Social Networks as Contract Enforcement: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field.

Chandrasekhar, Arun G.

Kinnan, Cynthia.

Larreguy Arbesú, Horacio Alejandro.

2018

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  • Lack of well-functioning formal institutions leads to reliance on social networks to enforce informal contracts. Social proximity and network centrality may affect cooperation. To assess the extent to which networks substitute for enforcement, we conducted high-stakes games across 34 Indian villages. We randomized subjects' partners and whether contracts were enforced to estimate how partners' ... read more
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  • Chandrasekhar, Arun G., Cynthia Kinnan, and Horacio Larreguy. 2018. "Social Networks as Contract Enforcement: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 10 (4): 43-78. DOI: 10.1257/app.20150057.
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