Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision.

Gee, Laura Katherine.

Andreoni, James.

2012.

Description
  • This paper compares two methods to encourage socially optimal provision of a public good. We compare the efficacy of vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the "hired gun" mechanism, to deter free riding and improve group welfare. Small self-governing organizations often place enforcement in the hands of an appointed leader—the depart... read more
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  • Andreoni, James, and Laura K. Gee. "Gun for Hire: Delegated Enforcement and Peer Punishment in Public Goods Provision." Journal of Public Economics 96, no. 11-12 (December 2012): 1036-1046. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.003.
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3j333d40w
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