Gunning for efficiency with third party enforcement in threshold public goods.

Gee, Laura Katherine.
Andreoni, James.
2014.

When public goods can only be provided when donations cross a minimum threshold, this creates an advantage in that Pareto Efficient outcomes can be Nash Equilibria. Despite this, experiments have shown that groups struggle to coordinate on one of the many efficient equilibria. We apply a mechanism used successfully in continuous public goods games, the Hired Gun Mechanism (Andreoni and Gee in J. P... read more

Subjects
Public goods.
Punishment.
Free rider problem (Economics)
Tufts University. Department of Economics.
Permanent URL
http://hdl.handle.net/10427/012384
Original publication
Andreoni, James, and Laura K. Gee. "Gunning for Efficiency with Third Party Enforcement in Threshold Public Goods." Experimental Economics 18, no. 1 (January 29, 2014): 154-171. doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9392-1.
ID: tufts:22281
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