Submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Abstract: Under the current enforcement mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO), small countries are not able to implement effective retaliatory measures. Given their insignificant effect on world trade, the suspension of concessions ends up causing harmful effects ... read moreto their welfare. As a result, small countries lack bargaining power and are not able to force their larger partners to respect their rights under the WTO system. The following paper explore the possibility to implement cross-retaliation, --specifically the suspension of commitments under the TRIPs agreement-- in favor of small countries to overcome ineffectiveness of their retaliatory measures and increase their bargaining power in trade negotiations. The paper includes a legal analysis and illustrates the economic implications of the alternative measure by using the case of the Banana Regime: Ecuador against the European Union.read less
