Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision.Gee, Laura Katherine.
This paper compares two methods to encourage socially optimal provision of a public good. We compare the efficacy of vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the "hired gun" mechanism, to deter free riding and improve group welfare. Small self-governing organizations often place enforcement in the hands of an appointed leader—the depart... read more
- Public goods.
- Free rider problem (Economics)
- Tufts University. Department of Economics.
- Permanent URL
- Original publication
- Andreoni, James, and Laura K. Gee. "Gun for Hire: Delegated Enforcement and Peer Punishment in Public Goods Provision." Journal of Public Economics 96, no. 11-12 (December 2012): 1036-1046. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.003.