

# CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES: RESCUING ARMS CONTROL

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*The historically discouraging experience of arms control talks, combined with new threats to peace, has recently focused attention on peripheral yet equally important measures of maintaining the stability of the world military balance. John Borawski views these alternative tactics, known as "confidence-building measures" or CBMs, as useful in a multitude of situations. By institutionalizing increased communication and information exchange, the observation and inspection of opposing forces, and the limitation of potentially threatening activities, CBMs actually complement arms control agreements. In addition, he asserts, unintended crises may be avoided through the use of the greater communication provided by CBMs. Mr. Borawski concludes that whatever their utility outside of arms control, arms limitation agreements themselves will be only as effective as the confidence inspired by CBM agreements.<sup>1</sup>*

Although U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations resumed in Geneva on March 12, 1985, arms control remains in a general state of paralysis. Past efforts to limit force levels have produced ambiguous results. The problem is compounded by radical disagreements over the optimal course to pursue in future talks and serious questions about compliance with existing accords. What progress has occurred over the past decades is being threatened by technological advances and the pace of force modernization.

Questions have also been raised about the *kind* of arms control that has been pursued. For the past fifteen years, the principal East-West arms control negotiations — SALT/START, INF, and MBFR — focused on limiting and reducing force levels. The traditional quantitative approach has failed to address two major problems, however.

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1. Portions of this article will appear in John Borawski, ed., *Avoiding Nuclear War: Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).

First, there now exists a concern about the initiation of war by surprise attack at both the conventional and nuclear level. In Europe, the Soviet Union is credited with having attained by the late 1970s a "standing start" offensive posture which, coupled with the gradual shift in favor of the Soviet Union in overall theater nuclear force assets, might threaten swift, conventional victory and effective denial of NATO's threat to resort to nuclear weapons. At the central strategic level, the Soviets have acquired an ability to pose a significant threat to the land-based elements of the U.S. strategic triad (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) by virtue of an almost three-to-one advantage over the United States in time-urgent, hard-target kill potential. Although no consensus exists on the import and the extent of these developments, these trends, coupled with the accelerating effort to develop anti-satellite and ballistic missile defenses, pose a real and growing risk that in a future superpower crisis, either side may be more tempted than before to launch a sudden, preemptive blow against the other's retaliatory forces. This crisis instability not only enhances the opportunities for political suasion and nuclear blackmail, but magnifies the risk that conflict may erupt inadvertently, by miscalculation or misinterpretation of an adversary's military activities.

Second, war initiated by third parties — "catalytic war" — has attracted renewed attention. Because of the diffusion of nuclear technology, worldwide growth in plutonium stocks, and the rise in the incidence of international terrorism, the fear has grown that a terrorist group, or some other third party, will acquire and detonate a nuclear device in such a way as to induce one or more of the nuclear powers to believe that an attack by another nuclear power has occurred. Although this scenario also represents a form of miscalculation, it is one even further removed from government control, and one which Moscow and Washington may be unable to contain.

The discouraging record of efforts to limit weapons proliferation, and the inadequate attention paid to measures explicitly directed at preventing and managing crises that would most likely create the risk of war in the first place, requires an examination of a neglected form of arms control: "confidence-building measures," or CBMs.

This article seeks to explain the significance of CBMs as alternatives to arms control in its "traditional" sense, survey CBM agreements in force and contemporary proposals, and offer some judgments as to the salience and negotiability of these measures in the present era of growing strategic uncertainty.<sup>2</sup>

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2. Apparently the term "CBM" was coined by NATO in or about 1972 in preparation for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the 1975 Final Act of which is the

## I. CONFIDENCE IN WHAT?

Although CBMs can be variously defined, essentially they are procedures that do not seek to limit forces in terms of quantity or quality, but rather control and communicate how, when, where, and why military activities are employed. They are intended to mitigate the possibility of conflict occurring through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication, and to diminish opportunities for political coercion and surprise attack. CBMs focus on the *use* of military activities and the *intentions* behind those activities, rather than on direct regulation of the hardware *per se*. They attempt to assure that military factors do not force the pace of crises; that procedures are at hand to prevent, contain, and de-escalate crises; that if conflict begins inadvertently escalation can be reversed as early as possible; and that if aggression is deliberately intended, then at least an attacker's task will be complicated and the advantage of strategic and tactical surprise denied. As such, CBMs should promote both military and political stability over the short- and long-term, in times of both crisis and calm.

Three very general and interrelated CBM types can be identified, as illustrated by Table I.

The first type of CBM concerns information exchange. On a basic level, the purpose is simply to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding by imposing a greater degree of "openness" or "transparency"

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first agreement to employ the term. Jan Sizoo and Rudolf Th. Jurrjens, *CSCD Decision-Making* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), p. 30; Ljubivoje Acimovic, interview with author, Haiko, Finland, 12 June 1985. Although CBMs have, in general, eluded the type and volume of analysis that other forms of arms control have received over the years, the most useful works to date would include the following: Jonathon Alford, ed., *The Future of Arms Control, Part III: Confidence-Building Measures*, Adelphi Paper no. 149 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), and Alford, "The Usefulness and Limitations of CBMs," in *New Directions in Disarmament*, eds. William Epstein and Bernard T. Feld (New York: Praeger, 1981), pp. 133-44; Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 303-09; John Borawski ed., *Avoiding Nuclear War: Confidence-Building Measures For Crisis Stability*; Borawski, "The Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures," *Arms Control*, vol. 6, no. 2 (1985); Richard Burr, "Building Confidence: Strategy for Enhanced Security," *Harvard International Review* 6 (March 1984): 23-29; Karl E. Birnbaum, ed., *Confidence-Building and East-West Relations* (Laxenburg, Austria: Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1983); Abbot A. Brayton, "Confidence-Building Measures in European Security," *The World Today*, 36 (October 1980): 386-91; Richard E. Darilek, "Building Confidence and Security in Europe: The Road to and from Stockholm," *Washington Quarterly*, 8 (Winter 1985): 131-40; James E. Goodby, "Security for Europe," *NATO Review*, 32 (June 1984): 9-14; Johan Jørgen Holst and Katen Alette Melander, "European Security and Confidence-Building Measures," *Survival*, 19 (July-August 1977): 31-45, and Holst, "Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," *Survival* 25 (January-February 1983): 2-15; F. Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe, eds., *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe* (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1983); and William L. Ury and Richard Smoke, *Beyond the Hotline* (Cambridge: Harvard Law School Nuclear Negotiation Project, 1984).

Table I  
TYPES OF CBMs

INFORMATION EXCHANGE	OBSERVATION/ INSPECTION	OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS
Disclosure of military budgets, major unit and command location and organization, force levels, doctrine	Observers at military exercises On-site inspection Sensors at ICBM silos	Ban on simulated attacks Designated troop exit/entry points Ban on forward-basing of "offensive" weapons and combat support equipment
Notification of accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained nuclear detonations	Noninterference with national technical means of verification	Ban on multiple missile launches
Advance notification of military exercises, missile launches	Non-concealment undertakings	SSBN sanctuaries/ASW-free zones
Dedicated communication links (Hotline)	Enhanced conditions for military liaison missions and military attaches	
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers		

N.B. Any one measure can serve multiple purposes.

on military activities. While such a measure may sound rather simplistic, it cannot be overstressed that surprise is often achieved not because of lack of warning, but because of a misreading of the adversary's intentions, even when ample warning is available. In addition, "surprise relies mainly on the conceptual ability to overcome the enemy's *understanding* of what is going on,"<sup>3</sup> that is, on deception. Therefore, the more that is understood about the activities of a potential adversary, the greater the chances of reducing uncertainty, and thus of diminishing the risks of surprise attack and miscalculation.

Information exchange can assume several forms. For instance, it can include military-to-military discussions held on a routine, peacetime basis to exchange views and concerns about strategy and force posture. It can also include communication facilities such as the U.S.-Soviet Hotline, which is reserved for the rapid transmission of urgent information for the purpose of clarifying intentions in emergencies. Another type of

3. Lt. General Bar-lev (Israel), quoted in Julian Critchley, *Warning and Response* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1978), p. 75.

information CBM concerns the advance notification of military activities. The purpose of announcing major military maneuvers several weeks in advance, along with details, is to enable each side to form a clearer picture of the pattern of routine activities the other side conducts. Within such a framework, anomalies can be detected earlier and more clearly, and sudden aggression or political intimidation can be inhibited. If a state fails to announce a given activity, or if what is announced does not comport with national intelligence data, or if the information disclosed itself causes alarm, other states will be able to take precautionary measures earlier and in a less ambiguous environment. Advance notification can also calm unwarranted alarm by avoiding misunderstanding. Thus, the first U.S.-Soviet notification CBM provided for the advance notification of planned ballistic missile launches — misinterpretation of which could lead to unintended catastrophe, particularly when test launches occur in the context of large-scale strategic exercises that simulate wartime conditions.

The second type of CBM focuses on observation and inspection. Observation usually refers to inspection arranged well in advance by invitation. Inspection normally connotes short-notice surveillance of a more intrusive nature triggered by the demand of the party seeking inspection. The purpose of both CBMs is to allow each side to assess independently the character of the other's military activities, thereby alleviating — or confirming — suspicions. Independent observation and inspection in a situation fraught with the potential for conflict could help defuse the situation. Failure to permit observation or inspection, of course, would provide another warning indicator. Moreover, evidence collected by negotiated, active, cooperative measures can be used to challenge the violating state, whereas intelligence obtained by national technical means will almost certainly prove too sensitive to reveal, lest sources and methods be compromised.

The third type of CBM concerns operational constraints. These measures restrict military activities by constraining in an operational sense how, when, and where such activities are conducted. Examples would include: prohibiting the field training of troops above a certain personnel or unit threshold; requiring that troops enter or exit a designated zone by only specified routes; and forbidding the forward-deployment of "offensive" weapons. The purpose of operational constraints is to avoid the employment or deployment of military forces in potentially threatening modes, and where possible, to increase warning time by complicating preparations for aggression. For example, during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis President Kennedy ordered the suspension of all routine U.S. flights in the direction of the Soviet Union. And during the 1973 Arab-Israeli

war, the Soviets refrained from placing their nuclear forces on elevated alert status despite President Nixon's decision to go to DEFCON III. Permanently operating constraints such as these could prove invaluable in future crises by providing an extra measure of reassurance and clarity when it is needed most.

To illustrate how these three types of CBMs could effectively work to prevent inadvertent confrontation, assume that NATO were to begin staging its large-scale annual Autumn Forge maneuvers in Western Europe at the same time as the eruption of a domestic crisis in Eastern Europe. Just as it would be useful for the Soviets to know that the NATO exercises were not intended and would not be employed as preparations for a Western intervention in Eastern Europe, it would be useful for NATO to know that Soviet preparations to intervene in Eastern Europe were not intended as a precursor to an attack against NATO. Both sides could also take advantage of operational constraints to provide extra reassurance such as refraining from conducting military activities that could not possibly be associated solely with routine maneuvers and police actions, respectively. With both sides providing reassuring information and avoiding deployments which could give grounds for assuming the worst, the risks of a nuclear-age Sarajevo could be considerably diminished.<sup>4</sup>

In addition to their military significance, CBMs can also serve other important political purposes, in terms of stabilizing international relations.

First, CBMs prohibiting the deployment or exercise of troops near border areas can reduce opportunities for intimidation, whereas advance notification can serve to inhibit sudden "sabre-rattling" or "gunboat diplomacy" — factors which are especially sensitive for smaller countries.

Second, over time, long-term stability can be promoted through CBM regimes which erect barriers against the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of nations. These regimes might thereby reduce the impact of the military factor on interstate relations.

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4. Although CBMs are likely to prove most useful in preventing crises, CBMs may also have a role to play in de-escalating and terminating crises or even hostilities after actual conflict erupts, e.g., cease-fire procedures, special observation regimes, and peacekeeping forces. Although conflict termination is, obviously, the hard case whether CBMs are applied to inadvertent or advertent confrontation, there is still much truth in Immanuel Kant's observation that "some sort of confidence in an enemy's frame of mind must remain even in time of war, for otherwise no peace could be concluded, and the conflict would become a war of extermination." From *Eternal Peace* (1795), Section I(6), quoted in Trevor N. Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman, *A Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament* (New York: Bowker, 1983), p. 35.

Third, because the majority of CBMs avoid interminable wrangling about the military balance, countries otherwise reluctant to engage in arms control might find CBMs palatable. No state has to forfeit a planned weapon system; it need only refrain from conducting its military activities in potentially threatening ways. For this reason, CBMs may also prove more likely to command bipartisan support, posing fewer negotiability and ratification risks than agreements aimed at force reductions. For example, despite the suspension in late 1983 of the START and INF negotiations, both superpowers found it possible to agree in July 1984 to upgrade the Hotline, and to convene, in January of that year, the multilateral Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe — only a few weeks after the first U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles became operational in Western Europe.

Finally, CBMs have been viewed as catalysts toward greater political accommodation. As Jonathan Alford has noted in the case of the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement, "By first instituting a series of measures to separate forces and reduce military tension in the Sinai, the conditions for a political solution were created."<sup>5</sup> CBMs have also been understood as catalysts toward other forms of arms control, such as disarmament negotiations, by laying a foundation on which to build more ambitious accords. In short, the "confidence" CBMs can generate is manifold.

## II. CBMs PAST AND PRESENT

Although earlier examples could be cited,<sup>6</sup> the 1963 U.S.-Soviet Hotline is commonly regarded as the first "CBM" agreement. A product of the Cuban missile crisis and U.S. initiative, the Hotline has been upgraded twice, in 1971 and 1984, and was reportedly used during the 1967 and 1973 Middle East wars, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, the 1979 Chinese intervention in Vietnam, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and in 1982 with regard to Lebanon. Several additional bilateral CBM agreements followed.

In 1971, the Accidents Measures agreement was concluded. It requires each side to maintain adequate safeguards against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; to notify the other immediately in the event of an accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained incident involv-

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5. Alford, "The Usefulness and the Limitations of CBMs," p. 135.

6. For example, an early "notification" agreement was the 1930 Graeco-Turkish protocol, which required each side to provide six months' notice of the acquisition of naval vessels. An early "constraint" agreement was the 1936 Montreux convention, which regulated warship deployment in the Black Sea and passage through the Turkish straits.

ing the possible detonation of nuclear weapons; to notify the other immediately in the event of unidentified objects or of interference with warning systems; and to notify the other in advance of planned missile launches beyond national territory and in the direction of the other side. Similar "accidents" agreements were concluded by the Soviet Union with France in 1976 and with Britain in 1977.

The 1972 Incidents at Sea agreement requires the parties to observe the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, to refrain from provocative acts at sea, and to notify mariners and airmen of actions — such as missile tests — which might pose a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight. The agreement is credited with having aided in defusing potential crises and with providing a model for military-to-military consultations.<sup>7</sup>

The conclusion of the ABM Treaty and the SALT I interim agreement also occurred in 1972. The ABM treaty established the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to promote the implementation of both the ABM and the SALT I accords. Although the SCC is primarily a compliance board, it also serves a number of confidence-building objectives. For instance, Article XIII (1) (d) authorizes the SCC to "consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty" — language presumably broad enough to cover questions other than verification. The SCC is also charged with overseeing the 1971 Accidents Measures agreement.

The 1973 Prevention of Nuclear War agreement requires the two sides to refrain from acts that could exacerbate relations between them, and to enter into urgent consultations should such events arise.

Lastly, in the category of bilateral U.S.-Soviet CBM agreements, Article XVI of the SALT II treaty, which is politically binding on both sides, requires advance notification of all multiple ICBM launches and of single launches planned to extend beyond national territory, regardless of direction. This measure closed two significant loopholes in the Accidents Measures agreement since neither side launches ICBMs in the explicit direction of the other side, and since it also provided for multiple launches not planned to extend beyond national territory (but which, nevertheless, could give rise to misunderstanding).

The superpowers are also parties to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Final Act provides for five measures for application in Europe (although excluding all but a 250 kilometer strip of Soviet and Turkish territory

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7. See Sean Lynn-Jones, "A Quiet Success for Arms Control: Preventing Incidents at Sea," *International Security* 9 (Spring 1985):154-84.



facing or shared with other CSCE participating states): politically mandatory notification twenty-one days in advance of ground troop maneuvers exceeding 25,000 personnel; and, on a voluntary basis, prior notification of troop movements, prior notification of smaller-scale maneuvers, exchange of observers at notifiable maneuvers, and exchange of goodwill military delegations. Although the intent of the Final Act measures was to reduce the dangers of confrontation "particularly in a situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities," their militarily modest and voluntary character prompted the inauguration of a new conference in Stockholm (discussed below).

An ambitious array of CBM initiatives building on the aforementioned agreements is also currently underway in various fora. However, there is no superpower consensus as to proper direction for the future CBM accords.

In general, the West has tended to favor the first two CBM types — information exchange and observation/inspection — with the objective of reducing the secrecy surrounding Warsaw Pact military activities. The Soviets have tended to resist greater military openness in favor of stressing broad political declarations, such as the non-use of force, which the West does not regard as CBMs. At the same time, however, the USSR has advanced measures which are ostensibly much more militarily significant than U.S. and NATO measures, such as operational constraints on military activities. An examination of the U.S. and NATO proposals and then of the Soviet CBM approach will demonstrate this difference.

### III. START AND INF

In the START and INF negotiations, now taking place as part of the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms, the United States proposed in 1983 that all launches of ballistic missiles at or exceeding 1,800 km in range — ICBMs, SLBMs, and land-based, longer-range INF ballistic missiles (Pershing II, SS-20, SS-4) — be announced in advance. These initiatives build upon the 1971 Accidents Measures and SALT II accords by including *all* ICBM launches, whether multiple or single and whether or not confined to national territory, and, for the first time, by requiring notification of all SLBM and LRINF ballistic missile launches. Because any launch of a ballistic missile, except for "pop up" tests, conceivably could generate alarm on the other side, a comprehensive missile notification regime is long overdue. As William Perry has observed:

Test notification, in my judgment, is not an academic issue. A number of years ago, the Soviets launched a whole squadron

of operational missiles, thereby making room for a new type of missile in the vacated silos. The Soviets were either displaying an incredible insensitivity or a blind faith in the reliability of our sensor and warning systems — a greater faith than I have. On these occasions, we did recognize the firings for what they were, but this was a dangerous game.<sup>8</sup>

Inclusion of SLBM and LRINF missile launches has special importance for crisis stability because unlike ICBMs, which are normally tested from known test ranges, SLBMs are tested from operational submarines. Coupled with the fact that SLBMs do not have permissive action links (PALs) — devices that preclude arming or launching until the insertion of a prescribed code or combination — SLBM launches could be especially subject to misinterpretation. Further, the short flight times of LRINF missiles and forward-based SLBMs also make them likely to generate alarm in the event of an unexplained launch, particularly in times of tension.

In addition, in START the United States proposed that each side provide advance notification of all major military exercises involving nuclear forces. Because large-scale exercises simulate wartime conditions, a reciprocal information exchange regime would serve a very useful purpose in avoiding misinterpretation. In both START and INF, the United States also proposed expanded information exchange on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces so as to enhance understanding as well as to aid in verification. As President Reagan stated on June 11, 1982: "Taken together, these steps would represent a qualitative improvement in the nuclear environment. They would help reduce the chances of misinterpretation in the case of exercises and test launches. And they would reduce the secrecy and ambiguity which surround military activity."<sup>9</sup>

#### IV. MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

In December 1979, NATO proposed a series of "associated measures" at the MBFR negotiations, primarily to enhance verification of an agreement on common, collective ground and air force active duty manpower ceilings in Central Europe. The associated measures, however, also contain two procedures designed for confidence-building, which is a function

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8. "Measures To Reduce the Risk Of Nuclear War," *Orbis* 28 (Winter 1984), pp. 1033-34. More recently, within the past two years, the Soviets launched thirty ballistic missiles within a 48-hour period. NORAD briefing, Cheyenne Mountain Complex, Colorado, 27 June 1985.

9. Quoted in U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Security and Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace* (1984), p. 52.

sometimes related to but distinguishable from verification:<sup>10</sup> notification thirty days in advance and by annual calendar of out-of-garrison activities by one or more division-size formations, and exchange of observers at announced out-of-garrison activities. These CBMs would apply to the territory of all European participating states, not just those with forces deployed in Central Europe, including a "substantial" portion of the USSR.

#### V. THE WEINBERGER REPORT

On April 11, 1983, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger issued a report recommending four new CBMs, which were endorsed by President Reagan on May 24, 1983.<sup>11</sup> The first measure proposed upgrading the Hotline by adding high-speed facsimile capability, to enable the two sides to transmit more complex data more rapidly and reliably. Instead of the present rate of one page of text per three minutes, the facsimile capability would allow for the transmission of three pages of text (or other forms) per minute. On July 17, 1984, the Hotline modernization agreement was concluded through an exchange of notes in Washington.

The second measure called for the establishment of a "Joint Military Communications Link," or JMCL, which would supplement the Hotline to facilitate communications below the head-of-state level regarding the military aspects of a crisis. The JMCL could be used for consultation and information-sharing in peacetime as well as in crisis.

The third measure called for an improved embassy-capital link between the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the State Department, and between the Soviet Embassy in Washington and the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Together with the Hotline and the JMCL, this communication link would contribute to resolving emergencies as rapidly as possible.

The fourth measure called for a multilateral agreement, open to all states, which would provide for consultation in the event of a nuclear incident involving a terrorist group or some other non-state actor. Presumably such an accord would supplement existing U.S.-Soviet consultations in various bilateral and multilateral fora, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors and General Conference meetings.

Despite the July 1984 Hotline upgrade, the Soviets have not expressed interest thus far in the JMCL and the embassy-capital link, and U.S.

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10. Although the two are sometimes used interchangeably, CBMs are distinct from verification measures in that CBMs stand alone as arms control instruments, and require verification themselves.

11. U.S., Department of Defense, *Report to the Congress by Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger on Direct Communication Links and Other Measures to Enhance Stability*, 11 April 1983.

European allies reportedly have failed to express enthusiasm for a multilateral nuclear incidents agreement.<sup>12</sup> These initiatives, nevertheless, may represent possible avenues for future discussions on a multilateral or bilateral basis.<sup>13</sup>

On May 8, 1985, President Reagan, addressing the European Parliament in Strasbourg, proposed the JMCL again as a "channel for exchanging notifications and other information regarding routine military activities" which over time "might evolve into a 'risk reduction' mechanism for rapid communication and exchange of data in times of crisis."<sup>14</sup> The President also proposed a regular exchange of U.S. and Soviet military observers at military exercises and locations, and regular, high-level contacts between U.S. and Soviet military leaders "to develop better understanding and to prevent potential tragedies from occurring." He cited the September 1983 destruction of a Korean airliner and the March 1985 Soviet shooting of a U.S. military liaison mission officer in East Germany. "[A]s terrible as past events have been," the President declared, "it would be more tragic if we were to make no attempt to prevent even larger tragedies from occurring through lack of contact and communication."<sup>15</sup>

## VI. SPACE ARMS CONTROL

Although current prospects for progress in space arms control are highly uncertain due to U.S. interest in a transition to defensive systems, CBMs could play a role in averting destabilization whether or not this transition goes forward. For example, with regard to anti-satellite (ASAT) activities, President Reagan stated on March 31, 1984 that among the arms control options under review was the regulation of "certain threatening activities related to space,"<sup>16</sup> which might include "restricting threatening activity and/or prohibiting attacks on satellites."<sup>17</sup> Conceivable ASAT and ballistic missile defense options could range from modest measures on information exchange about planned tests and programs, to constraints on space activities, *e.g.*, a ban on simulated attacks and on

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12. Lynn F. Rusten, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: Background and Analysis of Senate Resolution 329," in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 2d sess., 14 April 1984, p. 61.

13. In this context, it is encouraging to note that in June 1985 the SCC issued a communiqué stating that the two countries had reached a "common understanding" relating to the 1971 Accidents Measures agreement to consult urgently in the event of a third-party nuclear incident.

14. "Excerpts From Reagan's Address to the European Parliament," *New York Times*, May 9, 1985, p. A22.

15. *Ibid.*

16. "Report to the Congress on U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms Control," 31 March 1984, p. 16.

17. U.S., Department of State, *Security and Arms Control*, p. 65.

close passes by satellites and other vehicles near the satellites of the other side, and a ban on concurrent ASAT and ballistic missile defense system testing with ballistic missile test launches. Although space CBM considerations ultimately will be affected by the conclusions both sides draw about the character of deterrence in the next century, the need is clear for rules of the road to manage this competition and to avoid miscalculation.

## VII. THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

On January 17, 1984, the United States, Canada, and 33 European states convened the "Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe" (CDE) in Stockholm. Although future stages of the CDE may be devoted to arms reduction discussions, the first stage, which will endure at least until November 4, 1986, will be exclusively concerned with CBMs — or "CSBMs" in CDE parlance ("security" was inserted to distinguish the CDE measures from the CBMs of the Helsinki Final Act). The CDE objective is to negotiate a regime of militarily significant, politically binding, and verifiable CSBMs applicable to the whole of Europe as far east as the Urals. The NATO proposal, advanced on January 24, 1984, calls for (1) information exchange on the organization and location of major ground and air force formations, and on regulations governing accredited military personnel; (2) notification by annual calendar of military activities notifiable under measure three; (3) forty-five days' advance notification of out-of-garrison land activities at the divisional level or at 6,000 troops, mobilization activities at three divisions or 25,000 troops, and amphibious activities at three battalions or 3,000 personnel; (4) observers at notifiable activities; (5) non-interference with national technical means of verification and on-site ground and air inspection on demand; and (6) enhanced communication links among governments (bilateral "hotlines"). The NATO proposal builds upon the Helsinki Final Act by lowering the notification threshold from 25,000 to 6,000 personnel, extending the notification periods from twenty-one to forty-five days (so as more closely to approximate the time actually required to prepare for maneuvers<sup>18</sup>), expanding the types of notifiable activities, and introducing new measures such as annual calendar notification, information exchange, on-site inspection, and communications. The effect is to capture a larger array of military activities and thereby better prohibit potentially threatening activities and provide greater understanding and knowledge of the employment of opposing forces.

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18. Holst, "Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," p. 10.

### VIII. NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

The U.S. Congress has also focused on the need for CBMs. Indeed, the Weinberger report, discussed above, was prepared by way of a response to a September 1982 amendment to the 1983 Department of Defense Authorization Act. The amendment, sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), John Warner (R-Va.), and the late Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), requested a study of possible measures for improving the containment and control of nuclear weapons use, especially during crises.

Although the Senators praised the Weinberger initiatives, they also concluded that more comprehensive arrangements should be pursued. To this end, they proposed the establishment of separate national "nuclear risk reduction centers" in Moscow and Washington, which would maintain a continuous watch on any events with the potential of leading to nuclear incidents. The function of these centers, which were first proposed in conceptual terms by Henry Kissinger in 1960,<sup>19</sup> would be to outline procedures in the event of possible incidents involving the use of nuclear weapons, maintain contact during incidents precipitated by nuclear terrorists, exchange information about events which might lead to nuclear proliferation or to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by sub-national groups, exchange information about military activities that might be misunderstood during periods of tension, and establish a dialogue about nuclear doctrine, forces, and activities. Senate Resolution 329 urging the negotiation of these centers was passed unanimously on June 15, 1984.

Although the 1983 Weinberger report explicitly rejected the risk reduction center concept in favor of the JMCL, the Reagan administration gave its support to the concept on August 26, 1985<sup>20</sup>. However, neither the JMCL nor the risk reduction center concept has yet attracted active Soviet interest.

### IX. THE SOVIET CBM APPROACH

The Soviet Union, although having proposed measures similar if not identical to those of the United States and NATO Europe, appears to approach CBMs from a different perspective. Their view seems to be characterized by an enduring distaste for "transparency" and by extremes in terms of military significance — ranging from political declarations to ambitious constraint measures. However, as evidenced by historical

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19. "Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack," *Foreign Affairs* 38 (July 1960):566-67.

20. See Robert Bell, "Memorandum for the Record on Nunn/Warner Proposal on Risk Reduction Centers," U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 9 September 1985.

experience, areas of U.S.-Soviet convergence do appear to exist which offer the promise of useful cooperation.

On the one hand, the Soviets have long favored "declaratory" measures pledging benign intent but little more — "instant" CBMs, as it were. For example, in the CDE the centerpiece of the Soviet proposal is a treaty on the non-use of force and on the no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Adoption of either pledge, declared Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on January 18, 1984, would constitute "the greatest accomplishment" of the Stockholm Conference. The Soviets describe the NATO CSBMs as "aimed at laying bare the military activities of the Warsaw Treaty countries, at securing unilateral military advantages."<sup>21</sup> The Soviets do, however, favor improved notification and observation measures in their own CSBM proposal (*e.g.*, thirty days advance notification of ground troop exercises exceeding 20,000 troops), albeit of a more modest scope than the NATO measures, as well as improved means for crisis consultations. Nevertheless, at Stockholm the Soviets insisted that a CSBM regime "organically combine" what they term "political-legal" and "military-technical" measures. NATO has agreed, in fact, to such a formula; what remains to be seen is how far the Soviets will go in its adoption.

On the other hand, the Soviets have proposed CBMs of a much more ambitious scope than U.S. and NATO measures — operational constraints. Soviet proposals on this score include the prohibition of maneuvers exceeding 40,000 troops (advanced in MBFR and in the CDE), limits on naval activities, and various constraints affecting strategic and theater/tactical nuclear forces. For instance, a Moscow radio broadcast criticized the Weinberger report because it allegedly ignored the "specific and far-reaching" Soviet CBMs advanced in START such as bans on flights by heavy bombers and on aircraft carrier patrols in agreed zones adjoining national territory, and bans on ASW activity in SSBN sanctuaries.<sup>22</sup> The United States has long opposed these measures for a variety of reasons, including their effect on U.S. security commitments to Europe and Japan and upon overall military flexibility. Although Soviet constraint proposals naturally tend to favor their authors in various cases (to wit, aircraft carrier constraints and maneuver ceilings — 40,000 being a level that Warsaw Pact exercises rarely exceed, unlike NATO maneuvers), in theory constraints are of greater significance than other types of

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21. CDE Plenary statement by Oleg A. Grinevsky, Head of USSR Delegation 22 March, 1985, p. 4.

22. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Soviet Union* 14 April 1983, p. AA2.

CBMs because they actually do something about military activities in an operational sense. According to Gromyko: "the Soviet Union stands for preventing dangers and crisis situations, while the United States proposes simply to exchange information."<sup>23</sup>

An important factor to take into account in gauging Soviet attitudes toward CBMs is the inadequate record of Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Final Act CBMs. Until 1981, Eastern compliance had been adequate, if less than stellar. For example, Eastern notifications were typically very sparse and observers were invited on few occasions and generally from a select group of geographically proximate states. U.S. observers were invited to Warsaw Pact maneuvers only twice and not at all since 1979.

During 1984-1985, NATO and the neutral/nonaligned countries invited observers to thirty-one out of thirty-nine announced maneuvers, while the Warsaw Pact invited observers to only seven out of twenty-two announced maneuvers.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, in August 1981, the Soviets failed to disclose required information concerning the number and type of forces and the designation of a large-scale exercise held in the Byelorussian and Baltic military districts. Subsequently, TASS, rather than the required normal diplomatic channels, revealed that the exercise (Zapad-81) involved roughly 100,000 troops — one of the largest Soviet exercises in post-war history, the first large-scale test of the Operational Maneuver Group, and a show-of-force obviously designed to intimidate Poland. With additional compliance issues raised in connection with at least two other known exercises (Soyuz-81 and Shield-82), Soviet willingness to comply with even more ambitious measures, such as are being discussed in the CDE, might legitimately be called into question.

It should also be observed that, although recent trends may indicate otherwise,<sup>25</sup> the Soviets tend to view CBMs as integrally related to arms reductions. Separation of the two, Soviet commentators charge, is akin to what the Soviets argued during the disarmament negotiations of the 1950s — that the West seeks "control" without disarmament. Thus, while in START and INF the United States proposed separate CBM agreements, the Soviet proposals were framed as articles in their START and INF treaty proposals. Likewise, even though the Stockholm Confer-

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23. "Excerpts from Gromyko Speech Reviewing Soviet Union's Foreign Policy," *New York Times*, 17 June 1983, p. A8.

24. CDE Plenary statement by James Goodby, Head of U.S. Delegation, 24 September 1984, p. 1.

25. Bruce Allyn of Harvard's Russian Research Center detects two schools of Soviet thought on this score, noting that "there are indications that the Soviets may be loosening the heretofore tight linkage between CBMs . . . and the overall political relationship and arms control." "Soviet Views Of CBMs," in *Avoiding Nuclear War*, ed. Borawski.



ence is concerned solely with CSBMs, the Soviets introduced a variety of disarmament measures involving nuclear and chemical weapons. Hence, although both the United States and the Soviet Union view CBMs as complementing other forms of arms control, this understanding has been practically expressed in different ways. In addition, the Soviets tend to view the negotiability of CBMs as linked to the overall political relationship. For instance, Georgi Arbatov, commenting on President Reagan's May 8, 1985 Strasbourg speech, stated that "We might welcome some of the steps the president mentioned in the context of a certain policy. But that is not the case. Even if you have ten hot lines in a dangerous situation, it still would not be productive. It is the policy that is the problem."<sup>26</sup> Of course, the 1984 Hotline upgrade and the CDE took place in a period of poor U.S.-Soviet relations, the Hotline has been used in periods of both "fair" and "foul" weather, and it is unlikely that the Soviets would accept *in toto*, say, the NATO CSBM package had it been proposed at the height of "détente" during the Nixon administration. It should, nevertheless, be expected that CBM negotiations cannot advance very far without concurrent progress in arms reductions and the overall bilateral relationship.

Although the Soviets tend to regard certain Western attempts at "transparency" as espionage, there do exist particular CBM areas that are of mutual superpower interest and where progress can be expected. Soviet statements indicate that their priorities include containing the third-party nuclear danger, managing regional crises, and improving crisis consultation. While differences exist between U.S. and Soviet CBM attitudes, it is probably reasonably safe to concur with William Ury's judgement that "the Soviets will engage in crisis control and prevention, not just passively but actively, when it serves their interest to do so."<sup>27</sup> At the same time, it must be reiterated that it is not the West which has created some of the problems to which CBMs are addressed — to wit, surprise attack in Europe — and thus in some cases CBMs are an attempt to reverse the effects of deliberate Soviet policy courses.

## X. QUALIFYING OBSERVATIONS

In attempting to offer some preliminary thoughts on the future of CBMs, a number of qualifying observations must be borne in mind. First, thresholds will always exist for what sovereign states are willing

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26. "After Probing, American-Soviet Relations Appear to Be Poor," *International Herald Tribune*, 15-16 June 1985, p. 2.

27. *Beyond the Hotline: How We Can Prevent the Crisis that Might Bring On a Nuclear War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), p. 135.

to undertake for the sake of confidence-building in an uncertain world. No state will allow ubiquitous on-site inspection, nor can CBMs be allowed to pose the risk of paralyzing necessary action in ambiguous situations. For example, although the trade-offs between offensive and defensive "flexibility" are unclear, CBMs cannot be permitted to serve as a "sticky or frozen safety catch," for "If controls are so cumbersome that an opponent concludes that nuclear [or conventional] weapons would never be used, the weapons lose their deterrent effect."<sup>28</sup> Among other things, such concerns suggest that CBMs should proceed on an incremental basis, beginning with modest but useful information exchange measures prior to tackling the more tricky area of operational constraints.

Second, the risk will always persist that CBMs will be deliberately abused for deception. Notification measures are particularly prone to dissimulation, such as announcing as "routine" maneuvers which are in reality preparations for an offensive — as was the case with the 1939 German invasion of Poland and the 1968 Soviet intervention of Czechoslovakia, and what might have been the case in 1980 with Soviet activities around Poland. Advance notification of "maneuvers," in short, could amount to a clandestine declaration of war. Moreover, because of advanced imagery, electronic, and other intelligence assets, it is likely that a surprise attack will be accompanied by a widespread deception plan. One side about to attack may wish to create the impression that its actions are purely defensive, and that the crisis will subside if only cool heads prevail on the other side. As Douglas Hart observes regarding possible Soviet offensive preparations, "it is [vital] that NATO leaders realize what type of crisis they are in. Soviet steps to defuse a 1914-type scenario by maintaining low alert levels for key military forces would be exactly the effect a deception planner would want to create *vis-à-vis* NATO prior to a sudden attack."<sup>29</sup> And, as Richard Betts cautions, "Justified confidence in the excellence of early warning intelligence . . . means that leaders may be less sensitive to what they do *not* know about enemy capabilities; hence they may be more vulnerable to successful measures of deception and concealment than were earlier leaders who recognized that limited monitoring capabilities had left them with blind spots."<sup>30</sup> Therefore, comprehensiveness and verifiability are two critical conditions for a militarily significant CBM regime; otherwise, CBMs

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28. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Graham T. Allison, and Albert Carnesale, "Analytic Conclusions: Hawks, Doves, and Owls," in *Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War*, eds. Allison, Carnesale, and Nye (New York: Norton, 1985), pp. 213-14.

29. "Soviet Approaches to Crisis Management: The Military Dimension," *Survival*, 26 (September-October 1984):218.

30. *Surprise Attack* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 9.

pose the risk of contributing to the "noise" of warning that they are supposed to clarify.

Third, CBMs do not avoid the thorny problem of verification that has historically hampered arms control. Even if the Soviets were to consent to intrusive inspection regimes, ostensibly militarily useful CBMs may prove unverifiable, and, consequently, their adoption would prove worse than no CBMs at all. For example, while advance notification of major out-of-garrison activities does not pose an insurmountable verification problem if the unit of account is set at a division or other unit threshold, a constraint proposal to ban ASW activity in SSBN sanctuaries is another matter. Passive and active ASW equipment can be placed on commercial vessels and aircraft (*e.g.*, Soviet "fishing trawlers" that patrol the U.S. coastline are equipped to sabotage U.S. ASW installations) and on space-based systems (*e.g.*, blue-green lasers, infrared and microwave radiometers, and synthetic aperture radar). A ban on the forward-basing of SSBNs would also confront formidable verification difficulties. Cooperative measures revealing the location of SSBNs, for example, would nullify the principal advantage of the sea-based deterrent, that is, survivability via undetectability.

Fourth, although CBMs can prove critical for preventing and containing crises, crisis prevention and management — except for truly inadvertent events such as accidents — are ultimately political questions. CBMs can play a crucial but not an exhaustive role in managing superpower relations, as is the case with any form of arms control. Clarifying military intentions does not equate with forging political consensus between the superpowers on the permissible exercises of power.

Finally it must be kept in mind that CBMs do not affect ultimate military capability. The solution to the vulnerability of Minuteman missiles, for example, will hardly be found in advance notification of ICBM launches. As with any type of arms control, CBMs cannot substitute for prudent force planning.

To dismiss CBMs relative to arms reductions, moreover, overlooks the fact that not only have attempts at securing equitable quantitative and qualitative force limitations proved discouraging, and are likely to remain so indefinitely, but that such limits may not necessarily prove militarily meaningful or sufficient to bolster deterrence in the sense of promoting crisis stability. For instance, deep reductions to balanced levels in nuclear arsenals might not necessarily enhance stability: few weapons, even if intended as a step towards general and complete disarmament, might tempt surprise attack or make accidental nuclear war more likely if vulnerability is not appreciably reduced by lower force levels (for there is no logical connection between survivability and force quantity). The

initial U.S. START proposal, for instance, which called for reducing each side's ballistic missile warheads by one third and ballistic missiles by one half to equal levels, was roundly criticized for increasing the warhead-to-target ratio and thereby making a first strike a theoretically more attractive option. As Richard Betts points out, "The peacetime military balance is an irrelevant indicator of defense capability [and a limited yardstick for arms control] if surprise radically alters the balance at the outset of war."<sup>31</sup>

This is not to say that efforts to secure balanced force levels are irrelevant. Obviously, if both sides maintain secure retaliatory forces, the risks of surprise attack and of miscalculation leading to nuclear exchange are diminished. The point is, however, that arms reduction negotiations are unlikely by themselves to achieve a safer equilibrium, and that additional steps will be required to promote stability. As James Goodby observes:

[CBMs] are risk-reduction, not arms-reduction techniques. They specifically do not deal directly with the growing numbers of nuclear weapons, and cannot be considered a substitute for efforts to reduce that danger.

But neither do arms-reduction proposals themselves address some of the most likely proximate causes of war — misperceptions or miscalculations about certain kinds of military operations which might be seen as imminent threats and which might, particularly in a deep crisis, evoke a response on that assumption. The possibility of such incidents, as much as the existence of nuclear weapons, holds the potential for confrontation and for armed conflict. In fact, it would be incongruous to work towards the elimination of nuclear weapons . . . and not work to eliminate the proximate origins of a conventional conflict which could well be a prelude to nuclear war.<sup>32</sup>

## XI. CONCLUSION

The salience of CBMs is likely to grow in the foreseeable future in a wide spectrum of possibilities for land, air, naval, and space application encompassing nuclear, conventional, and exotic weaponry. If arms control

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31. *Surprise Attack*, p. 4.

32. Address by Ambassador James E. Goodby, Head of U.S. Delegation to the Stockholm CDE Conference, to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Los Angeles, 30 May 1985, p. 3. (Available from U.S. Information Service.)

has a future, certainly CBMs can be expected to play an integral role in the years ahead for at least three fundamental reasons.

First, given the likelihood that potential geopolitical flashpoints and Soviet power projection capability will increase, CBMs can aid in managing the risks of war arising both among regional actors and between the superpowers. The Stockholm Conference could provide a model for extra-European application in this regard in, for example, the Latin American and Middle Eastern contexts.

Second, CBMs can provide a valuable complement to nuclear non-proliferation efforts by reducing the dangers inherent in the diffusion of nuclear technology, whether these concerns manifest themselves in the form of U.S.-Soviet risk reduction centers or in other consultative or cooperative arrangements.

Third, regardless of whether force levels are reduced and stabilized in the future, CBMs will be required to deal with some of the enduring root causes of and paths to war that may be aggravated in the years ahead. As Alton Frye has eloquently framed the challenge: "We have invented our way into unprecedented insecurity through technological innovation. We must invent our way out of it through political innovation. In that endeavor confidence-building measures are likely to prove indispensable tools."<sup>33</sup>

Therefore, in the final analysis, CBMs do not offer a panacea for the current plague upon arms control. They cannot replace efforts to restrict ultimate military capability, to avert destabilizing force postures that tempt preemption, and to promote political accommodation. CBMs do offer the possibility of reducing the risks of confrontation, and opportunities for strengthening and expanding existing CBM foundations exist in abundance. With the requisite political will and analytical creativity, CBMs hold the prospect for a reinvigoration of the arms control process by providing militarily significant and indispensable complements to other means of enhancing security. While the Herculean task of reducing nuclear and other forces to the lowest levels consistent with stable deterrence must persevere, it is also imperative that effective rules of the road be emplaced in an era of deepening uncertainty about the nature of deterrence in the twenty-first century. CBMs may represent a promising alternative to the discouragement of past arms control efforts.

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33. "Building Confidence Between Adversaries: An American's Perspective," in *Confidence Building and East-West Relations*, ed. Karl E. Birnbaum, p. 44.

