%0 PDF %T Back Channel Diplomacy: The Strategic Use of Multiple Channels of Negotiation in Middle East Peacemaking %A Wanis-St.John, Anthony %8 2005-11-22 %I Tufts Archival Research Center %R http://localhost/files/6q182x57x %X Submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Abstract: Back channel diplomacy (BCD) refers to official negotiations conducted in secret among the parties to a dispute or even between a party and a third party intervenor, which complement front channels, and are potentially at variance with declared policies. Aspects of secrecy in negotiation have been the subject of descriptive and prescriptive literature. Research specifically focused on the strategic interaction of multiple channels of international negotiation-front and back channels-did not exist. In this study, the cases of Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations from 1991 to 1998 are rigorously analyzed according to a theoretical framework designed to understand what BCD is, and how it works. This helps us understand why decisionmakers choose to use it. The framework looks at the treatment of the issues negotiated, the role of secrecy, the exclusion of subparties that results from secrecy, the role of third party intervenors, the proximity of decisionmakers to the negotiators, and the strategic interaction of multiple channels (front and back). The overarching condition is that of incrementalist peace negotiations, which proceed from early agreements on principles, to interim accords and finally to a permanent settlement.Decision makers use BCD to mitigate a set of uncertainties that affect many negotiations, but which particularly salient for negotiations in violent international conflicts. The uncertainties regard the i) cost of entry into negotiations, ii) effect of spoilers in the peace process, iii) the lack of information on other parties, interests and preferences that is needed to make the decision to negotiate, and iv) impact of negotiation outcome on the decisionmakers. In helping to manage these uncertainties, BCD is associated with the achievement of early breakthrough agreements where front channels fail. However, under the condition of the incrementalist peace process requiring progressively more difficult implementation, BCD's inherent qualities of secrecy and the consequent exclusion turn problematic. The ability of decisionmakers to conclude accords before spoilers can mobilize against them is progressively diminished, until BCD no longer helps the parties reach agreement, but becomes a substitute for good faith negotiation and ultimately, yields negative returns. The potential exists for renewal of violent conflict. %G eng %[ 2022-10-14 %9 text %~ Tufts Digital Library %W Institution