Who may I say is calling?

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The other day I was reading a rough draft of a paper when I came to an underlined section of the text. Now (in my mind’s ear) the author’s familiar voice changed, giving careful emphasis to this passage. Strangely, the point was not particularly illuminating but the underlining continued on and on, and I soon realized that this was surely the result of a print command error. Only the first sentence should have been italicized. But even seeing this (and much against my will), his voice continued—emphasis added—and in a rising, near-manic pitch—on to the end of the page. Here was the voice of the ignored academic shouting into the intellectual void.

A. Tenlake, personal correspondence

For the normal subject, the phenomena of “talking to oneself” are indeed a wide variety of complex events. Above, the auditory image “heard” by the subject occurs in the course of a difficult cognitive task, matches the perceptions of another speaker’s voice, and (irritatingly) does not seem subject to voluntary extinction. But it is no hallucination. The elegance of Hoffman’s suggestion is that, amidst the jumble of strange but non-pathological phenomena, he offers a unitary explanation of several sorts of schizophrenic hallucinations and behavior. These pathologies can be blamed on a single sort of malfunction relatively deep within the organization of the cognitive system—an action–production disorder that is magnified into a cognitive illusion by the default assumptions of normal perception. Alas, such unity also proves the theory’s undoing, for in order to say exactly where and how this disorder occurs, Hoffman must locate it within an elaborate and detailed story about all the normal phenomena, too tall an order at this time. Hoffman’s sketchy story leaves enticing loose ends to lure our attention. What is Hoffman’s understanding of “presupposition,” “abstract representation,” the difference between involuntary and unintended acts, accessible versus inaccessible goals? Instead of yielding to temptation, however, we choose to concentrate on what we take to be the central (good) idea of the paper and a relatively minor, simplifying variation on it that might save Hoffman from many of these perplexities, at least for the time being.

Hoffman’s account is threatened by (inter alia) an infinite regress: If we identify “slips of the tongue” as misexecutions of communicative intentions, relative to what could there be “slips of thought”? Wittgenstein (1982) thought that “slips of thought” were impossible because a mistake presupposes an intention. Although we can intend to reach a particular (cognitive) conclusion—say, discovering a new way to drive from home to office—we cannot intend each of the individual thoughts that constitute our attempted derivation or discovery, on pain of generating a never-beginning regress of ulterior intentions to form thoughts. Some thoughts must just “come to mind,” however apt, well-ordered, and useful they prove to be in the larger project.

If what Hoffman offers us is in effect the sketch of a theory of slips of thought, he takes on the burden of straightening out all these problems about goals and their relations to intentions, and the question of when, if ever, our thoughts are intended. All this is worth doing, but an easier path is missed when he dismisses the suggestion that verbal imagery (as distinct from “thoughts”) is always the execution or misexecution of communicative intentions: intentions to communicate with oneself. “Goals concurrent with verbal imagery do not seem to be communication goals (unless we must for some reason communicate with ourselves); instead they are . . . frequently referable to manifest tasks and problem solving” (sect. 4, para. 13). There is in fact a lot to be said for the hypothesis that much of what is called thinking is a sort of verbal communicating to oneself or, more provocatively, a form of communicating within oneself. Rather than argue for this view here, we will just point out that the assumption that all “verbal thought” has an internal communicative function allows a simplification of Hoffman’s view, to wit:

When normal people have verbal imagery, they form (self-)communicative goals, which yield speech-act planning, which yields inwardly directed speech, and this speech is thereupon recognized as intended or at least not unintended in virtue of its lack of dissonance with those very communicative goals. The result: the familiar phenomenology of “talking to oneself.” In particular, it is quite possible to make middle-level production errors—of word choice, for instance—and recognize and correct them. (Can one “mispronounce” a word in verbal thought? Yes—think of reading the surnames in Russian novels.) When schizophrenics attempt to engage in this familiar practice, they form (self-)communicative goals, which yield disrupted speech-act planning (or perhaps performance), which yields inwardly directed speech that is dissonant or discordant; it fails to execute well the communicative goals just set. And if the discrepancy involves a high-level communicative goal, the verbal imagery is perceived as unintended-by-me, and subsequently as “other-produced.” Although Hoffman does not say this, one way to think of this “inference to otherness” is as follows. Because the discordance is so gross, it cannot be
interpreted away as an accident or a slip, a low-level malfunction such as a mispronunciation or a spoonerism. Indeed, because the images are voices, they are interpreted as speech acts; they are irresistibly interpreted as intended. And if I don't intend to say these things, then someone else must. The result: one "hears voices." (Compare: If I discover my hand drumming on the table, it is easy enough to interpret as mere fiddling—a nervous habit: if I discover my hand signing a contract or writing a death threat, I cannot interpret that as a mere verbal slip, but as some speech act or other gone awry.)

Postulating (only) self-communicative goals enables one to circumvent an infinite regress while eliminating some puzzling aspects of the original theory (Do dreams really occur in goalless states? Is the general nature of thought goal-directed?). Still, the above suggestions are made with trepidation; they can be regarded as just one more speculative gesture toward a complex story that Hoffman has begun trying to tell.