Abstract: What explains the causal mechanisms that underlie variations in governments' domestic policy behavior towards contentious collective action? Specifically, why certain governments choose violent repression as crisis strategy while others adopt both bargaining and comparatively low repression in reaching a political compromise to mobilized mass opposition? This r... read moreesearch advances the proposition that non-democratic government crisis response is a function of its consolidation (level of autocracy), which is closely associated with its domestic costs of state-sponsored repression. The more autocratic the regime, the lower its domestic costs for employing repressive measures against oppositionists, and this information enters into the government authority's decision making calculus on the onset of dissident collective actions. Highly autocratic governments are expected to repress dissent violently than engage in accommodative strategies, and therefore, they are more likely to either crush the uprisings or, if public protests persists despite the violent coercion, it would potentially escalate the conflict. Domestic costs, then, places decisional opportunities -and constraints- to autocratic policymakers. Domestic crises hardly stay domestic in this globalized world and hence governments are not immune from international costs that influence crisis management as they unfold. However, domestic costs are expected to play the dominant role at the outset of non-institutional collective contention.
At the request of the author, this graduate work is not available to view in the Tufts Digital Library until July 22, 2018.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Tufts University, 2016.
Submitted to the Dept. of Diplomacy, History, and Politics.
Advisor: Richard Shultz.
Committee: Andrew Hess, and Stephen Wright.
Keywords: International relations, and Middle Eastern studies.read less