A Critique of the 'As-If' Approach to Machine Ethics
You, Jun Kyung
2021
- In this paper, I argue that the replication of the effect of ethical decision-making is insufficient for achieving functional morality in artificial moral agents (AMAs). This approach is named the “as-if” approach to machine ethics. I object to this approach on the grounds that the “as if” approach requires one to commit to substantive metaethical claims about morality that are at least unwarranted, ... read moreand perhaps even wrong. To defend this claim, this paper does three things: 1. I explain Heidegger’s Enframing [Gestell] and my notion of “Ready-Ethics,” which, in combination, can hopefully provide a plausible account for the motivation behind the “as if” approach; 2. I go over specific examples of Ethical AI projects to show how the “as if” approach commits these projects to versions of moral generalism and moral naturalism. I then explain the flaws of the views that the “as if” approach necessitates, and suggest that they cannot account for the justificatory process crucial to human moral life. I explain how Habermas’ account of the justificatory process could cast doubt on the picture of morality that the metaethical views of the “as if” approach proposes; 3. Finally, I defend the relevance of discussing these topics for the purpose of functional morality in AMAs.read less
- You, J.K. A critique of the ‘as–if’ approach to machine ethics. AI Ethics 1, 545–552 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-021-00070-3
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- st74d531t
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- DOI:
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-021-00070-3
