In the Shadow of the Umbrella: U.S. Extended Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation in East Asia, 1961-1979
Ladha, Rizwan.
2017
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Abstract: To the extent that such they serve as effective nonproliferation
tools, security guarantees are designed to put the junior ally's mind at ease about its own
survival, since that is now ensured by its senior ally. Overall, such security guarantees
have been remarkably useful in mitigating undesirable junior-ally behaviors and thus
preventing proliferation. However, three important ... read morecases defy both historical trends and
the dominant theories: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, each of which, despite having a
bilateral security guarantee from the United States during the Cold War, went down the
nuclear weapons path to some degree. Relying on an exhaustive examination of declassified
U.S. archival records and utilizing qualitative process-tracing, within-case analysis, and
cross-case comparison techniques, this dissertation seeks to understand what compelled
these three states to venture down the nuclear weapons path, despite being under the
protective wing of the United States. In the case of Japan, a deep-seated fear that the
United States would abandon Japan upon the anticipated expiration of the Mutual Security
Treaty in 1970, and a resurgent nationalism that invigorated a national debate on how to
increase Japan's prestige in international politics, combined to compel the Japanese to
conduct nuclear weapons feasibility studies in the late 1960s and then leak these studies
to their American counterparts, in order to secure an extension of the Mutual Security
Treaty. In the case of South Korea, a fear that the United States would fulfill its promise
to remove all U.S. troops and nuclear weapons stationed on the Korean peninsula motivated
Park Chung-hee to first seek a nuclear weapons arsenal and, after his efforts were
discovered, then to seek a latent capability. Finally, in the case of Taiwan, the efforts
of the United States to normalize relations with China and recognize Beijing, rather than
Taipei, as the representative government of all of China incentivized Chiang Kai-shek and
Chiang Ching-kuo to seek a latent capability rather than a functional arsenal, in order to
avoid losing U.S. support altogether. At a broader level, this research finds that,
consistent with more recent scholarship on alliance dynamics, junior allies can often wield
outsized bargaining leverage vis-à-vis their patrons, often exploiting their senior allies'
worst fears in order to advance their own self-interests. Specifically, one of the
cornerstones of U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II has been advancing the
nonproliferation imperative, and U.S. allies can, under the right circumstances, win
concessions from Washington by playing on its fear of horizontal proliferation. Finally,
this research finds that, where a senior ally may hope to employ the security guarantee as
a nonproliferation tool in the present day or in the future, there are key steps it can
take to maximize its chances of success. Likewise, for a junior, non-nuclear-armed state
seeking to maximize its security and ensure its survival, there are certain actions it can
take with respect to its senior ally in order to achieve these self-driven
interests.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Tufts University, 2017.
Submitted to the Dept. of Diplomacy, History, and Politics.
Advisor: Antonia Chayes.
Committee: Ian Johnstone, and Vipin Narang.
Keywords: International relations, Political science, and History.read less - ID:
- kk91fz37h
- Component ID:
- tufts:22752
- To Cite:
- TARC Citation Guide EndNote
