Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision.

Gee, Laura Katherine.
Andreoni, James.

This paper compares two methods to encourage socially optimal provision of a public good. We compare the efficacy of vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the "hired gun" mechanism, to deter free riding and improve group welfare. Small self-governing organizations often place enforcement in the hands of an appointed leader—the depart... read more

Public goods.
Free rider problem (Economics)
Tufts University. Department of Economics.
Permanent URL
Original publication
Andreoni, James, and Laura K. Gee. "Gun for Hire: Delegated Enforcement and Peer Punishment in Public Goods Provision." Journal of Public Economics 96, no. 11-12 (December 2012): 1036-1046. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.003.
ID: tufts:22282
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