <p>Probe:</p> <p>To whom?</p> <p>How often?</p> <p>In response to what?</p>
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6.2	<p>What determines whether peacebuilding activities continue to receive funding?</p> <p>Probe:</p> <p>Funding in the first place?</p> <p>Staff resources?</p> <p>For positive and less-positive outcomes?</p>
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6.3	<p>How is the allocation and reallocation of resources decided?</p> <p>Probe:</p> <p>In response to what are resources reallocated?</p> <p>How common?</p> <p>For positive and less-positive outcomes?</p>
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6.4	<p>What are staff rewarded for? Why are people promoted?</p> <p>Probe:</p> <p>Held back? In this Country Office? At HQ? In other Country Offices?</p> <p>Different for those who work on peacebuilding activities?</p> <p>For positive and less-positive outcomes?</p>
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6.5	<p>What is this office rewarded for? Reprimanded for?</p> <p>Probes:</p> <p>What brings visibility? Incentives?</p> <p>What do individuals see as a reward?</p> <p>How does this relate to peacebuilding aims?</p>
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Further information

7.1	Anything else I should know?
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7.2	Who else should I talk to? Documents?